



Thursday, 13 April 1961
 at 3.30 p.m.

New York

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Chairman: Mr. Adnan M. PACHACHI (Iraq).

AGENDA ITEM 13

**Report of the Trusteeship Council (A/4404)
 (*continued*)**

THE FUTURE OF THE CAMEROONS UNDER UNITED KINGDOM ADMINISTRATION (A/4695, A/4699, A/4726, A/4727, A/C.4/448, A/C.4/479) (*continued*)

1. Mr. OKALA (Cameroun), resuming the statement he had begun at the previous meeting, said that there was reason to fear that the links of Northern Cameroonian officials with the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, as well as their powers and their actions, might have influenced the final outcome of the plebiscite, as the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner for the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration had admitted in paragraphs 421 and 422 of his report (A/4727). Instead of being protected from all direct or indirect psychological influences, as the sponsors of General Assembly resolution 1473 (XIV) had wished, the electoral body had, as a consequence of the extensive powers vested in the Native Authorities, been subjected to direct and effective pressure. As the integrity of the ballot was no longer guaranteed, its outcome could not be regarded as valid, because it was marred by serious irregularities. Furthermore, Nigerian residents had taken part in the vote in the Northern Cameroons, but paradoxically not in the Southern Cameroons, and had therefore acted as both judge and interested party.

2. Thus, the United Kingdom had clearly violated the Trusteeship Agreement and had flouted the General Assembly resolutions in the interests of integration, thus considerably weakening the guarantees and safeguards laid down in resolution 1473 (XIV).

3. The peoples of the Northern Cameroons had not made a free choice, and the United Nations must take into account the irregularities which had occurred. The activities of United Kingdom and Nigerian officials and of the Native Authorities appointed in the Territory by decree of the Premier of the Northern Region of Nigeria, whose territorial ambitions and desire to subjugate the peoples of the Territory were well known, had played a decisive role in the organization, conduct and outcome of the plebiscite.

4. The fact that, after more than forty years of United Kingdom trusteeship, 97 per cent of the Northern Cameroons population were still illiterate and there was

not a single Cameroonian senior official in the Territory gave reason to doubt whether the Administering Authority had always been guided by the colonial peoples' desire for freedom, which had been the constant concern of the United Nations.

5. In the belief that the General Assembly would, in the light of the failure to implement its resolution and of the numerous procedural irregularities, appreciate the need to reconsider the entire problem, since there was legal proof that the spirit and letter of the resolution, the Trusteeship Agreement and the Charter had not been observed, his delegation maintained its request for the annulment of the plebiscite held on 11 and 12 February 1961 in the Northern Cameroons. It did so because it believed that the peoples of the Territory must be given a free choice, which they had in fact been denied through a lack of impartiality and true democracy, the absence of a responsible local government, the administrative links with Northern Nigeria and, lastly, the various forms of pressure that had been brought to bear on them. Believing in the paramount importance of democracy and justice, Cameroun would accept the choice of the peoples of the Northern Cameroons when it was safeguarded by all the guarantees promised by the United Nations.

6. Mr. BALIMA (Upper Volta) proposed that the full text of the statement of the representative of the Republic of Cameroun should be issued as a document.

*It was so decided.*¹

7. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) reaffirmed the bonds of friendship between his country and the Republic of Cameroun. Having personally attended the independence ceremonies of Cameroun, he particularly regretted Mr. Okala's vehement and unjustified attack on the United Kingdom and its Government's policy. His delegation would reply in due course.

8. The representative of Cameroun had quoted extensively from the report of the United Nations Commissioner on the plebiscite of November 1959 in the Northern Cameroons (A/4314 and Add.1). It was after a study of that report that the General Assembly had invited the United Kingdom to adopt certain measures in regard to the administration of the Trust Territory. Those measures had been taken. Since November 1959, however, the situation had changed and the information given by the representative of Cameroun was no longer entirely correct. For a more accurate assessment of the people's aspiration, Mr. Okala would do well to study the last report of Mr. Abdoh (A/4727).

9. The representative of Cameroun had given the impression that his Government had not been placed on an equal footing with the Nigerian Government during the plebiscite. The questions put at the plebiscite did not appear to justify such an interpretation.

¹ See A/C.4/484.

10. The Camerounian representative's attack suggested that the Committee was confronted with a dispute between Cameroun and the United Kingdom. That was not so. His delegation believed that the peoples of the two parts of the Trust Territory had clearly expressed their wishes with regard to their future, by large majorities in each case, in accordance with the General Assembly's resolutions and under United Nations supervision. The Plebiscite Commissioner had himself stated that the Administering Authority had conducted the plebiscite efficiently and that the peoples of the two parts of the Territory had been able to express their wishes freely: their decision committed them alone, and not the peoples of the United Kingdom, Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroun.

