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Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Fukushima (Japan), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 31

Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/5136, A/5214, A/5337; A/SPC/74, A/SPC/L.89 and Add.1, A/SPC/L.90, A/SPC/L.91) (continued)

1. Mr. TARAZI (Syria), exercising his right of reply, wished to refute certain allegations which Mrs. Golda Meir, the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs, had made at the 370th meeting and which he considered completely unfounded.

2. According to the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Arabs were denying the Jews the right to belong to a particular people. That was false: the Arabs had never denied Jews the right to be Jews. Besides, freedom of religion had been proclaimed by the Charter of the United Nations. What the Arabs had always disputed since 1947 was that the Jews belonged to a single nation and that they had any right to Palestine. Palestine had been an Arab province of the Ottoman Empire and part of the vilayet of Beirut, which confirmed that it had been Arab. Mrs. Meir had also said that the Arabs had not been in a majority in Palestine. Figures proved the contrary: at the time of the Balfour Declaration,^{1/} the majority of the population of Palestine, both Christian and Moslem, had been Arabs. It would be strange, therefore, if recent immigrants who had come into Palestine as a result of the policy of the administering Power could claim sacred rights to that country.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel had also given as an argument in support of her thesis the fact that the Jews throughout the world observed all the religious celebrations which in ancient times had been observed in Palestine. But the Christians, too, observed their celebrations throughout the world; did they claim the right to return to Palestine on that account? Similarly, it would be absurd to say

that all Moslems were entitled to occupy the territory between Mecca and Medina because those were the cities of the Prophet. Mrs. Meir, by saying that Palestine belonged to the Jews of the entire world, was endorsing the racist principle that the Nation was founded on religion. That principle could not be accepted.

4. There had been much talk about the Balfour Declaration, which had been the basis for the establishment of a Jewish national home and, later, of the so-called State of Israel. In that connexion, he wished to make a clarification. As Mr. Samuel Landman had pointed out in the New Zionist Publication No. 1 which had appeared in London in March 1938,^{2/} the Balfour Declaration must be considered as the principal clause in a contract entered into by the United Kingdom Government with the Jewish leaders in order to induce the United States to take part in the First World War. The same writer had also disclosed that the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 had been altered so as to give all Palestine to the Jews as a reward for their services. Actually, the Balfour Declaration had been less a generous and grateful gesture toward the Zionist movement on the part of the United Kingdom than a political manoeuvre. The Bolshevik revolution of 1917 had revealed the existence of a secret agreement to dismember the Ottoman Empire after its defeat and to divide its different regions into zones of British and French influence. Since it was preferable to obtain the agreement of the United States in the matter because of its possible repercussions on the course of the First World War, the Zionists had, in a manner of speaking, been used as intermediaries between the United Kingdom and the United States. That manoeuvre had enabled the United Kingdom to pose as a friend of the Arabs and promise them independence if they revolted against the Caliph, but at the same time it had promised Palestine to the Jews. In an article entitled "Origins of the Balfour Declaration: Dr. Weizmann's Contribution", the English historian James Malcolm had described how the British leaders had had the idea of making use of the Zionist leaders to incite the United States to enter the war. It was therefore clear that Palestine had been handed over to the Zionists as a political manoeuvre. He endorsed the statement which the Saudi Arabian representative had made at the previous meeting, that Israel was not a State like any other: it was the result of secret dealings, according to a method which the United Kingdom had practised ever since it had become a great Power and which undoubtedly conflicted with the Charter of the United Nations.

5. The Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs had said that the Arab refugees should be integrated into the other Arab countries. The Arab refugees,

^{1/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No. 11, vol. II, annex 19.

^{2/} Great Britain: The Jews in Palestine (London, New Zionist Press).

however, belonged to an entity, a country, called Palestine, and they wanted to return to it.

6. The delegation of the Ivory Coast, one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.89 and Add.1, favoured negotiations. Negotiations, however, could only be carried out between the parties concerned. But who were the parties to the dispute? They were the Palestine Arabs and the usurper, Israel. The Arab States, for their part, could not negotiate with Israel because they were not a principal party to the dispute.

