

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 20 August 1985, at 10 30 a.m.

President: Mr. Mario A. Cámpora (Argentina)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. BELAID

Argentina:

Mr. M.A. CAMPORA

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Mr. G. PARINI

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER

Mr. R. ROWE

Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. J. RAEYMAECKERS

Mr. Ph. NIEUWENHUYIS

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. R. DEYANOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

M MYA THAN

U HLA MYINT

Canada:

Mr. A. BEESLEY

Mr. A. DESPRES

Mr. E. MORRIS

Mr. M. GWOZDECKY

Mr. R.G. SUTHERLAND

China:

Ms. WANG ZMIYUN

Mr. LIU ZHONGREN

Mr. XIA YISHAN

Mr. YU ZHONGZHOU

Mr. JIANG ZHENXI

Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG

Mr. LI BENSONG

Cuba:

Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. M. BADR

Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. JESSEL

Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE

Mr. W. KRUTZSCH

Mr. L. MUELLER

Mr. F. SAYATZ

Mr. A. BRIE

Mr. D. FELSKÉ

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. W. GERMANN

Hungary:

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO

Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO

Mr. F. QASIM

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. A. SHAFII

Italy:

Mr. F. PIAGESSE

Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI

Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan:

Mr. M. KONISHI

Kenya:

Mr. P.N. MWAURA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. S.O. BOLD
Mr. GONGOR

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. VAN SCHAİK
Mr. J. RAMAKER
Mr. R. MILDERS

Nigeria:

Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. J. GONZALES TERRONES

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI
Mr. J. RYCHLAK
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. A. POPESCU
Mr. S. POP

Sri Lanka:

Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS
Mr. L.E. WINGREN
Ms. E. BONNIER
Mr. H. BERGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. R. TIMERBAEV
Mr. G.V. ANTSEFEROV
Mr. V.A. LEPLINSKY

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.J.S. EDIS
Mr. I.P. CHALMERS
Mr. J.F. GORDON
Mr. K.I. MALIN
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWITZ
Mr. R. DORN
Mr. P. CORDEN
Mr. J. GRANGER
Mr. A. LIEBOWITZ
Mr. J. ENGELHARDT
Mr. T. SNITCH
Ms. M. WINSTON
Ms. STESTSON-MANNIX

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O.N. MONSCHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 331st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference today continues the consideration of the reports of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies; organizational questions; and the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any matter relating to the work of the Conference.

The list of speakers for today includes the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Sweden, New Zealand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the German Democratic Republic, the United Kingdom and Australia.

I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, your arrival in Geneva coincided with your country's obligation to assume the important function of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We have therefore the pleasant duty of welcoming you both as a new representative of Argentina and as the President of the Conference. I am convinced that we shall have the same friendly co-operation I entertained with your predecessor, Ambassador Carasales. The way you discharge your presidency demonstrates that you have already mastered the problems this body is dealing with and that we may fully rely on your guidance in the concluding days of this year's session.

On the other hand, it is with sorrow that we bid farewell to Ambassador U Maung Maung Gyi of Burma, Ambassador Dubey of India and Ambassador Alessi of Italy. I gained much from working with them and I wish them luck in their new assignments.

Just a couple of days separate us from the conclusion of the 1985 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Reports of the subsidiary bodies have already been written and the final shape of the overall report of the Conference is emerging. Will it contain something new, will it reflect some positive developments, or will it be just one out of a number of reports recording nothing more than a lack of progress on disarmament?

Frankly speaking, we can't but admit that even this year our Conference did not achieve what is expected from it. A reader of our report will find that it says nothing about the Conference's effectively addressing priority problems of nuclear disarmament. He will probably ask himself a question: how can it be that a multilateral disarmament conference did not establish subsidiary bodies on a nuclear test ban, on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of nuclear war? And this question will be fully justified. But who's going to offer a credible answer? The vast majority of delegations around this table are ready to negotiate on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and they even agreed, during the Conference's two sessions, to address the questions of verification and compliance with such a ban in the ad hoc working group. Where, then, is the real cause of the lack of progress? It is possible to speak at length on national security interests, offer a distorted order of priorities, but no credible answer to the above question can be given. To some extent this can be explained: why does one need a nuclear test ban if he continues, in parallel with the designs for strategic space defence,

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

to substantially improve and increase strategic offensive potential? But this explanation is not given by those who should do so in the first place. They know only too well that it would, to put it mildly, not be met with understanding.

We consider that the achievement of a nuclear-test ban would be an important and, certainly, not overly difficult, positive step creating a favourable atmosphere for further negotiations on nuclear disarmament. But we have to stop talking about why it can't be agreed upon and, instead, search for ways how it must be achieved. Recently, a very good example was offered in this respect. The declaration by the Soviet Union of a unilateral moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests is a step which, if followed by the United States of America, could become a starting point on the way towards the NTB. This view is widely shared, as is shown by international reaction to the Soviet proposal. Attempts to speculate on the motives behind this move and to denigrate it show that the other side is not ready to face its own responsibility in this regard. As was stated by Mikhail Gorbachev on 13 August, the United States had, so far, carried out more nuclear explosions than the Soviet Union and a roughly equal number of tests in the course of this year prior to the declaration of the moratorium. In view of the moratorium, the Soviet test programme had to be interrupted. All suggestions that the United States has to go on with nuclear tests since their cessation would fix an alleged Soviet advantage are simply unfounded. It is, moreover, absolutely clear that the moratorium is not meant as a substitution for the final solution of the problem of nuclear-weapon testing, which will be, as was stressed by Mikhail Gorbachev, an international agreement containing, besides relevant obligations, also an international system of both national and international verification provisions. But the moratorium would, undoubtedly, contribute to the achievement of this final goal, especially if it were reciprocated and extended beyond 1 January on the basis of mutuality, as is proposed by the Soviet Union. My delegation is encouraged by the positive response of a number of delegations in this room to this important initiative. This reaction is only natural, since one cannot call sincerely for a nuclear-test ban and, at the same time, ignore unilateral steps of such magnitude.

