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Wednesday, 14 November 1979  
at 10.30 a.m.  
New York

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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 34th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas)

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ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 AND 121 (continued)

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany appreciated the broad support that resolution 33/91 B on confidence-building measures received last year. My Government noted with satisfaction the virtually-unanimous adoption of the draft resolution it submitted together with 19 other sponsors from different regions.

In our opinion, a stable and comprehensive security partnership both between North and South and between East and West can be achieved only in an atmosphere of mutual trust. The Federal Government therefore attaches great importance to confidence-building measures as a primary step towards verifiable arms limitation and disarmament agreements and as an essential prerequisite for the continuation of the process of détente.

The broad acceptance of the resolution is, in our view, indicative of the significance that States are attaching to confidence-building measures as a means of strengthening international peace and security. This has also been expressed by the fact that the required action to be taken by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in implementing the resolution has resulted in 28 replies so far. Those replies are contained in documents A/34/416 and Add.1, submitted to the First Committee on 5 October. I should like to take this opportunity to thank the Secretariat, in particular Miss Segarra, for the work done in compiling the answers and passing them on to the First Committee for further action. I also thank those representatives who in their statements in the general debate have touched positively upon the matter of confidence-building measures.

It is encouraging to note that those replies underline the importance of confidence-building measures. They contain a number of important remarks and suggestions on the subject. I should like to mention just a few of them which seem to carry particular weight for the authors: first, confidence-

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal  
Republic of Germany)

building measures cannot replace concrete disarmament negotiations and disarmament steps; secondly, confidence can create and improve the climate for disarmament and arms control negotiations; thirdly, concrete recommendations should be worked out and given as illustrative examples for the consideration of confidence-building measures in specific regions; fourthly, evaluation of the possible usefulness of confidence-building measures for specific regions, taking into account existing experiences.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal  
Republic of Germany)

I should like to conclude this brief extract from documents A/34/416 and Add.1 by saying that quite a number of replies are from European countries. They reflect the positive experience gained there with confidence-building measures. As it is known, the confidence-building measures for the European region were developed and introduced in connexion with the European Conference on Security and Co-operation concluded in 1975 in Helsinki. The European countries, whether members of existing military alliances or not, stress in their replies the importance of the European example.

This view is fully shared by the Federal Republic of Germany. Like other countries, it transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations its views and experiences of confidence-building measures as agreed upon in the Final Act of Helsinki. Quite a number of European countries, including my own, have implemented the confidence-building measures agreed to in a broad-minded manner. We share the feeling of a number of European countries in the East and West that additional confidence-building measures can and should be taken in Europe.

The number and contents of the replies reproduced in documents A/34/416 and Add.1 have induced my delegation, together with others, to consider the next step in order to continue the momentum. We are convinced that the concept of confidence-building measures is sufficiently flexible to permit its application to the particular geographical, political and military conditions in specific regions. It is essential to realize that these measures can be developed and agreed upon and that their application leads to more openness and transparency among the States concerned. The measures help to prevent misjudgement and to assure that particular military activities of a neighbour do not represent a threat to one's own security. The embodiment of concrete confidence-building measures in regional agreements can strengthen their value.

As a result of these deliberations and the numerous contacts my delegation has had during these days, I have the privilege of introducing today draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.20 on confidence-building measures. I do so also on behalf of the other sponsors, namely, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Philippines, Romania, Spain, Turkey, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Zaire.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal  
Republic of Germany)

In its operative part, the draft resolution recommends that all States continue to consider arrangements for specific confidence-building measures taking into account the specific conditions and requirements of each region. Further, a comprehensive study on confidence-building measures shall be undertaken, taking into account the replies contained in documents A/34/416 and Add.1.

To this end, the Secretary-General is requested to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis. While the study is expected to be ready for submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, a progress report will be presented at its thirty-fifth session.

My delegation and the other sponsors are well aware of the amount of work which is involved in the elaboration of the comprehensive study and also of the financial implications. Nevertheless, we consider the study justified and essential because it will contribute substantially to the improvement of the environmental conditions necessary for concrete disarmament measures.

The study project has already been given positive consideration by the Advisory Board, which advises the Secretary-General on the aspects of studies. In its report of 11 May 1979, the Advisory Board noted "that this area might lend itself to a study in the future".

