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1. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call upon the first speaker on my list, I would draw the attention of members of the Committee to two draft resolutions which have just been circulated. The first, co-sponsored by four delegations, is contained in document A/C.1/L.446; and the second,

co-sponsored by eight delegations, is contained in document A/C.1/L.447. Finally, Austria has become the fifteenth co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444.

2. Mr. KULAGA (Poland): Today the Polish delegation would like to deal with one specific aspect of the disarmament problem: the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We do so in view of my delegation's co-authorship of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1 and 2, dealing with that question. We do so, too, in view of the interest shown in the question by many delegations. We therefore thought it might be useful to present to the Committee the reasons which led us, in Geneva, to initiate a proposal for a study of the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare, and here in the Assembly to co-sponsor, together with the delegations of Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, India, Mexico, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, draft resolution A/C.1/L.444.

3. Permit me, first, briefly to outline the basic considerations which, in our opinion, make a study of the problem a necessary, urgent and important topic. It is an undeniable fact that the potential of chemical and bacteriological weapons of mass destruction is ominous. It would be difficult to illustrate this potential better than did the Secretary-General in the introduction to the annual report, when he said that these weapons "in some respects . . . may be even more dangerous than nuclear weapons".¹

4. The same sense of gravity and urgency is conveyed in the report of the Study Group on Biological Warfare of the Fourteenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, held at Venice in April 1965, which stated on page 24 that "the human destructive potential of biological weapons could, with continued research and development, eventually rival that of nuclear weapons".

5. That is a factor we should always bear in mind. We have concentrated, and rightly so, on the problem of nuclear disarmament as the most important and most urgent of all the problems of disarmament. As far as we are concerned, we entirely agree with that approach and so stated very clearly in our last intervention in this Committee. We consider, however, that while concentrating on steps in the field of nuclear disarmament, we cannot and must not allow for a new, potentially even more destructive threat to emerge; hence the attention which we give to the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons, to the earliest

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 30.

possible start on circumscribing the danger before it becomes too difficult to avert.

6. Chemical and bacteriological weapons differ from nuclear weapons in that their manufacture does not require large expenditures, reaching, in the case of nuclear weapons, fantastic sums. They differ also in that their production does not require sophisticated technology, nor numerous cadres of scientists, technicians and other highly specialized personnel. As a result, access to these weapons is relatively easy, the possibility for their production and proliferation almost unlimited, and detection and protection extremely difficult, especially for smaller countries. Practically every country of the world is able to produce them. And this is what could be called the new dimension of C and B weapons when compared to nuclear weapons.

7. No other weapon of mass destruction evokes as much dread as chemical and bacteriological ones. This factor has been very vividly pointed out in the statement of the representative of Sweden [1609th meeting]. There is a deeply felt, growing concern and apprehension over the effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons, if and when they are used in armed conflicts. The profound revulsion of humanity at the thought of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, as evidenced in practice, is a factor which we cannot fail to take into consideration.

8. On the other hand, we are inclined to agree with the Secretary-General when he states that "too little attention"² has been given to this subject. This is true independently of the fact that the General Assembly has dealt with some important aspects of the matter, in particular at its twenty-first session. As a result of those deliberations it adopted resolution 2162 B (XXI). The importance and timeliness of that resolution is even greater today than it was at the time of its adoption.

9. Thus while expecting—while insisting upon—the implementation of that resolution, we recognize that chemical and bacteriological weapons are constantly being developed and improved, and that the danger they create increases proportionally; hence the growing awareness of the need to counter this growing threat. It seems to us that the best evidence of that awareness was the recommendation of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly "that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare".³ Similarly, the attention given to this problem by the Secretary-General in the introduction to the annual report, from which I have quoted in my preceding remarks, shows the extent to which this problem is preoccupying the world.

10. I should like to turn now—and this will be my second point—to the purposes of the report in question. My delegation would like to point out some of the most important ones.

11. Firstly, the report, in our opinion, should serve to inform fully and authoritatively all Governments and world

public opinion about the consequences of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological and other biological means of warfare. The need for such information is obvious if one takes into account how little information on the real dimensions of the problem is available to public opinion and if one considers how great is the world's concern.

12. Secondly, the report should be instrumental in strengthening the existing prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons as contained in the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.⁴

13. Thirdly, it should facilitate the further examination of the problems relating to chemical and bacteriological weapons and, above all, speed up the solution of the question of strict and universal observance of the banning of those weapons.

14. In our opinion, the full and universal observance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 should be the basis for any further steps in the field of the prohibition of the production and possession of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The universal acceptance of the Geneva Protocol which was invited by the Assembly in its resolution 2162 B (XXI) is of the first priority. It is my delegation's sincere hope that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will undertake without delay an examination of the ways and means of securing the observance by all States of this existing international instrument prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare.

15. Those were the considerations which guided us in co-sponsoring, together with fourteen other delegations, draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1 and 2.

16. We wish to express our appreciation of the spirit of co-operation which led to the drafting and submission by fifteen co-sponsors of the proposal now before the Committee.

17. We have tried to define the considerations which have guided us, the aims which we seek to achieve in the draft resolution. The operative part of that draft indicates the means through which we propose to achieve those aims: a concise report, to be prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, with the co-operation of Governments and national and international scientific institutions and organizations. This report should be based on all accessible material relevant to this subject. It should take also into account the documents, opinions and suggestions presented both in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in the First Committee. It would therefore have the broadest possible basis to formulate authoritative conclusions.

