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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEM 19

Question of disarmament (A/4868 and Corr.1, A/4879, A/4880, A/4887, A/4891, A/4892, A/C.1/856, A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1) (continued)

1. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that in a world labouring under the imminent threat of war, it was the clear duty of the non-nuclear States to seize every opportunity and exploit every encouraging development in the relations between the great Powers to create a favourable atmosphere for the resumption of negotiations on disarmament. That was why the small States had welcomed the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (A/4879) and had supported the draft resolution urging the nuclear Powers to agree on the composition of a negotiating body (A/C.1/L.299 and Add.1), which the Committee had adopted unanimously. However, the role of the small States was not limited to awaiting or seeking to promote agreement on that vital matter; nor should the General Assembly now renounce its competence to deal with all aspects of the disarmament question. What was at issue was much more than the mere signing of a treaty or agreement on the technical aspects of disarmament. Disarmament was the most serious problem that had ever confronted the world, and while experts could deal adequately with its technical aspects, its human and legal aspects were of direct concern to all mankind.

2. The question of control, for example, was more a juridical than a technical problem. The multilateral treaty contemplated would be of the most complex type, and would necessitate the establishment of an executive agency—whether it was called an international disarmament organization or a control organ or board—responsible for giving effect to its provisions and keeping constant watch to determine whether those provisions were being fulfilled. There was a fundamental link between disarmament and control, in other words, between the obligation assumed by the parties and the guarantee that they were complying with it. Such guarantees were an important element of any treaty; in a disarmament treaty, concluded in the era of nuclear weapons, they were a matter of life or death, for non-compliance would not only prejudice the rights and international prestige of the parties but would endanger their very existence as States. Consequently, the control organ must have full powers of verification; limited control would be absurd and dangerous in the extreme. But control was not merely a matter for the

experts or the negotiators; it was a question fully within the competence of the General Assembly. If disarmament was to be a reality, it was the duty of the Assembly to impress upon the negotiating parties the absolute necessity for prior verification without restriction, since any limitation on verification would make control inoperable. Moreover, verification must be applied not only to armaments reductions but to retained armaments. Another juridical aspect of control had been satisfactorily disposed of when the Soviet Union had agreed that the control organ should not be subject to the veto, that it should include non-nuclear Powers and that resolutions should be adopted in it by majority vote.

3. It was to be hoped that the disarmament treaty would provide for the elimination of all nuclear forces, the prohibition of nuclear weapons production and the abolition of all armed forces except those required for the maintenance of internal order and the establishment of a United Nations force. But even in an unarmed world, free of war psychosis, there would be disputes and divergencies. There would always be a need for States to defend themselves against potential aggressors, and there would certainly be a need for machinery to enforce collective international decisions. Articles 43 to 50 of the Charter of the United Nations had provided such machinery; but it had so far remained inoperative. If, therefore, the problem was not to be solved by action outside the Charter, the relevant Articles would have to be revitalized and given a more dynamic interpretation; while the disarmament negotiations were in progress, thought would have to be given to the question of the relationship between disarmament and the Articles referred to, to the possibilities of setting up, not merely an emergency force, but a permanent United Nations peace force. Obviously, the existence of the veto in the Security Council still represented a stumbling-block. Under General Assembly resolution 377 (V), entitled "Uniting for peace", however, it could be surmounted by bringing any question on which action had been vetoed in the Council before the General Assembly. In that connexion, it should be clearly understood and accepted by all States that when the Assembly exercised the functions of the Security Council, its decisions were not mere moral recommendations but were legally binding upon all Members of the United Nations.

