



安全理事会

Distr.: General
19 October 2015
Chinese
Original: English

2015年10月9日安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第751(1992)号和第1907(2009)号决议所设委员会主席给安全理事会主席的信

谨代表安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第751(1992)号和第1907(2009)号决议所设委员会，并根据安全理事会第2182(2014)号决议第47段，随信转递索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组重点关于厄立特里亚的报告。

请提请安全理事会成员注意本信和报告并将其作为安理会文件分发为荷。

安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的
第751(1992)和1907(2009)号决议委员会
主席

拉菲尔·达里奥·拉米雷斯·卡雷尼奥(签名)



2015年9月22日索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组成员给安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第751(1992)号和第1907(2009)号决议所设委员会主席的信

谨根据安全理事会第2182(2014)号决议第47段，随信转递索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组关于厄立特里亚的报告。

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安全理事会第 2182 (2014) 号决议所设索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组的报告：厄立特里亚

摘要

索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组在整个任务期间不断向厄立特里亚政府充分提供各项调查情况，并试图在本报告中根据其实质性价值及其与监测组任务的相关性列入其观点和意见。尽管多次提出要求，但监测组仍未获准在本任务期间访问厄立特里亚，也没有获得政府的充分合作，这有悖于第 2182 (2014) 号决议的要求。

在本任务期间，厄立特里亚与沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国结成新的战略军事关系，其中包括允许阿拉伯联盟在其反也门胡塞军事行动中利用厄立特里亚领土、领空和领水。监测组了解到，根据安排，厄立特里亚获得了这两个国家的补偿，包括资金补偿和燃料供应。将任何补偿直接或间接用于威胁到该区域的和平与安全的活动或使厄立特里亚军方受益，都将构成违反第 1907 (2009) 号决议的行为。此外，监测组还得到可靠消息称，在也门境内作战的部队中的阿拉伯联合酋长国特遣队中有厄立特里亚士兵。如获得确认，这将明显违反该决议。

监测组调查了红海公司在 Shaker1 号船上托运的一批货物。2015 年 1 月，该船在运载武器驶离苏丹港前往阿拉伯联合酋长国武器展的途中曾停靠厄立特里亚马萨瓦港。监测组过去曾记录该公司在从苏丹东部向厄立特里亚贩运武器方面的作用，以及该公司为掩盖其实际货物不被查获而对集装箱作虚假标识的做法。虽然监测组没有发现违反军火禁运的情况，但监测组发现了有关该船停靠马萨瓦的信息中一些不一致之处，并注意到了与该公司的一贯操作手法相同的情况。

监测组没有发现任何证据显示厄立特里亚支持青年党。不过监测组发现，厄立特里亚继续支持和庇护一些区域武装团体，包括一个新成立的埃塞俄比亚武装反对派团体统一阵线、提格雷人民民主运动以及金波特 7 号军事领导人。

提格雷人民民主运动仍然是厄立特里亚境内接纳的获得训练和资助的最重要的埃塞俄比亚武装团体。监测组了解到，提格雷人民民主运动战斗人员一支特遣队驻扎在靠近苏丹边界的厄立特里亚西部地区以及马萨瓦和周边地区。此外，提格雷人民民主运动参加了新组建的埃塞俄比亚武装反对派团体联合阵线。2015 年 9 月，该运动发生了迄今为止最高级别的叛逃，其主席 Asgedom Mola 在与统一阵线领导人出现政治分歧之后逃至埃塞俄比亚。监测组正在继续确定这次叛逃的影响。

监测组了解到，厄立特里亚继续维持受人民民主和正义阵线(人阵)控制的非正规经济，其交易是通过模糊而不透明的商业实体网络以硬通货进行，这些商业

实体正如厄立特里亚大多数公司一样由国家所有，并由政府高级官员、人阵和军方负责管理。

缺乏财政透明度继续造成结构上的困难，并制约了监测组评价该国遵守第1907(2009)号决议情况的能力。监测组特别关切的是，在国际和多边组织纷纷承诺为政府提供资金援助之时，总体而言，公共财政缺乏透明度。

监测组从厄立特里亚侨民及其所在国当局多个来源收到的证词证明，政府继续对生活在海外的厄立特里亚公民实行域外征税规定。似乎现在要求该国公民直接向阿斯马拉付款。根据先前的调查结果，拒绝付税往往导致领事馆和大使馆拒绝提供服务。

监测组注意到，政府的采矿收入仍完全缺乏透明度。监测组密切监测一起在加拿大法院审理的案件，涉及据称加拿大耐森资源有限公司经营的厄立特里亚碧沙矿场使用强迫劳动，并实行不人道待遇。原告指控，政府强迫应征士兵向下列政府承包商提供劳务：人阵拥有的 Segen 公司和厄立特里亚军方拥有的 Mereb 公司。监测组发现，耐森公司雇用 Segen 公司和 Mereb 公司提供劳务，根据安排，这两家公司支付工人的数额远远低于他们收取耐森公司的劳务费。Segen 公司和 Mereb 公司被怀疑扣留了差额，也即意味着，厄立特里亚军方和政府扣留了差额。

监测组继续注意到，2010年6月6日吉布提和厄立特里亚在卡塔尔政府主持下签署的全面协定中关于战俘的第3条方面没有任何进展。在任务期间，监测组获悉发生在2014年7月的一起在吉布提和厄立特里亚隔离地带绑架一名吉布提士兵的事件。此外，吉布提政府向监测组提供了其声称在押的厄立特里亚战俘名单及其声称在2008年6月10日至12日两国边界冲突期间在作战中失踪的吉布提战俘名单。厄立特里亚政府尚未承认它扣押着吉布提战斗人员，也未提供关于这些人当前状况的信息。

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一. 引言

A. 任务规定

1. 索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组的任务载于安全理事会第 2060(2012)号决议第 13 段，并经安理会第 2182(2014)号决议第 46 段延期。第 2093(2013)和第 2142(2014)号决议还为监测组规定了其他一些任务。
2. 根据第 2060(2012)号决议第 13(1)段，监测组于 2015 年 4 月 8 日向关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第 751(1992)号和第 1907(2009)号决议所设委员会提供了中期通报。监测组还在整个任务期间向委员会提交每月进度报告。
3. 在调查过程中，监测组成员访问了巴林、比利时、加拿大、吉布提、埃塞俄比亚、法国、黎巴嫩、马来西亚、挪威、卡塔尔、塞舌尔、新加坡、索马里、南非、瑞典、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国、阿拉伯联合酋长国和美利坚合众国。
4. 监测组设在内罗毕，成员包括下列专家：Christophe Trajber(协调员和海运)，Nicholas Argeros(金融)，Zeina Awad(运输)，Jay Bahadur(武装团体)，Déirdre Clancy(人道主义事务)，Bogdan Chetreanu(金融)，James Smith(区域)。

B. 方法

5. 监测组前几份报告中概述的证据标准和核查程序适用于本报告所述任务期间开展的工作。监测组重申其以往报告(最近的是 [S/2014/727](#) 和 [S/2013/440](#) 号文件)所用方法。本报告所用方法如下：
 - (a) 尽可能从多个来源收集关于事件和议题的信息；
 - (b) 尽可能从有关事件的第一手资料来源收集信息；
 - (c) 确定信息规律是否一致，将已经了解的情况与新信息和新趋势进行比较；
 - (d) 在信息可信度和信息来源可靠性方面继续一并考虑监测组有关专家的专业知识和判断以及小组的集体评估意见；
 - (e) 收集实物、照片、音像和(或)书面证据来证明收集到的信息。
6. 监测组特意有系统地努力通过那些直接了解违禁行为详情或认识直接知情者的个人来接触参与违禁行为者。在调查中，专家组与广泛的消息来源进行了 150 多次会面，包括会员国、非政府组织、厄立特里亚侨民和前厄立特里亚政府官员。特别是，监测组从会员国和区域组织获得了机密情报。监测组会见的各类人士包括外交官、前军事人员和军官、武装团体人员、自然资源部门和进出口部门的商人和交易商，特别是在厄立特里亚拥有最大商业利益的地方。监测组从这些不同来源获得证词以及保密和公开来源的文件。监测组评估了数百份文件，以确定哪

些内容对本报告有意义。最后，监测组通过直接会见和来往公文(见下文 C 节)从厄立特里亚政府获取信息。

7. 根据委员会过去的指导，监测组努力在本报告中列入尽可能多的证词和证据。不过，根据关于控制和限制文件的大会各项决议，特别是第 52/214 号、第 53/208 号和第 59/265 号决议，不得不大量使用附件，使得许多实质内容无法获得翻译。

C. 与政府的接触

8. 安全理事会第 2182(2014)号决议强调监测组必须与政府进行接触，并强调期待在监测组的当前任务期间加深这种合作，包括通过监测组对厄立特里亚进行定期访问的形式。因此，监测组力图在其上一任务期间同厄立特里亚官员举行的一系列会议(包括 2013 年 12 月 8 日在巴黎和 2014 年 2 月 14 日在开罗举行的会议以及 2014 年 7 月 28 日在纽约举行的视频会议)的基础上，继续与政府进行接触。

9. 2015 年 2 月 12 日，监测组在纽约与厄立特里亚常驻联合国代表吉尔马·艾斯莫罗姆·特斯法伊进行了礼节性会晤，在场的有秘书处官员。会上，监测组介绍了厄立特里亚小组的最新成员，并讨论了当前任务期间进行建设性接触的方式和前进方向。监测组还重申其早就提出的访问阿斯马拉并会晤当地有关当局的要求。

10. 2015 年 3 月 31 日，委员会主席拉斐尔·达里奥·拉米雷斯·卡雷尼奥先生主持了一次监测组与厄立特里亚常驻联合国代表的视频会议(见 [S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.20](#))。会议的目的是让监测组向该国政府通报初步调查情况，并让常驻代表在专家组 2015 年 4 月 8 日提交委员会的中期简报之前作出答复。

11. 常驻代表确认，他将书面答复实质性问题 and 指控，要求在中期简报中反映他的答复内容。此外，主席告知监测组，作为主席工作的一部分，他打算前往非洲之角区域，包括厄立特里亚，与那里的官员会面。此外，监测组协调员重申监测组随时准备访问阿斯马拉。

12. 在 2015 年 4 月 1 日的普通照会中，厄立特里亚常驻联合国代表团转递了在视频会议期间提出的政府的答复。代表团指出，对厄立特里亚的制裁是出于政治动机，并提出了也门冲突所造成的新的地缘政治气候问题，指出，“极端主义和恐怖主义正在该区域和全球蔓延”，并重申该国政府要求安全理事会解除对厄立特里亚的军火禁运，以便该国“能够切实有效地打击各类恐怖主义和极端主义”(见附件 1.1 和 [S/AC.29/2015/COMM.22](#))。

13. 至于 2% 的重建和复苏税，该国政府指出，它“从未‘使用恐吓或胁迫手段’收税”，并称税收是以透明的方式征收的。政府还指出，由于“监测组本身已确定，它‘没有发现任何证据证明厄立特里亚支持青年党’，监测组没有理由继续要求厄立特里亚提供有关[自然资源]的信息”。最后，该国政府重申拒绝讨论吉布提进程。

14. 监测组认为，该答复未充分回答其在视频会议上提出的实质性问题。因此，2015年4月2日，监测组致函厄立特里亚常驻联合国代表，列出其它在视频会议期间提出的初步结论，标明了尚未答复的信息请求和其他信息请求。

15. 2015年4月8日，监测组向委员会提交了中期简报。在通报过程中所提出的各点与3月31日视频会议和4月2日信函的内容一致。

16. 2015年4月17日，厄立特里亚常驻代表致函委员会主席，询问监测组4月2日的来信的目的，说他已经于3月31日的视频会议期间和在4月1日作为他的来信的附文提交的书面材料(见附件 1.3 和 [S/AC.29/2015/COMM.24](#))中答复了监测组提出的问题。在审查该信时，监测组发现，该信没有充分答复监测组向政府提出的下列信息请求以及工作组提出的下列实质性问题：

(a) 关于红海公司在 Shaker 1 号上托运的集装箱内装货物的详情；

(b) 关于提格雷人民民主运动的情况，包括其武器来源、训练营的地点以及关于其如何发展成为一支准军事部队的详细情况；

(c) 关于作战中失踪的吉布提战斗人员的情况；

(d) 显示来自侨民税和采矿税的收入不被转用于违反第 1907(2009)号决议的活动的文件。

17. 2015年8月21日，在委员会主席委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国常驻联合国副政治协调员 Alfredo Fernando Toro-Carnevali 主持下，监测组与厄立特里亚常驻代表通过视频会议举行了第二次会议。委员会秘书处的代表也出席了会议。在本报告完成前，监测组提出了其完整结论，并征求政府的意见，目的是根据政府提供的意见和书面证据与监测组任务的相关重要性将其纳入报告。常驻代表指出，厄立特里亚同埃塞俄比亚之间的问题不属于监测组的任务范围。他还强调，对厄立特里亚的制裁是就厄立特里亚与吉布提之间边界争端和关于厄立特里亚支持青年党的指控实施的，而与埃塞俄比亚与厄立特里亚之间的边界争端无关。他指出，厄立特里亚没有违反武器禁运。

18. 监测组其后于2015年8月25日给常驻代表发了一封信，其中概述了其在视频会议上介绍的调查结果，并请厄立特里亚对就监测组的调查所作询问作出答复(见附件 1.4)。

19. 2015年9月4日，常驻代表转达了政府对监测组提出的问题的答复(见附件 1.5)。在审查答复时，监测组再次发现，答复并未充分答复其提出的下列信息请求及其向政府提出的问题：

(a) 关于国家安全办公室及其在支持区域武装团体方面的作用的信息；

(b) 关于红海公司在 Shaker 1 号上托运的集装箱内装货物的详情；

- (c) 有关新成立的埃塞俄比亚武装反对派联合阵线的说明；
- (d) 关于厄立特里亚与金波特 7 号军事领导人 Negu Berhanu 之间的关系的说明；
- (e) 关于提格雷人民民主运动及其时任主席 Mola Asgedom 的作用的信息；
- (f) 有关吉布提反对派团体、恢复团结和民主阵线和厄立特里亚之间的关系说明；
- (g) 对关于厄立特里亚军事介入也门冲突的指控的评论，包括可能获得的补偿的性质以及对厄立特里亚与胡塞叛乱运动之间关系的说明；
- (h) 关于作战中失踪的吉布提战斗人员的情况；
- (i) 规定有关程序和条例的官方文件，目的是执行关于实行复苏和复兴税的通告，特别是对居住在国外的厄立特里亚人进行征税；
- (j) 说明政府收支状况的预算文件；
- (k) 关于厄立特里亚、耐森公司和下列各方之间的商业关系的性质的详细说明：Segen 公司、Mereb 公司、厄立特里亚军方和人民民主和正义阵线(人阵)；
- (l) 政府、耐森公司和前述国有公司之间的协议副本；
- (m) 耐森公司与国营公司或隶属于军方和人阵的公司，包括参与碧沙矿场的建造和经营的其他伙伴之间的任何协议和(或)合同或产品分享协议的副本；
- (n) 雇用劳工，包括应征士兵的所有费用的明细详情；
- (o) 关于费用如何以及由谁支付的解释；
- (p) 耐森公司、Segen 公司、Mereb 公司和军方之间的资金流动的详细交易记录。

20. 为便于参考，监测组在附件 1 中列出了与厄立特里亚政府的全部信函往来。尽管监测组多方努力，一再要求访问阿斯马拉，但监测组在本任务期间未获准进入厄立特里亚，也没有得到政府的充分合作，这有悖于第 2182(2014)号决议的要求。

二. 违反全面彻底武器禁运的情况

21. 监测组调查了关于违反安全理事会第 1907(2009)号决议对厄立特里亚实施的双向武器禁运情况的指控。监测组收到来自多个消息来源的可靠和有说服力的证词以及独立报告，指出沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国在厄立特里亚派驻了军事力量，将其作为打击也门胡塞反叛分子的军事行动的组成部分，并可能正向厄立特里亚提供补偿，以换取其允许阿拉伯联盟领导的战争行动使用其领土，包括可能使用其部队。

22. 同样在武器禁运方面，监测组调查了红海公司在“Shaker 1”号船上托运的一批货物。2015年1月，该船在运载武器驶离苏丹港前往阿拉伯联合酋长国武器展的途中曾停靠厄立特里亚马萨瓦港。监测组过去曾记录红海公司在从苏丹东部向厄立特里亚贩运武器方面的作用，以及该公司为掩盖其实际货物不被查获而对集装箱进行虚假标识的做法。

A. 也门

23. 根据安理会第1907(2009)号决议，所有会员国应立即采取必要措施，防止向厄立特里亚出售或供应所有各类军火和有关物资，包括武器和弹药、军用车辆和装备、准军事装备及上述物项的备件，以及与军事活动有关或与提供、制造、维修或使用上述物项有关的技术援助、培训及资金和其他援助，无论是否源自其境内。此外，根据第6段的规定，厄立特里亚不得从其境内或由其国民或利用悬挂其国旗的船只或飞机，直接或间接供应、出售或转让任何军火或相关物资，同时所有会员国应禁止其国民从厄立特里亚采购决议第5段所述的物项、培训和援助。

24. 监测组收到来自多个消息来源的可靠和有说服力的证词以及独立报告，表明沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国在厄立特里亚派驻了军事力量，将其作为打击也门胡塞反叛分子的军事行动的组成部分。监测组还了解到，厄立特里亚已经并可能继续收到补偿，以换取其允许阿拉伯联盟领导的战争行动使用其领土，包括可能使用其部队。

25. 监测组在本任务期间注意到，鉴于邻国也门的冲突持续不断，处于非洲之角与波斯湾交叉点的厄立特里亚的战略重要性大增。厄立特里亚横跨曼德海峡——分割阿拉伯半岛与非洲之角以及连接红海与亚丁湾和印度洋的狭窄水道。该海峡的最窄点宽度仅为29公里，一侧是也门和吉布提，另一侧是厄立特里亚。这是关键的商业和贸易战略通道，约4%的全球石油供应穿过这一海峡。¹

26. 该海峡下设若干岛屿，包括位于厄立特里亚南部与也门塔兹省之间的哈尼什群岛(见附件2的地图)。也门和厄立特里亚曾为这一群岛发生冲突，厄立特里亚在1995年两国交战后占领了群岛。战争结束四年之后，常设仲裁法院最终裁定两国应对这一群岛享有共同监护权。²

¹ 见 Peter Salisbury, “Houthi expansion threatens Yemen’s strategic Bab al-Mandab strait”, *Financial Times*, 23 October 2014, 可查阅 www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/444765c0-59dc-11e4-9787-00144feab7de.html#axzz3fIx4A0P6; Thomas C. Mountain, “Choke point Bab el-Mandeb; understanding the strategically critical Horn of Africa”, *Foreign Policy Journal*, 19 November 2011, 可查阅 www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/11/19/choke-point-bab-el-mandeb-understanding-the-strategically-critical-horn-of-africa/。

² 见 “Middle East flights back on between Yemen and Eritrea”, *BBC News*, 13 October 1998, 可查阅 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/192667.stm; 厄立特里亚人权调查委员会的详细调查结果(A/HRC/29/CRP.1, 第114段)。

27. 当反抗也门总统阿卜杜拉布·曼苏尔·哈迪·曼苏尔的胡塞反叛分子 2014 年 10 月控制西部荷台达港并开始将势力扩张至红海之滨的南部塔兹省时，哈尼什群岛的战略重要性大增。³

28. 厄立特里亚政府已经认识到亚丁湾和红海区域的近期地缘政治变化。2015 年 3 月 31 日，在监测组与厄立特里亚官员的一次视频会议期间，厄立特里亚常驻代表质疑对厄立特里亚实施的武器禁运，表示也门境内武装冲突造成的区域动荡是促进取消禁运的一个理由。他呼吁监测组考虑新的区域动态，并告诫说“伊斯兰国”可能企图夺取厄立特里亚的岛屿。他强调指出厄立特里亚有“自卫权”，并表示制裁“不公正和毫无道理”。他在 2015 年 4 月 17 日给委员会主席的信中进一步指出：

必须在非洲之角和红海区域的当前区域安全动态背景下审视对厄立特里亚实施的武器禁运……极端主义和恐怖主义正在本区域和全球蔓延。也门与厄立特里亚之间共有漫长的红海边界，其中包括仅 30 分钟飞行距离的曼德海峡，而该国遗憾地处于危机之中……厄立特里亚在红海上有 1 200 公里海岸线和超过 35 个岛屿，并位于连接曼德海峡与苏伊士运河的重要国际海上航线上的战略要地。毫无疑问，为了区域和国际和平与安全，必须支持而非限制厄立特里亚。

29. 监测组了解到，沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国正是在上述地缘政治背景下与厄立特里亚进行接触，以期建立一种新型战略关系，包括利用厄立特里亚的领土、领空和领海来推进其在也门的军事行动。⁴ 多个消息来源，包括两名与吉布提高级官员有直接联系的人士告知监测组，这一战略伙伴关系的动因是上述两个海湾国家未能与吉布提达成协议。鉴于无法在打击胡塞运动在曼德海峡扩张的军事行动中使用吉布提领土，两个阿拉伯国家转向了邻近的厄立特里亚。⁵

³ 见“Houthi rise in Yemen raises alarm in Horn of Africa”，World Bulletin, 12 January 2015, 可查阅 www.worldbulletin.net/haber/152737/houthi-rise-in-yemen-raises-alarm-in-horn-of-africa; “Houthi overrun Bab al-Mandab base as entire Saleh-loyalist division hit”，Middle East Eye, 31 March 2015, 可查阅 www.middleeasteye.net/news/houthis-overrun-base-bab-al-mandab-entire-division-saleh-loyalists-destroyed-1009330895; “Yemeni rebels strengthen positions in Strait, Djibouti says”，Bloomberg, 2 April 2015, 可查阅 www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-02/yemeni-rebels-strengthen-positions-in-key-strait-djibouti-says。

⁴ 同与厄立特里亚军方关系密切的厄立特里亚前军官的约谈，2015 年 5 月 6 日；同在波斯湾拥有高层交往的一名厄立特里亚政治分析员的约谈，2015 年 5 月 27 日；与来自非洲之角某国的一名高级外交人员的会面，2015 年 5 月 26 日；来自非洲之角国家的高级别官员的机密通报，2015 年 6 月 16 日；欧洲某国向监测组的机密通报，2015 年 7 月。

⁵ 同上，公开来源对此亦有报道。见“A slap in the face leads to serious diplomatic crisis with Abu Dhabi”，Africa Intelligence, 4 May 2015, 可查阅 www.africaintelligence.com/ION/alert-ion/2015/05/05/a-slap-in-the-face-leads-to-serious-diplomatic-crisis-with-abu-dhabi,108072196-ART?LOG=1&LOG=1; “Crisis with the UAE: Youssouf persona non grata in Saudi Arabia”，Africa Intelligence, 19 May 2015, 可查阅 www.africaintelligence.com/ION/alert-ion/2015/05/19/crisis-with-the-uae-youssouf-persona-non-grata-in-saudi-arabia,108074091-ART?LOG=1。

30. 据独立消息来源向监测组的通报,来自沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国的高级别代表团访问了哈尼什群岛并会见了厄立特里亚官员。⁶ 监测组无法掌握访问的确切日期,但估计上述访问时间是2015年3月或4月。此外,厄立特里亚总统伊萨亚斯·阿费沃基4月29日访问沙特阿拉伯并拜会了国王萨勒曼·本·阿卜杜勒阿齐兹·阿勒沙特。据包括亲厄立特里亚政权的媒体在内的公开消息来源报告,两位领导人缔结了安全和军事伙伴关系协定。⁷ 这一伙伴关系的详情尚未公开,在编写本报告时仍不清楚厄立特里亚总统是否同意了沙特提出的所有条件。然而监测组了解到,作为协定内容,厄立特里亚被要求允许海湾国家在打击胡塞分子的军事行动中使用哈尼什群岛和阿萨布港。监测组还了解到阿拉伯联合酋长国租用了距也门海岸60公里的阿萨布港,租期为30年。此外,厄立特里亚似乎被要求致力于禁止胡塞分子在其境内任何地方开展活动。⁸

31. 监测组还收到可靠的证明资料,表明作为上述安排的组成部分,厄立特里亚获得了补偿,包括金钱补偿和燃料供应。⁹ 然而,由于该国财政管理不透明,难以确定这项收入是否被转用于维持或加强厄立特里亚军方,并为违反安全理事会第1907(2009)和第2023(2011)号决议相关规定的活动供资。此外,如本报告的财务一节所详述,执政的人阵党和军方控制了该国的资金流动。因此,很难区分流向政府和流向厄立特里亚军方的资金,尤其是在军事行动的背景下。

