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Chairman: Mr. Franz MATSCH (Austria).

AGENDA ITEM 26

The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/4187, A/C.1/822, A/C.1/823, A/C.1/L.243, A/C.1/L.244)

1. Mr. TUGARINOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Korean question, which was of vital importance to the people of that divided country and to the preservation of peace in the Far East, had been brought no nearer to a solution by the unrealistic and unilateral proposals which certain Powers, led by the United States, had sought arbitrarily to impose. The time had come to deal with the Korean question in a realistic and objective manner, particularly now that a more favourable climate had been created as a result of the meeting between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, and the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, which had aroused hopes that mutually acceptable solutions of outstanding international issues would be sought by negotiation. The Committee could make a positive contribution to a solution of the Korean question by creating conditions for a dispassionate discussion based on the views of the representatives of the two parts of Korea. It should accordingly invite those representatives to participate in its debate without the right to vote. The USSR had submitted draft resolution A/C.1/L.243 with that objective in view.

2. The facts of the Korean situation made it imperative to adopt that draft resolution. Two separate States had developed in Korea with different approaches to the question of Korean unification. The people of those two States were legitimately concerned with their future. The United Nations had pledged itself to work towards a peaceful settlement, taking into account the interests of the parties concerned. If it were to continue to press for unilateral consideration of the question and invite only the representative of South Korea, it would be making a mockery of that pledge and using the Organization for cold war purposes. The people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were directly concerned; without their participation in the debate, no progress was feasible. The United States delegation should reconsider its position, withdraw its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.244), and join in supporting the USSR proposal.

3. It was only when representatives of both parts of Korea had participated in negotiations that any progress had been made towards a solution of the Korean question in the past. It had been with their participation that the Armistice Agreement^{1/} had been concluded and that the Korean Political Conference had been convened at Geneva in 1954. The United States had acknowledged the need for both parts of Korea to be represented at that Conference. Indeed, it was clear from the recent Foreign Ministers' Conference, which had been held at Geneva to deal with the question of Germany and at which representatives of both parts of Germany had been seated, that the principle of the participation of the States primarily concerned was gaining increasing recognition in the United States.

4. The withdrawal of the Chinese People's Volunteers from Korea in 1958 had created a favourable atmosphere for progress towards a solution of the Korean question. The withdrawal of all foreign troops would be a basic condition for the ultimate settlement of the issue. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was prepared to contribute to such a settlement and had officially requested that its representative should take part in the debate at the current session (A/C.1/822). The USSR supported that request and considered it essential that representatives of both States in Korea should be present in the Committee.

5. Mr. ROBERTSON (United States of America) said that the draft resolution which his delegation was submitting (A/C.1/L.244) was consistent with the practice of past sessions of the General Assembly. The Republic of Korea was the only lawful Government in Korea based, as the United Nations had recognized in General Assembly resolution 195 (III), on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea, and was the only such Government in Korea. Consequently, it was the only Government entitled to take part in the debate on the issue.

6. The Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.243) would place the North Korean régime, which had been created by the Soviet Union and installed in Korea in 1948, on an equal footing with the Republic of Korea. It would give recognition to a régime whose very founding had been an act of defiance of the United Nations designed to prevent free elections under United Nations auspices in that part of the country, and which had not been recognized by a single country outside the communist bloc. The seating of a representative of North Korea could add nothing to the debate and the United States opposed it.

7. He moved that priority be granted to the United States draft resolution in the voting.

^{1/} *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079, appendix A.*

8. Mr. CHANG (China) said that he knew of no drastic change in the situation in Korea which would warrant departure from the established United Nations practice of inviting a representative of the Republic of Korea to participate in the Committee's debate. The Republic of Korea had come into existence as a result of elections held under United Nations supervision and had been formally recognized by the General Assembly as the only legitimate Government in Korea. Gross injustice had already been done by barring it from United Nations membership. North Korea, on the other hand, was a political monstrosity imposed on the Korean people by an alien occupation army. Its status should not be dignified by an invitation to its representative to participate in the debate on a footing of equality with the representative of the legally constituted Government of the Republic of Korea. He would therefore vote in favour of the United States proposal and against that of the USSR.

9. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland) said that, as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, Poland approached the Korean question with an open mind. The Committee could not obtain a comprehensive and balanced picture of the situation in that country unless it heard the representatives of both States directly concerned. The United States argument was contrary to the basic principles of logic and equity, and Poland would vote against its draft resolution and support the USSR draft.

