

GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION

Official Records

Monday, 9 October 1972,
at 10.55 a.m.

NEW YORK

Chairman: Mr. Hady TOURÉ (Guinea).

AGENDA ITEM 38

The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (A/8666 and Corr.1, A/8670, A/8689, A/8703, paras. 501-519):

(a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8722, A/8770);

(b) Reports of the Secretary-General (A/8822)

1. The CHAIRMAN recalled that one of the items allocated to the Special Political Committee was the one relating to the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. The documents before the Committee under subitem (a) of that item were the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* (A/8722) and a report on maltreatment and torture of prisoners in South Africa (A/8770). Under subitem (b), the Committee would consider the reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa (A/8822) and on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2775 (XXVI).¹

2. He also reminded members that the President of the General Assembly, in his letter dated 25 September 1972 (A/SPC/150) had drawn attention to the view expressed by the General Assembly that the sections of the report of the Economic and Social Council (A/8703), concerning the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (*ibid.*, paras. 501-513) and the question of slavery and the slave trade in all their practices and manifestations, including the slavery-like practices of *apartheid* and colonialism (*ibid.*, paras. 514-519), which had been allocated to the Third Committee, might be of interest also to the Special Political Committee. Close contact would be maintained between the two Committees in that regard at the level of individual delegations and regional groups, as well as between their Chairmen, and the members of both bodies would be kept informed of pertinent developments.

*Statement by the Rapporteur of the
Special Committee on Apartheid*

3. Mr. AHMAD (India), Rapporteur of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, introduced the report of that Committee (A/8722). He would have preferred to submit a

much briefer report summarizing the 10 resolutions on the subject adopted by the General Assembly during the twenty-sixth session, stating that most of them had remained unimplemented, while a few had been partially implemented, and briefly describing the efforts of the Special Committee to awaken the conscience of the world, educate public opinion and stimulate action by the trade union movement. He would have concluded by reproducing annex II of the report without comment. However, the actions of the South African Government and of the opponents of *apartheid* were history and must therefore be recorded. When the history of the abolition of that modern form of slavery eventually came to be written, the report might provide material for the year 1972 in compact form.

4. The report consisted of three main chapters and three annexes. Chapter I was devoted to a review of the activities of the Special Committee under its expanded mandate. Chapter II reviewed the work done by the world community outside the United Nations to stamp out *apartheid*. Chapter III set out the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee, which, in its opinion, would provide a basis for further action by the General Assembly to intensify efforts to eliminate *apartheid*.

5. Annex I to the report contained a review of the developments concerning *apartheid* since October 1971. It showed clearly that the Government of South Africa had not heeded the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session demanding an end to *apartheid* and to repressive action against opponents of *apartheid*. On the contrary, the intensified application of *apartheid* continued to cause suffering to millions of Africans, Coloured people and Asians, while the aggressive expansionist policies of the South African régime had heightened tension throughout southern Africa. The Pretoria régime was able to persist in its inhuman policies because some countries still collaborated with it despite the condemnation of such collaboration by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In paragraphs 236 to 261 of the annex to the report, information was provided on assistance to South Africa in the military field, including the recent provision to South Africa of such sophisticated equipment as ground-to-air missiles. In a letter to the Security Council dated 5 June 1972 (A/8689), the Special Committee had drawn the Council's attention to military collaboration by certain States with the racist South African régime and had recommended effective steps to halt the transfer to South Africa of advanced technology and information, since such assistance was used against peaceful African countries. It had also called for a halt to the large-scale expansion of the manufacture of military matériel in South Africa with the assistance of foreign Governments and companies.

¹ Subsequently circulated as document A/8833.

6. As in the past the report provided a comprehensive list of atrocities committed by the *apartheid* régime during the period under review. During the past year, the régime had surpassed its own record of brutality against the opponents of *apartheid*. In that connexion, he would at a later stage introduce a separate report on maltreatment and torture of prisoners in South Africa (A/8770), which had been requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 2764 (XXVI). In June 1972 South African students had staged demonstrations against their Government's racist policies, meeting with brutal repression at the hands of the police in various cities. Tear gas had been used, and many persons, including white students and clergymen, had been arrested. The solidarity displayed between the youth groups and students of all races was one hopeful sign in an otherwise bleak situation. Details of those events and of the communiqué issued by the Special Committee in that regard were given in the report. The South African Government had extended its repressive measures by expelling from South Africa and Namibia a great number of clergymen and people engaged in charitable work, by withdrawing passports from the leaders of the National Union of South African students, by establishing a parliamentary committee to investigate four liberal and multiracial organizations and by rejecting the demand that a judicial commission, instead of a political body, should look into their activities.