32. 监测组还听到未经证实的指控,包括来自与厄立特里亚军方有往来的一名厄立特里亚前高级官员以及与厄立特里亚驻中东和非洲的现任大使有直接接触的一名厄立特里亚分析员提供的指控,称代表阿拉伯国家联盟在也门境内作战的部

⁶ 同与厄立特里亚军队关系密切的一名厄立特里亚前军官的约谈,2015年5月6日;同在波斯湾拥有高层往来的一名厄立特里亚政治分析员的约谈,2015年5月26日;与来自非洲之角国家的两名高级外交人员的会议,2015年5月26日;对派驻阿拉伯联合酋长国的厄立特里亚前官员的电话约谈,2015年5月。

⁷ 见“*How Eritrea benefits from the diplomatic crisis between Djibouti and UAE*”, Tesfanews, 15 May 2015, 可查阅 www.tesfanews.net/how-eritrea-benefits-from-the-diplomatic-crisis-between-djibouti-and-uae/; “*Eritrea and Saudi Arabia to boost Red Sea security*”, Tesfanews, 29 April 2015, 可查阅 www.tesfanews.net/eritrea-and-saudi-arabia-agree-to-boost-red-sea-security/。

⁸ 同与厄立特里亚军方关系密切的一名厄立特里亚前军官的电话约谈,2015年8月21日;同在波斯湾拥有高层往来的一名厄立特里亚政治分析员的约谈,2015年5月26日;与来自非洲之角国家的两名高级外交人员的会见,2015年5月26日;非洲之角国家官员的机密通报,2015年6月16日;与一名厄立特里亚前高级官员的约谈,2015年5月3日。

⁹ 某非洲以外会员国提供的机密资料,2015年7月;同在波斯湾拥有高层往来的一名厄立特里亚政治分析员的约谈,2015年8月18日;与一名厄立特里亚前高级官员的电话交谈,2015年8月22日;与派驻欧洲并在该区域有可靠联系人的一名厄立特里亚著名记者的电话交谈,2015年8月4日。

队的阿拉伯联合酋长国特遣队中约有 400 名厄立特里亚士兵。¹⁰ 如经证实，这将是违反第 1907(2009)号决议第 5 和第 6 段的行为。

33. 此外，沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国据报对胡塞分子在厄立特里亚境内的一些活动感到关切。监测组在其多个任期内从一些消息来源收到前后一致的资料，称厄立特里亚政府曾允许胡塞反叛运动利用其领土开展军事活动。虽然监测组未看到支持这些说法的任何具体证据，但收到了吉布提政府提供的 2015 年 4 月 14 日海湾合作委员会某成员国给吉布提政府的机密外交照会副本，内称吉布提的一个武装反政府团体的一名成员与据称是胡塞代理人的三名也门人于 2015 年 1 月在阿萨布进行了一次会议。会议目的是与胡塞代理人讨论反政府团体的武器需求。

结论

34. 监测组认为，厄立特里亚向第三国提供其领土、领海和领空，用于在另一国进行军事行动的行为本身不违反第 1907(2009)号决议。监测组还收到多个消息来源提供的证词，称厄立特里亚已经并可能继续获得补偿，以换取其允许阿拉伯联盟领导的战争行动使用其领土、领海和领空，包括可能使用其部队。将任何补偿直接或间接转用于威胁区域和平与安全的活动或使厄立特里亚军方受益将是违反第 1907(2009)号决议的行为。

35. 此外，如果监测组收到的关于厄立特里亚士兵确实正在参加阿拉伯联盟领导的战争行动的可靠说法得到证实，这将是明显违反第 1907(2009)号决议的行为。

36. 监测组在 8 月 21 日与厄立特里亚常驻代表进行的视频会议期间以及在 2015 年 8 月 24 日向其发出的正式信函中介绍了初步调查结果。在视频会议期间，厄立特里亚常驻代表否认厄立特里亚士兵在也门境内为阿拉伯联盟作战。8 月 27 日，监测组致函沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国政府，询问关于厄立特里亚可能正收到补偿以换取其提供领土并可能提供部队的详情，以及厄立特里亚士兵在也门境内军事行动中的角色(如果存在)。监测组没有收到任何答复(见 [S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.88](#) 和 [S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.89](#))。

B. Shaker 1 号

37. 安全理事会第 1907(2009)号决议第 5 段决定，会员国应采取必要措施，阻止向厄立特里亚出售或供应军火以及各类相关物资，包括武器和弹药、军用车辆和装备、准军事装备和与军事活动有关的备件。作为任务的一部分，监测组对 2015 年 1 月收到的可靠线报进行了调查，即国际海事组织编号 7929102、悬挂多哥国

¹⁰ 同与厄立特里亚军方关系密切的一名厄立特里亚前军官的电话约谈，2015 年 8 月 22 日；同在中东和非洲拥有高层往来的一名厄立特里亚政治分析员的约谈，2015 年 8 月 18 日。与厄立特里亚官员有直接往来的一个可靠消息来源收到并在高度保密基础上与监测组分享的资料印证了这一说法。

旗的 Shaker 1 号货轮，于 2015 年 1 月 15 日在厄立特里亚马萨瓦港停靠，船上载有源自苏丹的一批武器，目的地是年度国际防务展览会，这是一年一度在阿布扎比举行的一个大型武器展销会。¹¹ 在抵达厄立特里亚之前，该船于 2015 年 1 月 12 日在苏丹的苏丹港停靠过，并在那里卸下 10 个空集装箱、2 台新卡车和 10 台挖掘机，然后装载了目的地为展销会的重型武器和军用车辆。¹²

38. 这批武器的发货人苏丹军事工业公司是苏丹国防部的商业武器制造部门。据该军事工业公司总裁 2014 年 12 月 29 日签署的原产地证书概述，这批武器装备在国际防务展结束后将再出口运回苏丹。监测组取得了该军事工业公司提供、载于附件 3.1 中的提单，其中开列了以下武器：

- (a) 一台 D-30 122 毫米卡玛斯自行榴弹炮；
- (b) 一门 D-30 122 毫米榴弹炮；
- (c) 一台 BMP-2 装甲迫击炮车；
- (d) 一台 4×4 装甲运兵车；
- (e) 一台配备 107 毫米火箭发射器的军车；
- (f) 一台 FAC-19 500×182×172 战术车；
- (g) 一台 SOC-14 500×200×198 战术车。

39. 当监测组从 Shaker 1 号运营商、设在阿拉伯联合酋长国的 Wadi Al-Neel 结算及货运代理公司取得托运货物的载货舱单和提单时，决定调查此案。监测组注意到，红海公司是厄立特里亚 3 个收货方之一。在先前报告中，监测组始终认定该公司是厄立特里亚政府的主要采购渠道，进口了各种商品，包括基本主食和重型机械以及武器，从而违反了武器禁运。监测组在其 2014 年报告中，认定联接苏丹东部和厄立特里亚西部的路线是武器走私的主要路线，并指出该公司当时在 Teseney 镇的经理负责监督和协助武器贩运。监测组还注意到，该公司经常漏报所运货物内容细节，并在武器集装箱上标示错误标签，以掩饰其中真实内容(见 S/2014/727，第 17-23 段)。

40. 在此案中，监测组注意到，红海公司未列入所运材料细节。监测组取得的文字记录把托运货物描述为“农用冷冻室和备件”，其中未提供任何资料说明物项性质或品牌，而马萨瓦的另两个收货方却作出了充分说明(见附件 3.3)。

¹¹ 经营该船的王地阿利-尼尔结算及货运代理公司 2015 年 5 月在监测组与该公司代表在其沙迦办事处会面时对此予以确认。该公司的网址是 www.wadineelgroup.com/inx.htm。监测组还看到了日期为 2015 年 2 月 11 日的一份机密说明，是能够直接登船的武器核查人员向地区当局提交的。

¹² 展销会详见 <http://www.idexuae.ae>。

41. 监测组与 Shaker 1 号运营商核对后确认，马萨瓦的确是该船离开苏丹港后作出的第一次停靠。不过，监测组发现，据专门追踪全球船舶动态的组织劳埃德船级社的登记册显示，该船记录了其所有的计划停靠点，唯独没有马萨瓦。¹³ 此外，监测组还收到了关于该轮在马萨瓦停泊期间活动的相互矛盾的报告。该船离开厄立特里亚一周后停靠在索马里兰时，武器检查人员获准登船。他们约谈了该船的船长，并由此得知在马萨瓦卸载了 8 个空集装箱和 2 台民用车辆。¹⁴ 这一说法与监测组从 Wadi Al-Neel 结算及货运代理公司工作人员那里取得的文字记录不符，因为文字记录显示 Shaker 1 号卸下了 2 台民用车辆和 8 个满载、而不是空的集装箱。

42. 监测组先前曾就 Shaker 1 号作出过报告。2013 年，监测组发现有证据表明，储存的双重军事用途车辆被按照在阿拉伯联合酋长国杰贝阿里港的厄立特里亚官员的指示装上了该船，这批货物被运往马萨瓦港(见 S/2013/440, 附件 12 和 13)。

结论

43. 监测组虽一直未能取得违反第 1907(2009)号决议第 5 段规定的具体证据，但也不能彻底和肯定地排除违规的可能性，因为此案中存在诸多矛盾之处和记录在案的行为模式。监测组再次请求厄立特里亚政府予以配合，以使监测组能作出一个明确结论。监测组在其 2015 年 4 月 2 日和 8 月 24 日的信中，要求政府提供更多资料，说明红海公司托运货物的内容。政府两次都未向监测组提供任何其要求的资料。

三. 对区域武装团体的支持

44. 安全理事会第 1907(2009)号和第 2023(2011)号决议禁止厄立特里亚支持旨在破坏区域稳定的武装反对派团体，包括庇护、资助、协助、支持、组织、训练或者煽动个人或团体在该区域实施暴力行为。据此，监测组就厄立特里亚是否正在武装、训练或装备包括青年党在内的区域武装团体及其成员之事进行了调查。

45. 监测组未发现厄立特里亚支持青年党的证据，但确实发现厄立特里亚在继续支持和庇护某些区域武装团体，其中包括新组建的埃塞俄比亚反对派团体联合阵线、提格雷人民民主运动和金波特 7 号的军事领导人。目前难以确定厄立特里亚支持具体团体的确切程度和性质，因为厄立特里亚未向监测组提供合作和充分信息，而且监测组收到的关于厄立特里亚支持的具体武装团体的资料有时也相互矛盾。

46. 监测组了解到，总统的一个长期关系人 Abraha Kassa 准将，已接替 Fitsum Yishak 上校，负责指导和监督厄立特里亚资助、训练和武装的外国武装反对派团

¹³ 监测组还看到了 Wadi Al-Neel 结算及货运代理公司的 Shaker 1 号停泊港一览表。该文件把马萨瓦列为该船 2015 年 1 月 15 日的停泊港，并称该船当天卸下物资后即离开。

¹⁴ 2015 年 2 月 11 日提交给地区当局并与监察组分享的机密说明。

体。¹⁵ Kassa 准将与 Simon Ghebredengel 上校一道监督国家安全办公室。在与监测组分享的一份欧洲联盟成员国的机密通报中，该办公室被描述为“厄立特里亚政权的根基”。该通报称，该办公室有诸多职能，包括对外国武装团体进行监督和补给。厄立特里亚人权状况调查委员会的报告也认定 Kassa 准将是国家安全办公室负责人(见 [A/HRC/29/CRP.1](#)，第 275 段)。

47. 监测组调查了它收到的一些资料 and 文件，其内容涉及向下列区域武装团体提供的不同程度支持：新成立的埃塞俄比亚反对派团体联合阵线、提格雷人民民主运动、金波特 7 号以及团结民主阵线。2015 年 9 月，提格雷人民民主运动发生了其迄今为止最高级别的叛逃，其主席 Mola Asgedom 在与金波特 7 号军事领导人兼新组建的联合阵线主席 Berhanu Nega 发生分歧后，假道苏丹逃到埃塞俄比亚。¹⁶ 监测组正在继续判定这一叛逃的影响。

A. 新组建的联合阵线

48. 监测组了解到，厄立特里亚政府在 2015 年 5 月 24 日举行的埃塞俄比亚大选之前，促进和支持了一项旨在联合一批不同的埃塞俄比亚武装反对派团体的举动。¹⁷ 监测小组还收到一些报告说，在厄立特里亚西部举行了一次旨在聚合一批埃塞俄比亚反对派团体的会议。会议期间，包括提格雷人民民主运动、爱国阵线、金波特 7 号和 Arbegnoth 在内的这些团体，都同意在政治上和军事上统一起来。¹⁸

49. 这个新组建团体的成功程度和内部凝聚力尚不清楚，但 Asdegom 先生的叛逃说明其最高领导层中存在内部裂痕。监测组注意到美联社 2015 年 7 月的一份报道称，埃塞俄比亚警察打死了试图通过提格雷地区西部从厄立特里亚非法进入

¹⁵ 2015 年 3 月 15 日—欧洲会员国的机密通报；2015 年 1 月 29 日—非洲会员国的机密通报；2015 年 5 月 3 日与一名厄立特里亚前高级官员的会见；2015 年 5 月 6 日与一名厄立特里亚前军官的约谈。2015 年 8 月下旬，监测组获悉 Kassa 准将已被解职，但监测组未来得及证实这一消息。

¹⁶ Nega 先生的主席职位在监测组与以下人士的约谈中得到确认：2015 年 9 月 12 日和 14 日与一名前高级军官；2015 年 9 月 12 日与一名在中东有高级别交往的厄立特里亚政治分析家；2015 年 9 月 17 日与一名在该区域有很强人际关系的驻欧洲厄立特里亚记者。公开来源对此也有报道，见例如“Ethiopia: communiqué issued by joint anti-terrorism taskforce of nat'l intelligence, security service and federal police”，*Ethiopian Herald*，2015 年 9 月 15 日，可查阅 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201509150735.html>；Daniel Berhane，“Ethiopian rebels flee Eritrea en-masse”，2015 年 9 月 13 日，可查阅 <http://hornaffairs.com/en/2015/09/13/ethiopian-rebels-flee-eritrea-en-masse-to-sudan/>。

¹⁷ 2015 年 5 月 6 日与在厄立特里亚有活跃人际关系的一名厄立特里亚前军官的约谈；2015 年 1 月 22 日与在该区域有很强人际关系的一名驻欧洲厄立特里亚知名记者的约谈；2015 年 3 月 17 日与具有非洲之角专业知识的一名国际非政府组织研究人员的约谈；2015 年 2 月 9 日非洲之角一区域会员国的机密通报。

¹⁸ 2015 年 5 月 6 日与在厄立特里亚有活跃人际关系的一名厄立特里亚前军官的约谈；2015 年 1 月 22 日与在该区域有很强人际关系的一名埃塞俄比亚知名记者的约谈；2015 年 3 月 17 日与具有非洲之角专业知识的一名国际非政府组织研究人员的约谈；2015 年 2 月 9 日非洲之角一区域会员国的机密通报。

埃塞俄比亚的 30 名武装人员。¹⁹ 埃塞俄比亚政府在 8 月 18 日的一份情况通报中说, 这些袭击者来自新组建阵线的两个成员: 金波特 7 号和爱国阵线。监测组无法证实这一事件的具体细节, 包括哪些团体策划了这次袭击和进行袭击的武装小组的实际规模和战斗力。

B. 提格雷人民民主运动

50. 截至本报告撰写之时, 监测组了解到, 提格雷人民民主运动仍是在厄立特里亚境内获得训练、资助和收留的最重要埃塞俄比亚反对派团体。²⁰ 监测组先前曾广泛报告了厄立特里亚违反第 1907(2009)号决议第 15(b)段继续支持提格雷人民民主运动的情况(见 S/2014/727 和 S/2012/545)。

51. 提格雷人民民主运动, 在提格雷语中简称“Demhit”, 是一个埃塞俄比亚武装反对派团体, 由出自埃塞俄比亚执政党蒂格雷人民解放阵线的一批持不同政见者于 2001 年成立。提格雷人民民主运动在其网站(<http://demhitonline.blogspot.com.tr/p/aim.html>)上说, 其宗旨是“建立一个受人民欢迎的埃塞俄比亚民主政府, 使民族权利和民族特性得到尊重”。2014 年, 监测组发现, 提格雷人民民主运动在厄立特里亚东海岸一个红海岛屿 Harena 以及在靠近埃塞俄比亚与厄立特里亚之间边界的一些较小军事训练前哨基地接受训练。此外, 监测组 2014 年曾报告, 提格雷人民民主运动已成为厄立特里亚境内最重要的埃塞俄比亚反对派团体, 它具有双重职能, 既是一个埃塞俄比亚武装反对派团体, 又是现政权的一个保护者, 其战斗人员来自总统的同一个族裔群体, 被视为忠于他个人。厄立特里亚对提格雷人民民主运动的支持似乎比它对埃塞俄比亚其他武装团体的支持更加持久和更有组织(见 S/2014/727)。

52. 厄立特里亚人权状况调查委员会在其 2015 年 6 月报告中注意到了提格雷人民民主运动在厄立特里亚境内的存在, 并报告了它在围捕未向国家军队报到的厄立特里亚公民过程中发挥的作用(A/HRC/29/CRP.1, 第 1213 段)。这一调查结果得到了一些与厄立特里亚境内厄立特里亚人有接触的驻欧洲活动者的印证。他们告诉监测组, 近至 2015 年 2 月, 提格雷人民民主运动的外国战斗人员还参与了围捕民众进行征兵的大搜捕行动。²¹

¹⁹ 见 Elias Meseret, “Ethiopia police: 30 armed people killed on Eritrea border”, 美联社, 2015 年 7 月 10 日。可查阅 <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/b07160dcb2d34dcc950e6dd486e7cf58/ethiopia-police-30-armed-people-killed-eritrea-border>。

²⁰ 2015 年 5 月 6 日与在厄立特里亚有活跃人际关系的一名厄立特里亚前军官的约谈; 2015 年 1 月 22 日与在该区域有很强人际关系的一名厄立特里亚知名记者的约谈; 2015 年 3 月 17 日与具有非洲之角专业知识的一名国际非政府组织研究人员的约谈; 2015 年 5 月 3 日与厄立特里亚一名前高级官员的约谈。2015 年 3 月 13 日与一名居住在欧洲的作家和同“自由星期五”运动有关联的一些英国工党前党员的在线约谈。

²¹ 2015 年 3 月 13 日与同厄立特里亚一些活动者有关联的一名居住在欧洲的作家暨前政客的在线约谈; 2015 年 5 月 7 日与一名驻欧洲记者暨人权活动者的会面。

53. 监测组约谈了一名前资深记者暨提格雷人民民主运动社会活动者，他曾在阿斯马拉主持一个提格雷人民民主运动的时事电视节目。²² 他在提格雷人民民主运动呆了9年，于2015年3月叛逃到埃塞俄比亚。他告诉监测组，Mola Asgedom是提格雷人民民主运动主席。²³

54. 他还声称，提格雷人民民主运动在以下地点运行着5个主要小组：阿斯马拉；Harena-Jebel Hamid；巴伦图和 Adi K'eshi 和；马萨瓦，有一支特遣队在 Mai Atal，还有另一支在 Yangus；以及 Dekemhare。监测组无法独立核实这一说法，但从多个来源收到了可资佐证的证词，显示提格雷人民民主运动战斗人员的一支特遣队驻扎在厄立特里亚西部靠近苏丹边境的地区，在马萨瓦及其周边地区。²⁴

55. 2015年9月，提格雷人民民主运动主席 Mola Asgedom 假道苏丹叛逃至埃塞俄比亚。公开媒体来源报道说，他在他的部队与厄立特里亚军方的一次交战后越过边界进入苏丹。²⁵ 监测组从其消息来源了解到，他在与在新组建的联合阵线下运作的埃塞俄比亚各反对派领导人、特别是金波特7号军事领导人 Berhanu Nega 发生分歧后，带着他最多可能800名士兵叛逃，而且他与埃塞俄比亚政府一道为他的叛逃进行了一年的筹备。²⁶ 这些说法得到了公开来源现有资料的支持。据埃塞俄比亚政府发表的一份公报称，他于2015年9月12日抵达埃塞俄比亚。²⁷

56. 叛逃发生在监测组任务的后期阶段，监测组现正继续判定这一叛逃的影响。本报告撰写时的总体共识是，要全面评估叛逃的影响还为时过早，尤其是就其对提格雷人民民主运动军事实力的影响和政治意义而言。²⁰

²² 监测组通过网上可以看到的这名记者的作品确认了他的身份。

²³ 这名记者关于 Mola Asgedom 的说法在2015年1月21日与一名同厄立特里亚军方有关系的厄立特里亚前军官的约谈中得到确认。

²⁴ 2015年5月3日与一名前高级官员的约谈；2015年1月21日和2015年5月6日与一名同厄立特里亚军方有关系的厄立特里亚前军官的约谈；2015年5月28日与一名前提格雷人民民主运动活动者和当了9年记者的广播从业者的约谈。

²⁵ 亲厄立特里亚和亲埃塞俄比亚的媒体都报道了这一新闻，见例如“TPDM Chairman Mola Asegedom defected to Sudan”，Tesfanews，2015年9月11日，可查阅 www.tesfanews.net/tpdm-chief-mola-asegedom-defected/；“Ethiopian renegade general flees to Sudan: report”，Sudan Tribune，2015年9月12日，可查阅 www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article56368；“Ethiopia praises TPDM leader as ‘patriotic’”，Ethiomeia，2015年9月14日，可查阅 www.ethiomeia.com/1000parts/7253.html。

²⁶ 2015年9月12日和14日与一名前高级军官的电话交谈；2015年9月12日与在中东有高级别人际关系的一名厄立特里亚政治分析家的约谈；2015年9月17日与在该区域有很强人际关系的一名驻欧洲厄立特里亚记者的电话交谈。

²⁷ 见“Ethiopia: communiqué issued by joint anti-terrorism taskforce of nat'l intelligence, security service and federal police”，Ethiopian Herald，2015年9月15日，可查阅 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201509150735.html>。

57. 在 2015 年 3 月 31 日和 8 月 21 日的视频会议上，监测组两次请求厄立特里亚政府澄清其与提格雷人民民主运动的关系。政府未对两次请求中提出的实质问题给予答复。

C. 金波特 7 号

58. 2015 年 7 月 31 日，埃塞俄比亚常驻联合国代表泰凯达·阿莱穆致函委员会主席，通知他金波特 7 号军事领导人 Berhanu Nega 在厄立特里亚境内并计划发动对埃塞俄比亚的袭击。他附上了一份摘自一家亲厄立特里亚的公开来源媒体的报道，其中称“爱国金波特”（据信该团体是金波特 7 号和爱国阵线之间的一个联盟组织）欢迎 Nega 先生并重申支持开展武装斗争反对埃塞俄比亚政府（见附件 4）。

59. 监测组以往包括在其 2014 年报告(S/2014/727)中，曾报告过厄立特里亚违背第 1907(2009)号决议支持、庇护和训练金波特 7 号的历史。在监测组任务期间，Berhanu Nega 离开了他居住的美国前往厄立特里亚，并在那里被任命为新组建的埃塞俄比亚武装反对派团体联合阵线的主席。²⁸ 他已声明仍打算推翻埃塞俄比亚政府。²⁹ 监测组从直接了解此案的两个非洲以外会员国收到机密资料称，当 Nega 先生经埃及前往阿斯马拉时，总统一名高级顾问 Yemane Gebreab 在他抵达时亲自前往迎接。³⁰

D. 恢复团结和民主阵线

60. 2015 年 6 月 22 日，监测组收到吉布提政府的一份书面公报，其中称厄立特里亚继续煽动破坏稳定的活动，主要是在吉布提北部。

61. 吉布提专门挑出了团结民主阵线为例。这是一个以吉布提北部为基地的阿法尔州反叛运动，主张对政府开展武装斗争。监测组过去曾报告过它的活动，并发现厄立特里亚当时正在向一个以 Mohamed Kadd'ami 为首领的被称为团结民主阵线战斗组织的裂出团体提供有限的支持。这个团体在吉布提北部积极开展小规模军事行动（见 S/2011/433）。

62. 此外，在 2015 年 6 月 29 日的一份普通照会中，吉布提政府向监测组转递了一份跨境活动完整清单，其中包括 7 宗涉及厄立特里亚支持的出自吉布提的反叛分子的事件。值得指出的是，提及的有些日期和事件也得到公开来源的报

²⁸ 直接了解此案的一个西方会员国的机密通报，会议日期保密；2015 年 8 月 18 日一个非洲会员国的机密通报；2015 年 7 月 27 日与一名同金波 7 号领导人有直接接触的非政府组织研究人员的在线沟通；2015 年 8 月 7 日与一名专门研究区域武装团体的埃塞俄比亚安全分析员的电子邮件交流。