10. Mr. BROVKA (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) also supported the USSR draft resolution on the grounds that there could be no serious and fruitful discussion of the Korean question and, in particular, of Korean unification, unless representatives of the millions of people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were heard. In their absence, debate on the question had been one-sided and had sought to justify aggression. Even those who had opposed their presence in the Committee knew that the Government of Syngman Rhee, which was building up its military establishment and arming itself with atomic weapons while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was disarming and developing economically and culturally, did not and could not represent the South Korean people. Instead of working towards peaceful unification, that Government was threatening a new conflict in Korea.

11. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom) said that he would vote in favour of the United States proposal because it followed established practice found useful in the past and took into account the fact that, so far as the United Nations was concerned, the Government of the Republic of Korea was the only legitimate Government in that country. To invite the representative of North Korea would be to bestow upon that régime a status it did not enjoy. Accordingly, he would vote against the USSR proposal.

12. Mr. ZARUBA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the past practice of inviting only the South Korean representative had proved futile. It was the duty of the United Nations to approach the solution of so important a question as that of Korea with the greatest objectivity, and it could do so only by inviting both sides to participate in the debate. Exclusion of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would be another blow to United Nations prestige and an act of injustice to the Korean people. The United States proposal should therefore be rejected. He would support the Soviet draft resolution.

13. Mr. BUSNIAK (Czechoslovakia) said that just as the peaceful unification of Korea was inconceivable without direct negotiations between representatives of the two parts of Korea, so fruitful debate in the Committee was rendered impossible in the absence of spokesmen for both sides. Moreover, the United States draft resolution sought to exclude the representatives of a country which was striving towards peaceful unification and had consistently put forward constructive proposals towards that end. It indicated that the United States was determined to maintain the artificial division of Korea and its armed forces in South Korea. Those were the main obstacles to fulfilment of the legitimate aspirations of all the Korean people for peaceful unification and to the strengthening of peace in the Far East. The United States proposal should be rejected as one-sided and the Soviet proposal given full support.

14. Mr. BUDO (Albania) said that common sense, experience and the principles of international law should convince the United Nations that the representatives of both sides in Korea should be invited to assist it in its work. At each debate on Korea, the United States had imposed the discriminatory practice of hearing only the South Koreans in violation of the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. That practice had proved sterile. The fact that the United States did not like the régime in the north of the country was no reason to deprive its representatives of their legitimate right to be heard; that régime was the exclusive concern of the Korean people. In the interests of objectivity and United Nations prestige, the Committee should adopt the Soviet draft resolution.

15. Mr. MOREAU DE MELEN (Belgium) pointed out that, while it would be normal to invite representatives of both sides in any issue where the parties were recognized as equals, that procedure could not apply to the Korean situation because the United Nations recognized only one Korean Government and could not attribute equal status to a régime created in defiance of its decisions. Accordingly, he would vote in favour of the United States draft resolution and against that of the USSR.

16. U THANT (Burma) said that he could not endorse the exclusivity of the United States approach. Before the United Nations passed judgement on the future of Korea, it was only right and proper for it to hear both sides concerned. He would therefore support the Soviet proposal.

17. Mr. TUGARINOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the positions adopted by various delegations on the two draft resolutions before the Committee showed who favoured the peaceful unification of Korea and who wanted to maintain the artificial division of the country. Past practice in respect of inviting spokesmen for the Korean people must be regarded as invalidated. The USSR and those who shared its views on the matter were urging that representatives of South Korea should also be invited, not because they approved of the South Korean régime, but in the interests of objectivity.

18. Furthermore, the Committee should not disregard the statement of the authorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that they would regard any United Nations decision taken in the absence of their representatives as null and void (A/C.1/807). In the circumstances, those opposing an

invitation to their representatives were in effect dooming the debate to failure in advance.

19. He opposed the United States motion that priority in the voting should be given to the United States proposal. The draft resolutions should be voted upon in the order in which they had been submitted; the USSR text should be put to the vote first.

20. The CHAIRMAN called for a vote on the United States representative's motion that priority in the voting should be granted to the United States draft resolution.

The motion was adopted by 38 votes to 18, with 15 abstentions.

21. The CHAIRMAN accordingly put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the United States (A/C.1/L.244).

The draft resolution was adopted by 49 votes to 10, with 15 abstentions.

22. The CHAIRMAN next put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.243).

The draft resolution was rejected by 40 votes to 22, with 11 abstentions.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Cho, the representative of the Republic of Korea took a place at the Committee table.

GENERAL DEBATE

23. Mr. ROBERTSON (United States of America) said that the communist authorities in North Korea were willing to consider unification of Korea only under conditions which would once again expose the entire country to communist military attack. They denied the right of the United Nations to deal with the matter, perhaps hoping that the free nations would forget about Korea; however, the majority of the Members of the United Nations, bound together by their allegiance to the Charter, would continue to stand by that country.