I have also some comments to make on the work of the group of seismic experts and on its experiment last year on the transmission of seismic data through the channels of the World Meteorological Organization. We have definite ideas on how the system for the exchange of seismic data should serve the purposes of the future test ban. But it seems preferable to put aside these comments for a while and to revert to them when we are in a position to consider verification aspects in conjunction with other basic provisions of the treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Our Conference has never been able to establish a working organ on the prevention of nuclear war, despite the fact that a number of specific proposals have been submitted on this item. International public opinion is calling for action to prevent nuclear conflagration, which would, undoubtedly, escalate into a global conflict. A couple of months ago a symposium entitled "Survival in the nuclear age" was held in New York under the chairmanship of Mr. Willy Brandt.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

This symposium joined Mr. Brandt in the call he had made upon the major nuclear Powers to agree "on rules which make World War III impossible". The following measures are considered to be most urgently required:

An agreement to prevent the militarization of, and the extension of the arms race to outer space;

The immediate cessation of all tests of nuclear weapons and the prompt conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty;

A mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems;

The making by those nuclear-weapon States that have not done so of a declaration not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Needless to say, Mr. President, my delegation fully subscribes to these requirements. We continue to hope that the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations will bring some positive results. We support all efforts, whether bilateral or multilateral, aimed at prevention of nuclear war and at nuclear disarmament. We definitely do not consider that the Conference, where all nuclear-weapon States are represented, should content itself with simply putting these items on its agenda.

I would like to note with satisfaction, albeit very modest satisfaction, that when our annual report comes to the United Nations this autumn a careful and patient reader will find also some positive aspects. These relate mainly to our work under agenda items on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and on chemical weapons.

The mere fact of the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space reflects growing concern at the threat of the spread of the arms race to outer space, which would have serious political, military, economic and other consequences. The militarization of outer space would inevitably entail destabilization of the strategic situation, an increased threat of the outbreak of nuclear war, speeding-up of the arms race in all areas and growth of nuclear arsenals, and undermining of existing treaties and of the prospects for arms limitation and reduction. It would also hamper peaceful uses of outer space and create obstacles for international co-operation in this sphere.

The Ad Hoc Committee, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, succeeded in adopting a practical and useful work programme, enabling it to discharge its mandate. Issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space were considered, as well as existing agreements related thereto. A look at the existing treaties confirmed that it is prohibited to carry out any nuclear explosions and to deploy nuclear weapons or any other type of weapons of mass destruction in space, that it is prohibited to establish military bases, installations and fortifications, to test any type of weapon and to conduct military manouvres on celestial bodies. It is furthermore forbidden to develop, test or deploy space-based ABM systems or components. At the same time it was noted that the possibility of the deployment in space of weapons that are not weapons of mass destruction has not been closed off. And this is the channel which might be used for the deployment of offensive space weapons.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space were also considered. In this context the relevant Soviet proposals of 1981, 1983 and 1984 were widely referred to. A number of delegations approached this part of the programme constructively and submitted their own proposals. Let me mention, for example, the Swedish working paper of 1 August, which brings into focus a number of ideas. My delegation could support many of them, though some further clarification would be necessary. We welcome first of all the spirit of such an approach, oriented towards negotiating new, specific measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. However, there were also delegations which, in our opinion, didn't choose the best way to consider existing proposals. The Outer Space Committee is not the proper place for a bold, unsubstantiated refusal, especially if no counter proposals are offered.

One of the conclusions we draw from the work done this year is that the United States plans for strategic defence based in outer space are incompatible with the efforts to prevent the militarization of outer space. This project would result in the development and deployment in space of a new class of armament -- offensive space weapons. This, in turn, could in the long run undermine all efforts aimed at the prevention of the militarization of outer space. As far as the future activity of the Ad Hoc Committee is concerned, we maintain that it should move, as soon as possible, towards practical work on negotiating new specific agreements on outer space. We attach great importance to the fact that there are no offensive space weapons at present. This is also our great opportunity, which must not be lost. Once these weapons are introduced into outer space, the task of removing them from there would be incomparably more difficult than the one we are facing now.

We have just learned from the Press about the new initiative of the USSR for the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly for the prevention of the militarization of outer space. We heartily welcome it and believe that it will play an important role in further endeavours to reach that goal.

My delegation, together with a large number of other delegations, has been constantly calling on the Conference to start drafting a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. We proceeded from the presumption that while differences in the approach towards some aspects of the future convention persisted common texts on less controversial parts could be helpful. But it was impossible to elaborate such texts in the past. Finally, this year, the Ad Hoc Committee on chemical weapons, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, made a first step in this direction. Reports of the three working groups, though with some brackets and footnotes, represent a sort of common, integral text, which more clearly than the previous texts reflect the achieved level of consensus. Let me therefore congratulate Ambassador Turbanski on this positive result of his Committee. Naturally, our thanks go to all the three chairmen of the Committee's working groups -- Comrade Poptchev, Mrs. Bonnier and Mr. Elbe, for their tireless effort.

The outcome of this year's work on chemical weapons is even more encouraging if one takes into account that the recent political decisions concerning chemical weapons did not improve conditions for such negotiations; quite the contrary. By adopting a decision to produce binary chemical weapons the United States made a first step on the way which may lead to substantially complicating negotiations on chemical weapons, if not undermining them completely. As if realizing this

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

threatening development, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons worked more effectively, directed its attention to substantive problems and was practically free of interminable squabbles over procedural questions, which in the past took up much of its time.

As we supposed, work on the texts brought about new interesting ideas which undoubtedly have the potential to ease the movement forward on some aspects. Thus, in Working Group A, a notion of a key component of binary chemical systems of chemical warfare was introduced and met with a basically positive response. The use of this notion enables us to label in a clear way basic components of binary and multicomponent chemical weapons. We proceed from the obvious fact that a key precursor is not a chemical weapon, whereas a key component can practically be considered such a weapon. For this reason a key component should be defined and considered differently from a precursor. We welcome the fact that the notion of key component has already been accepted as one of the instruments for the solution of the problem of the CW definitions and we believe that, though for the time being it is treated by some delegations through brackets, it should be further considered once the Ad Hoc Committee resumes its work.

