

United Nations
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 1837th
MEETING

Friday, 26 November 1971,
at 10.30 a.m.

NEW YORK

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Chairman: Mr. Milko TARABANOV (Bulgaria).

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General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8328, A/8337, A/8457, A/C.1/1018)

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Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace
(A/8492 and Add.1)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. MELLBIN (Denmark): When addressing this Committee on 16 November 1971, my Foreign Minister expressed apprehension at the continuing nuclear arms tests and, with specific reference to the delay in reaching agreement on a complete nuclear weapon test ban, he said:

"It would seem as if the technical aspects of the matter have by now been dealt with to such an extent and in such detail that bridging the gap in the question of verification is mainly a political matter. In view of this, and on the reasonable assumption that little or no real benefit is to be derived from further nuclear weapon tests, it would not be unreasonable to express the hope and, indeed, the conviction that the coming year will produce results in this field." [1829th meeting, para. 30.]

2. It is in line with these views that Denmark is a sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.585, which requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue as a matter of priority its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and which stresses the urgency of bringing to a halt all nuclear weapon testing in all environments by all nations.

3. The purpose of this intervention is to set out some of the essential considerations on which the views of the Danish Government are based.

4. I shall first turn to the question of what arguments might still be adduced for continuing the nuclear weapon tests. Is there a need, in terms of security or balance, to acquire further knowledge of the design of nuclear weapons? Is there for these same reasons a need to develop new specific weapons? It seems reasonable to assume that the answer to both questions must be in the negative. It is difficult to imagine that the knowledge which has been accumulated with respect to the design of nuclear weapons should not be sufficient for any conceivable military need. It is, of course, a fact that nuclear weapons could still be somewhat further refined with respect to the ratio between weight and effect, but a limit is set by fundamental physical factors, and all indications are that the development of nuclear weapons has moved very close to that limit.

5. It has been alleged that without continuous testing a nuclear Power would run the risk of lagging behind in case of a technological break-through by some other Power with respect to nuclear explosive charges; and in spite of the advanced stage of development of nuclear weapons, the possibility of such a break-through cannot be dismissed. However, a break-through of any real consequence with respect to the design of nuclear weapons, and one which would affect the balance of power in any acute and drastic manner, can be all but excluded—quite apart from the fact that in regard to their nuclear explosive capabilities the balance of power between the super-Powers is not delicate. A real risk of destabilizing technological break-throughs would rather seem to exist in fields other than that of nuclear explosives.

6. It has also been asserted that nuclear weapon tests must be conducted in order to acquire further knowledge of the effect of these weapons. However, it is as sad as it is true that there ought to be much more than sufficient knowledge in this field. Anyway, this argument would apply in full only if atmospheric tests were also envisaged, and we take it for granted that the Powers which have acceded to the limited test ban Treaty¹ will not return to the practice of conducting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere. Furthermore, we do hope—and we do urge—that those Powers which are conducting atmospheric tests could see fit to discontinue such practices, if only for the reason that the success of efforts to achieve a complete test ban might well depend heavily on the concurrence of all nuclear Powers.

7. If I have gone in some detail into the possible arguments against a complete test ban, it is because of their obvious and strong bearing on the problem of verification, to which I shall shortly direct my attention.

8. I shall now turn to the arguments which are strongly in favour of a complete test ban.

9. It would contribute to *détente* in general. At a time when the over-all international situation seems to warrant cautious optimism, agreement in this important matter could produce a psychological feedback that would tend to further ameliorate international relations.

10. A complete test ban would also bolster the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII)*, *annex*]—directly, because a nuclear force cannot be developed without testing; indirectly, because it would be an encouraging sign to the non-nuclear States which have assumed specific obligations and restraints that the nuclear Powers are prepared themselves to accept perceptible limitations on their activities in the nuclear weapons field. And on both these counts a complete test ban might perhaps serve to motivate States which have not yet done so to consider acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty.

11. Finally, we take into consideration that once a complete test ban has been agreed upon, no ecological dangers or complications would arise out of unnecessary and useless nuclear explosions.

12. If the advantages to the international community in general from a complete test ban are compared with those hesitations which might still prevail, I think that the case for an early agreement on a complete test ban is clearly established.

13. However, we are all, of course, painfully aware of the fact that certain divergent views on the problems of verification still stand in the way of agreement on a complete test ban.

14. Among the various means for verification, seismic methods have for a long time been in the focus of attention, and rightly so, because they are probably the most reliable. Moreover, seismic methods are still being refined to register and define seismic events with increasing certainty. There are limits to this certainty, limits which cannot be removed in the foreseeable future. But if extensive international co-operation in the collection of information on seismic events and in their interpretation could be organized under binding rules, such an arrangement should go a long way towards satisfying the justified demands for reliable safeguards against undetected violations of a complete test ban.

15. Furthermore, there are a number of non-seismic means of verification: by satellites, by monitoring of radio communications, by on-site inspection, and by other means which are sometimes euphemistically termed “traditional”. It would seem as if the application of a broad range of these non-seismic methods would fill in whatever loop-holes seismic detection alone might be considered to leave open. In this connexion it is important to keep in mind that even if all the known methods of detection were incorporated into a complete test ban treaty, there would not be a hundred per cent guarantee against concealed nuclear weapon tests.

16. As we see it, the task must be to reach agreement on methods of verification that will make the likelihood of detection of nuclear detonations so great that attempts to circumvent a test ban would appear to be politically unacceptable to any Power. And that likelihood might be established at a level well below the one hundred per cent guarantee, which cannot anyway be achieved as long as any attempt to conduct a concealed nuclear weapon explosion is definitely much more likely to be detected than not.

17. Whatever technical methods can be agreed upon must then be incorporated in an agreed and reliable framework of political procedures in which the participants can have full confidence. In setting up that framework, due account must therefore be taken of all the realities of the situation, including the special responsibility of the great Powers and the justified expectations of other countries to play a proper and meaningful role under such procedures.