7. In the field of sports, the international campaign against *apartheid* continued to gain adherents and to benefit from the co-operation of true sportsmen all over the world. As indicated in the report, the South African régime was using misleading propaganda in an effort to offset its increasing isolation in international sports, but no one should be fooled by such manoeuvres. The Special Committee had expressed concern over moves to reinstate South Africa in Davis Cup tennis competition and to permit it to re-enter "through the back door" by participating in games in Latin America. In that connexion, he drew the Committee's attention to the encouraging reply which the Special Committee had received from Argentina. The Special Committee hoped that the other Latin American countries would follow that example and avoid facilitating a violation of the Olympic principle and of General Assembly resolution 2775 D (XXVI). The Special Committee had also followed closely South Africa's attempts to continue and expand sports exchanges with the Commonwealth countries. As Rapporteur, he had recently visited New Zealand as part of an effort to persuade the competent authorities to withdraw an invitation to a South African rugby team. The Special Committee stressed the need for a commitment on the part of every Member State to take positive action in application of Assembly resolution 2775 D (XXVI). Governments must not evade their responsibility to oppose discrimination in sports by delegating that responsibility to national sports bodies on which they exerted little influence. It was feared that the resolution would be defeated by inaction and by the refusal of some Governments to influence national sports organizations in favour of non-racialism.

8. The Special Committee had always emphasized that foreign investment in South Africa and foreign trade with that country were crucial in emboldening its régime to

impose *apartheid*. Action was necessary to end collaboration with South Africa, particularly by the Western European and North American countries and by Japan. The General Assembly should consider instituting a well co-ordinated, world-wide boycott of South African business and economic interests. Large corporations were content to work within the framework of the *apartheid* laws which limited the advancement of non-whites; the huge profits which they derived from *apartheid* contributed to the continuance of the social and economic degradation of the people. Those companies should be made answerable for their actions in South Africa.

9. The work of non-governmental organizations in support of the international campaign against racism and *apartheid* continued to expand and gain support. The Special Committee was particularly heartened by the increased activity of the trade-union movement, and the proposal to hold an international conference of trade unions on *apartheid*, initially put forward in General Assembly resolution (2671 D (XXV)), was to come to fruition in 1973. The Special Committee had decided to participate in the conference and had endorsed recommendations for action by the trade-union movement, employers and the International Chamber of Commerce. In that connexion, he drew attention to paragraphs 238 to 241 of the report, in which the Special Committee recommended the adoption by the General Assembly, at the current session, of a resolution supporting the convening of the international conference of trade unions, as well as the approval by the General Assembly of certain financial arrangements in that regard. Other important items in the Special Committee's programme of work for 1973 included participation in the OAU International Conference for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and *Apartheid* in Southern Africa, to be held at Oslo in May 1973, consultations with representatives of the mass media on promoting the information campaign against *apartheid* and consultations with the Organization of African Unity to promote further action against *apartheid*.

10. As in past years, the Special Committee had held a special session in March 1972 for consultations with the liberation movement, the anti-*apartheid* movements and other organizations. It had also held consultations with church representatives and religious organizations at that time. Those fruitful activities enabled it to benefit from the experience of others and to expand its contacts with non-governmental organizations. It had also kept in touch with the public by sending representatives to conferences on racial discrimination and *apartheid* organized by various national and international organizations.

11. In its report, the Special Committee had emphasized the deteriorating situation in South Africa and reiterated the belief that more energetic action by the United Nations was essential. It had again recommended action by the Security Council and enforcement measures against South Africa under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and, at the same time, had called for a number of measures to promote a comprehensive international campaign against *apartheid* with the participation of Governments, non-governmental organizations and the general public. On

behalf of the Special Committee, he commended those proposals to the Committee's earnest consideration with a view to meaningful action by the United Nations to assist the people of South Africa in their legitimate struggle for freedom.