11. Mr. HOLLIST (Nigeria) refuted Mr. Okala's implication that the Republic of Cameroun had special ties with the Northern Cameroons. It was true that the two territories had formed part of the same German colony; however, if one went somewhat further back in history, one found that a large part of the present Northern Cameroons belonged to the former Bornu and Adamawa empires, which were now part of Nigeria. The most that could be said was that the Northern Cameroons had had historical ties with both Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroun, but that those ties did not confer any greater rights on the one than on the other.

12. He objected strongly to the suggestion that the Administering Authority was deporting Northern Cameroonians into Nigeria as slaves. There was no slavery in Nigeria, and Northern Cameroonians enjoyed the same rights and privileges there as Nigerians.

13. His delegation reserved the right to speak again at a later stage.

14. Mr. OKALA (Cameroun) said that he did not intend to engage in polemics, but expressed regret that legal arguments had been countered with sentiment. The statement of the Nigerian representative was nothing more than a territorial claim for the purpose of restoring a vanished empire. The responsibility, nevertheless, rested with the United Kingdom, which had again brought the Northern Cameroons under the Nigerian heel. What would happen in the world if, in the interest of territorial claims, former empires sought to re-establish themselves? By the very act of calling them Cameroonians, the Nigerian representative implicitly acknowledged that the inhabitants of the Trust Territory were closer to the peoples of the Republic of Cameroun than to those of Nigeria; by recalling that the Northern Cameroons had been part of the Bornu empire, he had strengthened the argument of the Republic of Cameroun: either the United Nations had been wrong to place the Territory under trusteeship, or the United Kingdom had not honoured its commitments under the Trusteeship Agreement.

15. He reserved his delegation's right to comment in detail on the report of the Plebiscite Commissioner and to refute Nigeria's territorial claim.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Chief Martin and Mr. Samuel Endeley, representatives of the Bakweri Molongo, Mr. E. M. L. Endeley, representative of the Cameroon People's National Convention (CPNC), Chief Bokwe Sakwe, representative of the CPNC, Balondo Mokanya, Mr. N. N. Mbile, representative of the CPNC, Kumba Division, Mr. Samuel Ando Seh, representative of the CPNC, Nkambe Division, Mr.

Oumarou Michika and Mr. Samuel Samwe, representatives of the Kamerun Freedom Party (KFP), Mr. J. N. Foncha, representative of the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), Mr. Ibrahim Abba and Mr. Muhammadu Iya, representatives of the Northern Kamerun Democratic Party (NKDP), Mr. Ndeh Ntumazah, representative of One Kamerun (OK), Mrs. Marie N'Gapeth, representative of the Union démocratique des femmes camerounaises (UDEDEC), and Mr. Bebey-Eyidi, Mr. Manga Mado, Mr. Mayi Matip and Mr. Tetang, Deputies to the National Assembly of the Republic of Cameroun, took places at the Committee table.

16. Mr. ANDO SEH (Cameroon People's National Convention, Nkambe Division) stated that the Southern Cameroons was an artificial creation of the European colonial system, its population being a conglomeration of heterogeneous tribal groups. If, after more than forty years of colonial rule, the people was not imbued with any feeling of national unity, it could not be expected that the results of a plebiscite would suddenly arouse such feelings in them. The events leading up to the results of the plebiscite had in fact tended to increase discord among the people.

17. In the Nkambe Division, the people had a deep-rooted desire to continue its association with its kith and kin in the Northern Region of Nigeria.

18. He considered that the aim of a plebiscite should be to establish harmony, security and prosperity. He referred to a number of plebiscites organized in modern times to determine the future of various people. He also mentioned the case of Northern Ireland, which sent representatives to the House of Commons in London.

19. Nkambe's case for joining Northern Nigeria was based on ethnology, propinquity, and the people's votes at the plebiscite. After living in tribal groups under German rule, the population of the Southern Cameroons had been arbitrarily divided by the League of Nations into two distinct political entities entrusted, under mandate, to France and the United Kingdom respectively. The Nkambe group was the victim of the splitting of the Territory by the United Kingdom, some of its villages being incorporated in the Northern Cameroons and others remaining in the Southern Cameroons. There was, however, free access between one group and the other. Later the boundaries had been revised by the Administering Authority. It had been easy to trace the line of separation between the tribes constituting the Nkambe Division and those of the Bamenda Division, since there were great differences between them; but it had been difficult to decide on a demarcation line between the Nkambe tribes and the Southern Cameroons, where there were six tribes belonging to the Nkambe Division, in particular the Nisaje, Mbembe and Kaka groups.

20. The Nkambe Division, in the 1959 elections, had returned supporters of continued association with Nigeria to all its four seats. The reason why its people had not asked for secession from the Southern Cameroons until recent times was that it had always thought that, by voting to remain with Nigeria, it could meet freely with its kith and kin of the northern sector. After having voted in that sense on three occasions, it felt justified in calling on the United Nations to allow it to take the course which it had chosen of its own volition. Those were its "freely expressed wishes".

