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Chairman: Mr. P. V. J. SOLOMON
(Trinidad and Tobago).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Dashtseren (Mongolia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 23

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Southern Rhodesia (*continued*) (A/7200/Rev.1, chap. VI; A/C.4/L.909 and Add.1)

**CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION
A/C.4/L.909 AND ADD.1 (*continued*)**

1. Mr. LUARD (United Kingdom) said that he did not share the doubt that a number of representatives had expressed concerning the effectiveness of the sanctions applied against Southern Rhodesia.

2. Nobody would suggest that the sanctions imposed so far had achieved the desired results, but the reason for that was clear. Although the United Kingdom had applied sanctions against Southern Rhodesia from the outset of the crisis, other countries, or at least most of them, had applied only voluntary sanctions until the beginning of 1967, and only partial mandatory sanctions until May 1968. Only five months had elapsed since the Security Council had decided on the adoption of comprehensive sanctions. Moreover, the application of sanctions had, in many cases, required special legislation; their effects had thus been further delayed, and were only now beginning to manifest themselves. The newly established sanctions Committee could be expected to provide reliable information to Member States shortly.

3. Meanwhile, the Secretary-General's reports on the implementation of Security Council resolution 232 (1966) were the most authoritative source of information concerning the effects of the sanctions. The latest of those reports, dated 13 June 1968,¹ showed that, according to information given by countries in reply to the Secretary-General's note, imports into those countries from Southern Rhodesia had declined from \$US330 million in 1965 to only \$US40 million in 1967. Those figures related to almost all countries trading with Southern Rhodesia, except Malawi and South Africa. Exports from the reporting countries to Southern Rhodesia had declined from \$US187 million in 1965 to \$US54 million in 1967. As the Secretary-General had pointed out, it should be borne in mind, in interpreting those figures, that the 1966 resolution had to be implemented in different ways in different countries, that some goods had already been shipped before December 1966 and that other goods, in bond in some countries, appeared in the statistics long after their arrival in the importing countries.

4. It was obvious, therefore, that, even by June 1968, before the new sanctions had had time to take effect, Southern Rhodesia's economy had been experiencing serious difficulties.

5. During the debate, one representative had stated that certain United Kingdom exports to South Africa had in fact been finding their way to Southern Rhodesia, and that United Kingdom exports to South Africa had increased by 50 per cent in the past two or three years. There was absolutely no truth in those assertions; the figures for United Kingdom trade with South Africa, given in the Secretary-General's report of 13 June 1968, referred in fact to the whole of the South African Customs Union, which included not only South Africa but South West Africa, Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho. United Kingdom trade with the Republic of South Africa had, in fact, increased by only 8 per cent between 1965 and 1967. The most important figures in that connexion, namely, those relating to United Kingdom exports to South Africa, had shown a decline during that period. He pointed out that United Kingdom legislation on the sanctions decided upon by the United Nations made it an offence to sell to South Africa goods subsequently intended for Southern Rhodesia, and to import from South Africa goods of Southern Rhodesian origin.

6. The official figures published by the Smith régime itself were also revealing; although they clearly sought to minimize the difficulties, they could not conceal the serious

¹ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-third Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1968, document S/7781/Add.5.

state of the Territory's economy. Those figures showed that the situation with regard to tobacco, Southern Rhodesia's main crop, was becoming alarming; not only had production had to be reduced by half compared to 1967 but also, since there were no longer any export outlets, the Government had now been forced to buy up and stockpile the entire tobacco crop. That operation had cost the Government some £R34 million, compared with a total budget revenue of only £R90 million. At the same time, the price paid to the grower was steadily declining; at present it was little more than one third of the figure sometimes reached during good seasons, and was thus below subsistence level for the growers.

7. The situation was similar in the sugar industry. Before the illegal declaration of independence it had been hoped to attain a production of 400,000 tons, but the régime had now had to reduce the amount to 136,000 tons. Only two sugar estates had in fact survived, and those were thought to be making heavy losses.

8. The official figures were even more revealing with regard to trade and balance of payments. Exports had declined by 40 per cent since 1967; that was before the application of comprehensive sanctions, which were bound to have an even more drastic effect in the immediate future. That in turn must, of course, rapidly reduce the Territory's capacity to import. That was a consideration which ought to be borne in mind when speaking of the two leaks—South Africa and Portugal with its administered Territories—in the network of sanctions. He had no wish to minimize the importance of those leaks, which had so often been mentioned during the debates; nevertheless, he wished to remind the Committee once again that, although those countries could, in fact, provide Southern Rhodesia with goods it could no longer obtain elsewhere, they still required payment for them. Since those countries could not buy from Southern Rhodesia all the goods which it could no longer export elsewhere, it followed that Southern Rhodesia could no longer obtain the foreign exchange that it needed. One of the most significant events in recent months had been the protests raised by South African businessmen against imports from Southern Rhodesia and the further restrictions on such imports imposed by the South African Government as a result, the effect of which would be further to reduce Southern Rhodesia's capacity to export.