While we assess positively this year's results of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we fully realize that we are still far from having achieved decisive progress in the elaboration of the convention. It is important that we do not lose the momentum gained this year. For this to be preserved, the co-operation of all is needed. Those who still consider starting a new round in the chemical arms race should realize that their plans are contrary to the willingness and readiness of the whole international community to get rid of chemical weapons.

Some positive moments marked also the activity of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons under the chairmanship of Ambassador Butler of Australia. We consider it positive that the Committee was working on the basis of texts. We note that more understanding was reached on definitions and the scope of the treaty. The socialist countries displayed a flexible approach towards the solution of the problems discussed within the Ad Hoc Committee. If such flexibility were shown by all participants in the Committee's work, the treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons could be concluded in the near future.

The work of the Ad Hoc Committees on the CPD, under the chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, and on negative security assurances, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan, has again confirmed that some nuclear-weapon States have a very peculiar approach towards the priorities in nuclear disarmament. The achievement of an NTB has been pushed too low on the list of urgent measures to be achieved and effective measures for the prevention of nuclear war, like, e.g. readiness not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, have not even found their place on the list so far.

The work of the two committees mentioned above is closely connected with priority items of nuclear disarmament. Unless some nuclear-weapon States modify their approach towards basic aspects of nuclear disarmament, the two committees won't move forward and, what is more, the Conference will be doomed to a vain quest for the solution of today's most urgent disarmament problems.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and his kind words to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): May I first cordially welcome you as President of the Conference for the month of August and pledge to you the full support and co-operation of my delegation.

I should also like to express the appreciation of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador Ould-Rouis of Algeria.

Allow me also to warmly welcome the head of the delegation of Belgium, Ambassador Raeymaeckers, to the Conference.

On 25 July I made a statement in this forum on the negotiations of a chemical weapons convention and on the difficulties in devising measures to be applied to the different chemicals involved. Today, I have asked for the floor to introduce a working paper containing the ideas presented in the statement of 25 July.

For the purpose of the Convention, the relevant chemicals have in CD/539 been divided into five categories, i.e. super-toxic lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals, key precursors including key components for binary and multicomponent chemical systems for chemical weapons, and precursors. This has proved to be a very useful categorization. However, attempts to apply one and the same set of measures to all relevant chemicals in each one of the five categories have failed.

There is now a growing recognition that the diversity within a category and the different purposes for which these chemicals are produced need to be taken into account when elaborating the measures to be applied, in order not to hamper the development of the peaceful chemical industry, while at the same time ensuring that chemicals are not produced for chemical-weapons purposes. There is also concern that one and the same chemical might be subject to qualitatively different measures depending on the purpose of its production and that this might create "loopholes" in the Convention. The time has therefore come to refine the concepts somewhat and to look for alternative ways of structuring the relationship between the categories of chemicals and the measures to be applied to them.

In the statement in July, my delegation suggested a comprehensive approach for dealing with all the chemicals relevant to the Convention. This alternative approach allows for bringing together chemicals from different categories under one and the same régime, as well as for applying different régimes to different chemicals within one and the same category. This could be achieved through a regrouping of the chemicals without in any way changing the definitions and the five categories already agreed upon.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Such a regrouping also opens the way for a comprehensive way of dealing with the chemicals, so that one and the same chemical would be subject to the same régime in all parts of the Convention (i.e., as regard declarations, elimination, permitted production and verification). The philosophy of the approach is simple. Based on existing definitions, the chemicals are arranged in three groups. For each group a régime for the declarations, elimination, production and verification is devised. Régime I is the most stringent and demanding one and applies to all Group I chemicals. Régime II is also stringent but somewhat less burdensome and applies to all the Group II chemicals. Régime III is the least stringent of the three and applies to the Group III chemicals.

A number of delegations have been in contact with my delegation to express their interest in and to discuss various aspects of this approach. In order to facilitate further study by delegations of the issues involved and to assist in the search for a possible solution of the problems encountered in the Committee, my delegation is today tabling a working paper, CD/632, outlining the suggested comprehensive approach. It is my hope that it will prove useful for the negotiations.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the **representative** of Sweden for his statement and for his kind words to the President.

In accordance with the decision adopted by the Conference at its 289th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Mr. Lineham.

Mr. LINEHAM (New Zealand): It is my delegation's great pleasure to see you, the representative of that great country Argentina, in the chair of this Conference. The Conference is indeed most fortunate to be served as well as it is by people of the calibre of yourself and your predecessor Ambassador Ould-Rouis. We are also grateful to the Conference for the opportunity to make a brief statement.

New Zealand has taken the floor today to mark the tabling in this Conference as document CD/633, of a new treaty in the area of disarmament and arms control. When he addressed the Conference on Disarmament in March this year, the Prime Minister of New Zealand referred to the efforts of countries in the South Pacific to establish a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and the principles on which their negotiations were based. Earlier this month, the Australian representative, Ambassador Butler, informed the Conference that countries members of the South Pacific Forum had, on 6 August, adopted the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. Today the text of that Treaty is being tabled jointly by New Zealand and Australia, along with the texts of its associated Protocols, which have not been finalized, pending consultations with the countries eligible to become party to them.

Mr. President, eight Heads of Government from Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Niue, Tuvalu and Western Samoa signed the Treaty in Rarotonga. The Treaty is open for signature by the other countries of the Forum when they have completed their normal constitutional procedures.

(Mr. Lineham, New Zealand)

When the adoption of the Treaty was announced in New Zealand, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. O'Flynn, made the following comments:

"It is fitting that the date today in Rarotonga is 6 August. Forty years ago on that date a nuclear device was first used as an instrument of war in Hiroshima, Japan. On that date in 1985 in Rarotonga, New Zealand has joined with its neighbours in an action that will signal to the world our joint resolve that nuclear weapons have no place in our region. This is a very significant decision in the history of co-operation in the South Pacific, and a tribute to the ability of the countries of the region to work together in their common interest".

Mr. O'Flynn made a special reference to co-operation with Australia in this respect.

