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FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on
Thursday, 18 July 1985, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. Bachir Ould-Rouis

(Algeria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. B. OULD-ROUIS Mr. L. MOUSSAOUI Mr. A. BELAID
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. G. PARINI
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R. ROWE Mr. R. TYSON Mrs. S. FREEMAN Miss J. COURTNEY
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. J. RAEYMACKERS Mr. Ph. NIEUWENHUYS
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV Mr. K. STANKOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI U MYA THAN Y HLA MYINT
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. J.A. BEESLEY Mr. R. ROCHON Mr. R. VANIER Mr. A. DESPRES
<u>China:</u>	Ms. WANG ZHIYUN Mr. LIU ZHONGREN Mr. LIN CHENG Mr. YU ZHONGZHOU Mr. XIA YISHAN Mr. JIANG ZHENXI Mr. LI BENSONG Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG

Cuba:

Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA

Mr. H. RIVERO

Mr. J.L. GARCIA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. VEJVODA

Mr. J. HAJGAR

Egypt:

Mr. S. ALFARARGI

Mr. M. BADR

Mr. A. ABBAS

Mr. F. MONIB

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France:

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German Democratic Republic:

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Germany, Federal Republic of:

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Mr. D. MEISZTER

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Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO

Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO

Ms. R. TANZIL

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Islamic Republic of Iran:

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Mr. R. IMAI
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Mr. K. KUDO
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

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Mr. P.N. MWAURA

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Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

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Mr. O. HILALE

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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

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Mr. S.V. KOBYSH
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. V.A. LEPLINSKY

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Mr. D. DORN

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 322nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference today continues its consideration of agenda item 4, chemical weapons. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any matter related to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers the representatives of Cuba, Yugoslavia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mongolia, the German Democratic Republic and Canada.

I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Lechuga Hevia.

Mr. LECHUGA HEVIA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): First of all, we wish to greet Ambassador Ould-Rouis as President of the Conference. We know his diplomatic abilities and, as the representative of Algeria, a country of great merit in the struggle for disarmament, we were well aware that he would guide our work skilfully and efficiently.

We welcome the new representative of France, Ambassador Jacques Jessel, and hope he enjoys his stay in our midst. On the other hand, we regret the departure of Ambassador Carasales of Argentina, whom we wish success in his new duties. We also wish to pay tribute to the efforts made by the Ambassador of Zaire as President last month.

We should like to make some comments on aspects of two items currently being discussed in the Conference, namely, radiological weapons and prevention of attacks on nuclear facilities, and the problem of herbicides, which is being considered in the context of chemical weapons. With regard to the former, it is clear that document CD/594 of 12 June submitted by a group of Socialist States opens up new possibilities for resolving major aspects in the negotiations, since it indicates that the countries belonging to the Group are prepared to address the prohibition of radiological weapons and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in a single agreement, although they continue to favour a separate solution to the two questions.

Furthermore, it is well known that the member countries of the Group of 21 have been in favour of a successful solution to the negotiations, and to that end they have made important contributions to enable work to advance as rapidly as possible.

We therefore find, at this new stage in the negotiations, the flexibility displayed by the Socialist countries in order to smooth the way for an agreement encouraging: combined with the interest of the non-aligned and neutral countries, it can spur on the negotiations. However, we wish to draw attention, as has so often been done here in the Conference by various countries, to the urgent need successfully to complete an agreement, as it appears that some sectors still intend to extend ad infinitum the consideration of the item on the grounds, it is sometimes argued, that radiological weapons do not yet exist and that the prevention of attacks on nuclear facilities is a difficult problem to tackle. The same is said about the question of herbicides. We believe that in both cases there are enough elements for us to concern ourselves seriously with resolving them, and that no effort will be in vain.

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

It is true that radiological weapons do not yet exist as such, but the technological possibility of manufacturing them does, which is already a threat. It is no secret that large amounts, hundreds of thousands of tons, of radioactive sludge have been accumulated in the world, as well as other wastes with enormous destructive potential, which can be neither reduced nor neutralized by current methods, and we know that this is a serious problem for the major nuclear countries which have difficulty in getting ride of these lethal wastes.

A solution to this situation could be found by using this material for radiological weapons. Radiological weapons are an incentive for finding a use for this radioactive material, especially bearing in mind that there are countries which have already erased the arms limitation frontiers in the ceaseless search for every kind of weapon.

Furthermore, we cannot forget that the neutron bomb already exists which, from the technological standpoint, is considered more complex than a weapon whose sole purpose is the dispersion of radioactive material. It is well known that the neutron bomb uses one of the destructive factors of nuclear weapons, so-called penetrating radiation, and could also use as a destructive factor the radioactive contamination of the ground, which would be achieved through radiological weapons, and therefore clearly there is no lack of incentive for developing it. We recognize that there are problems which remain to be resolved, but they have solutions which it is not difficult to implement. These include the means of transporting the radioactive material to the objective in a safe and economical manner in relation to the objectives pursued. Another important problem referred to as an open question is the possible military justification for such weapons.

The view expressed by the experts on these problems seems to us to be valid. In the first place, the question of safe and economical transfer to the objective, in other words, the handling and economical use of radiological weapons without endangering the life and health of one's own forces, is in the view of the experts a complex technical problem but one which can shortly be resolved due to the extremely rapid development of high-density and low-weight polymers. These can produce materials with a high coefficient of semi-reduction, and thus light and thin, which will make it possible to protect the personnel handling the weapons and at the same time to transport them.

The other argument advanced by those who entertain doubts about radiological weapons is the military justification for them. In our opinion -- and in the opinion of experts in this field -- this view is groundless because such weapons could contaminate the ground in a military manoeuvre aimed at ensuring a rapid offensive; they could protect the attacker's flanks and disorganize enemy logistics. In other words, they could play the same role as chemical weapons in these respects. Thus, there is likewise no lack of military justification for using them.

Radiological weapons are therefore an immediate possibility from the technical standpoint, and would solve current problems for which there is no better solution, besides having a devastating military use.

Referring now to the prevention of attacks on nuclear facilities, we would point out that this is an issue of interest not only to the developing countries but also to the highly industrialized countries, and although what is essential -- and that is the central concern of the Conference -- is to avoid the consequences of the dispersion of radioactive material resulting from an attack, we cannot

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

overlook the immense damage which would be suffered by a developing country's economy as a result of not being protected against this possibility. The issue embraces both of these factors, neither of which can be ignored.

Today no one can forgo the advantages stemming from the peaceful use of nuclear energy. A number of developing countries are already using it industrially and others are on the way to doing so. I believe that we must speak frankly. An attack on a nuclear facility of a country which does not have the capability for military response, or which is not capable of deterring a potential attacker, is or should be a matter of concern to a developing country because the aggressor would have a very large margin of impunity and for that very reason would be encouraged to indulge in aggression. In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind the mass destruction resulting from radioactive dispersion and the accompanying economic damage which would also be a military objective.

With regard to herbicides, a question being considered in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons which some view as secondary in relation to the rest of the issue, we wish merely to recall the experience of Viet Nam. For many years to come it will suffer from the consequences of the indiscriminate use of herbicides by the United States, which sprayed thousands of tons of "Agent Orange" and "Agent Blue", causing more than 50 per cent of the cultivable land and forest to be eroded, to the point that experts have stated that it will take at least 50 years more for Viet Nam's soil to regain its earlier fertility.

As we know, herbicides are chemicals that are highly toxic not only for plants and animals but also for human beings. For example, an impurity of "Agent Orange" is dioxine, which affects human beings and takes many years to become innocuous, and thus after the Viet Nam war there has been a considerable increase in the rate of malformation in newborn babies.

The use of herbicides not only causes sterility of plants but also eliminates the sources of supply for the population in general, kills the fish in contaminated water, erodes the soil, causes serious poisoning of human beings and animals, and leads to sterility in women and malformation in newborn babies: in other words, it is hardly a gardening product -- it is something far more important and far more dangerous.

This is the tragic experience of its indiscriminate use in Viet Nam, which in fact was used as a large testing-ground in what no one can deny was an offensive act of war: its importance and its danger therefore cannot be underestimated. These are, in sum, the comments we wished to make.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Mihajlovic.

Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, I am taking the floor to introduce the Yugoslav Working Paper entitled "Permitted Activities and Verification Measures", which has been distributed to delegations under the symbol CD/613. Besides its basic task of banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, the future convention should also have an important task of regulating a number of permitted activities for which specific verification measures should be provided. These permitted activities concern permitted activities for protective purposes and so-called other permitted activities.

(Mr. Mihajlovic, Yugoslavia)

The permitted activities for protective purposes imply all activities aimed at the research, development and production of protective items and medicaments-antidotes. Some of these activities may create doubt about compliance with the convention and thus lessen confidence among States parties. In order to avoid this, the Working Paper points to the necessity of defining criteria for specific types of toxic chemicals which will be used for protective purposes, and measures of verification applicable to the production facilities for these purposes. To this end the production of toxic chemicals, mostly of super-toxic lethal chemicals, not exceeding 1 metric tonne per year is envisaged. Such production of toxic chemicals for these purposes should be carried out in a special facility the capacity of which should not exceed these quantities. Hence, such a facility should by its size belong to the category of small-scale production facilities.

Bearing in mind that this type of facility is used for the synthesis of highly toxic chemicals, of chemical warfare agents for the most part, it should be effectively automated. Automation would be needed for effective data recording, monitoring of the production and process control. The monitoring of all wastes would also be necessary. The monitoring of the production should, for its part, meet the basic requirements of continuous control of the material and energy balances of the synthesis and storage of the data in a computer centre. The verification of such a facility should, in our view, be international, and its method random inspection or challenge, depending on the consensus reached. The declaration of such a facility should be as detailed as possible, with all the necessary information on the technological processes, capacity of the facility and end use both of intermediates and final products.

Within the framework of other permitted activities, the attention of the previous negotiations was focused on the production of chemicals (other lethal chemicals, other harmful chemicals) which are widely used today in the civilian commercial industry. Such production is now being carried out, and is likely to be carried out in the future as well, in large industrial facilities. Further processing of such toxic chemicals is more often than not carried out within one technological process in the same facility. In this case the control of these chemicals is very simple, especially if the process is automated. The situation is a little more complex if the chemicals are sent to another processor. Then, in our view, the appropriate declaration should be made to permit verification. In any case, the verification of these facilities should, according to our Paper, be carried out by a national authority which should regularly inform the Consultative Committee about the production. Only if there is doubt that the convention is being violated will it be possible to proceed to international verification.

Having in mind the proposals put forward by many delegations that the convention should not prevent the development of the chemical, and pharmaceutical industry in particular, the Yugoslav delegation considers that there is a need to examine the possibility of producing super-toxic lethal chemicals for other permitted purposes. Namely, the rapid development of synthetic organic

(Mr. Mihajlovic, Yugoslavia)

chemistry over the past decades has brought about new methods of synthesis of biologically active chemical compounds whose structure is similar to that of natural compounds. Some of these compounds are highly toxic, but have, nevertheless, certain therapeutic characteristics which are increasingly being used in the treatment of many diseases. Due to their high toxicity, the doses of these chemicals used in human and veterinary treatment are very small. Consequently, the production of these compounds can be carried out in a pilot plant. In the view of the Yugoslav delegation, the annual production of these super-toxic lethal chemicals for other permitted purposes should not exceed 1 metric tonne, and only exceptionally their production should be maximally 2 metric tonnes per year. The number of such facilities will depend on the development of the pharmaceutical industry. The facility, however, should be so designed to permit full automation and monitoring at all stages of the production process. As in the case of small-scale production facilities for protective purposes, these facilities also should be equipped with instruments for recording aggregate material and energy balances and all parameters (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the process of synthesis.

As with the small-scale production facilities for protective purposes, the verification of these facilities should be carried out on an international basis depending on the consensus achieved. Having in mind, further, that the commercial products are also involved, it is necessary, we believe, to provide detailed information on the end user.

Overall, the purpose of this Working Paper is to contribute to the general desire that the Convention permit those activities which do not prevent further development of the chemical industry and technology, as well as the development of natural science in general.

The Yugoslav delegation expresses the hope that the Paper will be considered favourably by the delegations and will contribute to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in its drafting of the Convention.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, in today's statement I would like to address the present state of the multilateral negotiations on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

I would recall that these talks have been under way since 1980 when the Committee on Disarmament decided to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group. In past years we have achieved a certain amount of progress, and although such progress could have been considerably greater, nevertheless, at least until now, there has been movement in the direction we are seeking, namely, the elaboration of a draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. I am not going to refer now to the difficulties which stood in our way and hampered our progress, or to what caused those difficulties. The purpose of my statement today is to analyse the state of affairs at the negotiations and to assess a new obstacle our talks are currently facing.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

I have in mind the recent decision by the House of Representatives which, following the decision by the Senate of the United States Congress, has approved the appropriation of funds for the production of binary chemical weapons. And although this production is to start in 1987 and the decision contains some reservations, this does not change the substance of the matter: the United States is practically ready to add a new type of weapon -- binary nerve gas -- to its military arsenal.

It is highly significant that it is planned to deploy these weapons above all on the territory of West European countries. As in the case of the new United States nuclear missiles (Pershing-2 and long-range land-based cruise missiles), this decision also clearly reveals Washington's calculation to ward off a possible retaliatory strike from its territory and to divert it against its allies. Thus, binary weapons would become one more source of a sinister danger to the densely-populated countries of Western Europe.

However, this is not an aspect directly related to our negotiations. The Soviet delegation wishes to stress the negative effect which the practical creation and deployment of binary chemical weapons can have on our negotiations.

Even before the adoption of the above-mentioned decisions by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States Congress on appropriations for the production of binary chemical weapons, the Soviet delegation was proceeding on the understanding that the convention under consideration should contain provisions prohibiting the development of such weapons. It is well known from the records of disarmament negotiations that it is far simpler to prevent the development of a new type of weapon than to try to remove it from arsenals after it has been developed. This applies to binary weapons to an even greater degree, above all, because of the additional difficulties which can arise in singling out components of binary weapons from the vast, diversified area of commercial activities and the determination of the régime for key components and verification of compliance with that régime.

What is the basic difference between binary and non-binary chemical systems? Above all, it is that in order to produce components of binary weapons it is not absolutely necessary to create facilities specially designed for the purpose, whereas this is necessary for non-binary weapons. By their properties, the components of binary weapons can be produced at all usual commercial facilities of the chemical industry. That is the first basic difference between binary and unitary weapons.

Furthermore, key components and key precursors, are by no means the same from the standpoint of their military importance, in spite of the fact that according to their level of toxicity they could belong to the same category of chemicals. To produce the final product, i.e. supertoxic lethal chemicals, at least one more technological stage of production in industry is needed. But a key component is by no means a semi-product in the technological chain of the production of supertoxic lethal chemical that is one or more technological processes away from the stage of munition-filling; it is a part of a munition that is completely ready for use.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Industrial facilities are not required to produce the final product from the key component. The production process will be carried out during the delivery of the munition to the target, and at the point of use in combat the supertoxic lethal chemical, for instance YX nerve gas, would be released from the munition, as if the latter contained that chemical and not its precursor.

Thus, both supertoxic lethal chemicals and key components whose reaction with other component would produce this supertoxic lethal chemical at the moment of combat use, are chemicals of one and the same type, the same category. That is why the same requirements should apply to both supertoxic lethal chemicals and key components, both from the point of view of prohibition and limitations and from the point of view of the verification of how the prohibition and limitations are complied with. In this connection a whole number of additional complex questions can arise, which we will have to resolve taking due account of the United States decision to produce binary weapons.

If, within the framework of the convention which is being elaborated now, we were to ban binary weapons on the same basis as other types of chemical weapons, then, bearing in mind the above-mentioned specific features of binary weapons, the convention would contain very significant loopholes.

We have been told that binary weapons can be banned by the provisions on the verification of key precursors, which would be included into the convention. In other words, the same régime is proposed for the limitation and verification of both key components and key precursors, which would differ from the régime for supertoxic lethal chemicals. We agree with this as far as key precursors are concerned, for key precursors of such chemicals can be used in peaceful industry too. This softer régime for key precursors would also be justified with regard to the interests of the commercial chemical industry as well as the purposes of the convention because, as I have already said, key precursors by themselves cannot directly serve destructive purposes. To process them into supertoxic lethal chemical would require an entire industrial cycle or cycles. And it is precisely this stage -- and as far as we understand there is a broad understanding in this regard -- that should be controlled in an especially strict manner.