Together with the other sponsors, my delegation is hopeful that draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.20 will receive favourable consideration and broad support, because it touches upon an item which in recent years has rightly attracted more and more attention. With our initiative, an issue will be pursued which had already been taken up during the first special session on disarmament. The importance attached to it is reflected in paragraph 93 of the Final Document, which reads:

"Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament."

(A/S-10/4, p. 10)

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal  
Republic of Germany)

To shed more light on this important field, to evaluate the experience at hand and to elaborate suggestions for arrangements on confidence-building measures on a regional basis, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.20 have taken the initiative and submit it to the First Committee for its consideration and approval.

Mr. ADEWIJI (Nigeria): I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/34/L.16, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration of the Denuclearization of Africa". As can be seen, the draft is sponsored by a large number of African countries. I shall not read out all their names.

This is a draft resolution to which all the countries of Africa, members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), attach very great importance, since, as recent reports show, a new and very dangerous dimension is again being added to the already serious security situation on the continent posed by the apartheid régime of South Africa. The preparations by South Africa two years ago to conduct a nuclear explosion became public knowledge, thanks to the vigilance and co-operation of the Soviet Union and the United States. That public exposure of the preparations by South Africa came to us in Africa as no surprise. However, we had hoped that those who still had any doubts regarding the grounds for African disquiet at the nuclear programme of South Africa would be convinced that our suspicions were well-founded. We had hoped that in the name of nuclear non-proliferation and, what is more, in order not to jeopardize further the security of a region which is very explosive due to the policies of the South African régime, South Africa would be totally isolated and forced to renounce its nuclear ambition as well as its apartheid policy.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

Unfortunately and to our great regret, encouragement continued to be given to South Africa through nuclear collaboration, supposedly for peaceful purposes. The fallaciousness of any assumption that South Africa makes a distinction between peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the development of nuclear weapons must have dawned recently, I should like to believe, on those who held such views. The report of the explosion of a nuclear device conducted by South Africa in September has again highlighted the character of the desperate leaders of Pretoria. As in 1977, when alarm was raised at the nuclear test preparations in the Kalahari Desert, South Africa naturally denied having conducted any nuclear test. Who ever assumed that the apartheid régime would admit to having conducted the test? Certainly we did not. Yet what the international community knows of the régime in Pretoria is enough to convince us that South Africa might have conducted such a test.

Paradoxically South Africa is stepping up its nuclear blackmail, or the preparations for such blackmail, at a time when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is considering further steps towards the implementation of its Declaration, which was endorsed by the international community, to make the continent of Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

At the thirty third ordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers preceding the sixteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Monrovia, Liberia, in July of this year, the second resolution adopted at that conference dealt specifically with the question of the denuclearization of Africa.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

The resolution, CM/Res.718(XXXIII), in its operative paragraph 3:

"Invites Member States of the Organization of African Unity to study the question of Denuclearization of the continent of Africa ... and to transmit their observations and comments thereon to the Secretary-General at the earliest possible date, and in any case, not later than the next Summit Conference". (A/34/552, p. 7)

Operative paragraph 4 of the same resolution:

"Requests the Secretary-General to propose to the Eighteenth Assembly of the OAU Heads of State and Government concrete measures to be taken on the basis of comments received from Member States." (A/34/552, p. 7)

Thus it can be seen by the international community that independent African States have again shown, by the resolution adopted just a few months ago at the OAU summit, that they are determined to spare their continent the scourge of nuclear armaments with all its implications for international peace and security. This is consistent with the desire of the General Assembly which, in the Programme of Action of its special session devoted to disarmament stated in paragraph 60 of the Final Document:

"The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure." (A/S-10/4, III, para. 60)

The same document stated in paragraph 65:

"It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons." (A/S-10/4, III, para. 65)

What is involved in the draft resolution which I am introducing this morning on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa is whether the General Assembly will be true to its own determination to take all positive steps towards disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, or whether it will allow its determination in this respect to be shattered by such international outcasts as the apartheid régime of South Africa. For if nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, then the effect of such a weapon in the possession of an irrational régime such as the one in Pretoria is unimaginable. All efforts at preventing that régime from acquiring nuclear weapons must be a priority item for the United Nations and its Members.