12. In conclusion, he wished to pay a tribute to Mr. Farah of Somalia, who was shortly to end his long tenure as Chairman of the Special Committee to join the Secretariat. Within the framework of the Special Committee, Mr. Farah had succeeded in organizing representatives of sovereign States into an effective team dedicated to the elimination of *apartheid*; while refusing to compromise on matters of principle, he had never lost touch with basic human values.

*Statement by the Chairman of the
Special Committee on Apartheid*

13. Mr. FARAH (Somalia), Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, said that he did not intend to dwell in detail on the situation in South Africa since that was covered by the report of the Special Committee. Any new evidence was new only because it represented the most recent manifestations of the malignant disease that had afflicted South Africa for a very long time. All aspects of the problem of *apartheid* had been examined, and the proper conclusions had been drawn. It was agreed that from a political point of view *apartheid* was a threat to the peace and security of Africa and potentially a threat to international peace and security. Looked at from a legal and moral viewpoint, *apartheid* was a crime against humanity. Few members—with the exception of South Africa—would quarrel with those assessments.

14. The major Powers had in the past expressed their abhorrence of the policy of *apartheid*, as had most Member States at one time or another. That was because the principle of *apartheid*, as declared over 20 years previously, had from the beginning been a challenge to civilization that the world could not ignore and still retain its humanity. Since that time there had merely been a filling in of details. The principle of the separation of races had been seen in terms of individual human suffering, the psychological degradation of racial prejudice, people displaced and abandoned to poverty and hopelessness, and children doomed to death from starvation. There had been a steady sharpening of the instruments that ensured white privilege at the expense of the human rights of non-whites. The non-white population had been stripped of political rights, freedom of movement and property rights and had been denied educational and employment opportunities. Unjust laws had been harshly applied in order to support the *apartheid* system and crush its opponents. The migrant labour system had deprived many persons of the fundamental human right to establish a family. The fraudulent promise of self-determination in the guise of Bantustan schemes had come to nothing. The non-white population was being kept from the mainstream of South African society and denied a just share of the resources and riches of its native land.

15. At the Nuremberg trials, enslavement, deportation and genocide had been listed as crimes against humanity. Their counterparts were all to be found in South Africa.

Nevertheless, the world had failed dismally in its attempts to put an end to *apartheid* and to restore human rights to the non-white population of South Africa. All countries condemned *apartheid*, but not all found it convenient to commit themselves to the international campaign to eliminate it.

16. Those committed to the struggle against *apartheid* in South Africa, in the territories under Portuguese colonial administration and in Southern Rhodesia must have no illusions as to the nature of the forces opposing that struggle. Efforts were being made to isolate South Africa economically, politically, socially and culturally from normal diplomatic relations, but that country's main trading partners were not prepared to put principle before profit. Despite an immediate expression of horror, the actual response of those countries to the Sharpeville massacre had been a substantial rise in trade and investments. The world was being asked to condone those economic relations on the ground that they would produce changes inside South Africa and that an expanding economy coupled with trade and investment would weaken *apartheid* and improve the lot of the non-white population. Those arguments had been disproved. The report showed that the pattern of injustice inside South Africa would remain unchanged as long as *apartheid* was established in principle and practice and produced profits and financial benefits for certain sections of the international community. It was quite clear that the economic growth that was taking place was restricted to the white areas and did not extend to the Bantustans, in which 40 per cent of the black people lived and to which the South African régime intended to transfer the remaining 60 per cent. Despite the expansion of the 1960s, the gap between African and white incomes had widened.