18. Furthermore, there is another important reason why a reliable verification system is indispensable. Without such a system, seismic events that are not nuclear explosions could be misinterpreted or leave considerable doubts as to their character, and the result could easily be mistrust, political tensions and, if the worst came to the worst, the collapse of a complete test ban.

¹ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

19. Therefore, in the efforts to produce reliable and agreed verification arrangements in connexion with a complete test ban, willingness for constructive compromise and mutual concessions on all sides are called for. On the other hand, it must be emphasized that any attempt to solve the problem through over-simplification is doomed to fail, and might easily turn out to complicate a question which certainly is in no need of added complications.

20. In an effort to produce some progress in the matter, various proposals for intermediary or transitional measures have been presented from time to time. This is not the occasion to go over those proposals. Suffice it for my purpose to recall that my Foreign Minister in his intervention on 16 November said that pending the conclusion of a complete test ban Denmark

“... would be prepared to support imaginative proposals of a limited character, provided they are transitional in the sense that they will bring us closer to a complete test ban, while in no way hampering progress towards that goal. One constructive measure would be for all countries which have worked on the problems of seismological detection to present the information available, in particular, about the present stage of technology and about prospects for the immediate future, so that the international community as a whole could take stock of the situation.” [1829th meeting, para. 31.]

We do hope, however, that a complete test ban can be achieved at such an early date that there will be no need for transitional measures of any considerable scope.

21. A complete test ban is, of course, but a partial step seen in the context of general and complete disarmament, and even in the more limited context of disarmament with respect to the basic strategic weapon systems. It has been maintained, for this and for other reasons, that a complete test ban is by now lacking in importance. This I would not hesitate to call an ambush on the efforts to achieve a complete test ban, the considerable favourable impact of which my delegation, for one, considers to be beyond any doubt. We have gone a long way to reach the present stage in the endeavours to obtain a complete test ban. Technical problems have been dealt with to such an extent that it should by now be mainly a political matter to produce a solution.

22. Denmark will, on the basis of the views outlined in this intervention, go on urging an agreement on a complete test ban with effective safeguards, and we will support the efforts of others to that same end.

23. Mr. SARAIVA GUERREIRO (Brazil): Today the Brazilian delegation wishes to present some observations on the question of chemical, bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons. Because such weapons were not used during the Second World War, and because the new and devastating nuclear weapon came to take first place in the preoccupations of mankind, the United Nations for a long time gave only passing attention to chemical and biological means of warfare. In the last few years, however, resolutions of the General Assembly and discussions in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have shown a renewal of interest in the prohibition of these dangerous

weapons, which are generally to be classified among weapons of mass destruction.

24. Perhaps the first observation one can make is that, in spite of the fact that the main task in this field is still to be faced, one should not fail to welcome the progress that has been achieved, especially considering that it was obtained in a relatively short period of time. International negotiations on matters of this nature have always proceeded at a rather slow pace. Indeed, several resolutions of the General Assembly have reaffirmed and strengthened the purposes and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.² In resolution 2603 (XXIV) the use in international armed conflicts of all chemical and bacteriological agents of warfare without exception was declared to be illegal. Furthermore, the number of ratifications of the Geneva Protocol has increased in the last few years. My own country ratified the Protocol in 1970. The urgency and importance of eliminating the dire chemical weapons from the arsenals of nations, however, should spur and hasten our efforts in spite of the much greater difficulties to be overcome.

25. The different instruments, declarations and resolutions that dealt with the prohibition of the use of such weapons have always been completely comprehensive in approach, making no distinction between the treatment of bacteriological weapons, on the one hand, and that of chemical weapons, on the other. When we went one step further into negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of those weapons we had, however, to consider the problem of verification. Prohibition of use can always be effective because of the fear of retaliation, but prohibition of production, if not effectively controlled in a continuing manner, can leave a party abiding by the terms of the prohibition at the mercy of a violator of the commitment. Of course, there is no reason to wait for technically comprehensive controls. It is enough to have a reduction of risks, which under the political conditions obtaining at the moment is sufficient to create trust among the parties. However that may be, the differences in the military usefulness of biological agents, on the one hand, and chemical agents, on the other, the different peaceful uses of such agents and the very nature of the production processes themselves, when considered in view of the problems of control and verification, indicated that negotiations could hardly result in the simultaneous prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all biological and chemical weapons. That is why the Brazilian delegation, while always supporting the broadest prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, at the same time systematically avoided prejudging the form, number and opportuneness of the legal instruments that should embody such prohibitions. In fact, the memorandum of the group of 12 members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament presented last year in document CCD/319,³ though emphasizing that all chemical and biological weapons should be dealt with together, abstained from prejudging

² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

³ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, document DC/233, annex C, sect. 39.

the specific outcome of the negotiations. Resolution 2662 (XXV) of the General Assembly asked the Conference to continue its work and welcomed the general conception of the memorandum of the group of 12. Therefore, when as of March this year it became evident that political conditions permitted the conclusion of a convention limited to the prohibition of only biological and toxin weapons—as, in fact, some delegations, notably that of the United Kingdom, had been proposing since 1968—we thought that the Committee on Disarmament should not fail to take advantage of the opportunity to try to prepare a draft convention along these lines for consideration by the General Assembly. It was important, however, to make sure that this limited measure would not be allowed to have the effect of reducing the pressure and the momentum for effective progress in the banning of chemical weapons.

26. With that preoccupation foremost in mind, the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, Egypt and Yugoslavia presented working paper CCD/341 [A/8457, *annex C, sect. 23*] containing suggestions on the desirable changes to the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction—suggestions with which the delegation of Argentina associated itself. Most of those suggestions aimed at emphasizing the link between the prohibitions contained in the draft convention and the prohibition of chemical weapons and, at the same time, strengthening the commitment to continue negotiations on this more comprehensive measure. Several of those suggestions were reflected, albeit in a watered-down version, in the preamble and again and most particularly in article IX of the draft convention [*ibid.*, *annex A*].