7. According to an article published in *Le Monde* on 13 December 1962, Mr. Ben-Gurion threatened Syria with military action in the mountains bordering Israel on the first pretext that offered. The Israel Government, he said, would react as if Tel Aviv had been attacked. The object was to induce the United Nations to urge the Syrians to abandon the positions they held in the mountains, as well as those around Lake Tiberias, in accordance with the General Armistice Agreement.^{3/} So-called reprisals were thus announced, which Israel would organize after a violation of the General Armistice Agreement, an act with which it was familiar. The United Nations should call on Israel to implement that Agreement in full, for as long as Israel refused to appear before the Mixed Armistice Commission, the offers to negotiate on the question of the refugees could not be taken seriously.

8. The problem of the Palestine refugees was much more serious than was thought, because it affected the deepest feelings of the Arabs. It served no purpose to deplore the repetitious and heated nature of the debate. It was necessary to go to the root of the problem. The matter concerned a usurpation, the installation of a foreign population and the denial of the right of return to the legitimate inhabitants. Any solution which did not take those facts into account would not be applicable. The Committee must not recognize an accomplished fact, but consider the injustice which the Palestine Arabs had suffered. He recalled that in Algeria the war which had ended with the Evian agreements of 18 March 1962 had been necessary to obtain recognition not of an accomplished fact, i.e., the proclamation of Algeria as French territory, but of the sacred and inalienable right of the Arabs of Algeria to their homeland. It was to avoid a similar war that he was calling on the United Nations.

9. Mrs. MEIR (Israel), exercising her right of reply, repeated that the Arabs wanted to rewrite history; they even distorted her own statements. She had not said that Israel was asking the Arabs to recognize the right of the Jews to be Jews, but to recognize the Jews as a people.

10. As for the abusive analogies between Israel and the Nazis, she wished to say how proud she was of the attitude of the Jews who had stood beside the Allies during the Second World War and, above all, of the fact that all Jews had been opposed to Nazi Germany. She doubted if as much could be said of all the Arab peoples.

11. With regard to Mr. Ben-Gurion's statements, as reported by the representative of Syria according to *Le Monde*, it was salutary to know how Israel would react if the Syrians attacked villages situated in Israel

territory, as they had done the previous year. Were the Syrians respecting the General Armistice Agreement, when they machine-gunned Jewish villages from their positions in the mountains?

12. Mr. USHER (Ivory Coast) wished to reply to a question which the Iraqi representative had put directly to him at the previous meeting. He greatly admired the moderation and the logic of the representative of Iraq and regretted that his position did not coincide with his own. Unlike the Iraqi representative, he recognized the existence of Israel *de jure* and *de facto*. The representative of Iraq had asked him if he recognized the Arab community of Palestine. He was happy to be able to reply in the affirmative. An Arab community of Palestine had remained outside the frontiers of the State of Israel. If that community decided to implement resolution 181 (II) of 1947 and set up a State, he would recognize it. He also recognized the Arab community which had stayed in Israel and which had become integrated into it. As for the refugees, he advocated their return so that they could have the same rights and obligations as the community which had remained on the spot. Two communities could live together very well. In the Ivory Coast, sixty tribes speaking different languages lived together in the same State.

13. He was sorry that the representative of Syria had mentioned his name, because that obliged him to make his position clear once more. The representative of Syria had quoted an article from *Le Monde*; but must everything that a newspaper reported be believed? In another issue, *Le Monde* alleged that Syria had asked France to urge its former colonies not to concern themselves with the Palestine question. France no longer had any say in its former colonies and Syria knew it.

14. In proposing negotiations, the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.89 and Add.1 sought to bring the parties closer together. In the case in point, those parties were not only Israel and the Arab refugees from Palestine, but also the Arab countries, for while the Palestine Arabs were the principal party, the Arab countries should also take part in the negotiations as representatives of the Arab nation.

