



Wednesday, 30 January 1957,
at 3.15 p.m.

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CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 25:	
Admission of new Members to the United Nations (concluded)	25

Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Sudjarwo (Indonesia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 25

**Admission of new Members to the United Nations
(A/SPC/L.7 and Add.1, A/SPC/L.8 and
Corr.1 and Add.1, A/SPC/L.9, A/SPC/L.12)
(concluded)**

1. Mr. TARAZI (Syria), replying to questions raised by the Mexican representative at the 21st meeting, regarding the nature of the draft resolution submitted by India and Syria (A/SPC/L.12) pointed out that the proposal was purely procedural in that it called for no decision by the Special Political Committee on the merits of any of the applications for membership under discussion. While he agreed with the Mexican representative that the General Assembly had adopted a clear position in its resolution 918 (X) with respect to countries with unification problems, the reference to that resolution in the preamble did not prejudice the substantive issue nor make the proposal one of substance. Moreover, there was no contradiction between the preamble and the operative part of the draft resolution. The Security Council, although it was merely being asked to consider all pending applications for admission in the light of the principle endorsed by the Assembly in resolution 918 (X), could indeed choose to set aside that decision and to act favourably on the two thirteen-Power draft resolutions (A/SPC/L.7 and Add.1 and A/SPC/L.8 and Corr.1 and Add.1) or on the USSR draft resolution (A/SPC/L.9).

2. India and Syria were requesting that their draft resolution should be given priority in the voting because it would transmit all the substantive proposals before the Committee to the Security Council and would therefore be more comprehensive, and also because it raised a previous question which, according to United Nations practice and to parliamentary procedure, should be decided before a vote was taken on the substantive proposals. In effect, it called for the transmission of all substantive proposals to another organ of the United Nations. Moreover, the Committee should in all fairness respect the right of all movers of draft resolutions to have their proposals voted upon. Obviously, if the Indian-Syrian text was not voted on first, it would not be considered at all, or if it were voted on last, as it would be if proposals were taken in the order of their submission, it would become worthless.

3. Mr. GRAHEK (Yugoslavia) considered that the debate would not help to solve the problem of Korea and Viet-Nam. Indeed, the unilateral nature of the thirteen-Power draft resolutions would make a complex situation worse and would prejudice the unification of those countries, which was one of the main objectives of the United Nations. Accordingly, Yugoslavia would support the Indian-Syrian draft resolution. While it was true that the USSR draft resolution was a more constructive step towards achieving universality, it would bring no practical progress for the two divided countries. If the text submitted by India and Syria was not given priority in the voting, Yugoslavia would abstain on the three substantive proposals.

4. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) drew attention to the lack of realism exhibited by the United States and the other countries supporting the thirteen-Power draft resolutions. They were acting as if General Assembly resolution 918 (X) had never been adopted and as if the admission of sixteen States in 1955 had not marked a decided change in the situation with regard to the admission of new Members.

5. In connexion with the attacks directed by some delegations against the rule of unanimity in the Security Council, he recalled the statement made by the Secretary of State of the United States to the effect that the rule of unanimity reflected the obligation placed by the Charter on the great Powers to agree amongst themselves before exercising the power they possessed to make or break the peace. That agreement had to be reached by negotiation and not by the process of one Power imposing its will on the others. Some delegations appeared to fear the very word "negotiation"; the representative of Peru had apologized for the negotiation engaged in by the Committee of Good Offices on the membership issue. Yet it was only through negotiation that solutions could be found for the most complex problems.

6. It was the United States, and not the USSR, which had consistently blocked the admission of new Members. For years, the United States had excluded all applicant States whose political and social structure were not to its liking. In 1956 its efforts had finally been defeated owing to the overwhelming pressure of world public opinion in favour of the universality of the United Nations. It had succeeded only in excluding from membership the Mongolian People's Republic, whose application had been pending for more than ten years. Similarly, by its policy of discrimination against States with political and social systems it repudiated, it was now leading a movement to block the admission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Its arguments against their admission were the familiar cold war arguments, and could result only in straining relations between Member States of the United Nations.

