

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

THIRTY-FOURTH SESSION

*Official Records**



FIRST COMMITTEE
32nd meeting
held on
Friday, 9 November 1979
at 3 p.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 32nd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas)

CONTENTS

DISARMAMENT ITEMS

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 AND 121 (continued)

Statements were made by:

Mr. Al-Ali (Iraq)
Mr. Nuseibeh (Jordan)
Mr. Florin (German Democratic Republic)
Mr. Djokic (Yugoslavia)

* This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be incorporated in a copy of the record and should be sent *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, room A-3550.

Corrections will be issued shortly after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/34/PV.32
12 November 1979

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 AND 121 (continued)

Mr. AL-ALI (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/34/L.12, entitled "Israeli nuclear armament", on behalf of the following sponsors: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Viet Nam, Yemen and Yugoslavia. Mozambique has now been added to the list of sponsors.

All the preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution are self-explanatory and its operative paragraphs are also very clear.

There is expressed in the first preambular paragraph our deep concern at the increasing information and evidence - particularly that which came to light in the course of the general debate - stressing the fact that Israel was planning to manufacture nuclear weapons if it had not already managed to acquire them.

The second preambular paragraph recalls resolution 33/71 A adopted at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly concerning military and nuclear collaboration with Israel, which condemned the escalation of both conventional and nuclear weapons in Israel.

The third preambular paragraphs reaffirms a series of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly which all condemned the link between South Africa and Israel, particularly with regard to conventional and nuclear weapons.

Members of the First Committee are no doubt familiar with the report submitted to the General Assembly in the past few days, entitled "Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa", contained in document A/34/22/Add.1. In paragraphs 11 to 22 of that report, additional information is included stressing the military and nuclear collaboration between South Africa and Israel.

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

The fourth preambular paragraph reaffirms previous resolutions of the General Assembly over the last few years concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. I think everyone here is aware of the importance of the realization of this idea which will act as a warranty of international peace and security not only in the region itself but throughout the world.

The fifth preambular paragraph expresses the conviction that the development of nuclear capability by Israel would further aggravate the already dangerous situation in the region and further threaten international peace and security.

Operative paragraph 1 appeals to all States to put an end to any co-operation with Israel which might assist it in acquiring and developing nuclear weapons. It also appeals to these States to endeavour to dissuade corporations, institutions and individuals within their jurisdiction from undertaking any co-operation which might result in providing Israel with nuclear weapons.

Operative paragraph 2 calls upon all States to take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of fissionable material and nuclear technology to Israel, since this technology might be used by Israel to manufacture nuclear weapons.

And, consistent with this line of reasoning, operative paragraph 3 calls upon Israel to submit all its nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). When that step is taken, any doubts regarding Israeli nuclear capabilities will be dispelled. If Israel is ready to comply with that call, or if it refuses to do so, then we shall have clear-cut proof of Israel's positive or negative intentions.

Operative paragraph 4 strongly condemns any attempt by Israel to manufacture, acquire, store, test or introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

Operative paragraph 5 requests the Security Council to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the implementation of the relevant resolutions concerning Israeli nuclear armament.

And in order to clarify the action taken by Israel in the nuclear field and to cast some additional light on the matter and assist the General Assembly and the Security Council to adopt any future measure which may be dictated by events, operative paragraph 6 requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to prepare a study on the Israeli nuclear armament and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session. We would hope that such a study would be balanced and objective and that the members of the study group would do the following: first, compile a complete list of publications on the matter; secondly, obtain and analyse information concerning Israeli nuclear installations; thirdly, obtain and assess information published with regard to the Israeli nuclear armaments position.

I should like to take this opportunity to allude to one aspect of draft resolution L.12. The document distributed today (A/C.1/34/L.12) failed to include Mozambique among the sponsors, and I should like to draw this to the attention of the Secretariat.

Mr. NUSEIBEH (Jordan): The General Assembly held a historic special session between 23 May and 30 June 1978 which was tantamount to the ringing of an alarm bell by almost all Member States regarding the survival and the fate of the world because of the increasing buildup and proliferation of the monstrous and lethal nuclear arsenals.

