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Chairman: Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon).

AGENDA ITEMS 67, 86, 69 AND 73

Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament (A/4463, A/4503, A/4505, A/4509, A/C.1/L.249, A/C.1/L.250, A/C.1/L.251, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) (continued)

Report of the Disarmament Commission (A/4463, A/4500, A/C.1/L.250, A/C.1/L.251, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) (continued)

Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/4414, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) (continued)

Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/4434, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising his right of reply, said that the statements by the United States, United Kingdom and Italian representatives confirmed his delegation's contention that the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.250) had nothing to do with disarmament and was actually aimed at establishing a system of control over armaments, i.e. a system of legalized international espionage.

2. In his statement at the 1086th meeting, the United States representative had proposed no real measures looking to the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the destruction of stockpiles. Instead, he had repeated various proposals previously put forward by his Government. He had again brought up the United States proposal to halt the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and convert to peaceful uses a certain quantity of such materials from existing stockpiles. But to end the production of fissionable materials for military purposes would not prevent States from

retaining not only their existing nuclear weapons but also the huge quantities of fissionable materials already accumulated. Furthermore, an aggressor would be free to make use of nuclear weapons, since the United States had rejected Soviet proposals to prohibit their use. At the same time, the United States proposal to convert 30 tons of enriched uranium was not "an offer of the greatest magnitude", as the United States representative had stated; the United States was known to possess sufficient fissionable material to produce tens of thousands of nuclear bombs. The United States proposal for the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, even though it entailed no actual disarmament, would also call for the establishment of an extensive system of control and inspection in the territory of States. Such a system of control without disarmament would be a threat to the security of States. In his Government's view, a cessation of the production of nuclear weapons would have real meaning only if the use of such weapons was prohibited and all stockpiles were destroyed.

3. The United States proposals on outer space, which called for controls over all missiles launched into space, were also designed to establish control over armaments without providing for disarmament. The United States was obviously seeking to acquire a military advantage over the Soviet Union; it wished to retain all its bases encircling the socialist States and the means of delivery which would enable it to launch nuclear attacks from those bases, but it proposed the setting up of controls over missiles, which were the Soviet Union's most effective means of defence. The Soviet Government advocated the destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, including space missiles, and the elimination of all military bases in foreign territory at the first stage of general and complete disarmament; in those conditions, it would agree to any necessary control measures, including the inspection of space missiles.

4. The United States proposal for measures to prevent surprise attack was merely the old United States plan for aerial inspection and the exchange of inspectors at military installations. It would not prevent surprise attack because a nuclear attack could easily be launched as soon as the inspection of an airfield or launching site had been completed. The proposal would merely enable an aggressor to carry out espionage in preparation for an attack. The United States had brought out its surprise attack proposal once again because it had failed in its reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory and was now seeking a legal basis for continuing such flights. The best way to prevent surprise attacks was to destroy all means of delivering nuclear weapons. The United States representative, however, had called merely for technical studies of the problems of control over the reduction or destruction of agreed categories of nuclear weapons delivery systems. The limited nature of that proposal made it clear why France,

which had originally raised the question of eliminating delivery systems,^{1/} had not joined in sponsoring the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.250).

5. The United States proposals for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments called for the immediate establishment of a ceiling of 2.5 million for the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States. It was common knowledge, however, that the forces of both countries were already below that level. The United States proposal that the ceiling should subsequently be lowered to 2.1 million represented a negligible reduction. Furthermore, it was accompanied by certain conditions, including a demand that the disarmament treaty should include all militarily significant States. Since the People's Republic of China was presumably such a State, it was clear that a major reason for United States opposition to granting the People's Republic of China its rightful representation in the United Nations was its unwillingness to see the problem of disarmament solved. With regard to the United States representative's statement that his Government would agree to an ultimate reduction of armed forces to 1.7 million, it was to be noted that he had set no time-limits of any kind. It was also curious that five years earlier, when only measures of partial disarmament had been under discussion, the United States had proposed a ceiling of 1 million to 1.5 million, whereas now, when general and complete disarmament was under consideration, it was proposing a figure of 1.7 million. The previous proposal, incidentally, had been withdrawn as soon as the Soviet Union had accepted it.