15. Mr. BADRA (Tunisia) wished to reply to the dishonest arguments put forward by the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs. She had ventured to cast doubt on the attitude of all Arabs during the Second World War. He wished to recall that the Arabs, both in North Africa and in the Middle East, had been on the side of the Allies. Thousands of Arabs had died defending the world against Nazism. Marshal Lyautey, in his speech on being received into the French Academy, had already paid tribute to the Arabs who had given their lives during the First World War. King Mohammed V had been decorated with the Order of Liberation. The future President Bourguiba had given orders from his prison to his fellow-countrymen to help the Allies. Prime Minister Ben Bella was a hero of Cassino. How could anyone have the dishonesty to doubt the presence of the Arabs alongside the Allies?

16. Mr. CHANDERLI (Algeria) joined the representative of Tunisia in regretting that the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs had thought fit to criticize the conduct of Arabs during the two world wars. In the First World War, the Arabs of the Middle East and North Africa had participated at the side of the Allies in a conflict that was nevertheless not directly

^{3/} Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 2.

their concern. In the Second World War, he himself, at the head of an Algerian infantry regiment, had opened the gates of some of the German persecution camps.

17. There was no need for the Arabs to add the doubtful merit of being on the winning side to the justice of their cause, but not one could ever accuse them of not having fought to defend the freedom of all peoples, Jews or non-Jews. Such an insult to truth and justice called for an apology.

18. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq), replying to the representative of the Ivory Coast, said that he was pleased to note that, instead of sharing the Zionist attitude, that representative recognized the existence of a Palestine Arab community as a living reality resolved to remain so. He should therefore accept the logical consequences of his attitude. If the Palestine Arab community existed, it had rights and it was the duty of the United Nations to ensure respect for those rights.

19. The Palestine community, which had not been created by resolution 181 (II) of 1947 but had existed for centuries, possessed in the first place a right that was recognized as universally enjoyed by all communities, that of free self-determination. But that right which it had tirelessly claimed between the two wars had been refused it unjustly by the Mandatory Power, which had cynically asked it to wait until the Jews were in a majority.

20. He was convinced that if the Ivory Coast representative had found himself in the situation of the Palestine Arabs, who had constituted 93 per cent of the population in 1917, he would, like them, have refused to give up his place to a conquering minority without striking a blow. It would be ungracious to qualify as aggressors either the Palestine Arabs who had fought to defend their rights, or the Arab countries that had come to their help.

21. The members of the Palestine Arab community had yet another right, recognized by the United Nations resolutions: the right to return to their homes or to be compensated for the property they had lost. Israel had been flouting that right for fourteen years. Whoever recognized the existence of the Palestine Arab community should uphold its right to choose between repatriation and compensation.

22. The appeal for negotiation which the Ivory Coast representative had echoed should not be addressed to the Arab States, which had only entered the conflict in order to save Palestine from complete destruction and had no right to negotiate in the name of the Palestine Arabs. It was the latter who must be offered negotiation and with whom Israel should open conversations. But Israel, as had been seen since the start of the debate, refused to regard the Palestine Arabs otherwise than as individuals who should be dispersed throughout the various Arab countries. Such a refusal was easily understood: to recognize the Palestine Arab community was ipso facto to destroy the very basis for the existence of a Jewish State.

23. The essential question was whether Israel was willing, as required under international law, the United Nations resolutions and the universal standards of the civilized world, to restore to the Palestine Arabs the rights of which they had been deprived.

24. Mr. IGNACIO-PINTO (Dahomey) joined the other delegations in congratulating the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for the admirable work he had accomplished in often difficult circumstances, and thanked him for his objective and full report (A/5214).

25. It was regrettable to note that political, religious and even racial passions were envenoming the essentially human problem of the Palestine refugees. Neither hatred nor passion would truly serve their cause or help to solve their distressing problem. On the contrary, those who, on one side or the other, preferred violence to peaceful means were helping to make the problem still more insoluble.

26. He associated himself unreservedly with the views expressed by the representative of the Ivory Coast, which were also those of the majority of African delegations of like persuasion: far from adding fuel to the flames by defending any extreme position, they were making every effort to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes.

27. It was in that spirit that his delegation had joined the other sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.89 and Add.1, which was to be regarded not as a purely symbolic gesture, but an act of faith in the usefulness of negotiation.

