

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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11 July 1985
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 11 July 1985, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Bachir Ould-Rouis (Algeria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. B. OULD-ROUIS

Mr. L. MOUSSAOUI

Mr. A. BELAID

Argentina:

Mr. J. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER

Mr. R. ROWE

Miss J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE

Mr. J. RAEYMAECKERS

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Mr. K. STANKOV

Burma:

U MYA THAN

U HLA MYINT

Canada:

Mr. R. ROCHON

Mr. R. VANIER

Mr. F.R. CLEMINSON

China:

Ms. WANG ZHIYUN

Mr. LIN CHENG

Mr. LING

Mr. XIA YISHAN

Mr. JIANG ZHENXI

Ms. ZHOU YUNHUA

Mr. ZHONG WANGTHONG

Cuba:

Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA
Mr. H. RIVERO
Mr. J.L. GARCIA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. J. HAJGAR

Egypt:

Mr. S. ALFARARGI
Mr. M. BADR
Mr. A. ABBAS

Ethiopia:

Mr. K. KEBEDE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. JESSEL

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE
Mr. A. BRIE
Mr. W. KRUTZSCH
Mr. D. FELSKÉ
Mr. M. SILMEIDES

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. M. GERDTS
Mr. W.N. GERMANN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO
Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO
Ms. R. TANZIL
Mr. HARYOMATHRAM

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N. KAZEMI KAMYAB
Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. F. PIAGGESI
Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI
Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. K. KUDO

Kenya:

Mr. P.N. MWAURA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. VAN SCHAIK
Mr. R. MILDERS

Nigeria:

Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK
Mr. J. GONZALES TERRONES
Mr. J. RUBIO CORREO

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI
Mr. J. RYCHLAK

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. A. POPESCU
Mr. V. FAUR
Mr. S. POP

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS
Mr. WINGREN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

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Mr. M.E. KOKEYEV
Mr. Y.M. NOVOSADOV
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. R.J.S. EDIS
Mr. I.P. CHALMERS
Mr. K.I. MALIN
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWITZ
Mr. R. LEVINE
Ms. M. WINSTON
Mr. D. LAMBERT
Mr. T. BARTHELEMY
Mr. P. LEMBESIS

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 320th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

May I first of all welcome here the United Nations Disarmament Fellows for 1985, who will attend the Conference's plenary meetings as part of their study programme, and wish them every success in their studies.

The Conference today continues the consideration of agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any matter related to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Federal Republic of Germany and Mexico.

I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia) (translated from French): Mr. President, I should like first of all to express my delegation's deep satisfaction at seeing the representative of Algeria, a country with which Czechoslovakia enjoys relations of friendship and very active co-operation, presiding over our Conference. Your job during this penultimate month of this year's session is not an easy one, for it must be recognized that nothing is going right in disarmament. However, we must not let pessimism gain ground in our Conference. Needless to say, in your efforts as President you may count on the complete support and co-operation of the Czechoslovakian delegation. I should also like to associate myself with all previous speakers who thanked Ambassador Bagbeni Adeito Nzengeya of Zaire for his effective Presidency during the month of June. I also wish to welcome Ambassador Jessel of France.

[Continued in English]

We are now almost in the middle of the summer part of our session. In just a few weeks from now we will be closing our work for this year, and it seems highly probable that we shall not be in a position to present any specific result whatsoever. It is less than a poor record, especially in the year when the Third NPT Review Conference is to be convened. In this connection, it is most regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament was again prevented from taking action on those items of its agenda which are related directly to efforts aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation régime. A nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the commencement of the process of nuclear disarmament will not be dealt with effectively before the Third NPT Review Conference. I presume that everyone in this room knows only too well the reasons for the Conference not being in a position to start work on these questions. It is only natural that, given the present deadlock, a considerable amount of thought be given to the search for some practical, specific steps which could herald the turning point and establish favourable conditions for the solution of vital problems of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

A step in this very direction, and one with important consequences, would be the introduction of a moratorium on nuclear testing. The proposal of the Soviet Union to agree on such a moratorium, which would be in effect until a treaty on general and complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests is negotiated, was advanced some time ago. We know of no adequate response by the United States. Recently, this proposal has been reiterated and a date, 6 August (or any other earlier date) was suggested for the introduction of such a moratorium. We maintain that this proposal deserves most serious consideration. To ignore it would not be compatible with a responsible approach towards problems affecting vital security interests of all nations.

This Conference, together with many other fora of multilateral and bilateral negotiations, has been negotiating disarmament for decades now. Though progress has been slow, a number of important agreements was achieved and they have been complied with. It is, however, disquieting to note that this period may be coming to an end, since the wisdom of observing disarmament treaties has been questioned on a number of occasions. This applies to the SALT II agreement as well as to the two Soviet-American agreements concerning the limitation of underground nuclear tests and peaceful nuclear explosions. But of most serious concern is the fact that a political gamble is under way to make use of recent developments in technology in a way that would threaten a number of important disarmament agreements, in the first place the ABM Treaty of 1972. I am, obviously, referring to the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative, introduced by the present United States Administration. The very announcement of this initiative, which has nothing in common with a sincere, realistic quest for security, and the pushing of its implementation, have already had and continue to have a negative impact on the development of Soviet-American relations and East-West relations as a whole. This has become quite evident during the first round of the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on the complex of issues concerning space and nuclear weapons. From what we hear the second round is as well decisively marked by the stubborn persistence in the implementation of the SDI. One side apparently tends to forget that only an agreement covering all three fields, that is, strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear weapons and space weapons, can prevent a situation where limitations in one or two fields are undermined by the absence of limits to scientific and technological development in the third field.