Actually, there are several chemicals that can be simultaneously key components and key precursors. Naturally, any key component can be used as a key precursor in commercial industry. The whole question is whether it is appropriate to do so. However, by no means all key precursors can be key components. Therefore, key components belong to a more dangerous category of chemicals than key precursors.

What will happen if key components are equated with key precursors? There would be a possibility that key components would be directly used to fill binary munitions, and the régime designed for key precursors would not prevent the circumvention of the provisions of the convention. These components of binary weapons can be produced in commercial industry both deliberately, which would certainly represent a violation of the convention, and also -- if relevant

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

limitations are not introduced — not deliberately, because at commercial facilities some chemicals can be produced for peaceful purposes and, if desired, easily be switched over to the production of binary weapons. It would also mean that under the conditions for the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles the States with the technology for the production of binary weapons would have considerable military advantages because they would have a certain industrial base, in the form of commercial facilities, for developing chemical munitions.

That is why the TASS statement published on 10 July this year, which has been circulated as a Working Paper of the Conference on Disarmament, under symbol CD/615, of 17 July 1985, stresses that the Soviet Union firmly condemns the plans for the production and deployment of binary weapons and that the United States project to begin production of binary chemical weapons must necessarily arouse serious alarm and indignation. The United States Government bears full responsibility for all consequences of this step. It is the direct duty of peoples not to allow this planned new crime against peace and mankind.

The Soviet Union consistently advocates the radical solution of the question of the prohibition and elimination of all types of chemical weapons, and reiterates its readiness actively to co-operate with all States to accomplish this task. This is also stressed in the above-mentioned TASS statement.

We have thought it necessary to explain our position on the binary problem in detail in the hope that other delegations will also consider most seriously the new situation that has arisen in the negotiations. For there remain some delegations which seek to brush aside the problem of binary weapons. Unless it is solved, there can be no effective chemical-weapon ban.

Needless to say, in the negotiations there are many other complicated issues, chief among which may be said to be the question of verification. The Soviet Union has already demonstrated considerable flexibility on this question, having agreed to systematic on-site inspections of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and of permitted production at special facilities. With regard to other types of activities to be prohibited, we also admit the use of international procedures, in particular on-site inspections on a voluntary basis. The combination of national forms of verification with international procedures provides, in our view, the basis on which the problem of verification could be resolved.

The Soviet side seeks the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. We proceed from the understanding that its conclusion may be preceded by steps to prohibit chemical weapons at the regional level. In this connection I would like to recall the proposal of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty to the NATO States to rid Europe of chemical weapons, which was submitted in January 1984.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Partial measures at the regional level for the limitation, reduction and destruction of chemical weapons would involve a smaller number of States than the global measures, and it would be easier to co-ordinate and implement them. At the same time these regional measures leading to the elimination of the entire class of weapons of mass destruction would certainly strengthen European security, contribute to the lessening of the military threat, the strengthening of mutual confidence and the improvement of the political atmosphere as a whole.

In this context I would like to mention the initiative of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany which also propose to resolve the problem of chemical weapons at a regional level, involving three States. This positive initiative is designed to rid the European continent of chemical weapons.

The implementation of such partial measures would contribute to the efforts undertaken on a global scale aimed at the speeding up of the conclusion of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which remains a final goal of the Warsaw Treaty member States.

The Soviet delegation, for its part, is ready to speed up the elaboration of a draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and the implementation of the relevant United Nations General Assembly decisions which express the will of mankind as a whole.

We believe, that it is high time to begin, according to the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate to draft provisions of the Convention. There is a good foundation for this work in the form of the Annex to the 1984 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We are ready actively to participate in this process both within the framework of existing Working Groups and in the course of any multilateral and bilateral consultations. In our view, the fixing of agreements already reached would substantially facilitate further progress on other questions which remain unresolved.

In conclusion I would like to thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Turbanski, for his great contribution to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, and also to take this opportunity to congratulate him on the forthcoming National Day of the Polish People's Republic and wish him and his colleagues all the best. This is especially appropriate now, in the year when the fortieth anniversary of the victory over fascism is being commemorated. The Polish people made a great contribution to this victory, by paying with the lives of many millions of its sons and daughters and vast material losses for the great victory over nazism and fascism.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia)(translated from Russian): In my statement today I should like briefly to refer to agenda item 5, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

During both the spring part and this summer part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament we have heard many statements concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and this is absolutely justified. The arms race has spread to virtually every sphere of human activity and now threatens also to extend into space.

Anyone with a clear grasp of the reality of our time understands that the result of the arms race in space, the creation of new types of strategic weapons — offensive space systems — means an increase in the danger of the outbreak of a mutually annihilating conflict.

The militarization of space would be a mighty catalyst of the arms race in all areas and would undermine the very possibility of an arms limitation and reduction process. If it is not prevented today, the appearance of weapons in space will mark a qualitatively new stage in the arms race with uncontrolled and possibly irreversible processes. Despite the fact that the arms race has not yet spread to space, the political decisions to carry out the "Star Wars" are already plaguing the world and destabilizing the situation. The development of offensive space weapons would have, to say the least, negative consequences for all mankind, and would inevitably result in diminished security for all countries, including those possessing such weapons.

It will also certainly trigger off a chain reaction for the development of a continuing series of new weapon systems which will further complicate the strategic balance and further increase the degree of uncertainty which is already inherent in the modern strategic situation because of the very nature of nuclear weapons. In this connection it should be borne in mind that the growth of uncertainty for one side inevitably leads to the same for the other, as the first side will be obliged, to take the necessary retaliatory measures in order to reduce the degree of uncertainty created for it. Naturally, with such a course of events, the world would not be delivered from nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear disaster would only increase. It would be a mistake to proceed from the principle that a State can safeguard its security at the expense of others' security. The only possible approach is strict compliance with the principle of equality and equal security.

Owing to the existence of a dialectical link between strategic offensive and defensive weapons, the question of the development of space anti-missile systems largely determines the possibility of the achievement of agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, and in future also at the multilateral level, for the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive weapons, and the adoption of measures for their re-organization in the direction of enhanced strategic stability. In this connection it should be stressed that the goal of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva, as was agreed by the two sides in January this year, is to prevent an arms race in space and terminate it on Earth, and to limit and reduce nuclear arms. As we understand it, there are two aspects here, each of which is extremely important. Above all, the subject of the negotiations is to prevent, to bar the militarization of space, and not to allow it in this or that form. It is perfectly clear that here there can be no two points of view. And the other major element is that it is stressed that there

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

is a single correct and positive relationship between space and nuclear weapons, which is to say that the prevention of an arms race in space would facilitate agreement on the reduction of nuclear weapons, and vice versa.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the USSR and the United States were negotiating on strategic weapons, they jointly recognized that there is an unbreakable link between strategic offensive and defensive weapons. It was no accident that in 1972 the Soviet Union and the United States simultaneously signed the Treaty on the limitation of ABM systems which is of indefinite duration, and the first agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons (SALT I). What was necessary and right in the early 1970s has today become even more relevant at a time when plans are being prepared to convert space into a source of lethal danger. In this connection, we were unfortunately not convinced of the contrary by the statement of the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Lowitz, to which my delegation as usual listened with great attention last Tuesday. Ambassador Lowitz said, "the Strategic Defence Initiative is a programme to explore technologies that might some day be useful in providing a defence against nuclear ballistic missile attack".

In our view this means that the Strategic Defence Initiative pursues a quite definite goal, the development of an anti-missile system for the territory of the United States.

In this way, the programme, even if it is "purely a research programme", is already by its very nature incompatible with the ABM Treaty. The facts show that the appropriations for the SDI, which are far in excess of what would be required for scientific research, include in addition to research, expensive design work for new weapons as well as the testing of their components and sub-systems, which is directly contrary to the above-mentioned Treaty.

Like the overwhelming majority of the world's States, Mongolia is firmly in favour of the adoption of practical measures in order to erect a solid barrier in the path of the extension of the arms race to an area where it has hitherto not existed, outer space. This problem is one that can be wholly solved.

