United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIRTY-NINTH SESSION

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FIRST COMMITTEE 46th meeting held on Wednesday, 21 November 1984 at 3 p.m. New York

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# VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-SIXTH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil)

## CONTEN TS

CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION UPON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS (continued)

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## The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

#### AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 65 AND 142 (continued)

CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION UPON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS

Mr. SIMPSON (Ghana): I wish briefly to explain my vote in relation to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.6.

My delegation voted in favour of that draft resolution, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. It is the belief of my Government that all regions should be encouraged to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. In our view, that would make a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, especially to regions that do not have them or want them. It is for that reason that in the region I come from - Africa - we are deeply disappointed and distressed to observe that South Africa continues to receive assistance from some quarters in its frenzied attempt to expand its nuclear capability. It is certainly no consolation to be told that nuclear collaboration with South Africa is for peaceful purposes only, given the aggressive nature of the racist régime. More particularly, we believe that it is significant that South Africa continues to refuse to submit its nuclear activities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. <u>Mr. DEPASSE</u> (Belgium) (interpretation from French): It is with regret that the delegation of Belgium was unable to vote in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.51 and L.44 and it would like at this time to explain its abstention on these two draft resolutions.

As to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.51, Belgium was not able to accept the explicit exclusion in operative paragraph 4 of all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa. The Belgian delegation considers that the exclusion should have been limited to the military nuclear field, which is very specific and can perfectly well be isolated from the civilian field.

Concerning draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.44, the Belgian delegation hesitated for a long time between abstaining and voting in favour of that draft resolution, but finally it decided to abstain for two reasons: first, because the language in operative paragraph 4 seemed ambiguous to us. We do not really see how this paragraph should be interpreted. Is it intended to prohibit all nuclear collaboration, or is it only intended to prohibit collaboration likely to lead South Africa to a military nuclear capability? If it refers to condemning only collaboration in the military field, then my country absolutely agrees. Secondly, also in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.44 we find that operative paragraph 3 goes beyond what we think has been proved. We are not convinced that South Africa has a military nuclear capability, and we think that our view that that is not the case is well grounded.

In any event, the two abstentions of the delegation of Belgium should not be construed as half-hearted adherence to the principle of the denuclearization of Africa. Belgium has never done anything and never will do anything to thwart that perfectly justified intention of the international community. Our abstentions were simply intended to express a somewhat meticulous, very strict legal spirit, which is part of our way of thinking and which guides our political action.

My delegation wishes to express the hope that next year we will be able to have draft resolutions on this item which respond to the concerns I have just expressed and can be adopted by consensus.

Belgium's motivations for its abstentions bear no resemblance to the slanderous fantasies expressed in the explanation of vote by the Ukrainian delegation. It has never occurred to the Belgian delegation to explain the vote of another delegation in an explanation of vote, and for its part it refuses to allow other delegations to explain its position. <u>Mr. OYARCE</u> (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolutions relating to the establishment of nuclear-weaponfree zones on the understanding that, together with the requirements provided for in paragraphs 33 and 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the fundamental condition for the establishment of these zones is the political and legal will of the nuclear Powers, in terms of undertaking verifiable commitments and fully respecting the status of those areas. In the absence of such a commitment, the concept of nuclear-weaponfree zones lacks any substance, and obviously there is no point in having many countries in many areas of the world undertaking important efforts aimed at preserving certain nuclear-weapon-free geographical areas.

<u>Mr. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA</u> (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation did not intend to explain its vote after the adoption of the draft resolutions on which we voted this morning. However, since the delegation of at least one nuclear-weapon State has referred to the existence of States which have not ratified or adhered to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, my delegation considers it necessary to explain why it abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.14.

First of all, I should like to say that Cuba recognizes the importance and supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world because, as stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, the establishment of such areas is an important disarmament measure and also because there is no doubt that it is a valuable contribution to putting an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Cuba has not been able to adhere to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, for the simple reason that Cuba cannot unilaterally renounce the right to possess the weapons it may deem relevant for the defence of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, as long as part of its territory is illegally occupied in the Guantanamo region by a military base which has been and continues to be imposed upon it against the will of its people and Government.

Furthermore, Cuba cannot renounce that right as long as the only nuclear Power in this hemisphere pursues an increasingly hostile and aggressive policy towards Cuba, which has become more and more threatening in tone in recent months.

## (Mr. Nuñez Mosquera, Cuba)

There is no need to point out that that same nuclear Power is carrying out research on new types of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems, such as the so-called enhanced-radiation nuclear weapon, with regard to which the Council of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America itself was already expressing concern in 1982.

That same nuclear Power invades and occupies States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco; that same nuclear Power mines the harbours of States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco; that same nuclear Power carries out threatening and intimidating military manoeuvres and establishes military bases aimed against States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That same nuclear Power causes and maintains anachronistic colonial situations in the area of application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, where - as has been proven - it maintains military bases on which nuclear activities are carried out.

<u>Mr. de la GORCE</u> (France) (interpretation from French): The French delegation wishes to explain its vote on some of the draft resolutions adopted this morning. It abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.14, on the ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It cannot accept that France should be criticized while some countries in the area of application of the Treaty have either not signed or not ratified that Treaty and have not even made use of the clause by which the Treaty would enter into force for them before all countries of the region become parties to the Treaty. At an appropriate time the French Government will take the appropriate decision regarding Additional Protocol I, in keeping with the ratification status of the treaty itself.

It was with great regret that the French delegation was compelled to abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.44 and to vote against draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.51. The French Government, in fact, fully agrees with the basic objectives of those draft resolutions: the denuclearization of Africa and preventing South Africa from acquiring a military nuclear capability. Moreover, the French Government shares the concerns of African States with respect to South Africa's acts of force and attempts at destabilization against other countries of the region.