The implementation of the SDI could become a very dangerous precedent in so far as it would reopen the same channel for the arms race which was closed by the ABM Treaty 13 years ago. It is not too surprising that various and often differing interpretations of the ABM Treaty have been advanced recently. One of them would have us believe that the Treaty allows tests of space arms. And this is not just a personal opinion of an expert in the field. Such a conclusion was reflected in the Pentagon statement issued in April of this year. The report lists 15 major experiments which, according to the Pentagon, could be conducted without violating the ABM Treaty. It also includes experiments that would test weapons based in space and designed to shoot down incoming enemy projectiles.

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When justified doubts were raised in this regard, a "flexible" explanation was offered -- these weapons would be destroying anti-satellite weapons and not anti-ballistic missiles. The Associate Director of the Federation of American Scientists, John Pike, reacted to the explanation saying, that such a test would be "a waste of money", because the Air Force already knows how to shoot down anti-satellite weapons.

Allusions are being made by the proponents of the SDI about alleged violations of the ABM Treaty by the Soviet Union. The United States emissaries are quite active and lecture the public on this score here and there. But in spite of many words, not a single piece of serious evidence has ever been presented, to the best of our knowledge. Moreover, just a few days ago the Secretary-General of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, invited the United States to reaffirm, together with the Soviet Union, its commitment to the régime of the ABM Treaty, a Treaty of unlimited duration. He said further, and I quote from M. Gorbachev's reply to the message from the Union of Concerned Scientists: "The Soviet Union is not developing any space strike weapons, a large-scale ABM system, or the basis for such a system; it is abiding strictly by its obligations under the Treaty both as a whole and in its several parts; and it is unswervingly observing the spirit and the letter of that most important document. We invite the United States leadership to join us in this matter and to renounce the plans being nurtured for the militarization of outer space, plans which will inevitably lead to the scrapping of that document, the key link in the entire process of nuclear arms limitation".

The fears that the arms race will be transferred into outer space are not quite new. On numerous occasions we have heard in this Conference and in its preceding Committee delegates from the East, from non-aligned countries and also from the West expressing their apprehension that an arms race in outer space, and namely the SDI, would have enormous unfavourable consequences for mankind. Since then we have been subjected to extensive United States propaganda, starting with the slogan that the SDI will make the nuclear weapons obsolete, claims that it will remain at the research stage only, and recently that it is nothing but an idea, far from implementation etc.; but it is hard to believe all those arguments, the goal of which is just to calm down the world public opinion. We remember well that when the SDI was announced it was stated that the USSR could never catch up because it is behind in the necessary technology. So it was clear from the beginning that this project is in fact a result and a manifestation of the continuing long-term effort to upset the military-strategic balance on a qualitatively new basis. It is the culmination of efforts to achieve military superiority over the USSR, to intercept a retaliatory nuclear strike, to build new means of blackmail and dictate terms. Even if we were willing to admit that the SDI has something in common with defence, it is only too obvious that its basic purposes are offensive because the intended defence has one and only one ambition: to increase the overall offensive potential. Recent intensive development also of the offensive potential in the United States itself is the best confirmation of this simple truth. And what will undoubtedly be the consequences of the SDI?

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In a broader sense, the SDI will throw doubt on all the existing Soviet-American agreements in the sphere of arms limitations. Apart from the ABM Treaty, it would also jeopardize a number of multilateral agreements such as the Moscow agreement on a partial test ban of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the NPT. With the advancement of research and tests within the SDI programme, more and more detrimental consequences to the existing arms limitation agreements will inevitably appear. Here I would like to stress "research and testing". Usually results of research are immediately tested. One has to wonder if it could be possible to clearly and definitely separate research from testing. If that could be possible, then obviously, this should be reflected in a considerable reduction of costs of the programme. There are, of course, other possible consequences. It is quite clear that faced with the strengthened defence-offence capacities in outer space none would be willing to reduce its ballistic-missile potential. This will make it more difficult to achieve arms control agreements both in the bilateral talks in Geneva as well as in other fora. Thus, the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war would be further increased.

A good example in this respect is given by the research on X-ray lasers. Speaking on the SDI, United States Administration officials usually emphasize the use of non-nuclear devices to destroy missiles in space. Nevertheless, research on X-ray laser space weapons, powered by a nuclear bomb, continues actively. A couple of weeks ago an important advance in developing these weapons was reported, consisting in increasing the brightness and thus the power of the X-ray device by focusing its rays. The X-ray laser, which has been under development for nearly five years at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, exploits a nuclear explosion as a power source. Where is the guarantee that American military planners will resist temptation to make use of the recent advance and that nuclear weapons will finally not be introduced into outer space? Anyway, until now we have not witnessed too much moderation in efforts to use scientific and technological progress for military purposes. Views have already been expressed by eminent politicians and experts that the SDI means further vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Further, one cannot overlook the risk that if either or both the strongest nuclear Powers were to further develop ballistic missile defence-offence, the other nuclear-weapon States might be tempted to take corresponding measures also in the nuclear field, thus further increasing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The widely critical, or at least highly reserved, attitude towards the SDI, including among the United States allies, is one of the reasons why the Reagan administration seeks approval of the West European allies in NATO concerning the participation of their countries in the SDI, primarily in the form of a pledge that they will not question it but will support it, that they are ready to bear its full impact on their own interests both in Europe and in the world without grumbling. What is in question is not the accessibility to the as-yet dubious scientific and technological progress brought by the implementation of the SDI to the development of the civilian economy, but the unlimited opportunity "to drain" the West European scientific and technological potential. That means not big orders stimulating West European economic development but small crumbs falling from the American military and industrial complex and, what is more important, it would be the means of skimming the cream of the scientific and technological progress in Europe.

