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**FOURTH COMMITTEE, 1928th
MEETING**

Friday, 22 October 1971,
at 3.50 p.m.

NEW YORK

Chairman: Mr. Keith JOHNSON (Jamaica).

AGENDA ITEM 23

**Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Terri-
tories not covered under other agenda items) (continued)**
(A/8423/Add.5 (part I))

HEARING OF PETITIONERS (continued)

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. James Mancham,
Chief Minister of the Seychelles, took a seat at the
Committee table.*

1. Mr. PSONČAK (Yugoslavia) regretted that the United Kingdom had not answered the Sudanese invitation to participate in the debate and had given no indication of its opinion of the referendum, the possibility of sending a visiting mission and other matters referred to at the previous meeting. The United Kingdom had a responsibility to the United Nations with regard to the Seychelles and should therefore explain its position.

2. Mr. ISHAN (Nigeria) shared the opinion expressed by the delegation of Ghana at the previous meeting that it was not convincing to assert that the people of the Seychelles did not want independence. The peoples who had been under British colonial rule knew about the dilatory tactics it employed and, in the case of Nigeria, they had delayed independence for over 10 years. Mr. Mancham echoed his master's voice. His reply to the question put to him by the representative of the Byelorussian SSR on the United Kingdom's current interest in the Seychelles, after years of neglect, was not satisfactory. The truth was that, with the independence of its African colonies, the United Kingdom needed the Seychelles as a base for the continuation of its colonial policy in its own self-interest and those of Pretoria.

3. Mr. MANCHAM (Chief Minister of the Seychelles) said that it was debatable whether or not his words had been convincing. He reminded those who were not convinced, however, that he was willing to have a referendum in the Territory, organized by the United Kingdom in consultation with the United Nations. Furthermore, he wished to point out that the United Kingdom was not using any of the Seychelles Islands as a military base. He could not speak for the United Kingdom with regard to its military intentions, but he was certain that it did not intend to use the Seychelles as a base for a war against the African countries.

4. Mr. DIALLO (Guinea) said that he was sorry that he had been unable to attend the previous meeting, but he had understood Mr. Mancham to have claimed that the people of the Seychelles had no right to independence. That was not convincing, it did not even convince Mr. Mancham himself and it was an insult to the people of the Seychelles.

5. Mr. MANCHAM made it clear that he had never said that his people had no right to independence. It was simply a question of a right that should be exercised in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the population. He considered it insulting of the representative of Guinea to call his statement unconvincing and insulting while the same representative had been absent all morning from the discussion on the Seychelles.

Mr. Mancham withdrew.

AGENDA ITEMS 66, 67 AND 68

Question of Namibia (continued) (A/8388,
A/8423/Add.1, A/8423/Add.3 (part I) A/8473)

**Question of Territories under Portuguese administration
(continued)** (A/8348 and Add.1, A/8403, chapter XIII
(section A); A/8423/Add.1, A/8423/Add.4)

Question of Southern Rhodesia (continued)
(A/8423/Add.1, A/8423/Add.2 (parts I and II))

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)*

6. Mrs. SKOTTSBERG-ÅHMAN (Sweden) said that the Committee's decision once again to hold a single general debate on Namibia, Territories under Portuguese administration and Southern Rhodesia served a double purpose. On the one hand, it pointed up the relationship of the three colonial situations, each of which influenced and reinforced the others. Without being identical, they sprang from one common attitude of the colonial régimes in the area, all being backed by the racist Government of Pretoria. On the other hand, there was the necessity of having a close look at the different Territories with their individual characteristics in order to find a vulnerable spot that would make it possible to break through the colonial wall. In other words, in order to deal in a rational way with the problems of southern Africa, the Committee required a clear understanding of the situation as a whole, without losing sight of its component parts.

7. The views of the Swedish Government and people had been expressed on numerous occasions in different United

* Resumed from the 1926th meeting.

Nations organs—and also outside the Organization—both in words and in deeds. However, she wished to renew her country's commitment to work towards the day when freedom would finally come to the people of southern Africa and register once again its complete rejection of the colonial and racist policies which the white minority régimes were pursuing in Namibia, in Southern Rhodesia and in the Territories under Portuguese administration. She also reaffirmed her country's belief in human equality and its adherence to the principle of self-determination for dependent peoples. The peoples of southern Africa, subjected to oppression and the indignities of *apartheid*, had the right to expect support from the free nations of the world community in their endeavours to realize their aspirations to be free.

8. Since it believed in that objective, her country contributed to the United Nations programmes for southern Africa and had given direct humanitarian and educational assistance to a number of African liberation movements. The value of such assistance for the current fiscal year was approximately \$1.2 million, and her Government was willing to increase that kind of assistance still further.

9. As long as the situation in the colonies persisted, the African continent would not know peace. There would be constant uneasiness and tension along the borders between free Africa and the colonized south. Her Government wanted to express its deep concern over the recurrent violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent African States.