(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

The United Nations is not unaware of the fact that in a seminar on nuclear collaboration with South Africa, held under the auspices of the United Nations in London, in February 1979, a detailed catalogue of the danger posed by the South African nuclear programme was given, including the assistance that South Africa was receiving from some Western countries and from Israel. It is natural therefore that the draft resolution before this Committee should take note of the report of that seminar, which, as I said, was held under the auspices of the United Nations.

It is also necessary, so as to show that the OAU members themselves are taking active steps towards the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, to quote or to call attention to the decision by the OAU Council of Ministers in which that body took a further step towards the implementation of the Declaration.

In the operative part of the resolution, the General Assembly having strongly reiterated its call, in several resolutions, on all States to respect Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, "vigorously condemns the reported explosion of a nuclear device by South Africa;" (A/C.1/34/L.16, page 2) contrary to resolution 33/63, in which the General Assembly had definitely called on South Africa not to conduct such a test.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

The draft reaffirms that the nuclear programme of the racist régime constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security generally, and to the peace and security of African States in particular. The draft therefore calls upon States which still collaborate with South Africa in the nuclear field to desist forthwith and requests the Security Council to prohibit all such co-operation.

Furthermore, the draft resolution requests the Security Council to act in accordance with paragraph 62 of the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament by instituting effective enforcement action to prevent South Africa from further endangering international peace and security through its acquisition of nuclear weapons.

It is the belief of the sponsors of the draft resolution that the danger of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the racist régime, the total impossibility of drawing a distinction between South Africa's peaceful nuclear programme and its nuclear weapons programme, the South African record of insensitivity to world opinion and its constant defiance of the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations are cause enough for a draft resolution such as is being proposed in document A/C.1/34/L.16. We therefore hope for the support of all delegations, bearing in mind that recent developments on the question of the denuclearization of Africa call for some forceful action on the part of the General Assembly.

I now turn to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/34/L.17. In introducing the draft resolution on the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament, contained in document A/C.1/34/L.17, I should like to apologize to those sponsors whose names do not appear on the list as published. The paucity of formal meetings of this Committee in the last few days since the report of the Secretary-General on this item came out made it a little difficult for my delegation to contact a number of the prospective sponsors so as to obtain their consent. May I, therefore, request the indulgence of representatives to add the names of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and Venezuela to the list of sponsors. The list would now read: Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Nigeria, Philippines, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Venezuela.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

In Paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament, the General Assembly decided to establish a Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament, and requested the Secretary-General to prepare guidelines for the Programme on the basis of the proposal which my delegation submitted to the special session. At its thirty-third session the General Assembly approved the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General and requested him to make adequate arrangements so that the Programme might be commenced during the first half of 1979. The necessary funds were thereafter approved by the Assembly.

My delegation is grateful to the Secretary-General and to his staff connected with the Programme, to the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Centre, to the Director of the Programme and to its Co-ordinator for the excellent manner in which they have discharged their responsibilities. The great interest shown in the Programme by Member States is reflected in the number of applicants sponsored by their Governments: 40 candidates, we are told, applied for the Fellowship Programme, and the Secretariat had the not-so-easy task of selecting 20, which is the upper limit set by the General Assembly. I said that the task of the Secretariat in selecting 20 of the applicants was not so easy because I understood that all the applicants were highly qualified. It goes without saying, therefore, that the Programme has been inaugurated on a very sound basis, with a group of brilliant men and women whose background has set a high standard for the discussions during the course of the Programme. I have no doubt that their experience on the Programme will further enhance their usefulness to their Governments in the field of disarmament. I also hope that their views and comments will assist the Secretariat in its assessment of the content of the Programme.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/34/L.17, originally sponsored by eight delegations, and now by 11, with the addition of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and Venezuela, is quite short. In its preambular paragraphs the draft refers to the documents that authorize the Programme, as well as to the current report of the Secretary-General (A/33/640). Under operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.17 the General Assembly would take note with satisfaction of the Secretary-General's report, and in the very important operative paragraph 2 the General Assembly would decide to continue the Programme. Operative paragraph 3 is consequential on the decision to continue the Programme, while the last operative paragraph would have the Secretary-General submit a report on the implementation of the Programme at the next session of the General Assembly.