27. It is our view that the changes introduced into the draft convention now before the Assembly, together with a resolution along the lines of the draft contained in document A/C.1/L.581, will ensure, from the point of view of this Assembly, that the draft convention on biological and toxin weapons shall not militate against further action to be taken in order to ban chemical weapons but, on the contrary, shall stimulate and actively encourage further progress.

28. In fact, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.581 introduced by Argentina and 26 other members of this Committee, including my delegation, considers the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons as a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on a similar prohibition of chemical weapons. The draft convention is the beginning and not the end of a cycle. The draft resolution stresses the immense importance and urgency of the task still before us and supplies the Committee on Disarmament with a bare minimum of guidelines incorporating the elements of the memorandum submitted by the group of 12 members to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in document CCD/352 [*ibid.*, *annex C, sect. 33*]. Such elements, without introducing any undue rigidity into the negotiations, contain principles and concepts that are certainly in the mainstream of the feelings of the Members of the United Nations.

29. With reference to article IX of the draft convention, the Brazilian delegation wishes to place on record its understanding that its wording in no way constitutes a prejudgement of the precise nature and scope of the prohibition of chemical weapons. This provision is in our view fully in line with the position set forth in the joint memorandum submitted by the group. In the light of this understanding the Brazilian delegation regards article IX as a very important commitment to complement in the near future what is at present being achieved by the draft convention. Still in relation to specific articles of the draft convention, we should particularly welcome article X, which reflects a principle necessary in all disarmament measures, namely, that they not only should not hamper scientific and technological development for peaceful purposes but should, on the contrary, strengthen international co-operation in this field.

30. In making a comparative examination of the draft convention on bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, and document CCD/341 of the group of 12, one cannot fail to notice a conspicuous omission: the lack of a reference to the principle of channelling savings from disarmament to the promotion of economic development, in particular that of the developing countries. The importance of this principle, the potential magnitude of its future benefits, the endorsement it has received from different high level meetings of developing countries, emphasis on the same idea in different resolutions of this Assembly itself and even in resolutions of specialized agencies, as was the case with the World Health Assembly in 1964—all this is considerable and self-evident and requires no elaboration on my part. It is a principle that has always been present both in forums dealing with disarmament and in those concerned with economic development, as was only to be expected, since the solution of these two great problems, disarmament and economic development, is in fact an aspiration mankind holds in common in its endeavours towards the goal of peace and prosperity for all. Although in the specific case of this convention the principle could hardly have any concrete operational effect, there is no reason to omit it. On the contrary, since this is the first measure of actual disarmament and since the reaffirmation of the principle in this case creates no complex problems of application, it would be not only indispensable, but fortunately also expedient, to give due recognition to this linkage in a constructive and balanced manner.

31. The purpose of the amendment proposed by the delegation of Argentina and other delegations, including my own, in document A/C.1/L.582 is to provide for the establishment of such a linkage. That amendment, without changing the text of the convention itself, and therefore not prejudicing its general approval and eventual ratification by all States, still expresses adequately the consensus of the General Assembly in this matter. I said consensus because it is my belief that basically, despite one qualification or another, the principle is generally accepted.

32. We fail to see any serious reason why the resolution by which the Assembly commends the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction should not give a constructive and balanced expression to this principle.

33. Before I finish, I should like to turn my attention to the question of handling complaints of violation of the convention. The Brazilian delegation was ready to accept a certain refinement in the procedures, such as the system of verification by challenge, or, in the case of a complaint involving allegation of use of the prohibited weapons, the granting of authority to the Secretary-General to put into operation immediately a strictly impartial and factual inquiry mechanism. However, those procedures do not seem to be politically possible at the present time. In the specific case before us perhaps they are not absolutely indispensable and their absence should not deter us from concluding the convention.

34. In this respect, my delegation, and certainly the majority of the Members of the United Nations, would very much welcome a reassuring answer to the question presented by the representative of Sweden in her statement of last Tuesday that the practical result of article VI of the convention "is not that a permanent member [of the Security Council] by veto could prevent an investigation were a complaint lodged against it—or against one of its allies". [1834th meeting, para. 118.]

35. We also think that some other possibilities might be profitably explored within the framework of the Security Council itself. During the discussion of this item in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Brazilian delegation suggested that the Security Council could deal with complaints of violations of the convention initially and immediately at the level of a subsidiary body, which, acting informally, might in some cases prevent a dispute from deteriorating further and becoming an acid political confrontation. Consideration of a complaint at that level might possibly expedite preliminary investigative measures, perhaps avoiding the veto. Our suggestion, of course, reflected a general view of the Brazilian delegation, maintained for some time, in the sense that the Council should use all its diplomatic potentialities, having recourse to a greater variety of methods and flexibility of procedures. Consideration of this suggestion should be pursued in other forums, including of course the Security Council and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, for indeed it concerns not only the present draft convention but also future measures of disarmament and even the settlement of disputes in general.

36. Mr. TOLENTINO (Philippines): Because of its intense desire to maintain international peace and security, the United Nations had set as its most important goal the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This goal was enunciated by the General Assembly in resolution 1378 (XIV), which it adopted unanimously on 20 November 1959. Thereafter, the disarmament items have been given priority and utmost importance in the deliberations of the First Committee of the General Assembly.

37. But from among the many items on disarmament before our Committee, the problem of general and complete disarmament has been acknowledged as the number one problem confronting us—nay, the most important problem on the agenda of the United Nations.

38. In a statement a few days ago before the General Assembly on the proposed world disarmament conference,

my delegation ventured to suggest that general and complete disarmament should be accorded high priority in the agenda of the conference. This was in consonance with the view expressed by the Philippine representative last year before this Committee that there should be a realistic and comprehensive programme of disarmament so as to give meaning to the 1970s, which have been proclaimed as a Disarmament Decade and to which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should pay particular attention in seeking to achieve progress towards general and complete disarmament.

