



Saturday, 10 December 1955,
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New York

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Chairman: Mr. Luciano JOUBLANC RIVAS
(Mexico).

Requests for hearings (A/C.4/326) (concluded)

1. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the Committee should consider the request for a hearing from Mr. Abdirazak Haji Hussen, representative of the Somali Youth League, received by the Secretariat (A/C.4/326).

There being no objection, the request was granted.

AGENDA ITEM 35

The Togoland unification problem and the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration: report of the Trusteeship Council (A/3046, A/C.4/L.428/Rev.1 and 2, A/C.4/L.429/Rev.1 and 2, A/C.4/L.431, A/C.4/L.432, T/1206 and Add.1, T/1214, T/1215) (*continued*)

GENERAL DEBATE (*concluded*) AND CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY INDIA (A/C.4/L.428/REV.1 AND 2) (*continued*)

2. Mr. ROLZ BENNETT (Guatemala) congratulated the Indian delegation on having presented a draft resolution (A/C.4/L.428/Rev.1) which took into account the many different aspects of the problem of Togoland unification and the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration. The Guatemalan delegation could not, however, support some aspects of the Indian proposal. It hoped to learn more about other aspects in the course of the debate.

3. It was a matter for regret that the Indian draft resolution had to take into account a *de facto* situation which made it necessary to have, for the time being, separate solutions for Togoland under British administration and Togoland under French administration. The development of the two Territories had led to situations which departed in several respects from what could be regarded as the most appropriate application of trusteeship principles. It was disturbing to find that *de facto* situation forcing the Administering Authorities and even the United Nations to take decisions which might be inconsistent with the granting to the peoples of those Territories of self-government or

independence, the main goals of the Trusteeship System.

4. There were two kinds of sovereignty: territorial and political sovereignty. The first was inherent in peoples which had a valid claim to their land whether they were already occupying it or were, for reasons beyond their control, deprived of it or of some part of it. The second was exercised by a people when it assumed responsibility for and determined the form and method of operation of its own government and proceeded to develop its institutions, promote progress and further the well-being of all its members.

5. In the case of the two Territories of Togoland, both sovereignties belonged to the inhabitants, though hitherto they had been unable to exercise either sovereignty to the full. The United Nations would certainly have had a pleasanter task if it had had to consider the first steps in granting self-government or independence to both Togolands and not merely to Togoland under British administration. It was gratifying, however, that for the first time in United Nations history a Territory was to emerge from the Trusteeship System.

6. There were also grounds for satisfaction in the statements by the French Government to the effect that, at the appropriate time—it was to be hoped, in the near future—a popular consultation would be held in Togoland under French administration in order to enable the people to decide on their future.

7. He reminded the Committee of the provisions of Article 76 b of the Charter and associated himself in principle with the observations of Mr. Tarazi, a member of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Togoland under British administration and Togoland under French administration, 1955, which were set forth in paragraph 107 of the Mission's special report (T/1206 and Add.1). Since, unfortunately, Togoland under British administration did not possess its own institutions, the General Assembly was faced with the following alternatives: either it could delay the holding of the plebiscite in order to allow time for the establishment of the Territory's own political institutions, and thus delay the end of the trusteeship regime; or it could admit that the plebiscite should be held even though political conditions in the Territory were not those which should normally have been established in due course, in accordance with the Charter.

8. In order to dispel its own doubts as to the circumstances in which the plebiscite would be held, the Guatemalan delegation had put questions to the petitioners, but their contradictory replies had not entirely allayed its anxiety and it still feared that the plebiscite had been conceived in the light of the purely local interests of various groups of the population. Nevertheless, in view of the circumstances, and subject to the reservations of principle it had already made, his delegation agreed to the plebiscite.

9. It was necessary to examine some of the basic elements of a plebiscite, such as were examined, in one form or another, in document A/C.4/L.428/Rev.1: the subject of the plebiscite, the people who would participate in it, the manner of holding it, the conditions under which it would be held, the procedure to be followed, its consequences and the appointment of officials who would prepare and supervise the plebiscite and evaluate its results.

10. As it had been said that the forthcoming independence of the Gold Coast was the reason why a plebiscite should be organized immediately, it might be wondered whether the attainment of independence by the Gold Coast might be delayed or impeded if a plebiscite was not held in Togoland under British administration. The claim was advanced that it would be easier to draft the proposed constitution for the new Gold Coast State when the decision of the people of Togoland under British administration concerning their integration with the Gold Coast was known; however, he thought it should be possible to draft constitutional provisions which were flexible enough to allow for possible integration of one Territory with the other. Nevertheless, if it was really necessary to organize an immediate plebiscite before a new independent State like the Gold Coast could come into being—an event Guatemala welcomed—his delegation would have no objection. It wished to observe, however, that the entire discussion, and the consideration of a draft resolution of such complexity and such historical significance, were being conducted with a haste ill befitting the seriousness of a measure which all Member States would wish to support in order to secure the freedom of the continent which had suffered most from colonialism.