10. Since the discussion of the question of Namibia at the twenty-fifth session, a new element had been added. The illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and its obligation to withdraw its administration from that Territory had been confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971¹. Consequently, States were under obligation to recognize that illegality and to refrain from any acts which would imply recognition of or support for the South African Government's administration in the Territory. Her Government had officially informed the South African Government one year earlier that it considered its presence in Namibia illegal and did not recognize South African authority over the Territory.

11. Recently there had also been encouraging developments. The latest report of the Security Council's *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee on Namibia² had taken the Court's Opinion as its point of departure and contained several sets of proposals on which a certain measure of agreement had been reached. Moreover, Security Council resolution 301 (1971), adopted with only two dissenting votes—albeit those of two of the great Powers—was based on the Court's Opinion. It was to be hoped that the other draft resolution before the Council would be unanimously adopted. Her delegation welcomed the fact that the Council's *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee had undertaken to continue its search for

appropriate measures for reaching a solution in accordance with the aims of the United Nations concerning Namibia, and hoped that the constructive spirit which had hitherto characterized its performance would continue to prevail.

12. All United Nations actions should be guided by the need to recognize the right of the people of Namibia to decide their own future. That was all the more necessary since the South African Government was trying to convince the world that what it was doing in the Territory was, in fact, guiding the Namibians towards self-determination and eventual independence. In fact, South African policy in the Territory was the very antithesis of free choice; it was *apartheid* pushed to its ultimate extreme—*apartheid* not only between white and non-white, but between different tribes, designed to prevent and crush any emergence of a national feeling. If South Africa was so convinced that it was carrying out the will of the Namibians, and if it was sincere in its offer to the Court to hold a plebiscite in Namibia, why would it not allow the United Nations to conduct it under conditions which would guarantee full freedom of expression by all Namibians in accordance with democratic rules which would not be open to challenge?

13. Lastly, her Government attached special importance to strict respect on the part of all States for the repeated calls of the Security Council for an arms embargo against South Africa.

14. The situation in Southern Rhodesia appeared as bleak as ever. United Nations efforts seemed to have been of little avail. The sanctions decided on by the Security Council had not had the desired effect, and the main reason was the refusal of Portugal and South Africa to comply with the decisions of the Security Council. The United Nations should demand that those two countries assume their part of the burden which the rest of the world had accepted in the interest of the Africans in Southern Rhodesia. She expressed concern at the action begun in the United States Senate for approval of legislation to permit importation of chrome from Southern Rhodesia. Her delegation firmly supported the consensus on the question adopted a short time earlier by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and which was contained in paragraph 41(b) of chapter VI of its report (see A/8423/Add.2 (part II)). It hoped that the United States Government would not allow such damage to be done to a cause to which it was committed as a Member of the United Nations and a member of the Security Council.

15. No matter what the results of the sanctions had been thus far, many Member States shared her country's conviction that they should be continued, and that was also the belief of representatives of the liberation movements, who considered that the most important effect of the sanctions policy was that it had kept the illegal Smith régime in political isolation. Her delegation believed that the sanctions should not only be continued but could be strengthened. The means enumerated in Article 41 of the Charter had not been exhausted and the sanctions could be widened to comprise further measures provided for in that Article.

16. With regard to the reported talks that the United Kingdom Government was holding with the Smith adminis-

¹ See *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971.

² Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement No. 5.

tration in order to explore the possibilities for a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian crisis, her delegation did not consider that any attempt to negotiate the future of Southern Rhodesia with the illegal régime should be regarded *per se* as contrary to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and it had therefore not supported the resolutions that asserted that they were. However, her delegation's general support of the negotiations was not unqualified. As it had already stated in the spring of 1971 in the Special Committee, her Government considered that no settlement must be reached with Mr. Smith which would exclude the African leaders of the liberation movements, who must be involved in the negotiations. Otherwise, the United Nations would be failing in its duty to uphold the fundamental principle of self-determination. The United Kingdom, for its part, should scrupulously respect the freely expressed will of the people of Southern Rhodesia.

17. Portuguese policies in the African Territories made it impossible to have much faith in the rationality of man. Portugal had advanced its own definition of self-determination which, like that of South Africa, had little or nothing to do with what the majority of Committee members understood by that word. According to the Portuguese thesis the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) were exercising self-determination; but a look at realities indicated that that was no more than a myth. Despite the increased degree of autonomy that they had been given, those Territories continued to be part of a unitary State and the overwhelming majority of Africans had seen no increase in their opportunities to participate in the political, economic and administrative life of the country. The reforms did not appear to open up any road to self-determination and eventual political freedom for the colonies. Meanwhile, the military actions in the Territories continued, causing much human suffering. The political reforms were not meant to substitute for the military action, but only to supplement it.

18. Her Government was convinced that no peaceful and constructive solution to the conflict be found until Portugal decided to recognize the right of its colonial peoples to self-determination, to give them the opportunity freely to exercise that right, and yielded to their wishes thus expressed. If the Portuguese Government laid down its arms and honoured its obligations under the Charter, the representatives of the peoples in the African Territories would be willing to co-operate in a peaceful transfer of power.