4. Apart from their responsibility to bring about a resumption of negotiations on disarmament by creating a favourable atmosphere and by expressing their views on all but the technical aspects of the issue, the small nations had a further role to play: they should help to bring about a change in the psychological climate by urging the great Powers to abandon the concept of hegemony and to accept the principle of co-operation among nations. The alternative was collective suicide through nuclear war. Coexistence, or the preservation of the balance of power, should not be of a competitive nature; it should be inspired by a common desire to

share with other nations, for the greater good of all. Experience had shown that psychological factors played an important role in the disturbance or maintenance of peace. The psychological mood of the peoples today was a hopeful one; it was nurtured by their intense desire to avoid war and promote international co-operation. The General Assembly should turn that mood to account by emphasizing once again the economic, cultural and moral interdependence of all nations, irrespective of political or social systems. It should seek to bring about a psychological change by promoting greater communication between peoples, so that not only statesmen, but ordinary people, should realize the benefits of co-operation, and so that the genius of all peoples should be applied to building world peace. He believed in the possibility of creating not only regional solidarity, as in Latin America and Africa, but, ultimately, human solidarity.

5. Mr. MALALASEKERA (Ceylon) said that nuclear arsenals were a deterrent not to war but to peace and peaceful development. Time was of the essence: the problem of disarmament had to be viewed in terms of the clock rather than of issues, the latter having to a great extent been resolved in the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (A/4879). That document reflected the beginnings of a new science: the science of disarmament. He stressed the word "science" because it indicated the role in the task of disarmament of the unarmed nations, which, while they lacked experts to examine the details of any disarmament treaty which might be presented to the Committee, had nevertheless made their own contribution to the principles on which the philosophy of disarmament was based.

6. The Committee was faced with two interrelated difficulties: the first, a procedural one, was the composition of the negotiating committee, and the second was the disarmament process itself—the question of stages and their duration and the problem of controls.

7. The issue involved in the question of stages was basically one of confidence. The United States maintained that controls were the essence of disarmament, and that at the end of each stage there should be a pause, in which it could be determined whether the target for that stage had been achieved without putting either side at a disadvantage. The Soviet Union seemed to fear that such pauses might put the Soviet Union at a disadvantage and that controls at any stage before complete disarmament would be an invasion of a country's sovereign rights and national security.

8. Since, because of the absence of confidence, the two sides had not themselves been able to escape from the deadlock, the smaller, unarmed and non-aligned nations should be brought into the negotiations as mediators. But while the general principle that the smaller nations should be represented in the disarmament negotiating committee was accepted, no details had been agreed on, probably because of the confusion which existed about the part they should play. But disarmament concerned the smaller nations no less than the powerful nations, not only because the weak nations lacked the military power to defend their own security but also because they were the chief sufferers from the diversion of the world's productive capital. The number of smaller, non-aligned nations in the disarmament committee should therefore be equal to the number of nations on each of the two sides; and the smaller nations should have the same rights as all other members of the committee.

9. The reluctance to give the smaller nations equal status arose from a mistaken desire to by-pass the United Nations in the establishment of a disarmament organization. The United Nations was made up mainly of small Powers, and had always been the main moral force behind the whole disarmament effort. Yet if present tendencies continued, the United States and the Soviet Union would soon share a monopoly of power, which would eventually be translated into economic and political domination. They might indeed one day decide that they had common interests, and combine to dominate the world. That was not their present intention, but it was the danger of the growing concentration of military power in the hands of two nations.

10. The non-aligned countries could represent the interests of all small nations, aligned or otherwise, because all small nations wished to end the arms race, and only the non-aligned nations could form a bridge between the two great Powers.

11. The arms race was accelerating as science advanced; decolonization had increased the possibilities of local wars; and the economies of small nations were declining. It was therefore essential to act quickly. His delegation thought that a date should be set for the convening of the new disarmament committee, perhaps in the middle of January or at the beginning of February 1962, and that it was even more important to set a target date for the disarmament process itself. Although the four-year limit that had been proposed by the USSR^{1/} seemed far too long, his delegation would be ready to accept it; but an attempt at disarmament without a target date might accelerate the arms race. The target dates for each stage would have to be decided by the great Powers themselves, because they alone had the necessary scientific experts.