6. In his statement at the 1089th meeting, the United Kingdom representative had once again put forward the Western disarmament proposals of 16 March and 27 July 1960, which did not provide for disarmament but for control over armaments; thus, he was taking the same position as the United States representative. The United Kingdom representative's assertion that the Soviet proposals for the first stage of general and complete disarmament gave the Soviet Union a military advantage over the Western Powers was clearly untenable, since the Soviet Union proposed the destruction, in the first stage, of all military missiles and other means of delivering nuclear weapons. It was understandable that the United Kingdom representative should oppose the elimination of United States military bases in the territory of its allies, since the United Kingdom had a greater concentration of United States military bases than any other country. However, recent events in Japan, South Korea and a number of other countries showed that people were becoming aware that United States bases were spring-boards for aggression and were a threat to the countries in which they were situated. In any event, once the means of delivering nuclear weapons had been eliminated, as proposed by the Soviet Union, it would surely be curious for the United States to retain its nuclear bases in other countries.

7. The United Kingdom representative had been wrong in his assertion that the Soviet disarmament proposal called for the two sides to eliminate armaments but not to submit to control measures; in fact, the Soviet Union had worked out a detailed system of control over disarmament which it had made an integral part of its programme of general and complete disarmament. The

Western Powers, on the other hand, proposed that control measures should be carried out even in the absence of any disarmament measures.

8. Reverting briefly to the United Kingdom representative's references to the negotiations in the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, on which he had already commented at the previous meeting, he wondered why the United Kingdom representative had chosen to hark back to the initial stages of those negotiations, although great progress had by general admission been made since then thanks to the Soviet Union's willingness to make concessions. For his part, he could point out that the Western Powers had at first refused even to discuss the question of discontinuing nuclear tests, and had attempted to minimize the dangerous effects of such tests on the health of millions of people.

9. The United Kingdom representative's assertion that the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament would take as long as forty years to implement was unfounded. The Soviet Union had proposed a time-limit of four years or any other brief period acceptable to the Western Powers, while the Western disarmament proposals mentioned no time-limit whatever.

10. The United Kingdom representative had contended that his Government's proposal (A/C.1/L.251) that groups of experts should be set up to study inspection and control was purely non-political. However, the problem of how to prevent disarmament negotiations from bogging down in endless technical details relating to control was certainly a political one. The United Kingdom's aim was clearly to block progress towards disarmament.

11. From the statement made at the 1088th meeting by the Italian representative, whose delegation was one of the sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution, it appeared that his Government wanted agreements on "initial measures" in the field of disarmament but not a treaty on general and complete disarmament which had to be carried out within a fixed period of time. It was clear from the statements of the Italian representative at the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament that by "initial measures" the Italian delegation meant measures of control over armaments of the kind advocated by the United States representative. In opposing the elimination of military bases in the territory of foreign countries, moreover, the Italian representative was opposing general and complete disarmament, which was not possible so long as those bases continued to exist.

12. The Western Powers were attempting to discredit the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament by suggesting that the Soviet Union was unwilling to agree to early partial measures designed to stimulate the growth of confidence between States and thus create a more favourable atmosphere for the ultimate solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union had in fact long favoured such measures, but it did not wish them to divert attention from the problem of general and complete disarmament. One measure which would greatly contribute to the lessening of world tension was the conclusion of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. But the United States was preventing the conclusion of such a treaty, which the Soviet Union was prepared to sign.

^{1/} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 70, document A/C.1/821.

13. Another measure which should have been adopted long ago, and could have been but for the resistance of certain States, would be an undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such an undertaking would come as a relief to all peoples of the world and would augur well for future negotiations on the practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. At the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Soviet delegation had persistently urged the Western Powers to agree to such a measure; but to no avail. The reluctance of the United States and the United Kingdom to give that undertaking—even though it did not necessitate the elaboration of a system of control—could be interpreted only as meaning that they wished to reserve for themselves the right to set off a destructive nuclear war. It was gratifying that the Soviet proposal for such a measure had met with widespread support. For its part, the Soviet Government was ready to sign such a solemn undertaking immediately, provided that the Western nuclear Powers would enter into a similar commitment.

14. Another immediately practicable measure, and one that would strengthen international confidence, would be the establishment of atom-free and missile-free zones in such regions as Central and Northern Europe, the Balkans, Asia and the Pacific. A constructive proposal of that type, which could not fail to improve the international situation, had been made in the General Assembly by the President of Ghana, Mr. Nkrumah, with regard to Africa (869th plenary meeting), and the Soviet Union fully supported it. The Soviet Government also supported the measures suggested in the draft resolution submitted by Poland (A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1).

15. The peoples of the world were following the First Committee's discussions on general and complete disarmament with close attention. They could not but be alarmed at the fact that the Western Powers obstinately refused either to accept the realistic programme put forward by the Soviet Union or to propose any programme of their own for general and complete disarmament, but merely insisted on measures of control over armaments, which were quite unsuitable as a basis for negotiations.