The Mongolian approach to this problem is reflected in Working Paper CD/607 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", which I submitted on behalf of a group of Socialist countries on 9 July. Without going into details, I should like merely to stress that the Socialist States propose that agreement should be reached on the prohibition and elimination of an entire class of weapons, namely, offensive space weapons, including space-based anti-missile systems and anti-satellite systems. It is urgently necessary to resolve this question, before the next spurt is made in the space arms race, with incalculable consequences. The experience of negotiations on the limitation of large-scale weapon systems shows the difficulties which arise once weapons have already been developed, deployed and stockpiled.

The current situation requires that the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space should effectively carry out its work on the consideration of the issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and go on to the next, fundamental stage, which consists of negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

Together with working out new measures for the prevention of an arms race in space, it is very important to preserve and strengthen the foundation which already exists in this field. This applies first of all to the Soviet Union-United States Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 1972, which is of indefinite duration, as well as multilateral agreements such as the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963, the Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1967, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques of 1977, and others.

It is no less important, on this foundation, to ensure that the exclusion of space from the arms race should become a strict norm of the policy of States, and a universally acknowledged international obligation. This is the aim of the peaceful initiatives of the USSR such as the proposals for agreement on the prohibition of the stationing in space of weapons of any kind (1981), the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth (1983), and the use of space exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of mankind (1984). It is also worth recalling that in August 1983 the Soviet Union declared a unilateral moratorium on being the first to launch anti-satellite weapons into space, which is still in force now.

The Mongolian Delegation sincerely believes that with the political will of States it is possible to prevent a space arms race. This would ensure that space could be used for creative rather than destructive purposes. The guaranteed prevention of the militarization of space would make it possible to unite the efforts of all States in the peaceful use of outer space.

Mankind does not face the threat of war only from the nuclear arms race. The use of other types of weapon of mass destruction could also have disastrous consequences. Together with nuclear weapons, chemical weapons are one of the means of mass destruction that have been developed in practice. In addition, chemical warfare agents, unlike nuclear weapons, are available to a broad circle of States, which makes them still more dangerous. Thousands of tons of chemical weapons are stockpiled in the arsenals of States. Nevertheless, recently the House of Representatives of the United States Congress decided to appropriate funds for the production of a new generation of chemical weapons, binary weapons. All this makes the prohibition of chemical weapons one of the most urgent and pressing tasks.

Tangible progress must be made in the Conference on Disarmament in working out a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, bearing in mind that negotiations in this field are at an advanced stage.

We consider that building on the work that has already been done it would be possible to proceed to an agreement on the text of particular articles of the Convention on the issues on which there is general consensus.

The Mongolian Delegation welcomes the agreement recently reached between the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the leading political party of the German Democratic Republic, and the Social Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany on a framework for negotiations between Governments for the conclusion in the foreseeable future of a treaty for the creation of a chemical weapon-free-zone in Europe. There can be no doubt that such regional measures would greatly facilitate the achievement of an agreement for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The sixtieth anniversary of the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was recently commemorated. This document laid the basis for the prohibition of chemical weapons and its political significance remains entire. It must be strengthened in future, and the main thing that is required of the Conference of Disarmament in this connection is a display of political will and decision to achieve as rapidly as possible an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as the logical culmination of the Geneva Protocol.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference for the month of July. I am confident that your diplomatic skills and experience which we have come to appreciate in your capacity as the representative of Algeria, a country with which the German Democratic Republic has had long-standing friendly relations, be of great value in our quest for solutions to the difficult problems before us. I wish you every success in the discharge of your responsible duties and pledge my delegation's full support and co-operation. Through you, Mr. President, I wish to thank your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Zaire, for his consistent efforts and able work as President of the Conference on Disarmament in the previous month. Finally we would like to express our deep regret that Ambassador Carasales of Argentina is going to leave us. My delegation wishes to thank him very much for the excellent relations we have always maintained and we wish him good luck.

States tried to institute a ban on chemical weapons only when they had already claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people. Efforts to prohibit nuclear weapons were not undertaken until hundreds of thousands of people had already been killed by them in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If space weapons are created and used, there will hardly be anyone left to negotiate on their elimination. However, if we all join forces, we have still a chance to prevent the militarization of outer space.

Our Conference is well capable of making a significant contribution to this end. My delegation was guided by this awareness when it agreed to the present mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. Although it is less than what we had originally imagined, it still defines as the ultimate goal, approved by consenses, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We should lose no time in getting the work of the Committee started and in preparing concrete negotiations.

It is my delegation's impression that the discussions on how the Committee should proceed have revealed at least three different approaches.

The first apparent approach is that the Committee should engage in endless debates to interpret existing treaties. Some may even be seeking to cast doubts on clearly worded treaty provisions or justify their violation by interpreting them in an over-nice, legalistic and bizarre manner. Apart from the legal objections one would have to raise to such an attitude, that type of approach will definitely never lead us to our joint goal.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The second approach some delegations seem to have opted for is to combine interpretation exercises with proposals which boil down to toleration of the deployment of a great variety of space weapons and, at best, to agreement on rules to govern an arms race in outer space. That approach is incompatible with the mandate and would practically legalize the deployment of attack weapons in space. It is not control of the arms race that we need but its prevention.

The third approach, supported by the majority of delegations at this Conference, including my own, is to keep space clear of any weapons altogether. This is precisely what Working Paper CD/607, submitted by a group of socialist countries, is all about. These days, you will hardly find an international governmental or non-governmental forum concerned with world peace and disarmament which is not dominated by the theme of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Examples are the meeting of the Bellerive Group here in Geneva, the latest SIPRI Conference in Stockholm, the Symposium on "Survival in the nuclear age", held in New York earlier this year under the sponsorship of the Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies and Parliamentarians for World Order, the recent session of the Committee on Outer Space and, last but not least, United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/59, adopted with the votes of 150 States, with only one country abstaining.

In striving to reach the agreed goal, as formulated in the mandate, we will have to begin by analysing the situation such as it is -- a situation marked above all by plans to militarize outer space. Those plans have far reaching consequences, which cannot even be fully appreciated as yet. They will affect the entire fabric of international life. It is obviously intended to place science and technology under military control and to undermine peaceful international exchanges for purely selfish and hegemonic reasons. The programmes providing for the development of space attack weapons have even now adverse effects on international co-operative efforts to explore and utilize space for peaceful ends. By the way, this is another aspect which the Ad Hoc Committee should study in greater detail. The military and political consequences for the security of peoples are, of course, uppermost in everyone's mind. The military consequences for mankind's security and survival are the most serious, however. There are three aspects of particular relevance in this context. Firstly, the militarization of outer space represents the most dangerous and by far the most expensive round in the arms race ever to be undertaken in human history. Secondly, an arms race in space would take us closer to the brink of nuclear war and undermine stability in international relations in an unprecedented way. Thirdly, the arms race on Earth would be accelerated in all important areas and disarmament deferred to the realm of never-never.

Allow me, Mr. President, to comment briefly on these three aspects. As far as the objectives and the nature of the arms build-up programme for outer space are concerned, the development of so-called defensive weapons is neither a defensive nor an isolated endeavour. Rather, it is aimed at creating a crucial element of an integrated nuclear-strike capability. We find this reflected in an undisguised manner in the Official Air/Land Battle strategy, in the United States Army's Field Manual 100/5 and in the published extracts from the Guidelines Document 1984-88.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The purpose is to attain military superiority, which will ultimately manifest itself in the ability to make a nuclear war feasible and winnable. The nuclear weapon threat, which has not produced the desired results since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is to become a most effective tool of blackmail and world hegemony. In other words, virtually all nations could be threatened with nuclear destruction.

In the frequently-quoted Star Wars speech of 23 March 1983, we find the following interesting statement concerning space weapons: "If paired with offensive weapons, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy ...". It is precisely that combination of new types of nuclear offensive weapons and the development of space attack weapons that is going on. Facts substantiating this conclusion have repeatedly been presented at this Conference.

It is, therefore, obvious, Mr. President, that the aim pursued with the space armaments plans is not to render nuclear weapons meaningless or to remove them from arsenals, as is constantly being advertized, but to make those arms fit for use, without the attacker having to fear a counter-strike.

This brings me to the second issue, namely, the relationship between the arms race in outer space and the risk of nuclear war.

In the statement I delivered on 25 June, I underlined that my delegation attaches great importance to all the steps designed to lessen the risk of a nuclear war breaking out.