World public opinion and concerned and articulate organizations across the planet watched the proceedings with a mixture of apprehension, hope and the guarded expectation that the historic session might represent a turning-point, a heightened state of awareness if not a hallmark in arresting, stabilizing, and

(Mr. Museibeh, Jordan)

achieving a permanent halt in the arms build-up and, eventually, the deeply cherished goal of complete and total disarmament. It is in this spirit that my Government has warmly welcomed the SALT II agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, not as a be-all and end-all, but rather as a first step towards complete and total disarmament for the salvation of our planet - our only habitable planet.

It is likewise within this urgent context that I find it imperative to call upon this Committee to give its most immediate attention to, and to take action on, item 121 of our agenda which pertains to Israeli nuclear armament, because we are irrevocably convinced that unless practical and effective measures are taken to deal with this most ominous issue, it may very well some day, somehow bring about a nuclear holocaust, not only in the Middle East and surrounding areas but in the whole world. We are convinced that in transferring the conceptual framework of the East-West strategic game to the Middle East, the greatest care must be taken to prevent it from entering the area of regional situations - and we are speaking here of one of the most volatile and highly explosive regions in the world - which are fundamentally different and must be subject to far greater limitations, strictures and degrees of awareness. Whether Israel is maintaining a threshold capability or has indeed chosen the nuclear option and has already acquired its own arsenal as a means of achieving its political and strategic objectives is not the crux of the matter, even though almost all knowledgeable people are thoroughly convinced, on the basis of credible evidence, that the monster has for some years been let out of Israel's Pandora's box.

The crux of the matter is that as long ago as 1950 the Israeli leadership had determined - and this was a mental and psychological decision of intent - to follow the nuclear course, in pursuit of a carefully planned policy of territorial expansion, political blackmail and hegemony in its various manifestations.

(Mr. Museibeh, Jordan)

The late Mr. Ben-Gurion decreed in 1950 the establishment of an Atomic Energy Commission, accountable directly to him as Prime Minister, with the avowed purpose of assiduously working towards the acquisition of nuclear know-how. This was an announced decision - hardly concealed. I personally wrote an editorial in 1950 in the Arabic daily newspaper in Jerusalem, Al-Difaa', warning of the disastrous consequences to the region and to the world if Israel pursued, instead of renouncing - as many other technologically highly advanced countries did - such a perilous course.

The decision, however, seemed to have had very little impact, if any, on the international community still under the misguided spell of a helpless Israel surrounded by enemies bent on destroying it, even though a mere two years earlier it was the Palestinian people whose national existence had been destroyed in their homeland and the majority of them had been uprooted.

Israeli nuclear activities continued unabated under the very eyes of the major Powers, whose data-gathering capabilities no one should underrate. Indeed, some of the most prominent scientists in this very field whose emotional commitments to Israel were highly pronounced were generously given visas to visit Israel, ostensibly to attend scientific conferences, but without due regard being paid to the potential implications of such visits in the form of the transfer of nuclear know-how, while at the same time other American scientists of different national derivation, including Arab and, particularly, Palestinian scientists who had attained excellence in the United States, were denied even social visits to their next of kin and placed under strict surveillance, notwithstanding the fact that many of their countries of origin did not possess either the installations or the intention to engage in this dangerous game.

In the meantime and in a spurt of anger, a then reckless French Government in the pre-De Gaulle era, angered by the Arab world's support for Algeria's war of liberation, provided Israel with the Daimona nuclear reactor, which was big enough to possess the capability of upgrading Israel's uranium fuel into plutonium weaponry capability, as well as with the required scientists to enhance its acquisition.

(Mr. Museibeh, Jordan)

My Government had received in 1964 irrefutable evidence that Israel had definitely achieved the threshold of nuclear capability and that it required but a little longer to perfect its delivery system. As I came to that year's session, I took the opportunity to raise the matter with the then United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, who apparently did not seem to be wholly in the picture. When I gave him evidence - which we had obtained somehow - emanating from atomic scientist-engineers who had been working on both the Daimona and a French reactor in the outskirts of Paris, Mr. Rusk agreed to my request that an investigation be made, while conceding the considerable difficulties that would be encountered in such a search. Two months later the United States Ambassador in Amman informed my Government that the United States had been able to establish the accuracy of my Government's reports. He added that the United States, with all the difficulties encountered, had been surprised by its own findings as to the magnitude of Israel's nuclear achievement.