18. It is in the light of those considerations that we have examined the amendments of the delegation of Malta contained in document A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1. The basic aim of those amendments seems to be to give some guidelines for the study. While fully appreciating the

² *Ibid.*

³ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 26.

⁴ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, done at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

intentions of the representative of Malta, and his suggestions as to some of the problems which should be dealt with by the group of experts, we wish to express very frankly our doubts as to the practicability of including in the resolution itself a detailed list of such problems.

19. For we can adopt two ways of proceeding. One is to enumerate in detail in the resolution all topics with which the report should deal. This, in practice, may prove complicated indeed. Including only some of the topics might lead to an imbalance in the report and concentrate the attention of the group of experts on those selected topics, to the detriment of other important elements. Another approach is to give a broad mandate to the Secretary-General and the group of experts who, we understand, should be the most competent authorities in that field. We have, after consultations among all the co-authors, come to the conclusion that an approach based on general directives, requesting the Secretary-General to prepare the report on the basis of his remarks contained in the introduction to the annual report and in accordance with the recommendations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, constitutes the broadest possible terms of reference for the study. The excellent report⁵ so comprehensively prepared by the Secretary-General and his group of experts on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons confirms that view. If we take into consideration the fact that all documents and records of our discussions will be made available to the group which will prepare the report, we would think that this could satisfy the representative of Malta and that he might be willing to withdraw his amendments. Thus we could quickly and harmoniously reach, as I hope, unanimity on a resolution on whose substance we all seem to be agreed.

20. Mr. PARDO (Malta): The purpose of my brief intervention this afternoon is not to comment on the important disarmament items on our agenda—we hope to do that at an early subsequent occasion—but merely to introduce the amendments submitted by Malta and by Trinidad and Tobago [A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1] to the fifteen-Power draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1 and 2.

21. From the day my country was admitted to membership in the United Nations we have raised a lonely voice drawing attention to the increasing dangers of chemical and microbiological weapons. My Prime Minister, in statements at the General Assembly, has never failed to stress the importance of this question, which has never been either seriously discussed or seriously studied by the United Nations.

22. In 1966 the representative of Hungary introduced a draft resolution calling for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and condemning all actions contrary to those objectives. That draft resolution, after a comparatively short debate, was adopted as resolution 2162 B (XXI).

23. The Hungarian initiative had the merit of drawing the attention of members of this Committee to some of the consequences of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. But, unfortunately, the debate itself did not elucidate significantly the dangers to all countries, particularly to developing countries, of the present technological race in the production of ever more sophisticated chemical and microbiological weapons and in the means for their delivery.

24. In 1967 my delegation, encouraged by the apparent awakening interest of Member States in this aspect of arms control, delivered what is perhaps—despite wide omissions—the only systematic description to be found in United Nations records. The text of our statement is contained in the official record of the 1547th meeting. Although, for reasons which it is unnecessary to go into today, it was then impossible to adopt an agreed draft resolution, subsequent developments have been gratifying and give promise that this most important aspect of arms control will at last receive some of the attention it deserves. In July 1968 the question of chemical and microbiological weapons was brought to the attention of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the United Kingdom, and the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report argues persuasively that the time has come to deal more fully with the problem. He suggests that “a study which would explore and weigh the dangers of chemical and biological weapons would prove to be a most useful undertaking at the present time”.⁶ Finally, the representative of Poland, supported by a group of co-sponsors, has introduced the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1 and 2. This draft resolution in operative paragraph 1 requests the Secretary-General “to prepare a concise report in accordance with the proposal in part II of his introduction to the annual report for 1967-68 and in accordance with the recommendation of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee contained in paragraph 26 of its report”.

25. Let me immediately make clear that I consider the introduction of this draft resolution to be a constructive step: it is certainly better than nothing and my delegation wishes to stress that it supports the concept behind this text. We believe, however, that the draft resolution can be very materially improved, and this is the only purpose of the amendments sponsored by Malta and by Trinidad and Tobago.

26. The second and third preambular paragraphs of the fifteen-Power draft resolution read as follows:

“Considering that the possibility of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons constitutes a serious threat to mankind,

“Believing that the people of the world should be made aware of the consequences of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons”.

27. Why does the possibility of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons constitute a serious threat to mankind? That is not stated in the fifteen-Power draft

⁵ *Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of these Weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.IX.1).

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 32.

resolution. It is a serious omission which should be corrected. We should not be afraid to state clearly the reason, and that is that most of these weapons can be used as weapons of mass destruction.

28. But there is another reason why our formulation of the second preambular paragraph appears preferable to the one contained in the fifteen-Power draft. It is not only the possibility of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons which constitutes a threat to mankind; it is also the development of those weapons—that is, the present technological race by which ever more powerful, more dangerous, more insidious weapons are being developed—which constitutes a threat to mankind. I do not refer so much to the possibility of accidents—technicians infected by mysterious diseases or thousands of animals mysteriously dying—nor to the fact that a significant proportion of the microbiological research potential of some countries is devoted to the development of weapons in this field, to the development of more reliable and less detectable means of delivery and improved protection measures against chemical and biological attack, while that potential could be much more constructively engaged in the prevention of disease. I refer rather to the destabilizing effects of what has been happening in this field. Major breakthroughs by one or other major Power in the utilization for hostile purposes of some of the biological agents now under investigation could have a significant impact on the present precarious world strategic balance, particularly if accompanied by corresponding improvements in methods of delivery. Destabilizing effects of the continuing development of biological weapons in particular could be even more dangerous at the regional level.