Any winnable nuclear war concept and any move in that direction, however illusory it might be, could take us to the abyss. Space arms, which play a key role in that concept, constitute a deadly threat to all States, for several reasons:

The first reason is that a posture of real or perceived military superiority might tempt a country to embark on adventurism in its international dealings. For instance, the desire to impose one's own will upon other nations could set off global conflicts and lead to hopeless situations capable of triggering a nuclear world war.

The second reason is that it is the nature of the planned space war system to function only in combination with a first disarming strike. A majority of States call for the renunciation of the first-use of nuclear weapons as a decisive step towards averting the risk of nuclear war. Space arms, however, would make the first-use of nuclear weapons and a so-called preventive strike more likely.

This is by no means the only reason why space weapons presuppose readiness for a nuclear first strike. Those arms are fairly vulnerable themselves. There would be no chance for them to stay intact in any protracted, gradually escalating military conflict. To all intents and purposes, they could be protected only if a surprise attack was launched against the counterweapons of the other side. By building launchers for space attack weapons, the nuclear first-strike doctrine would literally be cast into steel and concrete.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

It is very remarkable, indeed, that the Star Wars strategists, in their most recent statements, no longer speak of comprehensive protection to be provided by means of the so-called SDI concept. The emphasis now is on protecting military targets. This view is less illusory, to a certain extent, but shows also the enormous dangers resulting from that concept. The discrepancy between far-reaching military ambitions and the demagogic protestations that mankind will be protected against the threat of nuclear war is becoming more and more obvious. An absolute missile defence shield would make a nuclear first-strike possible but would not necessarily require it. A limited shield, however, would virtually imply a first-strike and destabilize the entire international situation.

The third reason is the additional danger of the outbreak of an "unintentional" nuclear war. Considering the crucial role satellites are playing in the whole space warfare set-up, their accidental breakdown could easily touch off a devastating atomic war. The approximately 30 minutes still remaining today for counterstrike preparations in the event of strategic attack would be reduced to almost zero. One would have to respond without checking the circumstances that led to the alarm. Apart from that, space weapons are equally suited for subversive and regionally limited military activities, which pose a threat to all the countries alike and which may well result in a world-wide conflict.

To sum up, the implementation of the space arms build-up plans would dramatically increase the risk of nuclear war and make it a sword of Damocles permanently hanging over mankind. It has been claimed that the so-called SDI was a means to overcome the perilous doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Quite the reverse is true. In a recently published article, Fred Charles Iklé, United States Under-Secretary of Defence, wrote that the nuclear deterrence doctrine must be updated and carried on into the twenty-first century.

It stands to reason that even under these new conditions a nuclear war would have no winner but endanger humanity's survival. Even a highly efficient anti-missile defence system could not, according to experts of repute, guarantee protection for the civilian population. Nuclear fall-out, the destruction of the whole fabric of international economic relations, as well as cataclysmic environmental changes would do extremely severe damage to all regions. Nor would the attacker be spared the atrocious consequences resulting from the use of nuclear weapons: just take the scientifically-founded theory of a nuclear winter. It is certainly an interesting fact that there is no-one to dispute this argument.

It is also of great importance to analyse the effects the plans to militarize outer space would have on the arms race as a whole, both in qualitative and quantitative terms.

One effect would be a general acceleration of the arms race in all spheres. There would also be very specific consequences such as the creation of extensive infrastructures for the deployment and use of space weapons. Last but not least, the results obtained through space weapons research would give a powerful impetus to the so-called conventional arms race.

The following facts will corroborate this view. First, the space militarization programme goes hand in hand with an increased nuclear build-up. Both are inexorably linked together.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Second, the planned space attack weapons are but the tip of the iceberg. Components of space weaponry are to be based on submarines and are not to be deployed in space until their use. Naval and air force capability is presently being created for the protection, support and supply of those systems, with more of that being planned for the future. The region close to the equator would acquire particular significance in that context, since important satellite orbits can best be reached from there. The expansion of existing military bases and the establishment of new ones are under way around the globe. Three of the high-powered electronic telescope and television-camera units are already in operation in New Mexico, Hawaii and South Korea. The fourth unit is being built on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. As these developments unfold, one can be certain that further so-called "areas of vital interest" will be created into which the arms race will be carried.

Third, major additions to the Star Wars plans are also being made in what is usually referred to as the conventional field. Take, for instance, the deployment of the "Patriot" system in Western Europe and the development under the Air/Land Battle strategy of a "reconnaissance strike complex". What is more, the Star Wars technologies must be expected to spark off a virtual technological revolution in the conventional area.

The German Democratic Republic is greatly worried about those developments. Efforts to achieve a system of collective security in Europe and in the world at large will be torpedoed by them. Today, there is but one way left to arrive at lasting peace and that is the termination of the arms race on Earth and its prevention in outer space.

My delegation gives very careful consideration to every proposal designed to prevent an arms race in outer space. In our opinion, the Conference on Disarmament has been presented with interesting initiatives. If we succeed in agreeing on the principal issue, which is to prevent the deployment of attack weapons in space, opportunities will be opening up for taking confidence-building measures to ensure that outer space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes in the interests of all peoples.

The present treaties on outer space are of great importance. A number of military activities are already banned under them. This basis must not be touched. We need additional measures to rule out once and for all the possibility that weapons will be carried into space. My delegation is opposed to attempts to flog those treaties to death and, all of a sudden, to call into question provisions that allow of no interpretation whatsoever.

It is from this perspective that my country is looking into the proposals submitted by the members of the Conference. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic fully supports the draft treaty presented by the Soviet Union in 1983 (CD/476), as well as the subsequent Soviet initiatives which constitute a whole programme of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. That programme is an explicit affirmation, as well as the concretization and application of the non-use of force principle enshrined in the United Nations Charter. The Soviet proposals provide for the prohibition of the use of force in space and from space, and from the Earth against targets in space. Under this approach, a whole class of armaments -- space attack weapons, including anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile systems based in space, intended to hit targets in outer space -- would be banned and eliminated. At the same time, it would be the safest way to verify that the obligations undertaken are actually fulfilled.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Simultaneously, the USSR declared in a unilateral moratorium in 1983 not to be the first to deploy anti-satellite weapons in space.

The Soviet proposal that the Soviet Union and the United States should, for the duration of their negotiations, proclaim a moratorium on space attack weapons, including research, development and testing, and freeze their strategic offensive arms must be seen as a crucial step towards concrete progress in preventing the militarization of outer space.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic is of the view that all the suggestions submitted to this Conference in an effort to prevent an arms race in outer space should be included in the discussions as quickly as possible. At the same time, it must be regretted that proposals that deserve to be considered are withdrawn for incomprehensible reasons, although they have become even more relevant now.

The future does not lie in the stars, as we are being made to believe. It lies, without any doubt, in the hands of mankind. The Conference on Disarmament has an important mission to fulfil in that context. There are no attack weapons in space as yet, but time is pressing.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Mr. President, having already complimented you on conducting our deliberations I would embarrass you if I were to reiterate our continuing approval of the high standards you are setting for us, so I won't do so.

I intend to try and bring us down from the stars for a moment, and in so doing I mean no criticism of any statements by anyone else. But I am concerned more and more about our lack of progress on a comprehensive chemical weapons convention, and that is the subject of my statement today.

We all agree that a major objective of our deliberations are negotiations -- I am afraid deliberations may be the more appropriate term, although that is supposed to be the term applied to the United Nations Disarmament Commission: that is the deliberative body; this is supposed to be a negotiating body. A major objective of our negotiations, we all agree, is to make significant progress in negotiating a comprehensive verifiable ban on chemical weapons, including in particular their use. During the last two years, I think we would all agree also that some considerable progress towards this objective has been achieved. The basic structural framework of a treaty as set out in CD/539 has been largely agreed. Moreover, much useful work has been done in exploring and defining the specific provisions to be included in a treaty. Our thinking about the various treaty elements has obviously been steadily acquiring greater precision, and that is particularly true in the case of Canada, as I propose to indicate today in the case of one example. A little later I hope to be able to introduce a Working Paper to give further indications of the direction of our

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thinking. I have to say also that if it were left to our Chairman, Ambassador Turbanski, we would be making much more progress than we are, and this applies to the friends of the Chair also, as they do try to urge us on. The failure seems to be a collective one, because the Ad Hoc Committee and its working groups are continuing in their work but the results are not very great.