It is the wish of the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/34/L.17 that it be adopted by consensus.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

I should now like to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.18, entitled "Consideration of the declaration of the 1980s as a disarmament decade", sponsored by Egypt, Jamaica, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. In doing so, I should like to recall that there has been a universal expression of disappointment that the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade proclaimed by the General Assembly in 1969 have not been realized. Not only has there been no significant measure of disarmament, but even a comprehensive programme of disarmament has not been drawn up. At the same time we have continued to witness the escalation of military expenditure, which, according to the latest figures, has reached the staggering amount of \$450 billion annually. Thus, not only does the lack of progress in disarmament continue to endanger international peace and security, but it is clear that the continuation of the arms race consumes a substantial and ever-increasing part of world resources which could otherwise be used for economic and social programmes.

It is no accident that the second United Nations Development Decade is also drawing to a close without its goals having been achieved. The establishment of the New International Economic Order calls, inter alia, for the transfer of resources on a massive scale from the developed to the developing countries. Certainly, if resources currently being wasted on armaments had been released as a result of effective disarmament measures, there is a hope that a part of those resources would have been channelled towards assistance to economic and social development in the developing countries, thus accelerating the establishment of the New International Economic Order.

The draft resolution before this Committee in document A/C.1/34/L.18 can be seen as a procedural measure designed to lay the basis for the declaration of the 1980s as a second United Nations disarmament decade. Having sought to establish agreement in principle on the declaration of the 1980s as a second United Nations disarmament decade, the draft resolution, in paragraph 2, directs the United Nations Disarmament Commission to propose to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session elements of a draft resolution for consideration and adoption in proclamation of the disarmament decade.

Paragraph 3 provides guidelines for the Disarmament Commission for the draft resolution it will be preparing. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are self-explanatory.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

It is the hope of the sponsors of the draft resolution that it will be approved by consensus.

Finally, I should like to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.19. First of all I should like to apologize to the delegations of Ireland and Norway for the fact that their names do not appear in the document. My delegation thought that it had contacted the Secretariat in good time to have them included in the list of sponsors, but apparently the Secretariat was unable to do so. I would therefore ask that Ireland and Norway be included among the original sponsors of the draft resolution.

On behalf of the sponsors, I now introduce the draft resolution, entitled "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects". The Conference was held in Geneva from 10 to 28 September 1979, in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 32/152 and 33/70, and its report is before this Committee. The resolutions that called for the convening of the Conference entrusted it with the mandate of reaching agreements on the prohibitions or restrictions of use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, taking into account humanitarian and military considerations, and on the question of the early review of this matter and the consideration of further proposals. It was envisaged that a session of the Conference might be able to conclude work on this category of weapons, a task which was begun tentatively during the diplomatic conference on international humanitarian law and later in two preparatory sessions of the United Nations Conference, held in 1978 and early 1979.

The Conference was assisted by its two preparatory sessions, but it was still faced with the question of how to balance military requirements with the need to develop humanitarian law in warfare. In addition, the Conference had to devote a lot of its attention to the follow-up mechanism.

As the report of the Conference indicates, substantial progress was made both in its consideration of agreements on specific weapons and in the legal framework for those agreements as well as for pursuit of its future work. It became clear, however, that even with the spirit of accommodation shown by the participants in the Conference, its mandate was such that it could not be

fully discharged in the time available. Hence the recommendation of the Conference to request the General Assembly to authorize it to hold another session.

Essentially, therefore, draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.19 is designed to seek the authority of the General Assembly to hold this further session.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

It is natural, however, that the draft resolution should bring to the General Assembly's attention, in a very short form, the stage it reached in its work. This is the essence of paragraphs 1 to 4 of the draft resolution.

In paragraph 5, the General Assembly is requested to endorse the decision of the Conference to hold another session in Geneva for a period of four weeks beginning on 15 September 1980, with a view to its completing negotiations in conformity with its mandate.

Paragraph 6 calls attention to an understanding of the Conference intended to speed up work at its next session.

Paragraph 7 needs to be emphasized. It calls on States to continue to participate actively in the Conference with appropriate representation. At the Conference in Geneva in September representatives of only 81 countries were present. It is the hope of my delegation and of all the sponsors of the draft resolution that more States will be represented at the next session. The importance of this Conference, which is the first of its kind perhaps since 1925 and which features prominently in the Programme of Action of the first special session devoted to disarmament, leads my delegation to hope that more countries will participate in reaching decisions, which, we trust, will have an impact on the future disarmament agenda in the area of conventional weapons. The sponsors therefore hope that the draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.19 will be adopted by consensus.