21. In conclusion, he added that the Nsaw and Bum clans were determined to follow the Nkambe Division

in joining Northern Nigeria. In the plebiscite the Bum clan had voted overwhelmingly for association with Nigeria. With regard to the Nsaw chiefdom, which included tributary chiefdoms which had been promised freedom if they put their votes in the white ballot box at the plebiscite, its populations were now embarrassed to hear that they had voted not for a separate Southern Cameroons State but for union with the Republic of Cameroun. They would have preferred to join the Northern Region of Nigeria. Already people from Nsaw were so scared by the news of their joining the Republic of Cameroun that they were seeking new homes in areas of the Nkambe Division.

22. Mr. KENNEDY (Ireland) thought that any comparison between the Southern Cameroons and Ireland was fundamentally inappropriate. He suggested that the full text of the petitioners' statements should be distributed to members of the Committee in the original language, as was customary.

It was so decided.

23. Chief MARTIN (Bakweri Molongo) stated that in the opinion of the Bakweri Molongo, a cultural organization embracing all the indigenous inhabitants of the Victoria Division of the Southern Cameroons, and also in the opinion of the Victoria Divisional Council and the traditional chiefs of the Victoria Division, the results of the plebiscite which had been in favour of the Southern Cameroons joining the Republic of Cameroun should not be regarded as reflecting the wish of the people, for the following reasons.

24. When the Administering Authority had decided to terminate the trusteeship, it knew that the inhabitants of the Southern Cameroons were not yet ripe for independence, politically, economically or culturally. It was simply because Nigeria was to achieve independence in October 1960 that the United Kingdom had considered it convenient to give up control over the Trust Territory. There had been no real sense of nationhood in the Territory before the arrival of the Europeans, and the frequent tribal disputes which caused discord in the Southern Cameroons proved that a strong and impartial force was still necessary in order to mould the people into one nation.

25. The United Nations had made it quite clear that, before the plebiscite of February 1961, the Federation of Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroun should state the conditions under which the Southern Cameroons would join either of those two independent countries. The Federation of Nigeria had complied with that request, but the Republic of Cameroun had hitherto made no definite statement; he referred in that connexion to the statements in the Plebiscite Commissioner's report (A/4727, paras. 60-82). The Constitution of the Republic of Cameroun had not been changed to a federal one, despite the statements of its Government; the illiterate mass of the people of the Southern Cameroons had voted in favour of joining the Republic of Cameroun only as a result of tribal influences, and had not appreciated the difficulties that would arise in a union of two countries which had completely distinct systems of administration and cultures. The fact that the Republic of Cameroun had refused to observe the one condition imposed was a matter for apprehension, especially since the Southern Cameroons was still not a sovereign independent State. After a bitter electoral campaign between the KNDP and OK parties on the one hand and the CPNC party on the other, the people

had unfortunately followed the majority parties and voted without knowing what they were voting for. In the Southern Cameroons the Bakweri people constituted a minority group that for two or three centuries had lived in the Victoria Division. Immigration to the plantations had resulted in the Bakweri being greatly outnumbered. Unlike the Republic of Cameroun, the Federation of Nigeria had made arrangements for the protection of the fundamental rights and interests of smaller groups within the Federation. To agree to join the Republic of Cameroun would therefore, for the Bakweri, mean giving up certainty in return for vague promises.

26. The Bakweri had repeatedly petitioned the United Nations regarding their fears of losing their land rights. In that connexion he referred the Committee to the report of the 1949 United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa (T/798). Those fears had been mitigated by the understanding attitude of the United Kingdom Administration towards the different tribal groups, but had increased with the passing of political power into the hands of the Southern Cameroonians as a result of recent legislation in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly. The Bakweri feared that they were being deprived of their traditional rights to their land and were being made politically powerless.

27. The Bakweri wished therefore to be associated with Nigeria, and did not want to yield to a decision that had been greatly influenced by tribal feelings and party intimidations. The United Nations should consider giving the Southern Cameroons a separate status under the supervision of a special commission which would prepare the territory for independence, to be achieved after the various tribes and groups had learnt to regard themselves as one people. Should it be impossible to recommend that solution to the Trusteeship Council, the Bakweri would prefer to live apart, as a separate unit.

28. Chief SAKWE (Cameroons People's National Party, Balondo Mokanya) explained that, in the case of the Balondo tribes, association with Nigeria went back much further than the arrival of the Germans in the territories of the Southern Cameroons. The association, which had initially been commercial in character, had been reinforced by cultural and social ties which were highly valued by the Balondo. Having subsequently, like Nigeria, had to assimilate the British administration, the Balondos had naturally cast their votes, at the plebiscite, in the green ballot box, not in the white one which meant association with the Republic of Cameroun. It was therefore unthinkable for the Balondo to break all the ties which bound them to Nigeria and accept a way of life completely strange to them. If they were forced to do so, there would certainly be disturbances. The petitioners appealed to the feelings of the Committee and requested it to allow the Balondo to choose the only solution that seemed natural to them, namely, association with Nigeria.