He further said:

"The Treaty will go a long way to remove the spectre of the nuclear threat from the South Pacific. It establishes a zone — the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone — of vast dimension. It is only the second such zone to be established in a populated region of the world — the first being the Latin American zone created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The South Pacific Zone extends in the west from the west coast of Australia to the boundary of the Latin American zone in the east, from the Equator in the north to 60 degrees south, where the Antarctic Treaty already establishes a completely demilitarized zone covering the whole continent".

The Minister described the Treaty as containing a preamble, 16 articles and 4 annexes and added:

"Under its terms, the parties to the Treaty will pledge to each other not to possess, manufacture, or acquire nuclear explosive devices anywhere. They pledge to prevent the testing of nuclear explosive devices in their territory, and not to allow the stationing of nuclear explosive devices in their territory. They agree to take measures to prevent the diversion of fissionable material to non-peaceful purposes, and not to dump radioactive waste in the Zone. The Treaty does not in any way interfere with the right of each party to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields. Nor does it interfere with the freedom of navigation guaranteed by international law to such ships and aircraft.

"A comprehensive control system has been established to verify compliance with the Treaty, and there are mechanisms to investigate any complaints that may be made about such compliance. There is also provision for review, amendment and withdrawal, and for the boundaries of the Zone to be extended as further countries join the Forum.

(Mr. Lineham, New Zealand)

"In addition to the Treaty itself, there are three Protocols. The Forum has very sensibly deferred adopting them until they have been discussed by a Forum Working Group with the countries eligible to sign them. The first is open to the United States, France and the United Kingdom—the three metropolitan states with territory within the Zone—and invites them to apply the basic provisions of the Treaty to those territories. The second and third are open to those three countries as well as the other two nuclear-weapon States—the Soviet Union and China. By becoming party to those Protocols the five nuclear-weapon States would agree not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any country or territory in the Zone, and undertake not to test nuclear explosive devices here".

The South Pacific Forum is a regional grouping of all the independent and self-governing States of the South Pacific. It meets annually to discuss matters of mutual concern. The adoption by consensus of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty is a major achievement of the Forum. In the communiqué it released at the end of its meeting the Forum noted that one of the principal reasons for adopting the Treaty was the deep wish of all Forum members that no nuclear tests be conducted anywhere within the South Pacific region. Specifically, the Forum "urged France to cease immediately its nuclear testing programme at Mururoa Atoll" in French Polynesia. The Forum also "reaffirmed its strong opposition to the dumping of radio-active waste in the region". The communiqué noted that "Forum members were committed to the early conclusion of the Convention and Protocols being negotiated under the auspices of the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme which would, among other things, preclude the dumping at sea of radio-active waste in the region". By becoming party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, members of the Forum will thereby assume a commitment not to conduct such dumping.

The Forum was aware that the Treaty it adopted on 6 August was in accordance with article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which concerns regional arrangements to ensure the absence of nuclear weapons. It agreed that the Third Review Conference, which begins here a week from today, should be informed of the Forum's initiative, and affirmed its support for the NPT as the most important means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and his kind words to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, my delegation asked for the floor today in order to make some remarks on the nuclear test stop issue. The German Democratic Republic stands for an immediate stop of all nuclear test explosions everywhere, by everyone and for all time. Therefore, we call for the speedy elaboration and conclusion of a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests.

It shares this view with the other socialist countries, the non-aligned movement, prominent leaders of all continents -- as reflected in the recent Delhi Declaration -- the peace movement around the globe and many highly qualified experts and scientists. It is, last but not least, also the position of the United Nations as unanimously adopted in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and confirmed by the overwhelming majority of States in numerous General Assembly resolutions.

We therefore find it most regrettable that this year too the Conference on Disarmament was unable to make any headway in this field. Efforts to get out of that impasse and to start negotiations with a view to reaching an early agreement have again been doomed to failure as has been the case in this body and its predecessors for many years.

We have, however, never accepted that situation and we will never do so. Socialist and other countries have constantly explored ways and means of overcoming the existing obstacles. They, for instance, displayed in the past a high degree of flexibility with regard to accepting in 1982 the establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament with a mandate which they considered insufficient. Also, desirous of reaching a compromise, we agreed in the following year to continue work in the subsidiary body under the same inadequate mandate.

We agreed on that mandate on the assumption that all members of the Conference would reciprocate with a constructive approach, so that this would be a transitional step towards negotiations on a treaty. After the two years of that exercise, however, we learned that some delegations abused that preparedness in order to cover up by endless technical discussions the lack of political willingness to reach an international treaty. That is why we are no more willing to hold non-committal discussions, but demand negotiations which will lead to the commonly declared goal.

Last year, some Western delegations withheld their consent to a generally acceptable working basis despite the great efforts made by the other two Groups. Already on 5 March this year the distinguished representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Lowitz, made it very clear once again that his Government regards a CTB as a long-term goal and not an urgent task. This position taken at the Conference is tantamount to the fact that the United States rejected the Soviet Union's moratorium on all nuclear testing.

Such a moratorium would be an action of true restraint in the nuclear-weapon field. It could be the starting point for halting all nuclear testing and for concluding a CTB treaty. It is no wonder that the Soviet proposal met with broad positive response here at the Conference and on all continents.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Much to our regret, the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler, elaborating on the test-ban issue in his statement on 15 August, avoided a clear answer to that moratorium. He referred, inter alia, to my statement on 6 August. In that statement, I introduced on behalf of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and of my own country a working paper containing a proposal as to how to approach the entire subject of a CTB through systematic negotiations. Simultaneously, we reaffirmed the demand to establish a committee and to start the negotiating process within this framework. This made Ambassador Butler claim that we were against a business-like dialogue in order to discuss, among other things, the questions I had raised. It remains his secret how to bring his assertions in line with the realities. Everyone recognizes the simple truth that negotiations are necessary in order to reach a treaty. We do not want only to discuss questions, but we want to solve them this way. It is not sufficient to do "some practical work". And, let me add, what some people understand by "some practical work" is, in our opinion, nothing else but the attempt to replace the necessary political negotiating process by non-committal and endless technical discussions on verification, while nuclear explosions continue to be carried out.