The French Government supports the principle by which all States should refrain from any action which would promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Finally, we consider that South Africa should submit all its nuclear installations to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

#### (Mr. de la Gorce, France)

On all of those points, then, the French Government is in full agreement with the sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.44 and L.51. But at the same time it attaches great importance to the need to distinguish between the peaceful and the military uses of nuclear energy. We do not think that this distinction is sufficiently clear in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.44. Furthermore, we think that the way in which the views regarding the possession and development by South Africa of a nuclear capability are expressed might go beyond what we would consider to be useful.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.51, the doubts we have just expressed concerning the need to distinguish between military and civilian applications of nuclear energy apply to this text as well. We regret that this necessary distinction is lacking. Moreover, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.51 gives rise to serious institutional objections as regards the specific areas of competence of the principal organs of the United Nations. In this connection I would cite paragraph 8, in which the Security Council is requested to take enforcement measures. The Security Council is already seized of various aspects of the situation in South Africa and has taken steps in that regard. We consider that the request made of it in this draft resolution is not consistent with the provisions of the Charter concerning the allocation of responsibilities and powers among the principal organs of the United Nations.

<u>Mr. ROCHE</u> (Canada): Canada supports the thrust of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.44 on the denuclearization of Africa and therefore voted in favour of it. But in doing so Canada would like to register its reservations concerning the determination made in the fifth preambular paragraph, which falls within the purview of the Security Council.

<u>Ms. BOYD</u> (Australia): The delegation of Australia would like to explain its votes on two draft resolutions adopted in cluster 8. The first is the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.6, relating to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. Our abstention in the vote on this draft resolution should not be taken to imply any lack of support for the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones as such. Australia's strong commitment to this concept is evidenced, of course, by its promotion in 1984 of the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific region. There, we can state with some satisfaction that all regional Member States are clearly committed to the achievement of such an objective.

## (Ms. Boyd, Australia)

I turn now to the subject of our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.51 on the nuclear capability of South Africa. My delegation abstained in the vote on that draft resolution, but we should like to stress that this should in no way be interpreted as condoning <u>apartheid</u> or countenancing the thought of a South Africa armed with nuclear weapons. We are also deeply concerned that no country should assist South Africa in acquiring nuclear weapons. Our abstention is based on the fact that this draft resolution calls upon the Security Council to perform actions which, we believe, are beyond its constitutional powers, and also because it makes a condemnation of a specific State. This is a practice which we consider to be generally unacceptable in resolutions of the United Nations. Australia does support the intention of the draft resolution and strongly endorses the call on South Africa to become a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place all its nuclear installations under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

In conclusion, I should like to recall the words of the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Bob Hawke, who said at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in New Delhi in 1983 that Australia considers the <u>apartheid</u> system abhorrent and that we are determined that it must never become armed with nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: We have thus concluded consideration of and action upon draft resolutions in cluster 8.

## (The Chairman)

As we decided yesterday, we shall take up this afternoon the draft resolutions which remain in previous clusters and which are ready to be acted on today.

In accordance with our programme of work, now that we have disposed of cluster 8, we shall proceed to cluster 9. There are five draft resolutions in that cluster, and it is my understanding that four can be acted upon now. The fifth, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46, is still the subject of consultation and negotiation, and action on it will be postponed if the consultations and negotiations have not borne fruit by the time we have finished with the other draft resolutions in cluster 9.

We shall begin with the draft resolutions remaining in previous clusters and then proceed to those in cluster 9.

First, we shall take up draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.36, which is the remaining draft resolution in cluster 1. This draft resolution was introduced by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany at the Committee's 33rd meeting, on 8 November. It has the following sponsors: Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, . the Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay and Zaire.

The sponsors of this draft resolution have requested that it be adopted without a vote. If I hear no objection, we shall proceed in that way.

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.36 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on any representatives who wish to explain their position on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.36.

<u>Mr. NAZARKIN</u> (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation wishes to make the following statement in connection with draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.36, on confidence-building measures, which has just been unanimously adopted.

We fully share the view that, given the tension prevailing in the world today, confidence-building measures are of particular significance. Hence, the Soviet Union has made concrete and large-scale proposals on this subject repeatedly, including at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Europe, which is now going on. Of course, we have no objection to continuing

#### (Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

consideration of the question of confidence-building measures within the United Nations Disarmament Commission as well. That is the objective of the procedural draft resolution just adopted.

At the same time, we cannot but express our concern that recently talk about the need to strengthen confidence has been exploited to create illusions through allegations that this goal can be achieved by building up armaments - provided this is accompanied by measures having nothing to do with confidence-building, with openness, with transparency, and so on.

We are firmly convinced that confidence-building measures should not supplant disarmament measures. Rather, they should be carried out in connection with concrete steps to strengthen military détente and to limit armament.

Of course, it is impossible to produce a single model for confidence-building measures that would be suitable for and applicable to all situations. Concrete confidence-building measures should be determined in each individual case, in the light of the situation and the specific circumstances.

Unfortunately, such provisions are not contained in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.36. Nevertheless, we take into account the statement made by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Wegener, in introducing this draft resolution, that one of the fundamental principles in the field of confidence-building measures is that

"confidence-building measures must be neither a substitute for nor a pre-condition of disarmament measures and must not divert attention from them". (A/C.1/39/PV.33, p. 49-50)

<u>Mr. DUBEY</u> (India): The Indian delegation joined in the consensus on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.36 because of our support for the general idea of confidence-building measures. However, we do feel that that draft resolution ascribes to confidence-building measures an importance which is not at all commensurate with their potential, particularly in the context of the absence of real measures of disarmament.

Moreover, we also regret that in the third preambular paragraph confidencebuilding measures are placed on the same footing as disarmament measures. Our support for this draft resolution should not be taken as an endorsement of that view.

<u>Mr. MARTYNOV</u> (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic did not object to the adoption without a vote of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.36 on confidence-building measures, which was introduced by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany.

At the same time, we are firmly convinced that the efforts of States in the area of confidence building should not be confined solely to the introduction of draft resolutions, but that they should be buttressed by practical steps. That presupposes that States should not take actions leading to the undermining of talks by the stationing of first-strike weapons on the territory of other States, the improvement of nuclear weapons and the extension of the arms race to outer space.

States should take practical steps to promote the international rejection of the use of force in both nuclear and conventional terms, the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and of chemical-weapon-free zones, the reduction of military budgets and so on. Those would be genuine and effective confidence-building measures.