9. As a result of all those measures, Southern Rhodesia was clearly suffering from an increasing shortage of foreign exchange, with all the difficulties which that implied. The Press of Southern Rhodesia no longer made any attempt to conceal some of the problems, and complained that the struggle against sanctions was consuming time, effort and money which ought to be devoted to tackling such lasting problems as the growing unemployment and the birth rate among the African population, which at present was double the world average. Furthermore, Southern Rhodesian business circles were becoming increasingly conscious of the effect of sanctions on the Territory's economy, and were beginning to wonder how long that situation could continue. Mr. Smith himself had implicitly admitted that the sanctions were beginning to have serious effects.

10. A number of representatives had quoted extracts from the United Kingdom Press relating to the ineffectiveness of

the sanctions. It should be noted that, in most cases, the articles referred to were quite old. Therefore, he wished to quote from three articles which had appeared in the United Kingdom Press since 1 October 1968 and which contained a thorough and careful analysis of Southern Rhodesia's present economic situation. On 9 October, *The Times* of London had said that sanctions had led to the closure of an oil refinery and a motor vehicle assembly plant, to a crisis in the sugar industry and to the selling off of mining production, through middlemen in neighbouring Territories, at reduced prices. Sanctions had reduced a booming economy to a state of virtual stagnation. Southern Rhodesia had vast resources, but could not develop them without foreign investments; the latter, since the unilateral declaration of independence, had become extremely scarce.

11. On 13 October, the London *Sunday Times* had devoted an article to the current over-all employment and economic situation in Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia, it was reported, was beginning to encounter serious balance of payments problems, and the building sector was slowing down. South Africa was worried about Southern Rhodesia's intransigence with regard to Zambia and was beginning to exert economic pressure on the Smith régime. Southern Rhodesian exporters of manufactured goods affected by that pressure were encountering problems, as were the tobacco farmers, whose income had now decreased by 60 per cent. All those factors had not only crippled the economy, but also had stiffened pressure from the business sector for a settlement, a change in attitude which had become particularly noticeable during the previous three months.

12. Lastly, in an article dated 12 October, the magazine *The Economist* had pointed out that even before the unilateral declaration of independence, Southern Rhodesia's economy had been growing too slowly in comparison with population growth. Since 1965, the economic growth rate had remained fairly stable at 3 per cent, whereas the birth rate for both races had been 3.5 per cent. As to currency reserves, *The Economist* had noted that the 1968 surplus on visible trade very likely would have shrunk to almost nothing, whereas it had been £42 million before 1965. Furthermore, assuming an invisibles deficit running, as in the three preceding years of independence, at about £17 million, in 1968 there could be a deficit on current account of perhaps £15 million. Obviously, no one could guess at the net capital inflow for 1968, but even if it matched the exceptional figure of £9 million reached in 1967, there would still be a deficit of £5 million to £6 million on current and capital account. If those figures proved correct, it could be concluded that the accumulated deficits on current and capital account since 1965 would be approximately £8 million by the end of 1968. While that figure perhaps did not seem very high, it equalled Mr. Smith's realizable reserves in 1965 when he had decided to proclaim independence. In other words, *The Economist* concluded, by the end of 1968, Southern Rhodesia would have totally exhausted its foreign exchange reserves.

13. His delegation felt that all those facts clearly showed that the sanctions adopted thus far actually were already having far more impact than most representatives who had spoken had suggested. If over recent weeks there had been some modification in the attitude of the Smith régime on

some important points in dispute, that could have been the result only of the increasing economic difficulties Southern Rhodesia was encountering. If the United Nations resolutely persisted on the course all members had jointly undertaken, there was now at least some hope that it would achieve the task it had set itself.

14. A number of delegations had claimed that the United Kingdom Government was seeking to transfer its responsibility for Southern Rhodesia to the United Nations. He categorically rejected that suggestion. The United Kingdom had throughout recognized that it bore the primary responsibility, indeed the sole legal responsibility, for Southern Rhodesia. However, in implementing its policy of sanctions, it had called upon the assistance of the United Nations in order that Member States might co-operate as fully as possible in bringing pressure to bear against the Salisbury régime to persuade it to accept the transition to majority rule. He reiterated once again that his Government was fully conscious of its responsibility and that it had no intention of evading it.