17. The list of South Africa's major trading partners contained in annex II to the report should not be seen merely as a statistical table but as an indictment of those nations and a major challenge to the goals of the campaign against racism and colonialism. Moreover, the list did not show the full picture, since it did not take into account military assistance, technical services and the immigration of skilled personnel. The United Nations had called specifically for measures to stop the flow of skilled personnel, which provided South Africa with a much-needed labour force to maintain the economy and the principle of *apartheid* in employment. The economic relationship between southern Africa and the Western Powers was becoming a question of increasing importance for both sides. The West looked to southern Africa as a market for investment and for the sale of exports and the products of the South African subsidiaries of powerful multinational corporations. He quoted an international economist who had pointed out that what was involved was not just a problem of human rights and racism but also a crisis of the neo-colonial system. When efforts were made to isolate South Africa, they were frustrated by the same pattern of co-operation and close involvement between that country and its partners. It was clear from the report that the internal situation in South Africa was becoming linked to military considerations of global significance. The apparent desire of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to integrate South

Africa into the Western defence system could lead to the abandonment of the cause of the oppressed peoples of southern Africa or even to an open alliance against the African countries. The Western countries' collaboration with South Africa and their provision of weapons or of licences to produce arms represented the not-too-thin end of the wedge. There was no need to remind the Committee that the arms embargo was the only measure against South Africa that the Security Council had adopted so far and that the General Assembly, in its resolution 2775 A (XXVI), had removed any distinction between arms used for internal repression and those used for external defence.

18. Western military support for South Africa had important ramifications, since it gave the régime the political stability it needed to attract international investments and helped to establish an identity of interests which tended to preserve the status quo. The military, economic and political forces that helped to support the régimes in southern Africa were closely interrelated. They were not the result of indifference or inaction but of policies which had been planned for the present and the future. The result of those policies was to make southern Africa a possible area for big Power confrontation in which the conflict between black and white might be identified with the cold war. The South African and Portuguese régimes already claimed that the action taken against freedom fighters in Africa was part of the struggle of the free world against communism. South Africa's key geographical position and the Soviet Union's forward maritime policy had been seen by the United Kingdom in 1968 as a new element in the balance of power. The Simonstown naval base represented, in that context, a forward post of the NATO defences. There were clear indications that sides were forming for a possible racial war, while the question of justice for the non-white African population was not included in the global strategy. Such a situation was a threat to peace and consequently a grave responsibility of the United Nations, which was bound by its Charter to take collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.

19. The efforts to isolate South Africa socially, culturally and diplomatically had not received the support that would have seemed natural for such limited measures. The number of diplomatic and consular missions opened in South Africa had increased since the time of the Sharpeville massacre. The efforts of many Governments to isolate South Africa from sports and cultural events were inadequate, although concerned individuals and non-governmental organizations had done a great deal to bring home to the South African people the fact that their policies were abhorrent to the rest of the world. Many Governments held the mistaken view that it was possible to separate politics and sport. They ignored the fact that the basis for life in South Africa was racism implemented at every level of human activity. It was not by personal choice that black and white players could not play together on the same teams; the law forbade it. That policy had been restated recently by the South African Government for the benefit of those outside South Africa who hoped that the Government would ease the laws and permit mixed sports teams.

20. The question of the sports boycott was an important one since it was an area of the international campaign in

which some success had been achieved. International co-operation on that question would be of the greatest value. An increasing number of individuals and non-governmental organizations had taken effective action in the realm of sport, but many Governments and States showed inconsistencies and moral evasion on the matter. When the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had taken up the matter of South Africa's readmission to Davis Cup competition, a number of countries had maintained in their replies that they had no control over decisions taken by their nationals in a private capacity. An outstanding exception to that was Argentina, which had undertaken not to allow racist teams to enter the country or tournaments to be held in Argentine territory if the participation of racially biased teams was envisaged. The Special Committee on *Apartheid* would like to see a similar approach by the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States, which, although opposed to racism, claimed they were powerless to act where non-governmental bodies were involved.

21. The Special Committee had always been gratified by the response from the Latin American countries, which supported the aims of the international campaign against *apartheid*. It was to be hoped that all those countries would oppose the efforts of the Davis Cup organization to re-assimilate South Africa into international tennis.

22. Even though more than nine years had passed since the establishment of the Special Committee, it was still faced with the question of how to deal with oppressive racism in South Africa and with its alliance with financial, strategic and social interests outside the country.

23. Despite his emphasis on the negative aspects of the problem—an approach that seemed to be borne out by the report—there were positive aspects as well. The seeds of consciousness had been planted and were growing. In the realm of sport there was a growing commitment to action in support of the Committee's aims among students both inside and outside South Africa, churches throughout the world, trade-union movements and other organizations.