We note with regret that the draft resolution this year contains no reflection of an important provision to the effect that confidence-building measures cannot serve as a replacement for disarmament measures or be a pre-condition thereto. It will be recalled that at the last session of the Disarmament Commission the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic actively promoted the idea of combining large-scale political and international legal steps in the field of confidence building with measures of a military and technological nature. In future work on the problem of confidence-building measures, equal account should be taken of all approaches to resolving this problem, and we hope that the provisions of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution will be put into effect in our future work and in that of the Disarmament Commission. The CHAIRMAN: We have heard the last statement in explanation of vote, and the Committee has thus concluded its action upon draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.36.

The Committee will now turn to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.59, "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly: World Disarmament Campaign".

<u>Mr. OHIAMI</u> (Togo) (interpretation from French): On behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.59 - Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Uganda, Senegal, Singapore, Thailand and Togo - I should like to make a small verbal amendment to the text in order to meet the views of certain delegations and facilitate for everyone the adoption of the draft resolution by consensus.

The amendment is to the tenth preambular paragraph. In the third line of that paragraph, the text would end with the word "Campaign". The rest of the paragraph would be deleted. The paragraph, as amended, would read as follows:

"Convinced that the implementation of the recommendations contained in the aforementioned Message would contribute significantly to the effective promotion of the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign". The remainder of the paragraph is deleted.

With that amendment, the sponsors are convinced that the text of the draft resolution better reflects the principle of universality of the World Disarmament Campaign. Having thus satisfied those delegations that approached us, we hope that draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.59, as amended, will be adopted by consensus.

<u>Mr. NAZARKIN</u> (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): First of all, we should like to have the text of the proposed amendment to the draft resolution just made by the delegation of Togo in writing. Afterwards, we would be prepared to proceed to vote upon it.

For us, however, this is a new amendment, and we must examine it.

<u>Mr. OHIAMI</u> (Togo) (interpretation from French): The amendment to the draft resolution adds nothing new. It simply deletes the remainder of the sentence in the tenth preambular paragraph after the words "World Disarmament Campaign". No new element has been introduced.

<u>Mr. NAZARKIN</u> (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): With that clarification, the Soviet delegation is now prepared to vote on the draft resolution. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.59, as introduced and orally amended by the representative of Togo on behalf of the sponsors.

I now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote before the vote.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation will raise no objection to adopting draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.59 without a vote, as amended orally by the representative of Togo, because of the way in which we interpret operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution. Our interpretation is that neither that paragraph nor anything else in the draft resolution should be interpreted as modifying or affecting in any way paragraph 4 of resolution 38/73 D, adopted on 15 December 1983, and the similar paragraph, paragraph 6, of resolution A/C.1/39/L.35, which we adopted on Monday, the day before yesterday, on the subject of the World Disarmament Campaign.

<u>Mr. NAZARKIN</u> (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation has no objection to the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.59. However, we base our position on the explanation given by the sponsors of the draft resolution when it was introduced, to the effect that the implementation of operative paragraph 1, containing a request to the Secretary-General to provide assistance to such Member States in the regions concerned as may request it with a view to establishing regional and institutional arrangements for the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, will be carried out exclusively on the basis of existing resources and of voluntary contributions of Member States and will entail no additional financial implications.

<u>Mr. DEPASSE</u> (Belgium) (interpretation from French): The Belgian delegation will take part in the consensus on this draft resolution with the greatest pleasure. It is a particularly valuable concrete example of the principle which Belgium introduced into the Committee with regard to regional disarmament - I am referring to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.48, which was adopted by consensus.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has heard the representative of Togo request that draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.59, as orally amended, be adopted without a vote. If no delegation asks for a vote, may I take it that the Committee adopts draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.59, as orally amended, without a vote?

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.59, as orally amended, was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on those representatives who wish to explain their position on the resolution just adopted.

<u>Mr. WEGENER</u> (Federal Republic of Germany): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.59, concerning the World Disarmament Campaign. We were happy to join in the consensus.

We have already seized upon earlier opportunities during this General Assembly to stress our support for the Campaign and its rationale. More specifically, in connection with draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.59, my delegation joined in the consensus in recognition of the wish of the African authors of the draft resolution to have their own efforts for the promotion of peace and security better included in the activities of the World Disarmament Campaign.

At the same time, my delegation would like to sound a note of caution. Regional preferences, if introduced on too broad a scale in the World Disarmament Campaign, might appear to cause the Secretariat to lose overall planning competence for the Campaign, with the result that the principles of universality and balance might be placed in jeopardy. The overall concept of the World Disarmament Campaign, in the view of my delegation, therefore places certain limits on the degree to which draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.59 might be used to direct the Secretariat as to where to expend its funds for the Campaign.

This is not the only constraint under which the Secretariat has to steer the Campaign. A number of contributions to the Campaign have been made in non-transferable currencies. This is a major handicap to the Secretariat's efforts to extend its actions to many countries of the third world where programmes would require just that transferability of funds. Contributors to the World Disarmament Campaign should be aware that the most valued contributions are those which are fully transferable and which thus allow the Secretariat to establish its own priorities.

<u>Mr. GAUCI</u> (Malta): I just wish to draw the attention of the Secretariat to the word "efficiency" in the third preambular paragraph before operative paragraph 1. The way it is spelled might give the wrong impression. The CHAIRMAN: We shall now turn our attention to draft decision A/C.1/39/L.62, which was introduced by the representative of India at the 40th meeting, on 15 November. It is sponsored by Algeria, Argentina, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Mexico, Romania, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. The financial implications of this draft decision are contained in document A/C.1/39/L.77.

I call on the representative of India, who wishes to make an oral amendment.

<u>Mr. DUBEY</u> (India): My oral amendment is that the folowing text should become the second paragraph of draft decision A/C.1/39/L.62:

"The Committee further recommends that those Member States which wish to submit their views on the subject may communicate them to the Secretary-General no later than 1 April 1985."