16. The Soviet delegation therefore appealed to the Western Powers to enter into a business-like discussion of the Soviet programme, which was so far the only one envisaging general and complete disarmament. Of course, if the Western Powers had such a programme of their own—as distinct from a mere plan for control over armaments—the Soviet delegation would give it every consideration, in the hope of finding mutually acceptable solutions.

17. If the United States and its allies turned a deaf ear to the Soviet appeal and continued to use the disarmament discussions in the First Committee as a cloak to conceal the arms race and their policy of "brinkmanship", the Soviet delegation would have no choice but to cease participating in those discussions, in order to avoid giving the peoples of the world the false impression that serious business was being done there.

18. It was becoming increasingly evident that the United States was not at present prepared to hold fruitful negotiations on disarmament, and that its allies could do nothing but attempt to hide their helplessness

by appeals for patient negotiations, while failing to propose any real basis for the success of negotiations. In the circumstances, the only hope of solving the disarmament problem would be to convene a special disarmament session of the General Assembly in the spring of 1961, with the participation of Heads of Government and statesmen who could make responsible decisions on the question and give clear directives to a more restricted body which could proceed to detailed negotiations.

19. Mr. SHTYLLA (Albania) said that for the fifteen years since the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of peace, the peoples of the world had waited in vain for some concrete action to be taken towards disarmament. Instead, they had witnessed a monstrous acceleration of the arms race, caused by the cold war and the policy of positions of strength pursued by the Western Powers, led by the United States. They were now living under the threat of nuclear war; blood was being shed by the imperialists and colonialists in Algeria, Oman, the Congo and West Irian, and the United States was keeping possession of the island of Taiwan by force.

20. A year had passed since Mr. Khrushchev had presented to the General Assembly the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament (A/4219), a goal which had been unanimously approved by the Assembly in its resolution 1378 (XIV). The peoples of the world had hoped that as a result the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva would be able to achieve some progress towards disarmament; but while the socialist countries had exerted every effort to bring about agreement, the United States and its partners had sabotaged the disarmament talks and deliberately engaged in activities designed to aggravate international relations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had decided that the armed forces of its member countries should be increased; President Eisenhower had declared that the United States considered itself at liberty to resume nuclear tests; the United States had signed a military treaty with Japan which constituted an instrument of aggression against the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union; and the United States Government, by sending a U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory, had committed an unprecedented act of aggression.

21. The People's Republic of Albania regarded the problem of disarmament as the most vital problem of the day. Its peoples had known war and foreign invasion and wanted a world free from those scourges. They wanted security along their borders, and peaceful co-existence and friendly relations with all countries. However, Albania was surrounded by hostile armed nations which were parties to the North Atlantic Treaty^{2/} or the Balkan pact;^{3/} it was ringed about by United States military bases equipped with atomic weapons and missiles, while the United States Sixth Fleet carried out manoeuvres near its territorial waters. The Albanian Government had protested to the Italian and Greek Governments against the establishment of atomic and missile bases in their territories,

^{2/} United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 34 (1949), No. 541.

^{3/} Treaty of Alliance, Political Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the Government of the Kingdom of Greece, the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, signed at Bled, on 9 August 1954 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 211 (1955), No. 2855).

and had warned them that it would resist any threat to its territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Albania had consistently advocated that the Balkan and Adriatic region should be a zone of peace free of atomic weapons and missiles. It supported proposals for similar zones in other parts of Europe and on other continents. A most important step, in its view, would be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the parties to the Warsaw Treaty^{4/} and the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty; and Albania supported the recent proposal of the German Democratic Republic for the gradual general and complete disarmament of all of Germany (A/4504).

22. The Albanian Government unreservedly supported the proposals submitted by the USSR for general and complete disarmament. All the concrete measures the USSR had proposed were to be carried out under effective international control, within the framework of the United Nations and with the participation of all States. In a single year, the Soviet Union had put forward its proposal for general and complete disarmament on three occasions, progressively including many of the proposals of the Western Powers. Yet, as the Geneva talks had shown, the Western Powers did not hesitate to disavow their own proposals once they had been accepted by the Soviet Union. It was to be hoped that they would not follow the same procedure with respect to the new Soviet proposals before the Assembly's fifteenth session. However, the statements made in the General Assembly by the President of the United States (868th plenary meeting) and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (877th meeting), the draft resolutions submitted by the West in the First Committee and statements made by Western representatives indicated that the Western Powers were maintaining their negative position: they favoured not general and complete disarmament, but control and inspection of armaments. Their proposals would make it possible for a future aggressor to ascertain in detail the potential strength of his adversary and to choose the most favourable moment for attack. The socialist countries were against control over armaments; they advocated controlled disarmament as the only basis for agreement.

