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Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*):

- (a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament 1

Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 28

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*):

- (a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament (A/7072 and Add.1-
DC/230 and Add.1; A/7080; A/C.1/959-960;
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1. Mr. PARDO (Malta): Before dealing with the subject before us today, I should like to associate myself with the tributes that have been paid to the Foreign Minister of Ireland, Mr. Aiken, for his far-sighted initiative that resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 1665 (XVI).

2. I also wish to express the appreciation of my delegation for the untiring efforts of the two co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to draft, despite numerous and varied difficulties, a mutually acceptable non-proliferation treaty¹ that in some measure takes into account the guidelines laid down by the General Assembly in its resolution 2028 (XX)—efforts now crowned with success.

3. Finally, we are deeply grateful to all the other members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee for their outstanding work. There is little doubt that the large number of constructive suggestions put forward by those members have enabled the nuclear-weapon States to gain a clearer understanding of the expectations of the world community and of the interests and fears of those countries that are not cursed by the possession of nuclear weapons. Those suggestions which were wholly or in part accepted by the co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee have certainly improved the text of the draft treaty and are largely responsible for such conformity as exists between the draft treaty and General Assembly guidelines.

4. Malta is a small country—in area the smallest of the United Nations. We are a peaceful country. Never in 5,000

years of recorded history have we waged aggressive war; yet we have repeatedly suffered, as much as, if not more than, most countries, the cruel and terrible consequences of war. We have neither the capability nor the desire to acquire nuclear weapons. We detest and abhor the immense, senseless destruction and misery that has been, and in far greater measure today can be, caused by these weapons. In terms of our future, one nuclear bomb would destroy us as a people.

5. Hence we have a strong natural inclination to consider favourably any measure, any agreement, that gives realistic promise of controlling the nuclear arms race and eventually abolishing nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. Indeed our favourable inclination is so strong that we are reluctant to examine too closely for loop-holes or shortcomings the text of any agreement purporting to be a step towards the achievement of these aims.

6. We are, I believe, all agreed that a nuclear war would be disastrous both for the States directly involved and for all mankind. Any doubts on this subject must have been dispelled by the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons [*A/6858 and Corr.1*]. Therefore, in our view, the fundamental question to be asked is: will a non-proliferation treaty significantly reduce the danger of nuclear war and, either directly or indirectly, significantly increase the security of all countries? If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, we must then inquire whether the joint draft non-proliferation treaty now under consideration is directed towards achieving that end in a way which is effective and does not unnecessarily ignore the legitimate interests of many non-nuclear-weapon States. We shall attempt to explore these questions briefly and objectively, bearing in mind not so much our national interest—the issues are too grave—but the interests of the world community as a whole.

7. We were somewhat surprised by the statements of some delegations that extolled the virtues of a non-proliferation treaty to such an extent as almost to imply that, if the present treaty were endorsed by the General Assembly, the nuclear arms race would almost automatically be halted and progressive nuclear disarmament would rapidly take place. Some delegations have even stated that, if a non-proliferation treaty is not immediately adopted by the world community, fifteen or twenty nations will soon acquire nuclear weapons and this would make it extremely difficult to preserve the world from a nuclear conflagration.

8. It is of course difficult to question both the optimism and the pessimism of such statements. Much depends on a necessarily subjective appreciation of all the facts, and, while no delegation has access to all the facts, some have access to a far greater number of facts than others.

¹ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex I.

Consequently we treat the views of delegations whose access to facts is much greater than ours with great respect. Nevertheless certain facts do not appear to support the claim that widespread nuclear proliferation is inevitable in the near future in the absence of a non-proliferation treaty or that such a treaty will necessarily lead to a halting of the nuclear arm race, still less to nuclear disarmament.

9. The costs of developing a small high-quality nuclear force were analysed in some detail in the Secretary-General's report; and the conclusion is reached [*A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 96*] that only about six countries in the world other than the present nuclear-weapon States appear capable of finding the necessary resources to develop such a force. These countries are easily identifiable by comparing figure VIII in chapter II of document *A/6858 and Corr.1*, with table 11 of annex IV of the same document. They include the Federal Republic of Germany, India and four other countries whose names it is not necessary to mention here. The Federal Republic of Germany formally renounced nuclear weapons fourteen years ago, and the renunciation has been frequently repeated since by the responsible authorities of the Republic. Moreover, those authorities are well aware that, to quote Press Release 23 issued by the USSR Mission to the United Nations on 24 April 1968:

"neighbouring countries might feel an urge to take preventive measures of a military nature independently or with the help of allied powers possessing powerful nuclear means",

should the Republic take a decision to manufacture nuclear weapons itself.

10. The representative of India for his part reminded us [*1567th meeting*] that the highest authorities of his country had repeatedly and authoritatively declared over the past ten years that they intended to adhere firmly to the national decision not to manufacture nuclear arms and never to use atomic energy for destructive purposes.

11. With regard to the other four States with nuclear-weapon capability, I would refer you to what I had the honour of stating in this Committee during the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. I then said:

"... it is highly improbable that any of the existing civil nuclear Powers will exercise the military nuclear option without the most anxious and most thorough consideration. They are fully aware of the technical difficulties, the costs and the dangers inherent in the development of nuclear weapons. Above all, they are subject to political pressures, both external and internal, which have inhibited the spread of nuclear weapons in the past and can be expected to continue to operate effectively in the future."²

12. The decision to manufacture nuclear weapons would represent for these four countries such a drastic change in policy that it could not be envisaged as a realistic possibility unless their supreme national interests were gravely and directly endangered or a virtual revolution in national sentiment were to occur. The inescapable conclusion is that

none of the countries with potential small, high-quality nuclear-weapon capability is at all likely to take in the near future the political decision to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons; indeed, nobody, not even the delegations most anxious to stress the advantages of a non-proliferation treaty, has claimed in this Committee that such a decision is imminent. I would add that even in the highly improbable event that one of these relatively advanced civilian nuclear Powers were to take today a decision to manufacture nuclear weapons, no nuclear device could possibly be detonated for at least a year—or more probably two.

13. In the Secretary-General's report, however, it is stated that, at the present time, about six additional countries could, by mobilizing a major part of their technical and financial resources, develop a modest nuclear-weapon capability comprising a deliverable warhead and an elementary delivery system. No doubt the number of countries with such capability could grow to fifteen or twenty within the next ten years with the spread of advanced nuclear technology and access to increasing quantities of fissionable material. There is little doubt that some of these potential token nuclear-weapon States are situated in areas where regional tensions are strong and where, consequently, there may exist a temptation to obtain nuclear weapons for military or political advantage. Furthermore, there is some validity in the argument that while the United States and the Soviet Union have a stable deterrent—that is, they possess sufficient nuclear missiles in hardened sites to survive a first strike and still be able to retaliate by inflicting unacceptable destruction on the attacker—a State with elementary nuclear-weapon capability would not be in that position and would consequently be under some pressure to launch a first strike since in no other way could the real advantage of its nuclear capability be fully realized.

14. We recognize, therefore, the potential danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation and the potentially grave destabilizing regional effects that could ensue from the acquisition of even elementary nuclear-weapon capability by additional countries. We believe, however, that these destabilizing effects could be contained even without a non-proliferation treaty, in view of the asymmetrical distribution of power and of nuclear-weapon capability in the world today, and that the danger of the imminence of the development of nuclear-weapon capability by a civilian nuclear Power should not be over-emphasized. The reasons are not only political or financial but also technical. A civilian nuclear Power seeking to develop nuclear weapons, first, requires a supply of natural uranium and, secondly, must use its natural uranium either as a source of fissionable uranium 235 or to produce plutonium. Natural uranium contains only 0.7 per cent of uranium 235, and it must be enriched to produce weapon-grade uranium. This is accomplished through a highly secret, sophisticated and expensive process known as gaseous diffusion, which has been mastered only by present nuclear-weapon Powers. There is very little prospect that any civilian nuclear Power will assume the massive expenditure involved in the development of the gaseous diffusion technology. Although two countries have conducted some research on an alternative method using gas centrifuges, separation of uranium 235 by the centrifuge method is not considered a present possibility.

² This statement was made at the 1434th meeting of the First Committee, the official record of which was published in summary form.