29. Mr. MBILE (Cameroons People's National Convention, Kumba Division) reminded the Committee that he had already made an appeal to it at the fourteenth session (885th-887th and 890th meetings), and stated that it was particularly difficult for the different groups in the Territory to agree, even on the contents of the alternatives with which they were to be confronted. After the plebiscite, there was even greater discord than before. He had been appointed by the

traditional supreme body of all the Balondo-speaking peoples to act as their spokesman before the Committee. The population in question numbered about 50,000 persons who for geographical, social and economic reasons were closely linked with the peoples of the Calabar region, the port of Calabar being their only natural outlet to the Atlantic. Association with Nigeria was therefore a vital need for the Balondo, and it was not surprising that about 22,500 voters had favoured that solution. The 9,500 or so voters who had been in favour of association with the Republic of Cameroun—plantation workers or petty traders, generally natives of Bamenda or the former Cameroons under French administration—were supporters of Mr. Foncha and Mr. Foncha had promised them, in reward for their political support, that they would one day become landowners.

30. On 27 February 1961, at an extraordinary conference of the Balondo people, a resolution had been adopted and forwarded to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (T/PET.4/L.128). The Balondo people regarded the plebiscite as an opportunity for the peoples and tribes in the Southern Cameroons to express their own desires as to their future. Each tribe, i.e. each natural unit, should be able to live according to its choice. It was important, above all, to understand that the Southern Cameroons, like the Congo, appeared to be one people only from the outside. That impression was artificially promoted by the Europeans and unity could only prevail, after accession to independence, if the different tribes agreed to co-operate. If Mr. Foncha's supporters were sincerely in favour of attachment to the Republic of Cameroun, and if the supporters of Mr. Endeley and Mr. Mbile preferred association with Nigeria, then separation would have to be recognized. It would be unfortunate if errors committed elsewhere were repeated. The Balondo would never accept union with the Republic of Cameroun. On that issue they were supported by their allies, the Bakossi and Bakweri tribes. Mr. Foncha had stated that he saw no objection to persons who favoured joining Nigeria refusing to follow him towards union with the Republic of Cameroun, which seemed to indicate that he was not opposed to the actual principle of separation. The Balondo placed the matter in the hands of the United Nations and the United Kingdom Government, with a view to preventing a tribal war in the Southern Cameroons.

31. Having listened carefully to the statement of the Camerounian representative, he was surprised by the promises that were apparently being made to the people of the Southern Cameroons, when the town of Kumba, for instance, which was about fifteen kilometres from the frontier, was full of refugees who had fled from the Republic of Cameroun. He wondered how the Camerounian Government could promise security and prosperity to people from outside when it could not guarantee them to its own people. He also felt some apprehension as a result of official statements which had been made at Yaoundé to United Kingdom representatives on the need for maintaining Mr. Foncha in power. Actually, Mr. Foncha seemed to be nothing more than a creature of the Camerounian Government, and to have no freedom of judgement.

32. He recalled that the Trusteeship Council had recognized the need to draw up, in the Republic of Cameroun, a unified federal constitution in case the Southern Cameroons should vote for association with that country. But no sound constitution which could be accepted by the Balondo or the United Nations had

yet been promulgated. The Federation of Nigeria, on the other hand, had made provision for several measures, including safeguards for the rights of minorities. As for Mr. Foncha, he was still unable to specify what the Southern Cameroons could expect from the Republic of Cameroun.

33. He appealed to the United Nations to consider the problem from a human as well as a legal standpoint: the United Nations would surely not compel tribes having no ethnic or cultural affinity with the Republic of Cameroun to join that country, since that would amount to domination of one part of the population by the other.

34. Mr. Sam ENDELEY (Bakweri Molongo) addressed the Committee on behalf of Bakweri Molongo, a cultural organization representing the Bakweri of the Victoria Division in the Southern Cameroons. The organization had already submitted a petition (T/PET.4/L.117) in which the minority group constituting it expressed its fears of having to belong to a political unit in which tribal loyalties prevailed over national feelings and in which, under cover of democratic principles, the KNDP and its supporters were threatening the semi-Bantu tribes of the coastal belt with political oppression directed towards their extermination.

35. The Bakweri had been the first tribal group to come into contact with Western civilization. The idea of making the Southern Cameroons a separate Region within the Federation of Nigeria had come from Mr. E. M. L. Endeley, himself a Bakweri, and its purpose had been to endow the Southern Cameroons with the safeguards of the Nigerian Constitution. Unfortunately, the notable progress achieved in the Territory had not lasted long because of the tribalism preached by the Bamenda group, which had succeeded in overthrowing Mr. Endeley's Government and bringing the KNDP to power.