19. Her Government considered it essential that the arms embargo against Portugal should be strictly observed by all States. It was also confident that the Security Council would continue to keep the situation under review and seek peaceful and constructive solutions that would bring freedom, peace and stability to that part of Africa. That did not, however, relieve the General Assembly of the duty to play its part. There was unanimity in the Assembly—excepting only the minority régimes concerned—in repudiating the policies of those régimes and in the commitment to help set the Territories free. But as long as that unanimity did not find expression in the adoption of realistic resolutions, the General Assembly would remain an inefficient instrument for substantially changing the course

of events in southern Africa. As the Secretary-General had said in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization (see A/8400/Add.1, paras. 95 and 96), if the Assembly wanted to affect the course of events, it must heed all interests at stake and must realize what it could and what it could not do.

20. The greater the support from those Member States which had real possibilities of exerting direct influence on the minority régimes holding sway in southern Africa, the greater the hope of achieving a solution. The only Governments which could take comfort from a divided United Nations were those of Pretoria, Salisbury and Lisbon.

21. Her delegation sincerely hoped that the work in the Fourth Committee would be conducted in a spirit of good will and fruitful co-operation on the part of all delegations, and it was prepared to play its part in such endeavours. The cause of the peoples of southern Africa was the common cause of the United Nations and that goal also deserved a common effort.

Mrs. Skottsberg-Åhman (Sweden), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

22. Mr. ANDERSON (Jamaica) said that the situation in southern Africa dramatized the relative ineffectiveness of the United Nations in ending the oppression of 18 million Africans living in the region. Although many States had taken useful measures—his own country, among others, had offered its contribution to the education of Namibians and had recognized the system of travel documents worked out by the United Nations Council for Namibia—the action taken by the Organization on the problem had not yet met with the support of all Member States.

23. With regard to Namibia, the core of the issue was the refusal of a Member of the United Nations to yield its authority over the Territory in accordance with the many resolutions of the United Nations. Consequently, the administering machinery set up by the General Assembly, namely, the United Nations Council for Namibia, had been unable fully to carry out its functions. All efforts at negotiation had failed and South Africa continued to strengthen its control over the Territory. Stronger action by the United Nations was therefore necessary to make its legal authority over Namibia a reality; and that was now possible in view of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971.³ That opinion should dispel the doubts of certain countries with regard to their obligations towards Namibia and with regard to the competence of the United Nations to administer the Territory.

24. His delegation was convinced that there were Members of the United Nations which could exercise considerable influence on the South African régime. In 1969, three Western countries—the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—had accounted for over 52 per cent of South Africa's foreign trade. That represented an increase over their 1960 trade figures of 88, 79 and 171 per cent respectively. Over the same period, Japan's trade with South Africa had increased by 379 per

³ See foot-note 1.

cent. If those countries wished their protestations of belief in the principles of the United Nations to remain credible, they must earnestly exert their influence to secure respect for those principles. Otherwise, it would be impossible for the United Nations to succeed with regard to Namibia.

25. His delegation did not, however, wish to detract from the constructive proposals made in statements before the Committee by the Reverend Michael Scott (1921st meeting)⁴ and Miss Barbara J. Rogers (1922nd meeting).⁵ For its part, the *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee established under Security Council resolution 283 (1970) had also pointed to certain minimum steps which should be taken, especially in the light of the Opinion of the International Court of Justice. Unfortunately, the more substantial of those steps had not been accepted by the Council. But in resolution 301 (1971), the Council declared "that franchises, rights, titles or contracts relating to Namibia granted to individuals or companies by South Africa after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) are not subject to protection or espousal by their States against claims of a future lawful Government of Namibia"—a declaration which, as a logical consequence of the opinion of the International Court, seemed to provide a further basis for action suggested by Miss Rogers. Every member of the Fourth Committee, the United Nations Council for Namibia, the Security Council and the whole United Nations system must concentrate on those possibilities and report to the General Assembly on their feasibility. In any event, the action which could be taken would fail unless the United Nations received the unreserved support of the major Powers.

26. His delegation noted with real interest the draft resolution submitted by Argentina in the Security Council.⁶ In that respect, it wished to state that it was of course necessary always to proceed with caution, giving primary consideration to the interests of the Namibians and the legal status of the United Nations with regard to Namibia.

27. As to the Territories under Portuguese administration, 11 years had passed since the General Assembly had rejected the contention that those Territories were an integral part of Portugal, and affirmed that they were colonial Territories. Since then the United Nations had adopted resolutions and declarations, and had dispatched fact-finding missions which had sought to define the situation and to assist in decolonizing those Territories. In 1963 and 1965 the Security Council had affirmed that Portugal's action in southern Africa seriously disturbed international peace and security. In the meantime, efforts by the Secretary-General to establish contacts and initiate negotiations between Portugal and the African States had proved fruitless; instead, the threatening collaboration among South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal had been intensified. Although the details of the situation were well known, attention should be focused on the horrors of chemical warfare unleashed in answer to the efforts of the

peoples of those Territories to secure their basic rights and throw off foreign domination. As if that were not enough, the security and stability of the African States in the region continued to be attacked by the same forces that continued to colonize Africa for European aggrandizement.