15. Hence, at least for the immediate future, the only source of enriched uranium, for use either in reactors or for weapons, will remain the gaseous diffusion plants of the present nuclear-weapon States. Plutonium, the other possible material for fission weapons, is more readily available since it is produced as a by-product of the fission process in a nuclear reactor fuelled with natural uranium. Every civilian nuclear Power is producing plutonium today. The quantity depends upon the number, characteristics and method of operation of the reactors in use.

16. It is estimated that enough plutonium is being produced in civilian nuclear reactors to manufacture about 1,000 nuclear bombs per annum at the present time. This plutonium, however, must be separated from residual uranium and other reactor products in order to be used for weapons purposes and, outside the chemical separation plants operated by the present military nuclear Powers, only two small plutonium separation facilities are known to exist in the world today. The activities of both are supervised and it would appear highly improbable that either could be responsible for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the near future. Although the possibility cannot be dismissed that a civilian nuclear Power could eventually acquire, in the absence of a non-proliferation treaty or special agreements, unsupervised separation facilities, it is quite clear that the danger of an imminent increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States can be and has been over-stated.

17. It is also evident that a non-proliferation treaty does not deal directly with the main danger facing the world today, which the Secretary-General, in his measured prose, defines as the "further elaboration of existing nuclear arsenals" [*A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 82*]. Thus, in our view, other measures, as for instance a comprehensive test-ban treaty, would, at the present time, probably make a more positive contribution to world security and stabilization of nuclear armaments than an agreement directed against the somewhat less than imminent danger of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries not now possessing them.

18. Nevertheless, we recognize the value of a non-proliferation treaty. At the present time, such a treaty must be considered more as a political device that may, if certain hopes are realized, lessen world tensions and make possible greater trust between nations, thus indirectly promoting world stability, rather than as a serious nuclear arms control measure. The importance of a non-proliferation treaty as an arms control measure, however, will inevitably grow as the ever-wider diffusion of sophisticated nuclear technology and the increasing spread of advanced industrialization make the development of nuclear weapons more accessible to an ever-larger number of countries.

19. While recognizing the value of a non-proliferation treaty and that a solution to the problem of security cannot be found, to quote the report of the Secretary-General, "...in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them" [*Ibid., para. 91*]. We have more difficulty in accepting statements in this Committee to the effect that such a treaty, endorsed by the international community, is necessarily an indispensable bridge that must be crossed before further progress

towards the control of the nuclear arms race or a reduction in existing nuclear arsenals can be achieved.

20. We cannot see any really convincing reason for this view. Indeed, we should have expected, in view of the lack of imminence of the danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation and of the immense and ever-increasing stocks of nuclear weapons possessed by the two super-Powers, that an opposite opinion would have been forcefully expressed, that is, that specific, meaningful steps should be taken by the major nuclear Powers to stabilize the arms race, before non-nuclear States are urged to renounce their right to develop nuclear weapons, however precarious and dangerous such a right might be.

21. If possession of nuclear weapons creates insecurity, if possession of nuclear weapons is an oppressive economic and financial burden, as it undoubtedly is, one would have expected those possessing such weapons to hasten to take mutually agreed-upon steps to rid themselves of that burden, or at least to refrain from increasing their burden, before urging those still fortunately unencumbered to refrain from following the example they have set to the world.

22. We have no desire to engage in controversy on this point. We are aware that logic and political reality are not necessarily the same thing. We are most anxious to bring the nuclear arms race under control and to see the process of nuclear disarmament initiated. If a non-proliferation treaty can contribute to that end, we must favour it. We therefore accept, not on reason but on faith, the argument that approval of a non-proliferation treaty at the present time is a bridge that must be crossed now. We consider it a privilege that the non-nuclear-weapon States should be the pioneers of a progressive policy of peace and that they should have the opportunity—indeed, be requested—to give an example to everybody. Our example, however, would prove vain and illusory if the non-proliferation treaty which we are requested to endorse were merely an instrument giving, for a generation, legal sanction to a state of fact. The treaty must not only make nuclear-weapon proliferation impossible, but must also give reasonable promise of being speedily followed by effective steps to halt and reverse the arms race. Nor must the treaty dispose of what is still a somewhat limited and remote danger in a manner that is likely to injure the legitimate interests of the great majority of States Members of our Organization.

23. These ideas are embodied in the principles which the General Assembly considered should form the basis of any treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and prevent it in a manner acceptable to the international community. Those principles are well known to all of us, but their interpretation has given rise to some controversy. On the one hand, some representatives believe that the joint draft treaty attached to the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament conforms as closely as can reasonably be expected to the five principles proclaimed by the General Assembly in resolution 2028 (XX). A larger number of representatives appear either to believe that a greater effort could have been made to safeguard the security and interests of non-nuclear-weapon States, or appear to have some doubts with regard to the conformity with the principles established by the General Assembly of

the draft treaty which has emerged from the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, although in many cases the doubts are resolved by qualified approval. Finally, some delegations either reject in principle the concept of non-proliferation, or believe that the joint draft treaty before us is either so inequitable or ignores so completely their interests and security as not to merit approval. As for my delegation, I have no hesitation in acknowledging our inclination to make every effort to view the draft treaty with favour. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to deny that many of the provisions, particularly those dealing with the obligations of nuclear-weapon States, appear somewhat one-sided and ambiguous. I shall give a few examples.

24. According to article I of the joint draft treaty,

"Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices."

25. This article appears free of loop-holes; yet it would not seem directly to preclude a nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty from assisting organizations and entities other than States in acquiring nuclear explosive devices that could be used for purposes of political intimidation or to force change in the political direction of Member States. Such a possibility might appear somewhat remote, but it cannot be excluded as long as political organizations or movements within States are assisted in acquiring a rich variety of conventional weapons for political warfare on their respective Governments.

26. We recognize the need for the international safeguards to which reference is made in article III of the joint draft treaty before us, and we appreciate the fact that it is intended that the safeguard system be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities; nevertheless, we feel that it need not be strictly necessary to the effectiveness of the treaty that safeguards be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State concerned, as required by article III, paragraph 1. Given adequate verification techniques, we believe, with Sir John Cockcroft, that inspection of reactors may not be indispensable and that safeguards could with advantage be concentrated on the distribution and use of enriched uranium and on plutonium-separation plants.

27. We must note, in this connexion, that while a comprehensive safeguard system will operate upon non-nuclear-weapon States, the military nuclear Powers assume no obligation to permit any kind of inspection within their own territories. Thus non-nuclear-weapon States have no assurance that nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty will in fact observe the obligations they have assumed under article I. It is true that these obligations correspond to the interests of nuclear-weapon States themselves and that, in the past twenty years, there has been only one known case of a nuclear-weapon State voluntarily assisting a non-nuclear-weapon State to acquire nuclear weapons. But the

acquisition of nuclear weapons is *ex hypothesi* as contrary to the interests of a non-nuclear-weapon State as the transfer of nuclear weapons is to those of a nuclear-weapon State; consequently there would appear to be no logical reason why a similar system of safeguards should not apply equally to both categories of States. This, unfortunately, is not intended, and while it is fairly certain that the provisions of the treaty will be strictly and effectively applied in respect of non-nuclear-weapon States which will become parties to it, the latter have no assurance that it will be equally effective with regard to the signatory nuclear-weapon States.

28. Article IV ensures the right of all States parties to the joint draft treaty "to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" and to participate "in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy". The right of non-nuclear States parties to the treaty to have access freely and without discrimination to fissionable material for peaceful purposes is, however, not mentioned. If this access should be restricted, or worse still, denied, it would be quite difficult for non-nuclear countries to make practical use of their right "to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes"; nor would it be likely that they could long continue to participate in the exchange of scientific and technological information since their nuclear scientists would probably prefer to go to a country where practical use could be made of their skills.

29. According to article V of the joint draft treaty, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty are promised "that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available" to them "through appropriate international procedures" at a cost which "will be as low as possible". This is without question a valuable provision, for which we wish to express our appreciation. It is, however, doubtful whether all countries can take advantage of it. Even excluding the cost of research and development, the charge for even one nuclear explosion for engineering purposes might well be in the order of some hundreds of thousands of dollars and thus beyond the means of a number of States.