²⁹ 直接了解此案的一个西方会员国的机密通报，会议日期保密；2015 年 8 月 18 日一个非洲会员国的机密通报。

³⁰ 直接了解此案的两个非洲以外会员国的机密通报，会议日期保密。

道。³¹ 政府是在监测组调查阶段的后期提交的这份清单。监测组因而无法完成其调查及核实政府所述事件。

63. 2015年8月21日和随后在8月24日的一封信中,监测组把这些投诉通知了厄立特里亚政府,厄立特里亚政府两次都未予置评。

结论

64. 厄立特里亚对区域武装团体的支持具有不同的性质和程度。在提格雷人民民主运动案中,监测组发现,厄立特里亚违反了第1907(2009)号决议。在金波特7号案中,监测组认为厄立特里亚因庇护 Nega 先生和协助他工作而违反了该决议第15(d)段。鉴于缺乏证据显示厄立特里亚正在支持恢复团结民主阵线,监测组无法断定厄立特里亚是否违反了相关决议。

四. 为违反第1907(2009)号决议的行动筹措资金³²

A. 金融结构和控制的一般情况

65. 监测组已进行了调查,以确定厄立特里亚政府的收入是否被转用于资助违反第1907(2009)号决议的行动。过去几年来,监测组大量报告了厄立特里亚官员和人阵控制和管理该国经济的活动(见 S/2014/727, 第87-101段; S/2013/440, 第74-79段; S/2011/433, 第364-380段)。

66. 在本任务期间,数名厄立特里亚前政府官员和直接了解厄立特里亚财政状况的独立信息源都提供了相同的情况,即厄立特里亚政府继续维持由人阵控制的非正规经济,其交易是通过在若干法域设立的商业实体所构成的不透明网络以硬通货进行的。³³ 由于厄立特里亚政府完全缺乏财政透明度,因此能够维持由人阵控制的非正规经济。政府高官和人阵继续通过国有公司地下网络对收入实施完全的经济控制。³³ 监测组在以往报告(S/2014/727 和 S/2011/433)中大量记录了有关情况

³¹ 见 Cathy Ce ņe, “Djibouti: L’armée se heurte à la résistance du Frud”, *Humanité*, 2015年4月29日,可查阅 www.humanite.fr/djibouti-larmee-se-heurte-la-resistance-du-frud-572657; “The army wants to oust the FRUD from the Mablal Mountains”, *Africa Intelligence*, 2015年5月1日,可查阅 www.africaintelligence.com/ION/politics-power/2015/05/01/the-army-wants-to-oust-the-frud-from-the-mablal-mountains%2C108071805-GRA?did=108083176&eid=220126; “IOG wants to oust FRUD from the Djibouti-Ethiopia road”, *Africa Intelligence*, 2015年7月10日,可查阅 www.africaintelligence.com/ION/politics-power/2015/07/10/iog-wants-to-oust-frud-from-the-djibouti-ethiopia-road,108083682-GRA。

³² 安全理事会在其第1907(2009)号决议第19段(b)中指出,监测组不妨审议应提请委员会注意的有关该决议第16和第17段执行情况的任何资料。

³³ 在任务期间内,对掌握该国在欧洲、非洲、中东和北美洲等地金融和经济活动的前外交人员、厄立特里亚前官员和企业人士进行了多次访谈。2014年12月、2015年1月29日和30日、2015年3月27日至30日,在亚的斯亚贝巴对与厄立特里亚政府有关系的企业人士进行了多次访谈。

况，说明厄立特里亚如何管理一个由政府人员和人阵控制的离岸金融网络，以赚取收入流。

67. 监测组曾一再得出结论，厄立特里亚大部分公司都是国家所有，由政府高官、人阵和军方管理。与人阵有关联的公司所组成的网络依然是该国经济的主力军。政府通过人阵和军队完全控制了所有的经济活动，包括农业、贸易和制造业。2006年，政府通过了第 159/2007 号公告（《外资特别投资公告》），对国内批发业、国内零售业和机构委员会等金融服务领域的外国投资做出了专门限制，但允许其他领域的投资。³⁴ 同时，厄立特里亚政府 2005 年暂停所有私营企业在厄立特里亚从事建筑活动，实际将所有公共事业合同都交给了由人阵控制的企业。

B. 缺乏财政透明度

68. 按照安全理事会第 1907(2009)号决议第 19(b)段的规定，监测组的任务是调查厄立特里亚政府的收入是否被转用于资助破坏区域稳定的活动。

69. 尽管第 2023(2011)号决议第 12 段呼吁厄立特里亚表明其公共财政是透明的，包括为此与监测组合作，但厄立特里亚政府依然坚持不与监测组合作的立场。缺乏财政透明度和有效的控制，造成结构上的模糊不清，严重妨碍了监测组监测该国对第 1907(2009)号和第 2023(2011)号决议的遵守情况。厄立特里亚政府依然不披露其预算批款，该国预算也不对外公开。一般说来，财政透明也能带来财政问责。问责制要求政府募集公共资源和税收要有正当理由，并解释这些资源的用途。厄立特里亚政府目前没有遵循机构和政府采用的标准做法，即制定和管理预算应证明其合法性，并进行有效沟通。监测组敦促厄立特里亚政府保持公共财政和预算批款的透明度，以便监测组能够充分执行任务。

70. 在 2014 年 2 月 15 日于开罗举行的会议上，厄立特里亚总统高级政治顾问 Yamane Gebreab 答应向监测组提供过去三年来显示收支情况的预算文件。尽管监测组始终在跟踪这一请求，近来还在监测组与厄立特里亚政府分别于 2015 年 3 月 31 日和 8 月 21 日举行的两次视频会议上提出上述请求(见附件 1.2)，监测组迄今尚未收到任何这类文件。

71. 监测组对厄立特里亚公共财政总体上缺乏透明度感到关切，特别是在各国际组织正承诺对该国政府提供援助的时刻。缺乏财政透明度和财务报告系统，任何一个组织都很难管理捐助者提供的援助，确保资金的分配合乎预定用途。捐助界有义务对资金接受者进行充分监督，确保资金的使用不会违反制裁制度。

72. 2015 年 5 月，非洲开发银行宣布，该行已与厄立特里亚签订 4 150 万美元的供资协定，用于政府牵头的教育和农业项目。据厄立特里亚信息部长称，该协定

³⁴ 见美国国务院，2012 Investment Climate Statement on Eritrea(2012 年 6 月)。可查阅 <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191144.htm>。

由厄立特里亚财政部长 **Berhane Habtemariam** 和非洲开发银行区域主任 **Gabriel Negatu** 共同签署。³⁵ 该行历来与厄立特里亚有业务关系。据该行近期的一份报告称, 该银行集团资助了 10 项计划和一项研究, 累计承诺资金约 1.43 亿美元(1.01 亿记账单位),³⁶ 其中 33% 是非洲发展基金提供的赠款, 其余是该基金的贷款。³⁷ 此外, 据非洲开发银行称, 政府正在逐步实施银行资助的项目, 不过也出现一些延误, 原因是能力不足, 并且对银行的条例和程序不够熟悉。³⁵

73. 欧洲最近的移民危机使欧洲联盟更迫切地要解决移民问题, 更迫切地与厄立特里亚政府接触, 实施发展项目, 消解人们的移民愿望。根据欧洲联盟成员国对外边境行动合作管理局的数据, 2014 年有 35 000 名厄立特里亚人来到欧洲。³⁸ 欧洲联盟目前正在第 11 次欧洲开发基金(涵盖 2014-2020 年)框架下与厄立特里亚政府商谈一项重大的一揽子援助计划。

74. 欧洲开发基金于 1959 年启动, 是向非洲、加勒比和太平洋国家以及海外国家和领土提供发展援助的主要工具。在 2008-2013 年第 10 次欧洲开发基金期间, 为厄立特里亚拨付了 1.22 亿欧元。然而, 因厄立特里亚政府吸收资金缓慢, 上述金额减至 5 600 万欧元。据欧盟委员会称, 下列各部门中共有 4 个项目仍在第 10 次欧洲开发基金下贯彻实施: 农业和食品安全(4 000 万欧元)、对厄立特里亚社区法院的支持(520 万欧元)、公共行政管理能力建设(360 万欧元)及技术合作(1 020 万欧元)。³⁹ 欧盟国际合作与发展专员 **Neven Mimica** 在对欧洲议会发言时宣布, 援助将通过项目提供, 而不是直接给予受援国政府。⁴⁰

75. 在欧洲移民危机的背景下, 一些媒体报道称, 将在本期欧洲开发基金下拨付给厄立特里亚的资金将增加两倍, 达到 3 亿欧元。不过监测组从欧洲当局得到证

³⁵ 见“**AfDB and Eritrea sign US\$41.5 million education and agriculture funding agreement**”, **Caperi**, 2015 年 5 月 8 日。可查阅 www.caperi.com/afdb-and-eritrea-sign-us-41-million-education-and-agriculture-funding-agreement/。

³⁶ 非洲开发银行使用“记账单位”(简称为 UA)作为货币报告单位, 相当于国际货币基金组织的特别提款权。特别提款权的价值每天变动, 目前每天由货币基金组织以美元计算。1.01 亿记账单位被折合成特别提款权, 继而折合成美元, 依据的是 2015 年 9 月 18 日的汇率。关于汇率的进一步信息, 见 www.afdb.org/en/documents/financial-information/exchange-rates/。

³⁷ 见非洲开发集团编写的 2014-2016 年中期国家战略文件, 可查阅 www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/eritrea-interim-country-strategy-paper-i-csp-2014-2016-11-2014-50447/。

³⁸ 见欧洲联盟成员国对外边境行动合作管理局, **Annual Risk Analysis 2015**(Warsaw, April 2015)。可查阅 http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf。

³⁹ 5 月 31 日至 6 月 6 日在布鲁塞尔与欧洲联盟代表举行了数次会议。监测组会晤了国际合作与发展总局、欧洲议会部分议员、欧洲联盟非洲之角特别代表办公室的代表以及对外关系和外交事务代表。

⁴⁰ 与欧洲委员会国际合作与发展总局(东非与南部非洲发展合作司)的电子邮件联系, 2015 年 6 月 6 日。

实，关于操作细节的谈判仍在进行，在本报告撰写之际，仍未获知确切的细节和最后数字。⁴¹

76. 2010年至2012年，一些欧洲议员不断质疑欧盟委员会与厄立特里亚政府接触并为之提供新的一揽子援助计划的决定。2011年，他们要求委员会担保第10个欧洲开发基金下拨付的款项使用得当，并向欧洲议会提供资金分配细节。时任欧洲联盟外交事务与安全政策高级代表的凯瑟琳·阿什顿在2011年5月11日发布的书面答复中表示，欧盟委员会根据符合国际最佳做法的财务管理原则编写和执行预算报告。此外，方案的实施还受到几个控制机制的监督：供资协定中预先规定必须由外部咨询人进行外部财务审计和中期及财务评价。⁴²

77. 监测组访问了欧盟委员会总部，与各部门包括国际合作与发展总局(东非与南部非洲发展合作司)举行了会议。欧盟机构向监测组作出最高程度的保证，保证他们正在执行严格的监测和审计程序，⁴³ 确保仅向民众提供援助，不直接向厄立特里亚政府提供援助。⁴⁴ 代表们告诉监测组，资金将主要用于支持社会和经济发展，包括善政方案。³⁹

78. 监测组鼓励国际和区域机构和组织履行尽职责任，监测和充分监督向厄立特里亚提供的大额援助的分配。必须确保资金有案可查，不被转用于资助可能违反第1907(2009)号决议的活动。鉴于厄立特里亚政府缺乏财政和公共财政管理透明度，这一点尤其重要。

C. 侨税

79. 安全理事会在第2023(2011)号决议中谴责厄立特里亚政府利用“侨税”破坏非洲之角地区的稳定或将其用于违反有关决议的活动，包括采购武器及相关物资、支持区域武装反对派团体、或直接间接为这类团体提供资金转移或其他服务。安理会还决定厄立特里亚必须停止使用勒索、威胁使用暴力、欺诈或其他非法手段向境外国民或厄立特里亚后裔征税。

80. 因此，监测组展开调查，以判定厄立特里亚当局是否使用了非法的不正当手段在国外征税。为了调查厄立特里亚政府使用的方法，评估其是否使用了不正当

⁴¹ 见“Eritrea: EU plans to provide Eritrea’s oppressive regime with new funding”, *All Africa*, 28 April 2015, 可查阅 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201504281184.html>。另见与欧洲委员会国际合作与发展总局(东非与南部非洲发展合作司)的电子邮件联系，2015年6月6日。<http://allafrica.com/stories/201504281184.html>

⁴² 见 www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2011-002319&language=EN。

⁴³ 欧洲联盟分配援助款项的审计和财务程序详见 <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/1079>。

⁴⁴ 欧洲联盟监管和财务审计程序见 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/about-funding-and-procedures/audit-and-control_en。

手段征收域外税，监测组与会员国代表举行了会议，并对分布在欧洲、中东、东非和北美的厄立特里亚侨民进行了 40 多次访谈。⁴⁵

81. 监测组在此前的报告(S/2014/727、S/2013/440 和 S/2012/545)中大量谈到厄立特里亚全国议会 1994 年颁布的实行 2% 复苏和复兴税公告。在本任务期间，厄立特里亚侨民和东道国当局的多个来源都向监测组提供了证词，证明厄立特里亚政府继续对生活在外国的厄立特里亚公民实行域外征税规定。正如此前所报告的，在第 1907(2009)和第 2023(2011)号决议通过之后，厄立特里亚政府改变了征税办法，增加了政府检查。侨民和会员国的多个来源提供了证词，表明厄立特里亚驻外使领馆现在不象以前那样对立，公民得到的建议是直接向阿斯马拉缴税。⁴⁶ 缴税是厄立特里亚使领馆官员为公民提供服务的先决条件。同我们以前的调查结果一样，拒绝纳税往往导致侨民无法获得使领馆提供的服务。

82. 在监测组与厄立特里亚政府 2015 年 3 月 31 日举行的视频会议上，厄立特里亚政府重申其长期立场，即如果不纳税，则生活在国外的公民就会面临行政困境，例如“营业执照、土地权利及其他服务被拒”。监测组认为，这类行政惩罚措施属于间接利用恐惧心理，以控制收税过程。以往报告曾指出，厄立特里亚政府在其生活在国外的公民中制造了一种畏惧惶恐的氛围。监测组访谈过的大部分消息来源都表示，他们一直害怕将这些恐吓或胁迫措施报告给当地政府，因为担心那些亲厄立特里亚政府的人际网络会报复他们。监测组访谈的多个消息来源都确认，确实存在亲政府的人际网络，他们确实在厄立特里亚侨民中制造了恐惧气氛。一名现居欧洲、曾任职于厄立特里亚内部安全部队的前政府官员在 2014 年初叛逃后曾与监测组交谈。他告诉监测组，总统办公厅直接派遣他赴意大利开展行动，通过厄立特里亚驻意大利使馆收集居住在国外的厄立特里亚侨界的情况。中东、非洲和西欧的厄立特里亚侨民中的许多消息来源向监测组提供的证词进一步印证了地下线人网络的存在。

83. 2015 年 6 月发布的厄立特里亚人权调查委员会的调查结果与监测组本身的调查结果是一致的，即各地的使领馆都建立了复杂的线人网络，从居住在国外的厄立特里亚人那里收集情况并监视他们。委员会发现，“各地使馆为了找到替他们从事间谍活动的人，往往去接近那些厄立特里亚侨民，特别是那些缴纳了 2% 的复兴税的人，因为纳税被视为对政府的一种支持”(A/HRC/29/CRP.1, 第 348 段)。

84. 监测组还获得了书面证据，证明厄立特里亚政府继续为厄立特里亚武装部队募集资金，这是它在侨界收税活动的一部分。居住在联合王国的一名公民 2014 年收到的一张收据(见附件 5)显示，厄立特里亚政府要求该公民向厄立特里亚军方支付 200 英镑。

⁴⁵ 因担心厄立特里亚当局或厄立特里亚海外侨界其他人的报复，所有消息来源都要求匿名。

⁴⁶ 监测组在本任务期间对可信的消息来源进行了多次访谈，这些消息来源包括侨民、企业人士、负责该国财政和采购事务的前政府高级官员。

85. 在整个任务期间，监测组还咨询了被征税侨民所在会员国。它们一致表示，它们知道在征收该税，但没有从生活在这些国家的厄立特里亚侨民那里获得充足的证据，证明厄立特里亚政府使用勒索、威胁使用暴力、欺诈或其他不正当手段征税。另外，它们也建议厄立特里亚侨界，如果厄立特里亚政府采取任何行动，违反第 2023(2011)号决议第 11 段的规定进行征税，则应向当地执法当局报告。大多数会员国也像监测组一样，感到很难彻底说服厄立特里亚侨民正式、充分向当地政府报告以勒索、欺诈、威胁使用暴力等方式征税的行为，因为侨民们担心他们在厄立特里亚的家人遭到报复。

86. 2015 年 3 月 3 日，伦敦警察局收到针对厄立特里亚驻联合王国大使馆的一份起诉。原告称，大使馆命令他缴纳该税，这样才能获得领事服务。监测组约谈了该人，他在面谈时表示，他数次前往大使馆，想要为厄立特里亚的一名亲属获取委托书，以便解决家族企业待处理的财务和经营问题。2014 年 5 月 1 日，大使馆要求该人支付自 2009 年以来的欠款 350 英镑。当时，此人就该项税款而言享有免税资格，因为他提交了文件，证明自己当时是在联合王国接受高等教育。大使馆官员指示他用英镑直接在厄立特里亚缴税。他只好到厄立特里亚侨民中寻找要前往厄立特里亚的人，好帮他到阿斯马拉去交税。领事官员还告诉他，只有全额税款收到后，领馆才能了结他的企业事务和服务请求。监测组知道，伦敦警察局及其议会和外交分局审查了此案事实，以判定是否违反了联合王国法律或第 2023(2011)号决议的规定。⁴⁷ 监测组被告知，警察局评估认为，不存在违法情形，且未发现任何证据表明需要向外交与英联邦事务部报告违反该项决议的情形，因此不打算采取进一步行动。⁴⁸ 尽管该案结果如此，但应当指出，监测组以往曾记录并报告过，如一家庭成员未缴纳该税，则执照延期请求或委托书请求都可能被拒。

87. 2014 年，联合王国议会一名前议员请联合王国政府解释采取了什么措施遵守第 2023(2011)号决议。外交与英联邦事务部社区与地方政府司资深国务大臣在书面答复中表示，联合王国支持该决议，并呼吁厄立特里亚停止采用不正当手段征收该税。她还表示，2013 年 11 月 8 日，外交与英联邦事务部、国家打击犯罪局和西约克郡警察局与厄立特里亚侨民会面，讨论了该税的问题。会上，他们敦促厄立特里亚人向警察报告任何使用胁迫或其他不正当手段收税的行为。⁴⁹ 外交与英联邦事务部国务大臣在另一份书面答复中表示，根据英国法律，政府向海外公民征税不属于非法行为。不过，联合王国政府建议，任何被要求向厄立特里亚政府缴税的人如果遭受了违反第 2023(2011)号决议的行为，就应向警方报告，因为在联合王国，警方是调查这类指控的主管部门。

⁴⁷ 见 Sam Jones, “Diaspora tax for Eritreans living in UK investigated by metropolitan police”, *Guardian*, 9 June 2015. 可查阅 www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jun/09/eritrea-diaspora-tax-uk-investigated-metropolitan-police。

⁴⁸ 外交与英联邦事务部厄立特里亚组发送的电子邮件，2015 年 8 月 10 日。

⁴⁹ 见 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhansrd/text/140224w0001.htm。

88. 2015年6月初，德国议会就该税的问题展开辩论。当时正在就厄立特里亚人权状况调查委员会的报告展开大范围讨论。议会一致认为德国应当对征收该税一事仔细审查，并强调，应当停止以违反第2023(2011)号决议第11段的规定的方式征税。柏林联邦外交部告知监测组，政府没有对在德国征收该税的做法采取任何具体行动，因为征税行为完全符合国际和国家法律。过去，外交部曾向厄立特里亚表示，厄方不可以利用其银行账户或外交领事使团向厄立特里亚公民征税并转往国内。2012年，厄立特里亚驻德国使馆告知外交部，它将停止使用其账户征税。

89. 在监测组与厄立特里亚政府分别于2015年3月31日和8月21日举行的会议上，监测组请厄立特里亚常驻代表就该税问题提供具体情况，包括一份公告副本、概述公告执行程序 and 法规的正式文件以及证明每年征收的税款没有转用于违反安全理事会有关决议的活动的文件。厄立特里亚政府在2015年4月1日的答复中表示，公告只适用于厄立特里亚侨民，而不适用于已成为其他国家公民的厄立特里亚后裔(见附件1.1)。针对第2023(2011)号决议第11段的规定，政府表示，从未使用过胁迫手段或恐吓办法来征收该税，不交税的结果是受到行政措施的处罚，例如营业执照、土地权利及其他服务等被拒。此外，政府重申其一贯立场，即收税是以透明的方式进行，居住在境外的厄立特里亚人并没有因为未交税就受到起诉或定罪。监测组评估认为，这封信并没有充分解答3月31日的视频会议向上厄立特里亚政府提出的所有实质性问题。监测组在4月2日的信(见附件1.2)中再次要求提供更多具体情况。对此，厄立特里亚政府于4月2日书面致函答复。政府在信中表示，厄立特里亚常驻代表团已经在3月31日的视频会议上并在4月1日通过普通照会向委员会转递的文件中充分回答了所有问题。最后，在8月21日的视频会议中，厄立特里亚常驻代表否认该税是以违反第2023(2011)号决议的方式征收的。另外，厄立特里亚政府还在9月4日的信中表示，所有从该税获得的收入都“已转交财政部财务司和劳工与社会福利部”。据同一封信称，“2014年由2%的复苏和复兴税获得的年度税收为11 172 758.33美元，而政府用于支持烈属和伤残退伍军人的费用超过27 000 000.00美元。因此，将复苏和复兴税收入转用作其他目的的可能性是零。”厄立特里亚政府还向监测组提供了第17/1991号和第67/1995号公告的副本(见附件1.5)。它还解释说，依据第17/1991号和第67/1995号公告，“居住在国外的厄立特里亚人有义务依法纳税”，“居住在境外的厄立特里亚人也有义务依法纳税”(同上)。

五. 采矿部门收入

90. 监测组注意到安全理事会在第2023(2011)号决议第12段中对厄立特里亚采矿部门的收入可能被用于支持会破坏非洲之角地区稳定的活动表示关切，并呼吁厄立特里亚表明其公共财政是透明的，证明这些采矿活动的收入没有用于违反安理会的相关决议，为此，监测组就该政府是否为支持构成违反第1907(2009)号和第2023(2011)号决议行为的活动通过其金融机构转移来自采矿收入的硬通货进行了调查。

91. 监测组曾报告过厄立特里亚财政管理不透明和缺少预算拨款的情况。监测组无法获得关于该国金融体制和资金流动的重要信息，因此很难确定采矿部门是否在破坏非洲之角地区的稳定提供资金。获取信息是监测组对是否有资金被转用于破坏该地区稳定作出公正和准确评估的前提。厄立特里亚必须加强公共财政管理的机构透明度和问责制。

92. 由于采矿是厄立特里亚最成功的经济部门之一，而且采矿活动的付款是政府收入的重要来源，因此这种完全缺乏透明度的情况尤其引人关注。例如，厄立特里亚政府在 2015 年 9 月 4 日对监测组信函的答复中指出，该国 2014 年的采矿部门收入为 2 亿美元(见附件 1.5，第 27 段)。采矿部门继续扩张，为该国近期的经济增长作出了重大贡献。目前有数家跨国企业在厄立特里亚开展碳酸钾、银、铜和其他矿山的勘探项目。由于经济活动增强和对采矿部门的投资增加，预计该国 2015 年经济增长 2.1%，高于 2013 年的 1.3% 和 2014 年的 2.0%。⁵⁰

对政府的付款

93. 经营厄立特里亚碧沙矿场的加拿大公司耐森公司是目前唯一一家从事商业生产的公司，并继续为其生产活动向政府支付税款、特许权使用费和股权付款。耐森公司公布的数据显示，自从碧沙矿场开始商业运作以来，公司已向政府支付了大笔款项(见下表)。

耐森公司公布的数据

PAYMENTS TO GOVERNMENT					
Forms of taxation					
	TOTAL	2014	2013	2012	2011
Income taxes	\$ 395,053	\$ 88,983	\$ 60,484	\$ 209,586	\$ 36,000
Royalties	97,759	30,331	14,774	31,462	21,192
Payroll taxes	20,901	6,631	6,370	5,159	2,741
Withholding taxes, customs & duties ^[1]	15,206	4,260	5,007	3,236	2,703
	\$ 528,919	\$ 130,205	\$ 86,635	\$ 249,443	\$ 62,636
PAYMENTS TO ENAMCO					
Distributions ^[2]	144,750	76,750	—	68,000	—
Return of capital ^[2]	81,409	—	—	—	81,409
	\$ 226,159	\$ 76,750	\$ —	\$ 68,000	\$ 81,409
Total Payments to Government	\$ 755,078	\$ 206,955	\$ 86,635	\$ 317,443	\$ 144,045