What I have said so far is but a genesis of what I regard as the "original sin" - the laxity, indifference and I do not want to attribute any further adjectives, such as "silent acquiescence", because I realize full well that the super-Powers are adamantly opposed to any proliferation of nuclear acquisition. Yet the net result has been - and there are innumerable studies and articles and some books by prestigious institutes on this subject - that Israel has become the sixth or seventh nuclearized country in the world - including South Africa, whose collaboration with Israel in this field is both notorious and well-established.

The Israeli case as far as the United States is concerned, a case that clearly runs counter to the best interests of the United States, is seemingly compromised by the special United States-Israel relationship that is essentially anchored in the political imperatives of the United States. It is fundamentally dissimilar to the case of other countries in the world, such as India, Pakistan, Sweden, Japan and others, even though they have turned down the nuclear option; the United States seems incapable of unilaterally acting to deprive the Israelis of their announced nuclear capability by threatening to cut off its huge financial, economic, military and political support.

(Mr. Nuseibeh, Jordan)

The Israelis themselves have made what could only be construed as a public disclosure. Their former President, a scientist himself, made such a disclosure in a television statement that many people in Amman heard. The theft of fissionary material from United States atomic installations and the piracy on the open seas, some two years ago, of 200 tons of enriched uranium leave no room for doubt whither Israel has gone and is continuing to go.

In 1968 the former Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, declared:

"The spread of nuclear weapons would aggravate our difficulties in maintaining friendly relations with parties to a continuing dispute. If one party 'went nuclear', we might have to decide whether to help the other party directly or through security assurances, whether to sever economic aid to the country acquiring atomic weapons, or whether to stand aside even though the result might be a war which would be hard to contain". How true and rational his analysis was, and yet, in the face of devastating evidence that Israel was actually reprocessing the fissionary material for weaponry use, something that could not have escaped the highly sophisticated detectors of America's arms control apparatus, no measures have been taken to end Israel's nuclearization.

Indeed, the head of the Egyptian atomic installation, a top-level atomic scientist himself, briefed us in 1970 on the Israeli nuclear activity and mentioned the construction by Israel of a high tower to dispose of dangerous waste as one of the many proofs that Israel had been engaged in the production process. He even calculated how much was being produced each year.

I need hardly elaborate on further evidences of Israel's nuclearization, because facts have become too abundant and too pervasive to leave any room for doubt. The political and strategic implications of a dangerous development, namely, the transformation from a pre-nuclear situation to a post-nuclear one, compellingly confronts us with an untenable and unacceptable situation for which no clear-cut, fully thought out doctrine for action has been formulated by the super-Powers or is in existence.

(Mr. Museibeh, Jordan)

The fact that Israel has not declared itself unequivocally as having transformed itself deliberately and by calculation does not in any way diminish the overall implications for the stability, security and even survival of hundreds of millions of people in the region. And the fact that Israel disposes of nuclear weapons of devastation will sooner or later compel political and strategic decisions which are contrary to the peace, stability and survival of the world. It is the more compelling and dangerous when judged against Israel's openly-declared expansionist policies and its adamant refusal to agree on a fair and just solution to the Middle East conflict and the redemption of the Palestinian people. Quite apart from the fanaticism and intransigence of the Israeli leadership, our peoples are convinced that the acquisition of an atomic arsenal has been an overriding factor in Israel's callous disregard of all precepts of international law, elemental norms of justice and the international will of the United Nations as categorically embodied in its numerous decisions.

It is perfectly true that the late President Lyndon Johnson stressed to Prime Minister Eshkol as early as 1964 "that the United States was against proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world and she was certainly against their proliferation in the Middle East". But those grave warnings have never been translated into effective measures to forestall proliferation.

I can well understand the pampering of a favoured child and the existence of a unique relationship. But what no one can understand is that when you pamper a child you should give him not a reasonably harmless toy but a pistol which, by accident or design -- or because the child has grown up in an unhealthy atmosphere -- provides him with the wherewithal to kill and turn into an international monster. If I had such a child, I would regard him as a danger to the family -- and in this case the danger is to the family of nations.

(Mr. Museibeh, Jordan)

The Israelis are presently committed to preserving the post-1967 status quo, which means a total national obliteration of the Palestinian people in their homeland. The temptation might extend to attempting the creation of more and more status quo situations by atomic blackmail. Quite clearly, the people already victimized and those newly threatened by atomic blackmail will not in the long run accept their demise with folded hands.

There would then arise a variety of scenarios, each of which portends grave dangers to world peace and security. To begin with, a nuclear capability does not and will not preclude legitimate resistance to occupation and the restoration of Palestinian Arab rights, atom bombs or no atom bombs.