30. We would have hoped that the nuclear-weapon States could supplement their generous undertaking with regard to sharing the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions by establishing a fund, possibly within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to provide, free of charge, fellowships and technical assistance in the field of atomic energy for those countries that have not yet acquired the status of civilian nuclear Powers and that for some time yet are unlikely to be able to benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. The cost would be relatively small, the benefit to the underdeveloped world immense. Furthermore, such a measure would allay the apprehensions of some Powers as to the equitable sharing of technological advance in the nuclear field and it would enable the major Powers to demonstrate that they are determined to ensure the practical implementation of the principle embodied in the preamble to the joint draft treaty to the effect:

"...that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology ... should be available for peaceful

purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States”.

We attribute some importance to this matter since lack of assurances on this point might give rise to the impression that the non-proliferation treaty could deepen and render more permanent the division of the world into rich and poor as measured by modern technology.

31. We recognize that article VI of the joint draft treaty is intended to comply with the third principle adopted by the General Assembly, that is, that a non-proliferation treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. We willingly acknowledge that. As some have pointed out, this is the first time that the three nuclear-weapon States participating in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have accepted a legal obligation to negotiate in good faith in the field of nuclear disarmament. We cannot refrain from noting, however, that negotiations, presumably in good faith, on various aspects of the disarmament problem have been proceeding for over twenty years without producing very impressive results. We therefore believe that it is important to clarify the scope of the obligation which will be assumed by the parties to the joint draft treaty, particularly since this is a point which vitally affects the viability of the treaty and hence its value to the international community.

32. We are grateful for article VII of the draft treaty which, by safeguarding the right of groups of States to conclude regional treaties to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, conforms closely to the spirit and wording of the fifth principle adopted by the General Assembly in 1965. But, surely, the safeguarding of this right is of somewhat limited significance when it is not accompanied by an undertaking from the nuclear-weapon States that they will respect the regional nuclear-free zones established under a treaty endorsed by the General Assembly.

33. I do not wish to abuse the Committee's time, nor do I wish to repeat what has already been stated by others with an eloquence and a clarity which it would be difficult for me to emulate. I shall therefore confine myself to making one last observation. We note that nuclear-weapon States, despite the fact that they possess sufficient quantities of fissile material to destroy much of the world, have not seen fit to include in the treaty any undertaking, however vague, to cease further production of such material. Such an undertaking would appear to our eyes as a matter of ordinary common sense in no way endangering the security of anybody, since the two super-Powers already possess massive overkill capacity, and thus it would seem to be of no purpose to accumulate additional nuclear weapons. How many times should one be able to destroy civilization and the world in order to satisfy the requirements of security? Yet an undertaking to cut off the production of weapon-grade fissile material is not given in the treaty, nor have we heard any verbal assurances on this point. The matter is important since it reflects, indirectly perhaps, but clearly, on the real prospects for the control of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament.

34. In conclusion, there is little doubt that the projected treaty, despite useful improvements over earlier versions,

contains grave defects and unnecessarily serious deficiencies, due basically to a concept of responsibilities and obligations that is too one-sided to be easily acceptable to my delegation. In essence, the draft treaty does not sufficiently recognize the basic fact that abatement of the nuclear arms race and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are intimately interconnected subjects. As Hans Morgenthau has written:

“As long as the present nuclear powers continue to compete for the accumulation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems as instruments of their national policies, there appears to be no possibility of preventing other nations from following suit. Nuclear proliferation is a mere spatial expansion of the nuclear arms race.”³

35. Thus, had the treaty stood alone; our reaction would have been to refer the draft back to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for further revision. The treaty, however, does not stand alone: it comes to us in a certain psychological and political setting. Further postponement for necessary revision could deal a serious psychological blow to the entire work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The treaty is also accompanied by the text of a draft resolution which the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics intend jointly to sponsor in the Security Council.⁴ Although this draft resolution is vague and ambiguous, it is, we believe, of crucial political importance, since it establishes a community of interests in a vitally important area between the three nuclear-weapon States—a community of interests that may, in due course, lead to results beneficial to all countries.

36. We believe that these considerations are of sufficient weight to counter-balance much that is unsatisfactory in the projected treaty. Clearly, however, there can be little question that the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1-6 requires amendment. Endorsement of the projected treaty cannot be unqualified. At most, the treaty can be commended for consideration by Member States. The preamble to the draft resolution should be amplified, and mention should be made therein of the joint security guarantees offered to non-nuclear-weapon States. The General Assembly should show some awareness of the importance of associating all nuclear-weapon States in nuclear disarmament negotiations. The right of access of all States signatories to the treaty to fissile material for peaceful purposes should be clarified, and the principle should be affirmed that the treaty should be followed at the earliest possible date by effective measures and agreements relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

37. Some indication should be given regarding the manner by which it is proposed, in practice, to ensure that poor countries receive access to the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology. We hope that these and other important points can be incorporated in the revision of the draft resolution before us.

38. Mr. RÍOS (Panama) (*translated from Spanish*): The delegation of Panama, on the instructions of its Govern-

³ *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1967, p. 11.

⁴ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex II.

ment, would like to offer certain comments concerning the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

39. Some years ago a good many jokes were going around in the chambers and corridors of the United Nations because a representative of a small and poor country had emphatically stated that his Government had renounced the manufacture, possession and use of nuclear weapons. We might say that there was a proliferation of jokes over this very categorical declaration.

40. At this resumed twenty-second regular session of the General Assembly, all countries, weak and powerful alike, have been given an opportunity to adopt, through a multilateral treaty, the decision which at that time seemed only a facetious way of arousing the representatives from the somnolence into which they sometimes drop after listening to lengthy and exhausting speeches. Now, however, the matter does not call forth any superficial comments. On the contrary, it is very serious indeed, for it is the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the nuclear super-Powers which have brought us the text whereby those not having nuclear weapons are to renounce the possibility of some day possessing those devices which threaten to destroy the human race.

41. Panama is not a nuclear-weapon country; nor does it wish or have the possibilities ever to become one. Hence, with or without this treaty, we are not going to have at our disposal those instruments of death. So, as far as we are concerned, the world is free to perish in a nuclear holocaust. However, since the subject is of great interest to us for reasons of national, regional and world security, I shall present, in a constructive spirit, the observations and comments I have just mentioned.

42. First of all, we must acknowledge in all sincerity the efforts of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and of the nuclear super-Powers sponsors of the draft treaty before us. For those great Powers, which are generally at loggerheads, to have reached an agreement, they must surely have had to make sacrifices and concessions. But we, who do not know what it is to have nuclear weapons, and will surely never know what it means, would have wished at this stage that they had made the truly great sacrifices and concessions mankind has been demanding of the great Powers since the end of the last century, namely, nothing less than general and complete disarmament.

43. Let us go a little further into this matter. Article I of the draft treaty states:

“Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”

44. The prohibitions against the non-nuclear-weapon States are extremely clear. None of them shall be able to acquire nuclear weapons, technical assistance, material or equipment for manufacturing them from any of the present

nuclear Powers. The prohibition is specific, and is set forth in full detail. According to what we have been told here, this should tend to prevent a nuclear war, and actually this is partly true.

45. When ten or fifteen countries possess nuclear weapons, there will be more possibilities of nuclear war than there are now when there are only five nuclear countries. No doubt! But what the world wants is the certainty that it will not be the victim of a nuclear catastrophe, and obviously that is not achieved merely by preventing the emergence of other nuclear Powers. The weapons already stockpiled are more than sufficient to erase this planet several times over—without counting the devices which are daily undergoing various stages of sophistication.

46. What we do not see in article I or in any other article is a provision guaranteeing that the aim pursued is the effective non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a whole.

47. Resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, which is one of the bases of this draft treaty, in its operative paragraph 1

“*Urges* all States to take all steps necessary for the early conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons; . . .”

48. In operative paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a), of the same resolution, the principle laid down leaves no doubts as to the universal nature of the treaty. Allow me to quote this provision:

“The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.”

49. The draft treaty complies with this principle so far as the non-nuclear-weapon countries are concerned, but we do not see this commitment in any form for the nuclear-weapon countries. Thus it is clear, as has already been stated here, that the aim is not to eliminate the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but to prevent the proliferation of nuclear-weapon States. That is why Ambassador Zollner of Dahomey suggested very sensibly and aptly that the treaty should be entitled a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear-weapon States. What must be established is a solemn commitment to destroy all the nuclear arsenals which today threaten the survival of mankind; what must be achieved is an irrevocable commitment not to manufacture more nuclear weapons, and all of this must come under competent, impartial and responsible international supervision. Thus the proliferation of nuclear weapons would really be avoided; that is more tangible and convincing than avoiding a hypothetical proliferation of nuclear weapons by preventing an equally hypothetical manufacture of those weapons by the States which are not now in a position to produce them.