12. He regretted that General Assembly resolution 1648 (XVI), which called for a moratorium on nuclear testing, having been rejected by the United States, seemed to be inoperative. He welcomed the Soviet Union's compliance with General Assembly resolution 1649 (XVI) urging the Powers to resume negotiations for a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests, and he was not dismayed by the Soviet reservation that such a treaty must be linked to the question of general and complete disarmament. However, he was disturbed by the Soviet statement that if one party resumed tests the other would be free to do so, and by the fact that the President of the United States had made a similar reservation. His delegation would welcome a joint commitment by both parties not to resume tests during the Geneva negotiations.

13. The Soviet Union proposed that the abolition of nuclear weapons should take place at an early stage of disarmament, while the United States proposed that it should take place at a later stage. Although the non-nuclear Powers lacked the scientific knowledge to decide which was the right procedure, they abhorred nuclear weapons and would support their earliest possible immobilization and destruction, provided that neither side gained any advantage. He believed that the parties had accepted that principle in their joint statement.

14. The most important task of the United Nations in the next decade was the organization of a world order based on world law. That was necessary not only

^{1/} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 70, document A/4219.

because of the revolution which had taken place in the technology of weapons, but because the new conditions, new concepts of human rights and new economic relationships created by the rise of new nations and the liquidation of colonialism must all be given juridical expression; and such a world order could not be created without disarmament.

15. His delegation had been encouraged by recent statements, made in the highest circles in the United States and the Soviet Union, stressing the importance of general and complete disarmament: it regretted, however, that both countries had accelerated their arms race. That paradox could only mean that both sides were afraid and confused.

16. Negotiations must begin at once: next year it might be difficult, if not impossible, to begin them because of the acceleration of the arms race. His delegation had therefore joined in sponsoring a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1) calling for the creation of a "non-nuclear club", a suggestion whose positive significance had been recognized by the Soviet Union. That draft resolution, submitted on the initiative of Sweden, would encourage as many nations as possible to agree not to make or accept nuclear weapons, while the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.298) submitted by Ireland under agenda item 81 (Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons) would require the nuclear Powers to take the initiative. His delegation welcomed both draft resolutions, which were complementary.

17. It was also important to dispel the idea that there was any possibility of surviving a nuclear war; that was an illusion which could only result in dangerous complacency.

18. His delegation supported the suggestion which the Prime Minister of India had made in his address to the General Assembly (1051st plenary meeting) for a United Nations Year for International Co-operation designed to illustrate the extent of co-operation throughout the world. The United Nations might also proclaim a Disarmament Year, using all means at its disposal to create a climate of peace throughout the world. People should be fully informed of the dangers of nuclear war and of the significance of disarmament, so that they might influence their Governments to achieve disarmament as quickly as possible.

19. His delegation welcomed the Committee's unanimous adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.299 and Add.1, which urged the two great Powers to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body and it would support any proposal which recognized United Nations jurisdiction over disarmament and the right of small nations to be represented in disarmament negotiations, and any proposal which, by fixing target dates, would help to accelerate the achievement of disarmament.

20. Mr. AHMED (United Arab Republic) said that the resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union and the increase in cold-war tension in connexion with the German question and the organization of the Secretariat were symptoms of a worsening of the atmosphere in which disarmament negotiations were to be resumed. However, the two-Power statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (A/4879) was a significant step in the right direction, particularly since some of the points now agreed had been disputed until the previous year. Both great Powers had endorsed the disarmament resolutions of the Disarma-

ment Commission and those adopted at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, and had agreed, for example, that the proposed international disarmament organization and its inspectors should have unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification. It was clear that, with goodwill, the disarmament talks could eventually bear fruit. The agreement they had been able to reach showed the advantages of direct diplomatic confrontation of the parties concerned. Another encouraging sign was that the Soviet Union had recently agreed to resume negotiations with the Western Powers for the conclusion of a treaty on nuclear tests, and that the United States and the United Kingdom had also declared that they were ready to resume such talks. However, the two sides disagreed about the order in which disarmament measures should be carried out and about the details and extent of the control system. They also disagreed on the question whether the time limits for each stage of disarmament should be decided beforehand or should be determined according to the degree of implementation of each stage. That question, however, must be decided not by the Committee, but by the proper negotiating body. The problems still outstanding were serious and difficult ones, especially in the present state of world tension and mutual distrust.