Before I conclude, I should like to say that the delegation of Ethiopia wishes to be a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.17.

Mr. ANDERSON (Australia): On behalf of the sponsors, I have pleasure in introducing draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.14 dealing with the implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/60.

Last year, by resolution 33/60, the General Assembly reaffirmed its conviction that the cessation of nuclear testing by all States in all environments would be in the interest of all mankind, both as a major step



(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a means of relieving the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination for the health of present and future generations. It was the view of the General Assembly that negotiation of an effective comprehensive test ban treaty was a matter of the highest importance.

The conclusion of such a treaty would be significant in that all nuclear explosions would cease for the duration of the treaty. It would thus limit, and perhaps even stop, the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by the parties to the treaty. This in turn would strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, lead to the fuller implementation of that Treaty, and help overcome the objections of those States that see the Non-Proliferation Treaty as discriminating in favour of the existing nuclear-weapon States.

A comprehensive test ban treaty would also prevent, or at least restrain, horizontal proliferation. It would provide reassurance to the international community that nuclear development programmes in non-nuclear-weapon States were, in fact, directed towards peaceful purposes. It is relevant to note that States not party to the NPT could become party to a comprehensive test ban treaty and thus provide assurances that they were not becoming nuclear-weapon States.

Last year General Assembly resolution 33/60 urged that negotiations between the three nuclear-weapon States be concluded as a matter of urgency and that the results be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament before the beginning of its 1979 session. In addition, it requested the Committee on Disarmament to take up the agreed text of the negotiating States with a view to the negotiation of a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty.

It is of considerable concern to my delegation that the Committee on Disarmament was unable to comply with that request. The negotiating States did not conclude their deliberations.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

Australia, together with a large number of other States, has consistently expressed its dissatisfaction at the lack of conclusion of these deliberations. While we appreciate that there are complex and difficult problems involved, we had expected results. In the absence of conclusive results, we at least expected a more detailed account of negotiations than in fact was given to the Committee on Disarmament this year.

The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is a vital and attainable part of an intricate system of disarmament and arms control. It would be futile to attempt to conclude a treaty without the considered results of the deliberations of the negotiating States, and we therefore regard it as a matter of the utmost importance that they use their best endeavours to bring their negotiations to a positive conclusion in time for consideration by the Committee on Disarmament during its next session. The role of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiation of a treaty is indispensable.

The effective implementation of a comprehensive test ban is, of course, dependent on adequate verification, and in this regard the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to establish an international seismic data exchange system is of the utmost importance. It is hoped that States will continue to co-operate with that group.

In preparing the draft resolution now before this Committee, the sponsoring delegations have had foremost in their minds the urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty to be concluded. We have been anxious to produce a balanced resolution which accurately reflects what we believe to be the will of the General Assembly. The differences in approach on the item are not, we consider, substantial and it is our hope that all delegations will find the text acceptable. Certainly the sponsoring delegations have made every effort to consult widely and have attempted to incorporate in the draft resolution those points which we believe all delegations consider important.

If we are to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and contribute towards an end to the arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament, a comprehensive test ban treaty will, we believe, be a vital element in action towards that goal. On behalf of its sponsors, I commend this draft resolution to the Committee.

Mr. OSMAN (Sudan) (interpretation from Arabic): In introducing draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12 we are not pursuing political or propaganda ends as might be believed. We are introducing it because we are convinced that this question is closely linked to the peace and security of the Middle East, and hence to that of the world as a whole.

A study of the political situation in the Middle East and the geographical location of that region in the world demands that we examine this question with the greatest responsibility. We all know that the region is the scene of a bitter struggle being waged by an aggressor State, which pursues its aggression constantly, against States and peoples that are sparing no effort to put an end to it and to eliminate its consequences.

It is no secret from anyone that Israel is making tireless efforts to develop its nuclear programme and to equip itself with nuclear weapons. Evidence of this has come from many sources, and there is no need to mention once more the tell-tale signs because numerous speakers have already mentioned them.