50. Another way to prevent mankind from heading for a nuclear catastrophe would be to prohibit the spread of nuclear bases in various parts of the world. I am not speaking on an assumption or more or less vague suppositions: as far back as 1962, an atomic war almost broke out when a great Power installed rockets with thermo-

nuclear warheads very far from its own frontiers. At that time the United Nations marked up one of its most significant achievements on behalf of world peace. However, the good offices of this Organization may not always be effective. In October 1962, an interplanetary sounding device exploded in a cloud of fragments and particles which were registered on radar screens and gave the impression of a massive attack by intercontinental ballistic missiles. An error in the ultra-rapid interpretation of such data could have unleashed a nuclear war.

51. We may be told that the treaty under discussion reaffirms a good intention and, in fact, that is what the end of its preamble states:

“Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all the existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

But, as I said earlier, what mankind demands is not good intentions, but action, namely, that the nuclear Powers commit themselves to nuclear disarmament.

52. We most emphatically believe that this is the crux of the matter we are debating. If this is a document for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we fail to understand why it seems to be designed to be complied with by precisely the countries which do not have such weapons, while those which do have them and possess the means for increasing and perfecting their deadly effects remain entirely unaffected by it. This seems somewhat strange and that is why my delegation needs more time before taking any specific decision on this matter. This document, which some have termed a “political miracle” because it has enabled the Soviet Union and the United States to reach an agreement for once on a matter affecting their status as super-Powers, is something which calls for serious reflection on the part of our modest delegation. We express our sincerest hopes that some day those Powers may agree and decide that, under the strictest international control, they themselves will put an end to their nuclear race for war purposes. That decision would strengthen—indeed, greatly strengthen—the United Nations in its efforts to induce the other nuclear Powers to do likewise.

53. Another article which I think deserves some comment is article VI, which reads:

“Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

54. An expression of good faith is something very pleasant in human relations. We welcome these promises of good faith, just as we find evidence of bad faith repugnant. However, in either case the concept is so subjective and inconsistent that it had best be avoided in any serious negotiation. The fact is that friendship, goodwill and good faith are beside the point in international treaties. Each State—as the great Powers know very well—negotiates on

the basis of its own supreme interests; if any so-called good faith is involved, it vanishes the minute it conflicts with the aspirations, national imperatives and political interests of each negotiating State.

55. In any case, article VI would really seem to us to be in good faith if it were to say that each State Party to the present treaty would commit itself to take specific and immediate action to halt the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. This would indeed be a giant step towards nuclear disarmament. What a great service it would render for mankind! Can you imagine the benefits that could derive from the peaceful use of those thousands of millions of dollars which today are being irresponsibly invested in weapons of death and destruction? What an immense war could thus be unleashed against poverty, hunger and disease, which are most acute in the less developed countries but which may also be seen in dramatic form in the highly developed countries.

56. In our opinion, the two articles on which I have just commented, very modestly and briefly, are the basic ones, those embodying the substance of the treaty and the very reason for its negotiation. The treaty does contain other important concepts, but these would be better embodied in a special treaty. Such is the case with regard to the material and technical assistance to be given by the nuclear to the non-nuclear-weapon States for economic, technological and social development. A document exclusively devoted to this subject is, in our view, of the utmost urgency, particularly if the treaty we are discussing is approved. The obligations which development imposes upon the nuclear Powers as a whole constrain them to share their know-how and experience in nuclear physics with the non-nuclear-weapon countries, as their most outstanding and finest contribution to the welfare of mankind. But this is neither decisive nor necessary in the treaty now before us; nor can it be, since this is a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—as its own title states—and not a treaty on how the nuclear Powers should share their achievements, progress and formulas with the non-nuclear ones for the economical and peaceful use of nuclear energy. This is why that matter appears as a subordinate element in the treaty submitted to us by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. And this point, which is vital to the economic growth and happiness of mankind, submitted in incomplete form, without striking the necessary balance between duties, responsibilities and rights of great and small Powers, has raised some doubts and perfectly reasonable misgivings, as has been very pertinently pointed out by our sister delegation of Brazil.

57. For these reasons we repeat that the substance of articles IV and V should be the basis for an international treaty covering all aspects of nuclear development for peaceful uses, without relegating the non-nuclear-weapon States for a long time to a position of some sort of nuclear parasitism such as that which seems to emerge from the treaty now before us.

58. This completely new form of parasitism, besides being insecure, would seem to imply a disguised form of intervention in the internal affairs of other States, and the great Powers would never accept this if it were they who were in any way obliged to subject themselves to this

concealed intervention. Besides, all this seems to us to savour of a political ploy rather than a sincere concern over nuclear war.

59. We are greatly surprised not to find in this treaty an explicit prohibition to the effect that no State is to take advantage of its nuclear hegemony to threaten, let alone attack, another State which does not possess the same kind of weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon State must have assurances that it will not be subject to nuclear pressure or blackmail.

60. What is established in the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union [ENDC/222] is no more than a repetition of a principle of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, constituting the operative part of that draft resolution, are obviously vague and inconsistent. We cannot help wondering what guarantees can be derived by a non-nuclear-weapon State, if attacked or in danger of being attacked by a nuclear Power, from a resolution of the Security Council which says in its key operative part that the Council:

"Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used."

61. All we have here is an expression of a good intention, but, as the old saying goes, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The matter is so serious, and has such great implications for the future of mankind, that it calls for, it demands and imposes, something more than wholesome intentions—and not expressed just in a resolution of the kind submitted to us by the distinguished Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, but as an article of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons itself.

62. What we wish is to avoid once and for all the possibility that a nuclear Power may threaten or attack a non-nuclear-weapon State. It would hardly do a non-nuclear country much good if, after being attacked by a nuclear Power, it would have to wait for the Security Council to meet in order to take the appropriate measures in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, not to mention that, if it should come to the worst, all action would be paralysed by that detestable and discriminatory anachronism called the veto.

63. Most probably by the time it was possible to come to the defence of the country attacked it would no longer be found because it would have vanished. Therefore, I repeat, what is needed, in our view, are specific guarantees based on extremely formal commitments safeguarding the non-nuclear-weapon countries against the threat of destruction by one or more of the nuclear Powers. And if this means that the Charter must be revised in some of its provisions that have so far been untouchable, such as the veto, then the international community will surely welcome such revisions with joy.

64. I should like to conclude by saying, as emphatically as possible, that Panama is not opposed to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we have raised what seem to us to be pertinent questions, it is precisely because we would not wish the efforts made to achieve it to be in vain. We do want this treaty, as other speakers have already said, and that is why we wish it to fulfil the aspirations of mankind which views with fear the increase of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.

65. As a State party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco [see A/C.1/946]—Panama has undertaken, under article 1, paragraph 1, of that Treaty to prohibit and prevent in its territory:

"(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way, and

"(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way."

66. On behalf of my Government I wish to make it clear that this commitment of ours applies to the entire length and breadth of our Republic, including the so-called Panama Canal Zone.

67. Finally, we wish to state that we view with particular interest the intelligent and very timely suggestions for improving the treaty made by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Alfonso García Robles.

68. Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom): I am grateful for the opportunity to speak again in the First Committee. Having spoken at the beginning of this debate which deals with such vital matters for the future of mankind, I am glad to participate again as it nears conclusion and, I trust, a positive outcome.

69. I need hardly say that, during my absence, I have been following your deliberations closely. I have been pleased to note the substantial support that has been forthcoming for the draft non-proliferation treaty, but there have also been criticisms and perhaps some misunderstandings. Having given in my previous speech on 1 May [1558th meeting] the reasons why my Government is anxious that a treaty should be concluded at the earliest possible date, I should now like to examine some of the points made in the debate.

70. It seems to me that the discussion has turned around three principal headings: first, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, second, further measures of disarmament and, third, the security assurances offered by the three nuclear Powers in support of the treaty.