23. The partial measures proposed by the United States were essentially measures of control which would give the United States unilateral advantages. For example, the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L. 250) did not propose any real measure of disarmament, it did not call for a treaty on disarmament; and it did not fix time-limits for the completion of the various stages. All it did was to call for a resumption of negotiations, without offering any proper basis for such negotiations. The United Kingdom proposal (A/C.1/L. 251) to refer the question of disarmament to technical experts would in fact have the effect of burying the problem under mountains of technical reports. In the circumstances, Albania felt that the Soviet representative had been fully justified in saying that if the Western Powers continued to adhere to their negative position with respect to the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament, there would be no point in

continuing to take part in talks, which could only serve to delude the peoples of the world while the enemies of disarmament continued the arms race. Albania regarded disarmament as primarily a political problem, calling for a political solution. Once an agreement had been concluded specifying measures and time-limits for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under genuine international control, the experts could deal with the control and implementation of that agreement.

24. The Albanian delegation did not object in principle to the formation of a United Nations force, composed of contingents provided by Member States, after general and complete disarmament had been achieved. However, all the conditions for the establishment of such a force would have to be defined by prior agreement; and the first of those conditions was a reorganization of the structure of the United Nations Secretariat and of the Security Council. Albania would be absolutely opposed to setting up any United Nations armed force which might be used mainly against colonial peoples struggling for national liberation, and to placing such a force at the disposal of the Secretary-General. The United Nations Force in the Congo had been used to suppress the freedom of the Congolese and to assist in the dismemberment of the country and in conspiracies against the elected Parliament and the legitimate Government. Under present conditions, the creation of a United Nations permanent armed force would constitute an imperialist plot against freedom, against peace and against the Organization itself.

25. The United States Government also apparently wished to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only. It was paradoxical, however, to be concerned with what was still a hypothetical danger, while ignoring the real dangers on earth: the existence of United States military bases on foreign soil, for example, was a concrete and immediate threat to peace. According to the United States Press, there were some 300 military bases disposed around the socialist countries, 55 of them in Europe alone. Those bases were situated thousands of miles from the United States; they were a threat to the national sovereignty of the countries in which they were situated and a means of pressure and dangerous interference in their internal affairs. Moreover, they were being used without consulting the host Governments, and exposed the host countries to atomic attack. The abolition of those bases should be one of the first measures of disarmament.

26. The discontinuance of nuclear tests had also become an imperative need. The United States Government had prevented an agreement on that question and was preparing to begin testing again. If the United States Government genuinely desired disarmament, it should sign an agreement on the discontinuance of atomic and nuclear tests; it should agree to stop production of nuclear weapons and to destroy stockpiles; it should agree to the elimination of means of delivery of nuclear weapons and of foreign military bases; it should agree to conclude a treaty of general and complete disarmament.

27. Such United States proposals as those for the transfer to peaceful uses of 30 tons of enriched uranium or the establishment of a control system in respect of ballistic missiles would bring neither peace nor disarmament.

^{4/} Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Romanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic, signed at Warsaw, on 14 May 1955 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 219 (1955), No. 2962).

28. The facts showed that the United States was not in favour of general and complete disarmament. It was increasing its military expenditure and accelerating the production of weapons of mass destruction and of chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons. It was attempting to consolidate NATO, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and equipping its foreign military bases with nuclear weapons. Jointly with France and the United Kingdom, it was directly responsible for the resurgence of German militarism, which was threatening the peace in Europe. The German army was to be supplied with United States Polaris missiles, and it already had training bases in certain NATO countries.

29. In the view of the Albanian Government, the only basis for a resumption of fruitful negotiations on disarmament was the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249), together with the USSR proposals for the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament (A/4505). The United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251) and the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.250) should be rejected. The USSR documents would provide the committee on disarmament—which should be expanded by the addition of five neutral countries, as proposed by the USSR—with precise directives.

30. However, the problem of disarmament could not be solved without the participation of the People's Republic of China. Indeed, no major world problem would be solved by the United Nations if that great nation continued to be excluded from representation. But the danger of a nuclear war was real and could only be aggravated by delay in the adoption of effective disarmament measures. It was the responsibility of the Assembly to adopt at the current session the measures put forward by the Soviet Union.

31. Mr. GIBSON BARBOZA (Brazil) said that the continuing efforts being made to achieve disarmament were motivated principally by fear. It was important to bear that in mind because, regrettably, fear was a justifiable sentiment in the present state of the world. Many misunderstandings might be avoided if each party acknowledged that the other had the right to take precautions against any lack of balance between their respective military potentials and against the danger of a war arising from a miscalculation. Effective international control over disarmament was therefore essential, for no side would agree to disarm unless it was certain that the other side was fulfilling its commitments and would not obtain military advantage at any stage of disarmament.