11. The Guatemalan delegation would, in principle, have preferred the plebiscite to cover the questions prescribed by General Assembly resolution 860 (IX), but in view of the special circumstances in which it was to be held, and of the fact that a negative reply to one question would leave open several other solutions on which a subsequent consultation could be held, it was willing to accept a plebiscite on only two questions or even one question. That acceptance, however, was on the understanding that the Administering Authority, the political parties and groups in the Territory and the United Nations organs appointed to supervise the plebiscite would use every means at their command to explain the situation to the inhabitants of the Territory, and make quite plain to them the possible solutions which would remain if they replied in the negative to the question of questions put to them.

12. He congratulated the Visiting Mission on its comprehensive and well-balanced report (T/1206 and Add. 1) and paid a tribute to its important work. With regard to the popular consultation, he felt that there were insufficient grounds for fixing the minimum age for participation in the plebiscite at twenty-one years. The age of eighteen years was steadily gaining ground throughout the world as the age of majority for the exercise of civic rights, and if young people in Togoland under British administration were liable to taxation at the age of eighteen years, it was fair that they should acquire the advantages of citizenship at that age. Furthermore, although the age of twenty-one years was prescribed by local legislation, an exception could be made to the electoral law as the plebiscite concerned was of a special nature and called for special rules.

13. Turning to paragraph 4 of section A of the operative part of the Indian draft resolution, he expressed the fear that the Administering Authority and the United Nations supervisory organ might have difficulty in interpreting the provisions of chapter IV of the Visiting Mission's report for the purpose of preparing a definite plan of operation or a body of precise rules. He proposed that the General Assembly should instruct the Trusteeship Council to examine at its next session, in consultation with the Administering Authority, the rules for the popular consultation in Togoland under British administration. Paragraph 4 of the operative part of the draft resolution should be amended accordingly.

14. It would be desirable to appoint a commission to supervise the organization and conduct of the plebiscite. Not only should the genuine wishes of the inhabitants be fully expressed—and a commissioner could answer that that was done—but an atmosphere of calm and confidence among the entire population should be created in advance.

15. With regard to the evaluation of the results and the determination of the consequences of the plebiscite, the Guatemalan delegation felt that the resolution should leave no room for doubt. It was premature to decide now whether the results of the plebiscite would be evaluated for the Territory as a whole or on the basis of separate zones or regions. It should therefore be made clear in paragraph 5 of the operative part that the General Assembly would have to decide at its eleventh session, when the peoples consulted had expressed their wishes, whether those wishes could best be served by considering the results of the plebiscite as a whole, i.e. on a centralized basis, or by considering each zone or area separately.

16. His delegation had no general observations to make on section B of the draft resolution for the time being. It reserved the right to comment in due course on the amendments proposed by Liberia (A/C.4/L.429/Rev.1) and France (A/C.4/L.431).

17. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) felt that in making a proper study of the Togoland unification problem and of the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration, the purposes of the United Nations Charter, on which the Trusteeship Agreement was based, should be taken into account and a correct interpretation made of that Agreement. It was quite clear from Article 76 that the Charter provided for the self-determination and independence of all the peoples of the Trust Territories, and it was the purpose of the Trusteeship Agreements concluded for those Territories to enable them to achieve that status.

18. The reason why the Togoland peoples had not attained those fundamental objectives was not that the Charter of the Trusteeship Agreements were defective but that those directly concerned had not complied strictly with the provisions of the Charter or the Trusteeship Agreements.

19. The fault, if fault there was, did not lie with one party to the Trusteeship Agreement, namely the Administering Authority, for if the United Nations consciously or unconsciously failed to take a stand which would finally ensure attainment of the objectives set by the Charter, its Members would be equally responsible for that failure. The States Members of the United Nations could not escape responsibility if for any reason they had been induced to renounce

their principles and make concessions, which in some cases might not have been absolutely necessary, in order to preserve harmony in the Fourth Committee. Some Members had adopted a neutral attitude on important matters on which they should have made clear their position in support of the principles of the United Nations Charter. In many cases Members of the United Nations appeared to have been inclined—sometimes for reasons of expediency—to support steps which, in all fairness, conflicted in some degree with the principles of the Charter.

20. It was regrettable that the question of the unification of Togoland and its accession to independence, pending for eight years, should be given second place by certain members of the Fourth Committee. It was even more regrettable to note that the statements of certain representatives, whether intentionally or not, tended to some extent to close the door on any hope of a solution.

21. Her delegation thought that the Members of the United Nations should above all endeavour to create an independent Togoland for the Togolandese, leaving to them the decision as to what associations they might wish to enter into in the future. The United Nations was betraying that noble cause when it took hasty measures which, in the opinion of her delegation, would prevent any solution. In the first place, the United Nations had allowed certain functions to be performed in a way that was now weakening its support for a unified Togoland. Very frequently the members of the Fourth Committee, instead of stating their position, confined themselves to discussing the competence of the United Nations as set forth in the Charter, with the result that achievement of the basic objectives of the Charter was growing increasingly remote.

22. If from the outset the United Nations had firmly asserted its position in favour of the right of self-determination for the peoples of the Trust Territories and of their accession to independence, and had opposed outright any measure tending to delay achievement of that basic objective, it would not now be faced with a situation which certain members of the Fourth Committee found very complex and confused. All the blame therefore did not lie with the Administering Authorities, still less with the petitioners, who had not been guided under strict international supervision towards that basic objective and who had never had it clearly explained to them that the acceptance of anything less would be a compromise, not in accordance with the rights guaranteed to them by the United Nations Charter and the Trusteeship Agreements.