71. Some States have expressed disappointment with the provisions of the Treaty concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and have, in some cases, suggested that the outcome of the Treaty will have the effect of placing the non-nuclear-weapon signatories in some sort of servitude to the nuclear-weapon States. This is a complete misconception of the purposes and effect of articles IV and V and is in fact the reverse of the truth. The United Kingdom has

long recognized the desire of developing countries to share in the benefits that nuclear energy can bring and fully supports this desire. We supported the insertion of article IV because we are convinced that it can bring positive benefit to non-nuclear-weapon countries, particularly those in the developing world. Article IV lays a positive obligation on States to contribute either alone or in co-operation with other States and international organizations to further the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States party to the treaty. The United Kingdom already does this both on a bilateral basis and by playing a full part in the International Atomic Energy Agency and we shall continue to do so. We shall fully recognize our obligations under the treaty and I am confident that other States will do the same. Indeed the best guarantee that can be offered is the fact, for which many countries here can testify, that the three nuclear Powers which have expressed their intention to sign the Treaty already have an excellent record of co-operation with non-nuclear countries in this field. The treaty will encourage and intensify this co-operation and therefore I cannot understand why it should be argued that the effect of the treaty will be to lead nuclear Powers to adopt a more restrictive attitude to less-developed States. I am further convinced that the effective working of the safeguards measures will increase the climate of confidence and further facilitate these exchanges.

72. I turn now from article IV to article V, that is, from actual and immediate benefits to the potential benefit which may accrue from the peaceful use of nuclear explosions. It is necessary to distinguish very clearly between these two quite different applications of nuclear energy. Existing nuclear technology presents the opportunity to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear energy, particularly in the generation of electricity, by the use of nuclear reactors and, for example, in medicine. These applications are quite different from the use of explosives, and there is no need whatever to have access to the technology of nuclear explosives in order to profit from the peaceful application of nuclear energy envisaged under article IV.

73. Nevertheless I quite understand the concern of many countries here to seek the benefits if, as is hoped, the use of nuclear explosions becomes a safe, practical and economic instrument for civil engineering, public works projects and similar purposes. The potential benefit is enormous for many countries. I must, however, stress that they are potential rather than actual and at this stage, indeed, unproven. They may, in the event, prove an immense disappointment. Much work has still to be done, but I agree that we should make provision in the treaty for the use of such devices and ensure that if they prove successful the benefits should be available without discrimination to all signatories of the treaty.

74. But nuclear explosive devices are not only different in time scale from the other uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; they are also different in kind. The technology involved is indistinguishable in the final stages from the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The same device which might move millions of tons of earth could also be used to kill hundreds of thousands of people.

75. It is also the case that Powers that have developed highly sophisticated nuclear weapons have not yet perfected—and may not perfect—the techniques required, despite vast expenditures of money and scientific manpower. The cost of development will be enormous. For this reason, as I have explained at Geneva, it is unlikely that we in the United Kingdom, although we have the scientific capability, will find it practicable or economic to develop this technology. Therefore I cannot understand what is meant when it is sometimes suggested that countries signing the treaty are making a sacrifice in giving up their right to develop this technology for the use of peaceful nuclear explosions.

76. Surely the proper assessment is to say that all signatories are creating for themselves a very great potential benefit by the provisions of article V, which assure them a share in the opportunities which will flow from this technology, if it proves successful, and without participation in the very great burden of the costs of development. But for the coincidence of this technology with that required for making weapons, which makes it essential for it to be prohibited under the treaty, it would be reasonable for the nuclear-weapon Powers that are developing these devices to have expected the recipients to pay a contribution towards the enormous research and development expenditure necessary to make this new technology available.

77. At this point, I should also like to touch on the question of the safeguards envisaged in article III, which, as I have said, should also contribute to the further development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These safeguards must give equal confidence that all parties are fulfilling their obligations and must be strictly relevant to the purposes of the treaty. Fears have been expressed that they may lead to industrial and commercial espionage, although I think further study and enquiry has assured most countries concerned that such fears were ill-founded and this argument exaggerated. In this context the United States and the United Kingdom would be the most vulnerable, and yet we have both undertaken, although not required to do so under the treaty or on a strict interpretation of the purposes of the inspection procedures, to open the civil sector of our nuclear industry to similar safeguards to those adopted for non-nuclear-weapon Powers, thus expressing our confidence in the system.

78. The International Atomic Energy Agency inspectorate is a highly expert and responsible body. Countries concerned will have a say in any decisions affecting them made by IAEA. The agreements must provide for safeguards that are effective but as unintrusive as possible. Therefore there should be no concern about commercial espionage or unfair advantages.

79. Equally, difficulties such as safeguards on source materials, which have been mentioned, for example, by the representatives of Australia and South Africa, should be capable of reasonable solution, as the representative of Canada explained last week. Canada has had great experience in this field, and I should like to pay tribute to the great world-wide contribution Canada has made to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as working hard for a non-proliferation treaty. In its view,

and mine, those two objectives are mutually consistent. Safeguards will be concerned only with diversion of material to nuclear-weapon purposes and will not hamper economic or technological development.

80. I should also like to say in this context—since, as the Committee will know, my Government has applied to become a member of the European Communities—that I agree very much with the representatives of the Netherlands and Belgium in their remarks about Euratom. In my view the draft treaty will make it possible for IAEA to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the Euratom Commission. Such an agreement should make full use of Euratom safeguards, thus utilizing the experience of Euratom in this field as well as avoiding duplication, and making the best use of scarce scientific manpower. At the same time IAEA must satisfy itself and the parties to the treaty that the members of Euratom are fulfilling their treaty obligations. I see no reason why the valuable contribution made by Euratom in the field of multilateral co-operation should be impeded or hindered by the operation of the non-proliferation treaty, and, as I have said, the United Kingdom Government attaches importance to this as a prospective member of the European Communities.

81. Under the second heading, doubts about this treaty's relevance to future measures of disarmament, I can add little to what I said in my previous speech in which I concentrated upon this aspect of the treaty because, clearly, it is of the greatest importance. While the achievement of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is of value in itself, I will not disguise from the Committee that my enthusiasm for it would be much less if I did not believe that it was an essential first step in achieving the ending of the nuclear arms race and significant progress on the road to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

82. I cannot prove that the considerable undertakings in the preamble and in article VI will be carried out, and no words or language about future intentions can give such a guarantee; this can come only from actual agreements and treaties. The difficulties expressed here about this treaty, which has been approved so often in principle, by almost unanimous votes in this Assembly, illustrate the kind of problems encountered in translating principles into practical and effective action. It is easy to lay down a course of conduct for other people, but it is much more exacting and time-consuming to obtain agreement on matters which, as all real disarmament measures must, affect the interests and aspirations of all the nations of the world.

83. I can, however, and do, repeat the pledge on behalf of my Government that we will do all in our power to carry out these commitments and to achieve further progress at the earliest possible date. I believe that this is the sincere desire also of the United States and the Soviet Union, and indeed of all the Member States that will sign the treaty. We must also not underestimate the immense improvement in the international climate which, I am convinced, will follow the successful and rapid implementation of a non-proliferation treaty.

84. Against this I am sure that if we do not so proceed, if the treaty fails or is delayed, then no further progress will

be made at all. This is certain. Thus, weighing carefully the pros and cons of this argument, I am surprised that all those who, like myself, are concerned to achieve further measures of disarmament and who are critical of the great delays and lost opportunities in the last years, are not clamouring to get this treaty into force as soon as possible so that we can get on with the detailed work towards further measures without more delay.

85. In this connexion, I attach great importance to the forthcoming Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and very much hope that that Conference will pay considerable attention to the further measures of disarmament and that its deliberations will serve to increase the momentum and point the way to further achievement, as well as discussing other matters consequential to the conclusion of this non-proliferation treaty. Contrary to some views that have been expressed, and if as a non-participant I may be allowed to venture an opinion, it seems to me that the opportunities for positive influence and constructive progress at the Conference will be greater if the non-proliferation treaty has already been opened for signature than if its implementation were postponed.

86. Finally, I must say that I am disappointed to note that the security assurances which the United States, the Soviet Union and my Government have offered in support of the treaty have been subjected to considerable criticism on several counts, and I feel perhaps there is some misunderstanding of what is intended and why they have been offered.