^[1] Withholding taxes were merged with customs and duties in the 2014 reporting year
^[2] Of the \$226.1M paid to ENAMCO through December 31, 2014, ENAMCO has repaid \$124.7M in connection with its acquisition of an equity interest in BMSC

资料来源：耐森公司 2014 年企业社会责任报告，可查阅 www.nevsun.com/pdf/Nevsun-2014-CSR-Report.pdf。

⁵⁰ 见非洲开发银行 2015 年厄立特里亚国家报告。可查阅 www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2015/CN_data/CN_Long_EN/Eritrea_GB_2015.pdf。

94. 该表显示，耐森公司自 2011 年以来向政府支付了近 5.28 亿美元的所得税、特许权使用费和其他政府汇款，以分红的形式向厄立特里亚国家采矿公司(持有该矿 40% 的股份)支付了 2.26 亿美元，并为当地供应的商品和服务支付了 2.99 亿美元。监测组没有收到也无法从耐森公司、该国政府或厄立特里亚国家采矿公司获得独立审计的财务报表或记录，因此不能核实以上数字，特别是耐森公司向当地服务、其分包商及其当地雇员支付的薪金。

95. 监测组曾多次试图向耐森公司了解其在厄立特里亚的业务，从而核实该国政府没有通过其金融机构挪用和转移来自采矿部门的资金，以支持构成违反第 1907(2009)号决议行为的的活动。前几次任务期间，耐森公司在对监测组的一系列书面答复(见 S/2014/727、S/2013/440 和 S/2012/545) 中始终以保密和不披露协议为由，不回答监测组提出的问题，并多次指出这些问题应由该国政府回答。监测组多次请求该国政府在采矿收入问题上展示财政透明度，但政府始终拒绝提供实质性信息。

96. 正是在这种背景下，监测组密切监测加拿大法院在本任务期间接到的一起诉讼。2014 年 11 月 20 日，不列颠哥伦比亚最高法院接到一起对耐森公司的诉讼，该公司被控在碧沙矿场强迫劳动和实施不人道待遇。根据民事索赔通知(温哥华登记号：S-148932)，该国政府在 2002 年无限期延长了入伍士兵的服役时间，并强迫应征士兵为高级军官或人阵所拥有的多家公司提供劳务，其中包括 Segen 公司和 Mereb 公司。Segen 公司隶属于人阵，Mereb 公司则隶属于厄立特里亚军方。原告指控耐森的厄立特里亚子公司碧沙采矿股份公司及其承包商强迫劳动，工人每周工作 6 天，每天工作长达 12 小时，每月只能得到 10 美元的报酬。此外，原告称耐森公司与 Segen 公司、Mereb 公司和厄立特里亚军方合作在碧沙建造基础设施和采矿设施。

97. 由于厄立特里亚自然资源部门和厄立特里亚军方之间可能存在联系，监测组试图更清楚地了解该部门与武装部队之间的关系。具体而言，监测组试图了解和评估耐森公司是否违反安全理事会第 1907(2009)号和第 2023(2011)号决议规定的制裁制度，通过 Segen 公司、Mereb 公司或在该矿开展业务的其他任何国有实体将资金转移给安全和武装部队。

98. 碧沙矿场位于阿斯马拉以西 150 公里。其占地面积约为 46 平方公里，拥有锌、铜和金矿床。碧沙采矿股份公司是一家厄立特里亚公司，负责开采和经营该矿。耐森资源是耐森公司的间接全资子公司，拥有碧沙采矿股份公司 60% 的股份，厄立特里亚国家采矿公司持有其余 40% 的股份。耐森公司在答复加拿大民事索赔案的信中指出，碧沙采矿股份公司聘用南非的 Senet 公司，作为碧沙矿场项目的主要工程、采购和施工管理承包商。Senet 公司随后聘用了几家分包商，其中包括厄立特里亚土木工程和建筑公司 Segen 公司。耐森公司在同一封信中否认了 Mereb 公司向 Segen 公司、Senet 公司或碧沙采矿股份公司提供服务的指控。

99. 在整个任务期间，监测组从多个来源收到了证词，包括一位前厄立特里亚高级官员关于 Senet 公司、Segen 公司和 Mereb 公司让入伍士兵参与该矿的建设和工作的证词。根据多个可靠消息来源，耐森公司聘来提供劳务的国有承包商和分包商使用如下的非正式支付结构：对于该矿雇佣的入伍士兵或当地工人，承包商和分包商按人头向耐森公司收取一定费用，但付给入伍士兵或当地工人的工资远远低于这一数字。不清楚耐森公司和承包商所签订劳动协议中的具体数字，不过目前承包商和分包商工人每月领取的工资为 200 至 500 纳克法。⁵¹ 耐森付给 Segen 公司和 Mereb 公司的其余资金被上述承包商扣留，由于承包商实际上是国有企业，因此这笔资金被军方和政府获得。

100. 由于厄立特里亚经济被执政的人阵党和军方所控制，因此极难区分人阵所拥有的公司和军方的公司结构及所有权。一名人阵前高级官员表示，在钱的问题上，国防部和人阵之间没有区别。⁵² 在这类合同安排中，国有企业乃至政府在人阵和军方所拥有的企业中几乎零成本使用入伍士兵组成的劳动力，并从中渔利。

101. 由于无法获得文件，而且厄立特里亚和耐森公司不予合作，监测组无法跟踪或解释耐森公司/碧沙采矿股份公司支付给其承包商的资金以及承包商付给其劳动力的金额之间的差异。不过，厄立特里亚人权状况调查委员会报告中的内容佐证了监测组的调查结果，该报告指出，应征士兵尽管在为一家外国公司工作，却没有得到额外的报酬。委员会指出，外国公司用于支付工人报酬的资金被政府扣留(见 A/HRC/29/42)。美国 2006 年的外交电报也指出，Segen 公司的主要优势在于其大部分雇员为服兵役人员，雇佣劳动力的成本几乎为零，因此它能压倒私营部门的竞争对手，成为该国最大的建筑公司。⁵³

102. 2015 年 5 月 19 日，监测组致函耐森公司首席执行官，询问耐森公司是否违反对厄立特里亚实施的制裁制度，通过 Segen 公司和 Mereb 公司或任何其他承包商或分包商将资金转移给该国安全和武装部队。耐森公司在 2015 年 6 月 15 日的书面答复中表示，很多问题已呈交给不列颠哥伦比亚法院，因此公司不能对可能进入法律程序的事项作出答复。耐森公司以此为由拒绝披露监测组所要求的任何信息。首席执行官进一步表示，耐森公司和碧沙采矿股份公司都从未与 Mereb 公司、厄立特里亚军方或人阵有过任何商业安排，它们也不知道这些方面可能存

⁵¹ 在 2015 年 1 月 20 日至 23 日和 2015 年 5 月 5 日至 7 日期间，同负责管理付款的前厄立特里亚高级官员进行了数次约谈，包括：2015 年 5 月 6 日约谈一名前厄立特里亚政府高级官员；2015 年 5 月 8 日约谈一名前厄立特里亚国防军高级军官；2015 年 1 月 22 日约谈一名与该地区联系密切的厄立特里亚驻欧洲主要记者。此外，在整个任务期间，多位熟悉厄立特里亚自然资源部门的人士提供了证词，并与非政府组织举行了会晤。

⁵² 同一名与厄立特里亚政府有积极联系的前厄立特里亚高级官员的约谈，2015 年 5 月 5 日。

⁵³ 见 Matthew McClearn, “The slaves of Eritrea” *Canadian Business*, 2014 年 5 月 9 日。可查阅 <http://www.canadianbusiness.com/global-report/the-slaves-of-eritrea/>。

的任何商业关系。他还附了一封信，作为公司对不列颠哥伦比亚民事索赔案的答复，其中概述了耐森公司对诉讼指控以及各类其他事项的立场，包括与 Segen 公司和厄立特里亚国家采矿公司之间关系的详细情况。

103. 在其任务期间，监测组再次请求厄立特里亚政府提供过去三年的预算文件，说明收入和支出，但尚未收到这些资料。厄立特里亚总统高级政治顾问 Yemane Gebreab 曾于 2014 年 2 月 15 日在开罗同意了这个请求。在本任务期间，监测组在 2015 年 3 月 31 日和 8 月 21 日召开的两次视频会议中再次向厄立特里亚常驻代表提出这一请求。该国政府在 2015 年 4 月 1 日向委员会发出普通照会，其中完全没有回答所提出的实质性问题。普通照会所附的文件表示，“安理会决议关于采矿部门的规定基于收入的可能用途的假定和推理假设”，“由于监测组已经确认没有发现厄立特里亚支持青年党的任何证据，因此监测组没有理由继续要求厄立特里亚就该事项提供信息”。该国政府在同一份文件中指出，“国家需要和使用其收入的每一分钱来消除贫穷”，“我们的发展伙伴可以为此作证”。常驻代表在 8 月 21 日的视频会议中指出，耐森公司经营的碧沙矿场的收入由公司和政府分享，但厄立特里亚没有从其采矿部门获益，因为它将收入用于创造有利的条件，为该部门吸引更多外国直接投资。此外，该国政府在 9 月 4 日的信(见附件 1.5)中指出：

“相比教育、卫生和粮食安全等公共及社会支出，厄立特里亚政府单从碧沙矿业中获得收入微不足道。例如，2014 年厄立特里亚政府的教育、卫生和粮食安全预算就高达 328 894 753.00 美元，高于本国采矿部门 2 亿美元的收入。”

六. 阻碍执行第 1862(2009)号决议的行为

104. 监测组以前曾报告过有关阻碍执行安全理事会第 1862(2009)号决议的行为(见 S/2012/545、S/2013/440 和 S/2014/727)。安理会在第 1907(2009)号决议第 4 段中要求厄立特里亚提供关于 2008 年 6 月 10 日至 12 日两国边境冲突以来在作战中失踪的吉布提战斗人员的信息，以便有关方面确定吉布提战俘的存在和状况。安理会在第 2023(2011)号决议中再次表示严重关切厄立特里亚和吉布提之间的边界争端，并呼吁厄立特里亚和吉布提共同执行 2010 年 6 月 6 日在卡塔尔主持下签署的协定。

105. 在其任务期间，监测组向厄立特里亚政府询问据报在作战中失踪的吉布提军事人员的情况，但在 2015 年 3 月 31 日和 8 月 21 日监测组与厄立特里亚常驻代表举行的视频会议中，厄立特里亚政府拒绝讨论他们的命运，称该问题由卡塔尔调解小组处理，因此只能通过该渠道解决。厄立特里亚在 4 月 17 日与委员会的书面沟通中表示，“战俘问题是七点《全面协定》的一部分”，“不应采取挑肥拣瘦的办法，绝不允许采取或制定平行举措”。

106. 监测组注意到吉布提针对厄立特里亚的言辞愈加激烈。2015年2月，吉布提总统伊斯梅尔·奥马尔·盖莱和埃塞俄比亚总理海尔马利亚姆·德萨莱尼指控厄立特里亚破坏地区稳定，吉布提总统称厄立特里亚正在破坏包括吉布提在内的该地区各国的和平与安全。厄立特里亚驳斥了这些指控。⁵⁴

107. 监测组要求厄立特里亚和吉布提两国政府提供更多关于失踪士兵的信息。吉布提给予了合作，与监测组分享了据称在边境冲突中被厄立特里亚抓获的18名吉布提男囚犯的姓名、出生日期和所在团(见附件6)。这些人的名单如下：

- (a) Aden Ahmed, 生于1953年;
- (b) Abdourahman Mahmoud Farah, 生于1967年;
- (c) Hassan Elmi Had, 生于1965年;
- (d) Hoch Ofleh Kochin, 生于1967年;
- (e) Djama Ahmed Abrar, 生于1972年;
- (f) Ahmed Eleyeh Yabeh, 生于1971年;
- (g) Awaleh Eleyeh Yabeh, 生于1973年;
- (h) Awaleh Abdi Omar, 生于1973年;
- (i) Osman Mohamoud Ahmed, 生于1964年;
- (j) Cheiko Borito Ali, 生于1964年;
- (k) Kamil Youssef Ali 生于1970年;
- (l) Kadir Soumboul Ali, 生于1975年;
- (m) Mohamoud Hildid, 生于1971年;
- (n) Meiraneh Alo Bock, 生于1973年;
- (o) Houssein Ibrahim Houmed, 生于1978年;
- (p) Abdillahi Daher Said, 生于1965年;
- (q) Ali Gohari Gadito, 生于1968年;
- (r) Mohamed Youssoud Oudoum, 生于1966年。

⁵⁴ 见“Djibouti, Ethiopia accuse Eritrea of sabotaging stability”, *Bloomberg*, 2015年2月13日, 可查阅 www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-13/djibouti-ethiopia-accuse-eritrea-of-sabotaging-horn-of-africa; “Djibouti: leaders ‘Eritrea undermining regional stability’”, *Geeska Afrika*, 2015年2月8日, 可查阅 www.geeskaafrika.com/leaders-eritrea-undermining-regional-stability/7991/。

108. 吉布提政府还分享了据称在边境冲突中关押的厄立特里亚人名单。2010年8月24日编制的这份名单中包括据称被关押的17名厄立特里亚男子的姓名、原籍地和编制名单时的年龄(见附件6.2)。这些人的名单如下:

- (s) Binyam Mengistab;
- (t) Mohamed Mahmud Abraham;
- (u) Shishay Zejarayas Weldemariam;
- (v) Kuwaja Halemikael Gebreslade;
- (w) Yonas Berektb Msgna;
- (x) Tesfu Habtezyg Nuguse;
- (y) Ahmed Mohamed Fegih;
- (z) Fishale Kubrom Tekle;
- (aa) Asfaha Araia Teklesenbet;
- (bb) Tesfu Beyne Gebrab;
- (cc) Merhawy Teklehaymanot;
- (dd) Nuguse Mana Andu;
- (ee) Beraki Tekleab Gebrekidan;
- (ff) Kesete Sbhetu Nuguse;
- (gg) Tekleweyni Hadgu Abadi;
- (hh) Ayob Haileab Habtemariam;
- (ii) Tesfu Weldemikal Fruzin。

109. 吉布提外交部还向监测组提供了据称厄立特里亚破坏和平与安全行为的记录(按时间顺序排列)。该清单包含吉布提和厄立特里亚边界地区一起绑架案的详情。吉布提官员称,厄立特里亚士兵在2014年7月25日绑架了一位名叫 Ahmad Abdullah Kamil 的吉布提士兵,当时一辆卡塔尔车辆正在边界地区护送该士兵。经卡塔尔调解后,他随后于2014年9月15日被释放。⁵⁵

110. 卡塔尔政府通知监测组,该国目前约有200名士兵驻扎在厄立特里亚和吉布提的边界地区。负责调解该进程的官员一直在积极参与解决该问题,但尚未报

⁵⁵ 2015年2月5日与吉布提驻卡塔尔大使 Moamin Hassan Berri 在多哈会晤。吉布提外交部还向监测组提供了吉布提声称涉及厄立特里亚的事件清单(按时间顺序排列)。该清单包含据称2014年7月25日在无人区发生的绑架案详情。

告任何进展。卡塔尔外交部长哈立德·本·穆罕默德·阿提亚与两国高级官员举行了四次会晤，包括 2014 年 3 月 3 日和 10 月 31 日与厄立特里亚总统的会晤。总统还在 2015 年 8 月底前往多哈，会见卡塔尔埃米尔谢赫·塔米姆·本·哈马德·阿勒萨尼。⁵⁶

111. 监测组仍然认为，厄立特里亚拒绝协作或就吉布提战俘问题提供信息构成了阻碍执行第 1862(2009)号决议的行为，应审议对责任人采取第 1907(2009)号决议规定的针对性措施。

七. 阻碍监测组的调查或工作

112. 安全理事会在第 1907(2009)号决议第 15(e)段和第 2111(2013)号决议第 3 段中禁止任何阻碍监测组的调查或工作的行为，并规定此种阻碍是列名的标准。

113. 安全理事会在第 2111(2013)号决议第 31 段中着重指出，安理会期待厄立特里亚政府提供方便，让监测组不再拖延地进入厄立特里亚。此外，安理会在第 32 段中敦促所有会员国确保同监测组合作，并确保监测组可以不受阻碍地接触监测组认为与执行任务有关的人、文件和地点。

114. 厄立特里亚政府还阻止监测组在本任务期间前往阿斯马拉或在厄立特里亚境内开展调查。监测组认为那些对阻碍行为负有责任者违反了第 1907(2009)号决议第 15(e)段和第 2111(2013)号决议第 3 段的规定。

八. 建议

与厄立特里亚政府的接触

115. 安全理事会在第 2182(2014)号决议中欢迎厄立特里亚政府和监测组的代表举行会晤。安理会还强调指出，它期望加深合作，包括为此在当前任务期间访问厄立特里亚。由于该决议所述接触缺乏进展且厄立特里亚政府没有提供实质性资料，监测组建议安理会就深化和推进接触进程的方式提供具体的指导意见。

违反全面彻底军火禁运的情况

116. 鉴于第 1907(2009)号决议第 5 和第 6 段所述对厄立特里亚的双向军火禁运，监测组建议开展涉及厄立特里亚领土、领水、领空、安全部队和机构的军事行动的会员国寻求委员会关于遵守该决议的指导意见。

⁵⁶ 见“President Isaias arrives in Doha for a working visit”, Tesfanews, 2015 年 8 月 19 日，可查阅 www.tesfanews.net/president-isaias-arrives-in-doha/; “HH the Emir holds talks with President of Eritrea”, Qatar News Agency, 2015 年 8 月 19 日，可查阅 www.qna.org.qa/en-us/News/15081914430028/HH-the-Emir-Holds-Talks-with-President-of-Eritrea。

为违反第 1907(2009)号决议的行动筹措资金

117. 安全理事会在第 2060(2012)号决议第 13(k)段中授权监测组协助确定可在哪些领域中加强该区域国家的能力，以便协助执行索马里和厄立特里亚军火禁运。由于厄立特里亚的公共财政管理系统不透明以及对资源可能被用于破坏该区域稳定的担忧，监测组建议安理会敦促会员国考虑向厄立特里亚政府提供能力建设援助，以提高和加强该国公共财政的透明度。

Annex 1

**Correspondence between the Monitoring Group and the
Government of Eritrea**

Annex 1.1 : Government of Eritrea Correspondence, dated 1 April 2015

ቀዋሚ ሚሽን ሃገረ ኤርትራ
አብ ውድብ ሕቡራት ሃገራት ኒዩ ዮርክ



البعثة الدائمة لدولة إريتريا
لدى الأمم المتحدة - نيويورك

Permanent Mission of The State of Eritrea
To the United Nations, New York

ERITREA'S RESPONSE PRESENTED DURING THE INFORMAL CONSULTATION FACILITATED BY THE CHAIR OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE

New York, 31 March 2014

1. Eritrea thanks the Chair of the Security Council Committee, H.E. Ambassador Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño, for his active and constructive engagement in facilitating today's informal consultation with the Somalia Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG).
2. The politically motivated justifications for the imposition of sanctions in 2009 against Eritrea, i.e., support for al-Shabab in Somalia and the Eritrea-Djibouti issue has long proven to be non-existent. In its recent report the SEMG has ascertained that it "**has found no evidence of Eritrean support to Al Shabaab**". Moreover, the Presidents of Eritrea and Djibouti had entrusted the Emir of Qatar to mediate in their Agreement of 6 June 2010. This Agreement was endorsed by the UN Security Council. Accordingly, the Government of Eritrea (GoE) calls for the unconditional and immediate lifting of the sanctions imposed on the people of Eritrea.
3. It must be underlined that the SEMG has twice visited Eritrea. The Group met with all relevant government officials it had requested to meet. Eritrean officials have also met six times with the SEMG outside Eritrea, the latest of which being the constructive dialogue facilitated by the previous Chair of the Committee, H.E. Ambassador Oh Joon, in Paris, Cairo and New York in 2013 and 2014.
4. In all these interactions, the GoE has presented comprehensively, in writing and orally, its perspectives and explanations concerning the unjust and illegal sanction resolutions as well as adequately responded to various baseless allegations levelled against it. With the hope of dispelling the assumptions and baseless allegation once and for all, Eritrea would like to

present its views on issues of arms embargo, 2% Reconstruction and Recovery Tax, Natural Resources and Djibouti Eritrea issue.

Arms Embargo

5. The arms embargo imposed on Eritrea has no justification as Eritrea has never threatened regional and international peace and security. Eritrea's focus has been and remains hinged on tackling its myriad of economic and human developmental challenges. It harbours neither the desire, nor has the financial capacity, to funnel its limited resources towards unnecessary military expenditures.
6. However unjustified and lopsided the Security Council arms embargo is, Eritrea has not violated the arms embargo provisions.
7. The arms embargo:
 - a. Violates Eritrea's right for self-defense in accordance to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. When Ethiopia continues to occupy Eritrea's sovereign territories, including the town of Badme, the arms embargo punishes the victim and awards the culprit. Ethiopia is on an arms spending spree and in 2014 purchased weapons worth 200 million US dollars from Ukraine alone.
 - b. Will potentially create military imbalances that would encourage Ethiopia to contemplate another reckless adventure of aggression against Eritrea. Ethiopia is diligently working for regime change in Eritrea and has publicly pronounced that it will undertake military action inside Eritrea.
8. The arms embargo against Eritrea must be seen in the context of the current regional security developments in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea Region. Today Somalia, Libya, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Mali, etc. are unfortunately in turmoil. Extremism and terrorism is spreading in the region and globally. Yemen, whom Eritrea shares long border on the Red Sea, including Bab el-Mandab, and which is only 30 minutes flight, is regrettably in crisis.
9. In a volatile region of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, Eritrea with 50% Christian and 50% Muslims and nine ethnic groups, remains a peaceful and harmonious country. With 1200 k.m. of coastline and more than 350 islands on the Red Sea, Eritrea is strategically located at a major international maritime route that connects Bab el-Mandab and the Suze Canal. Invariably, for the sake of regional and international peace and security, Eritrea must be supported, not restricted. Unlike some countries who are asking the UN

Security Council for military action and intervention, Eritrea's request is clear and simple—it is asking the Security Council to lift the arms embargo so that it can effectively and efficiently fight all types of extremism and terrorism as well as protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Prevention is much better than crisis management.

2% Recovery and Reconstruction Tax (RRT)

10. The UN Security Council Resolution does not prevent Eritrea from collecting RRT from its citizens. In fact, Eritrea's action is consistent with the African Union Summit Decision that calls for the involvement of the Diaspora community in the social, political, cultural and economic development of their countries of origin.
11. RRT is an alternative and creative way of financing development that was promulgated in 1994. Until it was misrepresented and targeted as one of the areas that will weaken the Eritrean economy, it was a program that was emulated by numerous developing countries. Eritrea's diplomats and officials were invited to different forum to share their creative method of engaging the Diaspora in the national development of the country of origin.
12. The RRT represents a symbolic burden sharing by the Eritreans in the Diaspora with the people inside the country. In this sense, its historical, moral, humanitarian and patriotic values are more significant and profound than its material dividend. In fact, the funds collected annually are modest that should not be overstated when compared with government budget and expenditure on basic social services.
13. Make no mistake; the RRT Proclamation specifically targets only Eritrean citizens in the Diaspora, not citizens of other countries of who are of Eritrean decent. SEMG's presentation of RRT as "extraterritorial tax" is an attempt to give a misguided impression that the RRT is imposed on foreign nationals.
14. The deliberate distorted allegations that the SEMG attempts to present as a fact that the GoE uses "extortion, threats of violence, fraud and other illicit means" to collect the RRT is utterly baseless. It is a calculated misinformation aimed at preventing the active and voluntary participation of Eritreans in the Diaspora in the social and political affairs as well as economic development of their country of origin.
15. The Eritrean government has never used "coercive methods or intimidation" to collect the 2% RRT. The RRT is implemented in a transparent way. While Eritrean tax evaders residing in the country are legally charged and

- convicted for their failure to respect the taxation law, Eritreans residing abroad are not even charged or convicted. They will only face explicit administrative measures such as the “denial of a business license, land entitlement, and other services”. These measures are not and cannot be considered “extortion, coercion, or intimidation.”
16. Eritrean taxation rules and measures are in no way different from those taken by any country. For example, all citizens of the United States are taxed under the same personal tax system whether they live in the country or abroad, and no matter where and how they earned their income. If these American citizens refuse to pay or avoid doing so, the U.S. government does not only take administrative action but will take additional necessary legal actions. This cannot be called “coercion or intimidation”. In fact, the US government is contemplating not issuing a passport to individuals evading taxes. It has also become a norm for some rich European individuals to revoke their citizenship in order to avoid higher tax regimes.
 17. Concerning the role of diplomatic and consular mission, Eritrean missions abroad, including the Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations, as a representative of all institutions of sending state have the legal right under the Vienna Convention and an obligation towards their citizens to give the necessary information and advice on why, how and where RRT are paid. This cannot be considered “solicitation”, “coercion” or “intimidation”.