28. It was in fact the problem of the state of open or masked hostility between the Arab States and Israel that must be directly attacked if a way out of the refugees' situation was to be found.

29. It was distressing, for example, to hear some representatives declare that they would never rest until they had driven the Jews out of Palestine, if necessary by force. Such statements were contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter and might well lead the United Nations on to the reef on which the League of Nations had foundered.

30. It was therefore time for the adversaries, without self-consciousness, to abandon the path of discord and to prove sincerely their loyalty to the Charter by applying one of its fundamental principles—that of recourse to peaceful negotiation for the settlement of disputes.

31. It was also time for the Powers, both great and small, which had voted for the establishment of Israel to open their eyes and to look squarely at the danger threatening the peace of the world. His delegation deplored the fact that some refused, out of tergiversation or selfish motives, to see the usefulness of and the justification for a draft resolution calling on the parties to negotiate. Not only was negotiation linked, going back even further than the principles of the Charter, to the venerable and ancient African practice of the palaver, but there were many examples showing how fruitful it often was, even at the cost of some wounded pride. The recent Cuban crisis would probably have taken a different course if any one of the participants had not accepted the principle of negotiation. In the same way there was no need, to prove the futility of the word "never", to look further than France, now reconciled to England and Germany, its sworn enemies of former times.

32. Accordingly, his delegation, relying on the innate wisdom of human nature, appealed earnestly to all men of goodwill to choose the only path which could

lead to peace—the path of negotiation. For the honour and the glory of the United Nations, it wished with all its heart that the forces of peace might triumph and banish fear and hatred.

Mr. Benites (Ecuador) took the Chair.

33. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that in fourteen years no progress had been made towards a solution of the refugee problem; on the contrary, the problem steadily became more difficult as the number of refugees increased.

34. He recalled the origin of the Zionist movement, which had sprung from the perfectly natural nostalgia of an uprooted and scattered people, rendered still more acute by persecution. Zionism had not originally been based on narrow nationalism, and had looked forward to fraternal co-operation with the Arabs. Unfortunately, other factors had arisen which altered that conception, with the result that one people had found a haven only by inflicting a tragic injustice on another people for which no remedy had been found.

35. He regretted that the repeated solutions of the General Assembly remained a dead letter—in particular resolution 194 (III), which offered a clear-cut solution consonant with the spirit of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: that the refugees should choose between repatriation and compensation. It was incontestable that the right to a country and a home was one of the fundamental human rights, which could in no circumstances be ignored.

36. So long as the refugees felt that they had been dispossessed and were the victims of an injustice, the "détente" which must precede negotiation could not be achieved. It would be futile to expect a compromise until those who bore the primary responsibility for the situation had taken the first step to remedy it.

37. It was incumbent on Israel to take that first step. Operative paragraph 5 of resolution 194 (III) did, in fact, call for negotiation, but the repatriation and compensation provided for in paragraph 11 were, by the very terms of that paragraph, not subject to negotiation. Those measures, which were Israel's responsibility, should not follow, but should precede the negotiations, in order first to create an atmosphere of mutual respect.

38. There was no question of denying the existence of Israel, but at the same time it was intolerable that an entire community should be uprooted and dispossessed. The choice for the refugees between repatriation and compensation was therefore the essential basis for any solution, and they must be given that choice. The difficulty of such a decision should not be allowed to serve as a pretext for evading it. He ventured to hope that the great religious and moral traditions of the people of Israel would give them the necessary courage to do their duty, in their own interest.

39. By contrast with most similar situations, where the refugees did not wish to be repatriated and the only possibility was resettlement, the Palestine refugees were willing to return to their country. Their confidence in the treatment they expected to be accorded by Israel, which was reflected in that willingness, did honour to that country. It would therefore be to Israel's advantage, even from the psychological point of view, to promote better rela-

tions by taking a positive step towards the repatriation of the refugees. Repeating a suggestion made by his delegation at the sixteenth session (322nd meeting), he proposed that Israel should take the first step by repatriating a token number of refugees and paying compensation to an equal number who opted for resettlement in the Arab countries. A practical measure of that kind would have the advantage of taking that humanitarian problem, with its increasingly serious political repercussions, out of the present impasse by creating a more propitious climate of mutual understanding. Added to the positive efforts which the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine continued to make, it would facilitate a solution in conformity with the General Assembly resolutions and the principles of justice. It would then at last be possible for the two peoples to consider renewing their ethnic, historical and geographical ties, which should never have been broken.