36. Thus, hatred and tribal discrimination became the characteristic of the existing society and influenced appointments in the civil service. The plebiscite had been directed by the KNDP—who were more concerned with seizing the fertile lands of the Bakweri than with the political aspects of the problem—on tribal bases. The United Nations had submitted precise questions to the people of the Cameroons and had requested the Administering Authority to inform the people of the constitutional changes which would be introduced according to their replies. On 10 November 1960, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies had pointed out to all the political leaders of the Territory that if the people were to vote in favour of union with Nigeria they would have the guarantee of a Constitution, the Nigerian Constitution—which would not be the case if they voted for union with the Republic of Cameroun. But they had voted for the second alternative, favoured by Mr. Foncha and Mr. Ahidjo. It was clear, therefore, that the people had voted, not on the essential questions, but simply to maintain Mr. Foncha and the KNDP in power. Subsequent statements by the leaders of that party had confirmed the fears of Bakweri Molongo that the plebiscite had been manoeuvred by the KNDP political leaders and their advisers in order to bring the Southern Cameroons into a political unit where the people would be oppressed, its leaders would be subjected to unbearable indignities, and the people's lands would be seized.

37. Thus, shortly after the plebiscite, the House of Assembly of the Southern Cameroons had amended

the Native Authority Ordinance in order to extend to the settler population in the Victoria and Kumba Divisions the same rights as were enjoyed by the indigenous population in the matter of land claims, and had considered, for the amendment of the Native Courts Ordinance, a bill under which the local government would be invested with the power to appoint and dismiss members of those courts. The House of Assembly had also requested Her Britannic Majesty to amend the constitutional instrument under which the Territory was governed, with a view to increasing the Bamenda Division's representation in the parliament; if that were granted, it would make it impossible for the government to change hands, in view of the proportions assumed by tribalism among the grassland tribesmen of the Southern Cameroons. He considered that those laws, combined with other provocative acts of the KNDP against the Bakweri, justified his fears. When a people was called upon to give its opinion on political union with another people, it should receive assurances that its life and property would be safeguarded. Never in the course of history had a people been forced, for its own benefit, into a political union through threats and oppression. The problem was a human and not a political one. In the Nigerian Constitution there were equitable safeguards for minority groups. The Bakweri had no ambition to form a separate sovereign political unit, but only asked to join a political unit which would guarantee their safety, their lives and their property.

38. There was no question of disputing the plebiscite figures; but a final and lasting solution was required for a problem which could become explosive if the plebiscite results were interpreted in terms of the desires of certain tribal groups. It should be easy, if fairness and objectivity were exercised, to accept that request. But if the General Assembly assessed the case academically, the human aspect of it would be lost to sight and further confusion in Africa would be created.

39. Mr. E. M. L. ENDELEY (Cameroons People's National Convention) stated that the idea of a plebiscite in the Southern Cameroons had been accepted by Mr. Foncha, the head of the party in power, and by himself on behalf of the opposition parties, as a compromise only, and as a result of General Assembly resolution 1350 (XIII). Between the two extreme views represented by the leading political parties in the legislature there was another view, in favour of a third possible solution. This view advocated an independent Southern Cameroons, separated from Nigeria and from the Republic of Cameroun. It had been abandoned because of the fear that such a territory, once granted independence, would not be viable unless it were placed under further trusteeship until it attained economic independence.

40. In conformity with Trusteeship Council resolution 2013 (XXVI), the people should have been fully informed of the constitutional arrangements that would have to be made for the implementation of the decisions resulting from the plebiscite. The undertaking given by the Commissioner of the Southern Cameroons in March 1960 to invite the opposition parties to discussions, before the plebiscite, on the position to be adopted by the Government if the people chose to join the Republic of Cameroun had been neglected, despite the requests made to Mr. Foncha. At the beginning of October 1960, the head of the Government party, after a rapid visit to Yaoundé, had issued a hurriedly scribbled *communiqué* which he called the draft constitution of the United Federal Kamerun. Publication of that

document had provoked a reaction unfavourable to union with the Republic of Cameroun. Pressure in favour of independence for the Territory and its establishment as a separate entity had then been exerted both on the opposition parties and on the parties supporting the Government. He had then made an offer to Mr. Foncha to abandon, with his party, the aim of union with the Nigerian Federation if Mr. Foncha would abandon his policy of union with the Republic of Cameroun. But Mr. Foncha had refused to consider that offer, and had asked the United Kingdom Government to put a new interpretation on the second alternative and to surrender sovereignty in the Southern Cameroons to his Government before reunification was effected. In those circumstances, it had become clear that the plebiscite would not help to solve the question of the Territory's future, as intended by the United Nations. People who voted for the second alternative would be doing so blindly, and probably out of spite for being asked to rejoin Nigeria from which they had recently been separated. Many would vote out of ignorance and succumb to false propaganda from agents of parties who associated a vote in favour of joining Nigeria with the fall of the KNDP Government, which they regarded as a symbol of Bamenda supremacy.