Our efforts to conclude a chemical weapons ban are not, in our view, being pursued with the universality and the urgency which they deserve. While some conscientious and useful work is being done, important areas of divergence or disagreement remain to be addressed. Indeed, at a time of growing concern, and many would say, growing dangers of an alarming proliferation of chemical weapons capability, our sense of urgency seems to be dying away rather than intensifying. It is our view that this sense of urgency should be reflected through a more widely participatory and intensive negotiating process. My delegation is involved in weekly meetings of the various working groups dealing with specific aspects of a convention; it is difficult -- we all know the difficulties, and there are so many working groups meeting during each week and so many other calls upon their time -- but if this is a priority we have to show it. We have to show a readiness, I believe, to increase the time devoted to the task of achieving a ban on chemical weapons through intersessional work, something that most of us took for granted a little while ago but now seems to be very much open to question.

Let me cite one example, of the kind of proposal which we should at least be addressing in more concrete and specific terms. Of the concepts and language of the existing provisional texts, and there have been more than one, the most comprehensive one undoubtedly is that presented by the United States, CD/500. Now, delegations are addressing that text, and it is to their credit that they do so. Usually we hear more questions and criticisms than alternative solutions, but as I said on other occasions, that is the first step in working towards solutions, to determine whether the proposals before us already do reflect a measure of consensus. We do, however, need more in the way of counter-proposals, from those who do not find that they can accept this particular text. Let me make myself quite clear. We do not see this issue as a bilateral negotiation. We are not therefore addressing ourselves, for example, to the USSR or to the socialist group. It is not enough for us to leave it to the United States and the USSR, for reasons I have already mentioned, namely, the danger of proliferation. Are we all here addressing that issue because of fears arising out of the present position and the situation pertaining between the USA and the USSR? I do not think so. Again and again we preach to each other, although I do not know if the world notices, about the importance of multilateral negotiations on these issues, and on others, but when the opportunity presents itself to us we do not seem to be quite able to deliver. Let me make clear again that this is self-criticism as much as criticism of anyone else. I am saying that we really do need to come to grips with these problems a little better than we are doing.

I have said again and again that we regard this comprehensive chemical weapons convention as an attempt to develop a non-proliferation treaty. Now whether that term has an unfortunate connotation for some or not, I use it as a term of art. We want something more than a bilateral treaty. We want a genuine non-proliferation treaty that would head off the spread of these horrible weapons. Thus to my mind, and to the mind of my delegation and Government, every

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

one of us has the duty to make our contributions as concrete and as specific as we can make them in attempting to move these negotiations ahead. I have seen such contributions, and I have witnessed them personally, and seen evolutions of thinking indicating it can happen and does happen, but it is too uneven and it happens too infrequently. It seems to us that it really is the duty of all of us -- not only to our Governments, but to each other and to the countries not represented in this forum -- to do a little better than we are doing. In fact a lot better. Some delegations have gone to the trouble and the expense -- and it entails devoting resources to this, -- to table various kinds of working papers to push our work along. I think I should compliment the Yugoslav delegation for having just done that. This is an example of what we think more of us should be doing.

There is little doubt as far as we are concerned, that the key elements of a treaty, a comprehensive treaty, are reflected in the United States proposal, for example, since it is undoubtedly the most comprehensive and far-reaching. Now in so saying, I am endorsing it, I am not asking that anyone else endorse it as is. Indeed, as I understand the United States position, they themselves say that they do not consider that every line of every text is set in concrete. But it does seem to us that we have to address the elements, the issues reflected in that comprehensive draft.

It is no news to anyone here that to Canada verification and compliance are considered to be the most difficult and contentious but most important issue, and that is the point we will come to a little later when, if we manage to finish our homework, we will submit a working paper. However, we consider that the confidence of the parties that the treaty is being universally and effectively observed will depend on the efficacy of just such a provision. It is too easy in this case for something to be occurring without any obvious means of detecting it. That does not necessarily assume that we must all agree on the most intrusive types of inspection available, but it means that if we settle for less than that, there is going to have to be an element of good faith. It does not seem to be very much in evidence thus far, and perhaps we could work on that problem a little too.

We accept that delicate and legitimate issues arise touching on sovereignty and national security concerns for all States here represented and for all of those we represent collectively who are not in this Conference. These questions are involved. We accept also that patience, imagination and a very strong political commitment are required if we are going to avoid having this particular issue go the same route as others, on which we seem to have established a kind of track record for seven years, of a lot of talk, not much action.

The Canadian Government attaches great priority to these chemical weapons negotiations, and is particularly mindful of the need to ensure that any verification provisions are both effective -- that is to say capable of providing reasonable assurances of compliance -- and realistic in the sense of being operationally viable. Now I said I would give an example, I am going to do so, and I'm well aware that it is a sensitive one. In reflecting these concerns, the Canadian Government recently commissioned a private study by two Canadian jurists versed in international law, and perhaps as important for us, in Canadian constitutional law, to examine the implications for the

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Canadian Government and for Canadian industry -- for Canada, in other words, -- of a hypothetical requirement to implement a chemical weapons treaty incorporating verification provisions of the type set out in CD/500.

Now others may have made this kind of statement to accept such provisions, but I must have been sleeping when such statements were made. When we made this study, special attention was given to the potential implications of the open invitation verification provision as given in that text. If there is any importance to my statement it is in our effort to make clear that the central conclusion of our study -- and I confess that we were somewhat surprised -- is that the existing Canadian legislation would, in fact, allow for verification which includes on-site inspection on short notice. Such inspections are seen, for example, as no more stringent than existing domestic law, to which the Canadian chemical industry is already subject.

I recognize the distinction between internal process and something that involves representatives of other countries. Nonetheless, there is not a constitutional difficulty for us, and maybe for others, including perhaps some western States, some non-aligned, perhaps some socialist States. We consulted representatives of the Canadian chemical producers, and we still came to the same conclusion.

We recognize that this conclusion in relation to the constitutional, legal and regulatory processes of Canada may not have application to the situations in other States. Further, we recognize that the commissioning of this study and its conclusions, about which I have informed the Conference today, and I would like to emphasize this, should not be interpreted as signifying that the Government of Canada advocates agreement by this Conference on the precise verification provisions set out in CD/500. The purpose of my intervention is a more modest one, but one at least as concrete as that. It is to illustrate, as we see it, the desirability of each member State in the Conference on Disarmament, which is after all a representative body, giving close examination to the practical and operational implications of all proposals put before this body, from all sides, and I have spoken before of the USSR proposal on destruction of stocks, which we take quite seriously, in order to arrive at a considered evaluation of their acceptability. If we cannot find them acceptable then we continue to say that we should be trying to produce counter-proposals, even if they do not necessarily reflect the final word of the State or of the delegation putting them forward.

I would like to reiterate and make abundantly clear that we are certainly not addressing these comments to any one delegation, to any one group whether the western group, the socialist group or the Group of 21 and China. It is all of these groups outside of this Conference as well as those represented in it who have to address these problems. The onus, as we see it, is on all of us, and I do not think we are discharging this onus. It is very easy, as every lawyer knows, to reject a proposal and to pick holes in it. It is a little harder to propose solutions. My definition of a second-rate lawyer is one who can tell you all the reasons why you cannot do something. My definition of a good lawyer and a good diplomat is to tell you how to find your

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way through the difficulties. I do not want to say how we are qualifying, but I do not know how we would get through law school the way we are working lately. It is easy, of course, just to remain silent, and that is happening, but I suggest that it is open to us to utilize the tremendous wealth of talent in this room, backed up by expertize, and share it and pool it with one another, and give the support to the Chairman that he is entitled to, and to you, Mr. President, and to the others in working groups, to try and push this process a little further and a little faster than its going. I weep for Ambassador Turbanski trying to get us to move the way he asks us to. I think it is time we gave him a little better results than we have been doing. I am directing this at my own delegation as well as at anyone else. I do not often go into the working groups and one of the reasons I did not want to get involved in being a friend of the Chair again is because I knew just how much work was involved so I am as guilty as anyone else.