7. The fact was that there were two States in Korea and two States in Viet-Nam. The Democratic People's

Republic of Korea was a peace-loving, democratic State. It had repeatedly shown its desire to consolidate peace and comply with the Armistice Agreement. It had appealed to the South Korean Government to co-operate with it in preparing the way for unification. It had made concrete proposals for the development of social and cultural exchanges with South Korea, for trade, economic co-operation, freedom of movement and various other measures for narrowing the rift between the two parts of the country. South Korea had rejected all those proposals. While the Government of President Syngman Rhee pursued a policy of sabre-rattling and the United States Command was actively undermining the Armistice Agreement, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had reduced its armed forces and its military equipment and had solemnly declared that it would never be the first to use arms against South Korea.

8. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam had similarly demonstrated its peaceful intentions. It was making every effort to achieve unification of Viet-Nam on the basis of the Geneva agreements. South Viet-Nam, with the tacit agreement of the United States, was opposing those efforts. The Government of President Ngo Dinh Diem had rejected out of hand the recent proposal of its northern neighbour to initiate preparations for country-wide elections. The United States charge of aggression by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam against Laos was totally disproved by the joint declaration made by the two States in August 1956 pledging friendly relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and providing for social and cultural exchanges. Moreover, the United States and the United Kingdom in supporting admission for South Viet-Nam only were guilty of a gross violation of the Geneva agreements to which they had been parties. They were acting against the wishes of the majority in the United Nations which sought to promote unification of Korea and Viet-Nam so that they might ultimately be able to admit the representatives of two unified countries.

9. The USSR delegation would vote against the joint draft resolutions because it supported universality and opposed favouritism in the admission of new Members. They constituted a deliberate attempt to sabotage the unification of Korea and Viet-Nam, to widen the rift between the two parts of each country and to encourage the seizure of one part by the other. The only way to avoid those dangers was to adopt the USSR draft resolution (A/SPC/L.9). The USSR would also be prepared to support the Indian-Syrian draft resolution (A/SPC/L.12), and would not oppose giving it priority in the voting.

10. Mr. JORDAN PANDO (Bolivia) said that although his country supported the principle of universality, it recognized the practical wisdom of the Indian-Syrian proposal: solution of the membership issue depended on agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council. Admission of one part of a divided Korea and of a divided Viet-Nam would consolidate the artificial division of those countries and do a disservice to their peoples. Bolivia would therefore support the draft resolution of India and Syria and vote to give it priority in the voting. If the draft was not given priority in the voting it would abstain on the other draft resolutions before the Committee.

11. Mr. ROUX (France) associated his delegation with the arguments put forward by the Philippine, United States and United Kingdom delegations. France would oppose priority in the voting for the Indian-Syrian draft resolution and for the USSR draft resolu-

tion. It considered the former to be unrealistic; it did an injustice to States like South Korea and South Viet-Nam, which met the requirements for membership. France did not consider that North Korea and North Viet-Nam met those requirements.

12. He took exception to the Syrian representative's attack against France for its position with regard to Laos, Cambodia and Viet-Nam. It was clear from the observations of several other delegations that France had strong bonds of friendship with those three States.

13. Mr. ALEMAYEHOU (Ethiopia) pointed out that problems connected with the admission of new Members had been solved as a result of co-operation among the permanent members of the Security Council and the patience of the General Assembly. The problems of admitting Korea and Viet-Nam were complicated by the efforts of those countries to achieve unification and should be given more time and more careful consideration. Ethiopia would support the Indian-Syrian draft resolution which achieved that purpose and should be voted on first. However, if it was not adopted, Ethiopia, as a consistent supporter of the principle of universality and of the admission of States meeting the conditions laid down in Article 4, was prepared to vote for that thirteen-Power draft resolution recommending admission of the Republic of Korea. It could not vote for admission of North Korea because the Assembly had declared North Korea the aggressor in the Korean War in which Ethiopia had taken part, and because the Assembly had declared South Korea to be the only legal Government of the country. In the circumstances, of the four States enumerated in the USSR draft resolution, only one, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, was unacceptable to his delegation. He requested a separate vote on the pertinent words in the USSR draft resolution.