41. The Government party had made full use of the situation to convert the campaign into an election issue. The green box, which represented the first alternative, was interpreted as "Dr. Endeley's box", and as representing the opposition; the white one stood for the Government party and Mr. Foncha. The theory had been circulated, and supported by threats or torture, that a vote cast in the green box implied disloyalty to the Government of the Territory. The police had been impregnated with that propaganda, and that had enabled the members of the KNDP to escape prosecution for offences committed during the electoral campaign. Official plebiscite posters had been destroyed throughout Bamenda, and plebiscite officials who had tried to explain the alternatives offered by the United Nations had been threatened. He himself had been attacked. Later, British soldiers had been sent to that area to keep the peace, and as a result the people had been able to vote freely in that constituency, which had recorded a majority in favour of the first alternative. The situation had grown more and more tense as the polling date had approached, and many people had come in from the Republic of Cameroun and been given voting cards. Rumours had been spread in the Victoria and Kumba Divisions to the effect that anyone who dared to cast his vote into the green box would be liquidated by terrorists from the Republic of Cameroun. He was convinced that what had actually averted violence on polling day had been the knowledge that British forces were on the alert. Other irregularities which had marred the plebiscite had been the administration of oaths and the imposition of taboos in remote communities to compel the inhabitants to vote for the Government party. Despite the difficulties involved, his own party had managed to bring those facts before the Special Court.

42. The numerous excesses which had followed the announcement of the plebiscite results had been a sure indication that the whole purpose for which the United Nations had organized the plebiscite had been misunderstood. Minority tribes in the Victoria and Kumba Divisions had been victimized. The Premier was reported to have said that the Bakweri and others in Kumba who had voted for the first alternative would

be driven into Nigeria and that their property would be confiscated by the Bamenda, who would have a privileged position.

43. His party felt that it would be a grievous error to take the voting figures at their face value, an error which might lead to new tribal conflicts in the Southern Cameroons.

44. The results of the plebiscite could not be interpreted as a true expression of the wishes of the inhabitants, for the following reasons: the inhabitants had not been properly enlightened as to the implications of the two alternatives; the plebiscite had generally been understood only as an issue between the tribes controlling the Government and those represented by the Opposition; the plebiscite had sharpened tribal differences, and any feeling of unity in the Territory had vanished; the country and its people had not been adequately trained for democratic government, and there had been a strong tendency for the Government party to stifle opposition and degenerate into a one-party system; the Government of the Republic of Cameroun had its own domestic troubles, and it would be most imprudent to permit a union between it and the Southern Cameroons.

45. To remedy that situation, he proposed two solutions: either the Territory should be prepared for independence and also for self-sufficiency, with the help of United Nations technical assistance, during a period of from three to five years under a United Nations commission, with the United Kingdom continuing as administrator; or the tribal groups should be allowed to join either the Federation of Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroun, according to how they had voted in the plebiscite, and a new international boundary should be drawn between those two countries. The first suggestion was the one likely to receive the approval of people throughout the Territory, except perhaps for minority tribes in the extreme north and in the extreme south. The second suggestion appealed to groups which had come to fear oppression at the hands of the Bamenda.

46. Mr. FONCHA (Kamerun National Democratic Party) said that he was speaking to the Committee, not in his capacity as Premier of the Southern Cameroons, but as leader of the KNDP, in order to present the views of a large section of the people of the Southern Cameroons regarding the conduct of the plebiscite in the northern sector of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons. Although the Territory had come to be administered as two separate entities, the people of both sectors had always had a feeling of belonging to the same country. That was why he had pleaded, at the Nigeria Constitutional Conferences held in London in 1957 and 1958, for the separation of the Northern Cameroons from the Federation of Nigeria.

47. In 1952 the legislators of both sectors had agreed to come together as soon as possible. In 1952-1953 the Southern Cameroonians had participated in the formation of political parties in the Northern Cameroons. During a political crisis in the Nigerian House of Representatives, the two leaders from both sectors of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration had stated that they were moving towards a common front for the formation of a legislature for both sectors. Unfortunately, those two leaders, Mr. Endeley and Mr. Abba Habib, had quarrelled in 1953. It should be noted that in the Northern Cameroons, which had been

dismembered and administered as part of Northern Nigeria, the idea of one leader had always been handicapped by the fact that there had never been an elected government for the people. If it had not been for the administrative attachment of the Northern Cameroons to Nigeria, the plebiscite would have been conducted for the Territory as a whole, and in that case separation from Nigeria and unification with the Republic of Cameroun would have been a foregone conclusion. In the Southern Cameroons the people, through a general election to the House of Assembly, had rejected the previous Government, which had advocated federation with Nigeria. In the Northern Cameroons, on the other hand, there was much less political maturity; in fact, there were very few people there, apart from the appointed clan heads, who spoke for the masses. Accordingly, the KNDP wished to stress the difficulties confronting the people of the Northern Cameroons. He hoped that the Committee would give favourable consideration to the suggestion put forward by his party in its petition (T/PET.4/L.147) namely that further means should be sought to ascertain the true wishes of the people of the Northern Cameroons.