87. It is, of course, natural that this aspect should occupy a considerable part of our discussion, and I welcome this. It is, indeed, because of the concern of non-aligned, non-nuclear-weapon States that after long deliberation, we, together with the co-Chairmen, have made this substantial offer to meet what we recognize as genuine anxieties by States about their security in the light of their having renounced nuclear weapons themselves and then perhaps becoming the victims of nuclear aggression or the threat of such aggression. It is to meet this situation that the assurances are offered and clearly they must be of a positive character—that is, what the nuclear-weapon Powers are willing to do to deter such threats and to render assistance and support—not, as some seem to have suggested, negative in purpose, that is, declarations of what we will not do.

88. It has also been suggested that these are inadequate in that they are not sufficiently immediate and automatic as they would be if they were the same as a defence agreement. That is true. But one cannot provide the same situation outside a defence agreement as one can within it and most of the countries here, I understand, would in any case not wish to assume the obligations as well as the rights of a defence agreement. Such agreements are designed to meet the security requirements of a relatively small number of countries in a particular region in a limited range of circumstances. Here we are concerned to meet the needs of a wide diversity of security interests in countries, many of them non-aligned, situated in all parts of the world. Security assurances must also be indefinite in their duration. They must, therefore, be cast in very general terms. Nevertheless, as the leader of the Soviet Union delegation made clear in his important speech on 20 May [1571st

meeting], these assurances will add substantially to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and constitute a new element, in conjunction with the treaty itself, to world peace and security.

89. It is quite wrong to suggest that they add nothing to what is already contained in the United Nations Charter. Indeed, the most eloquent testimony of their value comes from those who have argued, because of their own difficulty in supporting the treaty, that they should not be confined to States which adhere to the treaty, but should be available to all countries, whether they join or not.

90. There has also been criticism of these assurances because they are offered within the framework of the United Nations, in fact in the Security Council. In our view, the Security Council is the proper forum in which they should be given. Nuclear aggression, or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear State, is clearly not limited to any one region; it would be a threat to the whole international community. It would be strange, therefore, for three Members of the United Nations not to offer their security assurances within the framework of the United Nations or, for that matter, within the Security Council, to which all Members of the United Nations have entrusted primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

91. There has been much criticism of the procedural position in the Security Council, including the existence of the veto and the effect this would have on the credibility of our assurances. On this I should like to make two points.

92. As the United States and Soviet Union representatives have already said, the resolution and declarations reaffirm the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence recognized under Article 51 of the Charter until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

93. Secondly, these assurances depend on more than a Security Council resolution supported by three identical declarations: once the treaty has come into force their credibility will become part of the vital self-interest of the three nuclear Powers that offer them.

94. I have naturally dwelt upon the aspects of the treaty about which there has been some controversy in the Committee, and, equally naturally, in all the speeches we tend to have discussion of these points.

95. In conclusion, therefore, I should like to stress that we should none of us allow concentration on matters of detail to divert us from the main purpose of the draft treaty before us—to put into force the frequently declared desire of the General Assembly to put to an end the dangers to world peace represented by the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a step towards the safer and saner world we are all concerned to create. We must not commit the error of failing to see the wood for the trees.

96. The whole world has much to gain by the early implementation of the treaty and much to lose if we fail to achieve this or seek the easy path of procrastination and postpone a decision.

97. The representative of Canada last week reminded us of the dog in Aesop's fable who lost his real piece of meat and ended up with nothing through pursuing the illusory aim of getting something more. There is great point in this story for our deliberations. If we refuse what is within our grasp, we could well end up with nothing.

98. I recall the experience of a friend of mine who was waiting to be evacuated from Dunkirk in 1940. He was actually on a ship which would have taken him to England. But it was very overcrowded and conditions were not to his liking. He preferred to wait for the next ship, which he was sure would come along. There was, however, no other ship and he spent the next five years a very unhappy man in difficult circumstances in a German prisoner-of-war camp, reflecting on the unwisdom of his decision—five wasted years before he got back to England, and then he was prepared to travel in any conditions.

99. We cannot afford to lose any time. We have been on this road too long already. We must seize the opportunity for progress towards disarmament now whilst it is presented to us.

100. Mr. EL KONY (United Arab Republic): It is to be recalled that the United Arab Republic has always advocated and endorsed all efforts aiming at the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. This line of policy stems from our belief that the fate of humanity is in jeopardy so long as national arsenals continue to be augmented and to be replete with ever-increasingly sophisticated weapons of devastating destruction. The future of mankind cannot be effectively safeguarded unless we go through the long process of nuclear disarmament. This should be the common objective which all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, should earnestly strive to achieve. Though this highly important goal has not yet been reached, it should be acknowledged that several steps on the right path have successfully been taken during the last decade. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty was followed by the Moscow partial test-ban treaty in 1963 and, in 1966, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 2222 (XXI), commending the treaty on the peaceful uses of outer-space which, in our view, still requires further perfecting. We fully realize that our task is an arduous one; we therefore welcome all steps that serve to move us nearer to our ultimate goal.

101. The question of nuclear non-proliferation is of the utmost importance and urgency. In this regard, I should like to pay special tribute to the Deputy Prime Minister of Ireland, Mr. Aiken, for his commendable initiative in putting the matter before the General Assembly.⁵

102. The deep concern of the non-nuclear States was amply demonstrated by the Declaration adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, held in Cairo in July 1964, in which they declared their willingness to undertake, by virtue of an international treaty to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or acquire control of atomic weapons. In addition, the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Annexes, agenda items 64, 70 and 72, document A/C.1/L.206.*

Aligned Countries, held in Cairo, in October 1964, requested the great Powers to forgo all policies conducive to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The non-aligned countries, moreover, declared their readiness not to produce, acquire or test any nuclear weapons. It is a matter of record that my delegation had the privilege of participating in those international gatherings and fully endorses this line of policy. It is also a matter of record that the United Arab Republic has consistently supported all the General Assembly's previous resolutions which aimed at preventing proliferation and outlawing nuclear weaponry in general.

103. It is with this background that we approach the question of non-proliferation.

104. Regarding the draft treaty under discussion, the delegation of the United Arab Republic had ample opportunity to address itself to its substance at the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We fully realize the inherent difficulties that circumscribe the conclusion of a treaty which, in the words of our representative at the 367th meeting of that Committee at Geneva, "must unite effectiveness with flexibility, the present with the future, and reconcile the requirements of security with those of progress in the peaceful use of the atom".

105. In assessing our position with respect to the draft treaty, we were guided by the basic principles contained in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), which my delegation had the honour of introducing to this Committee on 8 November 1965. We consider, firstly, that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself. We envisage the treaty as a further stride along the still long path of general and complete disarmament. Secondly, the draft should contain no loop-holes which might permit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thirdly, the draft should embody an acceptable balance of reciprocal responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear States. Fourthly, there must be acceptable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty. We believe that the yardstick that should be used in evaluating the efficacy and adequacy of such a treaty is whether, by its adoption, the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be prevented. This was the fundamental premise on which resolution 2028 (XX) was based.

106. We believe that a thorough scrutiny of the relevant provisions of the draft treaty would reveal that horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons would in fact be effectively halted. This, in our opinion, is the real test by which the treaty ought to be assessed. The draft treaty is to be considered only as an immediate and urgently needed preliminary step on the long road to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. It should be recalled that even the most ardent advocates of the treaty do not claim that it goes beyond that point. And this basic fact must be present in our minds when we formulate our attitude towards the text before us. By stopping the horizontal spread of nuclear arms, the treaty must be regarded as a step forward which merits our endorsement.

107. It has been argued by several delegations that the draft treaty before us falls short of meeting the requirements of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XXII), which

is universally considered as embodying the basic, requisite principles which any treaty aiming at preventing nuclear proliferation should contain. Certainly, it is an accepted premise that the treaty, besides preventing the proliferation of nuclear arms, should also contain a balance of reciprocal obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear and the non-nuclear States. The mutual balance of obligations, which is a natural prerequisite, ought to be tackled in an acceptable way. The success of any treaty depends largely on acceptance of the obligations emanating from its provisions and on fulfilment of those obligations in good faith. We have heard with keen interest and unlimited sympathy the objective arguments that have been raised here and during the deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The United Arab Republic acknowledges that certain provisions in the draft treaty require perfecting. Our delegation at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament meetings proposed several amendments which, in our opinion, would have improved the text. Some of the proposals made at Geneva have been incorporated in the text; however, some have not. Yet we are inclined to believe that the treaty is but an initial step which should be followed by other steps. We are of the opinion that it is important to focus the current debate on the treaty's central issue and *raison d'être*, which is its efficacy in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It should be kept in mind that its provisions have been perceived and meticulously drafted primarily so as to ensure against horizontal proliferation.