14. Mr. LACHS (Poland) said that the draft resolution submitted by India and Syria was procedural by all standards. The preamble quite properly recalled resolution 918 (X), one of the most important decisions adopted by the Assembly on membership, a decision, moreover, which paved the way for admission of sixteen States in 1955. The preamble, however, did not affect the operative part of the draft resolution, which represented an attempt at conciliation, asked for no final judgement, and did not prejudge a substantive solution. Poland supported the Indian-Syrian text and thought it should be given priority in the voting. If it was not adopted, priority should be given to the USSR draft resolution. Since unification was the ultimate goal in Korea and Viet-Nam, the reasonable course for the Committee would be to wait until it had been achieved. However, if it wanted to recommend those countries for admission forthwith, it could not reasonably admit one part of each country and exclude the other. Furthermore, the USSR proposal enjoyed a legitimate priority because it was more far-reaching than the others.

15. He wished to rectify a point raised by the Philippine delegation in connexion with the question of the recognition of North Viet-Nam. France had recognized that Government as early as March 1946 in an agreement specifying that Viet-Nam was a free State, with its own Government, its own Parliament and its own army and finances. Indeed, the United Kingdom, in recognizing the United States in 1783, and Portugal in recognizing Brazil in 1825, had used very similar terms. France's recognition not only retained its legal value, but was enhanced by the cultural agreement concluded with North Viet-Nam by France at the 1954

Geneva Conference. The reality was that North Viet-Nam, like North Korea, was a State qualified for admission to United Nations membership. The Bandung Conference of 1955 had confirmed that status. Any discrimination against those States would hamper their unification with the southern parts of their respective countries.

16. Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan) said that after studying with care the draft resolution submitted by India and Syria (A/SPC/L.12), his delegation had come to the reluctant decision that it would be unable to support it. He concurred generally with the observations made by the Mexican representative on its legal aspects, and noted further that it was not clear whether the draft resolution in fact included Korea and Viet-Nam in its scope. In the light of the context, and the Indian delegation's explanation, there appeared to be room for the argument that it was concerned only with Outer Mongolia.

17. The Canadian representative had made it clear that the formula used in General Assembly resolution 918 (X) had not been intended as a principle having permanent validity. The Japanese delegation had been much impressed by that statement and, in the light of it, was somewhat perplexed by the preamble to the draft resolution. The operative paragraphs of the draft resolution were also somewhat ambiguous. Operative paragraph 1 made no mention of the purpose of the transmission to the Security Council of the proposals made in the General Assembly, and did not even call for prompt action, unlike a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163) on disarmament adopted in the First Committee to which the Indian representative had compared it at the 21st meeting. Apart from the fact that it seemed to question the Security Council's competence to consider all applications for admission, operative paragraph 2 did not appear to have a great deal of meaning.

18. The Japanese delegation would vote against the USSR draft resolution (A/SPC/L.9) and in favour of the thirteen-Power draft resolutions as amended by Argentina (A/SPC/L.7 and Add.1, A/SPC/L.8 and Corr.1 and Add.1). As one of the sponsors of the thirteen-Power draft resolutions, the Japanese delegation wished to pay a tribute to the spirit of co-operation shown by Argentina, which had made it possible to agree on a compromise formula. He re-emphasized the statement made by the United States representative (20th meeting) that the second preambular paragraph of both draft resolutions was merely a factual statement. He wished to affirm that in the opinion of his delegation it did not involve the legal question of whether one of the permanent members of the Security Council had the power under the Charter to exclude any applicant from membership in the United Nations.

19. Mr. SHARIF (Indonesia) said that despite its adherence to the principles of universality of membership of the United Nations, his delegation had decided to abstain on both thirteen-Power draft resolutions and on the USSR draft resolution because it felt that the unification of the two countries should come first. The joint draft resolution of India and Syria (A/SPC/L.12) appeared to offer the best course as matters stood and the Indonesian delegation would accordingly vote in favour of it. Since the draft resolution was chiefly procedural, the Indonesian delegation would also vote to grant it priority in the order of voting.

20. Mr. DE BARROS (Brazil) said that as one of the sponsors of the thirteen-Power draft resolutions, the

Brazilian delegation would vote in favour of them. They were based on the principle of universality of membership and on the belief that the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam fulfilled the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter. The USSR draft resolution (A/SPC/L.9) paid no heed to the requirements of the Charter and the Brazilian delegation would vote against it. The draft resolution proposed by India and Syria was rather perplexing; the relationship between General Assembly resolution 918 (X) and the four applications being considered was not clear. Moreover, the draft resolution suggested no specific solution for the real problem. The Brazilian delegation would therefore vote against that draft resolution and against the request to give it priority in the order of voting.