48. If the General Assembly's resolution 1473 (XIV) calling for the administrative separation of the Northern Cameroons from Northern Nigeria had been fully implemented before the plebiscite, the result of the plebiscite would have been unchallengeable. But in fact part of the civil service of Northern Nigeria had been seconded to the one-man provisional Government of the Northern Cameroons. The personnel posted to the Northern Cameroons would naturally be in favour of the Northern Cameroons joining Northern Nigeria: as Northern Nigerian Government employees, those civil servants could hardly be disloyal to a course favoured by their employer. Many of them were in fact Nigerians. The Northern Cameroons was thus controlled by a civil service which owed its allegiance to another Government that was interested in absorbing it. Furthermore, that applied not only to the administration but also to technical personnel and, above all, to the police.

49. Following the first plebiscite of November 1959 in the Northern Cameroons, reforms had been introduced by the Government of Northern Nigeria and not by the Administering Authority, which alone had been competent to do so. The new Native Authorities installed had been those which best served the interests of that Government. In an area that was still backward, the Native Authority could exercise more direct influence on the population than the central Government, if one existed. Those Native Authorities were merely puppet institutions intended to support the Northern Nigerian Government during the plebiscite.

50. After those so-called reforms, the district heads had still been appointed by the Northern Nigerian authorities and had used their influence to suppress anyone who preached separation from Nigeria, particularly in the Mambilla area.

51. Furthermore, as the qualifications for registration had not been clearly defined, many Nigerians had been able to vote and to play a leading part in the campaign, in sufficient numbers to change the course of the plebiscite. It could therefore be said that the result of the plebiscite was not a true reflection of the wishes of the Northern Cameroonians.

52. Since the Administering Authority had, moreover, refused to bring the two parts of the Territory under

one administration, the Southern Cameroonians had found it extremely difficult to campaign in the Northern Cameroons; he himself had intended to go there, but had been advised against it for reasons of personal safety.

53. The sudden decision to allow two days for the voting had not been understood. It was common knowledge that in any election a vigorous campaign could change overnight the views of a substantial number of electors. There was no doubt that the men who had voted on the first day had had time to influence the women who, on the second day, were voting for the first time in their lives.

54. The Southern Cameroons had no territorial designs on the Northern Cameroons. It was merely asking that the population of that part of the Territory should be given an opportunity to decide without intimidation whether it wished to remain an integral part of Nigeria, or whether it desired to join the new federation which was to be established between the Republic of Cameroun and the Southern Cameroons. If the NKDP had been satisfied that the people had voted freely, it would not have complained and would have continued to feel the same friendship for the people of the Northern Cameroons as in the past. It had appealed to the United Nations to give careful consideration to its petition because it believed that a people should have the opportunity of freely exercising its rights to self-determination.

55. Mr. ABBA (Northern Kamerun Democratic Party) recalled that, according to Mr. Ando Seh, the Nkambe Division wished to join the Northern Cameroons in order to become an integral part of the Federation of Nigeria. That petitioner clearly did not know what had taken place in the Northern Cameroons, where in fact the majority of the people had no wish to be united with the people of Nigeria.

56. After German occupation, the Cameroons had been divided between the United Kingdom and France in 1916. The two parts of the Territory had been placed under mandate and then under trusteeship. The Northern Cameroons under United Kingdom administration had then been divided into three separate units and incorporated respectively in the provinces of Benue, Adamawa and Bornu, in the Northern Region of Nigeria. Since then the Northern Cameroons had been badly administered and had remained backward. Contrary to the recommendations of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1958, the United Nations had fortunately decided to hold a plebiscite in 1959. To everyone's surprise, the majority of Cameroonians had voted for separation from Nigeria, proving that when there was no foreign intervention the people of the Territory expressed their wish to remain Cameroonians. Subsequently, the General Assembly had decided to hold a second plebiscite in the Territory, giving the people two alternatives to choose from; it had however recommended that the Northern Cameroons should first be completely separated from Nigeria and that democratic institutions should be introduced. Those measures had not been fully implemented. Following the 1959 plebiscite, the NKDP had addressed to the Governor-General of Nigeria a request for the establishment of a Legislative Assembly in the Northern Cameroons, and, in a petition to the United Nations Secretary-General (T/PET.4/L.78), had asked for the separation of the Northern Cameroons from Nigeria. Nothing had been done. In

the circumstances—because the Northern Cameroons did not have a government like the Southern Cameroons, because United Kingdom officials had campaigned in favour of Nigeria, because the Northern Cameroons had not been separated from Nigeria and because the supporters of Cameroun had been oppressed—the NKDP did not recognize the result of the plebiscite. It wanted the establishment of a government elected by Cameroonians, the separation of the Northern Cameroons from Nigeria, and another plebiscite supervised by a greater number of United Nations observers.