108. The events of the last two decades, marked as they have been by unprecedented technological advances, have proved that the passage of time will accentuate rather than attenuate the difficulties which should be surmounted before we can achieve a world free from the persistent nuclear threat. The dilemma of this stage of our deliberations lies precisely in our conception of what might be called our priority list. To put it more bluntly, should all efforts to halt the dissemination of nuclear weapons be suspended pending the conclusion of a more comprehensive disarmament arrangement, or should we endorse what is within our reach now and continue, preferably at an accelerated pace, towards our ideal solutions? The logic of the situation, it is suggested, seems to indicate, if not to dictate, that we should give primary consideration to what is feasible and practicable right now. The collateral measures, desirable as they are, could be more vigorously pursued after adoption of this preliminary measure. For, despite imperfection in certain provisions, it is nevertheless essential that it be adopted. This is based on the assumption, whose validity has not been contested, that the risk of nuclear catastrophe is bound to increase automatically with every new addition to the nuclear club. Even with the treaty's limitations, it is rightly assumed that the impact of concluding the treaty would have a favourable and far-reaching implication on all future disarmament negotiations.

109. We fully agree with those who believe that the cause of world peace would have been immensely served had the draft treaty contained concrete provisions prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and enjoining nuclear States not to manufacture or test these deadly arms. However, it seems appropriate to recall that we do not live in an ideal world and our present shortcomings can always be rectified. It is

essential in this regard to take note of what the co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had to say on this very subject.

110. My delegation noted with appreciation that, on the first day of our deliberations here Mr. Kuznetsov, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, stated that:

"The Soviet Union is ready to enter into negotiations concerning other measures, including cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, reduction of stockpiles of such weapons, and subsequent complete prohibition and elimination of such weapons under appropriate international control; limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons; prohibition of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond national borders; limitation of areas open to nuclear submarines; ban of underground nuclear testing; prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons; elimination of military bases in foreign territory; and institution in an appropriate form of a régime for the sea bed and ocean floor ensuring their uses for peaceful purposes only." [1556th meeting, para. 115.]

111. It was with equal satisfaction that we heard Ambassador Goldberg, the representative of the United States, assuring us that:

"Following the conclusion of this treaty, my Government will, in the spirit of article VI and also of the relevant declarations in the preamble, pursue further disarmament negotiations with redoubled zeal and hope and with promptness; and we anticipate that the same attitude will be shown by others." [Ibid., para. 73.]

My delegation is happy to note that the preamble to the draft treaty recalls:

"... the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end."

112. The ultimate goal which should be strived for is also stated in the preamble to the draft treaty to be the desire:

"... to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

113. In the light of the above-mentioned statements by the co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, my delegation would interpret the provisions stipulated in article VI as constituting a solemn legal undertaking obligating the two States to embark on urgent negotiations:

"... on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

114. I should like now to discuss briefly the very important question of security assurances. It is apparent that, if all the nuclear Powers did not sign the treaty, the security assurances which are being offered to compensate and protect the non-nuclear signatories would be brought into sharper focus. It could even be argued that the non-nuclear Powers that signed the treaty without a firm guarantee from the major nuclear Powers would be undermining and even jeopardizing their very existence as sovereign States.

115. My delegation would therefore whole-heartedly welcome a security pledge against the threat or use of nuclear weapons which would be a solid commitment by the nuclear guarantors to take clear and precise military action to deter or repel all future nuclear aggression. It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States would agree to:

"... provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty ... that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;"⁶

This is in conformity with Article 26 of the Charter, which stipulates that:

"... The Security Council shall be responsible for formulating ... plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments."

116. However, one cannot help but wonder whether the adoption of such a resolution by the Security Council would suffice to dispel the wide scepticism about its credibility which has detrimental repercussions on the future success of the treaty as a whole. This is not to suggest that the Security Council is not the right forum to enunciate such assurances. On the contrary, perhaps it is the course dictated by the Charter. However, it springs self-evident that the crux of the security assurances is not who issues the assurance but what are its contents. It is a matter of confidence which should come from within. The Council's unfortunate reluctance and failure to take action to fulfil its Charter obligations and repel aggression is amply present in our minds. Experience has shown that it is no easy matter to repress a conventional armed attack, let alone a threat or use of nuclear weapons to wage war in ill-defined circumstances whose precise dimensions cannot possibly be assessed in advance.

117. I would venture to suggest that the whole predicament might radically be rectified if the security assurances were to be in the form of a pledge by the nuclear Powers to consider the threat or use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear party to the treaty as sufficient to prevent and even retaliate against nuclear aggression as a measure of collective self-defence. Ambassador Goldberg stated on 15 May that:

"The United States will reaffirm, in particular, the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack ... occurs against a Member of the United

⁶ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex II.

Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” [1568th meeting, para. 37.]

118. Could that statement be construed as meeting the legitimate expectations of the non-nuclear parties? Would the three co-sponsors categorically prevent nuclear aggression? I am sure that any anxiety would be allayed if solid assurances were given that nuclear attack would be deterred and that the sponsoring Powers would provide immediate assistance as a measure of collective security.

119. It is of utmost importance that the treaty include the potential nuclear States—States which are on the threshold of becoming nuclear—in order to be meaningful. Most of these States have manifold valid reasons to be susceptible when it concerns their national security. Some have even voiced apprehensions regarding the inadequacy of the proposed draft resolution. The representations they rightly make reveal an acute dilemma that should be seriously taken into consideration. Non-nuclear States would be induced to join if the security assurances were to be formulated in a more precise and unambiguous way which would commit the co-sponsors to take the immediate and prompt measures which are commensurate with the requirements of the situation.

120. I should like to conclude by expressing our sincere hope that our deliberations here will be successfully concluded by endorsement of the treaty and that humanity will soon benefit from the results of halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

121. Mr. GUEVARA ARZE (Bolivia) (*translated from Spanish*): Bolivia has subscribed to the Treaties of Moscow and Tlatelolco and has supported all the efforts of the United Nations to avoid the dangers of an atomic holocaust or those deriving from radio-active contamination. From the same point of view, my delegation considers it truly auspicious for mankind that the two nuclear super-Powers have reached an agreement to control that threat.

122. I do not propose to add further the comments expressed by other representatives concerning the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the draft resolution of the Security Council proposed by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the declaration which the co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have promised to make, and the draft resolution being discussed in this Committee.

123. Consequently, the specific and definite purpose of my statement is to emphasize on this occasion the concern of the Bolivian people—which lives in the very heart of South America—over the risks of radio-active fall-out which might result from atomic explosions for peaceful purposes if they should be carried out near the Bolivian frontiers, risks which—in certain circumstances which I shall discuss later—do not appear to be purely hypothetical.

124. For some time there has been an awareness in Bolivia of the magnitude and seriousness of this problem; but, paradoxical as it may seem, this problem has been intensified precisely because of the treaties which we have

signed to avoid it—a circumstance which becomes clearer when the draft treaty on non-proliferation is considered in the light of other, previously signed documents.

125. A comparative examination of the Moscow and Tlatelolco Treaties and the draft treaty on non-proliferation, plus the proposed safeguards system, shows us that nothing in these texts ensures us against the risk of radio-active fall-out over our territory originating in atomic explosions for peaceful purposes which might be carried out, without any legal violation whatever, by some countries of Latin America which may find it more in line with their interests not to sign the draft treaty submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the United States and Soviet co-Chairmen, and transmitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This observation, which has become increasingly obvious to my Government, accounts for my presence and my statement here.