Secondly, the whole concept of non-proliferation loses its moral as well as its practical efficacy when proliferation is acquiesced in, not necessarily by design but by inaction. Future generations will not tolerate such a situation of atomic blackmail placing them in a situation of perpetual bondage. If my reading of human nature is correct, the victimized and threatened will try to break loose, thus dealing a fatal blow to the doctrine of non-proliferation, which is at present one of the pillars of international security in the nuclear age.

Thirdly, the resolutions which various regions in the world have been submitting to this Committee pertaining to regional nuclear-free zones would be a mockery and a contradiction in terms as far as the Middle East was concerned. For a truly nuclear-free zone presuppose that all the States in the area are nuclear-free, and not that some have become nuclear while others have not.

Fourthly, the ratification by States which have not yet signed the ratification instruments would become more indefensible than ever before within a setting which is blatantly menacing, and would continue to become even more menacing to their existence and vital national interests.

Fifthly, States which are inherently opposed to nuclearization and regard it as anathema per se would find themselves compelled in the face of imminent and ever-growing danger to seek a protective umbrella from one or other of the super-Powers. This is perfectly understandable, but it would create a sharp polarization between the super-Powers - even at the regional levels which have their own peculiar imperatives, unlike the global imperatives of equivalence, sufficiency and deterrence. This may very well become one of the much sought-after objectives of decision-makers throughout the world.

(Mr. Museibeh, Jordan)

The price, of course, would be a considerable diminution of détente and the onset of situations which may lead to confrontation instead of the presently accepted doctrine of safe competition.

The whole Non-Aligned Movement came into existence in the early 1960s to help safeguard the world against super-Power polarization and the cold war.

Most of the arguments which I have just outlined apply in almost equal measure to the turbulent situation which exists in southern Africa. The plight of the Namibian people vies with that of the Palestinian people as being one of the two oldest items the United Nations has had on its agenda since its inception, and there does not seem to be any real and acceptable solution on the horizon to this situation, notwithstanding the commendable efforts of certain Western countries to soften up the obduracy of the racist South African régime. Zimbabwe gives brighter promise of an acceptable solution which we all seek. Let us wish it all the success it needs.

But while the whole of the continent of Africa is locked in conflict with racist South Africa, an atomic detonation is set off almost certainly by South Africa, in spite of its denials. That South Africa and Israel are involved in the closest atomic collaboration has been established by many sources, including the book entitled The Nuclear Axis by Zdenek Cervent and Barbara Rogers. In that book reference is made to the discovery in August 1977 that South Africa was ready to test its first atomic bomb in the Kalahari Desert, and Newsweek is quoted as saying that "Some United States intelligence analysts have concluded that the bomb South Africa had planned to set off had actually been made in Israel".

A high-ranking Washington official was reported as saying: "I know some intelligence people who are convinced with near certainty that it was an Israeli nuclear device".

It was a two-way deal in which Israel obtained from South Africa all its requirements of uranium without any international safeguards or inspection, in exchange for Israeli recycling of the technological know-how substantially and recklessly imported from outside.

(Mr. Museibeh, Jordan)

I do not need to elaborate any further on the evidence, in spite of the secrecy shrouding the collaboration, because available evidence is well-nigh irrefutable.

Was I going to excess when I argued at the outset against the inherent dangers of proliferation which, like a venereal disease, is passed on from one party to another, and to yet a third, in a chain reaction?

The end result, of course, is to place hundreds of millions of people in Africa, Asia and the Middle East in a situation of, to say the least, destabilization and anxiety, leading eventually to a response in kind. And all the while, both Israel and South Africa can continue to bask in their intolerable intransigence and illegalities, and their false sense of security and superiority. For in terms of time, the "while" that I am talking about is a fleeting moment in history and can never last indefinitely.

Total destruction can never bring about any real or meaningful or lasting peace. And even the spoils of war in a ravaged continent or sub-continent are hazardous to reap, with the radioactive contamination and the scourges of lethal disease.

(Mr. Huseibeh, Jordan)

And yet Israel and South Africa have shortsightedly chosen the path of nuclearization. Indeed, as one authoritative source has argued, the case can be made that the United States, by failing to exercise its undeniable leverage on a country for whose survival it is, in effect, the ultimate guarantor, so as to countervail or nullify the Israeli nuclear capability -- while it privately admits the existence of this capability, if not of assembled weapons as well -- is actually encouraging proliferation in the Middle East by default.