57. While he did not question the impartiality of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, he maintained that—because of the lack of observers, the inadequate roads and great distances involved—the Commissioner had based his report (A/4727) on information supplied to him by the Administering Authority.

58. Even so, paragraph 422 of his report showed that the supporters of Cameroun had been victimized for their political convictions by the Native Authorities, whose police force included many Nigerians, brought to the Territory in January 1961, who had never given serious consideration to the complaints made by the NKDP and the KFP. It was also clear from paragraph 454 that only the supporters of Cameroun had been arrested and imprisoned; on the other hand, Mr. Mumuni Michika, a supporter of Nigeria, had never been disturbed when he had given unauthorized public lectures. The district heads who supported Nigeria had even, on occasion, acted as police officers; those who were in favour of Cameroun, however, had been victimized or heavily fined. Contrary to the statement in paragraph 479 of the report, many people, including Mr. Hamidu Malagali, Mr. Abbasi, Mr. Ahmadu, Mr. Danhalal and Mr. Maidoki, had sought refuge from oppression in the Republic of Cameroun. The supporters of Cameroun had been denied medical care and loans for farming, and their cases had not been given a hearing by the judges, many of whom were Nigerians.

59. It was not true that the NKDP and KFP had incited the people to disturb the peace, as was stated in paragraph 531. Those parties had in fact on numerous occasions informed the Commissioner that their supporters had been assaulted and had been unable to hold meetings. Some had been arrested merely for mentioning the word "Cameroun". Even after the plebiscite, over 300 had been obliged to seek political asylum in the Republic of Cameroun, while their property had been destroyed and many village heads had been deposed.

60. During the election campaign, Nigerians had distributed many posters intended to mislead the people by creating confusion in their minds about France and the Republic of Cameroun and urging them not to vote for France, which had exploded an atomic bomb. The matter had been reported to the Administrator, who had taken no action.

61. Furthermore, most of the polling officers and counting agents were British and not Cameroonians. The ballot-boxes had not been protected, as the counting agents had not been allowed to stay with them. Contrary to the statement in paragraph 590, counting had begun on 13 and not 12 February because the ballot-boxes had been in the custody of the authorities, who held the keys to them. At Gembu, the district returning officer had opened them and had begun the count about three hours before the arrival of the United Nations observer. The Commissioner had been

unable to visit the Northern Cameroons often and had therefore not had an accurate knowledge of the situation; his liaison officer at Mubi had obtained his information from the Administering Authority and the district heads, who were violently opposed to the petitioner's party.

62. He went on to state why the separation of the Northern Cameroons from the Northern Region of Nigeria had not been completed. Local government had not been reformed as it should have been. Most of the district heads and local government heads had been appointed by the Administering Authority because they supported its policy and not because they had the necessary capability or the support of the people. Many parties had protested, and several had addressed a petition (T/PET.4/L.90) to the United Nations Secretary-General on 13 July 1960 and another on 25 July 1960 to the Governor of the Northern Region. He himself had made representations to the Fourth Committee in December 1960, as was shown by documents A/C.4/SR.1081 and 1096. Contrary to the statements of the Administering Authority, police officers had not been recruited in the United Kingdom, but in Nigeria, like the majority of the Native Authorities. All those officials had conspired with the Government of Northern Nigeria to deter the Cameroonians from supporting

union with the Republic of Cameroun. The United Kingdom had tried to destroy the Territory's identity in order to integrate it with the Northern Region of Nigeria.

63. Furthermore, about 100,000 foreigners, of whom less than 2,000 could claim to have ties with the people of the Republic of Cameroun, had been allowed to vote. There was no doubt that the Nigerians, who, to their surprise, had lost the first plebiscite, had been the first to register. Nigerian Public Works labourers had been sent to the Northern Cameroons for that purpose.

64. The CHAIRMAN, apologizing for having to interrupt the petitioner, suggested that it might be preferable to defer the rest of Mr. Abba's statement until the following meeting, in view of the lateness of the hour.

65. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) supported that suggestion.

66. The CHAIRMAN asked all the petitioners to make their statements as brief as possible, as the Committee had little time left in which to consider that important question. He also hoped that too much time would not be spent on questions and answers.

The meeting rose at 7.20 p.m.