15. As to the use of force, he emphatically repudiated contentions that the United Kingdom had not hesitated to use force in similar situations in the past. In fact, no colonial empire had dissolved with as little violence as had the British Empire. That could perhaps be explained by the fact that de-colonization had always been a United Kingdom policy, even before the establishment of the United Nations. It was a fact that, during the twenty years in which the dissolution of the British Empire had taken place, there had not been a single colonial war, that the violence in Guyana and South Arabia had been caused mainly by internal conflicts and that, in each case, British forces had been used only to preserve order. However, in Southern Rhodesia, it had been impossible to resort to rapid, sharp police action. To use force in Southern Rhodesia would mean attacking a régime which had its own army and would no doubt receive maximum support from neighbouring countries. The danger that military action in Southern Rhodesia might inflame all of southern Africa had prevented the British Government from embarking on such a perilous course of action. Many lives would be lost before military action could succeed, and the British Government was surely right to exhaust all peaceful means before considering any alternative. For that reason, it could not accept the terms of draft resolution A/C.4/L.909 and Add.1 calling on it to use force.

16. A number of representatives had referred to the legislation promulgated in Southern Rhodesia in 1967 based on the policy of *apartheid*. That legislation was indeed alarming, and the United Kingdom Government deplored it. However, it was somewhat encouraging that some proposals regarding an *apartheid*-inspired constitution had recently been rejected by the ruling party. His Government intended to ensure that no such constitutional developments would take place; moreover, it should be noted that the fourth principle contained in the proposals recently submitted to Mr. Smith called precisely for the abolition of all racial discrimination. He categorically rejected the suggestion by some delegations that the British Government had abandoned four of the six principles it had set out as prerequisites to an acceptable settlement and asserted that it remained committed to obtaining a settle-

ment in accordance with all six of those principles. In a previous statement, he had stressed the first and the fifth principles solely in order to rebut charges that the British Government was not adequately concerned with the interests and wishes of the African majority; that in no way implied that the British Government did not intend to ensure the observance of the other four principles. Furthermore, he reiterated once again that it would require a substantial change in circumstances before the British Government would abandon its commitment to the principle of no independence before majority rule. On that point, therefore, his delegation was unable to accept the terms of the draft resolution before the Committee. The degree of independence or dependence of any régime in Southern Rhodesia would depend not on any transfer of purely theoretical sovereignty, but on the conditions on which that sovereignty would be recognized—the conditions on which independence would be accorded. That was why the most crucial element in any agreement was the assurance of unimpeded progress towards majority rule within a reasonable period of time. It was particularly important to obtain guarantees to that end, and it was not by chance that it had been precisely over the question of guarantees that all negotiations had thus far broken down.

17. As to the suggestion by a number of members of the Committee that negotiations should not be with the representatives of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, but only with representatives of the African majority, his delegation repeated what it had already stated at the Gibraltar talks: any such discussions could only be a prelude to a series of meetings which would include the Africans. The fifth and most important principle laid down by the United Kingdom was that any settlement of the situation must be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. Furthermore, the proposals put before Mr. Smith at Gibraltar had included suggestions concerning the procedure for ascertaining the views of the African majority. In addition, in all earlier consultations, the United Kingdom had done everything possible to ascertain the views of the Africans. In the various visits, official and unofficial, which had been paid to Salisbury, consultations had invariably taken place with representatives of Africans in that country—though not, unfortunately, with those leaders who were under detention—and a few days earlier the United Kingdom Minister responsible for Rhodesia had had discussions with one African leader of a political party.

18. In reply to the questions asked at the 1768th meeting by the Liberian representative, he stated that, under Southern Rhodesian law, persons born in the Territory automatically became citizens. Citizenship could also be acquired by descent or by naturalization or registration. In addition, a large number of Southern Rhodesian Europeans possessed United Kingdom citizenship by birth or descent. As to the Liberian representative's second question, he stated that Southern Rhodesia had, and always had had, its own legislature, which had enacted most of the laws in force there. Certain acts of the United Kingdom Parliament could extend to Southern Rhodesia. However, under a convention adopted before the illegal declaration of independence, the United Kingdom Parliament did not legislate for Southern Rhodesia on matters within the competence of the Southern Rhodesian legislature except with the express agreement of the Southern Rhodesian Government.

There were, therefore, very few United Kingdom laws which were applicable in Southern Rhodesia. Since the illegal declaration of independence, of course, that convention had lapsed. The other questions raised some rather delicate legal problems, especially because the legal system of Southern Rhodesia was different from that of the United Kingdom; therefore his delegation could not answer those questions for the time being.