The amendment is introduced with the approval of all the sponsors of the draft decision with a view to eliciting the widest possible support for it. This is a routine amendment, and I hope that the Committee will be able to take a decision on the draft on the basis of this oral amendment. We very much hoped that the draft decision could be adopted without a vote, but we appreciate the position of countries which have asked that it be voted upon.

I commend the draft decision for the Committee's approval.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on those delegations wishing to explain their vote before a decision in taken.

<u>Mr. LOWITZ</u> (United States of America): It is with great reluctance that my delegation is forced to vote no on draft decision A/C.1/39/L.62 to conduct a study on nuclear deterrence.

The United States member of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies supported the study. My Government considers the topic an important one and had hoped that the work produced by the expert group would make a significant contribution to our understanding of this complex issue. The United States is pleased with the procedures developed by the Advisory Board for carrying out the study. As we undersand it, the experts are to draft their own contributions and there will be no attempt to reach conclusions or recommendations. We hope that these procedures will be a precedent for other studies mandated by this Committee in the future.

Nevertheless, as members of this Committee know, the United States is firmly committed to seeing the United Nations operate with no real growth in its budget

## (Mr. Lowitz, United States)

from year to year. This is especially true at a time when all Member States are forced to cut their own spending to the bone. For this reason we are obliged to vote no on draft decision A/C.1/39/L.62, as we have on resolutions extending other studies.

My delegation urges that every effort be made so that this study can be accomplished within existing resources and, in any case, at the lowest cost possible. Our financial experts will be looking at these questions carefully.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now take action on draft decision A/C.1/39/L.62, as orally amended. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: United States of America

Draft decision A/C.1/39/L.62, as orally amended, was adopted by 128 votes to 1.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those delegations wishing to explain their vote after the voting.

<u>Mr. NOETZEL</u> (German Democratic Republic): My delegation has supported draft decision A/C.1/39/L.62, as orally amended, concerning a study on deterrence, its implications for disarmament and the arms race, negotiated arms reductions and international security and other related matters, and I should like to make a few comments in explanation of our vote.

In the past my delegation has always taken a strong interest in the subject contained in the aforementioned draft decision and in doctrines of nuclear warfare in general. For instance, in a relevant working paper submitted by the German Democratic Republic to the Disarmament Commission at its 1984 session, attention was drawn to the risks and dangers involved in doctrines of nuclear warfare based on the admissibility of nuclear war and allowing for the first use of nuclear weapons.

For those and other reasons we believe that this subject is intimately related to the issue which has the highest priority on our agenda, namely, the prevention of nuclear war.

# (Mr. Noetzel, German Democratic Republic) Div

All of these considerations give us reason to expect that undertaking this study with the broad approach outlined in its title will be another step in preparing urgent practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate the strong interest of my delegation in the subject of the study and in a group of experts which would be established after the General Assembly has taken the appropriate decision.

<u>Mr. NAZARKIN</u> (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation did not object to the adoption of the decision on a study on deterrence. We took that position because such a study would contribute to revealing why deterrence is being used as an excuse for escalating the arms race and indicate the urgent need to reduce the level of military confrontation.

At the same time, we have serious doubts in connection with the financial implications contained in document A/C.1/39/L.77. Why are eight experts needed to carry out this study? Why could there not be a smaller number? Why are three sessions of the group planned? In our view it should be perfectly possible to complete the work in two. Why is provision made for holding the sessions in different places - New York and Geneva?

We think that provision should be made to hold two sessions in the same place - whichever is the more advantageous from the standpoint of expenditure. We therefore consider it necessary to review the expenditure involved in the proposed study with a view to reducing it substantially.

<u>Mr. CROMARTIE</u> (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I should like to speak briefly in explanation of vote on the decision in document A/C.1/39/L.62, which my delegation supported. My Government believes that deterrence is an important topic which deserves full and balanced discussion. We fully support the recommendation of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies that the study should be conducted in depth and on an objective basis and that all different schools of thought and points of view should be explored and reflected in the report.

The Board also stated that the study should give full expression to these differing views and supporting arguments without attempting to arrive at joint conclusions and recommendations. We agree that this approach would better enable the reader to draw his or her own conclusions on the value of the arguments

## (Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

presented. Moreover, a balanced approach of this kind, not only in terms of arguments but also in the space allotted to them in the text is the only way in which a worthwhile final report is likely to be achieved.

The United Kingdom believes that in the past United Nations reports which addressed the subject of deterrence have tended to do so in a superficial and unsatisfactory way. It is a highly complex and important subject, particularly from the view of the implications for its impact on international security, arms limitation and disarmament. It therefore deserves a detailed and realistic analysis of the kind envisaged by the Advisory Board.

My Government noted the Advisory Board's recommendation that the study should be carried out by a group of governmental experts and that this group should be kept as small as possible consonant with the requirements of geographical and political balance. We also hope that the group of experts will take up the Board's suggestion that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research might be involved in a consultative capacity, in order to make use of that Institute's expertise.

In conclusion, my delegation welcomes the fact that Member States will have the opportunity of submitting their views to the Secretary-General on the study in advance of the experts' first meeting, in accordance with the amendment to the decision introduced orally this afternoon by the representative of India.

The CHAIRMAN: If no other delegations wish to explain their vote, the Committee has concluded its consideration of the draft decision in document A/C.1/39/L.62.

We shall now take up draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.58/Rev.1. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Yugoslavia at the 37th meeting of the Committee, on 14 November, and is sponsored by the following delegations: Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Madagascar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

Does any delegation wish to make a statement before I call upon speakers in explanation of their vote?

<u>Mr. NOETZEL</u> (German Democratic Republic): Before the Committee proceeds to the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.58/Rev.1, permit me to state very briefly, in addition to what I said yesterday on the subject, that my delegation does not insist on a vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.9.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those delegations which wish to speak in explanation of vote before the vote is taken.

<u>Mr. LOWITZ</u> (United States of America): Yesterday, in the expectation that draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.58 would be considered by the First Committee, my delegation inadvertently explained its vote on that draft resolution. That explanation is on the record and I shall not repeat it. The amendments made to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.58 and announced yesterday only reconfirm my delegation's intention to oppose this draft resolution.