I am not suggesting that the United States is happy with what is happening, for it stands to lose most by its continuation. But I am definitely suggesting that by permitting the pampered child to become lethal, it is doing a grave harm to itself, to its pampered child and to the peace of the world at large.

There are moments in history when major Powers must assume major responsibilities, bitter as the medicine may at first seem to be.

The Israelis have always argued in debates in this Committee that such matters should be the subject of discussion amongst all the parties concerned. Our position is that the parties concerned are the whole world, the whole international community. Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not contingent upon bilateral discussions between two or more parties. It is an internationally recognized treaty which encompasses all and is open to every State which is genuinely determined to forgo the nuclear option, under international supervision and inspection.

Secrecy has really worn thin, and there is no longer any purpose in pretending that what exists does not exist.

My delegation fully supports draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12 which Iraq has just introduced. We would have liked to add an additional operative paragraph, which would have required the super-Powers to give categorical guarantees against nuclear aggression upon States which are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But since the sponsors of the draft resolution believe that it is adequate for the time being, my delegation supports the draft resolution as it is tabled.

As someone who is familiar with the intricacies, dynamics and configurations of the Middle East situation, I wish to state without the slightest hesitation that this agenda item 121 and the draft resolution just submitted have perhaps far greater impact upon issues relating to war and peace and eventually endangering world peace than any other issue -- if not directly, then indirectly.

(Mr. Nuseibeh, Jordan)

It is the earnest hope of my delegation that this Committee will deal with it promptly and decisively, not as just one more item, but as an issue which has the potential of disaster for the whole world.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like once again to appeal to members of the Committee to add their names to the list of speakers, in order that we may fully utilize the time available. I need not explain that the Committee has already lost several meetings unnecessarily owing to lack of speakers.

The Committee's Programme of Work is a very heavy one, as all members are aware and we cannot afford to lose any more of the time available to us. I therefore reiterate that I intend to end meetings at 6 p.m., and I would like to urge delegations that have already submitted draft resolutions to introduce them as soon as possible, in order that those representatives wishing to speak on them may do so without delay.

Mr. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic) (interpretation from Russian): In my statement on 17 October, I had the opportunity to state the view of the German Democratic Republic that the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly should give further impetus to efforts in the area of arms limitation and disarmament.

The intensification of disarmament negotiations has become a matter of paramount importance. For this reason, the German Democratic Republic is proposing under agenda item 42 the adoption of a draft resolution by which the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly would stress the importance of this objective in an appropriate manner. Today, I should like to introduce that draft resolution, which appears in document A/C.1/34/L.4, and to make a few comments on its contents.

Firstly, the first three paragraphs of the preamble proceed from the joint recognition expressed in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly that disarmament has become an imperative and most urgent task facing the international community, that the continued arms race is a growing threat to international peace and security, interfering with the solution of

(Mr. Florin, German
Democratic Republic)

urgent and vitally important economic and other problems, and that it is now necessary to take effective measures to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament.

We believe that these provisions must be reaffirmed in order that they may determine, to an even greater extent, the practical actions of States. There is no need for me to explain just how urgent this is.

Secondly, the German Democratic Republic would like to draw particular attention to the Programme of Action adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly. In that document, States expressed their determination to translate agreed objectives into practical measures as soon as possible. The fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution I am introducing stresses this point, namely, that it is necessary to bring about effective and binding international agreements on various aspects of arms limitation and disarmament that would bring us step by step closer to our objective of general and complete disarmament.

Negotiations are the decisive instrument for reaching such agreements. It is through negotiations that we will be able to bridge the gap that now exists between the Programme of Action of the Final Document and practical results. This is why the fifth preambular paragraph stresses as a point of principle the need to achieve systematic progress in all international negotiations dealing with issues of disarmament, in the broadest understanding of that word.

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

Negotiations should be speeded up so that in future they are preventive rather than tagging along behind the arms build-up and the increasing sophistication of the means of waging war. This applies to all negotiations, irrespective of where they are carried on. Here I would stress in particular the significance of the Committee on Disarmament.