21. Mr. DE LOJENDIO (Spain) did not agree with the Syrian representative's contention that the draft resolution of India and Syria (A/SPC/L.12) was a purely procedural proposal. Its adoption would imply a decision by the Committee on the admissibility of the applications for membership of both North and South Korea and North and South Viet-Nam. The Charter required that applicants for membership in the United Nations should be States, and if the Assembly asked that all four applications should be examined equally, it would be giving the status of States to all four applicants. It was generally admitted, even by the USSR delegation, that unification was the goal both in Korea and Viet-Nam. Such unification could never be achieved if the existence of two separate States in each country was confirmed by a General Assembly decision. Accordingly, the Indian-Syrian draft resolution turned upon a question of substance and should not be given priority.

22. Mr. RAJAN (India) said that operative paragraph 2 of the Indian-Syrian draft resolution requested the Security Council to consider all applications for the admission of new Members, including South Korea and South Viet-Nam. Thus, the resolution was not intended to exclude them, as some delegations appeared to believe. He recalled that General Assembly resolution 918 (X) had been passed by a very large majority, and he could not understand the objection to referring to it.

23. It had been argued by a number of delegations that the draft resolution of India and Syria was not a previous, procedural, proposal but one of substance. It was unfortunate that the rules of procedure of the General Assembly did not contain an adequate definition of a previous question. However, rule 66 of the rules of procedure of the Economic and Social Council, and rule 61 of the rules of procedure of the Functional Commissions of the Economic and Social Council, contained a reference to, and a definition of, previous questions, making it mandatory to put them to the vote first. The Indian-Syrian draft resolution did not require a decision on the substance of the other proposals and therefore satisfied the definition of a previous question. The Committee was governed in the matter by rule 132 of the General Assembly's rules of procedure and could accordingly decide not to give the draft resolution priority, but to do so would be contrary to logic, to equity and to the practice of other organs of the United Nations. He could understand the desire of the sponsors of the other draft resolutions to press them to a vote, although he believed that such a course would be harmful, but even so, the proper procedure would be to grant the Indian-Syrian draft resolution priority and then to vote on the others.

24. Mr. JOUBLANC RIVAS (Mexico) said that his delegation was still not convinced that the draft resolu-

tion was purely procedural. It would be unable to support the request to grant it priority in the voting, or to vote in favour of it.

25. Mr. FORSYTH (Australia) noted, in regard to the question of granting priority to the draft resolution submitted by India and Syria, that the Syrian representative had said in effect that the draft resolution would not prejudice the substance of the matter but was merely procedural. The Australian delegation disagreed on that point, and on the proposal to grant it priority. The draft resolution proposed to refer all the applications for membership to another organ of the United Nations, the Security Council, in which each permanent member possessed the veto. The practical effect of the adoption of the draft resolution would be to prevent the adoption of the thirteen-Power proposals to admit the Republic of Korea and Viet-Nam, which the vote on the draft resolution would have to be cast in the light of the support for the claims of North Korea, North Viet-Nam and Outer Mongolia. Finally, he noted that apart from the fact that the thirteen-Power resolutions had been submitted first, a vote to grant that draft resolution priority would have the same implications as a vote for the draft resolution itself. The Australian delegation would therefore oppose the proposal. It would also vote against the USSR draft resolution (A/SPC/L.9) and in favour of the two thirteen-Power draft resolutions (A/SPC/L.7 and Add.1, A/SPC/L.8 and Corr.1 and Add.1).

26. Mr. MAURTUA (Peru) regretted that the conciliatory intentions of his delegation had not been fully appreciated by the USSR. In suggesting negotiations from which all political considerations would be set aside, the Peruvian delegation had sought to remove the danger of a veto in the Security Council and to open the door to an understanding on the basis of the Charter. It had emphasized, however, that any such negotiations must be based on certain legal criteria if the rights of the parties were to be respected.