24. One of the Special Committee's most vital functions was the collection and dissemination of information on *apartheid*, a task that was being carried out admirably by the United Nations Unit on *Apartheid*. Co-operation between the Special Committee and a large number of non-governmental organizations had added a new dimension to the international campaign. It raised a hope that the grass-roots movement among concerned people would ensure that *apartheid* remained a live public issue and that pressure would be brought to bear on those Governments that had not so far co-operated with the campaign.

25. Despite the obstacles mentioned, the campaign's greatest successes had been achieved in the sphere of sports. Four years earlier, when the campaign to eliminate *apartheid* from sport had begun, it would have been hard to imagine such success. There was now an almost total ban on racially selected teams from South Africa in international sport. General Assembly resolution 2775 D (XXVI), concerning *apartheid* in sports, had been adopted without opposition and with few abstentions. Even the abstentions did not indicate an absence of opposition to *apartheid*: in

the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand there was wide and active opposition to teams being sent to South Africa and to visits by South African teams. The examples shown in the realm of sport could produce further effects in other areas. One effect of the boycott had been to show the South African people that they must act against their Government if they wished to end their growing isolation. They must realize that *apartheid* was abhorrent to the rest of the world.

26. Student protests, particularly within South Africa, showed an awareness of the moral issue and a courage which should be an inspiration to all. The South African students had been prepared to risk assault, imprisonment and the loss of their student status, if not of their passports, in order to demonstrate peacefully against *apartheid*.

27. The World Council of Churches had given financial support once again to the liberation movements of southern Africa and had provided moral leadership by its determination to act for the just cause of the oppressed peoples of southern Africa.

28. Perhaps the most important development of the past year was the positive response of the international trade-union movement to the Special Committee's initiative calling for the convening of an international conference of trade unions on *apartheid* (see General Assembly resolution 2775 H (XXVI)). The trade-union movement had committed itself to setting aside two days in the middle of the International Labour Organisation's conference in Geneva to work out a common programme of action against *apartheid*. It could confidently be hoped that a forceful new element would be added to the international campaign. The issues in the South African situation challenged every premise of the trade-union movement. At the Tenth World Congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions held in July 1972 in London, he had suggested various means by which the trade unions could involve themselves more effectively in the international campaign. One important point that had been made was that many international and national trade unions, while voicing opposition to *apartheid*, were involved directly or indirectly in permitting their funds to be invested in companies and financial corporations with extensive interests in South Africa. Following his (Mr. Farah's) statement of that fact, the Secretary-General of the Trades Union Congress of the United Kingdom had announced the decision of that organization to withdraw investments in companies with South African subsidiaries. Similar action could be taken by the whole trade-union movement.

29. The international trade-union conference on *apartheid* would be significant for several reasons. Trade unions had the autonomy and power to bring about change. The experience likely to be gained at the conference could be used to great advantage when other conferences of non-governmental organizations were planned, particularly if they were devoted to positive courses of action. The role of the United Nations would be limited to assistance in convening the conference, chairing its deliberations and providing certain technical conference services. It would be extremely unfortunate if the necessary preparations were held up by considerations of the financial cost of services

that the United Nations was quite rightly expected to provide. He trusted that there would be no misgivings about any request for financial assistance from the United Nations to help make the international conference of trade unions possible. If the proposal was defeated because of the reluctance of some States to contribute, it would place the very credibility of the Organization in jeopardy.

30. Another positive step towards the goals of the international campaign would be the proposed draft convention (see A/8768,² annex I) and draft protocol (*ibid.*, annex II) on the suppression and punishment of the crime of *apartheid*, which were to be considered by the General Assembly during the current session. That important measure would lay the legal basis for widening the international campaign, since it would put the principles and practices of *apartheid* within the framework of international penal law.

31. Individuals, non-governmental organizations and Governments could all contribute to the eradication of *apartheid*. On 21 March, the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, he had said before the Special Committee that the time must never come when voices were not raised against injustice. The unjust society of South Africa must be exposed and measured against the norms of a society committed to the principles of human equality. The result of that patient effort would depend on the conscience of the powerful group of interests which sought to create a permanent obstacle to the fulfilment of the aspirations of entire peoples.