21. In any programme of disarmament, it was essential that neither party should have a military advantage over the other at any stage. Once a disarmament agreement had been reached and its execution started, it would be very dangerous if either party should decide to go back; indeed, such an event might even lead to world war. That was why each side attached such importance to the composition of the negotiating body in which the disarmament agreement was to be reached.

22. His delegation was glad that the Committee had not suspended or adjourned the debate after the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.299 and Add.1, of which his delegation had been a sponsor, because it would be useful for the Committee's opinion and recommendations to be available to the two Powers before and even during their consultations on the composition of the negotiating body.

23. He noted that the representative of the Soviet Union had favoured the representation in that body, on an equal footing, of the Western Powers, the States supporting the Soviet Union, and the uncommitted nations, and that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada had also approved the participation of the non-aligned States in the disarmament talks.

24. Of the four alternative solutions suggested by the United States in its memorandum of 29 July 1961 (A/4880, I), only two were new. One was an increase in the membership of the negotiating body from ten to twenty, on the basis of "equitable representation of the different regions of the world" and "the desirability of selecting countries on the basis of such relevant factors as population and military capabilities". The second was the expansion of that body by the addition of three officers, who would act as chairman and vice-chairmen and would exercise their good offices without representing Governments or "attempting to act as formal 'representatives' of a non-existent 'neutral' bloc". The second alternative would hardly differ from the previous structure of the Ten-Nation Committee and would have the obvious drawback that Governments

outside NATO and the Warsaw Treaty would not be represented.

25. His delegation agreed with the United States that no neutral "bloc" existed; nevertheless, there was a large body of non-aligned opinion. He noted with satisfaction that the United States representative had referred to a community of goals on disarmament between the United States and the nations which had attended the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Belgrade in September 1961.

26. Several resolutions passed at the Belgrade Conference showed interesting similarities with the joint statement of agreed principles (A/4879). He drew attention in particular to resolution 16, which called for the elimination of the manufacture of arms as well as installations for military training, except for purposes of internal security, and the total prohibition of the production, possession and utilization of nuclear and thermo-nuclear arms, bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the elimination of equipment and installations for the delivery, placement and operational use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories; to resolution 18, which urged the great Powers to sign without further delay a treaty for general and complete disarmament, and stated that the non-aligned nations should be represented at all future world conferences on disarmament, that all discussions on disarmament should be held under the auspices of the United Nations, and that general and complete disarmament should be guaranteed by an effective system of inspection and control, the teams of which should include members of non-aligned nations; and to resolution 20, which recommended that the General Assembly should adopt a decision on the convening either of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to discussion of disarmament or of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations.

27. The influence of the negotiating body could not be over-emphasized; neither East nor West would wish to participate unless they were satisfied with and had confidence in it. But it was to be hoped that the great Powers would realize the constructive role which the non-aligned nations could play. The United States and the Soviet Union had already agreed on certain principles for negotiations, which had the support of the Committee, and he hoped that they would also reach an agreement on the negotiating body which would prove equally acceptable to other countries. In stressing the special contribution which the non-aligned countries could make, he was not overlooking the responsibility of the great Powers. Disarmament was not a problem which could be solved by majority decision; only a solution which was acceptable to both the United States and the Soviet Union had any chance of success. If they failed to agree, nothing that the United Nations could do would save mankind from nuclear disaster. He therefore hoped that the great Powers would resume their exploratory talks forthwith, taking into consideration the recommendations made by the Committee and the resolutions adopted at the Belgrade Conference. Until they reached an agreement, it was their duty to refrain from any act which might widen the gulf between them. It was incumbent upon them to show a sense of responsibility commensurate with their power.