28. In that case, too, his delegation felt that the answer lay in the will of the major Powers to exercise influence on the Government of Portugal in order to extract compliance with United Nations resolutions. The extent of Portuguese military and economic dependence on them left no doubt whatsoever that they had the necessary influence. Were the Portuguese armed forces not subsidized by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)? Was it not a fact that foreign investment in the Territories contributed millions of escudos to the Portuguese treasury, in addition to providing direct military assistance against the inhabitants of Angola and Mozambique? How else could Portugal, a relatively poor country, have afforded to increase defence and security expenditure by more than 50 per cent between 1965 and 1968? And that type of expenditure had continued to increase by 25 per cent between 1968 and 1971, in addition to higher military outlays by the colonial administrations. It should be pointed out that not only had the larger countries failed to exercise a restraining influence on Portugal, but they had collaborated in activities specifically designed to perpetuate Portuguese colonial domination in Africa, as, for example, in the construction of the Cabora Bassa dam and the Cunene River project.

29. On the positive side, it should be stated that several countries had made material contributions to the liberation movements and donations had been made to funds for southern Africa. Moreover, even in Portugal itself, resistance to that country's colonial stance had grown. The Special Committee had once again visited the area to confer with the freedom fighters and others able to contribute to United Nations efforts. Important though those efforts undoubtedly were, they were insufficient. His delegation therefore appealed to the major Powers to join battle against Portuguese colonialism with the commitment that the cause deserved.

30. With respect to Southern Rhodesia, the third report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968)⁷ constituted an indictment of those Members of the United Nations through whose assistance the illegal Southern Rhodesian régime not only had survived the Council's economic and other sanctions but had steadily increased its mineral exports. At the same time, the system of *apartheid* continued to be applied. A group constituting 4.5 per cent of the population continued to subjugate 95.5 per cent, with the declared purpose of perpetuating that injustice. His delegation therefore viewed with uneasiness the acceptance of Southern Rhodesian participation in the 1972 Olympic games and the action taken to lift certain trade embargoes against that colony. It opposed any action that would strengthen the position of the Smith régime and appealed for total implementation of the sanctions. Noting with great interest the rumours that the administering Power had taken new initiatives towards negotiations, Jamaica believed that there could be no settlement short of majority rule.

⁴ For the complete text of the statement, see document A/C.4/740.

⁵ *Idem*, A/C.4/738.

⁶ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971*, document S/10376.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-fifth Year, Special Supplement No. 3*.

31. Mr. SHEMIRANI (Iran) said that although the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had greatly speeded the process of decolonization in the world, millions of people still lived under the colonial yoke, some of them bravely fighting to gain their freedom and others trusting in the world Organization to free them from their intolerable plight.

32. When the Special Committee, of which Iran was a member, had begun its work in February, the Secretary-General had drawn attention in his opening statement (781st meeting) to the disquieting fact that 18 million people were living in conditions of discrimination and repression and being denied the most fundamental human rights. The decolonization process had been further complicated by the fact that the United Kingdom (A/8276) and the United States (A/8277) had withdrawn from the Special Committee, thereby destroying an opportunity for direct consultations between the administering Powers and the competent United Nations bodies.

33. The United Nations was being directly challenged in Namibia: not only had General Assembly and Security Council resolutions been defied but, in addition, racial discrimination had been introduced into a Territory which legally belonged to the international community. Iran had been a sponsor of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, which had terminated South Africa's mandate over the Territory of South West Africa; consequently, Iran fully supported the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice declaring the South African presence in Namibia illegal. The situation in that Territory required urgent action; not only were the people of Namibia, its freedom and sovereignty and Namibia's territorial integrity at stake but so was the prestige of the United Nations, whose resolutions had been disregarded and whose Council for Namibia had been unable to exercise its authority.

34. In Southern Rhodesia the illegal régime was maintaining its rule with almost complete immunity. Although the economic sanctions had caused a decrease in Rhodesian exports, it was evident that their purpose had not been achieved. It could not be denied that the responsibility rested mainly with the United Kingdom Government as the administering Power. The sanctions, which had been a burden for the developing countries since they were detrimental to their economies, could not be regarded as a substitute for the administering Power's responsibility. While the United Kingdom was merely exploring the basis on which negotiations with the Smith régime could be held, the people of Zimbabwe continued to be oppressed and exploited, as evidenced by the Land Tenure Act of 1969, the eviction of the Tangwena people from its land and the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. According to recent press reports, there seemed to be some preliminary developments aimed at direct negotiations between the administering Power and Southern Rhodesia. While his delegation had always favoured negotiations to find peaceful solutions, it believed that any negotiation with the illegal minority régime which would give it independence without majority rule would be contrary to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

35. The question of Territories under Portuguese administration had occupied the United Nations for a long time but

still remained unsolved. For more than 10 years the Organization had adopted resolutions calling on Portugal to implement the Declaration and withdraw from the Territories, but Portugal had persistently refused to comply. That frustrating situation was causing deep concern over the future of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). From all indications, Portugal intended to continue to occupy the African Territories in defiance of United Nations resolutions so long as the economic advantages of its occupation were greater than the disadvantages of a colonial war. It could be seen from chapter VIII of the Special Committee's report, contained in document A/8423/Add.4, that during the period 1967-1969 Portugal's balance of payments had become more and more favourable and its investment income had risen by almost 40 per cent. The price, however, had been high: the colonial wars had consumed 35 to 40 per cent of the budget, and defensive security expenditures had increased 10.5 per cent over the previous year.