32. It was generally recognized that all nations had an equal right to be heard on the subject of disarmament, irrespective of their size, since all faced the same peril of annihilation in the event of war. However, their respective approaches to the problem necessarily differed. He was referring not to differences in ideas or objectives, but to the difference in the contributions which could be made by the lesser and greater Powers respectively to the solution of the problem. Brazil was a great nation by many standards, with unlimited potentialities for building a country free from poverty, disease and ignorance. But, by a realistic assessment, it must be regarded as a lesser Power from a modern military standpoint. In a sense, therefore, Brazil, like the majority of States represented in the Committee,

had already advanced far towards the goal of disarmament pursued by the great Powers. Consequently, the approach of the majority of Members of the United Nations to the problem of disarmament differed from the approach of the great Powers. The lesser Powers were perhaps in a better position to lay down the main principles that should govern general and complete disarmament under effective international control, whereas the greater Powers were better equipped with the knowledge needed in elaborating the practical and technical details of disarmament. That was why he could not believe in the feasibility of the Disarmament Commission, comprising the whole membership of the United Nations, drafting "a treaty on general and complete disarmament, including a system of international control and inspection", as stated in the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249). There was no example in history of ninety-nine States drafting any treaty, not to speak of a treaty on disarmament. The Brazilian delegation could not agree to the Soviet suggestion that disarmament should be linked with changes in the structure of the United Nations Secretariat and the Security Council. It saw no reason for setting up a further obstacle on the already complex road towards achieving general and complete disarmament. Considering that the United Nations Charter had been drafted at a time when perfect understanding and confidence had prevailed among the great Powers, it was hardly possible to believe that in the present state of international tension a fundamental structural change in the United Nations would be feasible, even if it were desirable. Any attempt to link disarmament with such structural changes could only result in the indefinite postponement of a solution to the disarmament problem.

33. It was encouraging, however, to note certain similarities between the Soviet draft resolution and that submitted by the three Western Powers (A/C.1/L.250). Both drafts provided that disarmament should be carried out by stages and within a specified period or periods of time. They were also agreed that disarmament measures should be so balanced that no country or group of countries should gain a military advantage over the other. Those similarities showed that the recent negotiations had not been entirely unfruitful.

34. The Brazilian delegation saw no basic differences between its own views on disarmament and those advanced by the three sponsors of the Western draft resolution, which it would support. However, like the Mexican delegation, it was not concerned with an electoral victory. It thought rather that an agreement should be reached by the General Assembly at least on principles acceptable to both sides, so that disarmament negotiations could be resumed. If that could not be done, then consideration might be given to the possibility of a small, highly qualified and impartial group being appointed to work out a disarmament plan to be submitted later to the Ten-Nation Committee.

35. It was also necessary to devise means of improving the processes and machinery of the actual negotiations. The proposal for the appointment of technical experts made by the United Kingdom in its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251) might provide a good scientific basis for the negotiations. In that respect, the Brazilian delegation did not share the sceptical view advanced by the Soviet representative. There need be no conflict between the political task of the negotiators and the technical work carried out by scientific,

military and administrative experts. On the contrary, the work done by the experts might be extremely useful in preventing any purely scientific stalemate in the political negotiations. No commitment would be involved, for the final decision would be of a political nature. It was hard to disagree with the Soviet representative that the problem of ensuring fruitful disarmament negotiations and avoiding their entanglement in an endless labyrinth of technical details on control was a purely political matter. That, however, was beside the point, for the main task was precisely to endeavour to disentangle technical questions from the purely political ones. Moreover, the United Kingdom proposal did not imply that the future work would necessarily begin with the elaboration of technical details. On the contrary, the preamble of the United Kingdom draft resolution recognized that the resumption of negotiations need not await the outcome of an examination of the problems of verification. That had been confirmed at the previous meeting by the United Kingdom representative.

36. With regard to the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1), the Brazilian delegation would explain its views at a later stage, if it felt that to be necessary.

37. On the question of improving the instruments of negotiation, the Brazilian delegation supported the proposal that the disarmament group should be presided over by the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission. It would go further, however, and suggest that a Vice-Chairman and a Rapporteur be appointed. Those two posts should be held by representatives of uncommitted countries, one from Asia and one from Africa, on the understanding that the three officers would not be parties to the negotiations. Such an arrangement would ensure the impartial direction and reporting of the proceedings of the Ten-Nation Committee without altering its composition.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.