In its struggle against the Arab world Israel counted on its superiority in conventional weapons. It thought that the 1967 war would lead it to its goals and that the Arab world would accept its demands - on its knees and unconditionally. But since military gains did not match political successes, such was not the case. Israel then decided to develop its nuclear programme and to equip itself with nuclear weapons, believing that that alone would enable it to oblige the Arab world to give way to its claims and ambitions.

Therein lie the dangers threatening the peace and security of the region and of the world as a whole. The acquisition by Israel of nuclear weapons will force its neighbours, near and far, to seek in their turn to acquire nuclear weapons. Obviously, one of the first duties of every State is to protect its territory and its people from threats of aggression and from violation of its territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty. Imagine the magnitude of the dangers with which the peace and security of that region would be threatened if more than one State there acquired nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Osman, Sudan)

As I have already said, everyone knows that Israel is developing its nuclear programme. Its refusal to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons shows that it intends to acquire nuclear weapons, at the same time raising the not very convincing argument, "Why ask only Israel to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty when there are many countries that have not done so?" The answer to that question is simple.

First, most of the countries that have not signed the Treaty have not the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons.

Secondly, whereas Israel has established its nuclear programme and is continuing to develop it, most of the countries that have not signed the Treaty have done nothing of the kind.

Thirdly, most of the countries that have not signed the Treaty are not situated in a region where there is a serious conflict, as Israel is.

Fourthly, some of the countries that have not signed the Treaty are engaged in a conflict with Israel -- a conflict that has not yet been settled. In any case, those countries have indicated that they would accept the Treaty in principle if Israel signed it.

Fifthly, throughout its history Israel has been known as an aggressor State. The General Assembly has repeatedly condemned it. Moreover, Israel is not willing to abide by the resolutions of the United Nations.

Finally, as I indicated at the beginning of my statement, in submitting this draft resolution we have sought to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone so that it may be a zone of security, given its importance for the whole world and for international peace and security. We sincerely hope that this draft resolution will be adopted.

Mr. LIDCARD (Sweden): I have been instructed to make the following statement in support of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.19, which has just been introduced by the representative of Nigeria and which deals with the United Nations Conference concerning, particularly inhumane weapons.

All negotiations on limitations on methods and means of warfare are extremely complicated. Although the point of departure in these discussions is humanitarian, military and security considerations have to be taken into account. Indeed, any restrictions on conventional warfare that did not take them into account would be on shaky ground. In Geneva diplomats, lawyers and military and medical advisers have been engaged in a joint search for prohibitions or restrictions that are militarily viable and that bring some reduction of suffering, some reduction in risks for the civilian population. This is not an East-West or North-South balancing act but a joint humanitarian task. Still, security considerations make the exercise a difficult one, and this is especially so in the present field of international humanitarian legislation where we are dealing with the regulation of the use of specific conventional weapons. Against this background it should perhaps come as no surprise to anyone that the September meeting in Geneva will need to be followed by a second session.

That does not mean that the recently concluded session was a failure. We consider that, not least thanks to the very able chairmanship of Mr. Adeniji, encouraging progress was made. The draft resolution now before us in document A/C.1/34/L.19 takes note of that progress. The Conference has reached agreement with regard to a draft protocol banning the use of weapons which consist of non-detectable fragments. A wide measure of agreement has been attained on restriction of the use of landmines and booby-traps.

With respect to the question of prohibitions or restrictions of the use of incendiary weapons, there has been a further convergence of views, but considerable work still remains to be accomplished in this field. In our view, it will be difficult to term the Conference a success unless a substantive ban on the use of important incendiary weapons, including

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

napalm, is achieved. The world has long found the use of napalm and other flame weapons utterly inhumane. Is it not time to transform this reaction into State action?

On the positive side, we should also mention the unanimous resolution by the Conference concerning the development of small-calibre weapon systems. It calls, inter alia, upon States to exercise the utmost care in the development of such systems so as to avoid an unnecessary escalation of the injurious effects of small-calibre projectiles.

The Conference has recommended to the General Assembly that it be convened for a second session to be held in Geneva, beginning on 15 September 1980, with a view to concluding substantive and procedural matters left outstanding from its first session. One of the main issues left outstanding is the work on a treaty framework for the contemplated prohibitions or restrictions, including the question of a comprehensive review mechanism.