Natural Resources

18. The provisions of the UNSC resolution related to the mining sector are anchored on hypothetical and speculative assumptions of “potential use of revenue”. Since the SEMG has itself ascertained that it “has found no evidence of Eritrean support to Al Shabaab”, there is no justification for the SEMG to continue requesting Eritrea to provide information on this matter.
19. Even though there are 17 foreign companies that have been granted mineral exploration and development licenses, today Bisha mining plant, jointly owned by Nevsun, a Canadian Company, and Eritrean National Mining Corporation (ENAMCO), is the only plant that is in the production phase.
20. The financial proceedings of the Bisha plant are issued on a quarterly basis and are available in the public domain, including in the Nevsun website. These financial reports include the proceedings that accrue to Eritrea in the form of corporate tax, royalties and dividends for anyone to read.

21. Eritrea which is a developing country needs and uses every single penny from its revenue for the eradication of poverty. Our development partners can testify to this fact.

Djibouti

22. Eritrea is fully committed to the Qatari mediated comprehensive agreement signed between the Presidents of Eritrea and Djibouti on 6 June 2010. The issue of Prisoners of War is part and parcel of the seven point comprehensive Agreement. There should not be cherry-picking approach and parallel initiatives must not be allowed or created.
23. The Qatari army is deployed at the common border of Eritrea and Djibouti.
24. The relationship between Eritrea and Djibouti does not warrant the continuation of the sanctions under any pretext.

Conclusion

25. It has been ascertained beyond any reasonable doubt that Eritrea does not support Al-Shabab in Somalia and the relationship between Eritrea and Djibouti does not constitute a threat to regional peace and security. Combating extremism and terrorism in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region requires effective regional and international cooperation. Taking in to account Eritrea's strategic location and its commitment for regional peace and integration, the continuation of sanctions against Eritrea are not justified by any measurement. They must be immediately and unconditionally lifted.
26. Lifting the unjust sanctions will also help Eritrea to enhance its national economic development agenda, which is guided by principle of self-reliance. It will definitely create employment and other opportunities for the youth and women. Sanctioning a developing country like Eritrea also contradicts the letter and spirit of the Post-2015 Development Agenda, "No Country Should Be Left Behind".
27. Eritrea once again reiterates the need for the Somalia Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) to respect the standards for investigation as stipulated in the Report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997) which, inter alia, underscores the need for expert panels to rely on verified information and documents, and ensure that

their “assertions are corroborated by solid information and that their findings are substantiated by credible sources”.

28. The SEMG must refrain from dwelling on the Eritrea-Ethiopia issue, which is outside its mandate.
29. It must also “respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Eritrea” that is enshrined in the UN Charter. It must strictly adhere to its mandate, which is to monitor Eritrea’s support to al-Shabab in Somalia and the Djibouti/Eritrea issue in the context its implication for the maintenance of regional peace and security. It must also adhere to the principles of transparency, objectivity and political independence.

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Annex 1.2: Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group Correspondence dated 2 April 2015

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group

REFERENCE: S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.9

2 April 2015

Excellency,

I have the honour to address you in my capacity as Coordinator of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) mandated pursuant to paragraph 46 of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014), which is attached for ease of reference. Also attached are the letters from the Secretary-General appointing the members of the Group (S/2015/67 and S/2014/854).

In accordance with its mandate, the Monitoring Group is responsible for investigating, *inter alia*:

- violations of the arms embargos on Somalia and Eritrea;
- acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia;
- obstruction of humanitarian assistance to Somalia;
- Eritrean support for individuals and groups responsible for destabilization of, or violence in, the region;
- obstruction of the implementation of resolution 1862 (2009) concerning Djibouti;
- obstruction of the work or investigations of the Monitoring Group; and
- violations of the ban on the exportation and importation of charcoal from Somalia.

On behalf of the Monitoring Group, I would like to thank you for participating in the meeting held on 31 March 2015 via videoconference, under the auspices of the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) (hereafter "the Committee"), between the Monitoring Group and the Government of Eritrea, represented by you as the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations, and in the presence of the Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch, Security Council Affairs Division of the United Nations Secretariat. The videoconference followed the earlier meeting between you and the Monitoring Group in New York on 10 February 2015.

/...

His Excellency
Mr. Girma Asmerom Tesfay
Permanent Representative of the State of Eritrea
to the United Nations
New York

cc: Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

The purpose of this videoconference was to enable the Monitoring Group to provide advance visibility to the Government of Eritrea on the Group's preliminary findings and an opportunity to respond to them. I would like to reiterate that the Group is committed to a fair process and transparency.

The Monitor Group would also like to thank you for the note verbale dated 1 April 2015 from your Permanent Mission to the United Nations. The Monitoring Group has reviewed its content and is of the view that it does not fully address all the substantive issues and specific questions posed to the Government of Eritrea during the videoconference. As discussed then, the Monitoring Group is currently investigating the following issues pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 15 and 16 of resolution 1907 (2009), paragraphs 3 and 10 to 14 of resolution 2023 (2011), and paragraph 5 (ii) of resolution 1862 (2009):

Arms Embargo

The Monitoring Group discussed reports that the *MV Shaker I* cargo ship docked at Berbera port in Somaliland in January 2015. Upon an inspection by local authorities, military hardware was discovered on board the ship. The hardware was *en route* from Sudan to Abu Dhabi for the annual International Defence Exhibition and Conference (IDEX) that took place from 22 to 26 February 2015. The Monitoring Group has received information that the *MV Shaker I* also docked at the Eritrean port of Massawa where it unloaded at least six containers. The Group would like to reiterate its request made during our videoconference to receive further information on the contents of the containers.

Armed Groups - TPDM

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of a possible violation of paragraph 15 (b) of Security Council resolution 1907 (2009) in connection with preliminary information received by the Group indicating that the Government of Eritrea might be supporting, arming and training the Tigray People's Democratic Movement (TPDM), an armed Ethiopian opposition group. The Monitoring Group requested the following information from the Government of Eritrea:

- The sources of arms that might be provided to the TPDM by the Government of Eritrea;
- More information on claims that the TPDM has evolved into a paramilitary force; and
- Information regarding the location of military camps where the TPDM is being trained.

Djibouti

The Monitoring Group requested the Government of Eritrea to make available information pertaining to Djiboutian combatants missing in action since the border clashes of 10 to 12 June 2008.

/...

Diaspora Tax

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of the “Diaspora tax” and requested the following:

- Further information on the methods utilized to collect the tax;
- A copy of the Rehabilitation and Recovery Tax Proclamation (RRT) that was enacted by the Eritrean National Assembly in 1994, including official documentation that outlines the procedures and/or regulations regarding the law’s enforcement measures; and
- Documentation showing that the revenue currently collected annually through this tax is not being diverted to activities that violate relevant Security Council resolutions.

Natural Resources

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of natural resources in order to better understand the use of revenues from natural resources and requested Eritrea to share any documentation which shows that the proceeds of mining activities are not being used to violate relevant Security Council resolutions. During the last mandate, the Government of Eritrea committed itself to providing the Monitoring Group with budgetary documents that clearly demonstrate how revenues derived from the mining sector are being used. The Monitoring Group would like to reiterate this outstanding request (as outlined in OC S/AC.29/2014/SEMG/OC.64)

Visit to Asmara

In the overall context of the issues raised during the videoconference on 31 March 2015, the Monitoring Group discussed the possibility of a courtesy visit to Asmara. Accordingly, we look forward to continue this discussion with you and your Government.

We would be most grateful for your reply as soon as possible and no later than 17 April 2015, through the Acting Secretary of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, Ms. Snjezana Gillingham (Room DC2-2052, United Nations, New York, NY 10017; fax: +1-212-963-1300; email: gillingham@un.org).

Excellency, please allow me to offer you the assurances of my highest consideration.



Christophe Trajber
Coordinator
Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
Security Council resolution 2182 (2014)

Annex 1.3: Government of Eritrea Correspondence, dated 17 April 2015

SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE PURSUANT
TO RESOLUTIONS 751 (1992) AND 1907 (2009)
CONCERNING SOMALIA AND ERITREA

S/AC.29/2015/COMM.24
17 April 2015
ORIGINAL: English

Letter dated 17 April 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the State of Eritrea
to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

Excellency,

On 2 April 2015 I received a letter from the Coordinator of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group forwarded by Ms. Snježana Gillingham, Acting Secretary of Security Council Committee requesting Eritrea's response by 17 April to questions raised by the SEMG.

Even though I have clearly answered the questioned posed by the SEMG during the two hours videoconference that took place on 31 March 2015, under your able leadership, as well as through a written submission that I sent on 1 April 2015, once again I wish to attach Eritrea's response for the record and ease of reference. If there is any relevant additional information, I want to assure that I remain open to share it with you and the SEMG.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration and I would be most grateful if the letter and its annex could be circulated to all the members of the United Nations Security Council Committee, established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009).



Girma Asmerom Tesfay
Ambassador/Permanent Representative

Annex 1.4: Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group Correspondence dated 25 August 2015

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group

REFERENCE: S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.86

25 August 2015

Excellency,

I have the honour to address you in my capacity as Coordinator of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) mandated pursuant to paragraph 46 of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014).

In accordance with its mandate, the Monitoring Group is responsible for investigating, *inter alia*:

- violations of the arms embargos on Somalia and Eritrea;
- acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia;
- obstruction of humanitarian assistance to Somalia;
- Eritrean support for individuals and groups responsible for destabilization of, or violence in, the region;
- obstruction of the implementation of resolution 1862 (2009) concerning Djibouti;
- obstruction of the work or investigations of the Monitoring Group; and
- violations of the ban on the exportation and importation of charcoal from Somalia.

I am writing following the videoconference held on 21 August 2015 and organized under the auspices of the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea (hereafter "the Committee"), between the Monitoring Group and the Government of Eritrea, represented by you as Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations, and in the presence of the Deputy Political Coordinator of Venezuela, Alfredo Toro Carnevali, representing the Chair of the Committee, as well as the Secretary of the Committee. This videoconference was the third interaction between the Monitoring Group and the Government of Eritrea during the Group's current mandate; it followed two earlier meetings that were held, outside of Eritrea, in New York, United States, on 10 February 2015 and a videoconference on 31 March 2015.

During the videoconference on 21 August 2015, the Monitoring Group explained that it had completed its investigative phase and was currently drafting its final report on Eritrea. Prior to reaching its final conclusions and completing its report, the Group will endeavour to reflect the views of the Government of Eritrea based on their substantial value and as it relates to the Group's mandate.

/...

His Excellency
Mr. Girma Asmerom Tesfay
Permanent Representative of the State of Eritrea
to the United Nations
New York

The Monitoring Group described its investigations and requested additional information along the points below:

Armed Groups

1. Al-Shabaab

The Monitoring Group informed the Government of Eritrea that it had found no evidence of Eritrean support to Al-Shabaab during the course of the mandate.

2. National Security Office

The Monitoring Group understands that Colonel Simon Ghebredengel and Colonel Abraha Kassa oversee the country's National Security Office (NSO), which has many functions, including overseeing and managing foreign armed groups. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested that the Government of Eritrea provide the following:

- More information on the roles of Colonel Simon Ghebredengel, Colonel Kassa and the National Security Office (NSO) in supporting arming and training foreign regional armed groups.

3. Unity Among Ethiopian Armed Groups

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of Eritrea's attempt to unite disparate armed Ethiopian opposition groups ahead of the Ethiopian general election that took place on 24 May 2015. The Group's current findings show that a conference bringing together a number of Ethiopian opposition groups under the auspices of the Eritrean Government was held in western Eritrea. During the meeting, the groups – which reportedly included the Tigray People's Democratic Movement, Patriotic Front, Ginbot Sebat, and the Patriotic Front - agreed to unify politically and militarily. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested that the Government of Eritrea provide the following:

- Clarification of the role of Eritrea in the creation and maintenance of this newly unified group.

4. Ginbot Sebat

During the course of this mandate, the Group has been able to confirm that Ginbot Sebat military leader Mr. Berhanu Nega left the United States where he resides, for Eritrea. Mr. Nega has expressed his commitment to engaging in military activities against the Ethiopian Government. According to confidential information received by the Monitoring Group from a range of sources including two non-African Member States with direct knowledge of the case, Mr. Negu travelled to Asmara via Egypt where Senior Presidential Advisor Yemane Gebreab personally welcomed him on 18 July 2015. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested that the Government of Eritrea provide the following:

- Clarification on the nature of the Government of Eritrea's engagement with Mr. Negu.

5. TPDM

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of Eritrea's continued support for the Tigray People's Democratic Movement (TPDM), in violation of paragraph 15 (b) of resolution 1907 (2009). The Group's current findings show that the TPDM continues to be the most significant armed Ethiopian opposition group being trained, financed, and hosted inside Eritrea. In addition, findings by the Group indicate that in both May and June 2015, TPDM members, inside Eritrea, conducted roundups against Eritrean citizens who have failed to report to their national military service. The Monitoring Group has received multiple corroborating testimonials that a significant contingent of TPDM fighters is stationed in Eritrea's western region near the Sudanese border, and in and around Massawa, and that Molga Asgedom is identified as the chairman of the TPDM. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested that the Government of Eritrea provide the following:

- Explanation of the nature of the relationship between Eritrea and TPDM;
- Details on the sources of arms that are in possession of the TPDM;
- Information regarding the location of military camps where the TPDM is being trained and the precise role of Molga Asgedom.

6. Front pour la restauration de l'unité et de la démocratie (FRUD)

The Monitoring Group has received a written communiqué from the Government of Djibouti in which it stated that Eritrea continues to arm rebels from the FRUD that it dispatches to northern Djibouti. The Government of Djibouti provided the Monitoring Group with a comprehensive list of cross border activities that took place between June 2014 and April 2015 that involved Eritrean backed Djiboutian rebels. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested that the Government of Eritrea provide the following:

- Details regarding the relationship of FRUD and Eritrea, including the confirmation of the presence of FRUD military elements inside Eritrea, as well as the arming, training, and supporting of these elements by Eritrea.

Arms Embargo

7. MV Shaker-1

The Group has confirmed that the cargo vessel called *MV Shaker-1* docked at the Eritrean port of Massawa on 15 January 2015, and the Group noted that the Red Sea Corporation was one of three parties with consignments on the vessel. In previous reports, the Monitoring Group has identified the Red Sea Corporation as the primary procurement vehicle for the Government of Eritrea to import a range of commodities, from basic staples to heavy machinery and illegal weaponry. In previous reports, the Monitoring Group consistently identified the Red Sea Corporation as the primary procurement vehicle for the government of Eritrea to import a range of commodities, from basic staples to heavy machinery and illegal weaponry. In its 2013 report, the Group established that the route linking East Sudan to Western Eritrea was a key route for weapons smuggling, and it showed that the manager of the Red Sea Corporation in the Eritrean town of Teseney at the time was overseeing and

facilitating arms trafficking. The Group also noted that Red Sea Corporation weapon regularly mislabelled weapon shipments in order to hide their true contents. The Group had also noted that the Red Sea Corporation's weapons shipments were regularly mislabelled in order to conceal the actual contents (S/2014/727, pg. 13-18). And while the Group has confirmed that the first stop that the *MV Shaker-1* made after departing Port Sudan was the port of Massawa, the Massawa stop is the only scheduled stop that was not recorded in an international vessel tracking database the Group has access to. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested that the Government of Eritrea provide the following:

- Information on the contents of the Red Sea consignment. The Group would like to note that it had previously requested further information about the *MV Shaker-1* during the video teleconference on 31 March 2015.

8. Yemen

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of the on-going conflict in Yemen and the possibility that Eritrea's involvement in the Yemeni conflict could constitute a violation of paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 1907 (2009). The Group's findings show that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have forged a strategic military relationship with Eritrea that involves using Eritrean land, airspace, and territorial waters in order to advance the Saudi-led Arab coalition's military campaign in Yemen. Moreover, the Group understands that the UAE has leased the Port of Assab to the UAE for a period of thirty years. The Monitoring Group understands that Saudi Arabia has already established a military presence on Eritrean soil and as part of the agreement, Eritrea was asked to allow the Hanish islands and the port of Assab to be used by the Coalition in their military campaign against the Houthis. The Group also understands that Eritrea was asked to commit itself to banning the Houthis from operating in any part of its territory. Moreover, the Monitoring Group has received information that military personnel from the Eritrean Defence Forces may be actively participating in combat operations in Yemen under the umbrella of the Arab coalition. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested that the Government of Eritrea provide the following:

- Comment on allegations of Eritrean military involvement in the ongoing conflict;
- Explanation of the nature of the potential compensation received by Eritrea in exchange for allowing its land, territorial waters, airspace, and possibly its military troops, to be used as part of the Arab coalition-led war effort;
- Clarification of the nature of Eritrea's relationship with the Houthi rebel movement.

Financial issues

9. Recovery and Rehabilitation Tax (RRT)

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of the Recovery and Rehabilitation Tax (RRT) collected by Eritrean Embassies and Consulates abroad. The Group's findings indicate that unless the RRT is paid to the Government, Eritrean nationals living abroad cannot receive clearance to carry out a number of functions such as obtaining a power of attorney. During the videoconference, you kindly agreed to provide the

Monitoring Group with a copy of the Recovery & Rehabilitation Tax Proclamation. In addition, the Monitoring Group requested from the Government of Eritrea to provide the following additional information:

- Official documentation that outlines procedures and regulations regarding the enforcement of the RRT Proclamation.

10. Natural Resources

The Monitoring Group raised the issue of natural resources in order to better understand the flow of funds. It is within this context that the Group closely monitored a court case that was filed on November 2014 against Nevsun, a Canadian company that operates the Bisha Mine in Eritrea. More specifically, the Group sought to understand and assess whether any financial flows from Nevsun via Eritrean state-owned companies, Segen, Senet, Mereb or any other such company operating in Bisha Mine, are being channelled to the country's security and armed forces in a manner that could violate the sanctions regime on Eritrea. The Monitoring Group's findings show that state-owned contractors and sub-contractors such as Senet, Segen and military-owned Mereb were hired by Nevsun to provide labour and are engaged in an informal pay structure. The Group understands that the pay structure operates in the following way: the contractors and sub-contractors charge a certain amount to Nevsun while paying far less for each military conscript or labourer employed at the mine. In addition, the Monitoring Group requested from the Government of Eritrea to provide the following additional information:

- Budgetary documents that will paint a picture of the revenues and expenditures of the Government of Eritrea. In this connection, the Monitoring Group would like to note that Senior Presidential Adviser Yemane Gebreab had agreed to provide the Group with these documents during the course of the last mandate;
- Detailed information on the nature of the commercial relationship between the State of Eritrea, Nevsun and the following parties: Segen, Mereb, the Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF), and the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ);
- A copy of the agreement (s) between the State of Eritrea, Nevsun, and the aforementioned state-owned companies;
- A copy of any agreement and/or contract, or production sharing agreement between Nevsun, and state-owned companies or companies affiliated with the EDF and the PFDJ, including other partners and/or subcontractors that participated or participate in the construction and operation of Bisha Mine;
- Detailed breakdown of all expense (salary, accommodation, alimentation or any other) accrued from hiring labor force including conscripts, explanation of how these costs are being paid out and by which party (Nevsun, Segen, Mereb, the EDF and the PFDJ);
- Detailed transactional records of financial flows between Nevsun, Segen, Mereb, and the EDF.

Djibouti related issues

11. Prisoners of War and Qatari Mediation

The Monitoring Group reiterated its request to the Government of Eritrea to provide information on the fate of the Djiboutian military personnel reported missing in action. The Group also explained that it had requested from the Government of Djibouti to provide further information about the Djiboutian and Eritrean soldiers still missing in action. In addition, the Group's findings show that Eritrean soldiers kidnapped a Djiboutian soldier named Ahmad Abdullah Kamil, in the town of Rahita in "No Man's Land" on 25 July 2014. Specifically, the Monitoring Group requested from the Government of Eritrea to provide the following:


- Detailed information on the alleged kidnapping of a Djiboutian soldier took place in "No Man's Land" on July 25 2014;
- Confirmation whether or not Eritrea is holding Djiboutian prisoners of war;
- A clarification of the status of the mediation process sponsored by Qatar.

Visit to Eritrea

The Monitoring Group is committed to the process of dialogue and exchange of information with the Government of Eritrea and reiterated its readiness during the meeting on 21 August 2015 to travel to Asmara. Accordingly, we look forward to continuing this discussion.

We would be most grateful for your reply to the Monitoring Group as soon as possible and no later than 4 September 2015 through the Secretary of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, Ms. Snjezana Gillingham (Room DC2-2016, United Nations, New York, NY 10017; fax +t-212-963-1300; e-mail: gillingham@un.org [and] sc-committee-751-1907@un.org).

Excellency, please allow me to offer you the assurances of my highest consideration.



Christophe Trajber
Coordinator
Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
Security Council resolution 2182 (2014)

Annex I.5: Government of Eritrea Correspondence, dated 4 September 2015

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البعثة الدائمة لدولة إريتريا
لدى الأمم المتحدة - نيويورك

Permanent Mission of The State of Eritrea
To the United Nations, New York

**ERITREA'S RESPONSE TO QUERIES PRESENTED
BY THE SOMALIA ERITREA MONITORING GROUP (SEMG)**

4 September 2015

1. INTRODUCTION

1. Eritrea commends the Chair of the Security Council Committee, H.E. Ambassador Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño, for his effort to enhance a constructive dialogue and transparency in the work of the Committee as well as for facilitating the interaction with the Somalia Eritrea Monitoring Group. Eritrea also appreciates the role of the United Nations Secretariat.

2. Eritrea has on several occasions clearly and comprehensively responded, in writing and orally, to all questions and allegations of the SEMG. Unfortunately, Eritrea finds it inexplicable for SEMG to continuously ask the same questions that have been unambiguously addressed.

3. It must be underlined that in the spirit of engagement and cooperation, in the past the SEMG had visited Eritrea two times; met twice with the Political Adviser to the President, Mr. Yemane Gebreab, in Paris and Cairo; and in 2015 held three video conferences with the Permanent Representative of Eritrea, Ambassador Grima Asmerom. Several formal and informal meetings have also taken place between the SEMG and the Eritrean Mission in New York.

4. With the hope that the SEMG will not ask the same question in the future, the Eritrean Government will once again respond to the questions raised by the SEMG in its letter of 25 August 2015 (Reference: S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.86). However, while answering to the question raised, we ask the SEMG to:

- a) concentrate on its mandate of monitoring whether Eritrea is supporting Al-Shabaab in Somalia;
- b) refrain from dealing with matters that do not fall within the purview of its mandate, such as the situation in Yemen and in particular the **Ethiopia - Eritrea conflict**, which are agenda items for the UNSC to handle. The UNSC has full responsibility to urge Ethiopia to withdraw from sovereign Eritrean

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e-mail : general@eritrea-unmission.org

territory, including the town of Badme;

c) employ high standards of investigation methodology as stipulated in the Report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997) which, inter alia, underscores the need for expert panels to rely on verified information and documents, and ensure that their “assertions are corroborated by solid information and that their findings are substantiated by credible sources”;

d) respect for Eritrea’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence

e) fully include and reflect in the main part of the SEMG reports Eritrea's oral and written responses; and

f) in a spirit of transparency, share in advance its draft and final reports with the Eritrean government, as a concerned party.

II. SOMALIA

5. It is common knowledge to members of the United Nations Security Council, the Sanctions Committee and SEMG that the main reason for the sanctions against Eritrea were its alleged support to Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the relationship with Djibouti. In its report of 2014 (S/2014/727) and midterm report of March 2015, the SEMG stated that "it **found no evidence of Eritrean support to Al-Shabaab**". On its letter of 25 August 2015, it has also ascertained that "**it had found no evidence of Eritrean support to Al-Shabaab during the course of the mandate.**" Eritrea welcomes SEMG's conclusion. As a result of this assertion and conclusion by the SEMG, Eritrea expects the Sanction Committee to recommend to the UNSC to immediately and unconditionally lift the sanctions against Eritrea.

III. DJIBOUTI

6. The case for lifting the sanctions which continue to be maintained six years on and without any justification is bolstered by actions that the Eritrean government took way back in June 2010 when it, along with Djibouti, accepted the mediation of the State of Qatar. At that time Eritrea also redeployed its troops from the disputed territory, a fact that was confirmed by the State of Qatar in its letter to the UNSC on 6 June 2010. The mediation and redeployment were the key demands of the UNSC, both of which were fulfilled by the Eritrean Government, and which along with the affirmation of the absence of Eritrean wrongdoing should have led to the lifting of sanctions. But better late than never. It should be lifted immediately and unconditionally.