19. In conclusion, he pointed out that, in spite of the disappointment felt at the failure so far to bring the illegal régime in Rhodesia to an end and to bring about the desired constitutional settlement, some slightly encouraging trends could be observed. The facts and figures mentioned earlier indicated that the newly intensified sanctions were beginning to have a significant impact in Rhodesia and causing demands on the Government from many sectors of the population for a settlement. The fact that the Smith régime appeared ready to consider seriously some of the United Kingdom demands which it had previously rejected outright, showed that sanctions were taking effect. Even in Rhodesian internal policies there had been some slightly encouraging developments, such as the defeat of the proposals to move towards an *apartheid* régime and the abandonment of the mandatory death penalty for "crimes of terrorism", which must be attributed to the same causes. There was some reason to hope that many white people in Rhodesia, recognizing the hopelessness of the present situation, were demanding the establishment of a genuinely multiracial system. The establishment of such a system in the heart of southern Africa would be a powerful example to the other States of the region.

20. It might have been expected that, only a few months after the intensification of the sanctions and at a time when the régime in Rhodesia showed signs of weakening, the Committee would consider a draft resolution reaffirming the measures recommended earlier and seeking to unite all Member States in faithfully applying them. The new draft resolution, however, ignored all the results achieved thus far and laid stress on resort to violence and armed force, elements which could only divide the members of the Committee. The sponsors' call for the use of force, by the United Kingdom Government on the one hand and by freedom fighters in Rhodesia on the other hand, was surprising, since the United Nations was supposed to be devoted to peaceful ends. Yet, the members of the Committee certainly knew that the United Kingdom would not use force in Rhodesia, and nearly every Government whose representatives were urging the freedom fighters to take action in southern Africa was certainly well aware of the dangers inherent in encouraging that trend. If such activities were commended in United Nations resolutions, it would be all the more difficult to condemn them in ideological or other conflicts arising elsewhere in the world.

21. His delegation believed that the time had come—for the sake of the United Nations itself, among other reasons—to call a halt to the progression of ever more militant and violent resolutions bearing less and less relationship to the realities of the present world. His delegation would have liked to be able to abstain on the draft resolution, as it had on the resolution adopted in 1967, in order to show its support for the general aim of

bringing the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia to an end. However, for the reasons which had been frequently made plain by representatives of the United Kingdom, including Mr. George Brown, former Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, in his address to the 1567th plenary meeting of the General Assembly at its twenty-second session, it felt obliged to vote against the draft resolution now before the Committee.

Mr. Solomon (Trinidad and Tobago) took the Chair.

22. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said he was afraid that the draft resolution before the Committee was totally unsuitable to the situation in Southern Rhodesia. It was a delusion to believe that economic sanctions could be effective. The United Kingdom representative had invoked statistics to prove that the measures taken against Southern Rhodesia were beginning to produce results. It must be recognized, however, that, on the whole, Mr. Smith's régime, far from weakening, was growing stronger owing to the support of a number of colonial Powers which were helping him in every field. Sanctions were all the more unlikely to be effective because there were so many ways to evade them. A notable example in that connexion was that of Germany, which, after the First World War, had succeeded in maintaining its economy by developing many substitute products.

23. The United Nations could not continue to adopt resolutions which remained unimplemented while 225,000 Whites prevented 4 million Africans from exercising their rights. The stage was being set for violent events in Africa because the Whites who still made the laws there were continuing to behave as they had in the nineteenth century. Methods of peaceful pressure such as persuasion and sanctions having failed, there remained the use of force and, since the United Kingdom refused to wage an armed struggle against the Whites of Southern Rhodesia, the United States and the Soviet Union should address an ultimatum to Mr. Smith, through the Security Council, calling upon him to yield.

24. He concluded by saying that the United Nations would fail in its duty if it did not endeavour to bring about a decisive settlement of the Southern Rhodesian problem.

25. Mr. OULD HACHEME (Mauritania) deplored the United Kingdom's decision to vote against the draft resolution, because it did in fact reflect the views of the majority of Member States and was based on the principles proclaimed in the Charter and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

26. The United Kingdom representative had said that the draft resolution was unrealistic and unwise because, *inter alia*, the United Kingdom Government was firmly opposed to the use of force in Southern Rhodesia. That position would be tenable if it were still possible to believe in the effectiveness of peaceful means. That was not the case, however, and he felt compelled to recall once more that the United Kingdom itself had not hesitated to use force in certain cases when its interests had been threatened.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.