It is not for the first time that the question of guilt has been put forward in a wilful manner. The ones considered responsible for the situation at the Conference are those who give highest priority to the elaboration of a treaty and, naturally, demand relevant negotiations. On the other hand, the readiness of one delegation to hold non-committal discussions is praised, although everyone present in this hall knows about that delegation's negative position on the elaboration of a treaty.

By the way, the ever-recurring assertion that it is only a minority that rejects the approach of some delegations -- categorically supported by the United States delegation -- also expresses the wilful manner of handling facts. The report of the Conference says something else: last year it was a minority of States that rejected the proposal of the Group of 21 of 26 July 1984 to establish an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate. The speaker of the Group of Western countries at that time even stated: "It was not possible to unite all delegations in the Group of Western countries behind the mandate contained in document CD/520".

The proposal of the Group of 21 was supported by the Socialist Group and, vice versa, the negotiating mandate of the Socialist Group contained in document CD/522 was supported by the Group of 21. The situation is quite the same this year. Neither last year nor this year was the draft mandate of Western countries put to a decision. Such are the facts which say very simply: the majority of delegations to this Conference -- among them the socialist ones -- demands that negotiations on a CTB treaty start immediately. However, a minority of delegations rejects such negotiations and demands non-committal discussions. Such is the conclusion based on consensus documents.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, our statement today is devoted to a problem that rightly occupies first place in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, the problem

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of the halting of nuclear weapon tests. Today this problem is truly at the centre of international life. In its solution people see a real practical step towards the halting of the arms race, towards nuclear disarmament.

An open and sincere position, a specific, tangible measure -- that is how large areas of international opinion are describing the new peace initiative by the Soviet Union, which two weeks ago unilaterally discontinued nuclear explosions. In many of the world's countries, statesmen and public figures are welcoming our initiative and persistently expressing support for a moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing, for the following of the Soviet Union's good initiative by the other nuclear Powers.

We note with satisfaction that the Soviet Government's decision has also had a positive echo among many delegations here, at the Conference on Disarmament. We wish to express our profound gratitude to the distinguished heads of the delegations of Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Pakistan, Burma and others who have officially expressed great appreciation for this step by the Soviet Union.

International public opinion has also assessed at its true worth the fact that the USSR was not in any way striving to put the United States in a difficult position. No, the moratorium was perfectly capable of becoming a joint bilateral action if the United States had taken up the Soviet initiative. After all, the United States President was informed in advance of that initiative by a letter in which it was suggested to the Americans that they should act in the same way. However, I should like to hope that the negative reaction expressed by the United States official representatives is not their last word. There is still a possibility of maintaining the moratorium in force beyond 1 January if the United States, for its part, also refrains from setting off nuclear explosions.

I would not wish, Sir, to make an historical review of all the Soviet Union's efforts aimed at securing any comprehensive nuclear-test ban. That would take too long. We are sure that the distinguished representatives are well acquainted with the history of the past few decades, decades during which the Soviet Union has been, as it still is, upholding with exceptional consistency the cause of the discontinuance of nuclear testing because of its firm belief that that is the surest, simplest and most practical way to curb the nuclear arms race. I think that even those who, for ideological or political reasons, do not share our way of looking at things cannot dispute this incontrovertible fact.

As long ago as 1955 the USSR advocated the discontinuance of nuclear testing as a priority, independent measure, with no linkage with other disarmament issues. We have unfailingly been following this, our fundamental course ever since.

The moratorium declared on 6 August represents our new contribution towards the achievement of this general goal and I can assure you, gentlemen, that we shall not slacken our efforts in the future either in our struggle for the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests and, in consequence, the beginning of the process of curtailing the nuclear arms race. I stress, our goal is not any kind of breathing space between explosions, but the halting for all time of all test explosions of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Consequently, when here, within this chamber, some Western representatives try to cast aspersions on the Soviet Union's clear position, that is so unconvincing as hardly to warrant serious consideration.

They say, for example, that the moratorium does not lend itself to verification. Well, then, let us see whether the opponents of the moratorium have the slightest grounds for expressing doubt concerning the unwavering observance by the Soviet Union of the obligation it has solemnly taken upon itself.

They assert that the problem of monitoring nuclear tests is always "super complicated". For several decades now the saboteurs of the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests have looked to this argument as their "friend in need". But it has long since failed them. The scientific and technical facilities that exist in the United States give them the necessary degree of certainty that a nuclear explosion, even a low-yield one, will be detected and they are well aware of this in the United States. Just recently, the International Herald Tribune wrote that the United States system for detecting nuclear explosions includes seismic observatories in 35 countries. The article states, in particular, the authoritative opinion of a famous American seismologist, Jack Evernden, to the effect that, using this widespread network of seismic stations, and particularly a new array in Norway, the United States can detect all Soviet tests, "even fully decoupled ones". The Soviet Union, too, has adequate means for detecting nuclear explosions.

They declare, without a moment's hesitation, that the Soviet stance is one of "propaganda", while the West's proposals are "practical". But what is the real situation? In practice, it is the Soviet Union that has discontinued all nuclear explosions until 1 January of next year and is willing to prolong that moratorium. The USSR is willing in practice, immediately, at any moment to sit down at the negotiating table with a view to concluding as soon as possible a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests for all time, and it is not laying down any preconditions for that. It is willing to conduct the negotiations in any forum that would be acceptable to the other side, whether in the context of trilateral talks or in multilateral talks at the Conference on Disarmament, or simultaneously in both those forums. The USSR has in practice introduced for consideration by the Conference on Disarmament the basic provisions of a treaty in this field. Together with other socialist countries, it has submitted for decision by the Conference on Disarmament a mandate for an appropriate ad hoc committee that provides for the holding of practical negotiations. The Soviet Union also supports the mandate for such an ad hoc committee that has been submitted by a group of non-aligned and neutral States.