## (Mr. Lowitz, United States)

I would, however, like to comment on the third preambular paragraph of this resolution. In that paragraph it is stated that:

"... annual global military expenditures are approaching the staggering figure of \$US 1,000 billion ...".

While we share the sponsors' concern that this sum is staggering, we none the less find the use of this particular figure for current military expenditures quite interesting, in so far as it correlates with the United States estimates of military spending, as noted in a publication of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of April 1984 entitled <u>World Military Expenditures and Arms</u> Transfers, 1972-1982. In that document it is stated:

"World military expenditures are projected to pass the trillion-dollar mark in 1985. Spending in 1984 is estimated to be about \$970 billion in current dollars."

This document also notes that world military expenditures in 1982 were about \$820 billion current United States dollars. Of that amount, the document also notes that \$257 billion are directly attributable to the Soviet Union, while only \$196.3 billion are attributable to the United States.

We are pleased to note that despite previous disputes between countries over the estimates on current military spending, the sponsors of this draft resolution, who collectively represent many regions of the world, are in agreement with the United States on at least one aspect covered in this draft resolution, namely, military expenditures are staggering and, as indicated in our publication, are approaching the figure of \$US 1,000 billion.

<u>Mr. CROMARTIE</u> (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I should like to repeat the request that I made yesterday for a separate vote on the fifth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.58/Rev.1.

The CHAIRMAN: If no other delegation wishes to speak at this time, we shall proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.58/Rev.1. A separate vote has been requested on the fifth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

<u>Against</u>: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Cameroon, Malawi

The fifth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.58/Rev.1 was adopted by 100 votes to 19, with 3 abstentions.

<u>The CHAIRMAN</u>: We shall now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.58/Rev.1 as a whole.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

<u>Against</u>: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Cameroon, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.58/Rev.1, as a whole, was adopted by 111 votes to 11, with 9 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on the representative of Australia for an explanation of vote.

<u>Ms. BOYD</u> (Australia): Australia abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.58/Rev.1, because in operative paragraph 5 the draft resolution calls for a nuclear-weapon test ban, a concept far more limited in scope than that favoured by Australia.

As we mentioned in relation to the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.56 on the report of the Conference on Disarmament, which included the same reference, Australia does, of course, wish to see a prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, but we believe that such a measure would be ineffectual unless all nuclear tests by all States were banned.

In connection with the separate vote on the fifth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.58/Rev.1, we voted against the inclusion of this paragraph because of the unacceptable attack on the concept of deterrence contained in it. Australia considers that there is a continuing need for a balanced system of deterrence at the lowest attainable levels of nuclear arsenals. This is the only available guarantor of global security at the present time.

Let me stress, however, that we regard that system of deterrence as second best. We seek a better and more reassuring alternative. Unfortunately, at present, none exists.

The CHAIRMAN: If no other delegation wishes to explain its vote at this time, we have concluded consideration of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.58/Rev.1. We shall now take action upon draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1. This draft resolution was introduced by the representative of France at the 40th meeting, on 15 November, and is sponsored by the following countries: Bahamas, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Colombia, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zaire.

(The Chairman)

The budgetary implications of this draft resolution are set out in document A/C.1/39/L.79.

I now invite delegations to make statements concerning this draft resolution.

<u>Mr. de la GORCE</u> (France) (interpretation from French): The French delegation wishes to recall a number of points related to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1. I shall not read out the list of sponsors; it is a very long one.

Under operative paragraph 3, a preparatory committee would be asked to formulate and submit, by consensus, to the General Assembly, at its fortieth session, recommendations as to the provisional agenda, procedure, place, date and duration of the conference envisaged in operative paragraph 1. That committee would, in accordance with paragraph 3, be composed of 54 members, a number which corresponds to the membership of the Economic and Social Council. This number has been used for the composition of preparatory bodies for various conferences; in our view it allows for satisfactory representation of the various regional groups.

In conformity with the procedure employed in similar cases, the Secretary-General would be called on to invite the geographical groups to undertake consultations to designate the delegations which would be members of the preparatory committee, and the outcome of those consultations would be announced by the President of the General Assembly, if possible, before the end of the present session. Only the place and date of the preparatory committee's session should be proposed by the Secretariat; such proposals should take account of such factors as expenditures in keeping with the place of the session, availability of required facilities, opportunities for delegations to participate and the need to avoid to the extent possible simultaneous holding of meetings on similar questions requiring the presence of the same representatives. In this connection we take note of document A/C.1/39/L.79, which contains preliminary information on the programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1.

<u>Mr. MacFHIONNBHAIRR</u> (Ireland): I wish, on behalf of the 10 member States of the European Community, to address agenda item 55 on the relationship between disarmament and development. The Ten share the concern of the international community with regard to the situation created by the contrast between the continuing increase in military expenditures and the needs of developing countries. In this regard, they recall that, in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament:

#### (Mr. MacFhionnbhairr, Ireland)

"resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries". (S-10/2, para. 35)

The Ten consider it important that our efforts in pursuing this issue should not detract from the pressing need to reach the present internationally accepted level of development-assistance targets. Progress in improving resource transfers to development should not become hostage to progress in arms control and disarmament. One way in which additional resources for development assistance might be made available could be the start of a wider programme of resource reallocations arising as a result of savings accruing from balanced and verifiable measures of arms limitation and disarmament.

According to the Ten, the in-depth debate on this question which took place this year in the Disarmament Commission permitted real progress to be made. The Commission expressed:

"the renewed commitment of all its members to the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and their belief that the world economy, and particularly that of developing countries, would benefit from appropriate international action that took into account the close relationship of disarmament and development". (A/39/42, para. 27)

The Ten believe that any evaluation of the impact of world military expenditures on the world economic systems and on development, and of the contribution which a reduction in arms and military expenditure could make to development tasks requires a reliable data base. The Ten take note with interest of the report of the recently completed examination by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research of the possible modalities for establishing institutional mechanisms which might be used in transfers of resources at present devoted to military purposes, which appears in document A/39/229.

Therefore, the Ten support the initiative of one of its member States for the convening, with adequate preparations, of a conference which would consider the various implications of the relationship between disarmament and development.