27. The Indian-Syrian draft resolution appeared to presuppose in the second preambular paragraph that the Special Political Committee would be unable to come to a decision. The operative part itself recommended nothing. The decision to transmit to the Security Council proposals made during the current session of the General Assembly was unnecessary, and in prejudging the legal status of the applicants, it was unjustified. The Peruvian delegation could not regard the draft resolution as procedural because it affected the substance of the matter. He agreed with the Australian representative that the aim of the Indian-Syrian draft resolution appeared to be to prevent the Special Political Committee from solving the substance of the question of the admission of the Republic of Korea and Viet-Nam. To grant it priority in the voting would invalidate the thirteen-Power proposals. It might almost be designed to open the way for the USSR draft resolution (A/SPC/L.9). The Peruvian delegation would therefore vote against the proposal to grant priority to the draft resolution submitted by India and Syria.

28. Mr. MALOLES (Philippines) said in reply to the Polish representative that, although the recognition of North Viet-Nam by France was historically true, the question confronting the Committee was not the fact of recognition of North Viet-Nam but that of its qualifications for membership under Article 4 of the Charter. He reiterated his objections to the USSR draft resolution (A/SPC/L.9) which sought, he contended,

to make the admission of undesirable applicants a condition for the acceptance of two desirable candidates.

29. Several representatives had argued that Korea and Viet-Nam must both be unified before they were admitted to the United Nations. Unfortunately, as matters stood, unification was impossible. The Governments of the Republic of Korea and of Viet-Nam had expressed a desire to hold nation-wide free elections by universal suffrage and secret ballot, but the obstructionist policy of North Korea and North Viet-Nam had stood in the way. Thus, to suggest that unification should precede admission was putting the cart before the horse. In regard to the question of the need to curtail the application of the veto to questions of membership by imposing certain criteria, he noted that exclusion should be only on valid grounds supported by logic, and that admission should not be made to depend on conditions other than those set forth in Article 4. North Korea and North Viet-Nam were demonstrably not peace-loving States, and were therefore excluded under the terms of Article 4.

30. The Indian representative's reference to the rules of procedure of the Economic and Social Council was out of order. Rule 132 of the General Assembly's rules of procedure made it quite clear that, unless a decision was taken to the contrary, proposals should be voted on in the order of their submission.

31. Mr. SHALFAN (Saudi Arabia) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by India and Syria and in favour of granting it priority. If that proposal was rejected, it would abstain on all the others, on the grounds that Korea and Viet-Nam should be unified before they were admitted to the United Nations.

32. Mr. OSMAN (Sudan) said that the Indian-Syrian draft resolution (A/SPC/L.12) did have certain ambiguous elements, but they should not be allowed to weigh against the good intentions of its sponsors. The Sudanese delegation believed that the draft resolution might serve a useful purpose if it was given priority in the voting, and would vote in favour of giving it much priority and in favour of that draft resolution itself. If the proposal was not adopted, it would revert to its original position of abstaining on all the draft resolutions, on the grounds that it was against the admission of divided countries to the United Nations.

33. Mr. TARAZI (Syria) said that any proposal, no matter how procedural, must needs have some bearing on the substance of a question. The Indian-Syrian draft resolution was however essentially procedural. Moreover, it was actually in the form of a previous question. Priority for the joint Indian and Syrian draft resolution in the voting was therefore clearly justified by its purpose, which was to refer all proposals on the question to the Security Council. The two other thirteen-Power draft resolutions should therefore be held in abeyance until a decision had been reached on the draft resolution of India and Syria.

34. Tributes to the efforts of the Indian and Syrian delegations would be hollow indeed if the attempt at compromise and conciliation embodied in their draft resolution was not given a fair chance. In that connexion it was difficult to see how representatives who advocated the principle of the universality of the United Nations could support the applications of South Korea and South Viet-Nam and at the same time reject the applications of North Korea and North Viet-Nam.

35. The argument that North Korea and North Viet-Nam were not States was unfounded. The real criterion

in that respect seemed to be the existence of a territory and a Government exercising effective control over that territory. Both those conditions were fulfilled in the case of North Korea and North Viet-Nam.

36. He agreed that it would be better to wait until Korea and Viet-Nam were unified before they were admitted as Member States, but in their efforts to contribute towards a solution of the problem and to safeguard the principle of universality, the Indian and Syrian delegations had proposed a compromise solution by referring the matter to the Security Council.

37. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) considered that the Indian and Syrian draft resolution was a substantive proposal. If its only object was to inform the Security Council of the applications for admission made during the current session, it would be pointless. The members of the Council already had that information, which they received from United Nations documents, including those of the Special Political Committee. The draft resolution could not therefore be regarded in the light of a recommendation in support of those applications. It was drafted in such general terms that it would cover North Korea and North Viet-Nam. His delegation would therefore vote against the draft resolution and against the proposal to give it priority.

38. Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan) said that, on the basis of the supplementary explanations given by the Indian representative, his delegation was convinced that the Indian and Syrian draft resolution related to the substance of the question, and would therefore vote against it and against the proposal to put it to the vote first.

39. Mr. RAOUF (Iraq) said that his delegation did not share the view that the Indian and Syrian draft resolution was a purely procedural proposal. Its adoption would enable North Korea and North Viet-Nam, which had on many occasions been branded as aggressors, to gain admission to the United Nations. His delegation would therefore vote against the joint Indian and Syrian draft resolution and against the proposal to give it priority.

40. The CHAIRMAN state that, as the Committee had not been able to agree on the priority to be observed in voting, he would put first to the vote the request for priority made by India and Syria for their draft resolution (A/SPC/L.12).

The proposal was rejected by 43 votes to 25, with 7 abstentions.

41. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the USSR representative had proposed that priority should be given to his draft resolution (A/SPC/L.9) and called for a vote on that proposal.

The proposal was rejected by 45 votes to 12, with 18 abstentions.

42. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.7 and Add.1) concerning the admission of the Republic of Korea.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Yemen, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,

Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria.

The draft resolution was adopted by 45 votes to 8, with 22 abstentions.

43. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the thirteen-Power draft resolution concerning the admission of Viet-Nam (A/SPC/L.8 and Add.1 and Corr.1).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey.

Against: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania.

Abstaining: Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria.

The draft resolution was adopted by 44 votes to 8, with 23 abstentions.

44. The CHAIRMAN, in accordance with the Ethiopian representative's request for a separate vote on the words "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" in the draft resolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/SPC/L.9) put the retention of those words to the vote.

The retention of those words was rejected by 38 votes to 13, with 18 abstentions.

45. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) proposed that, to be consistent, the Committee should vote separately on the other three States referred to in the USSR draft resolution, in accordance with rule 130 of the rules of procedure.

46. Mr. DE LOJENDIO (Spain) objected to the motion for division. All that had been requested had been a separate vote on the words "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea".

47. Mr. CROSTHWAITE (United Kingdom) pointed out that what was at stake in the USSR draft resolution was more than a mere list of names of countries. It referred to the simultaneous admission of those candidates. His delegation would abstain if a separate vote was taken on each one of those countries and would vote against the draft resolution as a whole.

48. Mr. OSMAN (Sudan) felt that the other parts of the draft resolution should be voted on separately in accordance with the rules of procedure.

49. Mr. MAURTUA (Peru) pointed out that if the other three parts of the draft resolution were voted on separately the Committee should bear in mind that it had already asked the Security Council to reconsider the applications of two of the three countries in question.

50. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the USSR motion that the Special Political Committee should vote separately on the three other States referred to in the draft resolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The motion was rejected by 28 votes to 17, with 25 abstentions.

51. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the purpose of the USSR draft resolution, which was to recommend the simultaneous admission of all four States, had already been defeated by the Committee's decision to delete the reference to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He would therefore be obliged to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution, as amended.

52. The CHAIRMAN put the draft resolution of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/SPC/L.9), as amended, to the vote.

The draft resolution, as amended, was rejected by 35 votes to 1, with 35 abstentions.

53. Mr. TARAZI (Syria) said that the sponsors of the joint Indian and Syrian draft resolution (A/SPC/L.12) would not press for a vote.

54. Mr. KING (Liberia) said that his delegation's abstention in the vote should not be interpreted as indifference to the question of admission of new Members. His Government was prepared to welcome all States fully qualified for membership, in keeping with the principle of universality of the United Nations. In the absence of a recommendation by the Security Council, however, no useful purpose would be served by a General Assembly decision in the matter until the five permanent Members were able to settle their differences, as they had done at the tenth session when sixteen new Members had been admitted. His remarks applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the two thirteen-Power draft resolutions and to the USSR draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.