23. Her delegation accordingly thought that at the present time any factor liable to confuse the issue should be disregarded, and stress should be laid only on measures guaranteeing the largest possible degree of freedom of expression for the will of the population of Togoland under British administration. One of those measures was the plebiscite, wisely suggested by the Government of the United Kingdom and supported by the General Assembly. But certain members of the Committee were against allowing the population of Togoland any real freedom of choice. Freedom of choice meant the right of selection, and no selection could be made unless there were several possibilities. If only one possibility was offered, the person concerned might feel obliged to accept it. Her delegation therefore thought that to ask only one question of the inhabitants of Togoland under British administration would be not only confusing and ambiguous, but would

also be an abuse, an infringement of the right of choice, which was one of the democratic principles upheld by the Charter.

24. To ask the two questions set forth in the Liberian amendments would render the situation less confused, as the people of Togoland would see that they had a choice between two solutions and that they could choose the solution which would finally lead to their independence. If only one question were asked, what would happen if the inhabitants of Togoland said that they did not accept integration with the Gold Coast? If they were told that they must remain under the Trusteeship System until the United Nations was in a position to guarantee them an independent status, which would be done as speedily as possible, there was no reason to object to the questions suggested by the Visiting Mission. It would be much clearer for the Togolandese if they were asked two questions, and if it were explained to them that if they chose the second solution the United Nations would take all necessary measures to eliminate obstacles to the achievement of their wishes concerning their political future. Furthermore, if two questions were put to the Togolandese the United Nations would show that it was neutral and was not prejudging the results of the plebiscite.

25. Although credence could not be given to all that the petitioners said, the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of the Territory were paramount, as stated in the Charter, must not be forgotten, and the United Nations must approve all plans necessary to protect those interests and to determine the freely expressed wishes of the population.

26. Her delegation wished to say that while believing that the Charter guaranteed to the inhabitants of Togoland under British administration the right of self-determination and independence, it would support them unreservedly if, with an opportunity to choose between several solutions, they freely chose integration with the Gold Coast rather than an independent status.

27. Her delegation wished to congratulate the United Kingdom Government on its statement (528th meeting) that the populations of Togoland under British administration were in a position to take a decision concerning their political future. It would have preferred the United Kingdom to adopt a neutral attitude rather than suggesting that the Territory should be integrated with the Gold Coast, and to allow the inhabitants to express their wishes spontaneously, but it was convinced that the United Kingdom Government was neutral with regard to the choice made by the population of Togoland. It was also certain that the Togolandese would be grateful to the United Kingdom Government for having promoted their advancement.

28. Her delegation clearly understood that if the inhabitants of Togoland under British administration were requesting integration with the Gold Coast, they could not be refused. It hoped first that the Gold Coast might speedily achieve its independence, and then if integration between Togoland and the Gold Coast occurred subsequently, it was sure that that union would develop in strength and in unity.

29. In its concern to take measures in the interests of the inhabitants of Togoland under British administration, the Fourth Committee must not neglect the interests of the inhabitants of Togoland under French administration. No measure taken by the General Assembly should prejudice the choice which those populations might ultimately make if they desired a

unified and independent Togoland. Her delegation would like to inform the petitioners representing the interests of the inhabitants of Togoland under French administration and desirous of an independent Togoland that they should continue to uphold such a noble and lawful cause without discouragement, although the majority of the members of the Fourth Committee did not consider it desirable to give the question priority for the time being. The bud might be bitter but the flower would be sweet.

30. Passing on to the consideration of the Indian draft resolution, she pointed to an error in the text of her delegation's amendments (A/C.4/L.429/Rev.1). Amendment 3 applied to section B, not section A of the Indian draft resolution. It would form paragraph 1 of the operative part and the numbering of the present two paragraphs would consequently have to be changed.

31. She thought that the Indian representative had accepted her amendment 13, for the replacement of the word "*Endorsed*" by the word "*Recommends*". The amendment in paragraph 9 had not appeared in her delegation's original amendments (A/C.4/L.429). She thought that the plebiscite commissioner should have the power to propose any modifications of detail which he thought necessary, as circumstances required, in order to create a neutral atmosphere, since he would be on the spot.

32. In the absence of constructive proposals concerning the second question to be asked in the plebiscite, she had nothing to add for the time being. She accepted the recommendation of the Visiting Mission (T/1206, para. 105), taking into account the comments she had made on that subject.

33. Mrs. SKOTTSBERG-AHMAN (Sweden) said that in the view of her delegation the Indian draft resolution provided the best solution to the highly important problem which the Committee had to settle at the present session. There seemed to be widespread agreement in the Committee that the first essential step to be taken was to ascertain the wishes of the population concerned. It was obvious that the population at present concerned was the people of Togoland under British administration.