One aspect of the review issue is that the present Conference can deal only with weapons fully known to us now. If a considerable time passes between each opportunity to hold discussions, it may be argued that any humanitarian gains made in 1980 might soon be eroded by innovations in the field of weaponry. Accordingly there is a need for a system of periodic review, or follow-up, to use a perhaps more adequate terminology.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

The present state of arms technology clearly shows that there is a need for a workable mechanism to permit discussion of the question of new weapons. Let me give one example. One category of weapons which exists today but which will hardly be regulated at the present conference is fuel-air explosives. Fuel-air explosives are a relatively new concept in weapons technology: a container of volatile and inflammable liquid is ruptured by an explosive device and the contents are spread in the air; after a short delay, the fuel has then thoroughly mixed with the air and the mixture may be exploded by means of detonators present within the fuel cloud. In the fuel cloud high over-pressures are reached.

The main reason for discussing fuel-air explosive weapons in the context of "humanitarian law" is their specific property of causing severe lung injuries to persons exposed to them. The pressure levels and duration of the shock waves within the fuel cloud are of such magnitude that the probability of death for anybody present within the cloud is very high. Lung injuries will cause extreme agony and severe suffering to the victims before their death.

Further, a review mechanism is needed to permit discussion of completely new weapons. Some examples of this may be laser weapons, microwave devices, light flash devices and infrasound devices, in so far as those weapons are of an anti-personnel character.

The present Conference on the prohibition or restriction of use of certain conventional weapons is an unusual event of great importance. Not only has the international community a chance to ban or restrict the use of some particularly inhumane weapons which are being produced today but there is also a unique opportunity to establish in the future a mechanism to check, from a humanitarian point of view, the development of new weapons. The international community should not miss this opportunity.

Consequently, we urge unanimous support of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.19.

Mr. VELISSAROPOJLOS (Greece)(interpretation from French): I should like to say a few words about draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.17, which was introduced this morning by the representative of Nigeria.

Greece has always demonstrated great interest - and we have been repeating this since last year - in study fellowships on disarmament. It is only natural, therefore, that we should find this draft resolution entirely satisfactory. But I wonder whether we should not include in it a reference to the fact that in its first application the programme of fellowships on disarmament had very encouraging and very positive results. I think such a reference - although I have not worked it out fully in my mind - could be included in operative paragraph 1 of this draft resolution. I feel that it would be very useful, the more so since until now there has not been such an abundance of tangible results as to warrant our refraining from making mention of one achievement, however modest, that gives us cause for gratification now.

In keeping with that line of thinking, Greece is ready to sponsor this draft resolution.



The CHAIRMAN: Since no other delegation wishes to speak at this time, I should like to announce the following additional sponsors of draft resolutions: Italy and Kenya, A/C.1/34/L.13; Burundi and Congo, A/C.1/34/L.16; Ghana, Ethiopia and the Philippines, A/C.1/34/L.18; the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Nicaragua, A/C.1/34/L.12; Chile, A/C.1/34/L.20; the Philippines, A/C.1/34/L.5/Rev.1 and L.14; the Netherlands, A/C.1/34/L.21, and Morocco, Sierra Leone and Senegal, A/C.1/34/L.14.

Representatives will remember that at our 33rd meeting I said that on Friday morning next we would take action on certain draft resolutions, but in the event draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.2 is not yet ready to be voted on. However, we shall vote on Friday morning on draft resolutions A/C.1/34/L.5/Rev.1, L.7, L.10 and L.11, if I hear no objection, and I should also like to ask the sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/34/L.16, L.17, L.18 and L.19 whether they will be ready to be voted on then.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): I do not think that the Committee will be able to take a decision as early as Friday on draft resolutions A/C.1/34/L.16 and L.17, since the comments that the representative of Greece has just made may call for some revision of the texts after discussion among the group of sponsors.

On the other hand, I think that we may be ready for a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.18 as early as Friday, if there is no indication by representatives of a desire to submit amendments. We may also be ready for a decision to be taken then on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.19, since we are hoping that it will be adopted by consensus.

The CHAIRMAN: If I hear no further objection, on Friday morning the Committee will take action on draft resolutions A/C.1/34/L.5/Rev.1, L.7, L.10, L.11, L.18 and L.19.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.