29. The General Assembly, we believe, would be taking an unnecessarily restrictive view of the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons by linking the danger they represent exclusively—and I repeat, exclusively—to the possibility of use. The technological microbiological weapons race is equally dangerous, and we should show some awareness of its existence. That is what our formulation of the second preambular paragraph is designed to convey.

30. I should now like briefly to explain our amendment to operative paragraph 1 of the fifteen-Power draft resolution. The purpose of this amendment is two-fold: in the first place, to clarify to some extent the meaning of operative paragraph 1 of the fifteen-Power draft; and in the second place, to ensure, within the limits indicated in operative paragraph 2 of this draft that the proposed study by the Secretary-General will contain information vital to the security of countries that are not technologically advanced in the chemical and biological fields.

31. Only a few words need be said with regard to the first point. Even a casual comparison between the Secretary-General's proposal contained in paragraphs 31 and 32 of his introduction to the annual report for 1967-68 and the recommendation contained in paragraph 26 of the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will reveal very substantial differences between the two suggestions. Thus we cannot be sure what will be the substance of the report which we are requesting.

32. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament recommendation in particular is excessively narrow since it contemplates only the appointment of "a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare".⁷ As the representative of Hungary observed on 12 December 1967, in connexion with a similar proposal: "... the effects of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons are, unfortunately, already widely known" [*1547th meeting, para. 167*]. The representative of Hungary, after giving a number of examples, concluded that section of his statement by saying:

"Thus, as far as the assistance of experts is concerned, it is no longer needed; their opinion has already been given and is available to anyone." [*Ibid., para. 170.*]

33. While perhaps I would not be quite as certain about the lack of value of a report on the effects of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons as was the representative of Hungary last year, I must concede that a report by the Secretary-General limited to examining the effects of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare can have but limited utility.

34. We are anxious, desperately anxious, that the proposed report by the Secretary-General, in addition to examining the effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons, contain also some indication of their nature and their means of delivery and, in particular, some mention of methods of detection and measures of protection which perhaps could be adopted by technologically less advanced countries. As the representative of Hungary cogently observed yesterday:

"... developing countries are neither economically nor technologically prepared for chemical and bacteriological warfare. Especially they are not prepared for defence against such weapons. ... it must be taken into account that the 'simple' measure of crop destruction alone may spell a national disaster to the developing countries. And one ought not to forget the degree of development of health services, since the provision of immunization, assistance and medical treatment is the primary condition of defence." [*1613th meeting, para. 85.*]

I cannot but agree, and therefore it is of vital interest to my country, and I should think to all small countries, that the report of the Secretary-General contain more than just a description of the effects of these most insidious weapons.

35. I have listened with great attention to what the representative of Poland has just said. I am grateful for his clarification of the purposes and content of the report which it is proposed to request from the Secretary-General. In view of that clarification I do not see what possible obstacle there could be to the sponsors accepting the amendment to operative paragraph 1 proposed by the delegation of Trinidad and Tobago and by my delegation. This amendment does not set any guidelines, does not attempt to dictate any way of proceeding. It is intended exclusively to complete the proposal of the Secretary-General contained in the introduction to his annual report for 1967-68, and to clarify the wide discrepancy between

⁷ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 26.

the Secretary-General's proposal and the recommendation made by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in order to enable the experts who will be appointed by the Secretary-General to work on the basis of clear terms of reference.

36. It is difficult for a layman like myself to sound warnings in a Committee where so many are so much more knowledgeable in these matters than I. But perhaps I may be permitted to conclude by explaining very briefly and in a much over-simplified form why we attribute so much importance to the study of chemical and microbiological weapons. We do not believe that nuclear weapons are likely to be used as long as a rough nuclear balance is maintained and there exists adequate and near-invulnerable second and third strike capability; also because it is in the interests of nobody and of no social system to risk suicide for the prospect of taking over a largely ruined and radio-active world.

37. On the other hand, microbiological agents are, potentially, particularly suited by their very nature to serve the political goals of States without the risks of nuclear warfare. Hence it is possible that, while the nuclear-weapon States are engaged in the frustrating and economically burdensome exercise of measure and counter-measure, new methods of attack to be countered by new methods of defence, major efforts will be made to achieve a breakthrough in the development of extremely effective weapons based upon nature's own ecological system. Such intensified efforts, we have reason to believe, have been under way for some time and represent a formidable and largely unnoticed danger to all countries, particularly to the less technologically advanced countries. Microbiological agents, in particular, represent a whole range of weapon systems, rather than a single type of weapon. They can be used to achieve a wide range of goals. Furthermore, anti-personnel, anti-animal and anti-crop agents all pose different detection and protection problems.

38. It is essential that wide publicity be given to the general lines of a situation that has been developing in almost total secrecy for too long. It is essential that less technologically advanced countries should be made authoritatively aware of some of the methods of detection of and protection against some types of chemical, and particularly microbiological, attack which might be available to them. Those are the purposes of the amendment contained in document A/C.1/L.445, which I would respectfully commend to the favourable consideration of this Committee.

39. Lij ENDALKACHEW MAKONNEN (Ethiopia): Since this is the first time that I have intervened in the present debate in the First Committee I wish to associate myself and my delegation with those colleagues who have spoken earlier in expressing to you, Sir, sincere congratulations and best wishes on your election to the high office of Chairman of our Committee.