34. Her delegation also endorsed the proposal that only one question should be put in the forthcoming plebiscite; it was consequently opposed to paragraph 5 of the Liberian amendments. As a matter of general principle the questions put in a plebiscite should be simple and clear. Of course, it was in the nature of a plebiscite to offer an opportunity to those consulted to choose between two solutions, but the simple question proposed by India, whether the Togolandians wanted integration of their territory with an independent Gold Coast, implied such an alternative, and the second question suggested by the Liberian amendment added nothing. A negative answer to the first question would mean the same as an affirmative answer to the second, namely, continuation of the Trusteeship System for the time being, pending a decision later. If the question proposed by India received a negative answer, the United Nations would be confronted with a new situation which would then have to be considered. But it would be quite another thing for the United Nations itself expressly to offer a continuation of trusteeship. That would not be a true alternative in the sense of being a proposal for another way of achieving an ultimate solution. Her delegation did not therefore consider such an explicit offer advisable.

35. The United Kingdom Government had notified the United Nations that it considered Togoland under British administration ready to abandon the status of a Trust Territory for something that represented the very goal of the Trusteeship System, and it would be contrary to the spirit in which the Trusteeship System had been created if a continuation of trusteeship was contemplated. It might even be said that such an attitude would be in striking contrast with the urgent requests so often advanced in the Fourth Committee that the Administering Authorities should hasten the achievement of independence by the Trust Territories.

36. With regard to the suggestion that the Territory should be sub-divided into four areas for the purposes of the plebiscite, made in paragraph 8 of the Liberian amendments and in paragraph 108 of the Visiting Mission's report, her delegation took a different view. Such a sub-division would tend to prejudge the results of the plebiscite by drawing the dividing lines on the basis of an assumption as to the inclination of the majority in each different part. It would also actively encourage fragmentation of the country.

37. With regard to the question whether the United Nations should appoint a commissioner or a commission to supervise the plebiscite, her delegation was in favour of the Indian proposal. It thought it not only unnecessary but unsuitable to appoint a commission. If there were disagreement between the members of the commission and if both majority and minority reports were presented to the United Nations, confusion might be created. Furthermore, the commissioner appointed by the Administering Authority would have to deal not with one person but with a group, and perhaps a group in disagreement.

38. As a whole, section A of the Indian draft resolution seemed well adapted to the requirements of the moment and should be left as it stood. As for section B, her delegation thought that it would be considerably improved by the amendments proposed by the French delegation. Those amendments did not really change anything in the substance but reflected more accurately the realities of the case.

39. Mr. SERAPHIN (Haiti), replying to the Liberian representative who, he felt, had probably been referring to the attitude of some delegations which had not taken part in the discussion, wished to state once and for all that the Haitian delegation would not support any proposal involving the fragmentation of the African Trust Territories.

40. The Haitian delegation had been looking forward to the unification of the two Togolands since 1947. The Ewe movement had developed so strongly that the two Administering Authorities had had no alternative but to establish, first, the Standing Consultative Commission and, then, the Joint Council for Togoland Affairs; and, as early as 1952, the General Assembly had recommended, in its resolution 555 (VI) that a special visiting mission should study the Togoland unification problem. Moreover, the General Assembly had referred to Togoland unification as recently as its resolution 860 (IX).

41. The present approach to the problem—that of possible integration of Togoland under British administration with the Gold Coast—did not coincide with the Haitian delegation's approach. The Haitian delegation would accordingly reject systematically, either by voting against or by abstaining, any solution which did not involve unification of the two Togolands.

42. He reserved the right to make more detailed observations, if necessary, when the vote was taken.

43. Mr. APUNTE (Ecuador) asked whether the Secretariat could arrange the rapid publication of a document containing the Indian draft resolution and all amendments thereto. The amendments should be either underlined or placed in square brackets for ease of reading.

44. Mr. WIESCHHOFF (Secretary of the Committee) said that owing to the number of new amendments tabled constantly by members of the Committee, such a document would become obsolete very soon.

45. Mr. SAAB (Lebanon) explained the considerations by which his delegation would be guided when the Indian draft resolution and the amendments submitted by the Liberian and French delegations were put to the vote.

46. The real issue at stake went far deeper than a mere question of organization of the plebiscite in Togoland under British administration. It was a matter of readjusting the historic relationship between the European and African continents, of the birth of nations and States in newly emerging Africa, and of the re-drawing of African frontiers on the basis of more rational considerations than those which had been dictated by the scramble for African possessions. In Togoland, as throughout West Africa, the Africans were called upon to choose between the nation State, or the tribal State, and the multi-national State or multi-tribal State. That choice was essentially a matter for the Africans themselves.

47. The Lebanese delegation, in casting its vote, would be guided by the fact that nothing should be done which would delay the evolution of the Gold Coast towards complete self-government and independence. The Gold Coast was an African entity which was developing a promising working democracy in which local African traditions and the exemplary British traditions of democracy prevailed. When his delegation voted, it would keep in mind that it was highly desirable for that new human experiment to be a success in the political, social and cultural fields.