39. In this connexion I also wish to recall that in the debates of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year several delegations referred to the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. For instance, the representative of Mexico, at the 495th meeting of the Conference, in alluding to the impatience of the United Nations General Assembly with the meagre results obtained thus far in the matters entrusted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, said that he was convinced that the Conference should pay special attention, as a guideline for its work in this and future years, to the comprehensive programme of disarmament appearing in document A/8191,⁴ to which specific reference was made by the General Assembly in its resolution 2661 C (XXV).

40. The representative of India, at the 504th meeting of the Conference, said that on the question of general and complete disarmament the General Assembly had urged the Conference to make more intensive efforts to bring about a faster pace towards the achievement of disarmament measures; while the representative of Italy, at the 500th meeting, suggested the establishment of a small working group which could prove to be the most effective means of examining thoroughly the problems posed by the principles of an organic programme of disarmament. Furthermore, as stated in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

"the delegations of Bulgaria, Mongolia, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet Union declared their readiness to continue efforts with a view to achieving a positive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament." [A/8457, para. 71.]

41. During the current debate in this Committee on the disarmament items, my delegation has taken note of the fact that the delegations of the USSR, Argentina, Poland, Denmark, Ghana, Ethiopia, Brazil, Iran, Hungary, Guyana, Malta, Yugoslavia, Zaïre, Morocco, Czechoslovakia, Ceylon, Bulgaria, Greece, New Zealand and Nigeria have referred to the need of not losing sight of the goal of general and complete disarmament and of giving to it the importance that it deserves. To our mind, that list of delegations is quite impressive. At the same time, the Italian suggestion that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should in the main concentrate on general and complete disarmament at its next session was mentioned and described as a constructive proposal by a number of delegations.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 93 and 94.

42. We have also followed closely the debate on the proposal in the General Assembly for a world disarmament conference and we have noted that an overwhelming majority of the representatives who spoke were in favour of the convening of such a conference. From the views expressed in that debate it can be deduced that a world disarmament conference would create an impetus towards the solution of disarmament problems, particularly and especially the question of general and complete disarmament.

43. Thus it appears abundantly clear to my delegation that there is a markedly strong sentiment in the United Nations for giving urgent consideration and priority to the problem of general and complete disarmament through the initiation of a programme or a course of action for the years to come. In this connexion my delegation is convinced that favourable circumstances exist at this time justifying concerted action on the problem. Let me enumerate those circumstances.

44. First of all, mention should be made of the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, a historic event interpreted by many delegations as one that could contribute greatly to the credibility of disarmament negotiations. In the past we have often heard delegations bemoaning the fact that two nuclear Powers—France and the People's Republic of China—are absent from or not seated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. But with the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations the remedy to that situation may well be at hand. The opportunity is here for China to be actively involved in the mainstream of disarmament negotiations within the United Nations. It is indeed heartening to note that in the inaugural address before the General Assembly by the Chairman of the delegation of the People's Republic of China, he expressed the view that: "It is understandable that the people of the world long for disarmament and particularly for nuclear disarmament." [1983rd plenary meeting, para. 210.] It should also be noted that, in his speech in the General Assembly on the subject of a world disarmament conference, the Chairman of the Chinese delegation, in spite of his critical attitude, stated categorically that China had always been in favour of disarmament, and he continued:

"We should consult each other fully and continue the discussions to find a way truly conducive to disarmament and avoid discussions that lead to no solutions or decisions that are not put into effect, for this can only further disappoint the people of the world." [1995th plenary meeting, para. 57.]

45. In the light of those statements and as we continue our work in the days ahead, there is reason to expect that the People's Republic of China will gradually participate in the deliberations and discussions on disarmament in the United Nations. That is how my delegation interprets the situation now, notwithstanding other views to the contrary.

46. Secondly, the attitude of France towards the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations in the context of disarmament discussions is a positive one. During his statement in the General Assembly, the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations said the following:

"Finally, France does not intend to let any opportunity pass to reopen the discussion on disarmament. Events prompt us to seize this opportunity once again. China, a nuclear Power, now has a seat among us. And the presence of China is an invitation to us to discuss disarmament, because this problem, like many others, can neither have a satisfactory solution nor be of universal significance without that country's participation." [1989th plenary meeting, para. 24.]

47. It is indeed to be hoped that in the very near future France will assume its rightful role in disarmament negotiations.

48. Thirdly, reference should be made to President Nixon's oft-repeated policy of "negotiation and not confrontation" and to the measures he has adopted towards the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. In this light his projected visits to Peking and, later on, to Moscow next year cannot but be viewed as salutary factors in the international situation, creating favourable conditions for initiative and action towards disarmament.

49. Fourthly, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union, which recently entered their sixth round in Vienna, may yet achieve a breakthrough which could generate other developments favourable to genuine disarmament. If the slow pace of the talks is to be deplored, as many delegations have deplored it, the continuation of the talks between the two super-Powers should, on the other hand, be viewed with hope and as something which augurs well for disarmament negotiations in the future.

50. Fifthly, the spirit of *détente* sweeping across Europe, which one hopes could lead to the convening of a European security conference and result in a mutual and balanced reduction of forces between the NATO Powers and the Warsaw Pact countries, should obviously be considered as a favourable circumstance leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament. If the European security conference comes into being and succeeds in its avowed objectives, much of the distrust and suspicion which have in the past hindered disarmament negotiations would be dispelled and forgotten.