Thirdly, the seventh preambular paragraph reflects concern over the inadequate results of current negotiations. This is a concern which is shared by almost all States. We do not want to rest on our laurels, but rather to intensify the awareness of the responsibility of States for resolving these very relevant tasks as quickly as possible. All Members of the United Nations have this responsibility, in particular all nuclear States, and those States which have a great military potential. This has been very accurately stated in paragraph 28 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. Here we have in mind also those negotiations which have been interrupted.

Fourthly, the draft resolution which we are introducing stresses the fact that important proposals on arms limitation and disarmament have not yet been included in the negotiating process. We do not have to look far to find examples of this. A simple comparison of the programme of action of the tenth special session of the General Assembly with the subject of current negotiations shows just what still has to be done in this area. Naturally, there are often different views on how any given problem should be resolved. This is perfectly normal and it is quite legitimate that there should be very careful study of initiatives from the viewpoint of the interests of security and whether these proposals are valid, as well as of their applicability to specific disarmament measures. However, it is important that such doubts and reservations should be the subject of negotiation. They should not be used in order to block consideration of important proposals or for an unjustifiably long period of time to keep initiatives on the sidelines of negotiations. It is negotiations that enable us to find and use opportunities to achieve acceptable compromises which serve our general objective. Practical experience teaches us that almost all proposals which so far have led to the reaching of international agreements in the area of arms limitation and disarmament were at first controversial. However, it

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

it then became possible gradually to find settlements for these complex issues. A clear example of this, without any doubt, is the SALT II agreement. In calling for the inclusion of important proposals in negotiations, we are not questioning agreed priorities but rather endeavouring to ensure that there will be very thorough consideration of these proposals in the interests of making progress on the substance.

Fifthly, I should like to sum up my comments on the preambular part of the resolution in the following manner. We already have the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly. It contains agreed objectives, principles and tasks. The deliberative and negotiating machinery has been amended in order to enhance its effectiveness. However, one and a half years after that special session, it has now become clear that we have to stress negotiations on the substance of issues. Such negotiations, and all aspects thereof, have become the decisive phase in this process of establishing what our determination is, namely, to move from the idea right up to the international agreement or treaty. In the interests of the human race, current diplomacy should be commensurate with the tasks entrusted to it. The thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations should therefore make use of its full authority in order to speed up and intensify negotiations on issues relating to disarmament.

Sixthly, what we have stated here has led us to the conclusions which are contained in the operative part of the draft resolution. It is proposed there that the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly should make an appeal to all States to

"Expedite all current negotiations by conducting them with greater intensity and singleness of purpose in order to reach a decisive breakthrough in these negotiations in the near future and to successfully complete the preparation of new effective disarmament measures."

States are also called upon to resume negotiations on several aspects of disarmament which were suspended without any reason. Moreover, States are called upon to enter, without delay, into negotiations on current issues of arms limitations and disarmament on which concrete proposals have been *submitted, but which have not yet become the subject of negotiations.*

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

Seventhly, we believe that the text of the resolution is acceptable to all States. It hinges on the decisions taken at the tenth special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and it reflects the concern which has been very clearly expressed by many delegations in the current debates at this thirty-fourth session of the Assembly. Our position has been confirmed in these consultations which we have held with many representatives in the First Committee. We should like to express our appreciation to those delegations that have made suggestions to us for improving the text. We will take them duly into account when we work further on this text.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic hopes that draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.4, which we are now introducing, will be widely supported here and that it will be adopted by consensus.

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.13 on behalf of a group of sponsors consisting of the following countries: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Zaire and Yugoslavia.

The tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted particular attention to the organization of work of international bodies dealing with disarmament issues. It took important decisions whose primary goal was to promote the process of international negotiations in this field of international relations and thus contribute to a more rapid and more effective solution of disarmament questions. Among them, the decision to establish the Committee on Disarmament was particularly important. Our draft resolution is concerned with the Committee's work.

During the general debate at the present session of the General Assembly, as well as in the First Committee, there has been a great deal of talk about the work of the Committee on Disarmament and the unsatisfactory state of current disarmament negotiations. In our opinion, we should draw from the debate the conclusion that new and more resolute efforts should constantly be exerted in the search for solutions to disarmament issues, and that the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body in this field, plays a primary role in this respect and bears special responsibilities. It is precisely the last two points that the sponsors had in mind in drafting this resolution.

In the preamble of the draft, satisfaction is expressed over the establishment, in accordance with agreement reached at the tenth special session, of the Committee on Disarmament and the fact that it has achieved valuable results concerning its organization and procedures.