40. The representative of Cyprus endorsed draft resolution A/SPC/L.90. The appointment of a custodian was necessary, since nothing had yet been done to protect the inalienable right of the refugees to their abandoned property.

41. With regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.89 and Add.1, although his delegation subscribed without reservation to the principle of direct negotiation, it repeated that the prerequisites for such negotiation would not exist until the refugees had been granted the right of free choice. The time was therefore not ripe for such a proposal.

42. His delegation would support draft resolution A/SPC/L.91 submitted by the United States.

43. In conclusion, his delegation wished to thank the Commissioner-General and the staff of UNRWA for the excellent work which they had done under difficult conditions. It drew attention particularly to the programmes of basic education and vocational training which had been organized and which, unfortunately, were still inadequate. In any case, those were only stop-gap measures. The basic problem had to be solved, and he urged all the parties concerned to make every effort towards that end.

44. Mr. ASIROGLU (Turkey) said that no progress had yet been made towards a solution of the painful question of the Palestine refugees, which had been on the Assembly's agenda since 1948. The debates had shown that serious political and social problems were involved, the numerous aspects of which had been carefully analysed. The main difficulty lay in the fact that up to the present it had not been possible to separate the question of the Arab refugees from the question of Palestine. In view of the particular nature of that problem and the unyielding positions adopted, the general principles underlying any solution to a refugee problem were not applicable in the present instance. Whatever the fears or aspirations of the parties directly or indirectly concerned, the present deadlock only made the situation worse and increased the distress of the refugees. His delegation considered that their tragic situation was a moral responsibility of the United Nations, which should use all the means at its disposal to remedy it. Turkey endeavoured to contribute, so far as it was able, to the solution of the Palestine refugee problem. As a member of the Conciliation Commission, it followed closely the Agency's remarkable achievements. The report sub-

mitted by the Commissioner-General showed the competence and dedication of Mr. Davis and his staff. Thanks to the co-operation of the Governments of the host countries and the generosity of a number of Member States, the Commissioner-General had been able to make UNRWA a small oasis of hope in a vast desert of distress and suffering. On behalf of his Government he was glad to pay a tribute to the Commissioner-General and to assure him of his country's unflagging support in the accomplishment of his noble and humanitarian work.

45. Since its establishment, the Conciliation Commission had sought to fulfil its mandate. As all its efforts to secure the repatriation of the refugees had proved unsuccessful up to the present, the Commission had often been criticized by the Arab delegations. While it endeavoured to understand the feelings which impelled them to act in that way, his delegation hoped that they in turn would understand the difficult conditions under which the members of the Conciliation Commission worked. The General Assembly had recognized those difficulties, since it had seen fit to stress in resolution 512 (VI) that the Governments concerned had the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement and that the Commission should be available to the parties to assist them in reaching agreement. Unlike the General Assembly or the Security Council, the Conciliation Commission had no executive powers. As its name indicated, its function was to reconcile the views of the parties concerned. It was not its function to exert pressure on them or to impose on one the will of the other. That being the case, it was difficult to understand the attitude of those who criticized it when they deplored the fact that certain resolutions were not being observed. Naturally, no organization was perfect and, as a member of the Commission, his country would be happy to take account of any constructive criticism or recommendation which might help advance the Commission's work. As its report (A/5337) pointed out, the Commission had been able to obtain encouraging results in such technical fields as the identification and valuation of the property of the Arab refugees and the release of their bank accounts. His delegation took that opportunity to thank all those who had co-operated in that difficult task.