What, in practice, is the position at the Conference on Disarmament of western delegations? One of the representatives expressed disagreement here with the words of M.S. Gorbachev to the effect that "in Geneva, the United States and other western countries have long been sabotaging the holding of such talks", i.e. talks about the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In this connection it is, I think, sufficient to recall the mere fact that, in the past two years alone, western delegations have frustrated five times the achievement of agreement on the commencement of talks in the relevant subsidiary organs for the purpose of elaborating an agreement, namely: at the 255th meeting, on 3 April 1984; at the 276th meeting, on 26 July 1984 (twice); and at the 301st meeting, on 21 March 1985 (twice).

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Although all in all the situation does not, unfortunately, give grounds for great hope, the Soviet delegation would none the less like to conclude its statement today on an optimistic note.

In the course of this year, the Conference on Disarmament has given no small attention to the question of a nuclear-weapon test ban. Many delegations, including the Soviet delegation, have spoken on this matter several times. From the multiplicity of views that were expressed in the course of the discussion a number of conclusions may be drawn. The chief among them is that the problem of banning nuclear tests must be resolved and resolved without delay. A radical solution of the question would be the banning of nuclear tests by all persons and in all places, for only such a solution would place any serious obstacle in the way of the creation, development and perfecting of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and so slow down, and ultimately bring to nothing the nuclear arms race.

Another important conclusion to which many representatives came in their statements -- and one with which we fully agree -- is that the building material for the elaboration of a treaty is already to hand. It is the draft basic provisions for a nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty which the Soviet Union introduced in 1982 and in which account is taken of the degree of agreement attained in the course of the trilateral talks; it is the draft treaty on a nuclear-test ban introduced by the delegation of Sweden. It is, finally, the constructive views and proposals expressed by many States concerning the specific content of a nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty, including the issues of verification of such a treaty.

And one further important conclusion present in the statements of most delegates is that the reason why there is no treaty is not that there is no basis for its elaboration or that there are any supposedly insuperable difficulties in devising verification measures, but the absence of political will on the part of certain Powers fundamentally to resolve the problem of banning tests.

The Soviet declaration of a unilateral moratorium provides the Conference on Disarmament with a most powerful impulse to commence business-like, to-the-point negotiations with a view to prohibiting nuclear tests by all persons everywhere.

The problem of restraining the arms race, of preventing nuclear war and of disarmament is so serious that humanity has no right to permit the endless postponement of its solution. As M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in his recent answers to questions from a TASS correspondent, "the responsibility incumbent on the Soviet Union and the United States is too great to evade the resolution of the major security issues".

"What we are proposing", the Soviet leader stated, "is a genuine possibility of halting the further build-up of nuclear arsenals, of really starting to resolve the task of reducing and, ultimately, eliminating them".

In view of the widespread interest which, as demonstrated in particular by today's meeting and that of 15 August, Mr. Gorbachev's answers to the questions from the TASS correspondent have aroused in the Conference on Disarmament, the Soviet delegation has requested the secretariat to circulate those answers as an official document of the Conference.

Mr. EDIS (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I wish first to congratulate you on behalf of my delegation on your assumption of the Presidency.

Today I should like to deal with three subjects on which the Conference has been able to record modest but useful progress.

On outer space, the Conference was able this year to establish an Ad Hoc Committee and begin serious work; on radiological weapons and the protection of nuclear facilities, there was a more sensible examination of the issues at stake; and on the comprehensive programme of disarmament we succeeded in clearing up some of the outstanding points in the draft text.

Outer space was the newest and in many ways the most challenging issue confronting the Conference this year.

As the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, has noted, President Reagan's vision in his statement of March 1983 made a decisive impact in several respects. It focused interest on existing military activities in space, and on new weapons systems which might theoretically be deployed or aimed there. It also drew to public attention the very considerable research under way in the Soviet Union on a range of potential measures.

At present, space is used by a limited number of military systems. Firstly, by communications, early-warning, and reconnaissance satellites, which add significantly to the effectiveness and credibility of mutual deterrence. They are efficient and cost-effective and make a unique contribution to stability. Secondly, by reusable launchers: by their nature they are, however, too limited, too costly and too vulnerable to pose a threat of aggression. The Soviet Union is now developing a similar system to the space shuttle, and we are hearing less condemnation from that quarter. Thirdly, there is the potential transit of space for the delivery of nuclear warheads by ballistic missiles based on Earth, which we must seek to ensure remains an unrealized potential. Fourthly, there is the problem of anti-satellite systems, exacerbated by the Soviet deployment over the past decade of a capability in this field, which it is only prudent for the West to balance.

As regards future systems, which in the words of the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, are many, many years away, the United States is publicly, and the Soviet Union more covertly, engaged in research programmes, which are permitted under the 1972 ABM Treaty. On this issue, Her Majesty's Government's policy is clear. At Camp David last December, Mrs. Thatcher agreed with President Reagan on four points:

The United States and Western aim is not to achieve superiority but to maintain balance, taking account of Soviet deployments;

Strategic Defensive Initiative-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation;

The overall aim is to enhance, not undermine deterrence; and

East/West negotiation should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

(Mr. Edis, United Kingdom)

It is in this spirit that we welcome the initiation of bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union aimed inter alia at preventing an arms race in outer space. We must all hope that these negotiations between the two major space Powers will produce results.

Against this backdrop of existing and potential military use of space, and the opening of the bilateral negotiations, the Ad Hoc Committee of this Conference has begun its work of examining issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Committee has made a good start to its work under the calm and able chairmanship of Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt. It was right that the Committee's programme of work should encompass an examination of existing agreements. A full understanding and appreciation of the present legal régime in outer space is essential before additional measures which may be necessary can be considered. Substantive contributions on this topic were made by several delegations, but it would only be fair to single out the wide-ranging documentation tabled by the delegation of Canada (CD/618). My own delegation made a contribution to the process by tabling a working paper entitled "Principal international agreements which apply or otherwise relate directly or indirectly to outer space" (CD/OS/WP.7). In view of the encouraging comments that we received on this paper, we have now decided to table it as a document of the Conference, as CD/637.