36. Despite international criticism, Portugal had not only continued to consolidate its colonial rule but also intensified its repression in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), at the same time endangering the security of neighbouring States.

37. History showed that the struggle for self-determination and independence was an irreversible process which, once begun, inevitably led to victory. The struggle of the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination could not be an exception to that rule. Eleven years earlier Iran had had the honour of introducing the historic resolution 1514 (XV), and since then it had ardently supported the noble cause of decolonization. His delegation was convinced that sustained efforts by the United Nations, together with a more active mobilization of world public opinion and parallel action by the Organization of African Unity, could bring about implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in southern Africa. It also believed that better co-operation, co-ordination and exchanges of views—as manifested at the Joint Meeting of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration, the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and the United Nations Council for Namibia—were of vital importance in solving the problems of colonialism.

38. Mr. ARYUBI (Afghanistan) said that opposition to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations was a basic principle of Afghanistan's foreign policy, as it had been even when international opposition to colonialism had not been so visible and well organized as today.

39. It was regrettable that despite the adoption of the historic Declaration and other resolutions of various United Nations bodies, colonialism continued to exist in some parts of the world. The days when the subjugation of peoples by alien Powers had been the common practice were gone forever. The post-war period had brought the national awakening of the peoples of Asia and Africa and, after a long and hard fight, the emancipation of many of those countries from the yoke of classical western colonialism.

40. With regard to the Territories under Portuguese administration, his delegation noted with regret that Portu-

gal, instead of complying with the various resolutions of the United Nations, was not only continuing to perpetuate its illegal rule over the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) but also committing acts of aggression against countries bordering on those Territories. The recent complaints of Senegal and Guinea were but two examples of the aggressive acts and intentions of the Portuguese colonial authorities. Everyone knew that Portugal would not be able to carry out those acts of aggression without the economic and military assistance it received from certain States Members of the United Nations. It was also noteworthy that Portugal was continuing and increasing its diplomatic and military co-operation with the illegal Southern Rhodesian régime and South Africa, which posed a serious threat to international peace and security. His delegation was prepared to support any measures to put an end to the explosive situation resulting from Portugal's colonial rule and from the unholy alliance of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal.

41. Afghanistan regretted that the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, had been unable to take effective and urgent steps to put an end to Southern Rhodesia's illegal racist régime, in accordance with the repeated demands of the international community.

42. There was evidence to show that the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia was continuing to benefit from the co-operation of some States Members of the United Nations, particularly South Africa and Portugal, in flagrant defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. In his delegation's view, the Security Council could take steps at once to expand the economic sanctions, which were now being flouted with impunity. Unfortunately, it was well known that the sanctions instituted by the Security Council were ineffective because of the continued co-operation of the Governments of South Africa and Portugal with the régime in Southern Rhodesia. It was therefore imperative that the Security Council, with the full co-operation and understanding of the administering Power, should take more effective measures.

43. With regard to Namibia, it was deeply disappointing that since the adoption of the historic resolution 2145 (XXI), in which the General Assembly had terminated South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa, the Namibian problem remained unresolved and the Government of South Africa was still arrogantly defying the authority and the relevant resolutions of various United Nations organs. The inability of the United Nations to settle the problem was a source of concern to the international community.

44. The problem was so serious that the United Nations could not confine itself to the adoption of resolutions or further condemnations of the colonial and racist policy of South Africa. The question of Namibia called for effective measures, which were long overdue. The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice was a landmark in the history of international legal order. Moreover, the Court, through its Advisory Opinion, had regained the confidence of the international community and enhanced its prestige in the eyes of the world.

45. The Government of South Africa, as was to be expected, had openly rejected the Opinion of the Interna-

tional Court. Its illegal presence in Namibia constituted a typical example of its open defiance of the decisions of the international community and of the United Nations, an Organization of which it was still a Member. Its conduct to date seemed to indicate that South Africa would continue to occupy Namibia unless effective measures were taken to bring its occupation to an end.

46. His delegation had been hopeful that resolution 301 (1971) adopted by the Security Council during the current week would provide for effective measures to put an end to the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia, but unfortunately such had not been the case. He was convinced that the Government of South Africa would not withdraw from Namibia no matter how strongly it was urged to do so in one resolution or another; the situation in Namibia called for practical and effective action by the Security Council.