46. In the course of the past year, the Commission's Special Representative, Mr. Joseph E. Johnson, had continued his efforts and had had some useful exchanges of views with members of the Commission regarding the application of General Assembly resolution 194 (III). The delegation of Turkey greatly appreciated Mr. Johnson's competence and tireless devotion.

47. The Turks felt the greatest sympathy for the Palestine refugees. Turkey, which was in the same geographical region as the countries directly involved in that dispute, feared its dangerous repercussions, for it regarded it as a threat to peace and political and economic stability in the Middle East. Accordingly, his Government would spare no effort either in the Conciliation Commission or in other organs of the United Nations in the search for a just and equitable solution to the problem of the Palestine refugees.

48. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia) said, exercising his right of reply, that he would put one question to the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs through the Chairman. Her reply might change the course of the debate and affect the action that would be taken on

the draft resolutions before the Committee. His question was: was Israel prepared to accept all the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the question of Palestine?

49. Mrs. MEIR (Israel) said, in exercise of her right of reply, that in spite of the filth and insults that had been hurled at the people of Israel and their representatives, the Israel delegation would never lower itself to the level of some of the remarks that had been made in the Committee. She would thank the representatives of the Arab countries not to distort her words. She had not said that no representative of an Arab country could assert that Arabs had fought against Nazi Germany. What she had said was that no representative of an Arab country could assert that all the Arabs had fought against Nazi Germany. Israel, which had suffered so many dead, did not desecrate the memory of any of them, and had particular respect for those who had laid down their lives for the sake of a world in which men could live in freedom and dignity. Nevertheless, while not forgetting the part that Arabs had played in the struggle against Nazism, Israel had never believed that participation in the struggle conferred any privileges other than recognition of that fact. The peoples of Europe had not been the only ones to rise up against Hitler Germany. Peoples all over the world, some of them remote from Europe, had realized the threat it represented and had joined in the common fight. Among them had been hundreds of thousands of Jews. However, such facts must not be permitted to obscure others. Was it or was it not a fact that the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem had been listed by the United Nations War Crimes Commission as a person suspected of war crimes? Could it be said that all Arabs had refused to have anything to do with him? Had it not been stated in the Committee that Arab representatives were still co-operating even now with the Grand Mufti? Could anyone deny the Nazi insurrection of Rashid Ali in Baghdad, which had occurred in 1941 simultaneously with the Nazi advance in the desert? It was not surprising that the Rashid Ali revolt had been accompanied by a pogrom. Was it not true that the United Kingdom had had to dispatch troops to Baghdad specially for the purpose of putting down the revolt? Those were all facts that could not be obliterated and it was those she had had in mind in saying that all Arabs had not opposed Nazi Germany. The Arab representatives who had brought the subject of Nazi atrocities into the discussion would do well to remember that.

50. Before replying to the question asked by the representative of Saudi Arabia, she would like to ask a prior question: did he and the other representatives of Arab countries accept resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 establishing the State of Israel in a part of Palestine, and did they recognize the creation of the Jewish State?

51. Mr. USHER (Ivory Coast), exercising his right of reply, said that he was afraid he had not made himself clear. He had never termed either the Arabs of Palestine or the Arab States aggressors. His Government's instructions were that he should not condemn anyone but promote compromise and negotiation.

52. He was well aware that the Palestine question was much older than the Balfour Declaration. Representing a new Member of the United Nations, the delegation of the Ivory Coast had tried to understand

the causes of the present situation. It recognized the existence of the Arab community of Palestine and, apparently, those who had voted for partition had also recognized it. By creating two States, they might have intended to prevent the two communities from disappearing, for the partitioning of a community did not result in its dissolution. The history of Africa was full of partitions and many African communities were divided at the present time by a national frontier. However, the Africans were willing to live for the present with their frontiers, which had been drawn by the colonialists, while hoping they would ultimately disappear.

53. The Committee had before it three draft resolutions, none of which appeared to be satisfactory. The idea of those who rejected any practical solution was, no doubt, that resolution 181 (II) on partition should be rescinded and that Israel should be replaced by a single Palestinian State. Since no one dreamed of attempting such a radical solution, the only course open appeared to be that of negotiations.