32. The problem of *apartheid* could not be isolated from the other problems of southern Africa, namely those of Namibia, Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique, since it involved not only human rights but also slavery, colonialism and the denial of basic rights to non-whites. Although the relationship between each southern African territory and the United Nations was governed by different legal circumstances (Angola and Mozambique were colonial territories in which a war was under way, Namibia was a colonial territory under illegal occupation and South Africa was an independent State and a Member of the United Nations), certain elements were present in every case.

33. The time had come for the United Nations to match that interrelationship by a high degree of co-ordination in its efforts to combat racism; indeed, in view of the almost unanimous agreement that the total commitment to racism of the minority régime in southern Africa presented a challenge to the Organization, such co-ordination was essential. According to the allocation of the agenda items for the current session, the policy of *apartheid* would be discussed under 10 items in various Committees. Such a procedure would inevitably lead to a duplication of efforts and might even result in conflicting ideas and approaches. The three bodies which dealt primarily with the problems of southern Africa had already taken a step in the right direction by holding a joint meeting in 1971 to discuss co-ordination. Another joint session of those bodies was called for in paragraph 250 of the report of the Special Committee.

²For the printed text, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 54 and Corr.1, document A/8542, para. 32.

34. Currently there were at least 12 bodies in the United Nations dealing with the interrelated problems of southern Africa. Not only was that very confusing but it also dulled the impact that the United Nations could have on public opinion. Ideally, co-ordination of United Nations efforts should be achieved through the establishment of a single committee on southern Africa. Until that was done, the liaison between existing bodies should be increased where it already existed and instituted where it did not. One of the chief aims of the liaison should be examination of the goals and activities that those bodies had in common. Another would be to see that measures which had proved successful in one area were applied to others. A third aim would be the review of policies which had not proved successful. Finally, an attempt should be made to determine the priorities for intensifying pressure in particular areas, including the economic, political or social. Naturally, pressure should be maintained with the full support of all the bodies dealing with southern Africa.

35. Among the working methods that could further those aims, it might be possible to set up a Secretariat unit for southern Africa as a whole, using the Unit on *Apartheid* as a nucleus.

36. There was much information of general value that was only available to members of particular organs. The special studies prepared over the years by each organ should be surveyed and listed so as to enable everyone to ascertain easily what information was already available. Such a list would be valuable for the continuing work of those organs and would eliminate any further duplication of effort.

37. It had been realized early that world public opinion, especially in the Western countries, had to be reached, which was why the Special Committee had tried since 1966 to promote an international campaign and to establish close links with non-governmental organizations. In view of the Western Powers' boycott of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (the Committee of Twenty-Four), increasing attention should be paid to creating a powerful international campaign exposing *apartheid* as the ultimate form of colonialism. A southern African unit could be helpful in the dissemination of information in an extended international campaign.

38. One of the findings and recommendations of the International Seminar on *Apartheid*, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism, held at Kitwe, Zambia, in 1967,³ had been that the undertaking of a world-wide campaign of information in regard to *apartheid*, racial discrimination and colonialism in southern Africa was one of the most urgent and important priorities in order to secure the application of the decisions of the United Nations in regard to South Africa and to counteract the massive and misleading campaigns which the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia were conducting throughout the world. The Seminar had noted

that, in order to be effective, such a public information campaign would have to be conducted on a scale at least equal to that employed by the racist and colonial régimes of southern Africa and should use the most modern methods of the mass communications media for that purpose. South Africa had spent approximately \$9 million in 1971 in trying to sell *apartheid* to the outside world. It would be interesting to find out how much the Office of Public Information was spending in that regard in view of the fact that every Member State except South Africa condemned *apartheid* and that there was almost unanimous support for the international campaign.

39. The United Nations information services on southern Africa still fell short of the goal set by the Kitwe Seminar; there had been no concrete proposal to create a news agency to handle a world-wide information campaign or to entrust such a campaign to a non-governmental agency, as suggested by the Seminar. In creating a truly comprehensive and efficient public information campaign on the question of southern Africa, the United Nations should look further than the expertise available in the Office of Public Information. It should try to enlist the professional advice of the very distinguished panel of correspondents accredited to the Organization. Those correspondents were the main link with the international news media; it would be interesting to find out from them how best to promote a cause which had international approval.