47. Mr. SÖYLEMEZ (Turkey), after welcoming the delegations of Bahrain, Bhutan, Oman and Qatar to the Committee, observed that the problems of southern Africa were difficult ones, directly concerning the future and the well-being of 18 million Africans, who were still living under colonial rule and fighting for their independence. He thanked the Chairman of the Committee and the Under-Secretary-General for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories for their statements (1919th meeting) giving a clear picture of the present situation regarding decolonization. It must be admitted that although many positive results had been achieved, the process of decolonization had slowed down noticeably, especially in the past few years. One problem which should particularly be noted was the proliferation of committees within the United Nations, which led to duplication and competition and to what had been called the "documentation explosion". Rhetoric should now be replaced by action and there should be an end to the adoption of resolutions that were not implemented. In the archives of the United Nations there were more than 2,500 resolutions, a substantial number of which related to colonial questions. Positive action was needed and the Committee should call upon, or request, or decide, only where practical results were possible. That would be an excellent contribution to raising the prestige of the Committee and consequently the credibility of the Organization.

48. United Nations activities relating to the problems of southern Africa should be carefully planned, taking into account the existence of a number of bodies which concerned themselves with those questions. The joint meetings between the three United Nations bodies directly concerned which had taken place during May and August 1971 (see A/8388) had been an important step which had served to underline the urgent necessity of co-ordination among those bodies. Those meetings should be repeated at regular intervals, with the participation of the Security Council and its *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committees on Southern Rhodesia and Namibia.

49. The situation created in Southern Rhodesia following the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 was still unresolved after almost seven years. Although a glimmer of hope could now be seen, if the international trade of the illegal régime was to be curtailed and clandestine trans-

actions were to be stopped, rigorous enforcement of the economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council was an absolute necessity. The Government of Turkey scrupulously observed the provisions of the Security Council resolutions instituting the sanctions and had suspended its trade with the Salisbury régime. The decision adopted in the United States Senate, in early October 1971, to permit the importation of Rhodesian chrome, despite the mandatory sanctions of the Security Council, constituted a retrograde step: it was to be hoped that the decision would never be put into practice and would not result in the abandonment of the position of the United States Government, which had so far observed and implemented the Security Council resolution instituting those sanctions. Moreover, there could be no question that it was incumbent on the administering Power, the United Kingdom, to restore constitutional government in Southern Rhodesia and to ensure that the people of Zimbabwe enjoyed all political and economic rights.

50. Although *apartheid* had been unanimously condemned, it continued to exist in South Africa and had even been extended to Southern Rhodesia and Namibia. The proclamation of 1971 as the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (General Assembly resolution 2544 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969) had rightly focused attention on all the aspects of *apartheid*.

51. On the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration, his Government had clearly expressed its position in the Fourth Committee and in the General Assembly when it had supported the resolutions sponsored by the Asian and African countries regarding the implementation of the historic Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which the Turkish delegation had co-sponsored 11 years previously. The Portuguese contention that its colonies were overseas territories was not acceptable to the international community. His delegation hoped that Portugal would realize that self-determination and independence must come to Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and that oppression and violence could lead only to bloodshed and tragedy. The violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Guinea, Senegal and Zambia which had been committed in clear contravention of the United Nations Charter should also be noted.

52. On the question of Namibia, a historic development had taken place in 1971 when the International Court of Justice had, in its Advisory Opinion, declared that the presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and that South Africa was therefore under obligation to cease its occupation of the Territory immediately. In that way, the Court had reaffirmed that the termination of the Mandate over Namibia declared in 1966 by the General Assembly had been a legal act and that the Security Council had not been exceeding its competence when it had adopted resolutions 276 (1970), 283 (1970), 284 (1970) and other equally important resolutions on the question.

53. The intransigence of South Africa and its persistent defiance of United Nations resolutions needed no elaboration and were the main proof of the insincerity of the South African Government when it spoke of self-determination and suggested a plebiscite in Namibia. The Bantustan

policy which South Africa was applying in Namibia was a clear indication of the South African desire to divide and rule in that Territory. However, so long as the United Nations existed, the international community would prevent South Africa from annexing Namibia.

54. Turkey, together with 10 other countries, was a member of the United Nations Council for Namibia which, since its establishment five years previously, had been engaged in practical activities designed to serve the interests of the people of Namibia. Thus, contact had been established with the various representatives of the people of Namibia; the Council had gone to Africa so that its members could acquaint themselves at first hand with the problems involved and while there it had collected data and information; it had proposed the setting up of education and training programmes for Namibians living outside Namibia; it had expressed a profound interest in the question of refugees and had worked to solve the problem of Namibians' travel documents, which now served as genuine United Nations passports.