51. In sum, we believe that the time is ripe for resolute action on the problem of general and complete disarmament.

52. During the debate we have heard repeated enumerations of treaties, beginning with the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and going down to this year's draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, annex A]. My delegation does not for a moment deny that those agreements have their own place and value as measures worthy of note in the negotiations of the past 10 years or so. However, it should be pointed out that those treaties—the Antarctic Treaty,⁵ the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,⁶ the outer space

⁵ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

Treaty,⁷ the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] and the sea-bed Treaty⁸ are all collateral measures of armaments control and not true measures of disarmament, because they do not provide for the reduction or destruction of armaments. The draft convention on bacteriological and toxin weapons is the very first agreement that provides for the destruction of weapons in military arsenals, and yet some experts have expressed the opinion that bacteriological weapons are not usable weapons, given the present stage of technology, in the sense that there is no guarantee that the one who used such weapons would not himself be a victim of them. Also, we have heard statements that a ban on the production of chemical weapons is of much greater practical and military urgency.

53. We therefore cannot but agree with the representative of Argentina, who at the 1827th meeting of the Committee on 11 November criticized the approach to the question of disarmament as one which was limited to the adoption of non-armaments measures and would therefore lead to an unacceptable international situation, which he described as "the disarmament of the disarmed".

54. We should not be lulled into false hopes of security by these non-armament measures because, in spite of them, the expenditures devoted to the arms race are spiralling. Let us instead follow the principle of first things first, which, in the field of disarmament, goes back to 20 September 1961, when the Soviet Union and the United States issued a joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations.⁹ Those principles are as valid today as when they were first announced, and they could be the point of departure for renewed negotiations. In addition to the agreed principles there are two other documents which should be very useful. Those are the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, and the outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, submitted by the United States. The Soviet draft was submitted in 1962¹⁰ and last up-dated in 1964,¹¹ while the United States document was also submitted in 1962¹² and last amended in 1963.¹³ Those two documents may well be in need of further revision and up-dating, as has already been suggested by a number of delegations, but undoubtedly they could be considered as basic tools for renewed negotiations. Then too, as well as the Soviet Union

and the United States, other members of the Committee on Disarmament could participate in suggesting amendments or revisions as the basis of discussion with the two major Powers.

55. A document which has gained and continues to gain support in the First Committee and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is the comprehensive programme of disarmament circulated under the symbol A/8191 and dated 2 December 1970.¹⁴ It was submitted on behalf of Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia. The aim of the comprehensive programme is to achieve tangible progress in order that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control may become a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and economic and social progress is attained. It is a well-balanced document which not only includes an enumeration of principles and a priority list of measures of disarmament but also suggests procedures by which the comprehensive programme might be implemented.

56. My delegation gives its support to the comprehensive programme of disarmament as a means of moving the negotiations on general and complete disarmament from dead centre. We also support the Italian proposal that a small working group should be established in the Committee on Disarmament to examine and consider the problem, and that the next session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should in the main be concentrated on the question of general and complete disarmament. Whatever may be achieved from now until the actual convening of the proposed world disarmament conference would be a step towards the cherished goal of disarmament and an invaluable help to the Conference in its consideration of the problem.

57. It has been said that general and complete disarmament is a utopian idea, and a mirage as opposed to reality. That assertion is unacceptable to my delegation, because we hold the view that as long as the United Nations has set the solution of this problem as its goal, so long will it be its bounden duty and responsibility to achieve that goal. There may be other problems related to our goal, such as peace-keeping, the settlement of disputes, the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence among nations and the establishment of an effective collective security system in the United Nations. In other words, the road may be a long and difficult one, but let it be made perfectly clear that there should be no shirking the task of traversing that road.

58. My delegation intends to speak again, as may be necessary, when we come to the consideration of the draft resolutions submitted on the other specific items on disarmament on our agenda.

59. Mr. WALDHEIM (Austria) (*interpretation from French*): The United Nations, created immediately after the Second World War, established disarmament as one of its main goals. Those who acceded to the Charter also dedicated themselves to the purposes and principles of the

⁷ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

⁸ Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (resolution 2660 (XXV) annex).

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 90, document A/C.1/867.

¹¹ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1964*, document DC/209, annex 1, sect. A.

¹² *Ibid.*, *Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. F, and document DC/205, annex 1, sects. E and F.

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Supplement for January to December 1963*, document DC/208, annex 1, sect. H.

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 93 and 94.

Organization, the main goal of which was to maintain international peace and security. The pertinent Articles of the Charter provide that the establishment and the maintenance of international peace and security should be accomplished with the minimum of diversion to armament of the world's human and economic resources.

60. By resolution 1378 (XV), unanimously adopted in November 1959, nations recognized for the first time in the history of disarmament that general and complete disarmament achieved under effective international control constituted the ultimate target of their efforts.

61. However, in the existing political situation it would not have been realistic to expect a global agreement on general and complete disarmament in the foreseeable future. Realizing this fact, the United Nations concentrated its efforts on partial disarmament measures that might strengthen trust and confidence, while stating that the question of general and complete disarmament continued to be the most urgent and important of all matters confronting the world. This approach to the question in the course of the last decade has led to the conclusion of important international agreements on the limitation and control of armaments, agreements that have safeguarded vast areas of the environment and regions of the world from the arms race.

62. The Austrian Government has always attached great importance to this method of work, decided upon in order to achieve effective ways of controlling and limiting armaments in all fields, however restricted, where an agreement might be possible. Each of these agreements in fact contributed to a relaxation of tension, helped to keep conversations going and to improve the framework and the machinery in which negotiations on disarmament could take place. We recognize sadly, however, that despite these basically precious, albeit collateral measures, we have as yet not succeeded in any significant way in drawing any closer to the final goal of our endeavours.

63. In assessing the situation as it appears today, we should, however, take note of certain changes and developments which might awaken a hope to see a new situation develop in the field of disarmament. One new and very obvious element which enhances our debate on the disarmament items on the agenda is the presence here of the delegation of the People's Republic of China. In fact, when the General Assembly adopted its historic decision on 25 October, [*resolution 2758 (XXVI)*] it did so recognizing the importance of the People's Republic of China in the negotiations on disarmament. Once again I would like to express the satisfaction that we feel at seeing the representatives of China in this room with us, and we give them a very warm welcome. For the first time all five nuclear Powers are now represented in the United Nations, and we warmly hope that they will together participate in the disarmament conversations, because it is obvious that no significant disarmament measures can be adopted without the participation of all the nuclear Powers in such negotiations.