40. You and I represent two countries that have shown to the world how, with goodwill and genuine effort, the enmity of yesterday can be transformed into mutually beneficial relations, based on respect and mutual benefit. I am glad to say that the same spirit of mutual understanding

and respect which characterizes the relations between our two countries has always likewise characterized relations between the two of us here at United Nations Headquarters. Today, it is in that same spirit that I salute you and assure you of my wholehearted co-operation in the accomplishment of your difficult and responsible task.

41. Once again the First Committee is seized of the long and difficult debate on world disarmament. No international endeavour holds greater potential for world peace and progress than the effort aimed at disarmament; yet in no area of international endeavour have the peoples of the world encountered as much disappointment and frustration as in the effort to remove the terrible dangers inherent in the accumulation and proliferation of arms.

42. If the problem was acute and dangerous in the days of the League of Nations, the danger has been multiplied a thousandfold by the refinements brought about in the means and methods of scientific warfare—so much so that the prospect of human annihilation is no longer a hypothesis but an ever-growing reality. It is that awful reality that we need to bear constantly in mind when discussing the different aspects of world disarmament.

43. As is customary, the First Committee has now begun to consider the different aspects of disarmament, after general statements have been completed in the plenary Assembly. For the second succeeding year, the majority of Member Governments have left no doubt in their statements that the international situation has further deteriorated. They have pointed out the anomaly of increasing recourse to force and the threat to use force in order to settle international disputes. They are also generally agreed that the immediate future does not bode any substantial improvement.

44. Thus, as we begin our discussion here we should not minimize the fact that the international situation has not of late been particularly propitious so as to warrant prudent hope that some headway might be made in the field of disarmament. We should recognize this, because it is only by accepting things as they are and by trying to correct them that one can hope to make real progress in disarmament. On the other hand, we know very well that we cannot afford to despair, if only because despair in this regard would mean to any nation total self-abnegation, complete withdrawal from the international community. Such isolation has never been feasible historically, even when nations wanted it. In the world of today it is, of course, out of the question.

45. Any discussion of the problem of disarmament has therefore to start with the recognition that an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence is a necessary condition for all such discussions to produce results. Agonizing reverses and disappointments notwithstanding, we have above all to increase and strengthen our efforts in the area of negotiation for disarmament, with the hope that, given our constant probings, the nations of the world, especially those which have the greatest say in the problem of war and peace, may be pushed to see that their own self-interest, as well as the survival of the human race, would be better served by a world which had freed itself from the terrible fear of self-destruction.

46. In that double task of promoting conditions for peace and pushing practical negotiations on the outstanding issues of disarmament, we have to try harder and harder, even when we do not have very much to hope for. The slightest break, the slightest progress, should be seized upon, so that it may lead to better opportunities and to growing results, however slowly they may come.

47. All of us who have found the international situation to be disappointing must be agreed that in what has otherwise been a rather lean year the approval by the General Assembly of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] has meant significant progress. It is precisely for the potential opportunity that it can offer in the field of disarmament that my Government has recognized, and recognizes, the importance of that Treaty.

48. First, the negotiating process used in working out the Treaty has demonstrated how useful the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament can be in evolving agreements on seemingly intractable issues. If we do not slacken our efforts and thereby lose the momentum, undoubtedly the lesson derived from those negotiations could be used with greater results for the resolution of the other outstanding problems. The quiet, persistent negotiations in Geneva, with frequent intervals to afford the nuclear-weapon Powers an opportunity to undertake negotiations among themselves and to come forward with common agreement, have provided the best possible method for furthering the cause of disarmament in a realistic manner.

49. Secondly, apart from considerably reducing the risk of nuclear war, by checking the spread of nuclear weapons to nations which do not now have them, the great significance of the non-proliferation Treaty lies in the fact that, by committing those signatory nuclear-weapon Powers to negotiating in good faith for an early cessation of the nuclear arms race, the Treaty has established priority regarding the problems which could be tackled next.

50. Third, by giving sufficient recognition to the needs of the non-nuclear-weapon countries in the development and application of atomic energy for peaceful uses, the Treaty has stimulated useful discussion on this vital matter. The spirited discussions that took place in this regard at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and the useful recommendations that emerged bear ample testimony to that fact. No doubt the speed with which we will translate promises into action in this field, and particularly the ability of the non-proliferation arrangement to ensure non-discriminatory co-operation in the harnessing of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, will say a lot about whether this vital undertaking is going to be a self-adapting, viable arrangement or just simply a stop-gap measure which will soon be overtaken by developments and events.

51. It was therefore inevitable that in the aftermath of the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the non-proliferation Treaty, the natural question to ask should have been "What next?". As was to have been expected, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament addressed itself to the same question at its last session, the report on

which is now before this Committee.⁸ That report indicates that certain areas of priority regarding problems to be tackled next have already been defined and that tentative plans are envisaged to pursue negotiations on them.

52. Since Ethiopia is a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, it goes without saying that my delegation agrees with the priority delineated by that Committee, and in what follows I propose to address a few observations to each one of those items.

53. My delegation believes that special significance should be attached to the conclusion reached by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in paragraph 17 of its report that first priority in its work should be given to:

"Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."

That conclusion flows from the non-proliferation Treaty itself, which commits the nuclear-weapon countries to pursue negotiations in good faith to that end. And in the view of my delegation that commitment perhaps more than anything else forms the most essential part of the Treaty.