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The economic consequences of the implementation of the SDI would be truly unprecedented. It would lead to a massive diversion of material, human and financial resources from civil to military purposes. Such a diversion would certainly multiply current world economic problems with the substantial reductions of activities in the social sector. Further increases in the already massive military expenditures will have adverse effects not only on the economies of the countries directly involved but also on the rest of the world, particularly on those with the most limited resources.

There is one more highly negative aspect of the implementation of the SDI that is also of an economic nature. The more resources are invested and thousands of people become dependent for their careers on the project, the more difficult it would be to stop it, and it would thus gain a momentum of its own.

The more one analyses the SDI project and its possible consequences the more one comes to the conclusion that a completely different approach is needed, especially with respect to outer space. An outstanding example represents the moratorium on the placement of anti-satellite weapons in outer space initiated by the USSR two years ago, and its readiness to abide by it for as long as the other States act in the same way. This moratorium creates favourable conditions for the achievement of an agreement to put a total end to efforts to develop new anti-satellite systems and for such systems already possessed by the USSR and the United States, including those whose testing has not yet been completed, to be scrapped.

With respect to outer space we consider that bilateral and multilateral negotiations should complement each other. We therefore welcomed the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and we are fully prepared to co-operate with the other delegations in the Conference in the implementation of its mandate. Our more specific views on how this should be done are contained in the Working Paper of a group of socialist countries, CD/607, introduced on Tuesday by Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, whom I would like to greet today, on the National Day of Mongolia.

Let me conclude by expressing the firm belief of my delegation that the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space is in a position to do useful work already in the course of the present session. What is needed is a constructive approach on the part of all delegations based on the understanding that the prevention of an arms race in outer space corresponds to the vital interests of all nations.

Space must be used for all humanity for peaceful purposes, for communication, education, information transfer and surveying natural resources. That is the field in which scientists of the whole world must co-operate. The Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, having in view this noble task, is going to organize an international colloquium on that subject. We hope that it will bring incentives for peaceful co-operation in space of all, East and West, North and South. This would certainly be more to the benefit of mankind than any star-wars plans whatsoever.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Cromartie.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): Mr. President, as this is the first time I have spoken in plenary this month I should like to congratulate you on the assumption of the Presidency for the month of July. I hope that it is a good omen for our joint endeavours that we are starting this month on the second alphabetical cycle of Presidencies. I welcome the efforts that you are making to solve the problems facing the Conference and I pledge you the full support of my delegation in your important and difficult task. I should also like to express the thanks of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador Bagbeni of Zaire, for his able conduct of the Presidency during the month of June.

I should like today to speak to the items on our agenda relating to nuclear issues; and as a practical contribution to our work to introduce a new paper on Seismic Monitoring for a Comprehensive Test Ban.

As my Minister, Mr. Luce, noted when he addressed the Conference on 12 March, the background to our discussion of nuclear matters is more hopeful than was the case last year because of the re-opening of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear armaments, and on the additional subject of space arms. There have been some negative public comments from some quarters recently about the prospects for these negotiations, but these seem to my delegation to be at the best, premature. It was always clear that these negotiations, given the importance and complexity of the subject matter, would be long and difficult. However, these bilateral negotiations between the two Powers with the overwhelming preponderance of nuclear weapons, and the greatest military capability in space, offer by far the most realistic hope of halting the nuclear arms race and initiating the process of reducing nuclear armaments.

It is for this reason that my delegation, with others, felt unable to agree to calls to initiate multilateral negotiations on this subject in the Conference on Disarmament under item 2 of our agenda. In our view any such negotiations would be unrealistic, premature and could well be harmful to the prospects of the bilateral negotiations. For the same reason we do not consider that the creation of a subsidiary body under this item of the agenda would serve any useful purpose at the present time.

On item 6 of our agenda relating to negative security assurances, the unilateral declaration that the United Kingdom has made remains a firm, credible and reliable statement of our policy regarding the use of our nuclear weapons. We are not opposed to the principle of an international convention on this subject, although work in previous subsidiary bodies of this Conference has shown the difficulties involved in elaborating such an instrument.