40. There should be extensive consultation between those organs whose work was most closely related. There were times when the Committee of Twenty-Four was concerned with the same problems that came before the United Nations Council for Namibia or the Special Committee on *Apartheid*. The concerns of the Special Committee and the Commission on Human Rights were often the same. All those bodies were concerned with the review of *apartheid* legislation. Despite the fact that three of them were directly concerned with violations of the arms embargo against South Africa, no joint consultation had taken place so far, nor had there been any pooling of research facilities to produce comprehensive reports and studies of value to all the organs.

41. A further area where there could be a pooling of resources and joint action was that of fact-finding missions, whose evidence was often of great value to a number of bodies but which customarily went out at the behest of one only. Joint hearings of petitioners could be held, or petitioners invited by one organ could be heard by another.

42. As he had pointed out earlier, the General Assembly considered many resolutions on items relating to southern Africa, some of which were identical and some of which conflicted. They were considered by the Special Political Committee, the Fourth Committee and the First Committee. Those three bodies could hold joint sessions when matters of common concern were being discussed. A precedent for such joint sessions could be found in the early days of United Nations work, when overlaps in the work of different organs had occurred. The General Assembly had asked the Fourth Committee and the Committee of

³For the report of the Seminar, see document A/6818 and Corr.1 (mimeographed).

Twenty-Four to co-operate on a study of the activities of interests impeding the elimination of *apartheid*.

43. The question of the procedure governing the membership of the various organs was pertinent, since it related to the goal of maintaining a vigorous and dynamic approach to the problem of southern Africa. When the three bodies on *apartheid*, decolonization and Namibia had been established, no limit had been set to the term of office of the original members; voluntary resignations had been the only cause for changes of membership. Such an arrangement was contrary to normal United Nations procedure. It was important that those bodies remained open to new ideas and to the possibility that new impetus could be given to their work by a system of rotating membership. He suggested that, provided that there were States willing to serve on them, one third of their membership should retire each year. That would ensure continuity and avoid the danger of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* becoming the concern of a few members only. Such measures would not entail the setting up of cumbersome new machinery or any conflict between the mandates of different organs.

44. Although there was already some co-operation between the various organs, the Secretary-General's report on the co-ordination of United Nations activities with regard to the policies of *apartheid* and racial discrimination in southern Africa,⁴ which the Economic and Social Council had had before it at its resumed forty-eighth session, showed how many and how isolated were the different approaches being made to the problems of southern Africa and how much still remained to be done in order to present a truly effective front against racism and colonialism.

45. He suggested that a committee on southern Africa should be established. Such a body could replace the three already dealing with the problems of southern Africa and could take on the responsibilities of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa. Membership could be approximately 30 and should rotate. Under such an arrangement, the Commission on Human Rights and its subsidiary bodies would be responsible only for those questions pertaining to racism and colonialism in southern Africa that had been specifically referred to them by the southern Africa committee. The three separate departments of the Secretariat that serviced the three bodies dealing with southern Africa could form a single unit to service a unified organ on southern Africa. Logic and economic reasons pointed to the necessity for such a reorganization. At the current session, it might be possible to exchange experience and consider how best to develop the type of co-ordination suggested. Such co-ordination was necessary if the goals of justice and freedom for the people of southern Africa were to be realized.

46. The CHAIRMAN said that, in leaving the ranks of Government representatives and joining the Secretariat, Mr. Farah could have left no better legacy than the proposals he had just put forward, which deserved the serious consideration of the Committee. On behalf of all members, he thanked Mr. Farah for his great contribution to the Com-

mittee's work and expressed the conviction that his wide experience would serve him well in his new post.