64. Other encouraging aspects of the evolution in the international field are linked to certain improvements in relations among States, in the establishment of an in-

creasing *détente*, particularly in Europe, but which, generally speaking, includes the relations among the most important Powers. My delegation considers these developments to be of importance, since we continue to be convinced that effective disarmament cannot ultimately be achieved except in an atmosphere devoid of both hostility and suspicion.

65. To refer specifically to the disarmament items on our agenda, I would like to speak first on the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [*A/8457, annex A*]. This draft convention is, in fact, the first partial measure of disarmament that contains a real disarmament element in the true meaning of the word and is also the only concrete result that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is submitting to the General Assembly this year. If for no other reason, it deserves careful attention, but there are others also which advise a more thorough study of the different aspects of that convention.

66. I have already stated that, in providing for the destruction of existing weapons, the convention bespeaks true disarmament. Furthermore, it eliminates weapons which are of the most inhuman type, which strike both military personnel and civilians and have disastrous effects on the human environment. If these weapons had ever been used, their effects would have been felt by entire generations. As drafted at present, the convention is a first step towards the complete elimination of chemical weapons, which is a question that calls for an urgent solution. The fact that the convention carries the obligation on the signatory parties to continue conversations in order very soon to come to an agreement on effective measures in order to prohibit chemical weapons is also an important element that has led to our decision to join in sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.579. That draft resolution commends the draft convention for approval by the Assembly, and the opening of the convention for speedy signature and ratification by States. The linking of toxins with the other contents of the draft convention strengthens the links between the present convention and any future instrument which would prohibit chemical means of warfare.

67. We support the present draft on biological warfare as one of the best compromises that could be arrived at in the present circumstances. With regard to the need for verification—one of the crucial aspects of disarmament agreements—we agree with the idea that, in the light of the special nature of biological weapons, the complaint procedure submitted to the Security Council might replace the more necessary and stringent controls that are required for other disarmament measures. A similar procedure was employed in the case of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [*resolution 2660 (XXV), annex*]. The trend to seize the Security Council of control measures over armaments would also contribute to strengthening the tie between disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security.

68. The representative of Sweden, speaking at the 1834th meeting on the verification procedures provided for in the

draft convention on bacteriological weapons, wanted to be reassured that this procedure involving the Security Council would not lead a permanent member of the Security Council, by using its veto, to paralyse any investigation, whereas a non-permanent member would in all cases have to undergo inquiry decided upon by the majority of the Security Council. My delegation feels that the intention in the minds of those who from the very outset took part in the drafting of the convention was not to submit a treaty that contained any discriminatory clauses, but rather a convention that would, on an equal footing, commit all signatories to respect the same rules of application and control. However, we certainly recognize the validity of the question asked by Mrs. Myrdal and trust that adequate assurances will in due course be given her.

69. Pending the achievement of the total elimination of means of chemical warfare, we want to stress again the need to take all appropriate measures to strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925.¹⁵ In this context we note with satisfaction that in the course of last year a considerable number of States, heeding the appeal of the General Assembly, found themselves ready to adhere to that Protocol. Once again my delegation is a sponsor of a draft resolution inviting all States strictly to comply with the principles and the objectives of the Geneva Protocol. That draft resolution, which appears in document A/C.1/L.580, also requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue its work to prepare a convention on the prohibition of the manufacture, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and also their destruction. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in this context is requested to take into account the views expressed in the joint memorandum of the non-aligned members of the Conference [A/8457, annex C, sect. 33] as well as other proposals presented to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the First Committee. We believe that this approach to the problem is more realistic and might be more conducive to tangible progress which is so absolutely necessary if we wish to maintain the rhythm that has now been established in these negotiations.

70. The main basis for measures for the stemming of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament was constituted by two treaties: the Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear arms tests in three environments,¹⁶ and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]. But both these agreements provided for further negotiations and obligations in the same field. The Moscow Treaty of 1963 expresses the determination of the signatory parties to continue negotiations in order to “achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time”. And in accordance with the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the nuclear Powers committed themselves to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”.

¹⁵ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

¹⁶ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

71. The entry into force last year of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons implied the practical application of all the provisions of the Treaty, including the system of safeguards under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We greeted the establishment of a safeguards committee to fulfil consultative functions regarding the terms of the agreement on guarantees which signatory, non-nuclear-weapon States to the Treaty would have to conclude with the Agency. The Committee has concluded its work successfully and therefore the Agency has now been able to undertake talks and negotiations with non-nuclear-weapon States.

72. True to its principle of scrupulously complying with commitments contracted, my Government immediately undertook negotiations with the Agency and very recently signed an agreement on safeguards in accordance with the terms of the Treaty. Since international agreements are not very useful unless they are implemented, we would express the hope that other non-nuclear-weapon States that have adhered to the Treaty will also start the negotiations called for with the International Atomic Energy Agency to the same end.

73. Another aspect which should be mentioned within the framework of the implementation of the Treaty is the one I spoke of earlier, and that is the commitment of the nuclear Powers to continue negotiations for the adoption of effective measures of control of nuclear weapons and of disarmament. Since we continue to consider that the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on strategic arms limitation are a natural outcome of the spirit of the non-proliferation Treaty, it would, I think, be appropriate in this context to refer very briefly to the progress achieved in the course of those talks. Two developments have taken place in those talks, being carried on alternately in Helsinki and Vienna, which warrant mentioning at this stage. First, the announcement made on 20 May of this year that the United States of America and the Soviet Union have agreed to concentrate their efforts this year on an agreement on the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic devices, together with an agreement to be arrived at on measures limiting strategic offensive systems; and secondly, the signing by the two Powers of two agreements on measures to reduce the danger of the unleashing of a nuclear war. These first practical results of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks do not, of course, solve the essence of the problem of strategic arms limitation, but they do nevertheless tend to reduce tension and give us hope that progress on the substance of the talks can be expected.