On the other hand, it is pointed out that negotiations on priority tasks in the field of disarmament have not yielded any concrete results so far and that the Committee should become urgently and directly involved in substantive negotiations on priority disarmament questions and play the central role in the implementation of the Programme of Action adopted at the tenth special session.

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

Finally, it is stressed in the preamble that negotiations on specific disarmament issues conducted outside the Committee on Disarmament should not in any way constitute an impediment to negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on such questions.

The operative part urges the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without any further delay to substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the tenth special session and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. In addition, it invites the members of the Committee on Disarmament involved in separate negotiations on specific priority questions of disarmament, to make every effort to achieve without further delay a positive conclusion of these negotiations for submission to the Committee and, failing this, to submit to the Committee a full report on the status of their separate negotiations and results achieved so far in order to contribute most directly to the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament.

Further, the draft also contains an appeal to the Committee to initiate negotiations, at its next session, on the comprehensive programme of disarmament with a view to completing its elaboration before the second special session on disarmament and, in doing so, to take as a basis the recommendations adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

The draft also contains two paragraphs requesting the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, and deciding to include in the provisional agenda of the thirty-fifth session an item entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament".

May I, in conclusion, express the confidence of the sponsors that the draft will meet with the general support of the members of the Committee and that it will be adopted by consensus.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Israel, who has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. EILAN (Israel): The representative of Israel is not going to stoop to the level of market square vituperation, which we have heard from Ambassador Nuseibeh. I shall leave to him the study of venereal disease which he mentioned in this Committee.

I shall, however, answer briefly what he said about the Palestinian cause and the championship of that cause. Does the Jordanian representative really assume that no one, but no one, in this Committee remembers anything of what has happened in the Middle East in the last few decades? If Jordan is as adamant in giving the Palestinians their rights, as the Jordanian representative now claims, how is it that for 19 years when Judaea and Samaria were under Jordanian occupation, no Palestinian State was set up? How is it that Palestinians were prohibited during that period from voicing their grievances against Hashemite oppression? How is it that hundreds of Palestinians languished in Jordanian gaols for demanding the exercise of the kind of political rights they have been enjoying since Judaea and Samaria came under Israel's control? Above all, how does Ambassador Nuseibeh explain the events of September 1970 when the Jordanian army killed thousands of members of the PLO? Those who survived swam across the Jordan, preferring the Israel régime to life under Jordanian occupation. Ambassador Nuseibeh's words are now an exercise of ghoulish hypocrisy which this Organization can ill afford to accept.

The CHAIRMAN: We have just heard the last speaker for this afternoon, but before adjourning the meeting I should like to announce that the Lao People's Democratic Republic has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.6 and that the delegations of Indonesia and Singapore have become sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.14. Ghana has become a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.13.

At the risk of sounding like a broken record, I should like to say that the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions is Friday next, 16 November. I hope that all proposals will be submitted by that time and introduced as soon as possible thereafter.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Before we adjourn, I should like to ask the Secretariat, through you, Mr. Chairman, for information with regard to a decision that this Committee adopted last year.

As will be recalled, on 16 December 1978, on the recommendation of the First Committee, the General Assembly adopted a decision on what appears in the list of decisions as "Production of a United Nations film on wars and their consequences". The vote on that decision was very significant: it was adopted by 108 votes to none, with 23 abstentions. Pursuant to it, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to produce that United Nations film at a cost of approximately \$200,000. Since almost one year has elapsed, I should like to ask the Secretariat, through you, Sir, if it would be possible to find out from the Department of Public Information -- which was the Department entrusted with the production of the film -- what precisely is the present situation regarding the implementation of that General Assembly decision.

Mr. GEMRAJIAN (India): I should like to associate myself with the question just put to the Secretariat by the representative of Mexico. My delegation also is interested in acquainting itself with the fate of that decision taken last year, and we should appreciate receiving information on it from the Secretariat.

The CHAIRMAN: The Secretariat will reply to that question at our next meeting.

Once again I regret to have to say that we have at present only one speaker for Monday. If that remains the case, we shall not be able to meet on that day. This all seems to lead to the simple conclusion that either representatives inscribe their names to discuss draft resolutions or we may not be able to take up some of those that members might deem it necessary to take up. I request representatives to consult the Journal to ascertain whether or not we shall meet on Monday morning, which will depend on whether or not further speakers are added to the list before then.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.