48. The Lebanese delegation agreed with the Visiting Mission that a plebiscite was the most democratic means of ascertaining the wishes of the people of the Trust Territory, and thus had no alternative to voting in favour of the draft resolution and the amendments which embodied that recommendation. Like all human institutions, however, a plebiscite had its faults. That was probably what had prompted the Syrian member of the Visiting Mission to state his own views. In that connexion he quoted from an article in Handbook No. 159, entitled *Plebiscite and referendum*, of the Historical Section of the United Kingdom Foreign Office, which stated that a plebiscite, if it did not yield an overwhelming majority one way or the other, served only to emphasize the division of opinion and to open the way for intrigue, perhaps for civil war. A plebiscite had the further defect of submitting the destiny of a whole people to the decision of the classes most easily swayed by passing considerations, in other words those least fitted by education and experience to deal with the complex issues involved.

49. It should not be inferred from that that the Lebanese delegation would vote against any kind of plebiscite. It merely wished to explain that it would vote in favour of those provisions of the Indian draft resolution and those amendments which would secure

for the Togoland people the most adequate conditions for the free expression of their wishes. Those conditions were the following: first, simultaneous plebiscites should be held in both Territories of Togoland; secondly, the Togolandese should be asked more than one question, including one on the independence and unification of the two Togolands. The grounds for those two prime conditions had already been explained by Egypt, Syria and Liberia. However, he wished to add, first, that his delegation had for three years voted for the unification and independence of the two Togolands; and secondly, that all the petitioners were in agreement in asking for their country's independence even though they did not all agree on how it should be attained or on the form of association they should have with others. Further, the operations should be supervised by a commission and not by a commissioner. Lastly, it should be understood that the plebiscite was only one stage in the settlement of the problem and that the General Assembly would have to examine its results.

50. As some of those conditions were not fulfilled in the draft resolution or the amendments, his delegation would vote in the manner which allowed it to adhere to them as closely as possible; but its vote would not imply any doubt as to the pledges or acts of the Government of the United Kingdom, France or the Gold Coast.

51. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) stated for the Haitian representative's information that she had been referring, not to the Committee's present discussion, but to the negligent attitude which several delegations had taken for a number of years.

52. Mr. KHAN (Pakistan), noting that the two Administering Authorities had not responded to the appeal he had made to them at the 541st meeting, concluded that they wished the situation to be resolved in the manner indicated by the Visiting Mission.

53. He felt that while the Mission had made a laudable effort it had nevertheless omitted a point which was vital to the people's interests: it should have asked them whether they desired independence or not. It merely stated that two views had been put forward, one favourable and the other opposed to integration with the Gold Coast. Furthermore it recommended that the Territory should be divided into electoral units—a recommendation which was difficult to explain, for the Trusteeship System applied to the Territory as a whole, which should therefore constitute a single unit. He warned the Committee against the possible consequences of dividing the Territory into the proposed units, for he feared that if one unit took a different view from the others, it would be told that what could not be cured must be endured; thus opposition would be created, a state of affairs which was hardly desirable.

54. With regard to the questions proposed by the Mission, he felt that the first should be worded as follows: "Do you desire complete independence? If not, do you desire integration with the Gold Coast or with Togoland under French administration?" The second of the Mission's questions seemed to him unhappily framed: he saw no reason to remind those concerned of their regrettable situation as a people under trusteeship.

55. As to representation of the United Nations in the Territory during the plebiscite, he favoured the appointment of a commissioner and opposed the

establishment of a commission, which would merely complicate the issue.

56. The Pakistani delegation agreed to the holding of a plebiscite because no better solution could be found at present, and was able to support the draft resolution as a whole.

57. Mr. HOPKINSON (United Kingdom) pointed out, in reply to the Guatemalan representative, that under the democratic electoral system of the Gold Coast parliamentary electors must have reached the age of twenty-one years. The United Kingdom, which had long parliamentary experience, had not considered it desirable to lower the age limit for its own territory, nor had many other countries.

58. He thanked the Liberian representative on behalf of the United Kingdom Government; all it had done was to discharge the duty it had accepted in signing the Trusteeship Agreement.

59. U ON SEIN (Burma) was gratified that the Gold Coast would shortly attain independence and congratulated the Governments of the Gold Coast and of the United Kingdom on their achievements. The Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration, long administered as an integral part of the Gold Coast, naturally wished to share the benefits of self-government. The Trust Territory had no outlet to the sea and was hardly viable economically, in view of its political frontiers, whereas German Togoland, having had an outlet to the sea at Lomé, had been economically and politically viable. For a long time it had been realized that in both Togolands there was a general desire for unification, and any amendment to the Trusteeship Agreement relating to Togoland under British administration would patently have consequences for the interests of Togoland under French administration.

60. Since the attainment of self-government or independence on the part of Trust Territories had to be in conformity with the freely expressed wishes of the populations concerned, an official consultation of the population had to precede any decision affecting their political future. His delegation would accordingly support a plebiscite which would enable the Territory's inhabitants to express their aspirations freely. The plebiscite should not prejudice whatever solution— independence, integration or other course—they might choose later. The questions should be so clearly worded that the voter would understand all the courses open to them.

61. His delegation in no way opposed the integration of Togoland under British administration with an independent Gold Coast, if that was the population's wish. Burma would always offer its support to any Trust Territory that was advancing towards independence. For reasons of principle and also for practical reasons he considered that the plebiscite should be Territory-wide. If the Indian draft resolution was so amended as to enable the population concerned to understand all the possible solutions he would support it. As the case under discussion was the first instance of the attainment of independence by a Trust Territory, the Assembly had a historic function to perform which it should discharge in a realistic manner.