We recognize the vital importance of preventing nuclear war, which relates to item 3 on the agenda of the Conference. As a nuclear-weapon State, the United Kingdom acknowledges its responsibility to do everything in its power to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used. Our policy remains one of deterring aggression and of preventing all war. Our approach on this subject is fully set out in the draft resolution which we and other delegations presented to the First Committee of the last General Assembly, as well as in our response to the Secretary-General's note of 26 December 1984. We are grateful for the report of the Secretary-General on this subject, issued to this Conference as document CD/603. This is a good summary of

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views expressed, and contains in paragraphs 79 to 88 a valuable analysis of the common ground that exists. For our part, we are sceptical of the value of sweeping and unenforceable declarations of the sort advocated by some delegations. Nevertheless we remain ready to discuss this subject and to consider any practical and realistic ideas which may emerge to reduce the danger of war, especially nuclear war. We believe that it should be possible to work out a generally acceptable framework for such a systematic discussion in this Conference, and we support continuing efforts to this end.

The main subject of my statement today relates to item 1 on our agenda... on the Nuclear Test Ban. As the responsible British Minister, Mr. Luce, has reaffirmed in the House of Commons as recently as 7 June, "Her Majesty's Government, in accordance with their international obligations, remain firmly committed to the pursuit of a verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban". In the context of substantial reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons, this could be an important step towards nuclear disarmament.

The United Kingdom has demonstrated its support for effective constraints in this field by becoming one of the Original Parties to the 1963 Partial (or Limited) Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting nuclear weapon test explosions in the atmosphere in outer space and under water, which it has strictly observed. This important Treaty now has 113 parties and has in practice put an end to atmospheric testing even by countries which are not parties. The relative ease with which atmospheric nuclear tests can be detected and identified provides a basis for international confidence that it is being fully observed.

The United Kingdom has played a full and active part in the efforts made since then to achieve a complete ban on nuclear testing in all environments. This is, of course, a much more difficult task both technically and politically, because of the risk that a country would gain a clandestine military advantage by undetected underground nuclear explosions. Together with the United States and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom participated from 1977 in trilateral negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), which were adjourned in 1980 following a failure to resolve a number of important questions.

The United Kingdom strongly supported the establishment in 1982 of a Nuclear Test Ban Working Group in the Committee on Disarmament and played a full and active part in its work. During the 1983 session I tabled two substantive papers in the Committee on Disarmament as a contribution to its work on this subject entitled "Peaceful Nuclear Explosions in Relation to a Nuclear Test Ban" (CD/383) and "Verification Aspects of a CTB Treaty" (CD/402). We had hoped that these two papers would be the subject of detailed discussion, and we have been very much disappointed at the absence of consensus on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament to continue the work of the Working Group, because this procedural problem has frustrated further substantive discussion of these important questions, and in particular the detailed issues raised in these two British Working Papers of 1983. On 20 July 1984 the United Kingdom and other Western delegations tabled a broader draft mandate (CD/521) for an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban designed to permit the "substantive examination of specific issues relating to a Comprehensive Test Ban, including the issue of scope as well as those of verification and compliance, with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject". I recall that at the thirty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly a large number of

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delegations voted in favour of a paragraph of a resolution, which specified that the resumption of work at the Conference on Disarmament should take place on this very basis. Despite the apparent reluctance of a minority of other countries to agree, we remain convinced of the value of further substantive work towards a Comprehensive Test Ban at the Conference on Disarmament. As I said in the statement I made on 21 March on behalf of a group of Western countries, we must "continue the search for agreement on a formula that will allow the Conference to undertake practical work on this item". We are glad that efforts to this end are being pursued at the current session of the Conference.

The United Kingdom considers that a test ban treaty would be unacceptable unless it contained adequate provision to ensure compliance by all its parties. The importance of resolving outstanding difficulties over how to verify compliance lies at the heart of the extensive consideration of a comprehensive test-ban over the last 25 years. The issue cannot be evaded or dismissed as too complicated, too hard to understand or too detailed to merit further discussion, because an inadequate comprehensive test-ban treaty which lent itself to evasion would be worse than useless. Clandestine continuation of nuclear testing at levels sufficient to confer a significant military advantage would have extremely serious and far-reaching consequences, not only for the Treaty itself, but also for the general framework of international security and stability. It is therefore an essential element of a comprehensive test-ban that such clandestine testing be effectively precluded. I stress the word effective -- we are not looking for 100 per cent verification. The questions which in our view need to be answered are:

Will any undetected evasion of the agreement provide a significant military advantage?

Will significant non-observance of the agreement be detected early enough to allow any necessary counter-measures to be taken?

If the evidence of such non-observance is available, will it be convincing enough to justify such counter-measures?

And if we are confident that we can give the right answers to these questions, can we also be confident that the risk of international exposure will outweigh any temptation to depart from strict compliance with the agreement?

The United Kingdom is closely involved in the useful technical work performed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts set up by a predecessor body of the Conference on Disarmament. I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the work of the Ad Hoc Group and to its Chairman, Dr. Dahlman of Sweden, the Scientific Secretary, Dr. Ringdal of Norway, and the Co-ordinator of the Technical Test, Mr. McGregor of Australia. The Group will be meeting in Geneva again shortly. A lot of work remains to be done under their present mandate, and there is further work of great value that they could undertake. We therefore hope that the Ad Hoc Group's mandate can be renewed, and if necessary extended, by general agreement.