7. The SEMG raises the issue of developments in the Qatari mediation. This is an issue that should be addressed to the Government of Qatar not to Eritrea. Similarly, the issue of prisoners of war is the responsibility that both parties gave to the Government of Qatar. In the already mentioned letter of 6 June 2010, the Prime Minister of Qatar apprised the Security Council that “the issues of the POWs and the missing persons will also be settled under the supervision of the State of Qatar,” as stipulated in Article (3) of the Agreement Between the Presidents of Eritrea and Djibouti.

8. In keeping with its practice of raising issues outside its mandate and mostly irrelevant information collected from dubious sources that have axes to grind against Eritrea, the SEMG asks about the alleged "kidnapping" of a Djiboutian soldier in the town of Rahaita in “No Man’s Land.” Aside from its pettiness and total irrelevance to the Eritrea-Djibouti issue, the SEMG is wrong on several counts. There was no “kidnapping” of a Djiboutian soldier by Eritrea. Rahaita is in Eritrea. Calling indisputably sovereign Eritrean territory “No Man’s Land” is unacceptable.

9. Over the past six years, Djibouti has made it absolutely clear that it feels it is the beneficiary of the status quo in the Horn of Africa and consequently does not want a resolution of any differences with Eritrea, favouring instead to stoke tension between the two countries, including through futile efforts to subvert Eritrea.

10. But this is beside the point. The pertinent fact is that on Somalia and Djibouti, which were the main and adjunct reasons for the sanctions respectively, there is no justification to maintain the sanctions on Eritrea. They should be lifted immediately and unconditionally. There is no Eritrean involvement in Somalia and the Djibouti Eritrea issue is being handled by the Government of Qatar.

IV. ARMS EMBARGO

11. Eritrea has consistently stated as a nation whose territory is occupied by Ethiopia and is subjected to the threat of force its rights to self-defense should be respected as enshrined in article 51 of the UN Charter. Yet, Eritrea the victim is punished while Ethiopia the culprit is rewarded. Nonetheless, Eritrea has not violated any of the provisions of the arms embargo. The mention of MV Shaker-1 or any other ship docking at the Eritrean port of Massawa does not justify or constitute violation of the arms embargo. Especially when by its own admission the SEMG has stated that "**the docking of the ship in Massawa port is not recorded in an international vessel tracking data base, the Group has access to**"; and when it has also admitted that it has no information on the contents of the third container.

V. CONFLICT BETWEEN ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA

12. Despite repeated entreaties from the Government of Eritrea, the SEMG, again overstepping its mandate, has sought to involve itself into the **conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea** and,

moreover, doing so in a manner that totally ignores and disregards context, perspective and ramifications.

13. Once again Eritrea underlines that the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is an issue between occupier and occupied. It is the full responsibility of the Security Council. **It is not within the purview of the SEMG mandate.**

14. Ethiopia continues to occupy militarily and illegally large slices of sovereign Eritrean territory, again in violation of international law and its treaty obligation. Thousands of Eritrean families have been displaced from these occupied areas, having lost their farms, businesses and possessions.

15. For the past 13 years Eritrea has been calling on the international community, including the UN Security Council, to shoulder its responsibility and call on Ethiopia to respect its treaty obligation, the **Final and Binding of 2002 Delimitation and 2007 Demarcation Decisions of the Eritrean Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC).**

16. The United Nations, which along with the United States, the European Union and the African Union witnessed and guaranteed the Algiers Agreement that led to the final and binding boundary decision between Ethiopia and Eritrea, continues to shirk their responsibility, thereby encouraging Ethiopia in its violation of international law and Eritrean sovereignty and territorial integrity.

17. Moreover, it is known to everybody and can be verified easily that Ethiopia continues to establish, arm, train, finance, deploy and command armed mercenary groups to destabilize Eritrea.

18. Furthermore, Ethiopia officials continue to threaten Eritrea. Most recently, the Ethiopian Prime Minister speaking to his Parliament on 7 July 2015 said, "**Ethiopia will be forced to take an appropriate action against Eritrea**". The use or threat of force against any country big or small is a violation of the United Nations Charter and international law that should be condemned. The Security Council must not tolerate Ethiopia's war threat and the occupation of sovereign Eritrean territory.

18. Eritrea has repeatedly, but to no avail, reminded the SEMG that it cannot ignore the reality and salient facts elaborated above and direct spurious charges, often based on tips from Ethiopian intelligence and military sources, against Eritrea. Dealing with the Eritrea Ethiopia conflict, context and perspective must be properly applied.

19. For the sake of peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the security of the region, Ethiopia must be urged to immediately and unconditionally withdraw from Eritrean sovereign territory, including the town of Badme.

VI. Yemen

20. The SEMG again steps out of its mandate to take up the issue of Yemen and includes in its report an amalgam of outright falsehoods, errors, inaccuracies and insinuations. We only mention it here because it is an additional example of the SEMG exceeding its mandate.

VII. FINACIAL ISSUES

21. Concerning the financial issue, unlike what some quarters try to insinuate, the resolutions do not restrict the Eritrean government from collecting the 2% Recovery and Rehabilitation Tax (RRT) from its citizens residing outside the county and does not also restrict the revenues it collects from the mining sector to be utilized for the development of the country.

22. It must be underlined that the provisions related to revenues from 2% Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Tax and the Mining Resources in Security Council Resolution 2023 (2011) are meant to look into the “potential use of revenue” for the destabilization of the region. To this date the SEMG has not found any evidence of any Eritrean transgression in this regard.

23. Once again since the SEMG has unequivocally confirmed that “it had found no evidence of Eritrean support to Al Shabaab”. There is no justification for the group to pursue this issue which is based on hypothetical assumptions. However, for the record, Eritrea wishes to provide the following facts concerning the utilization of revenues from the **2% RRT** and the **mining sector**:-

a) Recovery and Rehabilitation Tax (RRT)

- all over the world, taxation is a legal obligation that must be respected and tax evasion is a criminal act that is not tolerated;
- Eritreans residing inside the country are obliged by law to pay taxes. Eritreans residing outside as well are obliged by law to pay taxes on the basis of Proclamations No 17/1991 and 67/1995. (see **annex 1 & 2**).
- in Eritrea, like in all countries, not paying the RRT has administrative consequences. But, they are not criminal measures that send someone to prison. The actions taken are denial of a business license, land entitlement, and other services against those Eritreans who fail to meet their legally required tax obligations. These enforcement measures are not and cannot be implemented “extraterritorially” and cannot be considered “extortion, coercion, intimidation etc. Nobody is detained for not paying the RRT and no Eritrean citizen with Eritrean ID or passport is denied from visiting Eritrea.
- the purpose of RRT is symbolic burden sharing by the Eritrean citizens in Diaspora on the nation building activity of their country and an alternative source of financing for development. It is also consistent with the African Union Summit Decision that calls for

the involvement of the African Diaspora in the social, political, cultural and economic development of their countries of origin

- the 2% RRT is collected in a transparent manner, through Eritrean consular and diplomatic offices inside and outside Eritrea. It is not collected "discreetly" or "under coercion or intimidation" as some quarters continue to insinuate.
- in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular of 1961 and 1963, Eritrean Diplomatic and Consular Missions, officers, regularly inform Eritreans residing abroad on their rights and obligations as well as the procedure on how and where the payments could be done. This is done openly and publicly through town hall meetings, seminars, workshops and online media outlets. The forms are posted in the mission's website for anybody to read and print. Moreover, those who fulfilled their obligations are given an official receipt as proof of payment on the spot.
- all the revenues from the 2% RRT is transferred to the Department of Treasury of the Ministry of Finance;
- the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, in cooperation which has branch offices all over the country, with all relevant government institutions and grass roots civil society organizations, is responsible for identifying those who meet the requirements for assistance. This file is regularly updated;
- the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare allocates a monthly payment of 600.00 Nakfa for families of martyrs that is payable for a lifetime to the parents while limited until the age of 18 years for minor dependents and siblings of the martyrs. All war disabled fighters that could not be fully rehabilitated with employable skills are also beneficiaries of the monthly assistance. The disbursements are public information and are regularly reported and broadcasted in the national media outlets and posted at different websites. **(annexes 2, 3 & 4);**
- the historical, moral, humanitarian and patriotic contents and values of 2% RRT is more significant and profound than its material dividend. The annual proceeds are modest and should not be overstated when compared with government budgets and expenditures allocated to the families of the martyrs and war disabled veterans. For instance in 2014, the annual revenue from 2% RRT was \$11,172,758.33 UN dollars while what the government spent to support families of martyrs and war disabled veterans is over \$ 27,000,000.00 US dollars. Therefore, the potential or probability of diverting RRT revenue to other activities is zero.

b) Revenue from the Mining Sector

24. The same goes for the revenue from the mining sector wherein the SEMG continues to disregard its mandate by delving into the practices of investors companies. Even though there are 17 foreign companies that have been granted mineral exploration and development licenses, it is

only one plant that is at production phase. In fact, Eritrea started exporting its mineral resources at more or less the same period as when Resolution 2023 (2011) was adopted.

25. The financial proceedings of the Bisha mining plant are issued on a quarterly basis and are available in the public domain, including in the Nevsun website. These financial reports include the proceedings that accrue to Eritrea in the form of corporate tax, royalties and dividends for anyone to read.

26. The revenue Eritrea gets from Bisha is around 200 million US dollars annually. And this is prior to its debt servicing requirements for loans incurred for purchase of 30% equity from the company as well as substantial *pro rata* payments for the initial capital expenditures for the establishment of the plant prior to production.

27. The income the Eritrean Government gets from a single Bisha mining operation is insignificant when compared to the public and social expenditures such as education, health and food security. For example, in 2014, the Government of Eritrea's budget for education, health and food security alone was **\$328,894,753.00** US Dollars which is more than the 200 million dollars the country earned from the mining sector. Therefore, the potential and possibility of diverting resource to cover other activities is nonexistent.

VIII. CONCLUSION

28. Once again, as unequivocally confirmed by the SEMG, "**there is no evidence that Eritrea is financially and militarily supporting Al-Shabaab in Somalia**". There is also UN Security Council endorsed mediation activity by the Emir of Qatar to solve the issue between Eritrea and Djibouti, a process to which Eritrea remains committed. In this regard, the continuation of sanctions against Eritrea is not only unjustified but unwarranted. It must be unconditionally and immediately lifted.

29. Moreover, in line with the post-2015 Development Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) that advocates that "**no country or people should be left behind**", sanctions definitely have negative implication on the social and economic development of the Eritrean people, in particular on the issue of poverty eradication agenda. It must be lifted immediately and unconditionally.

30. Eritrea with 1,200 kilometers of coastline and more than 350 islands with 50% Christian and 50% Moslem population is an oasis of peace in the volatile Horn of Africa and the Red Sea Region. In light of the crisis in Yemen and the spread of global terrorism and extremism, Eritrea's capability to protect its security and territorial integrity should not be undermined or weakened. The unjust sanctions must be lifted unconditionally and immediately.

ANNEX I

ለዋጅ 17/1991/

ንሐሐለ ሰንኩላን ተጋደልትን፣ ጽጉማት ሰድራ ላከሰ ሰንኩላንን ሰውላትን ተጋደልትን፣ ብባህሪያዊ ሓደጋታት ዝተጎድኡ ዘፋል ሕብረተ-ሰብ ኤርትራን ንምፅጋል ናይ መሕወደ ግብሪ ንምእካብ ዝወጸ ላዋጅ

ናይ ህዝቢ ኤርትራ ድሌትን መሰልን ከኸብሩን ናይ ናጽነትን ሰላምን ሃንቀውታኡ ከረጋግጹን ብህይወቶም ከይተረፈ መሪር መስዋእትነት ናይ ዝኸፈሉ ክቡራትን ሓርቦኛታትን ፍቱዋት ደቁ ዘይሕለል ጻዕሪ ዓወት ኣብ ዝተጎደፈሉ ኣብዚ ግዜ'ዚ ፍረጺማኦም ብዓይነት ኮነ ብመንፈስ ምፍጻይ ዘይከላል ኣንተ-ኮነኳ ንፅሁምን ንጽጉማት ሰድራ-ቤቶምን ምፅጋል ህዝቢ ኤርትራ ቆይጣ ኩሉ ዝሰርዖ ዝግበዩ ጉዳዩ ሰለ ዝኾነን ከምኡ'ውን ብባህሪያዊ ሓደጋ ናይ ዝተጎድኡ ዘፋል ሕብረተ ሰብ ኤርትራ ፅጌ ህዝቢ ኤርትራ ንስደዖ ዘይሓልፍን ኢደይ ኢድካ ተባሂሉ ዘርህዖ ወፈራኡ ስለ ዝኾነን፡-

ነዚ ዕላማዚ ኣብ ናይ ርእሰኹ ምኽላል መትከል ብምምርጫ ናይ መሕወደ ገንዘብ ንምእካብ ላዚ ዝሰፀብ ላዋጅ ተሓዊጁ ኣሎ፡-

ምዕራፍ 1. ሓፈሻዊ

1. ሓጺር ኣርእስቲ
እዚ ላዋጅ'ዚ "ንሐሐለ ሰንኩላን ተጋደልትን፣ ጽጉማት ሰድራ ላከሰ ሰንኩላንን ሰውላትን ተጋደልትን፣ ብባህሪያዊ ሓደጋታት ንዝተጎድኡ ዘፋል ሕብረተ-ሰብ ኤርትራን ንምፅጋል ናይ መሕወደ ግብሪ ንምእካብ ዝወጸ ላዋጅ ቁጽሪ 17/1991 ዓ.ም" ተባሂሉ ክጥቀስ ይከላል።

2. ትርጉም

እብዚ ላዋጅ'ዚ፡-
1/ ኤርትራዊ' ማለት ዝኾነ ኤርትራዊ ዜጋ ወይ ብመሰረት ሕገ ኤርትራ ዝቐመገ ብሕገ ናይ ሰብነት መሰል ዝተዋህበን ኣካል ወይ ኣብ ወጻኢ ሃገር ዝቐመ ኮይኑ፡ ኣብ ኤርትራ ጨንፈር ወይ ቤት- ጽሕፈት ዘለዎ ትካል ማለት ኢዩ።
2/ "ሰብ" ማለት ብህሪያዊ ሰብ ወይ ብሕገ ናይ ሰብነት መሰል ዝተዋህበ ኣካል ማለት ኢዩ።

3/ "መንግስታዊ ናይ ልምዓት ትካል" ማለት" ዝኾነ ርእሱ ዚኢሉ ናይ ምምሕዳር ወይ ምቁጽጽር ስራሕ ዘካይድን፣ ናይ ርእሱ ኣታዊ ንኸረከብ ስልጣን ዝተዋህበን ኣብ ንግድ፣ ኢንዱስትሪ ወይ ኣገልግሎት ናይ ምሃብ ስራሕ ዝተዋፈረን መንግስታዊ ትካል" ማለት ኢዩ።

ዘርዘርም/

2/ እቲ ግብረ ዝኸፍል ሰራሕተኛ ናይ ደሞ-
 ፕሮጀል ብኸፍሊ ፋይናንስ ኣብ ዝጸለጠሉም
 ኣብያተ-ጽሕፈት ዝሰርሕ ምስ ዝኸወን፣ እቲ
 ግብረ ብመገንጺ ዘፍሊ ፋይናንስ ካብ ናይቲ ሰራ-
 እናተነዘዩ ብቐጥታ ንገግዳዊ ባንክ ኤርትራ
 ብመሰረት ኣብ ግንባርት 18-19 ናይዚ ኣዋጅ
 ኣገቡብ ኣብ ፍሉይ ሓሳብ ይኣቱ።

3/ ብኣታዊኦም ኣብ ዝመሓዳደሩ ናይ ልምግ
 ትካላት፣ ባጀቶም ኣመኛሊሉም ኣብ ዝወሰዱ
 ኣብያተ-ጽሕፈት፣ ናይ ኣክሲዮን ኩባንያታት፣
 ዝተወሰነ ናይ ብሕጺ ኩባንያታት፣
 ሸርክናታትን ናይ ብሕጺ ናይ ገግድ ትካላት
 ሰራሕተኛታትን፣ ኣሰራሕጺ ነቲ ናይ መሕወድ
 ናይቶም ሰራሕተኛታቶም ደሞዝ እናነዘዩ ዝሆ-
 ኣታዊ ውሽጢ ሃገር ወይ ንናይ ኣውራጃታት ወ-
 ድገብ።

4/ ናይ ኣታዊ ግብረ ኣብ ዘይከፍሉ ኣህጉራዊን ግ
 ትካላት፣ ኣብ ናይ ወዳኢ ሃገራት ልሎ
 ሰራሕተኛታትን ከምኡ ወገን ብመሰረት ናይ
 ኣዋጅ ካብ ዝረኹብዎ ደሞዝ ነቲ ዝሕተት ናይ
 ባዕሉም ናይ ምክፋል ሓላፍነት ዘለዎም ሰራሕተ-
 ብመሰረት እዚ ኣዋጅዚ ዝኸፈለ ናይ መሕወድ
 ኣታዊ ግብረ ኣብ ዝኸፍሉ ግዜ ወሲኾሞ
 ግብረ ባንጻል መዚ ይኸፍሉ።

4/ መገንገስታዊ ናይ ገንዘብ ትካል" ግለት ንባንክታትን፣
 ኣለታሕቲ ትካላትን፣ ናይ ኢንሹራንስ መድሕን ትካላትን
 የጠቓልል።

5/ " ደሞዝ" ግለት ካብ ሰራሕ ምቐዳር ዝርከብ ምዳብ
 ኣታዊ ኮይኑ ኣብ ግንባርት(6) ናይዚ ኣዋጅዚ ገዝተጠቐሱ
 ኣታዊታት እውን የጠቓልል።

6/ "ኮብቲ" ግለት ንኣሓን ጫል ባንክን ኣግግልን የጠቓልል።

3. ምክፋል ናይ መሕወድ ግብረ
 ብጀክ ናይ ኣታዊ ግብረ ካይክፈሉ ዝተወሰነ ወርሓዊ
 ዘፍሊት ዝረከብ ሰብ ዝኾነ ኣታዊ ዘለዎ ሰብ ብመሰረት
 ዝምልከቶ ናይዚ ኣዋጅዚ ግንባር ገኣካሰ ሰንኩላን
 ተጋደላትን፣ ጽጉማት ስድራ ስንኩላንን ስውኣት
 ተጋደላትን፣ ብጠይቓዊ ሓዲጋታት ንዝተጎድኡ ዘፋል
 ሕብረተ-ሰብ ኤርትራን ንምፅንጋል ናይ መሕወድ ግብረ
 ናይ ምክፋል ግደታ ኣለዎ።

ምፅራፍ 2. ካብ ደሞዝ ዝኸፈለ ናይ መሕወድ ግብረ

4. ኣሸንፍን ኣኮፋፍላን ካብ ደሞዝ ናይ ዝኸፈለ ናይ
 መሕወድ ግብረ

1/ ነፍሲ ወከፍ ደሞዝ ዝረከብ ሰብ ካብ ጠቓላላ ወርሓዊ
 ኣታዊኡ 2% ክልተ ብግእቲ/ናይ መሕወድ ግብረ ይኸፍል።

5/ ናይ ሓደ ስራሕተኛ ደሞዝ ብመጻፍቲ፣ ብሰሙን ወይ ብክልተ ሰሙን ይክፈሉ ብዘየገደሱ፣ ኣታዊሉ ብወርሒ እናተሰለፀ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ ይኸፈል።

- 6/ ምስ ደሞዝ ተጽብጺቦም ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ ዝኸፈለሉም ጥቕሚታት እዞም ዝሰፀሉ ጥራይ ኢዮም፡-
 - ሀ/ ናይ ቦረኻ ኣበል፣
 - ለ/ ናይ ተረፍ ሰዓት ስራሕ ክፍሊት፣
 - ሐ/ ናይ ዓመት ፍቓድ ክፍሊት፣
 - መ/ ቦናስ፣
 - ረ/ ናይ ኣገልግሎት ክፍሊት /ሰርቪስ ቻርጅ/።

ምፅራፍ 3. ክብ ናይ ሕርሻ ስራሓት ኣታዊ ዝእከብ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ

5. እሸንናን ኣከፋፍላን ክብ ናይ ሕርሻ ስራሓት ኣታዊ ናይ ዝእከብ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ

1/ ነፍሲ ወከፍ ሓረስታይ ክብ ዓመታዊ ጠቐላላ ኣታዊሉ 2% ብልተ ብሚኦቲ/ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ ይኸፍል። ይኸን እምበር ክብ ነፍሲ ወከፍ ሓረስታይ ዝእከብ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ ብዓመት ክብ ብር 10/ ዓብርተ/ ክውሕድ ዮብሉን።

2/ ነቲ ብመሰረት እዚ ኣዋጅቲ ክብ ናይ ሓረስቶት ናይ ሕርሻ ስራሓትን ናይ ኩባቲ ምፍራይ ኣታዊን ዝእከብ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ እትሰለፀ ናይቲ ወረዳ ናይ ክፍሊ 4.ይናንስ ተወካሊ እቦ ወንበራን ናይቲ ወረዳ ምምሕዳር ተወካሊን ናይቲ ወረዳ ህዝባዊ ባይቶ ኣቦ ወንበርን ዝኣባሉታን ኮሚቴ ትኸውን።

3/ክብ ናይ ሕርሻ ስራሕ ወጻኢ፣ ናይ ንግድ ፍቓድ ኣይሃልዎ ብዘየገደሱ፣ ኣብ ናይ ንግድ- ጠቀስን ተመሳሳሊ ስራሕን ተዋፊሩ ኣታዊ ዝረኸበ ሓረስታይ ብተወሰኺ ዘም ነጋዳይ 2% ብልተ ብሚኦቲ/ ክብ ኣታዊሉ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ ይኸፍል።

4/ ክብ ናይ ሕርሻ ስራሓት ኣታዊ ዝእከብ ግብሪ ተኸታቲልካ ኣታዊ ክምዝኸውን ምግባር ናይ ቤት- ጽሕፈት ናይ ወሽጢ ሃገር ኣታዊን፣ ምምሕዳር ወረዳታትን፣ ናይ ወረዳ ህዝባዊ ባይቶታትን ናይ ሓባር ሓላፍነት ይኸውን።

ምፅራፍ 4. ክብ ናይ ብሕቲ ናይ ንግድ ስራሕን ናይ መያ ኣገልግሎትን ኣታዊ ዝኸፈል ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ

6. እሸንናን ኣከፋፍላን ክብ ናይ ብሕቲ ናይ ንግድ ትከላትን ውልቁ- ቡብ ነጋዳን ኣታዊ ናይ ዝእከብ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ

1/ ናይ ኣክሲዮን ኩባንያ ወይ ሓላፍነቱ ናይ ዝተወሰነ ናይ ብሕቲ ኩባንያ ክብ ዓመታዊ ጠቐላላ ኣታዊሉ 2% ብልተ ብሚኦቲ/ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ ይኸፍል።

2/ ኣብ ናይ ነዳዲ ምፅዳል ንግድ፣ ናይ ኮሚሽን ውክልና ወይ ተመሳሳሊ ናይ ኣገልግሎት ስራሕ ዝተዋፈረ ሰብ ክብ ዓመታዊ ናይ ኮሚሽን / ዩንትዮሎ/ ጠቐላላ ኣታዊሉ 3% / ሰለስተ ብሚኦቲ/ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ ይኸፍል። ይኸን እምበር ክብኪ ዝተጠቐሰ ናይ ስራሕ መዳይ ወጻኢ ብኸለእ

8. ብዓንቀጽት 6-7 ናይዚ ኣዋጅ'ዚ ዘይኸፈን ናይ መሸጣ ወይ ኣገልግሎት ኣታዊ
 1/ ብዓንቀጽት 6-7 ናይዚ ኣዋጅ'ዚ ዘይኸፈን ናይ መሸጣ ወይ ኣገልግሎት መቐለላ ዓመታዊ ኣታዊ 2% /ክልተ ብሚሊቲ/ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ይኸፈሉ።

2/ ብመሰረት ንኡስ ዓንቀጽ 1/ ናይዚ ዓንቀጽ'ዚ ዝኸፈለ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ኩብ ብር 30 /ሰላሳ/ ከውሕድ የብሉን።

9. ኣብ ወጻኢ ሃገር ኣብ ናይ ብሕቲ ስራሓት ዝተዋረሩ ኢርትራውያን
 ኣብ ወጻኢ ሃገር ብኖይ ሙያ ኣገልግሎት፣ ንግድ፣ ሕርሽ ወይ ካልእ ናይ ብሕቲ ስራሕ ዝተዋረሩ ኢርትራውያን ናይ ዜግነት ግደታኦም ከግለሉ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ዝኸፈሉ ኩነታት ከኖሉ ወጻኢ ጉዳያት ብመምርሒ ይውሰኑ።