62. Mr. PYMAN (Australia) discussed first section A of the Indian draft resolution (A/C.4/L.428/Rev.1). The four principal provisions of the draft (early plebiscite, organization of the plebiscite by the Administering Authority, supervision by a United Nations

commissioner having the functions and powers as envisaged by the Visiting Mission, report by the commissioner to the Trusteeship Council with a view to a final decision by the Assembly) were in keeping with the Australian delegation's point of view and he would support them. Subject to the adoption of certain of the amendments which had been proposed, section A was generally acceptable to his delegation.

63. Turning to the amendments proposed by the representative of Liberia (A/C.4/L.429/Rev.1) he said, with reference to amendment 1, that the proposed change in the wording of an agenda item would produce more than procedural difficulties. It was at the request of the Administering Authority that the item "Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration" had been placed on the agenda, and it was only at that Power's request that such an agenda item could be inscribed, for it alone could decide at what moment the trusteeship vested in it had accomplished its purposes. So far as Togoland under French administration was concerned, the Assembly had always considered the question only in relation to the single problem of the unification of the Togolands. The item had never been discussed specifically to the end that the Trusteeship Agreement might be modified or terminated, for in that respect only the Administering Authority, France, could take the initiative. There was much evidence that in a few years' time France might make a proposal similar to that made by the United Kingdom. For the moment that stage had not yet been reached and there were no grounds for implying in the wording of an agenda item that France had made such a proposal. To the extent to which the Committee, in dealing with the unification problem, was also concerned with the situation in the Territory under French administration it had always been able to discuss that situation without difficulty and the position would presumably remain the same so long as the unification problem remained on the agenda. Consequently, there was no practical reason for adopting a different wording, which would have the additional disadvantage of confusing the issue. He would accordingly vote against amendment 1 of the Liberian text and in favour of French amendments 1 and 3 (A/C.4/L.431), which proposed the deletion of the sub-titles.

64. Amendment 2 of the Liberian text, which proposed that a passage from resolution 860 (IX) should be reproduced, was unnecessary. A reference to that resolution in the preamble would suffice; the Assembly would then take the terms thereof into account in its final decision under paragraph 5 of the draft resolution. He would not however vote against Liberian amendment 2.

65. With reference to amendment 3, he agreed with the views previously expressed by the representative of India. It would be preferable to deal with each of the two Territories in the particular draft resolution relating thereto. Consequently, he would oppose the amendment.

66. Liberian amendments 4 and 5 proposed the addition of a second question to be asked in the course of the plebiscite. He saw no reason for such a second question, which was by implication contained in the first. If the voters answered No to the question concerning union with the Gold Coast, they would not thereby be prevented from remaining under trusteeship for a short time pending a clarification of the situation. Moreover, the form in which it was proposed

to pose the second question seemed to suggest that trusteeship might be continued for a long time to come, an eventuality which was not justified either by the statements of the Administering Authority or by the statements of the populations concerned or by any circumstance. To proceed in that way would furthermore invite the risk that the populations might vote for union with the Gold Coast for the sole purpose of avoiding the continuance of trusteeship for an indefinite period. If the populations clearly understood that a negative answer in no way prejudiced their future, the basic position of the Visiting Mission would be upheld and the second question formulated by the Visiting Mission, which had inherent disadvantages, would become unnecessary. He would accordingly oppose those amendments.

67. He dealt next with certain criticisms concerning the powers and functions of the commissioner. Inasmuch as the Administering Authority was solely responsible for administering the Territory under the Trusteeship Agreement, it was quite natural that it should be solely responsible for conducting the plebiscite. The commissioner would have purely supervisory functions, not being responsible either for organizing or for carrying out the plebiscite; he would not be answerable for the conduct of the plebiscite. The commissioner and his staff would be free to make representations to the Administering Authority and to observe, unhampered, the way in which the plebiscite was conducted. If the Administering Authority should not accept the representations, the commissioner would presumably give his comments in his report to the Council. His functions and powers would certainly not be inadequate; if he criticized the conduct of the plebiscite it was possible that the Council or the Assembly might take an unfavourable view of the plebiscite and regard its findings as invalid. Thus the commissioner would lack neither power nor influence. In consequence of that situation, it was, indeed, most unlikely that the Trusteeship Council would have occasion to arbitrate in disputes between the commissioner and the Administering Authority. Even if such a situation should arise, Mr. Pyman, could hardly imagine, as the representative of Yugoslavia had said (543rd meeting), that action in the Council might be obstructed by virtue of the Council's composition, for the issue would be too serious and in any case the Council's decision would ultimately be reviewed in the Assembly.

68. The Liberian delegation proposed that a commission, not a commissioner, should be appointed. In his view such a decision might be very harmful. A hydra-headed supervisory organization could only be of limited efficiency. Not only would authority be divided, but the direct personal relationship which the Mission felt should exist between the United Nations commissioner and the commissioner of the Administering Authority would not exist. A plurality of commissioners was justified neither by the size of the population nor by that of the area of the Territory, and there should not be more supervisors than organizers. Furthermore it was always possible that there might be a dissenting opinion, and since that could lead the Assembly to contest the validity of the plebiscite, it would place the Administering Authority in an intolerable position. The Australian delegation would therefore vote against Liberian amendment 6.