24. He recalled that, at the Cairo Conference in November 1943 and the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference in July and August 1945, the United States, China and the United Kingdom had declared that Korea should become free and independent; the Soviet Union had subsequently subscribed to the Potsdam Proclamation of 26 July 1945 and had joined with the United States and the United Kingdom at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1945 in agreeing that a provisional government should be set up for all of Korea. Following the military division of Korea along the 38th parallel in 1945, however, the Soviet authorities in North Korea had refused to co-operate with the United States authorities in formulating a joint policy for the administration of the country. At the Moscow Conference, the Soviet Union and the United States had agreed to set up a joint commission to discuss Korea's long-range political and economic problems, including the establishment of a provisional democratic structure for the entire country. But the joint Soviet-American Commission had been able to accomplish nothing. A joint conference, established to deal with more immediate problems on an all-Korean basis, had also proved a failure as a result of the Soviet authorities' rejection of all major proposals submitted by the United States. After the

United States Secretary of State, Mr. Marshall, had taken the matter up directly with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, the joint Commission had reconvened, but the deadlock had continued. The Soviet Union had subsequently rejected a United States proposal for a four-Power conference on the implementation of the Moscow Agreement.

25. After it had become clear that nothing more could be accomplished through bilateral talks, the United States had submitted the Korean question to the United Nations.^{2/} At its second session in 1947, the General Assembly in resolution 112 B (II) had decided to establish the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and had recommended that elections should be held in all of Korea on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot. After the Soviet authorities had refused to permit the Commission to carry out its functions in North Korea, the Commission had conducted elections on 10 May 1948 in the southern part of the country, which was inhabited by approximately two-thirds of the population of Korea; on 23 August, a democratic constitution had been promulgated in the Republic of Korea. In resolution 195 (III) of 12 December 1948, the General Assembly had declared that the Government thus set up was "based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate" of South Korea and was "the only such Government in Korea".

26. In September 1948, the Soviet authorities had established in North Korea the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a puppet régime whose principal leaders had been and still were Soviet citizens of Korean ancestry. In June 1950, after the withdrawal of United States forces from Korea, the North Korean régime had launched an armed attack against the Republic of Korea and had consequently been condemned as an aggressor by the United Nations Security Council and its General Assembly. The North Korean régime had defied the United Nations and, during the hostilities in Korea, had violated established principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and committed atrocities against United Nations military personnel and Korean civilians; as a result, it had not been recognized by a single Government outside the communist bloc. The Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 had been systematically violated since that time by the Communists, who had prevented inspection from being carried out in the North, had strengthened their fortifications and had brought in modern weapons prohibited under the Agreement. He wished to renew the United Nations Command's appeal to the North Korean authorities to account for the 2,047 missing members of the United Nations military forces, including 451 Americans, and repatriate those who were still alive, as required by the Armistice Agreement; it was known from North Korean propaganda statements that some had at one time been in North Korean hands as prisoners of war.

27. At the Korean Political Conference, which had been provided for in the Armistice Agreement and which had convened at Geneva in April 1954, the United Nations participants had declared (A/2786) that a Korean settlement must be based on the two fundamental principles that the United Nations was fully empowered under the Charter to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, General Committee, annex I b.

security, and to use its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement, and that, in order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, free elections should be held under United Nations supervision for representatives in a National Assembly in which representation would be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in all parts of Korea. However, the communist participants at the conference had denied the competence of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question and had proposed that an all-Korean elections commission should be set up in which North Korea, with a population of 9 million, would have the same representation as South Korea, with a population of 22 million, and in which all decisions would be subject to a veto. As a result, the Conference had been a failure.

28. In the four years following the Conference, the General Assembly had repeatedly urged by overwhelming votes that negotiations should be resumed on the basis of established United Nations principles, but the Communists had remained inflexible. On 5 February 1958, a new exchange of communications between the Communists and the States participating in the United Nations Command had begun with a North Korean proposal that elections should be held in Korea under "the observation of a neutral nations organ" after all foreign forces had been withdrawn from the country (A/3865, para. 9). Two weeks later, the Communists had announced that the so-called Chinese People's Volunteers would be withdrawn from North Korea by the end of 1958 and had called on the Governments of the United Nations Command to withdraw their forces from South Korea. The States represented in the United Nations Command had replied (A/3865, para. 13) that they welcomed the projected Chinese Communist withdrawal but that they wished to know whether the Communists were prepared to permit free elections on the basis of the United Nations principles stated at the Korean Political Conference. In their reply of 6 May (A/3865, para. 14), the Chinese Communists had merely restated their position that no measures looking to the reunification of Korea could be taken until the United Nations forces had been withdrawn from South Korea. On 2 July, the States participating in the United Nations Command had again made inquiries regarding the principles which would govern the conduct of a Korean election; they had stated that they were prepared to withdraw United Nations forces from South Korea when the conditions for a Korean settlement laid down by the General Assembly had been fulfilled, but that any prior withdrawal would merely remove a guarantee against further aggression.