ምፅራፍ 5 ኩብ ምፅራፍ 2 ክሰብ 4 ኩብ ዝተጠቐሱ ወጻኢ ብዘኾነ ናይ ኣታዊ ምንጭታት ዝኸፈለ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ

10. ኣሸንፕን ኣከፋፍላን ኩብ ናይ ሉተሪያ ወይ ቶምሶ ወይ ቢገን ጠቐላላ ኣታዊ ናይ ዝእኩብ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ

1/ ዝኾነ ኩብ ናይ ሉተሪያ ወይ ቶምሶ ወይ ቢገን ኣታዊ ዝረኽቦ ሰብ፣ ዝረኽቦ ጠቐላላ ኣታዊ ብር 1000 /ኣዲ ሺሕ / ወይ ኩብሉ ንላዕሊ ምስ ዝኸውን ብኖሉ ወኮፍ ናይ

ንግድ /ንኣብነት ምሕጻብ መካይን/ ብዘረኽቦ ጠቐላላ ናይ መሸጣ ወይ ናይ ኣገልግሎት ዓመታዊ ኣታዊ ብተወሰኸ 2% /ክልተ ብሚሊቲ/ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ይኸፍሉ።

3/ ብመሰረት ንኡስ ዓንቀጽ 1/ 7/2/ ን ናይዚ ዓንቀጽ'ዚ ዝኸፈለ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ኩብ ብር 30/ ሰላሳ/ ከውሕድ የብሉን።

7. ኣሸንፕን ኣከፋፍላን ኩብ ናይ ሙያ ኣገልግሎት ኣታዊ ናይ ዝእኩብ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ
 1/ ኣብ ናይ ሙያ ኣገልግሎት ስራሕ / ከም ጥብቅና፣ ናይ ብሕቲ ስክምና፣ ኣማኸርነት/ ዝተዋረሩ ሰብ ኩብ ዓመታዊ ጠቐላላ ኣታዊ 3% /ሰላሳ/ ብሚሊቲ/ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ይኸፍሉ። ይኹን እምብር ኩብዚ ዝተጠቐሰ ናይ ስራሕ መዳይ ወጻኢ ብዘረኽቦ ጠቐላላ ናይ መሸጣ ወይ ኣገልግሎት ዓመታዊ ኣታዊ ብተወሰኸ 2% /ክልተ ብሚሊቲ/ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ይኸፍሉ።

2/ ኣብ ምስላፅ ናይ ሙያ ኣገልግሎት ስራሕ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ነቶም ብኖይ ውሽጢ ሃገር ኣታዊ ቤት ጽሕፈት ዝተመዘገቡን ዝፍለጡን ስራሕተኛታት ዝተኸፍሉ ደሞዝ ጥራይ ይገድሉ።

3/ ብመሰረት ንኡስ ዓንቀጽ 1/ ናይዚ ዓንቀጽ'ዚ ዝኸፈለ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ኩብ ብር 30/ሰላሳ/ ከውሕድ የብሉን።

ቅቡል እንተኾይኑ ብመሰረት መዝገቡ፡ ቅቡል እንተዘይኮይኑ ዝላ ካብ ናይ ውሽጢ ሃገር ኣታዊ ቤት- ጽሕፈትን ናይ ዘተማ ምምሕዳርን ዝተዋድሉት ኮሚቴ ኣታዊኡ ብዝገመተቶ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ይኸፍል።

2/ ነቲ ግብሪ ኣታዊ ናይ ምግባር ሓላፍነት ነቲ ክለብ ናይ ዘመሓደር ላኪል ይኸውን።

13. እሸጎናን ኣከፋፍላን ካብ መገማኸታዊ ናይ ልምዓት ትክላትን ናይ ገንዘብ ትክላትን ኣታዊ ናይ ዝእከብ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ

መገማኸታዊ ናይ ልምዓት ትክላትን ናይ ገንዘብ ትክላትን ካብ ጽረይ ግመታዊ ኣታዊኦም 2% /ክልተ ብሚእቲ/ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ይኸፍሉ።

14. እሸጎናን ኣከፋፍላን ካብ ናይ ምርኢት ኣታዊ ዝኸፈል ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ

1/ ካብ ዝኾነ ምርኢት ኣታዊ ዝረኸበ ዝኾነ ሰብ ወይ መገማኸታዊ ናይ ልምዓት ትክላት ካብ ዝረኸበ ጠቐላላ ኣታዊ 3% /ሰለስተ ብሚእቲ/ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ይኸፍል።

2/ እቲ ግብሪ ከስም ኩነታት ከብ'ቲ ነቲ ምርኢት ተርእኦ ኣካል ወይ ካብ ቲኪት ይእከብ።

ሉተሪያ ኣታዊ 5% /ኣሙኸተ ብሚእቲ/ መሕወይ ግብሪ ኣብ ውሽጢ ሓደ ወርሒ ይኸፍል።

2/ እቲ ሉተሪያ ወይ ተምቦላ ወይ ቢጎጉ፡ ብዓዳነት ዝወሃብ ምስ ዝኸውን እቲ ግብሪ ብገንዘብ ተኸኒኑ ብመሰረት ንኡስ ግንቀጽ /1/ ናይዚ ግንቀጽ'ዚ ይኸፈል።

3/ ሉተሪያ ወይ ተምቦላ ወይ ቢጎጉ ንዝበጽሑም ሰባት ዝኸፍል ኣካል ነቲ ንመሕወይ ዝኸፈል ግብሪ ኣጉዲሉ ኣብ ናይ ውሽጢ ሃገር ኣታዊ ቤት - ጽሕፈት ኣታዊ ናይ ምግባር ሓላፍነት ይዘልዎ።

11. እሸጎናን ኣከፋፍላን ካብ ናይ ገንዘብ ቁጠባን ልቓሕን ማሕበራት ኣታዊ ናይ ዝእከብ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ

1/ ነፍሲ ወከፍ ናይ ገንዘብ ቁጠባን ልቓሕን ናይ ሕብረት ስራሕ ማሕበር ካብ ዓመታዊ ጠቐላላ ናይ ወለድ ኣታዊኡ 3% /ሰለስተ ብሚእቲ/ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ይኸፍል።

2/ ነቲ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ኣታዊ ናይ ምግባር ሓላፍነት ናይ'ቲ ማሕበር ፈጻሚ ኣካል ይኸውን።

12. እሸጎናን ኣከፋፍላን ካብ ናይ መዘናግዒ ክለባት ኣታዊ ናይ ዝእከብ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ

1/ ነፍሲ ወከፍ ብርእሱ ዝመሓደር ናይ መዘናግዒ ክለብ ካብ ጠቐላላ ዓመታዊ ኣታዊኡ 3% /ሰለስተ ብሚእቲ/ መዝገቡ

15. አሸንፎን አከፋፍላን ከብ ክራይ ናይ ንብረት ዝኸፈለ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ ከብ ናይ ዝንቀሳቀሶ ወይ ዘይንቀሳቀሶ ንብረት ናይ ክራይ ኢታዊ ዝረኸበ ሰብ፡ ከብ ዝረኸበ ጠቅላላ ናመታዊ ኢታዊ 2%/ባልተ ብሚእቲ/ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ ይኸፍል።

16. አሸንፎን አከፋፍላን ከብ ዝመሓለለ፡ ንብረት ናይ ዝእከብ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ
 1/ ከብ ዝኾነ ዝመሓለለ፡ / ብውርኻ፤ ህያብ፤ መሸጣ... ወዘተ/ ዝንቀሳቀሶ ወይ ዘይንቀሳቀሶ ንብረት 2% /ባልተ ብሚእቲ/ ከብ ዋጋኡ ንመስመይ ግብሪ ኣብ ዝመሓለሎሉ ግዜ ይኸፈል።

2/ ዋጋ ናይቲ ዝመሓለለ፡ ንብረት ኣብ ከተማታት ከብ ናይ ውሽጢ ሃገር ኢታዊ ቤት-ጽሕፈትን ናይ ከተማ ምምሕዳርን ብዘተዋድኡት ኮሚቴ ኣብ ገጠራት ድማ ከብ ናይ ክፍሊ ፋይናንስን ናይ ገጠራት ምምሕዳርን ብዘተዋድኡት ኮሚቴ ይኸነን።

17. አሸንፎን አከፋፍላን ተሃጊሩ ድሕሪ ምጽናሕ ንዋናታቲ ከብ ዝምለስ ተረፍ ገዛ ናይ ዝኸፈለ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ
 1/ ብመግዘእታዊ ስርዓት ደርግ ተሃጊሩ ድሕሪ ምጽናሕ ንዋናታቲ ከብ ዝምለስ ተረፍ ገዛ ብናይ ምጽናድ ኮሚሽን (ኣዋጅ ቁ. 16/1991) ትእዛዝ ብኪኢላታት ተገማቲ ከብ ዝተረጋገጸ ዋጋኡ ብኸምዚ ዝሰዕብ ሚኒስትራ ናይ መስመይ

ግብሪ ከምለስ ከብ ዝተወሰነሉ ግዜ ኣብ ውሽጢ ሸቶብተ ኣዋርሕ ይኸፈል።

ህ/ ዋጋ ንብረት ከብ ብር 50,000 = / ኣምሳ ሺሕ/ ንታሕቲ ምስ ዝኸውን 2% /ባልተ ብሚእቲ/ ከብ ዋጋኡ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ፤

ዋጋ ንብረት ከብ ብር 50,000 = /ኣምሳ ሺሕ/ ንላዕሊን ከብ ብር 100,000 = /ሚእቲ ሺሕ/ ንታሕቲን ምስ ዝኸውን 3% /ባልተ ብሚእቲ/ ከብ ዋጋኡ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ፤

ዋጋ ንብረት ከብ ብር 100,000 = /ሚእቲ ሺሕ/ ንላዕሊን ከብ ብር 200,000 = /ባልተ ሚእቲ ሺሕ/ ንታሕቲን ምስ ዝኸውን 4% /ኣርባዕተ ብሚእቲ/ ከብ ዋጋኡ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ፤

ዋጋ ንብረት ከብ ብር 200,000 = / ክልተ ሚትኢ ሺሕ / ንላዕሊን ከብ ብር 300,000 = / ሰለስተ ሚእቲ ሺሕ/ ንታሕቲን ምስ ዝኸውን 5% /ኣመብተ ብሚእቲ/ ከብ ዋጋኡ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ፤

ዋጋ ንብረት ከብ ብር 300,000 = / ሰለስተ ሚእቲ ሺሕ / ንላዕሊ ከብ ብር 400,000 = /ኣርባዕተ ሚእቲ ሺሕ / ንታሕቲን ምስ ዝኸውን 7% /ኸውንተ ብሚእቲ/ ከብ ዋጋኡ ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ፤

ዋጋ ንብረት ከብ ብር 900,000 = / ትሸዓተ ሚሊቲ ሺሕ / ንላዕሊ ከብ ብር 1,000,000 = / ሓደ ሚሊዮን / ንታሕቲን ምስ ዝኸውን 9% / ምስ ንብርተው ትሸዓተ ብሚሊቲ / ከብ ዋጋኡ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ይኸፈል።

ለ/ ዋጋ ንብረት ከብ ብር 1,000,000 = / ሓደ ሚሊዮን / ንላዕሊ ምስ ዝኸውን ብነፍሲ ወከፍ ተወሳኺ ሚሊቲ ሺሕ ብር 2% / ክልተ ብሚሊቲ / ብተወሳኺ እናተደመረ ይኸፈል።

ጌኡብነት :- ዋጋ ናይ ኣርባዕተ ዝውጥቲ ብር 1,370,000 = ምስ ዝኸውን እቲ ዝኸፈል ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ከምዚ ዝስዕብ ኢዩ :-

- ናይ ብር 1,000,000 = 1,000,000 x 19% = 190,000 =
 - ናይ ብር 100,000 = 100,000 x 2% = 2,000 =
 - ናይ ብር 100,000 = 100,000 x 4% = 4,000 =
 - ናይ ብር 100,000 = 100,000 x 6% = 6,000 =
- ስለዚ ብድምር ናይ ብር 1,370,000 = ይኸውን ብር 202,000 እዚ ማለት ከላ ናይ ብር 1,300,000 = ዝኸፈል ኮይኑ ን ናይ ብር 70,000 = ግን ግብሪ ኣይክፈለሉን።

2. ተገራ ድሕሪ ምጽናሕ ንዋናታቱ ናይ ዝምለስ ተረፍ ዝዛ ናይ ዋነነት ምስክር ወረቐት ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ክይተኸፍሉ ኣይግባዥን።

ዋጋ ንብረት ከብ ብር 400,000 = / ኣርባዕተ ሚሊቲ ሺሕ / ንላዕሊ ከብ ብር 500,000 = / ሓመብተ ሚሊቲ ሺሕ / ንታሕቲን ምስ ዝኸውን 9% / ትሸዓተ ብሚሊቲ / ከብ ዋጋኡ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ን።

ዋጋ ንብረት ከብ ብር 500,000 = / ሓመብተ ሚሊቲ ሺሕ / ንላዕሊ ከብ ብር 600,000 = / ሸድብተ ሚሊቲ ሺሕ / ንታሕቲን ምስ ዝኸውን 11% / ምስ ንብርተው ብሚሊቲ / ከብ ዋጋኡ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ን።

ዋጋ ንብረት ከብ ብር 600,000 = / ሸድብተ ሚሊቲ ሺሕ / ንላዕሊን ከብ ብር 700,000 = / ሸውዓተ ሚሊቲ ሺሕ / ንታሕቲን ምስ ዝኸውን 13% / ምስ ንብርተው ሰለስተ ብሚሊቲ / ከብ ዋጋኡ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ን።

ዋጋ ንብረት ከብ ብር 700,000 = / ሸውዓተ ሚሊቲ ሺሕ / ንላዕሊን ከብ ብር 800,000 = / ሸዋንተ ሚሊቲ ሺሕ / ንታሕቲን ምስ ዝኸውን 15% / ምስ ንብርተው ሓመብተ ብሚሊቲ / ከብ ዋጋኡ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ን።

ዋጋ ንብረት ከብ ብር 800,000 = / ሸዋንተ ሚሊቲ ሺሕ / ንላዕሊን ከብ ብር 900,000 = / ትሸዓተ ሚሊቲ ሺሕ / ንታሕቲን ምስ ዝኸውን 17% / ምስ ንብርተው ሸውዓተ ብሚሊቲ / ከብ ዋጋኡ ናይ መሕወይ ግብሪ ን።

ምዕራፍ ፩ ዝተፈላለዩ ድንጋጌታት

18. ቅብሊትን ምምሕራፍ ብግብሪ ኢታዊ ዝኾነ ገንዘብን ብመሰረት እዚ ኣዋጅ'ዚ ናይ መሕመድ ግብሪ ዝእኩብ ናይ ውሽጢ ሃገር ኢታዊ ቤት ጽሕፈት ወይ ክፍሊ ፋይናንስ ወይ ንግዳዊ ባንክ ኤርትራ፡

1/ ብመሰረት እዚ ኣዋጅ'ዚ ናይ ዝተቐበሉ ግብሪ ቅብሊት ፈልዮ ይህቡ።

2/ ብሰም ነዚ ብናይ መሕመድ ግብሪ ዝላቲ ገንዘብ ኣብ ማዕከሉ ክውዕል ዝተመዘኑ ቅብሊት ኣብ ፍሉይ ናይ ንግዳዊ ባንክ ኤርትራ ዋና ቤት ጽሕፈት ኢሳብ ንክላቲ ብመሰረት እዚ ኣዋጅ'ዚ ዝእኩቦ ግብሪ ከይደንገዮ ኣብ ውሽጢ ሓደ ወርሒ ኣብ ከባቢኡ ንዝርከብ ጨንፈር ንግዳዊ ባንክ ኤርትራ የመሓላልፍ።

3/ ብመሰረት እዚ ኣዋጅ'ዚ ዝኾረሉ ግብሪ ናይ ዝተላከበሉን ዝተማሓላለፈሉን ሰነድ ይሕዝ።

19. ብመሰረት እዚ ኣዋጅ'ዚ ዝእኩብ ናይ መሕመድ ግብሪ ገንዘብ

ኣቲ ብኸምዚ ኣብ ንግዳዊ ባንክ ኤርትራ ኣብ ፍሉይ ኢሳብ ዝእኩብ ናይ መሕመድ ግብሪ ገንዘብ ብኸምዚ ዝሰፊብ ኣገባብ ይገብሩ።

1/ ክብቲ ፍሉይ ኢሳብ ዝኾረሉ ወይ ገንዘብ ዘማሓላልፍ እቲ ነቲ ገንዘብ ኣብ ማዕከሉ ክውዕል ዝተመዘኑ ቅብሊት ጥራይ ይኸውን።

2/ ነቲ ገንዘብ ኣብ ማዕከሉ ክውዕል ዝተመዘኑ ቅብሊት ናይ ዝላተወ ገንዘብን ዝተገብረ ወጺኢን ሰነድ ሓዘ' ኣብ ሰበሰቡ ወርሒ ጸብጸቡ ንግዚያዊ መንግስቲ ኤርትራ ቅዳሕ ድማ ንኸፍሉ ፋይናንስ ይህቡ።

3/ ትውጊታት ናይ ኢሳብ ብብግዚኡ እንተዋሓደ ግን ብዓመት ሓንጻብ ብኣዲተራት ግዚያዊ መንግስቲ ኤርትራ ይምርመር።

20. እዚ ኣዋጅ'ዚ ዘይምልኮቶም ሰባት

እዚ ኣዋጅ'ዚ ከከም ኩነታቲ ጠቐላላ ወርሓዊ ናይ ደሞዝ ኢታዊኦም ካብ ብር 60/ ሱባ/ ገታሕቲ ገዝኾትን ብናይ ጡረታ ኣበል ንዝመሓደሩ ሰባትን ንተጋደልቲን ኣብ ሃገራዊ ኣገልግሎት ንዝርከቡ ሰባትን ኣይምልከትን።

21. ትርጉም፣ ኣካይዳ ስራሕ፣ ትግበራ፣ ጥርጥርታትን መቐጻጸቦትን ይግባዩን

1/ ነዚ ኣዋጅ'ዚን ብኣኡ መሰረት ንዝወዱ ሕጋዳትን ናይ ምትግባር ሓላፍነት ብኣፈሸኡ ናይ ክፍሊ ፋይናንስ ብፍላይ ድማ ናይ ውሽጢ ሃገር ኢታዊ ቤት ጽሕፈት ቦዓል መዚ ይኸውን።

25. አዋጅ ገጽ 79 ስር ገዢ አዋጅ ገዢ ንወርሐዊ ደሞዝ ብዝምልከት ክብ ጥሪ 1/1992 ፣ ብዓመታዊ ኢታዊ ንዝክፈል ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ ብዝምልከት ክብ ሓምሌ 1/1991 ዓ.ም. ንክለእ ኢታዊ ብዝምልከት ክለ ብጋዜጣ ኢዋጃት ኤርትራ ተሓቲሙ ክብ ዝወጸሉ ፅላት ጀግሩ ብኸልእ ኢዋጅ ክሰብ ዝትክእ ብዋጃሊ ይሰርሓሉ።

እስመራ ታሕሳስ 10.1991 ዓ.ም.
ግዚያዊ መንግስቲ ኤርትራ

21/ ኢብዚ አዋጅ ገዢ ብክልእ ኢገብብ ንክፍጽም እንተዘይተሓገጉ ፣ ንቲርጉማት ፣ ኢክደጻ ስራሕ ፣ ቲግብራ ፣ ጥርጉፍትን መቐጻጸብን ይግባዩትን ናይ ኢሰላላዳን አተኣኻኻባን ግብሪ ናይዚ አዋጅ ገዢ ብዝምልከት ኢብ ናይ ኢታዊ ግብሪ አዋጅ ዝሰፈረ ከም ዘሉ ተፈጻሚነት ይህልዎ።

22. ውገዞፍ ውጽኢታት መግዛእታዊ ስርዓት ደርግ ብድርቲ ንዝተጎድሉ መስመይ ከምኡ እውን ንናይ ሃዘር ሓድነትን ድሕነትን መከላኸሊ ብዝብል ምስምስ ውጽኢት ንምእኩብ ብዘውጽኡም ኢዋጃት መሰረት ንና ዘይተኣከበ ወይ ዘይተኸፍለ ውገዞፍ ውጽኢታት እዚ አዋጅ ገዢ ብጋዜጣ ኢዋጃት ኤርትራ ተሓቲሙ ክብ ዝወጸሉ ፅላት ጀግሩ ትሩፍን ክፍሊት ዘይሕተተሉን ይኸውን።

23. ናይ ምትሕብባር ግደታ ዝኾነ መንግስታዊ ቤት-ጽሕፈት ፣ ሀዝባዊ ግንባር ፣ ብሕታዊ ትካል ወይ ውልቀ-ሰብ ነዚ አዋጅ ገዢ ምስ ዘተግብሩን ናይ መስመይ ግብሪ ምስ ዝእኩን ትካላት ናይ ምትሕብባር ግደታ ኣለዎ።

24. ሕጋጋት ናይ ምውጻእ ስልጣን ሓላፊ ክፍሊ 4 ደናገስ ኢብዚ አዋጅ ገዢ ንዝሰፈሩ ድንጋጋታት ብዝያን ንምሰላጥ ሕጋጋት ክውጽእ ስልጣን ተዋሂቡዎ ኣሉ።

ANNEX 2

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<p>Annex 2</p> <p>الجريدة الأثرية الرسمية تصدرها الحكومة الأثرية</p>	<p>العدد (1) لسنة ١٩٩٥م/٧/٨٠ الثمن : ٥ سنتيمات</p>	<p>المرسوم التشريعي رقم/٦٧ لعام ١٩٩٥ الخاص بضريبة الدخل المترتبة على الإرتيين المغتربين</p>
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<p>፲፱፻፱ አዋጅ ት ሴርትራ የዘመን ግዛት ሴርትራ ዝገታ ግም</p>	<p>ቀን 5/1995 ቁ. 1 አስመራ 10 ሰዓታት 1995 ዓ.ም. ዋጋ 0.50</p>	<p>አዋጅ ቁጥር 67/1995 የብዙ ሴርትራ ወዳኔ አፍሪካ ስርዓት ግዛት ሴርትራ ወዳኔ ግዛት ግምት ስርዓት አዋጅ</p>
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المرسوم التشريعي رقم ١٧/ لعام ١٩٩٥ م
الخاص

بضريبة الدخل المترتبة على الإرتريين المغتربين

١/٢ توطنه :-

- يسمى هذا المرسوم :-

(المرسوم التشريعي رقم ١٧/ لعام ١٩٩٥ م الخاص بضريبة الدخل المترتبة على الإرتريين المغتربين) .

٢/٢ دفع الضريبة :-

- كل مواطن إرتري مقيم بالخارج (مغترب) يتحصل على دخل سواء من الوظيفة ، أو اجرة اموال منقولة أو غير منقولة (عقارات) ، أو التجارة أو المهنة أو غيرها من انواع العمل والانشطة والخدمات ، يتوجب عليه دفع ضريبة دخل بنسبة (٧٪) من صافى دخله وذلك وفقا لظروف الحالة اما شهريا او سنويا .

٢/٢ جباية الضريبة :-

- تترتب على وزارة الشؤون الخارجية - إرترية - مسؤولية متابعة وجباية ضريبة الدخل الموجبة بموجب المادة ٧/ اعلان ذلك عن طريق سفاراتها وقناصلها وغيرهم من مبعوثيها بالخارج وان تقتصر مباشرة بإيداع حصيلته تلك الضريبة باسم وزارة المالية والتنمية في حساب خزينة مصرف إرتريا .