The CHAIRMAN: I call now on delegations wishing to explain their votes before the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1.

<u>Mr. ISSRAELYAN</u> (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation wishes to comment on the vote to be taken on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1. The Soviet Union fully shares the deep concern felt by the vast majority of the countries of the world at the fact that the arms race caused by the forces of imperialism continues each year to allocate to unproductive purposes increasing material and intellectual resources, while at the same time many of the inhabitants of our planet continue to suffer from hunger and disease and are deprived of elementary education and medical care.

The spiralling arms race increases instability in international economic relations; it jeopardizes the prospects of orienting those relations justly and democratically towards the creation of a new international economic order free from exploitation and diktat.

In the view of the Soviet Union, the inescapable pre-conditions for the resolution of this burning problem - the economic development of States, particularly those which have recently acquired political independence - are the prevention of nuclear war, the adoption of specific arms-reduction measures and the achievement of disarmament.

## (Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

It is precisely in that context that the Soviet Union regards the relationship between disarmament and development. We are tenaciously endeavouring to ensure the implementation of appropriate measures to halt the arms race and ensure disarmament and to reduce military expenditures so that resources may be allocated to development purposes, especially in the developing countries. To that end, we have made many concrete proposals both within the United Nations and outside it. A number of these Soviet initiatives have been strongly supported at the United Nations.

We have listened with understanding to the demands made by many States, especially developing States, that measures on arms limitation and disarmament be adopted and that these be closely linked to the solution of problems of economic development. In that spirit, we are prepared to support the proposal for the convening of an international conference to review the relationship between disarmament and development. This idea is reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1.

In this connection we believe, on the basis of our position of principle, that the conference should consider means to obtain additional resources for development through practical measures on arms limitation, measures which could be examined during the relevant negotiations.

The recommendations of the conference would have real weight and meaning only if the solutions to substantive problems were adopted by the conference by consensus. This is provided for in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution.

The Soviet delegation is prepared to support draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1.

The CHAIRMAN: I have received a request for the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1 without a vote. If I hear no objection, we shall proceed in that way.

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their position on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1, which has just been adopted.

<u>Mr. CROMARTIE</u> (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I wish briefly to explain my position on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1, which has just been adopted by consensus.

This draft resolution calls for an international conference to discuss not

#### (Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

only the relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects, but also the releasing of additional resources for development through disarmament measures. My Government believes that the main objective of the conference should be the discussion of the general relationship between disarmament and development, and that it should focus on the underlying international and regional security situations which lead to States spending scarce resources on defence. My Government believes that it would be inappropriate at this stage for an international conference to discuss the reallocation of resources.

As the United Kingdom stated in its reply to the United Nations Secretary-General's note of 31 January 1984, on the relationship between disarmament and development, there is no automatic link between the process of disarmament, the reallocation of resources that might result from such a process, and the provision of development aid. Furthermore, my Government believes that any relationship between disarmament and development must be considered in the more complex triangular relationship of security, disarmament and development. To treat one particular facet of this triangle in isolation from the other two risks promoting a sterile debate.

Finally, while the United Kingdom currently funds the fifth largest bilateral develogment and programme which is concentrated on the poorest countries, it is the conviction of my Government that the search for disarmament, improved international security and development are all equally important goals.

<u>Mr. CARASALES</u> (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Argentina joined in the consensus by which draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1 was adopted, because it certainly agrees with the substance and the form of the objectives of this draft.

Although Argentina was not one of the sponsors of the draft resolution, it was kept constantly informed of the progress of the negotiations carried out by the sponsors with a view to achieving the adoption of the draft resolution by consensus, as indeed has just been done.

My delegation of course commends the co-sponsors for their efforts to achieve a generally accepted draft. However, in the process of revising the text, some concepts or phrases were deleted and others were included, and my delegation has some doubts about the advisability of some of them. We recognize the necessity for the changes, in order to achieve consensus, but, I repeat, we question the advisability of some of the changes that were made.

## (Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

In particular, my delegation cannot but view with concern what seems to be a growing trend to lay down the rule of consensus for the adoption of decisions on all matters directly or indirectly relating to disarmament.

My delegation certainly recognizes that, in connection with important resolutions or decisions involving the interests of many countries or groups of countries, it is advisable and even necessary to take into account the views of all delegations concerned. It is obvious that it makes good sense and that it is rational for bodies dealing with these issues to take due account in their decisions of the interests of all sectors. But, at the same time, we think that imposing the rule of consensus in every case may be counter-productive and may present difficulties for the adoption of decisions. That is why, as I have said, we have serious reservations about this trend, which is reflected in the draft resolution that has just been adopted. <u>Mr. DUARTE</u> (Brazil): My delegation did not object to the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1 without a vote. We have, however, serious reservations regarding the decision-making process that is to be followed by the proposed conference on disarmament and development according to the provisions of operative paragraph 1 of that draft resolution.

Members of the international community can identify a growing trend in recent years for what we might call an institutionalization of the rule of consensus in the multilateral decision-making process. This trend has been promoted and actively supported by the two super-Powers and their allies, that is, the countries that already enjoy the privilege of veto in the Security Council.

Forty years ago the United Nations was founded on the basis of the sovereign equality of nations. The only exception to the principle of one nation, one vote was the veto power conferred on the five permanent members of the Security Council, which in time became the five nuclear-weapon Powers of today.

The current tendency towards the generalization of the requirement for compulsory consensus is tantamount to the extension to all organs of the United Nations, as well as to conferences outside its purview, of the ability to wield the power of veto. The multilateral process in the field of international security was once paralysed by selective veto. Now, the whole multilateral process, in every field of activity of the United Nations, runs the risk of being paralysed by compulsory consensus.

In the particular case of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1 the provision for compulsory consensus in operative paragraph 1 is, in our view, excessive and constitutes a prejudgement of the deliberations of the preparatory committee to be set up under operative paragraph 3. In fact, if the preparatory committee is barred from deciding by democratic vote on the procedure of the conference, the primacy of consensus would already be adequately protected.