The members of the Conference have recently had an admirable opportunity to see on the ground in Norway how research in this field is conducted and how seismological observations are made. I should like to use this occasion to thank the Norwegian Government publicly for their generous hospitality,

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and for all that they did to make our visit to Norway so successful both from the professional and the personal point of view. The visit gave me a first-hand picture of the great delicacy of the seismological equipment required for this task and the extraordinary complexity of the task of the transmission, correlation and analysis of the results of the observations. The Noress array is a pioneer effort to improve the possibilities of detection and identification of weak seismic signals at regional distances, which promises to improve substantially our capability to detect and identify them within the relatively short range for which it is destined. We hope that this experiment will provide in time a solution to some of the outstanding technical problems to which the conclusions of the Norwegian paper (CD/599) on the Oslo Workshop refer. We support the Norwegian view that it is essential to establish the global seismological network proposed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

The United Kingdom Working Paper of 1983, to which I have referred earlier (CD/402) identified seismic monitoring as the most promising technology for the long-range collection of data on underground explosions and as an essential element in any verification arrangement for a comprehensive test-ban. It also drew attention to the fact that current techniques of seismic monitoring would require improvement before adequate verification of a comprehensive test-ban could be envisaged. It has been disappointing that this paper has not so far received any detailed study in this Conference.

My delegation continues to hope that the Western draft mandate to which I referred earlier will provide a basis for establishing an ad hoc committee of this Conference in which detailed discussion of these complex issues can take place. With this in mind I should like to introduce today a further British Working Paper entitled "Seismic Monitoring for a Comprehensive Test Ban", which has been circulated as document CD/610. This Paper is designed to supplement the earlier paper by a more detailed analysis of the issues of seismic verification. It aims to explain and distinguish between the two fundamental problems involved in monitoring a nuclear test-ban by seismic means: the detection of seismic signals from nuclear explosions against the ambient seismic noise background and the identification of seismic signals, that is, discrimination between signals observed from earthquakes and from man-made explosions. In each case the Paper describes the current technical capabilities and the prospects for their improvement. It reviews some of the techniques that might be used to provide detection or identification of clandestine tests carried out under a comprehensive test-ban régime, assesses their likely effectiveness and discusses the technical possibilities in a global seismic network for monitoring a comprehensive test-ban at tele-seismic range. The United Kingdom delegation believes that this Working Paper should make a substantial contribution to further discussion in this Conference of the verification of a nuclear test-ban, the major unresolved problem relating to the achievement of an effective ban.

The problem of verification of a comprehensive test-ban is in any case a difficult one. It is made infinitely more so by the insistence of some members of this Conference on claiming exemption from a test ban for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. This problem was analysed in detail in the other British Working Paper to which I referred earlier, CD/383 of 17 June 1983. As the then Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

Office, Mr. Douglas Hurd, made clear in his Plenary statement on 10 March 1983, the British Government would be prepared to renounce permanently the right to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as part of an agreement on a comprehensive test-ban of all nuclear explosions in all environments. As Mr. Hurd said, it is for those who seek an exemption for peaceful nuclear explosions, which Britain does not seek, to tell us in detail what practical system of verification they propose to give confidence that the nuclear explosions they might carry out were exclusively peaceful and brought no military advantage of any kind.

Finally, I should like to turn to a major existing achievement of multilateral arms control negotiations, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was negotiated in a predecessor of this Conference, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. My delegation looks forward to a thorough review of its operation and achievements in the same constructive spirit as has been shown at the three meetings of its preparatory Committee held here in Geneva. The Treaty now has 129 parties, the highest number for any multilateral Treaty in the field of arms control and disarmament. In the view of my Government, it has brought increased security not only to all of us who are parties to the Treaty but to the world as a whole. It has been influential in inhibiting the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons both by establishing a basis of mutual confidence and by providing a norm of international behaviour. It has thus made an important contribution to the achievement of one of the aims we have set ourselves in this Conference, the prevention of nuclear war. Its unique comprehensive system of verification provided by the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency has generated wide international confidence, and has provided a basis for the development of nuclear trade and of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in many countries throughout the world. The provision in its Article VI for negotiations on effective measures related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament express a common longing among all its parties to see the achievement of these goals. The early years after the Treaty came into force in 1970 brought a wave of noteworthy achievements in disarmament both on a multilateral and on a bilateral basis. To the great regret of all of us the international climate in the present decade has not so far been propitious for further achievements in this field. This year we have new hope with the re-establishment of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, on a more comprehensive basis than ever before, aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. We must all hope fervently for the success of these negotiations and do all in our power to contribute to it. In the meantime, it is essential to maintain and strengthen the broad degree of consensus that already exists on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is in this spirit that my delegation will approach the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation régime.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, today the Soviet delegation would like to address the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is not our first statement concerning that issue. However, being aware of its importance and topicality, we would like to reiterate our position on it bearing in mind the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee has started its work.

On 9 July a group of socialist countries submitted a Working Paper summarizing ideas regarding the programme of work of the Conference in this area. I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Ambassador of the Mongolian People's Republic, and through him the whole Mongolian people, on the sixty-fourth anniversary of the People's Revolution. The socialist countries proceed from the understanding that pernicious developments fraught with a real threat of an arms race in outer space can and must be stopped, reversed and, finally, ruled out by political means, through the adoption of effective urgent measures negotiated at both bilateral and multilateral talks. We are convinced that our Conference is capable of making a major contribution to accomplishing this task.

It is universally acknowledged that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is at present one of the central issues of modern international relations. Numerous governmental and non-governmental international fora, including the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, as well as discussions in the world press and various negotiations, prove this fact. It is unlikely that anyone would dispute that the future of mankind depends to a large degree on how this issue is resolved.