55. Many of those results could not have been achieved without the co-operation of the Governments of Zambia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Kenya. For example, the travel documents were issued by the office of the Acting United Nations Commissioner for Namibia which had recently been established at Lusaka through the co-operation of the Government of Zambia. The Council also endeavoured to disseminate information on Namibia, about which little was known outside the United Nations. His delegation, for instance, had proposed that a series of United Nations stamps should be issued bearing the title "Namibia—UN Responsibility", although the suggestion had unfortunately not been acted upon. The Council had also established contacts with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and had participated in the latest OAU summit meeting. It had likewise taken a decision that the people of Namibia should be represented at the meetings of the Economic Commission for Africa by a Namibian, Mr. Sam Nujoma.

56. The United Nations Council for Namibia was still striving to overcome the many obstacles to the implementation of its terms of reference, and its freedom of action continued to be limited by the reluctance of certain members of the Security Council to take action. Nevertheless, it constituted a unique precedent, being the first international body of its kind; as such, it had attracted the attention of political scientists, international lawyers and concerned citizens from all over the world. Actually, the limitations of the Council for Namibia were the same as the limitations of the United Nations as a whole. The question was what could the United Nations do for Namibia following the decision of the International Court of Justice. Many suggestions had been made, ranging from the application of the coercive methods envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter to establishing a dialogue with South Africa, and including holding a plebiscite, declaring all licences and concessions issued by South Africa since 1966 invalid, suspending South Africa from membership in the specialized agencies, imposing tariff barriers against imports from South Africa, establishing a juridical committee for the review of South African decisions concerning Namibia and maintaining international pressure on South Africa's main

trading partners. Some of those proposals were extreme, but the important thing was not to lose sight of the goal and to act with common sense.

57. In view of the difficulties arising in connexion with any discussion of Namibia in the Security Council, it was encouraging that that body should now be dealing actively with the matter through its *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee on Namibia. The report of the Sub-Committee to the Security Council⁸ contained various proposals, some of which were a direct consequence of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice and had been embodied in Security Council resolution 301 (1971); that resolution also included other important measures, especially in paragraph 11, aiming at the economic and diplomatic isolation of South Africa. It was to be hoped that those measures would win the support which they deserved.

58. Mr. BRATUN (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that colonialism had tightened its control in southern Africa, where more than 18 million Africans lived in a territory covering 15 per cent of the area of the continent. The United Nations had taken many decisions, but, as a result of the efforts of the colonialist States, the situation continued to deteriorate. There was an alliance among the colonialist countries: certain countries which had had colonies gave economic support to the Pretoria, Salisbury and Lisbon régimes, and, in the period 1970-1971, investments in southern Africa had risen to \$1,000 million.

59. In the circumstances, a dialogue between the African States and the colonialist Powers was impossible, and the Organization of African Unity had therefore rejected any attempt at a dialogue which was not based on the right of self-determination.

60. His delegation wished to refer, in particular, to the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration. In its view, the true voice of the people of those territories was that of the national liberation movements.

61. The Portuguese Government was following the policies of Salazar and had introduced amendments to the Constitution which in no way changed the situation in the Territories. Portugal seemed to be adopting a régime like that of South Africa. The Secretary-General of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) had requested aid from the United Nations for the hungry population of the Cape Verde Islands; Portugal had not only taken no steps to rectify that situation but had endeavoured by every means to conceal the facts.

62. Millions of dollars were constantly being invested in the Portuguese colonies to help the Portuguese régime to retain them, something which it would obviously be unable to do by itself. It was with such Western assistance, and with German capital in particular, that the Cabora Bassa and Gunene River projects were being carried out. The Portuguese Government was delighted to receive such contributions from the monopolies, which helped it to strengthen its colonial role.

63. As for Portugal's military position in Africa, that country was supported by its NATO allies, from which it

received military assistance and modern armaments. A large share of Portugal's budget was devoted to defence, since it could retain its colonies only through war. In that connexion, *The Washington Post* had stated openly that there was a clear parallel between the United States in Viet-Nam and Portugal in Guinea (Bissau).

64. The support which Portuguese colonialist policies received from Western imperialism was what prevented the implementation of United Nations resolutions and permitted acts of aggression to be carried out against African peoples. On four occasions, the Special Committee dealing with colonial countries and peoples had had to consider complaints concerning Portuguese acts of aggression in which Portuguese soldiers had used chemical weapons. His delegation had protested in the General Assembly against repeated violations of African sovereignty, which showed that the development of the free African peoples would continue to be threatened until colonialism was eliminated.

65. His country condemned the crimes of Portugal and declared its solidarity with the African people's struggle for freedom. The United Nations must implement the resolutions it had adopted. An effective boycott against the last remaining colonialists must be carried out. That was indeed the task of the United Nations.

66. Mr. NYIRENDA (Zambia) recalled that his Government had recently had the honour of a visit by Mr. Olaf Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden, who had reaffirmed to the Government of Zambia the moral and material support of the Swedish people for the cause of African liberation.