74. The next point that falls under the general heading of general and complete disarmament deals with the question of a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. A treaty on total prohibition, similar to the non-proliferation Treaty, would serve to contain one of the aspects of nuclear proliferation. While the non-proliferation Treaty puts an end to the horizontal dissemination of nuclear weapons, a treaty fully banning nuclear tests would put an end to the vertical proliferation and perfecting of nuclear weapons. The latter aspect is also closely linked to the substance and the objectives of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Indeed, to arrive at any lasting results in the field of the limitation of strategic weapons, new efforts

must be made in that of the total prohibition of nuclear tests. During its twenty-fifth session the General Assembly was fully aware of the interdependence that existed between those two problems when it requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to give priority in its continued deliberations to a treaty on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests and to present to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly a special report on the result of its deliberations [*resolution 2663 B (XXV)*].

75. The report that has been submitted to us by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [*A/8457, part III*] gives us an over-all view of the present situation concerning the possibility of concluding such a treaty. While appreciating the lucid drafting of the report we are obliged to note that the Committee did not come closer to achieving its goal. Indeed, the situation stands as it did last year, perhaps with the exception that new nuclear weapon tests have taken place in the meantime. This has made even more evident the incalculable dangers that face mankind while we fail to achieve the total prohibition of such tests.

76. As I said last year, the opinion has prevailed in the past that there were two main aspects to the problem that stood in the way of the conclusion of a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The first of these stumbling-blocks was of a technical nature, namely, how to set up an adequate system of verification that could guarantee the application of such a treaty to all environments; the other stumbling-block was of a political nature, namely, the decision and the determination of the nuclear Powers to put an end to such tests in all environments.

77. The ways and means available to supervise the prohibition of these tests by seismological detection have been considerably perfected in the meantime, and this would indicate that the problems related to the extension of the Moscow Treaty to cover underground tests have now become virtually purely political.

78. In fact, seismology has allowed us gradually to lower the threshold over which nuclear weapon tests can be detected and identified and distinguished from other underground upheavals. Therefore, when we now confront the possibility either of allowing underground tests to continue unrestricted or of agreeing to a treaty completely and totally prohibiting all tests, without any system of verification which could register weak underground nuclear weapon tests, we prefer the latter alternative. Such a treaty would doubtless have a considerable, if not priceless, advantage over the present situation, although it means our accepting the calculated risk that certain less powerful explosions might escape the system of verification.

79. The importance and the urgency that we attach to this question are attested to by the fact that we have decided to join in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.585, which calls upon all Governments that have been conducting nuclear weapon tests immediately to undertake unilateral or negotiated measures of restraint that would suspend, limit or reduce the number of underground nuclear tests, pending the early entry into force of a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapon tests in all environments. That draft resolution would also request States to take an active and

constructive part in developing, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, specific proposals for an underground test ban treaty.

80. When the Romanian delegation last year submitted a draft resolution concerning a study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security, the Austrian delegation supported that initiative and was among the sponsors of the draft resolution. With the assistance of a group of eminent international experts, the Secretary-General thereupon prepared a report [*A/8469 and Add.1*], which has been very often referred to and which has put our entire discussion on disarmament within a different perspective. We wish to thank the Secretary-General for that report, which has given a new direction to our discussions. With the Secretary-General, in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization,¹⁷ we hope that the report on the consequences of the arms race will convince people and their leaders "that they must begin to rearrange their national and international priorities and concentrate their resources . . . on the solution of the . . . economic and social problems facing humanity". We feel that the document deserves the widest possible distribution.

81. I should like to add a few words concerning regional disarmament measures, which have given rise to renewed interest for two specific reasons: first, by the further strengthening of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the first denuclearized zone of an inhabited region of our planet; and, secondly, by the submission of the item to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

82. As is the case for any disarmament treaty, the Tlatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America¹⁸ cannot fully achieve its objectives unless it is accepted by all the States to whom the Treaty is addressed. Since in matters of nuclear weapons and the survival of mankind we are dealing with global questions that are of direct and close interest to all States, we would appeal to the nuclear Powers that have as yet to do so to sign Protocol II of the Treaty.

83. With regard to the proposal concerning the Indian Ocean, we would express the hope that the valuable initiative of the Government of Ceylon [*A/8492 and Add.1*] will open the door to fruitful negotiations that will add a new measure to those that already exist to strengthen international confidence and security.

84. This year has shown us a number of encouraging signs in our efforts to achieve disarmament. The Disarmament Decade proclaimed two years ago should spur us to continue and intensify these efforts. If we approach the problems confronting us in a spirit of realism and co-operation, then the Decade may fulfil the promises of progress and constructive results.

85. Mr. ABDALLAH (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): The second year of the Disarmament Decade has some achievements to its credit which, albeit modest, none

¹⁷ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

¹⁸ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

the less cast a ray of hope on a world prey to concern and fear. Twenty-six years after the proclamation of the Charter, we are still very far from our objective in the field of disarmament. In point of fact, the progress achieved up to now has been slow and, in any case, not commensurate with the progress of science and technology. The armaments industry is constantly thriving on new improvements which only add to the destructive power of lethal weapons. It is only normal that under such conditions world public opinion should be more impatient with the reluctance of the nuclear Powers to halt the arms race and to commit themselves to a genuine course of disarmament.