There is a question why the prevention of an arms race in outer space has become so urgent now, several decades after the launching of satellites into space, as well as the flight of many spacecrafts.

While nuclear energy was first used for military and only then for peaceful purposes, the exploration of space, ushered in by the launching of a Soviet satellite in 1957 during the International Geophysical Year, has from the very beginning followed the path of peace and international co-operation.

For almost three decades now, peaceful co-operation in space has been serving the interests of mankind, as an effective means to solve many global problems, including those of economic development. These problems are, in particular, the exploration and wider use of the Earth's natural resources, the struggle against natural disasters, ensuring food supplies, the improvement of transport and communications, and the development of new materials and technologies. Opportunities and prospects are here practically as unlimited as outer space itself.

And now mankind is facing a real threat of the development and deployment in space of strike weapons designed to destroy objects both in space and on Earth or in the atmosphere from space, and the deployment of weapons, however they may be based, designed to destroy space objects. This creates a situation that is essentially different from the present one because of the appearance of a new type of weapons, namely, attack space weapons which are global weapons with qualitatively new purposes and specifications.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The reality of today is -- and, as the discussion shows, many delegations are interested in this aspect -- that at present there are no offensive space weapons in the arsenals of States. Their communication, navigation, early-warning and other satellites are not weapons in the proper sense of the word. They do not pose the threat of a direct attack in space or from space. They cannot "shoot" or destroy other objects.

Allegations that the militarization of outer space began long ago, almost simultaneously with the launching of satellites of different kinds, and that the arms race in space has continued from that time, do not tally with the facts.

With the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative, the United States has declared to the world that it is going to turn outer space into a new arena of military confrontation. I would like to specify at once that in referring to the SDI we are not being polemical but going by the objective fact that at present it is the only programme which furthers the proclaimed intention of deploying a new type of weapon in space.

The Soviet Union does not have such programme or such intentions. Mikhail S. Gorbachev stressed in his reply to a message from the well-known American organization, the Union of Concerned Scientists, published the other day, that "on behalf of the Soviet leadership I should like to state in all certainty that the Soviet Union will not be the first to take weapons into space. We shall make every effort to persuade other countries too, and above all the United States, not to take such a fatal step, which would inevitably increase the threat of nuclear war and spur on an uncontrolled arms race in all directions".

This important document contains the principled position of the Soviet Union on the key issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its cessation on Earth. At the request of the Soviet delegation the text of Mikhail Gorbachev's reply will be distributed as an official Conference document.

The authors of the SDI, justifiably called the "Star Wars" programme in the United States itself, are trying to convince the world that the implementation of this programme or, in other words, the spread of the arms race to outer space, would allegedly contribute to strengthening peace, preventing nuclear war and even eliminating nuclear weapons. The United States Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, argues this in an article in today's Herald Tribune.

The Soviet Union, as well as the overwhelming majority of States, opposes the militarization of space because, in their view, the implementation of the SDI would have the most fateful consequences for mankind, including the United States.

The Soviet delegation believes that a clear perception of the consequences of the spread of the arms race to outer space is of primary importance for a businesslike and purposeful analysis of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We put the question in this way because we wish to show objectively the urgent and important character of the situation, to explain why the task we

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

face calls above all for a broad political approach, for a display of political will, for the understanding that there is no reasonable alternative to peaceful co-operation in space. It would not be necessary to speak so extensively of the consequences of the militarization of space, if there were no attempts to present the prospect of "Star Wars" as a factor that would strengthen international security.

As for the militarization of outer space, it would begin with the launching into space of offensive weapons designed to destroy objects in space and from space in the atmosphere or on Earth, or with the deployment of weapons designed to destroy space objects. The spread of the arms race to outer space would have various negative long-term consequences: political, military, economic and others. In today's statement I shall refer to the major military-strategic consequences.

First, the emergence of offensive space weapons would accelerate the arms race in all directions, including strategic weapons. It would greatly multiply the arsenals of both sides, cause structural changes in the armed forces and sharply increase the level of military confrontation and the likelihood of nuclear war.

The specific nature of offensive space weapons would play a significant role in such developments. Deployed in geo-stationary orbits and equipped with manoeuvring systems, these weapons can appear over the territory of any State, posing a threat to its security at any moment. In addition, space weapons will probably have enhanced combat readiness and act almost instantly. They can be targeted on objects both in space and in the atmosphere and on Earth.

Naturally, one can imagine that by means of new types of weapons one will succeed in developing a system -- and even according to optimistic calculations it would take decades -- which would be capable of destroying quite effectively the missiles that exist today. However, these missiles will be modernized accordingly. Absolute weapons, which are what is being aimed at, cannot exist: the creative nature of technical progress, science and technology denies the absolute. Moreover, no technology, even the most sophisticated, can guarantee either security or disarmament, for these are political problems and cannot be resolved by technical means.

Secondly, strategic stability would be gravely undermined.

The scope for the emergence of crisis situations, as a result, among other things, of misinterpretation, incidents or technical failure, would be substantially expanded. By way of example, if now the failure of a satellite can only be the result of technical faults, when space is saturated with armaments it could be misinterpreted as the result of premeditated activities by the other side.