126. Let me present the problem directly, as we see it.

127. I should like to point out the following features of the Moscow partial nuclear test ban Treaty: firstly, the Treaty has not been signed by two of the five Powers possessing control over the technology in this field. Secondly, it hardly need be added that there are other nations which, without belonging to the “atomic club” and therefore without having signed the Moscow Treaty, are known to have the technological and industrial capacity to manufacture nuclear devices at any time and, consequently, to collaborate in this kind of undertaking with one or more countries interested in such collaboration. Thirdly, while it is true that the Moscow Treaty has been signed by the Latin American countries, it is no less true that article IV of the Treaty permits its repudiation when exceptional circumstances might endanger the supreme interests of the nations wishing to withdraw. That possibility was pointed out, by analogy, by a Latin American representative when he referred to article X of the draft treaty on non-proliferation, of which the first sentence reads as follows:

“Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”

128. Thus, this provision is literally identical with the first sentence of article IV of the Moscow Treaty. It is obvious that, if the supreme interest of a country could lead it to repudiate article X of the draft treaty on non-proliferation, it would necessarily lead it to take the same attitude, for the same reason, with respect to article IV of the Moscow Treaty. Given the same text and the same reason, it would be perfectly logical to adopt the same attitude in both cases.

129. Moreover, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, particularly article 18, has been interpreted during this debate in contradictory ways by Latin American representatives in their respective statements, thereby confirming a divergence in views which we know exists from the history of the negotiation of this Treaty.

130. In fact, it has been said that in article 18 the Treaty of Tlatelolco expressly allows the signatories, using their

own resources or in association with other parties, to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions; and it adds that we should make the draft treaty on non-proliferation compatible with the rights and obligations provided for in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and ensure the unlimited use of nuclear energy for the economic development of the peace-loving countries which will not hesitate to renounce war, but which will not be able to renounce the benefits of such techniques and technology in all their forms.

131. Following the same line of reasoning, another Latin American representative said that the draft treaty on non-proliferation limits the powers of the non-nuclear-weapon States all along the line in research and investigation relating to explosions for peaceful purposes and that, in this respect, the wording of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, particularly in article 18, seems appropriate for taking into account the interests of the developing countries.

132. As we can see, the essence of this interpretation of article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco is that in itself, and with no limitations, it allows the Latin American countries to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions using their own resources or with the aid of other parties.

133. Now, who could those parties be? Obviously, any one of the atomic Powers which has not signed the Moscow Treaty, or a nation which, without being a member of the "atomic club", nevertheless would have the technological and industrial capacity to manufacture nuclear devices at any time.

134. This hypothesis does not seem absurd. If, on one hand, the same nuclear Powers which did not subscribe to the Moscow Treaty should not sign the treaty on non-proliferation either, which at least appears likely, they would automatically be entitled to grant such technological assistance, without which it seems doubtful that Latin America could advance in this field. And if it were not those Powers, it could be any other country technologically and industrially qualified to do these things and economically interested in doing them.

135. If, on the other hand, the Latin American countries which consider the draft treaty on non-proliferation incompatible with the Treaty of Tlatelolco—particularly as regards to the carrying out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes—should refuse to subscribe to this draft treaty, it is obvious that the conditions will have been created for one or more countries on the continent to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions, with their own means or with aid from other parties; and should this occur in Latin America, it would have to be done far from the large population centres and, therefore, close to Bolivia's frontiers.

136. It is true, as I said earlier, that a different interpretation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been given in this Committee. It has been said that, with regard to peaceful nuclear explosions there is not, nor can there be, any conflict between article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and article II of the draft treaty on non-proliferation, on condition that the provisions of both are interpreted correctly; paragraph 1 of article 18, as its wording unmistakably indicates, is subject to articles 1 and 5 of the same

Treaty, which means that, for one of the States Parties to the Treaty to be able to carry out a peaceful nuclear explosion, that State will have first to prove that it will not require a nuclear weapon for such an explosion; in other words, according to the objective definition given in article 5 of that Treaty, a device which is capable of releasing uncontrolled nuclear energy and which may possess a group of characteristics appropriate for use for war-like purposes; and, since there is a consensus among the experts in this field that this is impossible at present, it necessarily follows that the States Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco will not be able to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices, even if intended for peaceful purposes, unless and until technological progress makes it possible to develop devices for such explosions that cannot be used as nuclear weapons.

137. Not even an exegesis of the most scrupulous Benedictine prolixity would appear to be sufficient to solve, once and for all and to everybody's satisfaction, the controversial point concerning the true scope of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and, therefore, concerning its compatibility or incompatibility with the draft treaty on non-proliferation. Anyone carefully reading the much-mentioned article 18—which is the source of the divergent views I have noted—will find that, although it does expressly authorize peaceful nuclear explosions, it does so on the understanding that such explosions are technically impossible at present. In other words, it permits doing something which it recognizes in advance cannot be done. This, in fact, simply does not make sense.

138. I do not claim to judge who is right or which of these contradictory interpretations is the correct one. What does seem to me beyond doubt is that, in spite of all the existing rules for the interpretation of treaties, such interpretation is usually based on the criterion or serves the interests of the country making it, especially when the question involved is controversial.

139. In this specific case, it would not be strange, but would rather seem normal, if one or more of the Latin American countries which judge themselves to be authorized by the Treaty of Tlatelolco to carry out peaceful atomic explosions and even protected by it, using their own resources or with the aid of others, were not to sign the treaty on non-proliferation because they found it incompatible with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and were therefore to decide to carry out their own programme of peaceful nuclear explosions.

140. This is all the more foreseeable because, as has been said repeatedly in this Committee, it is felt that there is no balance between the obligations imposed on the non-nuclear-weapon countries by the joint United States-Soviet Union draft—which would result in permanently perpetuating the backwardness of some and ensuring the technological monopoly of the others—and the obligations which should be assumed as a corollary by the countries which have achieved control of nuclear technology. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that some of the Latin American countries may judge that their supreme interests are being unjustly affected and may therefore decide to follow their own course of action in this matter. It hardly need be added that, if even one Latin American country engages in

such an enterprise, one or several others will want to follow in its path.

141. The logical conclusion for Bolivia, which has borders with five Latin American nations, is that, in whatever part of the continent such peaceful explosions might be carried out, we would suffer the consequences of radio-active fall-out.

142. I beg the representatives to note that I have consistently referred to atomic explosions for peaceful purposes, avoiding any reference to military activity. I have done so because we do not believe we could be subject to the risk of atomic bombings, or even to the threat of such a risk. But, as we all know, radio-active contamination produced by a peaceful nuclear explosion is no different from that produced by explosions for military purposes.

143. In connexion with what I have just said, I should like to add that the safeguards system offered by the great Powers to prevent the use of atomic bombs, or the threat of their use, would be useless in any part of Bolivia if the conditions I have mentioned were to arise, because that safeguards system expressly refers to, and is by its very nature designed to prevent, military situations and does not seem applicable to those of a non-military nature such as the peaceful explosions which are the subject of our concern.

144. In outlining these complex problems, I am not losing sight of the fact that the legal system created by the various treaties regulating the testing and use of nuclear energy is not as simple or straightforward as I have described so far. To be sure, there is the International Atomic Energy Agency, with all the functions conferred upon it by its Statute and the relevant safeguards system. The Treaty of Tlatelolco itself, in articles 12 and 16, sets up a system of control and special inspections, but its implementation presupposes at least a previous suspicion of violation of the

Treaty, something which can only occur in military form. Paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (e) of article 18 imposes the obligation of notifying the body established by that Treaty and also IAEA of the date of the explosion, and of providing the most complete information on the resulting possible radio-active fall-out and the measures that will be taken to avoid risks to the population, flora and territories of any other party or parties. Lastly, I have already mentioned the Moscow Treaty, to which the Latin American countries are Parties, and which prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water.

145. But all these regulations, which at first glance appear more than enough to overcome our concern, depend in practice on the way they are interpreted and co-ordinated with respect to the concrete and specific point as to whether or not peaceful nuclear explosions, carried out with our own resources or with the aid of others, are authorized on our continent, even when their consequences may be identical with those of explosions for military purposes. If there is a divergency of views on this basic concept—and we have seen that there is such a divergency—it is logical to assume that each country concerned will in time find the necessary justifications to proceed according to what it judges to be most in keeping with its supreme interests.

146. My delegation, on the instructions of its Government, will vote in favour of the adoption of a draft resolution recommending the signing and ratification of the treaty on non-proliferation. At the same time, however, it wishes to announce that, if a situation of risk, such as that which I have taken the liberty of describing, should arise, we would resort to the United Nations and, if necessary, to the Security Council itself, to protect ourselves from such a calamity.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.