86. In the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization,¹⁷ the Secretary-General has interpreted the concern felt by the international community over this development of the arms race, the increase in military expenditures, and the dangers inherent in the stockpiling of nuclear weapons. In paragraph 42 he states:

“Not only have the nations of the world failed to halt or slow down the arms race—particularly the nuclear arms race—but they have escalated this disastrous course at a greater rate and to a higher level than ever before in history. During this period, world military expenditures have increased from \$120,000 million to over \$200,000 million per year. Each of the two nuclear super-Powers has at its disposal sufficient nuclear “overkill” to destroy each other and the world many times over. They are still engaged in testing and producing nuclear weapons and in testing and deploying more sophisticated delivery systems.”

87. Such a statement calls for no comment. It stresses the deleterious consequences of a generalized trend to base a precarious peace on a balance of terror. Whilst a great part of mankind lives in poverty and want, it is to say the least regrettable to witness such a negligent waste of human and economic resources. In this connexion, we should congratulate our Secretary-General and the experts who took part in preparing the report on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security [A/8469 and Add.1].

88. My country, which lives in harmony with its neighbours, devotes only an infinitesimal part of its budget to national defence in order to concentrate its resources and energy on the problems of development. But we are duty bound to note that in some areas—in Africa, in the Middle East and in Asia—countries are compelled, in order to guarantee their security and to discourage the cravings of more powerful neighbours, to take part in the arms race and to divert for the purchase of military equipment enormous sums which they would have preferred to use to combat hunger, disease and ignorance. It is the feeling of insecurity and, I would even say, the instinct of self-preservation which incites those peoples to seek their salvation by strengthening their military potential. Tunisia is in favour of halting the arms race, especially in the developing countries; but one should start by doing away with the causes of tension and by imposing respect for law and justice. The United Nations—and, more particularly, the great Powers, which are invested with special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security—is in duty bound to set up an effective and safe

international order, which alone would be likely to reassure the small countries and to shield them against any foreign threat, enabling them to devote all their efforts to more constructive tasks.

89. At the beginning of my statement I referred to the encouraging signs which have appeared this year and which augur well for a more favourable development towards controlling the arms race.

90. To begin with, I would mention the admission of China to the United Nations. That was an event of special importance which will have deeply-felt repercussions on our work and which, we hope, will bring us closer to a solution of the disarmament problems.

91. Furthermore, in Europe signs of *détente* have become apparent. The agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, between the latter and Poland, the Berlin Agreement, the prospects for a conference on European security, and the forthcoming negotiations between the countries of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact aimed at mutual and balanced reductions of forces in Europe are all factors which make more remote the dangers of a confrontation in that sensitive region.

92. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks will soon resume in the effort to reach agreement on limitation of the emplacement of antiballistic missile systems. Other agreements could be reached thereafter for the limitation of offensive strategic weapons within the framework of those talks. Agreements were signed last September by the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce the risks of the unleashing of a nuclear war and to improve the direct line of communication between Washington and Moscow.

93. Undoubtedly, this is progress which contributes to creating the dynamics of disarmament and which, given goodwill on all sides, could be followed by more concrete achievements.

94. Another subject for satisfaction is the preparation by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of a draft convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, annex A].

95. In the opinion of my delegation, this is a genuine disarmament measure, the first of its kind, at which we can only rejoice. The draft strengthens the 1925 Geneva Protocol,¹⁹ to which my country has already adhered.

96. Of course, we would have hoped to see a more comprehensive draft encompassing chemical as well as bacteriological weapons. In this connexion, my delegation attaches the greatest importance to article IX of the draft convention, which contains a formal undertaking to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

97. My delegation would also have wished to see accepted the proposal to include in the preamble of the draft a

¹⁹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

paragraph stating that a "substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries". [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 23.] However, we think that this draft is the result of a compromise and is therefore a positive measure. My delegation is happy to be among the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.579, which commends the draft convention.

98. While we welcome this achievement by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament we note, however, regretfully, that, with respect to the prohibition of nuclear tests, nothing has yet been done despite the efforts of several delegations in the Conference. Eight years after the signing of the Moscow Treaty,²⁰ underground tests continue at an alarming rate while other nuclear Powers carry out nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and under water.

99. We know that the question of control is the major obstacle to an agreement on the total prohibition of tests. We are, however, of the view that it is, again, the political will which is lacking. In the present stalemated situation, my delegation can only support the opinion of the representative of Canada, who said in his statement of 16 November that the two major testing Powers now have approximate strategic parity and that:

"It is surely for these Powers then to decide whether mutual deterrence has now reached the point where efforts to upset the current strategic balance of an unrestrained testing situation might not involve greater dangers of destabilization than the consequences of a few undetected low-yield evasions of any underground test ban." [1829th meeting, para. 48.]

100. In any case it is important for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at its next session to make every effort to reach agreement on the conclusion of a treaty for the total prohibition of tests, and that nuclear weapon Powers, as proposed by the Secretary-General, strive to work out in 1972 a treaty prohibiting all underground nuclear weapon tests.

²⁰ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

101. In conclusion I should like to welcome the initiative of the delegation of Ceylon aimed at proclaiming the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Tunisia will study that proposal with all due sympathy and attention.

102. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): I wish to announce that Tanzania has decided to join the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.581.

103. The following countries have become sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.584, submitted by Mexico: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uruguay.

104. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. Chairman, I believe I heard you mention the United Republic of Tanzania, but it should be Panama, not the United Republic of Tanzania.

105. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): I apologize. There appears to be an error in the Secretariat document. It is, indeed, Panama that has become a sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.581, and not the United Republic of Tanzania.

106. Mr. MONTANER (Chile) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation also wishes to sponsor this draft resolution, and we have so informed the other sponsors.

107. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): The Secretariat will take note of that and will make a suitable announcement.

108. Mr. SEATON (United Republic of Tanzania): Mr. Chairman, since you did us the honour of mentioning our name, I wonder if I could request the representative of Mexico and the other sponsors to accept Tanzania into the select group of sponsors.

109. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): As far as the delegation of Mexico is concerned, it will be honoured to include the United Republic of Tanzania among the sponsors of the draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.