54. The sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.89 and Add.1 recommended negotiations with a view to finding a solution acceptable to all the parties concerned, and his delegation had never denied that the Palestine Arab refugees were such a party. However, the war that had taken place had been a war between the Arab States and Israel, countries which were still at war since there was only an armistice between them. Given such a context, the problem as a whole could be settled only through negotiations. His delegation deplored the attacks to which it had been subjected because of its sincere efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Palestine conflict, but it was not unaware that difficulties were to be expected from telling people the truth.

55. Whether one liked it or not, the State of Israel existed; that was a reality which could not be ignored. Whether one liked it or not, there would be negotiations sooner or later, perhaps even secret talks with a mediator lending his good offices. Whatever might have been said on the subject, negotiations of some kind were perhaps still the best means of bringing about a rapprochement between the opposing positions.

56. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia) said, in exercise of his right of reply, that he had something to say to the representative of Israel through the Chairman. She had asked whether the Arab States accepted the 1947 resolution on the partition of Palestine. He was ready with his answer but before giving it he would like to ask the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs the following question: if the Arab States accepted the 1947 resolution concerning partition, was Israel prepared to carry out all the provisions of all the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine?

57. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq), exercising his right of reply, said that he had a number of points to make. It was wrong to say that the insurrection of Rashid Ali had been a Nazi movement. The revolt, in fact, had been aimed against the then Regent of the country. Moreover, it had been amply proved that the fighting in 1941 between United Kingdom and Iraqi forces had been provoked by the United Kingdom. In his history of the Second World War, Winston Churchill had made no secret of the fact that the United Kingdom Government had attempted to maintain in Iraq a government obedient and devoted to the

United Kingdom. If the movement had really been inspired by the Nazis, Hitler, who had been practically the master of Europe at the time, could easily have helped the Iraqis to repel a relatively weak force of United Kingdom troops. However, he had not done so.

58. The Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs had also referred to a pogrom, although none had taken place and, in the disorders that had occurred in Baghdad at the time, Moslems and Christians had suffered more than Jews.

59. She had mentioned the Jewish community in Iraq. For 2,400 years, that community had enjoyed a respected and honoured place in the country. In view of the number of crimes committed by Israel against the Arabs in a period of fourteen years, he shuddered to think what would have happened if the situation had been reversed.

60. The representative of the Ivory Coast had wondered how the present situation of the Palestine refugees had come about. He himself and the representatives of other Arab countries had tried to explain. On the pretext that in a small part of Palestine an independent Jewish State had existed for 400 years out of the 4,000-year history of that country, the Zionists had made use of the most despicable methods in order to seize a land which did not belong to them and to oust its rightful owners. The intervention of the Arab States had been a rescue operation designed to protect the Palestinian population, threatened with annihilation, and to prevent the Zionists from occupying the whole of Palestine in accordance with plans for aggression drawn up long before partition.

61. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel had said that 8,000 square miles were not very much when compared with the vast expanse of the Arab world. But that was not the question. The 8,000 square miles meant a great deal to the Arab people of Palestine because they were the heart of their stolen country. Why should they have to give them up? The other Arab peoples each had its own country. Would Africans agree to give a white minority a corner of their country, however tiny? Unlawful occupation by force of arms did not mean legal ownership, and the people of Palestine would continue their struggle until their rights were restored. It was significant that those rights had not once been mentioned by the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs during her statement.

62. With regard to draft resolution A/SPC/L.89 and Add.1, he recalled that resolution 194 (III) had recognized the right of the refugees to choose between repatriation and compensation. That right was therefore not negotiable. The negotiations mentioned by the draft resolution had already taken place and had resulted in the conclusion of armistice agreements between the Arab States and Israel. The inalienable right of the refugees could not be indirectly challenged without violating the provisions of resolution 194 (III). The Iraqi delegation, therefore, could not accept draft resolution A/SPC/L.89 and Add.1.

63. The CHAIRMAN announced the end of the general debate and said that future statements would be limited to the draft resolutions before the Committee.

The meeting rose at 1.50 p.m.