54. In this connexion, if the momentum generated by the non-proliferation agreement is not to be lost, there is no question but that we shall have to move rapidly towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty which will prohibit the underground testing of nuclear weapons. As we have stated before, it is our judgement that the immediate fate and continued viability of the non-proliferation agreement are vitally linked with the speed with which we are able to agree on the prohibition of underground testing of nuclear weapons.

55. It is no secret that continued underground testing is designed to develop ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons. It is also related to the development of a system of defence against ballistic missiles. Moreover, by encouraging the vertical proliferation of ever more sophisticated nuclear arms the further tolerance of underground testing will soon deprive the non-proliferation agreement of its essential meaning and will in fact undermine its very spirit.

56. Even more ominous would be a situation whereby the nuclear-weapon Powers would be allowed to go on improving on the sophistication of their nuclear weaponry and to provide, either by fortuitous coincidence or by deliberate design, a technological breakthrough which, by altering the present precarious technological balance in the nuclear field, might usher in an arms race with ever-escalating cost, a race which would be infinitely more difficult to control, let alone reverse.

57. It was because of the recognition of this great urgency for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty that my delegation was prompted to submit together with seven other non-nuclear-weapon countries a memorandum⁹ to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at its last session, in August. In that memorandum the eight nations,

⁸ *Ibid.*, document DC/231.

⁹ *Ibid.*, annex I, sect. 10.

after calling attention to the inherent danger of continuing to tolerate the situation, noted in particular that, despite the considerable progress made with regard to the methods of control of underground testing, no serious negotiations have taken place on the different proposals that have been submitted. It is also to be noted that the eight nations underlined in that memorandum the urgency of a universal and comprehensive solution of the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in the context of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

58. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall at the end of this statement formally present and introduce on behalf of the original sponsors of the above-mentioned memorandum, a draft resolution which will incorporate the essentials of that memorandum.

59. The second area where progress is considered possible, an area to which the momentum generated by the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty can be carried, is the reduction in the deployment of both offensive and defensive missile systems. In this respect the agreement already reached between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States of America to enter in the nearest future into bilateral discussions is a welcome development. It is regrettable, however, that recent events have made it impossible for these bilateral discussions to start. If we are not to be overtaken by developments which might put our expectations and calculations out of gear, it is clear that the envisaged bilateral discussions cannot for long remain postponed. We appeal therefore to the two leading nuclear-weapon Powers to begin bilateral negotiations at the earliest possible time.

60. It seems to us that the two leading nuclear Powers could agree on the reduction of deployment of offensive and defensive missiles without endangering their security. Their common interest demands that they must stop the ever-escalating arms race which, considering the speed of technological development in weapons systems, could not conceivably for any length of time give either party a strategic nuclear arms superiority in any real or lasting sense. The choice, it seems to us, for the two leading nuclear-weapon Powers is between mutual self-restraint and escalation of the arms race to the point where mutual conflict and destruction become inevitable.

61. Moreover, the tremendous cost involved in the development of this new generation of weapons systems is so staggering to comprehend that again common sense tells us that it is both in the interest of the leading nuclear Powers themselves and in the larger interests of mankind, especially of the developing section of mankind, that these resources be deployed for constructive purposes. There are many areas both in the countries of the nuclear Powers and in the vast regions of the under-developed world where political resources saved by the avoidance of an arms race in the second generation of nuclear weapons systems could be used to the benefit of world peace and progress.

62. While my delegation readily agrees that it is necessary that the negotiations with regard to the reduction of deployment of strategic missiles should be left, at least in the initial stage, to bilateral talks between the two leading Powers, it cannot but emphasize the useful role of the

Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in completing and finalizing the necessary agreements. As I have already said, the lesson learned from the successful conclusion of the non-proliferation agreement could be quite useful in this respect.

63. The third area in the field of disarmament to which priority has been accorded is the question of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. Considering the mortal danger to which mankind has been exposed as a result of the unchecked and sophisticated development of chemical and bacteriological means of war, it is indeed surprising that we have not considered this question with the utmost urgency that it has always required and deserved.

64. It may well be that our sense of judgement has for so long been so clouded by the spectre of the devastating nuclear catastrophe that we have been unable to contemplate the equally horrendous spectacle that could result from chemical and bacteriological warfare. At any rate, as the saying goes, better late than never. At last the international community has been awakened to the urgency of the problem. The Secretary-General, in the introduction to his annual report, has drawn attention to the great danger of leaving unchecked the further development of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. He has, with particular emphasis, called our attention to the fact that the development of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare is potentially and immediately more dangerous than that of nuclear weapons, because of the fact that such development is very cheap and could be effectively concealed, thus making control in disarmament in this area extremely difficult.

65. It is no secret that for a long time quite a number of advanced industrial nations have been carrying out research and development in this area, and it is only fair to assume that because of the relatively small cost involved there may have been considerable development. We hope that, in accordance with the recommendation in paragraph 26 of the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Secretary-General will be authorized to initiate a study of the consequences of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare and that the outcome of this study will at last prompt the international community to take immediate action.

66. It was also agreed at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that we should prevent the sea-bed from becoming an area for the installation of weapons. Again, if we are not to be overtaken by technological developments we have to move quite rapidly by making progress in this area. It seems to us that it is quite possible to reach agreement now with regard to the sea-bed; on the other hand, delay in this respect is bound to complicate matters and to militate against possible agreement in the future.

67. The time factor is so important in this regard that in our estimation the question of the sea-bed is a matter with respect to which the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should be given a definite time limit to complete a draft agreement.