28. As regards draft resolution A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1, it was clear that if the spread of nuclear arms

could be prevented, mankind as a whole would benefit directly and agreement on a disarmament treaty between the Powers which already possessed nuclear weapons would be made easier. His delegation therefore welcomed the draft resolution.

29. Mr. LEGENDRE (France) said that rapid scientific and technical progress had opened a new era in the history of the world. But at the same time it had led to the development of weapons of vast destructive power and had greatly changed the strategic situation. Two revolutions, which were still gathering momentum, had upset the old standards and profoundly altered the problem of disarmament. First, the atom had been conquered—an achievement in which France had played perhaps a decisive role. Now, world stocks of fissile materials which could be used for military purposes, including bombs, totalled some hundreds of tons. France, adhering faithfully to the statement made by its representative before the United Nations in 1946,^{2/} had refrained for more than ten years from using the new knowledge for military purposes. Its example had not been followed, and it had therefore belatedly decided to carry out some explosions. Its former experience in the nuclear field had enabled it to undertake within a few months a programme, now completed, consisting of four explosions, three of which had been of low yield. If appropriate steps were not taken, other countries would follow in France's footsteps. The second and more recent revolution was the conquest of space. Again, military applications had predominated over peaceful uses. The most important factor was the development of solid-fuel rockets which were relatively easy to handle and could be launched from fixed or mobile sites on land, at sea or under the sea. Their range, speed and accuracy were constantly growing. Fortunately, the largest rockets were still limited in number; but they would multiply as the means of production spread.

30. Thus ever since 1957 the development of science had created a new technical situation, which was still evolving. There were several approaches that could be adopted to the problem of disarmament in those circumstances. One approach was to enter, either unilaterally or through agreements, into purely moral commitments subject to no control or sanction; for example, a moratorium on nuclear tests or the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction. That was an easy but ineffective method, which took no account of the real problems, as was shown by the fate of the recent voluntary moratorium and of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.^{3/} Moral commitments might be useful at a certain stage of the disarmament process and in a certain context, but to begin disarmament on such a basis would be dangerous and unprofitable. The only realistic solution was to undertake genuine disarmament measures subject to effective international control. France had always been in favour of progressive and controlled general disarmament. It now considered that the emphasis should be laid on nuclear disarmament, and in particular on those aspects which were most important and to which control could most easily be applied, given the new scientific situation. The cessation of the production of fissile material for military purposes was one measure which could still

^{2/} See Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, No. 3, 3rd meeting.

^{3/} General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, signed at Paris on 27 August 1928 (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2137).

be controlled, at least in part. Such materials were produced at a relatively small number of large plants; thus, control was theoretically possible, but it would have to be very exact, as even a small leakage in the main producing countries would enable large stocks to be built up again. Furthermore, it was possible that more simple manufacturing processes would be developed. But if production was controllable, stocks were not. In any case, a reduction in existing weapons would have no immediate military consequences, since those remaining would be sufficient to devastate vast areas and it would be relatively easy for a State to obtain a decisive advantage by cheating. That was undoubtedly the most serious problem with which any disarmament negotiations would have to deal.

31. At the most recent negotiations, France had urged the adoption of a new procedure corresponding to the new technological situation, namely, the controlled destruction of the main means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Although it would be practically impossible to eliminate or reconvert existing fissile materials and nuclear devices, the instruments by which such devices were launched or carried offered an opportunity for effective disarmament. Nuclear bombs acquired military importance only if they could be delivered in sufficient quantity and with sufficient accuracy to certain targets without any chance of interception. The development of rockets, satellites and launching vehicles was approaching the critical point: if suitable decisions were not taken quickly, control would no longer be possible in that field either. In that connexion he drew attention to document A/C.1/821 submitted by his delegation at the fourteenth session^{4/} and to the French President's statements on 25 April and 31 May 1960 and his letters to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of 10 June, 30 June and 12 August 1960. If any serious disarmament negotiations were held, France would propose a disarmament programme which gave priority to the elimination of means of delivery of nuclear weapons as an urgent necessity, while retaining the flexibility necessary to enable the parties to bridge the gap between them.