69. With regard to amendment 8 it would be noted that the Indian draft resolution did not explicitly prescribe that the results of the plebiscite should be

counted for the Territory as a whole. Furthermore paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, which left the General Assembly the responsibility for final decision on the Territory's future, also implied that the plebiscite would not be decisive. The Australian delegation would therefore oppose Liberian amendment 8.

70. It did not see what useful purpose amendment 9 would serve, and would therefore vote against it.

71. Amendment 11 meant that the commissioner would be responsible for securing a free and neutral climate for the plebiscite. But everyone was agreed that the commissioner should not be given an executive role: he was to have supervisory functions only. The provision would therefore conflict with the definition of the commissioner's functions as recommended by the Mission and set forth in the draft resolution. The Australian delegation, which fully shared the wish that the plebiscite should be held in a free and neutral atmosphere but which felt that that atmosphere should be created by the Administering Authority in consultation with the United Nations commissioner, would oppose amendment 11.

72. Turning to section B of the Indian draft resolution, he agreed with the French representative that that text did not give an accurate account of the order of events. It erred also in suggesting that the Mission had submitted positive conclusions or recommendations in that connexion. It was obviously the French Government which had taken the initiative, as could be seen from paragraphs 118, 120 and 121 of the Mission's report. The French delegation's amendments restored the facts, in their correct sequence and perspective, and the Australian delegation would therefore support them and vote against the corresponding paragraphs of the draft resolution. In that connexion he emphasized that the French delegation had taken a praiseworthy step in presenting its text. It had given the Assembly an unequivocal account of its Government's position. That was a co-operative gesture which could not but be warmly approved and which, if accepted in the same spirit by the Fourth Committee, could not fail to ensure a healthy understanding during the discussions leading up to the attainment by Togoland under French administration of the objectives of the Trusteeship System.

73. The Australian delegation would support the two new paragraphs which the French delegation proposed for the operative part because, in calling for special action by the Trusteeship Council, they went far beyond the Indian proposal. They clearly implied moreover that the Administering Authority should provide all relevant information. The Australian delegation would vote against the Liberian amendments in so far as they were incompatible with the French proposals or the views his country had expressed.

74. Paragraph 2 of the operative part of the Indian draft resolution was unacceptable in its present form, for it gave a false idea of the approach which should be made to the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. The initiative should come from the Administering Authority.

75. Lastly, his delegation would vote for the French amendment to the fourth paragraph of the preamble to section A of the draft resolution because it took into account the views of political organizations which had been unable to send petitioners to the Fourth Committee.

76. His delegation assumed that sections A and B of the draft resolution would be put to the vote as separate draft resolutions.

77. Mr. ROLZ BENNETT (Guatemala), speaking in reply to the United Kingdom representative on the subject of the minimum voting age, pointed out that the age of maturity varied with latitude. Furthermore a tendency to lower that age limit could be observed in the countries which had come into being since the nineteenth century. In addition, the young people of the Territories unquestionably took a keen interest in public affairs unaffected by preconceived ideas or by compromises. Lastly, the Mission stated that adults became liable to taxation on reaching the age of eighteen years; it would therefore be fair for them to have the franchise.

78. With regard to the evaluation of the ballot, he felt that the General Assembly's resolution should leave no doubt as to how the results of the plebiscite were to be counted: that would render the measure much easier to apply. He therefore proposed an amendment (A/C.4/L.432) to the second revised text of the Indian draft resolution (A/C.4/L.428/Rev.2), to the effect that paragraph 5 should be modified so as to enable the General Assembly to determine how the results of the plebiscite were to be counted.

79. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) stated that she had consulted the Secretariat and that it would be possible, even at the present stage of the debate, to make the change suggested in her delegation's amendment 1. If that amendment was not adopted, she would reserve the right to raise the matter at a plenary meeting of the Assembly.

80. As to the second question she proposed for the plebiscite, she had not been prompted to include it by what the petitioners had said.

81. Mr. ESKELUND (Denmark) pointed out, with regard to Liberian amendment 1, that it was not for the Fourth Committee but for the General Committee to amend the title of an agenda item.

82. With regard to the voting age, he was sure that young people aged eighteen years would meet the required conditions of maturity. He wished, however, to mention what had happened in his country after the 1920 plebiscite by which part of Schleswig had been attached to Denmark. The age of electors eligible to participate in the plebiscite had been fixed at twenty-one years, whereas the age prescribed by Danish law for parliamentary electors was twenty-five years. Considerable internal difficulties had resulted. The situation in the present case would be somewhat similar, as the prescribed age in the Gold Coast was twenty-one years.

83. Mr. CALLE Y CALLE (Peru), referring to the evaluation of the results of the plebiscite, said that the Visiting Mission's report was sufficiently clear. He felt, moreover, that before they voted the inhabitants should know what method was to be used in counting the votes.