68. It is apparent, in the aftermath of the successful conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty, that the most

urgent measures which call for agreement are measures designed to arrest the arms race and its extension to areas and environments which have been free of it so far. In the long run, however, our efforts must go beyond this exercise of preventive measures to unfreezing the *status quo* in armament, for disarmament implies that the *status quo* should be unfrozen. Equal and rigorous attention must be given to the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapon use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons, and the reduction and elimination of nuclear stockpiles.

69. Finally, I should like to make some brief reference to the conclusions and recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States which was concluded early in October. My delegation hopes to address itself to this important question at an appropriate opportunity in the future. But we must recall in this connexion that the fact that the Conference was attended by ninety non-nuclear-weapon States and four nuclear-weapon countries attests to the importance that the international community attached to the problems that were the main preoccupations of that Conference.

70. The Conference, as was to be expected in the new situation after the conclusion of the non-proliferation agreement, addressed itself to the twin problems of the security of non-nuclear Powers and the question of international co-operation in harnessing atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

71. With regard to the question of security guarantees, the most commonly felt sentiment at the Conference—a sentiment that my delegation fully shares—was that the nuclear-weapon States could find lasting security only through general and complete disarmament, by which all weapons, both nuclear and non-nuclear, would be first reduced and then eventually abolished, and that to this end a first condition was that the nuclear arms race be stopped. The Conference therefore passed a number of recommendations designed to stop the arms race and help initiate real measures of disarmament.

72. With regard to the international co-operation for the harnessing of nuclear energy for peaceful use, the vital needs and requirements, especially of the non-nuclear-weapon countries, were recognized and important recommendations were passed which, if implemented, could benefit both the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon countries.

73. It now remains for this Committee to take up the question of ensuring the continuity of the work undertaken by the Conference. My delegation is receptive to any proposal on this score and is actively considering proposals which have been brought to its attention. We shall at a later stage make our views known, after consultations on this aspect have matured.

74. I shall now, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, present for the consideration of the Committee the eight-Power proposal I referred to earlier. On behalf of the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.447.

75. It is apparent from a first reading of the draft resolution that its various parts are clear and self-explanatory. Moreover, the draft is in line with previous resolutions of the Assembly on this subject. I should like, however, to add a point of information with regard to the last preambular paragraph. The exchange of views referred to in that paragraph relates to the Conference of Experts held in Stockholm under the auspices of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research, the report of which¹⁰ is before the Committee.

76. The draft resolution is, as I say, self-explanatory in its presentation and content, but I am sure that I speak for all the co-sponsors when I say that we shall gladly explain any points that may require further clarification. It is the sincere hope of the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.447 that this proposal will receive the favourable consideration and approval of the Committee.

77. The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Ethiopia for his congratulations and the confidence which he expressed in me. I especially appreciated the high terms in which he spoke about the relations and the bonds of mutual trust and friendship which have been established between Ethiopia and Italy and, happily, also between ourselves.

78. Mr. REYES VICUÑA (Chile) (*translated from Spanish*): The advances in technology combined with the aggravation of the political, economic and social problems in the world today force us to give priority to disarmament among the items for discussion at the current Assembly.

79. This holds for all of us, great and small countries alike. The former face risks and rivalries which can affect the lives of all men, squandering resources that should be used for noble purposes; and the latter spend more than they can afford, jeopardize their independence, sink deeper and deeper into penury, equipping themselves only for military adventures.

80. Machiavelli long ago cynically recommended Governments above all to arm if they wanted to exert pressure by their power. Since time immemorial, the problem of armaments has been in the offing as a consequence of political events and at the same time as a determining factor in them. History repeats itself, and today we have the so-called balance of terror; but in the international community as reflected here, and in world public opinion, there is a definite consensus that there is no problem more grave, no concrete task more urgent for the world's leaders, than the achievement of disarmament.

81. There is no question but this is an arduous task. If real progress is to be made, we must relinquish narrow vested interests; we must thwart the ambition of certain nations simply to impose their opinions on all the rest in this vital sphere, and we must move forward with determination and realism. This is the premise on which we wish to join the current debate.

82. We have before us several documents. The first is the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Com-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, sect. 6.

mittee on Disarmament, the Geneva Conference as it is called. The document has been discussed and criticized during this debate, both by States members of that body and by others which like Chile do not belong to it. All have recognized that this has been a sterile year, with no progress made in regard to the main aspects of disarmament, except for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the text of which was recommended by the First Committee in April 1968. Subsequent to that important event, practically no progress has been made towards improving the instrument or in regard to the other matters entrusted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee. This paralysis is a serious matter and calls for detailed analysis both inside and outside the Geneva Committee.

83. In the debate in the First Committee on the draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation there was broad recognition that it was a positive achievement in the field of disarmament, or nuclear non-armament. At the same time, however, it was made plain that the Treaty was a means and not an end, a step along the road towards atomic disarmament but in no sense the goal itself. In the text of the Treaty and the relevant resolution [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) and annex*], important tasks were mentioned which far from being fulfilled have not even been embarked on. Other measures, regarded as indispensable by many countries in the course of the discussion, were considered by the General Assembly as a logical sequel and supplement to the efforts made in the direction of non-proliferation.

84. The report of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [*A/7277*] is without doubt the most important document before this Committee. It adequately reflects the understandable disquiet of the non-nuclear countries and particularly the less well developed, including those which, putting aside many legitimate interests and views, approved the resolution recommending the Treaty. It is impossible to forget that the nuclear question places the future of all nations in jeopardy, with respect not only to their security but also to their economic development.