29. On 10 November 1958, a further Chinese Communist communiqué (A/C.1/813) had called for the withdrawal of United Nations troops from South Korea, after which all-Korea free elections could be held under the supervision of a "neutral nations organ". In reply, the United Nations Members had transmitted General Assembly resolution 1264 (XIII), which urged the communist authorities to accept United Nations objectives and to agree to genuinely free elections under the principles endorsed by the General Assembly. Finally, on 4 March 1959, the Chinese Communists reiterated their demands and argued that the United Nations had been reduced to a belligerent in the Korean war and had lost all competence to deal fairly with the Korean question, and that consequently any resolution would be null and void (A/4187, para. 11).

30. The Communists' insistence that United Nations troops should be withdrawn from Korea prior to an agreement on unification, that the United Nations had lost all competence to deal with the question and that all-Korean elections should be held under the supervision of a neutral nations organ indicated that they would not consider a settlement on any terms short of surrender by the United Nations.

31. However, to withdraw United Nations protection from the Republic of Korea before the question had been solved in accordance with United Nations principles would leave Korea exposed to the threat of aggression, as it had been when the United States troops had withdrawn in 1949. At that time, not only was it impossible to verify announcements that the Soviet Union had withdrawn its forces, owing to the barrier of secrecy surrounding North Korea, but it was a known fact that the Soviet Union had already trained large numbers of North Korean forces, which had been assisted by senior Soviet officers in the capacity of "advisers" when the aggression had been launched. By that time the United States forces were already far away and the aggressors had been able to overrun most of the peninsula before the United Nations counter-offensive could be organized. Now again, the North Korean forces were heavily armed—in violation of the Armistice Agreement—and, as before, supplies and re-enforcements could be sent at short notice from beyond the Yalu river. Nor should it be forgotten that when the Chinese Communist "Volunteers" had allegedly been withdrawn from North Korea, Mr. Chou En-lai, Premier of the People's Republic of China, had stated that the Chinese people had not "forsaken their international duty to the Korean people"—words which carried ominous military implications. Since the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement, United Nations troops in Korea had been greatly reduced and, as had been frequently reiterated, would be completely withdrawn when conditions for a lasting settlement had been fulfilled. A withdrawal under present conditions, however, could lead only to communist conquest.

32. As for the contention that the United Nations was a mere "belligerent" in Korea and had lost all competence and moral authority to deal fairly with the Korean question, it could only be reiterated that the United Nations was fully empowered by its Charter to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend its good offices in seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea—a principle which had been repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly.

33. If the proposal that all-Korean elections should be held under the supervision of a "neutral nations organ" was prompted by a genuine desire for impartial supervision, then surely that impartiality could be found among the Members of the United Nations who had already supervised more than one election. In the past, "neutral nations supervision" in Korea had been provided by two genuinely neutral members and two communist members, and the attitude of the latter had been so far from neutral that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission had been unable to carry out its duties as laid down in the Armistice Agreement. It was thus hard to escape the conclusion that the authorities controlling North Korea were afraid to let the people express their wishes freely.

34. After careful examination, the United Nations had to conclude that the communist proposals did not reflect a willingness to reach a reasonable settlement but were merely one-sided demands. Thus the wisest course for the United Nations was to stand by the principles it had enunciated in the past, namely, the right of the United Nations to extend its good offices for a just settlement of the Korean question, the need for genuinely free elections throughout Korea under United Nations supervision and the election of a national assembly in which representation should be directly proportional to the indigenous population in all parts of Korea. Those principles were once again embodied in the draft resolution which the United States was sponsoring with a number of other Member States.^{3/}

35. In the face of prolonged injustice, there was a temptation for those who upheld justice to weary of the struggle and, perhaps, to attribute to the offender more control over the forces of history than he actu-

ally possessed. Yet the cause of a free and united Korea was far from lost. The Republic of Korea enjoyed an expanding economy, civil and religious freedoms, a high morale and the firm support of the United Nations. Its wide-spread recognition in the free world and membership in the specialized agencies of the United Nations showed that it was firmly established in the family of nations. Undoubtedly, the people of North Korea were in a far worse position and yearned for freedom.

36. While those factors would not necessarily induce the Communists to change their stand in the immediate future, it was nevertheless a fact that the long-range prospects of the Republic of Korea were good and that nothing should be done to dim them. Merely because a solution was not yet in sight the United Nations should not lose faith in its principles or flag in its responsibilities, for the desire for freedom and justice was perhaps the most powerful force working in the minds of men.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.

^{3/} Subsequently distributed as document A/C.1/L.245.