32. Technological development had also made it essential to reconsider the order of disarmament operations if the balance of forces was not to be upset. The process must take place in phases, and the security of all concerned must be safeguarded by effective control. In that connexion, the joint statement of agreed principles by the United States and the Soviet Union (A/4879) had certain merits, but it was also open to criticism on some points. First, there was certainly no agreement on the question of control, as was shown by the letters exchanged between those Powers on 20 September 1961, the texts of which were contained in documents A/4880 and A/4887. Secondly, the principles did not take sufficient account of the latest technical developments. Thirdly, the time had in any case passed for statements of general principles; it was the practical aspects of a general disarmament programme which must not be considered. The implementation of such a programme would no doubt be made easier by the adoption of preliminary measures relating, for example, to the freezing of forces and armaments and the publication of relevant data. But to avoid delay such measures should be considered at the same time as the main programme. For the stages of the programme itself, reasonable but fixed time-limits

should be agreed. As each stage was completed a report should be made to the Security Council.

33. As regards control, the French view had always been that disarmament must be subject to strict and effective control by an impartial international organization having the necessary means of investigation at its disposal. The basic reason for the failure of all disarmament negotiations was that the Soviet Government did not share that view. It constantly accused the West of wanting only arms control and legalized espionage, while avoiding any definite answer to the specific questions put to it. Its latest statement, to the effect that it would accept the Western Powers' proposals on control if those Powers would accept its programme on general and complete disarmament, was typically vague. Some parts of the Soviet plan were unacceptable; others were acceptable only if there was provision for effective control. But it was precisely on control that the Soviet Union would not negotiate seriously.

34. There were two possible approaches. On the one hand, as France proposed, a beginning could be made with far-reaching disarmament measures and with the concurrent establishment of effective control. On the other hand, more modest measures could be adopted, subject to less strict control, such as preliminary notification of certain military decisions, publication of the size of forces and the nature and disposition of weapons, or a world-wide programme for warning against surprise attack and preventing war by accident. One of those approaches must be adopted.

35. As regards the composition of the body in which negotiations were to take place, he recalled that on 7 September 1959 the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union had agreed on the composition of the Ten-Nation Committee. France had given its agreement only in order that negotiations might be resumed. Some three months after they had in fact been resumed, the Soviet Government had suddenly left the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, in circumstances which were well known. Thus if the Soviet Government really wished to resume serious negotiations with the Powers parties to the agreement of 7 September 1959, it should discuss the conditions for such negotiations with them. There was no reason, however, why the General Assembly or the Disarmament Commission should not set up one or more working groups to study the problems of disarmament; they might, indeed, do very useful work. The composition of such bodies was an important but not a fundamental question. They should preferably be restricted in size and should not reflect in any way the alleged division of the world into three blocs, which did not correspond to reality.

36. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan), recalling the assurances given by the Chairman that every effort would be made to avoid concurrent meetings of the First Committee and the General Assembly, drew attention to the fact that both bodies were scheduled to meet the following morning. He proposed that the Committee should hold its night meeting from 8 p.m. to midnight and thus avoid having to reconvene the following morning.

37. Mr. BURNS (Canada) said that the general debate on disarmament would continue at least until the end of the current week. To extend the night meeting and cancel the next morning's meeting would scarcely save much time.

^{4/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 70.

38. Mr. PAZHWAK (Afghanistan) requested that his proposal should be divided into two parts for purposes of the voting.

39. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Afghan proposal that the Committee should hold its night meeting from 8 p.m. until midnight.

The proposal was adopted by 26 votes to 8, with 26 abstentions.

40. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Afghan proposal that the next morning's meeting should be cancelled.

The proposal was adopted by 21 votes to 8, with 31 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.