85. The resolutions of the Conference, which Chile actively helped to formulate, are varied in nature and embrace the whole spectrum of the nuclear problem and disarmament. They have already been analysed at length in this room, so that I do not think I need repeat the process at this stage of the debate, although my delegation reserves the right to emphasize certain aspects if the occasion should arise. Let it suffice for the time being to point out that in political terms the Conference represented what might be called a reaction against a certain "paternalism" on the part of the nuclear Powers. In other words, it reflected clearly the will of the non-nuclear-weapon States to undertake, as a body and on their own initiative, the role appropriate to them in the solution of the multitude of problems raised by atomic energy for the future of each one of them and of mankind.

86. The resolutions adopted, in addition to calling for general and complete disarmament and urging compliance with the pledges given in the matter of nuclear disarmament, turned the spotlight on two major points which worry the non-nuclear-weapon States: their security in a world bristling with atomic weapons; and access to nuclear technology and exploitation of the peaceful uses of nuclear

energy, which are the key to their future. With these goals in mind, various resolutions were adopted and a general declaration, together constituting direct, concrete proposals worthy of support by the international community and subsequent implementation.

87. There is a strong feeling that the resolutions of the fruitful Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States must not remain mere scraps of paper to be pigeon-holed, or words to be quickly forgotten. They must be implemented, and the appropriate instrument must be found for the purpose.

88. My country took part in the talks which made it possible to secure the adoption of the resolution advocating the Non-Proliferation Treaty prior to the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, the argument used being that the agreements reached at the Conference would supplement the Treaty, and implementation would be arranged through some appropriate body.

89. It has become plain that what is needed is a special organ which will supervise the implementation of the resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and channel the common determination expressed by those States at Geneva. There is no question of setting up institutions along the same lines as the existing ones, or of establishing a new disarmament committee to deprive the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of its rightful competence or hamstringing the action of the specialized agencies. The concrete proposal—as has been explained in the course of the debate—is the establishment of a special committee, attached to the General Assembly, which like many such *ad hoc* bodies set up to deal with important problems, would take up certain well-defined aspects of the nuclear problem.

90. This special committee, as has been said, would supervise the implementation of the resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, seeing them through the various other organs and agencies concerned, with the assistance of the Secretary-General. Secondly, it would take up the question of closer international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, paying special attention to the needs and interests of the developing countries, in accordance with the conclusions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States; and it would place suggestions before the General Assembly and the various competent bodies in regard to co-ordination of the activities of the international organizations working wholly or partly in this field. Lastly, it would consider what additional measures should be taken to solve the problem of security; and it would report on all these matters to the General Assembly.

91. The proposed committee is not calculated to prejudge positions in regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and as has been indicated in other statements, it would supplement that instrument without interfering with it in any way. Nor does it involve overlapping with organs like the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament or other bodies dealing with these subjects. Those bodies must not only continue but must intensify their work, which is clearly of a different kind, as is evident from the terms of reference proposed for the

special committee. Its establishment would simply fill a gap; it would keep the resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States alive; it would provide an incentive to seek further progress in peaceful co-operation for disarmament; and it would be a logical forum for the expression of the anxiety and the will to live of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

92. The special committee is still further justified if it is borne in mind that this is a process that is only just beginning and inevitably as time goes on will be affected by new situations; that not all the nuclear Powers are signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and that a basic multilateral treaty would always be more advantageous in promoting the peace and progress of mankind than one achieved bilaterally or regionally, speaking in geographical or political terms.

93. Presentation of a united front by the non-nuclear nations, and particularly the developing ones, in respect of their common interests is an imperative need if they are to vindicate their legitimate views. We must be masters of our own fate and face the circumstances defined by the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs in the general debate in the Assembly, when he spoke of the developing countries as follows:

"Here we are face to face with the great actors and makers of history, or rather under them, we, the rest of the countries of the world, whose future is being decided, and perhaps even lost, without our consent . . .

"We realize that understanding among the great Powers, their dissensions, the fluctuations in the temperature of war, are facts that we small countries find ourselves compelled to recognize as inevitable. Since we are all compromised by them, we must cope with them energetically, for they are morally and politically our concern and fall properly within the sphere of action of every country without exception." [*A/PV.1685, plenary meeting, paras. 62 and 63.*]

94. Our peoples, the peoples of the developing countries, want to be subjects and not objects of history, actors and not merely spectators of the drama being acted out before our eyes, which can affect our very survival, whether by way of military security or of economic development.

95. The status of actors in the drama will be ensured by the establishment of a special committee making it possible to keep constantly up to date the results achieved by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and to formulate recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly at each succeeding session.

96. I should like to dwell in particular on resolution B of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, concerning the establishment of the nuclear-free zones, since it is of special interest to my country. Chile is a signatory of the Antarctic Treaty,¹¹ the Treaty of Moscow,¹² and the Treaty on the Exploration and Utilization of Outer Space [*General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI)*]; and we voted

in favour of resolution 2373 (XXII) recommending the Non-Proliferation Treaty on the understanding that the signature and ratification of that treaty by Chile would depend on its signature and ratification by what Chile regards as a sufficient number of States [*1582nd meeting, para. 13*]. Chile is also a signatory of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,¹³ in virtue of which we have renounced the right to acquire or manufacture atomic weapons.