67. He welcomed the States of Bahrain, Bhutan, Oman and Qatar, which had just become Members of the United Nations.

68. His delegation considered the current year a crucial year of decision and commitment, both for the Fourth Committee and for the United Nations as a whole. Although the programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had been adopted the year before by General Assembly resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970, and the International Court of Justice on 21 June 1971 had handed down its Advisory Opinion on Namibia, there had been a marked worsening in the grave situation in southern Africa and Guinea (Bissau), punctuated by criminal acts of aggression and political and economic blackmail against neighbouring independent States. Talks were being held between the United Kingdom and the rebels in Salisbury, while the Fascist Portuguese colonial authorities in Lisbon were receiving aid from their NATO allies, and certain countries, especially the United Kingdom and France, supported the Fascist, racist Pretoria régime through the sale of arms and assistance in the manufacture of arms and jet aircraft in South Africa, in defiance of the United Nations arms embargo and international public opinion.

69. The colonialist and racist Lisbon-Pretoria-Salisbury axis, in an unholy alliance, and their Western protectors, were attempting to subjugate independent Africa once more while trying to tighten the racist, colonial yoke on the peoples of Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), Zimbabwe and South Africa.

⁸ See foot-note 2.

70. The United Nations, in accordance with its mandate under the Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), should act decisively in 1971, as the Secretary-General had urged. It was necessary to choose between economic and military interests and the support and protection of outlaws on the one hand and human life and freedom, peace and stability in southern Africa and Guinea (Bissau) on the other.

71. His delegation did not wish to see a new proliferation of pious and hollow statements and pledges of support, which had been a traditional ritual for some Member States. Neither did it consider the time appropriate to call for caution or moderation, for that would mean no action at all. In that connexion, he recalled that the Security Council, which had been considering the question of the international Territory of Namibia since 28 September, had adopted resolution 301 (1971) on 20 October which, because of the obstructionist tendencies and attitudes of certain countries, and particularly of certain permanent members of the Council, fell far short of the action demanded by the gravity of the question. It contained no mention, for instance, of the mandatory application of Chapter VII of the Charter in the event that South Africa refused to comply with it.

72. Following the historic Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, which categorically endorsed the decisions of the United Nations, those States had shifted their argument and now maintained that they could neither support nor accept the Advisory Opinion, although they publicly proclaimed their solidarity with the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people for freedom and independence. His delegation did not understand that reasoning, which appeared to be illogical and untenable, both in theory and in practice, as well as morally indefensible.

73. It should be recalled that the Security Council had had to interrupt its consideration of the question of Namibia to consider Zambia's complaint concerning South Africa's acts of aggression against Zambia. As expected, the allies and protectors of the *apartheid* régime preferred not to recognize the significance of the crimes the Pretoria Government was committing against Zambia, principally from the international Territory of Namibia. The only "crime" that Zambia had committed was that of being a State bordering on the international Territory, opposing colonialism and the policy of *apartheid*, and firmly believing in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

74. The Government of Zambia was prepared to resist any intimidation at all costs and oppose South Africa's attempts to interfere in Zambia's internal affairs, which were aimed at disturbing the unity of its people. The Pretoria authorities would do well to realize that they themselves, the usurpers, had created the heroic struggle of the Namibian people and that Zambia could not be held responsible for it.

75. Thus the importance which South Africa attached to the international Territory of Namibia, both politically and militarily, was clear. It would therefore be idle for the Committee to continue hoping that Pretoria, to say nothing of the Fascist colonial authorities in Lisbon, would show itself to be reasonable. It was necessary for the Committee, and the United Nations as a whole, to take a definitive decision in 1971; in that connexion, he put forward the following ideas: (a) that the General Assembly, having already decided repeatedly that assistance should be provided to the liberation movements, should examine the possibility of establishing a special fund to provide concrete assistance to those movements, a fund which would be separate from existing funds devoted to educational, training and humanitarian purposes; (b) that, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, an observer status in the specialized agencies shall be granted to the liberation movements operating from liberated areas; (c) that, the status of Namibia having been clearly determined, the Security Council should, through the full application of Chapter VII of the Charter, put an immediate end to South Africa's illegal occupation and exploitation of that international Territory; (d) that, with that end in view, the United Nations Council for Namibia, which was the Territory's Government-in-exile, should be given all the powers necessary to administer the Territory on the spot, and not from New York, and that, within that framework, Namibians should be appointed to represent Namibia in all the specialized agencies; (e) that the Council should be empowered to obtain the recognition of the foreign economic, financial and other interests currently operating in Namibia, with a view to ensuring that all royalties and other dues were used for the education and training of Namibians; and (f) that the Committee should endeavour to adopt only meaningful and comprehensive resolutions on each of the items on its agenda. With that end in view, he appealed to all regional groups to participate in the drafting of such resolutions.

76. His delegation firmly believed that the ideals and principles of human freedom, independence and justice were indivisible, as were those of peace and security. Thus, it considered that the time had come for the international community as a whole to join hands with the liberation movements.

77. Mr. ALDEGHATHER (Saudi Arabia) suggested that maps of the Territories considered by the Committee should be displayed in the Fourth Committee's conference room. It would, of course, be necessary to correct the names appearing on those maps, where appropriate.

78. The CHAIRMAN replied that the Secretariat would study the possibility of placing maps in the conference room.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.