I think the time has come to fish or cut bait. It is hard to conceive of solutions. We accept that, and having said so, we think that we may be forced to consider other approaches, and especially important in the case of proposals which appear to depart boldly from established international practice, the kind that raise initial doubts about their operational viability.

Please look at just one issue, one of the most difficult and the most sensitive. We found that it did not present us with the kind of difficulties we thought we would find. I am talking, of course, about some form of verification which would not be merely internal, but which would include other countries, and not just neighbours, unless we think of neighbours as being north and south in the case of Canada. It is only by adopting such a pragmatic approach, in our view, that we are likely to succeed in concluding an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, before the capability for production and use of such weapons begins to proliferate uncontrollably.

This is our concern, proliferation. We do not see it as an east-west or north-south or any combination or variations on those kind of groupings. It is a problem which involves all of us, and we think that we have to indicate our good faith by hard work and by submitting proposals designed to focus on those areas of common ground that do exist -- and some good work has been done here -- but also to develop new areas of common ground, something I think I might have mentioned once or twice before. So perhaps I could conclude as I often do, by citing Grotius without repeating his exact words, and urge that we all follow his advice and attempt a little faster and little harder to develop common ground in this vital area of work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. There are no more speakers on my list. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of the United States.

Mr. BARTHELEMEY (United States of America): My delegation will be providing a more detailed statement on chemical weapons issues in the near future. The United States statement will include concrete and practical suggestions aimed at opening the way to progress in the chemical weapons negotiations.

However, as the United States delegation has made clear, both privately and in meetings of this Conference, we do not intend to sit silently in the presence of the kind of statement that was given today by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union without responding in an immediate way. So I ask the indulgence of the delegations for a brief response.

What we have been increasingly hearing here, and I think it is clear that it reached a new level today, can only remind students of European history -- and we have been told a good deal about various anniversaries at our session this year -- of events not four decades ago but, perhaps more appropriately, five decades ago. What we have, in document CD/615, and in the accompanying Soviet statement, is the product of what I will call, to be diplomatic, an information machine. Like that other, very famous information machine that operated in Europe some 50 years ago, this one produces material often oddly insensitive to the knowledge of the immediate audience. For we have been told about a new type of barbarous weapon, a deadly nerve gas mixture intended to ensure the military superiority of the United States. We have been told about a planned crime against peace and mankind.

Now most delegations here have the benefit of fairly substantive sophistication in the area of chemical weapons. This issue has been under negotiation for some period of time so the delegations here consider the matter with considerable knowledge. To begin with, I have no doubt that the delegations here view chemical weapons with abhorrence as do the people of the United States and their Government. We want these weapons to be effectively and verifiably banned. You know about the 16-year moratorium on chemical weapons production that has been followed by the United States Government. You know that the Soviet Union has, by a wide margin, and, I repeat, by a wide margin, the largest stockpile and forces in being for the use of chemical weapons, in the world, and of course these Soviet chemical weapons include nerve gas. But you are not the intended audience of the disinformation as contained in the TASS statement that is in document CD/615. That audience is perhaps the Soviet population, or it may be, and it is likely the case, that the intended audience is populations elsewhere, who, it is hoped, will be uninformed and will not ask about Soviet chemical-weapon capabilities, or whether indeed they have the safety that would be built into binary chemical weapons if they are produced by the United States at some point. I would submit that you delegations are indeed the intended audience of another message, and that message is the same one that was purveyed by that other famous information machine five decades ago. That machine drove home the message over and over again that States had no right to national defence or collective defence. This message was the message of intimidation and this message was accompanied by aggression. The United States and its allies have no intention of renouncing the right to national or collective self-defence, so once again, we would ask the Soviet delegation to devote its attention, not so much to discussing the process by which the United States considers its

(Mr. Barthelemy, United States)

defence programmes but instead to provide us with information on the Soviet chemical weapons programme. How much, in roubles, has been devoted to CW production, last year, this year, any of the last 16 years. Bearing in mind our experience of the last 50 years, I believe that the delegations in the Conference may not hold their breath as they wait for this information, but, rest assured, the United States delegation will continue to ask for it. We will also continue to work tirelessly toward a chemical weapons ban and we urge that all delegations to this Conference engage seriously in negotiations so that a treaty can be achieved; that bans these heinous chemical weapons.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I must say that it was not an immediate decision on my part to take the floor in reply, because one statement to which I must reply does not deserve that. Mr. Barthelemy mentioned universities in his statement. In this connection I should like to say that I myself studied a great deal and took two degrees, and furthermore I taught for many years. In all this long process of studying and teaching I have reached one conclusion, which has probably also been reached by the overwhelming majority of those sitting here, except, of course, Mr. Barthelemy. That conclusion is that one should not be in a hurry to answer a question without thinking about it, and not be in a hurry to comment on a proposal without having considered it. Otherwise one will receive a poor, unsatisfactory, low mark for one's answer. This is what I should like to advise Mr. Barthelemy, who, I am afraid I must use the word, said filthy things about my country. It is not worth my arguing with him, with a man who clearly does not know elementary history, in particular about the co-operation between the American monopolies and the Hitlerites not only 50 years ago but also during the war years.

Now, with regard to the statement of my friend Ambassador Beesley, I should like to say the following: it pleased me, and I endorse both its emotional tenor and its substantive proposals. We must indeed speed up our work, and his appeal to us, the representatives at the Conference, is absolutely right. Of course, our positions are fixed in our capitals, but we ourselves can do a great deal, and here Ambassador Beesley was quite right, and we ourselves should do as he advises. I also endorse his views concerning the significance of working papers if, of course, such working papers further the progress of the negotiations. I share his view that it is necessary to try to understand the position of the other sides; to understand the reasons why they encounter this or that difficulty, to take into account the many circumstances, above all social and economic, political, geographical and, indeed, if you will, traditional, since behind each of us or each country which we represent there are many years, a thousand years of history. Different countries have developed different approaches to specific issues, and we must together try to find acceptable solutions, taking these differences into account. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee has this intention, as I already mentioned in my main statement. Naturally, we support him as regards, so to speak, the formulation of our convention.

Today we have, to put it bluntly, a clean sheet of paper, for as we all know document CD/539 -- the annex to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee which worked last year under its Chairman, Ambassador Ekéus -- this document does not contain the provisions we have all agreed upon. These are the possibilities open to us.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We could already this year submit the agreed texts to the General Assembly; even though there may not be many of them, even though there may be few of them, at least we will be able to say to the General Assembly that we have already agreed on something, we have reached agreement, and we are continuing work on the other provisions. I do not know how my colleagues feel when they return to their capitals to report, but I do not feel very comfortable when I am asked what the Conference has achieved after five years of negotiations. What have the 40 States represented in the Conference managed to agree on? To this question unfortunately the reply must be, "So far it has not been possible to agree on anything". Probably each of us has to answer this question in the same way. Therefore let us, as Ambassador Beesley has also invited us to do, do all we can, spare neither effort nor time, to advance the negotiations.

I know that many of my colleagues have an objective difficulty in allocating the extra time and personnel for negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, but of course if we do not conduct negotiations tirelessly, if we do not attempt to fix the agreements achieved day by day, then we will never reach the end. We are sometimes told that negotiations can be continued if there are results, but of course there will be results only through a process of negotiation. We endorse the appeal made by Ambassador Beesley, but at the same time we do not agree with everything he said. In particular, we consider that the basis for our work (and I believe this is the general view, and hope that Ambassador Beesley will support me in this) is document CD/539 which is the result of the previous years' work. Let us therefore advance step by step on the basis of that document and not of any other document.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

I should now like to submit for adoption the time-table of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies which was circulated this morning. I should point out that this time-table was drawn up in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees. As usual, it is purely indicative and may be amended as necessary.

I give the floor to the representative of Morocco.

Mr. HILALE (Morocco) (translated from French): Two weeks ago, the delegation of a member State of our Conference requested the secretariat kindly to draw up the time-table of work for the Conference on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies in such a way as to allow all delegations, and particularly those with small staffs, to take part in all meetings.