Statement by the Chairman of the Committee of Trustees of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa

47. Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden), Chairman of the Committee of Trustees of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, introduced its report (A/8822, annex) noting that in addition to encouraging contributions to the Trust Fund, deciding on grants for humanitarian assistance to the victims of *apartheid* and racial discrimination in South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia, and promoting co-ordination among voluntary agencies engaged in such humanitarian assistance, the Committee of Trustees also ensured that grants from the Fund were used for the humanitarian purposes laid down by the General Assembly. He personally had met with the leaders of voluntary agencies in Europe during the summer and had ascertained that, despite the difficulties, grants were being properly spent. The consultations, which would be continued, had involved no cost to either the United Nations or the Trust Fund.

48. In 1972 the Trust Fund had received larger contributions from more donor Governments than in previous years, and in that connexion the Committee of Trustees appreciated the Secretary-General's support of its efforts to promote contributions.

49. Many serious cases of persecution had taken place in the past year. In Namibia students had been expelled from school for expressing jubilation at the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of June 1971, several persons had been tried and sentenced in Windhoek for participation in the strike of the contract labourers, and six persons from the Ovamboland region of Namibia were currently on trial on charges of murder following long periods of imprisonment. In Southern Rhodesia, too, there had been an increase in repression—following the visit of the Pearce Commission—and in South Africa itself four persons of Indian origin were being tried under the Terrorism Act. Scores of students and churchmen had been arrested and tried in connexion with peaceful demonstrations in June in protest against discrimination in education, and a number of persons had been forced to leave their homeland. Such continued persecution, together with the rise in the cost of legal defence and in the cost of living, obliged the Committee of Trustees to appeal once again for larger contributions. A generous contribution to the Trust Fund on 21 March 1973 would be a very appropriate way of observing the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for, although the humanitarian operations carried out through the Fund could not help solve the situation in southern Africa, assisting the victims of racial discrimination was a practical way of demonstrating concern and could play a significant role in promoting the objectives of the United Nations.

50. The Trust Fund had enjoyed the virtually unanimous support of several of the main organs of the General Assembly, the Organization of African Unity and numerous non-governmental organizations. On behalf of the Committee of Trustees, he appealed to every Member State,

particularly the richer countries—some of which had not yet made any contribution, while others had contributed only once several years previously—to consider contributing to the Fund in the coming year. It would be of particular significance if all the permanent members of the Security Council responded to the appeal.

51. Finally, he expressed appreciation to the voluntary agencies which had provided assistance to the victims of persecution and voiced the hope that the tragic situation in southern Africa would be resolved. In the meantime, it was only appropriate that the international community should do all it could to alleviate the hardships to which men, women and children were subjected by a system universally recognized as unjust.

Question of procedure

52. Mr. MOHAMMED (Nigeria) supported the appeal made by the Chairman of the Committee of Trustees, noting that African leaders in South Africa were persecuted under the Suppression of Communism Act—used mainly against the opponents of racism—and the Terrorism Act—terrorism being defined, in actual fact, as any act of resistance to *apartheid*.

53. He expressed his delegation's indignation at the detention, trial and other acts of persecution directed against persons in Namibia while the Secretary-General was negotiating for a solution to that Territory's problems and his delegation's concern at the report that certain Namibians currently on trial might face the death sentence. If the South African Government continued to torture and kill Namibian patriots, the consequences could indeed be grave.

54. Finally, he proposed that the statements made by the Rapporteur and Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* and by the Chairman of the Committee of Trustees of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa should be reproduced *in extenso*.

55. Mr. SIYOLWE (Zambia) and Mr. TEYMOUR (Egypt) supported the proposal.

56. Mr. PETRIE (United Kingdom) asked how many statements were to be reproduced *in extenso* and whether he could take it that there would be a statement on the financial implications of such reproduction, as expressly provided for in paragraph 9 of the first report of the General Committee (A/8800/Rev.1).

57. The CHAIRMAN said that he took it that the Committee agreed to the proposal that transcriptions of the three statements should be circulated in accordance with the Assembly's authorization since the recommendation contained in the said paragraph 9 had specifically exempted the Committee from the provision regarding such a statement.

It was so agreed.⁵

58. Mr. PETRIE (United Kingdom) said that that had not been his delegation's interpretation of the passage when the General Committee had taken the decision in question but that he would accept the Chairman's interpretation.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

⁵ The full text of the statements was subsequently circulated in document A/SPC/PV.809.