٤/٢ نفاذ هذا المرسوم :-

- تسرى احكام هذا المرسوم من تاريخ ١٧/١٩٩٥ م

اسعرا ٢٨٠/٢٨٠ م ١٩٩٥

الحكومة الإرترية

አዋጅ ቁጥሩ 67/1995

ካብ ኤርትራ ወጻኢ እናነበኛ እቶት ንዝረኸቡ ኤርትራውያን ግብር ንምገባል ዘወጹ አዋጅ ።

1- ልዩር ልርእዖቲ

እዚ አዋጅ ዚ ካብ ኤርትራ ወጻኢ እናነበኛ እቶት ንዝረኸቡ ኤርትራውያን ግብር ንምገባል ዘወጹ አዋጅ ቁጥሩ 67/1995 ፡፡ ተብሊኒ ክጥቀስ ይኸክል ።

2- ምክፍል ግብር

ዝኾነ ካብ ኤርትራ ወጻኢ ዝነበርን ካብ ስራሕ (employment)፣ ካብ ክራይ ዝገባብዎን ዘይንቀሳብዎን ንብረት፣ ካብ ግዳዊ፣ ሙያዊ ወይ ዝኾነ ክልእ ንይኖት ስራሓትን ንጥራታትን አገልግሎትን እቶት ዝረክብ ኤርትራዊ ዜጋ፣ ካብ ዝተዳረፉ አቶቲ (net income) ከኸም ካንታቲ አብ ወወርሒ ወይ አብ ዓመት ክልተ ካብ ማእተ (2%) ግብር ይኸክል ።

3- ምእካብ ግብር

ሚኒስትሩ ወጻኢ ንዳያት ዘዚ ብመሰረት ዓንቀጽ 2 ናይዚ አዋጅ ዚ ዝኸፈለ ግብር ብመገዳ ኤምባሲታትን ቁጥራታትን ክልኮት ልኡኻትን ተኸታቲቲ ናይ ምእካብን ብተታቲ እብ ናይ ሚኒስትሩ ፍይናንስ ልምዳትን ናይ ዝንክ ኤርትራ ናይ ግምጃ ሕሳብ (treasury account) ና። ምምሕልላቱን ኣላፍነት ይህልዎ ።

4- አብ ግብር ዝወሰለቲ

እዚ አዋጅ ዚ ካብ 1 ጥር፣ 1995 ዓ.ም. ጀሚሩ አብ ግብር ይውሰል ።

አስመራ 10 ሰኔ 1995

መንግስቲ ኤርትራ ።

8/26/2015

Ministry disburses over 3.5 billion Nakfa to Martyrs families |

Annex 3

ANNEX 3

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Local Magazines

- [Men'esev Magazine](#)
- [Shebab Magazine](#)

Ministry disburses over 3.5 billion Nakfa to Martyrs families



Asmara, 17 June 2015 – The Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare disclosed that over Nfa. 3.5 billion has been disbursed to Martyrs families in the past 10 years on the basis of a monthly benefit scheme.

Mr. Zerai Tekleab, in charge of follow up of the welfare of Martyrs families, said that the Government devised the monthly benefit scheme in January 2004. Citizens including members of the Defense Force and the community in general are also backing up such endeavors with various activities.

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8/26/2015

Families of martyrs in Aqordet rehabilitated |

ANNEX 4

Annex 4

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Families of martyrs in Aqordet rehabilitated



Barentu, 28 June 2015- As part of the ongoing process, the residents of Aqordet sub-zone rehabilitated 16 families of fallen heroes. Each family of the fallen heroes received 10 thousand Nakfa.

Sheik Idris Zaid, Chairman of the Committee for Rehabilitating families of Martyrs, said that the assistance provided for the families of the fallen heroes is part of the high respect the society is giving to its martyrs.

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8/26/2015

Financial support to families of martyrs |

ANNEX 5

Annex 5

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Local Magazines

- [Men'esev Magazine](#)
- [Shebab Magazine](#)

Financial support to families of martyrs

Massawa, 13 July 2015 – Wealthy citizens in Massawa have donated over five hundred thousand Nakfa in support of 43 families of fallen heroes. Each beneficiary family received twelve thousand Nakfa.

These continuous gestures of benevolence attest to a deeply entrenched culture of solidarity and burden-sharing among the Eritrean people.

A former freedom fighter, Meriam Banai, for her part donated twenty-four thousand Nakfa to two families of martyrs that will be disbursed in monthly disbursements for one year.

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Annex 2

Strategic location of Eritrea and the Hanish islands in relation to Yemen

Bab al-Mandab strait separates the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa and links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean




Annex 3

MV Shaker 1


Annex 3.1: MIC –Bills of Lading detailing Sudanese Weaponry on Board

3/18/2015 u0635u0648u0631u0629 u0645u0646 u0627u0644u0628u0648u0644u0654u0635u06290001.jpg


 بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
شركة وادي النيل للحلول المتكاملة
للملاحة والشحن والتفريغ
WADI ALNEEL INTERGRATED SOLUTION CO. LTD
SUDAN - PORT SUDAN

Marine Bill of Lading				
Shipper: Military industry corporation (MIC – Sudan) Kassa'a Street ,Kafuri, Khartoum north Fax: 249 185 338 080 Po Box :10783 Khartoum Sudan Jama Air Fink LLC C/O IDBX 2015-01-05 Po Box :27372 Abu Dhabi UAE C/o : Jamal Khatib - general manager Tel : +971 2 634 9597		Bill Of Lading: 1 <div style="font-size: 2em; opacity: 0.5; text-align: center;">COPY</div>		
Notify Address: Military industry corporation (MIC – Sudan) No: 12 – D36 ILDC 2015- Abu Dhabi POB: Port Sudan POB: Zayed Port /UAE		AGENT: Destination:		
Pre-carriage by:		Place of receipt by pre-		
Vessel: SHAKER 1		Port of Loading: PORT SUDAN		
Port of Discharge: Zayed Port		Place of Delivery by on- Zayed Port		
No	Marks and Nos	Description of Cargo	Qty	Weight/CBM/LM
1	300761	Self-propelled Howitzer D-30 122mm	9	18.030
1	20054002	kamaz 43116x6		14.200
1	896835	BMP -2Armoured mortar vehicle (AMV)		5.045
1	KM-48000C3480	(AMV)		4.700
1	18000055328	Military Vehicle with 107 MM Rocket Launcher		2.570
1	GLT01DS0073	6x6Armored Personnel Carrier (APC)		2.800
1	GLT01DS0095	Tactical Vehicle (1)		20.000
1	*****	Tactical Vehicle (2)		12.000
1	*****	Fast Attack Craft (FAC-19) Special Operation Craft (SOC-14)		
Note		Particulars furnished by the Merchant		
Under collection		Received for shipment in apparent good order and condition, weight measure, marks numbers, quality, contents and value unknown, for carriage to the port of discharge or so near thereto as the Vessel may safely get and lie always a float, to be delivered in the like good order and condition at the aforesaid Port unto Consignees or their Assigns, they paying freight as indicated to the left plus other charges incurred in accordance with the provisions contained in this Bill of loading. in accepting this Bill of Loading the Merchant expressly accepts and agrees to all its stipulations on both pages, whether written, printed stamped or otherwise incorporated, as fully as if they were all signed by the Merchant. One Original bill of Loading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the goods or delivery order. IN WITNESS where of the Master of the said Vessel has signed the number of original Bills of Lading stated below, all of this tenor and date, one of which being accomplished, the others to stand void. REMARKS: Destination charges & fees other than trucking on consignees account.		
Applicable only when documents used as a Through Bill of Lading		Freight payable at _____ Place and date of issue 13/ 1 /2015 PORT SUDAN AS AGENT(S) ONLY TO THE CARRIER		

Annex 3.2: Cargo Manifest of the Consignments Loaded at the Port of Massawa


شركة وادي النيل للشحن والملاحة ذ.م.ش.
WADI AL-NEEL FORWARDING & SHIPPING Co. L.L.C.
 Since 1982

ص.ب. 912، الشارقة - ا.ع.م. هاتف: 0091389 / 0091497 / 0091501 فاكس: 0091512
 P. O. Box : 912, Sharjah - U.A.E., Tel.: +971 6 5591973 / 5591489, Fax: +971 6 5599214
 E-mail: wadineel@emirates.net.ae, Website: wadineelgroup.com

Manifest


Doc No : MFSE1315
 Vessel : mv SHAKER-1
 Port of Loading : JEBEL ALI SEA PORT
 Captain : AHMED WAJIB SABRA

Date : 01-11-2014
 Voyage : VGSE81
 Port of Discharge : MASSAWA PORT

Sno	BOL No	Shippers	Consignee	Notify	Marks & No	Pkgs	Description	Weight	Measure	Final Destination	Remarks
1	BLSE5773	WADI AL NEEL FORWARDING AND SHIPPING	RUTA MESFN FRE	SAME AS CONSIGNEE	JTECB09J67303 4610	1	TOYOTA-LAND CRUISER - STATION MODEL 2007-COLOR-WHITE (S.T.C. 7 PACKAGES OF 4 PCS USED TIRES 1 RABA RUFFING 1 PC COVER TIRE 1 PC TV STAND (PACKAGES STUFF COUNT AND LOAD BY SHIPPERS UNDER OWN RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY- CONTENTS NOT VERIFIED)	1500.0	17.0 ^{CBM}	MASSAWA PORT	FREE OUT
2	BLSE5774	WADI AL NEEL FORWARDING AND SHIPPING	HABTOM FESEHATSIAN TEWELDE	SAME AS CONSIGNEE	LETAA18AHN 02789	1	GMC PICKUP MODEL 2010 COLOUR WHITE (S.T.C. PACKAGES CONSISTING OF 2 PCS DRAM 1 PC MEAT GRINDING 1 PC TABLE WITH CHAIRS 1 PC TV STAND 4 PCS TIRES 6 SOLAR BATTERY 6 PANEL SOLAR 2 CARPETS 3 PAGED FOOD STUFF 1 PC ENVENTER STUFF STOW COUNT LOAD BY SHIPPERS AT OWN RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY- CONTENTS NOT VERIFIED).	1500.0	17.0 ^{CBM}	MASSAWA PORT	FREE OUT
3	BLSE5758	ALASSRI IND. COOLERS INDUSTRY AUTOMOBILE	RED SEA TRADING CORPORATION	SAME AS CONSIGNEE	S/N - 1401 - S/N 1402 - S/N 1403 - S/N 1404 - S/N 1405 - S/N 1406 - S/N 1407 - S/N 1408	8	AGRICULTURE REFRIGERATION ROOM AND SPARE PARTS	32000.0	1480.0 ^{CBM}	MASSAWA PORT	FREE OUT

055 3890737
Ayub Booked by

Annex 3.3: Official Paperwork for the Red Sea Corporation Container Loaded in the Port of Massawa



شركة وادي النيل للتشحن والملاحة ذ.م.م.
WADI AL-NEEL FORWARDING & SHIPPING Co. L.L.C
 Since 1982

ص.ب. - الشركة - أ.ع.ج. هاتف: 0591469 / 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469
 P. O. Box : 912, Sharjah - U.A.E., Tel: +971 6 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469 / 5591469
 E-mail: wadineel@amiratoa.wadi.ne, Website: wadineelgroup.com

Bill of Lading

Shipper : ALASSRI IND. COOLERS INDUSTRY AUTOMOBILE **BL NO :** BLSF5758
 VEHICLES INDUSTRY REFRIGERATED STORAGE ROOMS
 SHARJAH-UAE
 TEL:065310161

Consignee : RED-SEA TRADING CORPORATION **Agent :**
 ASMARA-ERITREA
 P.O.BOX.332
 TEL:002911124386

Notify Party : : SAME AS CONSIGNEE

Pre - Carried by : _____ Place of Receipt by Pre-Carrier : _____

Vessel : _____ Port of Loading :
 HAMRIYA PORT, DUBAI, U.A.E.

Port of Discharge : MASSAWA PORT Port of discharge by On Carrier : _____

Marks & No	Pkgs	Description of Goods	Gross Weight	Volume
S/N - 1401 - S/N 1402 - S/N 1403 - S/N 1404 - S/N 1405 - S/N 1406 - S/N 1407 - S/N 1408	8	AGRICULTURE REFRIGERATION ROOM AND SPARE PARTS	32000,0	1488 CBM

Notes : FREE OUT

Freight Details, Charges Etc.,
 Freight :
 FREIGHT PREPAID

Received for shipment in apparent good order and condition, weight measure, marks numbers, quality, contents and value unknown, for carriage to the port of discharge or so near there unto as the Vessel may safely get and lie always afloat, to be delivered in the like good order and conditions at the aforesaid port unto Consignee or their Assignees, they paying freight as indicated at the left plus other charges incurred in accordance with the provisions contained in this Bill of Lading. In accepting this Bill Of Lading the Merchant expressly accepts and agrees to all its stipulations on all the pages, whether written, printed stamped or other wise incorporated as fully as if they were all signed by the Merchant. One Original bill of Lading must

*Applicable only when documents used as a Through Bill of Lading	Number of Original: 1	Place & Date of issue: SHARJAH 01-10-2014
--	----------------------------	---

10/8/14 10:21 AM Page 1 of 1



شركة وادي النيل للشحن والملاحة ذ.م.م.
WADI AL-NEEL FORWARDING & SHIPPING Co. L.L.C.
SINCO 1982

ص.ب. 912، الشارقة - إ.ع.م. هاتف: 0691973 / 0691489 / 0691588 / فاكس: 0691974 / 0691489
P. O. Box : 912, Sharjah - U.A.E., Tel.: +971 6 5691973 / 5691489, Fax: +971 6 569214
E-mail: wadineel@emirates.net.ae, Website: wadineelgroup.com

BOOKING NOTE - LCL / FCL CARGO

SHIPPER NAME:	Alassoi Ind. Coolex Industry Automobile.	اسم الشاحن:
ADDRESS :	Vehicles Industry Refrigerated Storage Rooms. Sharjah - U.A.E. Tel: 065310161.	العنوان:
CONSIGNEE NAME:	Red Sea Trading Corporation	اسم المستلم:
ADDRESS:	Asmara - Eritrea P.O. Box : 332 Tel: 002911124388	العنوان:
LOADING PORT:	Hamsiya Post, Dubai, U.A.E	ميناء الشحن
DISCHARGE PORT:	Massawa Post.	ميناء التفريغ
SHIP NAME:		اسم الباخرة
TRUCK NAME:		رقم الشاحنة
DATE OF CARGO RECEIVED:	01/10/2014	تاريخ استلام البضائع
RECEIVED BY:	Siraj	استلام بواسطة
BOOKED BY:	Monem	تم الحجز بواسطة
DATE OF SHIPMENT:	09/11/2014	تاريخ الشحنه:
CARGO DETAILS :	Agriculture Refrigeration Room & spare Parts	تفاصيل البضاعة:
VOLUME [CBM]:	1488 CBM	الحجم:
WEIGHT [KGS]:	32,000 Kgs	الوزن:
BL NO:	BLSE5158	رقم البوليصه:
FREIGHT [AED / USD]:	354,872 AED 354,872 / SI 3077 BR 589	أجور الشحن:

RECEIVED BY

ACCOUNTS DEPARTMENT

Annex 4

Government of Ethiopia Correspondence, dated 30 July 2015

SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE PURSUANT
TO RESOLUTIONS 751 (1992) AND 1907 (2009)
CONCERNING SOMALIA AND ERITREA

S/AC.29/2015/COMM.49
30 July 2015
ORIGINAL: English

Letter dated 30 July 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

Excellency,

I wish to recall the letter I sent to the President of the Council on 29 October 2014, forwarding him copy of the interview conducted by the Editor of a U.S. based Ethiopian opposition website on 22 October 2014, with the leader of Ginbot 7 - a terrorist group outlawed in Ethiopia.

In this connection, I would like to enclose herewith a news report released on 19 July 2015 by TesfaNews - a news website affiliated with the Eritrean government publicly announcing that the leader of Ginbot 7, Dr. Berhanu Nega, has "joined his comrades in Eritrea" to launch attacks aimed at overthrowing the Ethiopian government.

In providing support to this terrorist group, which openly professes its ill intentions against the Ethiopian government, Eritrea is indeed in a clear violation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2023 (2011) adopted on 5 December 2011 which, among others, "Demand[ed] Eritrea to cease all direct or indirect efforts to destabilize States, including through financial, military, intelligence and non-military assistance, such as the provision of training centers, camps and other similar facilities for armed groups, passports, living expenses, or travel facilitation".


From:

07/30/2015 22:03

#214 P.002/004

This latest development is yet again another demonstration that Eritrea is neither ready nor willing to desist from destabilizing Ethiopia and the region at large. It's continuous provocation against Ethiopia and countries of the region will have serious ramifications for peace and security. That is why I believe your committee should consider this issue as a matter of utmost concern.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.




Tekeda Alemu
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Enc.

H.E. Mr. Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992)
and 1907 (2009) on Somalia and Eritrea
New York

Received Time Jul. 30. 2015 9:57AM No. 1898


From:

07/30/2015 22:04

#214 P.003/004

DR. BERHANU NEGA JOINS HIS COMRADES IN ERITREA

July 19, 2015



Welcoming ceremony for Dr. Berhanu Nega (Chairman), Ato Neamin Zelege (former CEO of ESAT) and the rest of the leaderships at the Arbegnoch Ginbot 7 (AGUDM) headquarters in Asmara. This is a turning point to the struggle for freedom. The countdown has now officially started.

By Patriotic Ginbot7,

AS YOU have already learnt, our struggle against the minority TPLF-led regime in Ethiopia has reached a crucial milestone at which our comrades have begun paying the ultimate sacrifice.

Armed struggle has never been our primary choice of the struggle. However, after closing all avenues of peaceful resistance, the regime has left us with the

Received Time Jul. 30. 2015 9:57AM No. 1898

From:

07/30/2015 22:05

#214 P.004/004

only options of either to remain enslaved losing all our civil liberties and freedom on our home land or to fight back and regain our democratic rights.

Today, Chairman of our struggle and one time democratically elected mayor of the capital Addis Ababa, Dr. Berhanu Nega, has finally joined his comrades in arms on the ground so as to lead the struggle of freeing the Ethiopian people from the clutches of the TPLF apartheid regime.

As we have confidence in the victory of good over evil, we have no doubt that Dr. Berhanu Nega and other leaders of our organization will effectively lead our struggle to freedom, justice and democracy!

Source: <http://www.tesfanews.net/dr-berhanu-nega-joined-his-comrades-in-eritrea/>

Received Time Jul. 30. 2015 9:57AM No. 1898

Annex 5

Sample of two percent tax Receipts with Defence contribution, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

ሃገረ ኢርትራ
ገጠና ተሳታፊ ግዛድ



دولة إرتريا
وزارة الشؤون الخارجية

The State of Eritrea
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

ዓለት: 2014

ቁ.መዝገብ: [Redacted]

መለስ ስም አባ መንገት:	[Redacted]	ቁ.መንገት 1:	[Redacted]
መለስ ስም አባ ፓላቲቦት:	[Redacted]	ቁ.ፓላቲቦት 1:	[Redacted]
አድራሻ:	ሱጊና	ተሰርጉ:	[Redacted]

ዓ.ም	ባለሃዘ	ብድር	ወረያት
1992			1ይ መደረሻ
1993		ባለሃዘ	
1994		ብድር	
1995			2ይ መደረሻ
1996		ባለሃዘ	
1997		ብድር	
1998			3ይ መደረሻ
1999		ባለሃዘ	
2000		ብድር	
2001			ወ.አሰነት መግቢ
2002		ባለሃዘ	150.00
2003		ብድር	ግለሰብ ለምን ፓዎንድ
2004			መዝገብ MILITARY FUND
2005		ባለሃዘ	200.00
2006		ብድር	ከልተ ግለሰብ ፓዎንድ
2007	50.00	ላምን ፓዎንድ	ድርሻ
2008	200.00	ከልተ ግለሰብ ፓዎንድ	
2009		ብድር	
2010			ወረያ
2011		ባለሃዘ	
2012		ብድር	
2013			

54 (ግዕዝ ርዕይ) ለይግልነት ይግልነት
 አባሪታት: 1. ህግ ምድቃሰ ህዚ ሰነድ ዘይቅቡል ይገቡዱ።
 2. ህዚ ሰነድ ዘይ-ህዚ ለባ ኤርትራ ዝሰ ግይነት ለገልግሎት ክረከብ ለይግልነት።

ስም ከግምን አሳዳጅ

ስም ከግምን አሳዳጅ



Annex 6

**Correspondence received by the Monitoring Group from
the Government of Djibouti**

6.1: List of Djiboutian prisoners in Eritrea as provided to the Monitoring Group by the State of Djibouti

NOMS	REGIMENT S	GRADE	DATE D'ENTREE EN SERVICE	MATRICULE	DATE DE NAISSANCE	N° CIN et DATE DE DELIVRANCE	SITUATION FAMILIALE	NOMBRE D'ENFANTS
KADIR SOUMBOUL ALI	1° RAR	CAL	01/01/2002	02/2098/T	1975	123319 de 1997	MARIE	0
MOHAMOUD HILDID	1° RAR	CAL	01/01/2002	02/0725/T	1971	082349 de 1990	MARIE	0
MEIRANEH ALI BOCK	1° RAR	CAL	01/12/1997	97/0315/T	1973	102698 de 1993	MARIE	0
HOUSSEIN HASSAN HOUMED	RIAO	CAL	01/01/2002	02/1165/T	1978	123383 du 11/03/97	CELIBATAIRE	0
HOUSSEIN IBRAHIM MOHAMED	RIAO	CCH	01/01/2002	02/0861/T	1972		CELIBATAIRE	0
ABDILLAHI DAHER SAID	RIAO	SGT	07/06/1989	89/0104/S	1965		MARIE	7
ALI GOHAR GADITO	RIAO	SGT	15/05/1989	89/0021/S	1968		MARIE	12
MOHAMED YOUSOUF OUDOUM	RIAD	SGT	15/05/1989	89/0169/S	1966	156242 de 2003	MARIE	5

LISTE DES PERSONNELS MILITAIRES PORTES DISPARUS SUITE A L'AGRESSION DE L'ARMEE
ERYTHREENNE

NOMS	REGIMENTS	GRADE	DATE D'ENTREE EN SERVICE	MATRICU LE	DATE DE NAISSANCE	N° CIN et DATE DE DELIVRANCE	SITUATION FAMILIALE	NOMBRE D'ENFANTS
ADEN AHMED	ALI	CCO	01/07/1977	77/0091/T				
ABDOURAHMAN MAHAMOUD FARAH	1° RAR	ADC	01/02/1997	97/0049/T	1953	030155 du 16/05/87	MARIE	4
HASSAN HAD	ELMI	1° RAR	01/01/2002	02/0613/T	1965	082400 de 1990	MARIE	2
HOCH KOCHIN	OFLEH	1° RAR	01/01/2002	02/0869/T	1967	082228 de 1990	MARIE	
DJAMA ABRAR	AHMED	1° RAR	01/01/2002	02/0879/T	1972	084585 de 1990	MARIE	0
AHMED YABEH	ELEYEH	1° RAR	01/01/2002	02/0665/T	1970	103998 de 1990	MARIE	0
AWALEH OMAR	ABDI	1° RAR	01/01/2002	02/0670/T	20/02/1971	102619 de 1996	MARIE	3
OSMAN MOHAMOUD AHMED	1° RAR	CAL	01/01/2002	02/0859/T	1973	102753	MARIE	5
CHEIKO BORITO ALI	1° RAR	CAL	01/01/2002	02/1233/T	1964	103932 de 1993	MARIE	0
KAMIL YOUSOUF ALI	1° RAR	CAL	01/01/2002	02/1224/T	1957	052346 de 1988	MARIE	1
					1970	156334 de 2003	MARIE	0

Annex 6.2: List of Eritreans currently in custody in Djibouti as provided to the Monitoring Group by the State of Djibouti

Djibouti, le 24 Août 2010

Liste nominative des prisonniers de guerre des soldats Erythréens détenus à l'Ecole de Police IDRISSE FARAH ABANEH (E.P.I.F.A.).

N°	Noms et Prénoms	Age	Région
01	BINYAM MENGISTAB TSEHEYE	27 ans	ASMARA
02	MOHAMED MAHMUD ABRAHIM	18 ans	ZOBA SUD
03	SHISHAY ZEKARYAS WELDEMARIAM	27 ans	ZOBZ SUD
04	KUWAJA HALEMIKAELE GEBRESLASE	40 ans	GACHE
05	YONAS BEREKTAB MSGNA	23 ans	BARAKA
06	TESFU HABTEZGY NUGUSE	28 ans	ZOBA SUD
07	AHMED MOHAMED FEGIH	24 ans	ZOBA SUD
08	FISHALE KUBROM TEKLE	24 ans	ZOBA -ANZBA
09	ASFAHA ARAIA TEKLESEN BET	27 ans	ZOBA SUD
10	TESFU BEYNE GEBRAB	34 ans	ZOBA MAKEL
11	MERHAWY TEKLEHAIMANOUTE ASFAHA	24 ans	ZOBA SUD
12	AFA HAMED MAHAMED	36 ans	ZOBA MAKEL
13	HAYLE GABREMEDHEN TEKLEHAYMANOT	26 ans	ZOBA ANZABA
14	NUGUSE MANA ANDU	41 ans	ZOBA GACH BARAKA
15	BERAKI TEKLEAB GEBREKIDAN	21 ans	ZOBA SUD
16	KESETE SBHETU NUGUSE	39 ans	ZOBA GACHE BARAKA
17	TEKLEWEYNI HADGU ABADI	29 ans	ZOBA SUD
18	AYOB HAILEAB HABTEMARIAM	29 ans	ZOBA MEKAELE
19	TESFU WELDEMIKAL FRUZUN	33 ans	ZOBA SUD