In reaching its decision not to object to the adoption of the draft resolution without a vote my delegation took into account the importance that many developing countries attach to the proposed conference on disamament and development, but we feel that it is the duty of the international community – and particularly of developing countries like Brazil – to be aware of the current negative trend represented by the attempt to institutionalize veto by means of consensus as a necessary requirement.

#### (Mr. Duarte, Brazil)

Consensus is certainly a desirable goal which must be actively sought in every international forum, but it cannot and should not become a straitjacket imposed as a pre-condition. My delegation is confident that the dangers of overemphasizing the merits of consensus decisions will not go unnoticed, especially by the delegations of the developing countries, which are the ones that stand to lose the most.

The CHAIRMAN: There are no other delegations that have asked to speak in explanation of vote. The Committee has thus concluded its consideration of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72/Rev.1.

The Committee has now disposed of some of the draft resolutions that were pending from previous clusters, and today we have also concluded cluster 8, with one exception, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.45, which is still pending clearance of its financial implications.

The Committee should now take stock of its proceedings for the few days remaining for action on the draft resolutions still before us. Aside from a few draft resolutions remaining from previous clusters, the Committee has postponed consideration of cluster 6, a group of draft resolutions in cluster 7 and the whole of clusters 9, 10 and 11. If the Committee could dispose of cluster 9 today, we could go forward and deal, at our meeting on Monday, with the remaining draft resolutions, namely, cluster 6, the group of draft resolutions in cluster 7 and clusters 10 and 11.

I had not previously announced that we might proceed today to consideration of cluster 9. My first question, therefore - one to which I should like to have very brief replies - practically "Yes" or "No" - is whether there are delegations that would have problems in beginning our consideration of and action upon that cluster now in order to take advantage of the time available.

Are there any comments in that connection?

<u>Mr. SIRJANI</u> (Islamic Republic of Iran): Since we introduced draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46, entitled "Preventive measures against the further use of chemical weapons", there have been some amendments suggested to that draft resolution by one delegation. These, amendments -

The CHAIRMAN: I apologize for interrupting the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I should like to have a clear-cut reply as to whether the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared for me to put consideration of items included in cluster 9 on the agenda now, with the exception of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46. I am sorry to insist but I should like only to have a yes or a no. Then he will be able to make a statement later.

<u>Mr. SIRJANI</u> (Islamic Republic of Iran): We completely agree with your suggestion, Sir, that we postpone consideration of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46. But at this point I wish to introduce a revised version of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46.

The CHAIRMAN: You may speak in due course.

The Committee will now take action on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.10, L.15, L.25 and L.60. Action on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46 will be postponed. Despite this postponement, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran has asked to speak in order to introduce some amendments to that draft resolution.

<u>Mr. SIRJANI</u> (Islamic Republic of Iran): Since draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46 entitled "Preventive measures against the further use of chemical weapons" was introduced by my delegation, some amendments have been introduced by one delegation. Those amendments are considered by a large number of delegations to be not really relevant to the substance of this draft resolution and the item under which we have submitted it. The amendments consist of inserts in the text of the draft resolution and at some points they break the logical flow of the draft resolution.

So in order to give the draft resolution a shape that is not too affected by those inserts and amendments, we have had to make minor changes in the text of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46.

As many representatives are aware, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46 was produced after many hours of consulations with many different delegations with different points of view and it was supposed to be very balanced. Now with these amendments, the balance acquired has been terribly disturbed. Apart from several words that have been added to the paragraphs of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46, one preambular paragraph has also been added and it reads as follows:

## (Mr. Sirjani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

"Noting with appreciation the Secretary-General's report (S/15834) of 20 June 1983 of his mission to inspect civilian areas in Iran and Iraq which have been subject to military attack and his recent report (S/16433) on allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons."

This preambular paragraph is going to be added after the third preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46.

There are also two operative paragraphs to be added, one of which reads as follows:

"Strongly condemns acts causing damage or destruction against civilian areas, cities and villages by military means such as aerial bombardment, missile and rocket attacks or use of other high explosive or engineering equipment, as reflected in the Secretary-General's report (S/15834)". The next new operative paragraph reads:

"Urges the observance of the generally recognized principles and rules of international humanitarian law which are applicable to armed conflicts and the obligations under international conventions designed to prevent or alleviate the human sufferings of warfare."

The two paragraphs I have just read will be operative paragraphs 5 and 6. There is also a change in the previous operative paragraph 3. It is now divided into paragraphs 3 and 4 and they read:

"Takes note of the positive response received from one of the Governments in respect of the Secretary-General's appeal of 29 June 1983 concerning non-use of chemical weapons",

and :

"Urges the party which has not yet done so to respond immediately and in a positive manner to that appeal."

The CHAIRMAN: Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46, as revised, will be circulated at our next meeting.

I shall now call on those representatives that wish to make statements of position or explanations of vote on the draft resolutions contained in cluster 9.

<u>Mr. AKKERMAN</u> (Netherlands): My delegation wishes to explain its position on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.15, introduced by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic.

#### (Mr. Akkerman, Netherlands)

In 1984 the Conference on Disarmament has continued its efforts aimed at the early conclusion of a comprehensive, effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. In our view, some progress was made. The urgency of that task was sadly illustrated by recent use of chemical weapons. In the negotiation of a chemical weapons ban important problems remain to be solved. These cannot be underestimated and they need our joint attention and our united efforts. Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.24, by virtue of its consensus character, underlines our general agreement on this score. It is because we firmly believe that the goal of a chemical weapons ban is commonly shared that the Netherlands once again has to express its profound regret that the German Democratic Republic and the other sponsors, by submitting draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.15, have, as in previous years, cast doubt on the sincerity of their participation in such a consensus approach.

#### (Mr. Akkerman, Netherlands)

The draft continues to criticize the possible resumption of chemical weapons production by the United States, a country which has unilaterally observed a freeze on such production for over 15 years. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has not matched the restraint shown by the United States and, on the contrary, to the best of our knowledge has continued massively to build up its stockpile of chemical weapons of all sorts. The Soviet Union therefore now possesses not only the largest but also indisputably the most modern arsenal of these horrid weapons.