However, in view of the time-table proposed for next week, it must be recognized that this appeal has unfortunately not been heeded. My delegation wishes first of all to express the hope that in future the secretariat may take more account of the difficulties faced by many delegations in carrying out their duties. The difficulty stems from the fact that the meetings of some Ad Hoc Committees are scheduled for the same times. As you well know, Mr. President, the

(Mr. Hilale, Morocco)

Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has reached a crucial stage in its work, and that the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons will begin intensive consultations next week. In order to enable all delegations to take part in these meetings, and not be obliged to sacrifice one meeting in order to attend another, my delegation would request the secretariat to revise the time-table proposed for next week so that the meetings of these two Ad Hoc Committees, or at least those scheduled for Tuesday, will be held at different times rather than at the same time.

Mr. KANT SHARMA (India): Mr. President, please allow me to join my voice to the request made by our distinguished friend from Morocco. This is the third week in which we have a programme where two Ad Hoc Committees are meeting simultaneously and for my delegation it would be tantamount to cynicism if I were to dismiss one of those Committees and attend the other. So, I have on my own, requested the delegations whose heads have been chairing these Committees if they could accommodate the request of delegations like mine and Morocco. The distinguished Ambassador of Mexico has kindly agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament could meet on Monday morning at 10.30 a.m., so that delegations like mine could attend both meetings, on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament as well as on radiological weapons.

Having said that, please allow me to say that one expects this kind of arrangement to be carried out before seeing this paper. My delegation considers the tradition to have the programme of the following week presented on the previous Thursday, a very good tradition, and it would not like to have this tradition in any way eroded either in substance or in importance. From my side, and for the delegation of India, we will be there to co-operate with you. However, I cannot but share the sense of uneasiness which our distinguished colleague from Morocco has expressed. Because one comes across this predicament which is Kafkaesque if not bizarre, that delegations make a request and things are not done.

I would just like to say that the programme has five days a week and there are only six Ad Hoc Committees; there are two mornings which are generally taken up by plenary meetings. Theoretically, therefore, it is possible to arrange for the six Ad Hoc Committees to meet so that they do not clash. As regards the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and its Working Groups, it was decided in 1983 that the Conference would work to ensure that no two Ad Hoc Committees would meet together, but, concerning the contact groups there could be a kind of simultaneity. So, when we have Mondays and Fridays free from Ad Hoc Committees it should be possible to avoid clashes. My observations are for the Conference as a whole and I would like to make it clear that they are not directed against any one component of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. GARCIA GARCIA (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): As this is the first time I am taking the floor, please allow me to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference for this month, and to wish you every success in your important duties and assure you of my delegation's co-operation.

(Mr. Garcia Garcia, Venezuela)

My delegation is in complete agreement with what was said by my distinguished colleague from Morocco. There are several delegations, including my own, which lack the staff to be able to cover all meetings included in the time-table, especially meetings of the Ad Hoc Committees in which we are particularly interested. We would like the secretariat in future to try not to arrange for simultaneous meetings of the Ad Hoc Committees so that delegations such as my own will have a chance to attend their meetings.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Venezuela for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I have asked the secretariat to reply to the comments which have just been made. I give the floor to Ambassador Berasategui.

Mr. BERASATEGUI (Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament): I would like briefly to refer to the points raised by the distinguished representative of Morocco a moment ago. I am very happy to have this occasion to explain what the position of the secretariat is in this connection.

First, allow me to note that some of the Ad Hoc Committees have already agreed on their programmes of work or time-tables containing specific dates for their meetings. This is the case, for example, for the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons; the programme of work is listed in document CD/CW/WP.111 of 14 June 1985. It is also the case of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, with a time-table which has been adopted and appears in document CD/RW/WP.60 of 19 June 1985. Of course, the secretariat has to abide by these decisions of the Ad Hoc Committees. Also, in the case of some other Ad Hoc Committees, they have been meeting regularly at certain days of the week and it has become an established practice for them to do it on those occasions.

Second, I would like to stress that the secretariat does not, in any case, assign meetings to the Ad Hoc Committees or to their Chairmen. As we are not in a better position than the Chairmen to assess how the substantive work of the subsidiary bodies is proceeding and we should, of course, be at the disposal of the Chairmen, we consult with them on their needs for meetings and limit ourselves to assisting them by providing what is required. You can be sure that the Chairmen of the various Ad Hoc Committees have been duly informed by the secretariat of the concern expressed here in the plenary of the Conference. But, under certain circumstances, some overlapping is unavoidable.

At this point I would only like to emphasize that the secretariat prepares the informal paper on the basis of what is requested from it. We are not organizing the time-tables of the Conference, we are merely assisting in that task, which is exactly the function that the secretariat should perform in accordance with rule 13 of the rules of procedure, where it is stated that the secretariat assists the Conference and its President in organizing the business and time-tables of the Conference. We cannot, under the rules of procedure, ourselves organize that business and those time-tables.

Mr. HILALE (Morocco) (translated from French): I should like to thank Ambassador Berasategui for the explanation that he has just given us concerning my delegation's request. I have two comments. First of all, with regard to the programmes of work on which the Ad Hoc Committees have taken decision, in the view of my delegation these work programmes are purely indicative. What is essential about them is that the necessary number of meetings should be held. As for their dates, I think that no Chairman of any Ad Hoc Committee or any delegation would raise any problems about them. We repeat, these time-tables are purely indicative and what is important is that the designated number of meetings should be held, whether on Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday being beside the point.

Having said this, with regard to rule 13 which Mr. Berasategui stressed, unless I am mistaken, of course, the role of the secretariat is to assist, to facilitate the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees in their work, but also to transmit to the Chairmen the difficulties encountered by delegations in participating in their meetings. We do not wish to lay the responsibility entirely upon the secretariat, but at least it should be aware that we have difficulties in participating in meetings scheduled in the time-table.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): First of all, I should like to say that what Ambassador Berasategui said faithfully reflects what has happened so far. Secondly, naturally, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament I shall do everything in my power to satisfy delegations having any difficulties. But I do think that it is desirable that everyone should know what to expect with regard to meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I believe that it is very useful that there should be an understanding that the Committee will continue meeting, for example, on Thursday afternoons. I do not want that to change. If the question of Tuesday presents difficulties for some delegations, in that case a change can be made, but it should not always be the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament that would have to meet on Mondays. One Monday it could be the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, as I have with great pleasure offered to arrange in this case for the distinguished representatives of India and Morocco, but another week it would then be the turn of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons.

Mr. ROWE (Australia): I shall be very brief. I would just like to indicate, in the same spirit as the distinguished representative of Mexico, that we would, in our capacity as Chairman of the Radiological Weapons Committee, be prepared to consider a solution to the Tuesday afternoon problem, when meetings do clash between the Radiological Weapons Committee and the Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I think this is a matter that we can resolve in consultation between the two Chairmen and the secretariat. If it is of assistance, we would certainly be willing to give consideration to a meeting of the Radiological Weapons Committee on Monday morning of the following week.

Mr. KANT SHARMA (India): I am sorry to ask for the floor again but there is a small point which was mentioned in the context of the Ad Hoc Committees having already decided their programme and the number of meetings for the session. I would just like to submit, Sir, that because of the sheer inability to be present at the meetings when these Ad Hoc Committees decided the number of meetings they would hold during the session, my delegation cannot be bound by that decision. If it were bound by that decision, then I would be going against my own delegation's interest and allowing it to be split at one time. I would like to say that, while I would like to co-operate to the extent possible, those decisions of the Ad Hoc Committees, which are in working papers of the Ad Hoc Committees, were adopted when my delegation could not be present because of the problem of time, so my delegation cannot be bound by them.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of India once again for his statement. If there are no more comments on this subject, may I summarize the discussion. First of all, I should like to thank the representative of Mexico and the representative of Australia for their comprehension for making the necessary arrangements to satisfy all delegations as far as possible, taking into account the comments that have been made. I think that all delegations have also been satisfied by the explanations given by the secretariat on the way in which meetings have been organized. With the amendments made, and the comments of the representative of Mexico and the representative of Australia, and the arrangements which the secretariat will make to that end, may I take it that the Conference wishes to adopt the time-table?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I wish to remind members that the Conference will today hold an informal meeting immediately after the plenary meeting to consider the question of the report to the General Assembly on the consideration of new measures in the field of disarmament to avoid an arms race on the sea bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

I do not think the meeting will take more than a quarter of an hour. I think that we will not be able to go beyond 1.10 p.m., to allow the interpretation service to rest. If we agree on these arrangements, the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 23 July 1985, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.