97. The resolution just referred to invites other States to follow the Latin American example and to create other nuclear-free zones; and it goes on to reiterate urgently the appeal in General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) to the nuclear Powers to sign Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and thus perfect the system of denuclearization and security embodied in that instrument. It seems to me appropriate to recall the resolutions in question and to review the appeal they contain.

98. Nuclear disarmament should not exclude and cannot disregard the importance of the limitation of conventional weapons, which have acquired importance once again in the most recent conflicts the world has witnessed. Expenditure on conventional weapons plays an excessive role not only in the budgets of the great Powers but also in those of small nations, either for reasons of fear or insecurity, or in other instances because of futile competition with their neighbours.

99. It is difficult to determine whether the desire for domination brings about the arms race or whether the arms race leads to war. This is the same problem as arises in periods of international tension such as we have had and still have in various crucial areas of the world. Many people argue that this is not the time for disarmament; that there must first be a stage of peace, and then arms limitation. Obviously that argument could be turned round the other way. In point of fact, historically, arming does lead to war. Hence everything seems to indicate that everywhere in the world, of course, but particularly in the main trouble spots, trade in arms and the sale of arms should be avoided and formulas should be sought to avoid aggravating the danger of what might be called "armed peace".

100. Chile's policy in regard to arms limitation has been consistent. We have advocated various devices for limiting the level of expenditure on armaments in Latin America. Only recently, President Frei repeated what had been agreed on the subject during the meeting at Punta del Este:

"My Government, like the previous one, maintains that it is necessary to limit the acquisition of arms; otherwise we could find ourselves engaged in competition the political and economic consequences of which would be of the utmost gravity, since no country could remain aloof without risk to its own security.

"It is inconceivable that, on the one hand, we should be claiming as our main objective the integration of our nations while on the other we are embarking on a policy of unlimited acquisition of arms."

101. These statements were repeated by the President during his recent visit to Brazil.

¹¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, 1961, No. 5778.

¹² Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, signed in Moscow, on 5 August 1963.

¹³ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico City, on 14 February 1967.

102. At a time when the United Nations is endeavouring to institute a new development decade designed to improve on the meagre results of the first, and when there is renewed hope of international co-operation that has too often remained on paper, the release of the resources earmarked for warlike purposes seems essential if the world is to make headway in the cause of peace. International statistics mention an over-all figure of \$200,000 million a year in military expenditure, as against the \$10,000 million constituting the total amount of so-called economic aid to the developing countries. These figures reveal that a saving of a mere 5 per cent—a bare twentieth part—in military expenditure would literally double the amount of economic aid. Such figures are self-explanatory.

103. It is impossible in a single statement to refer to all the complex issues before this Committee. The Chilean delegation considers that some of them should be referred to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which should give them due priority in the work it will carry out next year, doubtless with a renewed sense of urgency.

104. But at the same time, if we are to attain the goal of complete and general disarmament, my delegation is in favour of convening a world disarmament conference which would make an objective analysis of this issue of vital importance for every one of the peoples on this earth.

105. I would like to underline just one matter on which it seems possible in present circumstances to make substantial progress, namely the prohibition of nuclear explosions. This is partly covered by the Moscow Treaty—to which ideally all the nuclear Powers should accede—underground test explosions being excluded. This exclusion, it was argued, is justified by the fact that it is impossible to control such explosions adequately without an inspection system, which certain Powers were unwilling to accept on grounds of security. We were informed in the course of our debates that the interesting experiments and studies carried out under the auspices of Sweden have been successful, and recently we have seen it confirmed that this is an encouraging reality. If it is possible today to distinguish between an underground explosion and a seismic movement, there seems to be no valid reason to hold up mutual agreement on this matter in the near future. We believe that this is the most urgent task the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva could take up at the present moment.

106. The Chilean delegation welcomes the initiative implicit in the Soviet Union's memorandum [A/7134] in regard to the diffusion of measures to be taken to reach the

goal of general disarmament under effective international control. It believes that this memorandum, and the debates on the item, represent a vast consensus and might be referred to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for due consideration.

107. We were also most gratified at the initiative concerning chemical means of warfare [A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1 and 2] referred to recently by the representative of Ethiopia. We decided to co-sponsor this proposal, and we hope it will likewise be whole-heartedly supported in the course of these debates.

108. Finally, I would like to refer to a subject which is palpably of concern to all mankind. It was referred to in the statement made in the general debate by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, Mr. Gabriel Valdés [1685th plenary meeting], when he said that we should not proceed with the race to produce more and more powerful multiple-headed missiles and corresponding defensive systems combining high cost with a destructive power which constitutes an additional danger for mankind. Following the approval by the General Assembly of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it was stated that those negotiations would be held promptly. But the determination appears to have been weakened by political events known to all, which it is inappropriate to refer to in this forum. Although apparently some tension still subsists, an appeal should be made to the great nuclear Powers to renew their efforts to bring about negotiations which, according to the experts, could be brought to a successful conclusion without involving any major technical difficulties. It is surely not possible to wait until circumstances are ideal in order to avoid creating conditions which may be irreversible and entail unimaginable cost and danger. We are confident that this appeal will not go unheeded.

109. Let me repeat: Chile has always been a peace-loving State, and once again it declares its support for the cause of disarmament which it has always loyally championed as part of its national policy and within the framework of the United Nations. I add my voice to those of all who have made similar appeals that we should proceed with realism, but at the same time boldly, towards the great ideal of seeking disarmament; for the present times demand no less.

110. The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the meeting, I wish to announce that Chile has become the sixteenth co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1 and 2.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.