Practically, space weapons are designed automatically to hit their targets. While modern weapon systems allow a certain amount of time to evaluate the situation, hold consultations and prevent the irreparable, with the presence of offensive space weapons war can break out instantly, literally at lightning speed. Political confidence would thus be reduced to the level of reliance on technology, and its capabilities.

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Thirdly, the spread of the arms race to outer space will disorganize the process and machinery of disarmament talks, and undermine the prospects of limiting and reducing armaments as a whole.

The Soviet-United States negotiations on nuclear and space weapons may become one of the first victims of the "Star Wars" programme. As we have already said, the unconstructive position of the United States at these negotiations is hampering mutually acceptable agreements. Those who hope to use the SDI as a means of pressure on the Soviet Union are grossly mistaken. We will not again allow the negotiations to be used as a blind for military preparations.

The negative effect of the SDI in spurring on the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, can already be felt at other talks. The Conference on Disarmament witnesses this phenomenon in the discussions on practically all agenda items.

Fourthly, the policy to militarize space shatters the present system of treaties restraining the arms race on Earth and preventing it in space.

The United States, for instance, already does not conceal that when the stage comes of taking the decision to deploy the weapons created under the SDI programme it will unilaterally break the ABM Treaty. In principle, the United States will face the same dilemma with regard to a number of other international legal documents limiting the military use of space.

The consequences of an arms race in space to which we have referred are by no means all, but the foregoing is enough to understand that it will lead to the destabilization of the situation and a greater threat of a nuclear war.

That is why the socialist countries have suggested that the Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 of the agenda should discuss -- in strict compliance with its mandate -- the political, military, economic and other consequences of the extension of the arms race into outer space.

The socialist countries have proposed that the Ad Hoc Committee should concentrate its attention on the significance of existing international agreements relating to the limitation of military activities in outer space for the prevention of an arms race in space, as a second topic. We seek a businesslike discussion with a clear purpose -- to determine which channels of such a race are already closed off and which should be closed off to guarantee its prevention, so that we may effectively tackle the main problem, which is to work out urgent practical measures.

A similar businesslike approach underlies the third element of our outline for the programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee, the discussion of the proposals on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We propose that in this context the following Soviet proposals should be studied: the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space (1981), the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth (1983) and the proposal on the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind (1984). Naturally, we are also ready productively to discuss other proposals and initiatives in keeping with the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee and to find practical solutions for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We are ready to co-operate constructively with other participating States to implement the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. It is from this position of constructive co-operation that we approach the draft programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee submitted by the Group of 21. The orientation and the specific provisions of this document have very much in common with those of the socialist States. In our view, this is no mere coincidence but a proof of a similar approach to the substance of the problem. This similarity has been demonstrated at the Conference from the very beginning of the discussion of problems relating to the prevention of an arms race in space.

The stance of the Western countries produces a quite different impression. It obviously leads away from the mainstream of work and is designed to produce a protracted discussion which will not lead to concrete measures in the foreseeable future. In proposing, in particular, that the agreements limiting the use of space for military purposes be reviewed, the group of Western countries is, apparently, more interested in finding areas of understanding and differences in views on the application of existing agreements, in other words, in the legalization and regulation of the arms race in space, rather than its prevention. Hence the appeals for an in-depth lengthy examination of existing agreements, to engage in "intellectual exercises", stem from.

However, the mandate does not provide for such work. In addition, some of these agreements have their own review mechanism. The Conference on Disarmament -- even bearing in mind all its potential -- can hardly provide such a universal mechanism. And there is no practical need for it. The task of the Ad Hoc Committee can be successfully accomplished without such considerable detours.

This should also be pointed out in connection with the statement of the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany at the plenary, in which he referred to a wide range of questions. Both the Working Paper of the socialist countries and our statement give answers to some of them. However, we are going to comment on further issues raised in the statement at one of the next meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee.

We have presented some views of the Soviet delegation concerning the guidelines for the Conference's activities this year in relation to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Soviet leadership considers it most important that space should serve peace. The Soviet Union basically considers that the task of the prevention of an arms race in space and its cessation on Earth can be practically resolved, given the political will and the sincere desire of all participants to achieve this historic goal.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, I am taking the floor today in order to introduce a Working Paper of my delegation, under agenda item one, Nuclear Test Ban. This paper is now before you; it bears the number CD/612.

I am pleased that the tabling of this document coincides with the introduction of another Working Paper on the same subject by the delegation of the United Kingdom. As explained to us by the distinguished Ambassador of the United Kingdom, that Paper provides an excellent description of the technical and political problems involved in test ban issues, and, in particular of the present state of the art of seismic technology. Working Paper CD/610 merits a serious and detailed discussion in this Conference. My delegation fully supports its thrust. This British Working Paper should be looked at in close conjunction with the Working Paper I am introducing today.

The Federal Government attaches great importance to the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. It thus supports initiatives which allow further progress in the realization of this objective. At the same time, my Government is conscious of the significance that must be attributed to the Geneva negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and lends its full support to the goal of deep reductions of nuclear-weapon arsenals. It is in this general context that the present Working Paper on "the Establishment and Progressive Improvement of an International Seismic Monitoring and Verification System relating to a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban" has been conceived.