It was clear from the Committee's examination of existing agreements that there already exists a considerable body of international law and practice, both multilateral and bilateral, bearing on the question of outer space. Indeed, it was remarked with justification that the arms control régime in outer space, which does not at present constitute a permanently inhabited area, is in many ways more comprehensive than that on Earth; for example, in banning the use of nuclear weapons in space and from space to Earth. Military activities on, and military activities from the Moon and other celestial bodies are also forbidden. And at least implicit immunity is accorded by existing agreements and practice to certain satellites which constitute national technical means of verification. These conclusions seemed to be common ground in the Committee, although the limited time permitted did not allow for exhaustive examination of the subject.

The Committee's look at existing proposals and future initiatives was also necessarily preliminary and tentative, though a number of interesting proposals meriting further examination were made. These included the establishment of a "rules of the road" agreement for outer space; the possible multilateralization of existing bilateral agreements, for example, in relation to the immunity of certain satellites; international monitoring of satellites; and the possibility of constraints upon elements of anti-satellite activity.

One point that came very clearly out of the discussion, especially of the latter two points, was the sheer complexity as well as the importance of verification in relation to additional measures of arms control in outer space. This applies particularly with regard to proposals of a far-reaching nature. In space as on Earth, proposals for unverifiable blanket bans are not only useless but, worse than that, they are disingenuous and potentially dangerous too. What we should be searching for are not easy propaganda gestures, but rather realistic

(Mr. Edis, United Kingdom)

and practical measures which build on the existing legal régime and which will complement agreements which we all hope will emerge from the bilateral negotiations.

We believe that the Ad Hoc Committee has made a generally constructive and co-operative start to the work set out in its mandate. In the limited time available, very useful work has been done. We look forward to further work on this important and complex subject at our next session.

Turning now to radiological weapons, the Conference has found itself in recent years engaged in an increasingly sterile discussion where well known and well-worn positions on a radiological weapons treaty, the protection of nuclear facilities, and their relationship, if any, to each other were restated. In our speech to the Conference towards the end of last summer's session, we called for a systematic stage-by-stage examination of each element, untrammelled by preconceptions as to final form. Something very like this has been undertaken at the current session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, under the energetic and pragmatic chairmanship of Ambassador Butler of Australia.

Under Ambassador Butler's leadership, a framework was found allowing discussion of concrete language without prejudicing the final position of delegations on their approaches to the subject. And a real and welcome effort has been made by delegations from all groups to find practical ways forward from the impasse in which the item had found itself. The United Kingdom delegation played its part in this process, including on the question of protection of nuclear facilities, which we recognize is an issue of real concern to a number of countries, especially from the Group of 21. In our view, facilities considered for special protection should accept IAEA safeguards.

The pragmatic approach adopted by the radiological weapons Committee at the current session achieved useful results, which must be built on next year. If the momentum gained cannot be maintained next year, it would cast grave doubts on the question whether an agreement or agreements on these subjects will ever be attainable within the Conference on Disarmament. This is not a conclusion which we would welcome reaching.

On the related subject of new weapons of mass destruction, we participated actively in discussion of this subject previously, both by sending experts to the then CCD in 1976 and 1977 and in taking the lead in sponsoring General Assembly resolutions 32/84B and 33/66A. Our view remains that it would be a most serious development if any new kinds of weapons of mass destruction were invented and deployed. However, no serious evidence has been put forward to indicate that new types of weapons of mass destruction are in prospect. In the absence of such evidence, we see no point in considering any agreement dealing with unspecified new weapons. It should be enough for the present for the Conference to keep the subject under regular review as requested by the General Assembly.

This year also saw the re-establishment of work on drafting a comprehensive programme of disarmament under the distinguished and dedicated chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico. Conscious, no doubt, of the significance

(Mr. Edis, United Kingdom)

of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, delegations from all groups threw themselves into intensive and constructive efforts to reach agreement on the major outstanding portions of the text. In some cases agreement was achieved and in the remainder, as a minimum the issues at stake were more clearly identified. On this basis, we can envisage the approach of the deadline of the forty-first session of the General Assembly for submission of a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament with greater confidence.

It is quite common for speakers in our Conference to end with a literary allusion or quotation. I shall not attempt to follow them on this occasion. But I should like to finish by sharing with delegations a description of an earlier disarmament conference that took place nearly 100 years ago, at The Hague in 1899.

There are some remarkable echoes in the proceedings of that conference with our work here. There was, for example, a proposal for a freeze on the number of battleships or dreadnaughts, which I suppose one can consider the ICBMs of their time. The proposal came from Great Britain, which had an existing superiority in this category of weapons, but was strongly opposed by Germany and a number of other countries.

At that time, too, there was a new development in technology on the military horizon which was causing deep concern. This was the use of the lower atmosphere for military purposes -- by the launching of projectiles or explosives from hot-air balloons. And here I quote from Barbara Tuchman's book, The Proud Tower:

"Here was something, almost untried, that almost everyone was willing to ban, especially the Russians, for whom the prospect of adding a new dimension to warfare was altogether too much. As the Russian delegate, Colonel Jilinsky, almost plaintively put it, 'In the opinion of the Russian Government, the various means of injuring the enemy now in use are sufficient.' As regards air warfare, most of the delegates were willing to agree and a permanent prohibition was voted. The committee congratulated itself. Then suddenly, at the next meeting, the US delegate, Captain Crozier, having had serious second thoughts after consultation with another US delegate, Captain Mahan, raised an objection. They were proposing to ban forever, he said, a weapon of which they had no experience. New developments and inventions might soon make airships dirigible, enabling them to be steered by motor power over the area of battle and to take part at a critical moment with possibly decisive effect, thus in the long run sparing lives and shortening the conflict. Would it be in the humanitarian interest to prevent such a development? Instead of permanent prohibition, Captain Crozier proposed a five-year ban at the end of which period they would have a better idea of the capabilities of airships. This time impressed, the delegates agreed."