84. Mr. RIVAS (Venezuela) said the French proposals were especially important. In that connexion, he pointed out that, although Venezuela had not always shared the views of the Administering Authorities, it still paid a tribute to the work which they had accomplished. Among the French amendments to the Indian draft resolution the most important was amendment 7, which related to paragraph 2 of the

operative part. He would suggest to the French delegation that the words "at its eleventh session" should be added at the end of that paragraph. That change would enable the General Assembly to examine simultaneously the results of the plebiscite and that of the special study concerning the proposed consultation with the peoples concerned in Togoland under French administration.

85. He would be prepared to accept the French amendments 1 and 3, but he preferred the Indian text to amendment 2. With regard to amendment 4, he suggested that the words "under the supervision of the United Nations" should be inserted after the phrase "in due course". He would support French amendments, but had some reservations with regard to amendment 6, which he thought might be amended to read "*Shares...* the Visiting Mission's opinion that, in accordance with the wish expressed in the Territorial Assembly, the aspirations of the various political groups and the intentions of the Administering Authority...".

86. Passing on to consider the amendments proposed by Liberia (A/C.4/L.429/Rev.1), he explained that he would abstain on the first, because he preferred the French amendment, but he would feel no hesitation in supporting amendments 2 to 7. He would strongly support amendment 8. Moreover, he would support the compromise solution proposed by Guatemala, as it had the advantage of expressing the Indian representative's intentions more clearly.

87. He agreed with amendments 10, 11 and 12 proposed by Liberia, but would prefer the French version to amendment 13. Finally, he would support amendments 14 and 15, and would abstain from voting on amendment 15.

88. He would support the Indian draft resolution if the amendments which he favoured were adopted.

89. Mr. BARGUES (France) pointed out that his amendments to the Indian draft resolution related to form rather than to substance. He would agree to the change proposed by the Venezuelan representative to amendment 7. But he would prefer that the words "if possible" should be added before "at its eleventh session".

90. Mr. RIVAS (Venezuela) hoped that France would be in a position to provide the necessary information in good time.

91. Mr. BARGUES (France) had no doubt that his Government would be able to meet the wishes of the representative of Venezuela.

92. Mr. ROLZ BENNETT (Guatemala), referring to his delegation's amendment, stated that chapter IV of the Visiting Mission's report contained no reference to subdivision into areas, and left some doubt on the subject, as the Indian representative did not seem to have accepted amendment 8 as proposed by Liberia.

93. Mr. JAIPAL (India) agreed that the French amendments did not change the substance of the Indian text. Except for amendment 6, which he could not accept, he had taken account of them in the second revised text of his delegation's draft resolution (A/C.4/L.428/Rev.2), which he was now submitting.

94. At the moment, integration with the Gold Coast was the only practical solution the General Assembly could contemplate. That solution would not necessarily exclude other possible courses in the future. But union

with Togoland under French administration could not take place at once. It would amount to misleading the electorate to propose such union now. Nor could the General Assembly consider the prolongation of trusteeship, as the objectives of trusteeship had been substantially achieved. Obviously, if the Togolandans voted against union with the Gold Coast, they would have to remain under British trusteeship pending other arrangements; but that would be a purely temporary arrangement. In the circumstances, it would be unnecessary and misleading to offer continued trusteeship as an alternative question, for it was not a real alternative.

95. So far as division of the Territory was concerned, he said that it would be natural, in organizing the plebiscite, to take existing electoral districts into account, but he stressed that the final count should not depend on a territorial division fixed in advance, for that would mean prejudging the issue. The purpose of paragraph 5 of the Indian draft was to obviate that very drawback by empowering the General Assembly to determine the further action to be taken in the light of the results of the vote and all other circumstances.

96. He was not yet in a position to take a final stand on the Guatemalan amendment, but it, too, would seem to prejudge the issue.

97. Turning to the Liberian amendments, he was ready to accept amendment 11, provided that the Liberian delegation agreed to replace the word "commission" by "commissioner". He thought it unnecessary, from a purely practical point of view, to have

a commission of three members to supervise some 160,000 votes.

98. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) said that the Committee would have to choose between a commission and a commissioner. She was in favour of not limiting the plebiscite to a single question, because some of the Togolandans were apparently ready to accept a continuation of trusteeship until the United Nations gave them an opportunity to settle their own future.

99. Her delegation was submitting a second revised text of its amendments (A/C.4/L.429/Rev.2).

100. Mr. JAIPAL (India) remarked that, even if trusteeship were continued in order to give the people an opportunity to vote later for the unification of the two Togolands, the danger remained that that solution might be rejected. The result would be the partition of the Ewes—precisely what the General Assembly had wished to avoid.

101. Mr. ROLZ BENNETT (Guatemala) said that his amendment exactly expressed the Indian representative's thought and did not prejudge the issue.

102. Mr. BARGUES (France) stated that the Indian delegation had taken into account most of France's wishes. The few remaining difficulties could no doubt be resolved in the near future.

103. Mr. CHAMANDI (Yemen) noted that there were many amendments to the Indian draft resolution, which might complicate the voting. He appealed to the delegations of Liberia, France, Guatemala and India to work out a joint text embodying all the amendments on which they could reach agreement.

The meeting rose at 2.5 p.m.