Despite numerous efforts and consultations among delegations it has so far not proven possible to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the agenda item "Nuclear Test Ban" in the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation deplores this fact. We are convinced that important work remains to be done, in particular, in the field of monitoring and verifying a CTB. Although a consensus on a mandate for a CTB work organ eludes us, my delegation is determined to continue the analysis and search for solutions of those problems which are crucial to the implementation of, and compliance with, a future comprehensive test-ban.

The effective verification of compliance with a test ban constitutes the key to a successful conclusion of efforts to bring a comprehensive test-ban treaty about. The willingness of States to commit themselves to an absolute nuclear test stop presupposes the conviction at a very high level of confidence that continued and militarily significant nuclear testing cannot go undetected. For this very reason the major part of efforts in this Conference and in its predecessor bodies to establish a CTB has focused on issues related to verification, in particular verification by seismic means. All of these considerations, however, have been geared to the elaboration of a legal instrument and to the moment where such an instrument in the ultimate form of a test-ban treaty would be put into effect.

In contrast with this anticipatory approach it is the purpose of this Working Paper to initiate the establishment and continuous operation of a monitoring and verification system based on seismic technology at the present time, well before the conclusion of a CTB Treaty. In order to set such a process in motion the international seismic-data-exchange system, as tested

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

in the 1984 GSE test run, should be put into a continuous operating mode. While in operation this system would be geographically expanded and technically improved with the objective to implement a global seismic network which would meet the degree of sophistication desired for monitoring and verifying a CTB on the global level. The proposed project would give scientists the opportunity to resolve, in a learning-by-doing process, remaining problems of monitoring and verification and to increase, progressively, the system's capability to detect and identify explosions. In a dynamic process of scientific research and practical application the global seismic network would mature over time and be available and operational upon the conclusion of a CTBT.

The establishment and continuous operation of such a network needs to be embedded in an institutional framework. It is, therefore suggested in the Working Paper that during the transitional period, that is during the pre-treaty phase, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should be assigned the task of supervising the establishment and continuous operation of the global network and making recommendations for its further improvement. The GSE would, as in the past, submit its recommendations and reports to the Conference on Disarmament. Its new task could be bestowed upon the GSE by way of a new mandate once the GSE has finalized, and submitted, its comprehensive report on the 1984 technical test run. Seismological facilities and data centres would be operated, as during the 1984 experiment, by participating States.

Mr. President, let me add a brief comment on the technical section of the Working Paper. This section is a summary of a more detailed scientific study which will shortly be presented to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts by the Federal Government's scientific advisors. The data provided in the present summary reflect a broad over-all approach to the intricate problems of estimating magnitude-yield relations. They need further refinement in the light of additional calibration data.

The Paper focuses on monitoring and verification by seismic means. This does not, however, exclude other possibilities, such as for instance monitoring of atmospheric radioactivity, to the extent that they could also make a contribution. Such additional technological approaches to verifying a future CTB could and should be incorporated in the proposed institutional framework.

My delegation submits this Working Paper with the intention of giving to our considerations relating to a CTB a new impetus. I hope that this concrete and practical proposal will find a positive and supportive reaction from delegations in this Conference during the present session and will motivate all delegations to embark once more on a substantive dialogue on the subject of a comprehensive test-ban.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Two and a half months ago, on 25 and 26 April, a Symposium on "Survival in the Nuclear Age" was held in New York, co-sponsored by the Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies and Parliamentarians for World Order. The Symposium was chaired by Willy Brandt and, as he said in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the 29 participants in the Symposium, of whom I had the privilege to be one, "coming from East and West, North and South" were broadly representative of the world community.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

As a result of its discussions, the Symposium adopted a Statement dealing with topics which were intimately related with those included in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, and my delegation therefore thought fit to request to have it reproduced and circulated as an official document of the Conference, which has been done today under symbol CD/609.

We believe that the conclusions summarized in the Statement may be useful for our work, as will be evident simply by listing the main topics with which it deals: the nuclear threat, East-West relations, a nuclear-weapons freeze, a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test-ban, the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the relationship between disarmament and development, and the mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament.

The authors of the Statement refer in approving terms to another Declaration, namely, the one signed in New Delhi by six heads of State or Government on 28 January of this year, which was also circulated in due course as a document of the Conference on Disarmament under symbol CD/549; and they conclude with an appeal for "the rapid initiation and implementation of a programme of disarmament" which should include the following four measures which greatly resemble those recommended in the New Delhi Declaration:

"1. An agreement to prevent the militarization of and the extension of the arms race to outer space;

2. The immediate cessation of all tests of nuclear weapons and the prompt conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty;

3. A mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems;

4. A declaration by those nuclear-weapon States that have not done so, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons."

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement. There are no more speakers on my list. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

The secretariat has today circulated at my request a time-table of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The time-table has been drawn up in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees. As usual, it is purely indicative and can be modified as necessary. In this connection, I should like to announce that, after consultations with the Co-ordinators of the groups, it would appear that there is no objection to adding to the time-table circulated by the secretariat an informal meeting of the Conference on Thursday, 18 July immediately after the plenary meeting. This informal meeting will be devoted to the report by the Conference to the General Assembly on the consideration of new measures in the field of disarmament to avoid an arms race on the sea bed and the ocean floor and in the

(The President)

subsoil thereof. If I hear no objection, the secretariat will circulate a revised time-table including this addition, and I will take it that the Conference wishes to adopt the time-table thus amended.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 16 July, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.