Mr. President, it may not be so easy for the eloquence of delegates to convince others of their views at our Conference. But at least this account may do something to give perspective to our work here, and remind us that others before us have grappled with problems of a not entirely dissimilar nature.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the words he addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler, who will also speak as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons in order to introduce the report of that Committee, which has been circulated today as document CD/635.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, it is my privilege to introduce to the plenary session of the Conference document CD/635, which is the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. It was approved and adopted by that Committee at the end of last week. I do not think that it is necessary for me to read the report or take the Conference through it in any detail. I believe and hope that it speaks plainly for itself. The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom referred a few moments ago to the spirit of co-operation that had characterized the work of our Committee this year and I can only strongly endorse those remarks. There was, in my view, a very real determination in the Committee to conduct constructive and practical work both this year and as a basis for further progress in the future. I do believe that the results of that co-operation and that determination are now shown in document CD/635.

I think it is important to draw attention to paragraph 10 of the document which, among other things, states that it was the view of the Committee that the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons should be re-established at the beginning of next year's session, the 1986 session, of the Conference and that the Annex to the present report be considered as the basis for its further work. That Annex does give some expression to the practical progress that was made this year and my definite hope is that this recommendation will be accepted, that we will start our work at the beginning of next year's session of the Conference and that, indeed, the Annex to this report can form a basis of that work. I understand that the Conference will not be asked to adopt the report today. As is customary procedure, it will lie on the table for delegations to study and consider and, of course, we are in your hands, but, our understanding is that the report will probably be presented for adoption at the beginning of next week.

In this context, I do ask the indulgence of the Conference to mention a minor proposed amendment to the text in CD/635. This is not an amendment of substance: it is merely a documentary reference, has been the subject of consultations amongst delegations in the Conference and has been agreed to. It was simply omitted from this copy of the text and it occurs on page 2 of the Annex in the English language version. At the bottom of Article II (b), where, within square brackets reference is made to an annex, a register, it is proposed to add the words, "In this context, CD/RW/WP.67 contains Chairman's suggestions for draft elements of an Annex relating to Article II (b)". The inclusion of this as a footnote would simply draw attention to the last of the documents listed in paragraph 6 of the report and this is, as I say, a suggestion that has been agreed to. Its sole purpose is to provide a relevant documentary reference.

There is nothing more for me to say in introducing this report other than to express my very sincere gratitude for the co-operation that all members of the Conference showed the Chair in this work and, on a personal note, my sincere gratitude and appreciation for the warm and friendly relations that characterized all of the work that we did in the Ad Hoc Committee this year.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Australia and Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons for his statement.

Is there any delegation which wishes to comment on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons? That does not seem to be the case.

I give the floor to the delegation of Australia.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): On this occasion I am speaking as the representative of Australia and, on another subject, with your permission.

I wanted to express the gratitude of my delegation to the distinguished representative of New Zealand, Mr. Brett Lineham, for the statement he made this morning on the occasion of our two delegations' tabling, jointly, the text of the Treaty for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, together with its associated map and Protocols. It was my impression, when I reported to the Conference seven or eight days ago on the decision of the South Pacific Forum to endorse this Treaty, that there was indeed a considerable interest in the Conference on its terms and its associated Protocols. It's a source of great pleasure to my delegation and, as has been made clear this morning, to the New Zealand delegation too, that we have been able to produce this as a document of the Conference and we hope and trust that it will be studied with interest.

I would also like to address briefly the question of a nuclear test ban. I was very grateful this morning to hear Ambassador Issraelyan offer to circulate as a document of the Conference the replies given by the General Secretary, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, to some questions posed to him on this subject by the TASS news organization. In the statement I made last Thursday, on nuclear test ban, I did in fact read into the record two citations from those replies given by Mr. Gorbachev to TASS. I had fortunately received a copy of those replies, at that stage in the English language. I sincerely believe that the quotations I read were accurate, but I will certainly read the whole, as it were authorized version when it is circulated by the Soviet delegation as a document of this Conference.

I also heard with interest, and some sense of depression, the remarks that were made this morning by the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic. I don't want to continue this exchange, because, as I pointed out last Thursday, my delegation considers it to be unhelpful, and not a very worthy technique to misrepresent the nature of proposals that are put before this Conference. This morning Ambassador Rose, on a couple of occasions, passed off the Western proposal on a nuclear test ban as providing merely for discussions. That is a misrepresentation, it is not a fact, and I think we would all be served if such misrepresentation were to cease. Our proposal calls clearly for substantive examination of the specific issues involved in a treaty with the view to the negotiation of a text of a treaty. It is there in black and white, it has been there in black and white for two years and it serves no purpose to plainly and simply misrepresent what we are calling for.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no more speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

(The President)

As we are approaching the end of the session, it is essential that we use our time as well as possible. Consequently, I suggest that we should begin our plenary meetings from today until the end of the session punctually at 10 a.m. As things stand, many delegations wish to express their opinions in the plenary and, as you will appreciate from the last two lists of speakers, it is important that we should begin ahead of the normal time so that we can also concentrate on other questions. If there is no objection, I will take it that **the Conference** agrees to begin our plenary meetings at 10 a.m. until the end of the present session.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should like to inform the Conference of the arrangements concerning the schedule of meetings for this week. As you know, when we draw near to the end of the session, this schedule must be adjusted as our work progresses. Consequently, it has been necessary to make a number of changes that will enable us to use the time available as efficiently as possible.

This afternoon, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 5, prevention of an arms race in outer space, will hold consultations from 3 p.m. in Conference Room 1. Then, at 8 p.m., the Drafting Group on the substantive paragraphs will meet on the sixth floor, in the secretariat conference room, to begin consideration of working paper CD/WP.194 and of the amendments submitted at yesterday's informal meeting.

A meeting, or, as the case may be, consultations by the Committee relating to item 5 will be scheduled for Wednesday afternoon. If the Committee concludes its work, the time would be available for the Drafting Group to go on with the draft substantive paragraphs.

We shall hold a plenary meeting on Thursday, at 10 a.m., as we decided recently, and, if there is any time left that morning, there will be another meeting of the Drafting Group. The Committee established in connection with item 6, which concerns negative security guarantees, may meet on Thursday afternoon or Friday morning, depending on the result of the consultations which I understand are now in progress. The decision will be announced by the President at the end of Thursday's plenary meeting, at which time I shall also inform the Conference what we could do on Thursday and Friday in the Drafting Group.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 22 August, at 10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.