For those reasons my delegation will abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.15.

<u>Mr. NOUANETHASING</u> (Lao People's Democratic Republic): I should like to make the following statement in explanation of the vote of the Lao delegation on the draft resolutions on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

As one of the victims of a chemical war, the Lao People's Democratic Republic has always supported all efforts for the complete elimination of any chemical danger from the life of human society. From that standpoint, my delegation advocates the strict observance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction in order to prevent the use of chemical weapons.

However, with reference to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.60, my delegation will vote against it for the following reasons. First, that draft resolution is not new. From its first appearance my delegation has voted against it. Secondly, the so-called fact-finding mechanism referred to in resolution 37/98 D was not drawn up by all the parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. That is a violation of one of the basic principles of international law, namely, article 39 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which stipulates that the amendment of treaties can be permitted only by the agreement of the States parties. Thirdly, the new fact-finding mechanism mentioned in resolution 37/98 D can easily be misused for interference in the internal affairs of any sovereign country or for slanderous political aims.

## (Mr. Nouanethasing, Lao People's Democratic Republic)

My delegation considers that the drafting and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament at the earliest possible date would be the most effective guarantee of the non-use of chemical weapons. It would be lawful and right to include in the aforementioned convention a provision for appropriate verification procedures, including verification <u>in situ</u> on a voluntary basis.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1, it is similar to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.60 and for the aforementioned reasons my delegation will vote against it and in favour of A/C.1/39/L.24.

<u>Mr. DJOKIC</u> (Yugoslavia): I should like to explain my delegation's votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 and A/C.1/39/L.60 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

My country is a signatory to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. It is also a signatory of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. In other words, Yugoslavia's position on the use of such weapons is unequivocal. We condemn most energetically any use of such weapons, regardless of who may use them. We resolutely endeavour and shall continue to work for the prohibition of the use and the destruction of all chemical, bacteriological, biological or other toxin weapons.

Consequently, we call for the establishment of an effective system of verification and control of the implementation of international agreements on disarmament. However, such a system should have as its objective the building of confidence and the promotion of co-operation among States signatories of the agreements in order to secure consistent implementation of accepted obligations.

With regard to its application, such a system should be universal and not selective; otherwise, as we have repeatedly pointed out, it could be abused and not always motivated by the objectives that it seeks to achieve.

In view of the fact that draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.60 and A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 are part of an action or constitute continuation of the action that my country has not supported in previous years, my delegation will abstain in the vote on them.

<u>Mr. DUARTE</u> (Brazil): I should like briefly to explain the position of and votes that will be cast by the Brazilian delegation on the draft resolutions dealing with chemical weapons to be acted on today.

Brazil has always maintained that it is inappropriate for action by the General Assembly to be substituted for action that should be taken by the parties to an international instrument. Because of that objection of principle in the past we have consistently abstained in votes on resolutions aimed at conferring upon the United Nations a role which, in our view, it is not intended to play. My delegation will, accordingly, not give its support to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.60.

It will, however, vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1, on the understanding that the mention of efforts to strengthen relevant international prohibitions refers specifically to the ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a convention to prohibit chemical weapons. That convention is expected to reinforce the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, by such means as the establishment of fact-finding mechanisms acceptable to all the parties.
# (Mr. Duarte, Brazil)

My delegation will also abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.15, although its operative part calls for the early conclusion of the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament. The reasons for our abstention lie in the continued mention of the concept of chemical-weapon-free zones, which is not in line with Brazil's position on this matter, and in the singling out of specific types of chemical weapons as matters of special concern. We believe that the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction should encompass all types of chemical weapons, thus precluding the possibility of any kind of chemical warfare.

Finally, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.24 is in our view entirely satisfactory in this regard and we shall vote in favour of it.

<u>Mr. TURBANSKI</u> (Poland): With reference to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.60, introduced under agenda item 64 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the delegations of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics wish to make the following statement.

Those countries are strongly in favour of banishing chemical weapons from the face of the earth and are ready to agree without delay on the complete prohibition of such weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of them. As parties to the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, they are scrupulously complying with their obligations under that important international instrument. Those countries support any efforts aimed at the early conclusion of an international agreement which would once and for all exclude chemical weapons from the arsenals of States. They also consider that obligations provided for in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, now a rule of international law, should be scrupulously observed by all States.

It is advisable, in their view, that the chemical weapons convention which is being elaborated in the Conference on Disarmament should include a provision which would prohibit the use of such weapons and provide for verification procedures through the application of the monitoring mechanism of the convention, including on-site inspection on a voluntary basis. The early elaboration and conclusion of

### (Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

such a convention would be the most effective and complete guarantee of the non-use of chemical weapons. Hence they think it necessary to concentrate all efforts on expediting the drafting of such a convention and not to take action which could complicate that process.

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.60 not only fails to deal with the problem of saving mankind from the threat of chemical weapons and of consolidating and expanding the number of States parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol but, to make things worse, it constitutes an attempt to undermine and illegally revise that major international instrument. By providing for the establishment of a procedure for monitoring compliance with one of the existing international agreements in the field of limiting the arms race, the draft resolution thereby broadens the scope of the obligations assumed by the States parties. Such a decision is totally unlawful, since it would be adopted not as a result of agreement between the parties to the instrument concerned but through a resolution in the United Nations, with the participation, inter alia, of those States which have yet to adhere to Thus an attempt is being made to set a dangerous precedent of that instrument. forcing through the United Nations the revision of an existing international disarmament agreement without due regard for the views of all its participants and, moreover, contrary to the views of a considerable number of them.

Such a practice of changing agreements constitutes a flagrant violation of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaties, particularly its article 39, which provides for a change in a treaty only when so agreed by its parties.

The delegations I referred to at the beginning of my statement wish to emphasize that the unlawful review of the Geneva Protocol being attempted now may damage not only the Protocol itself but also the entire system of international agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. An attempt to invest the United Nations Secretary-General with functions for monitoring compliance with disarmament agreements, functions not conferred on him under the United Nations Charter, is also a cause for serious objection. Our delegations wish to indicate that the States they represent are deeply concerned at the desire to revise the 1925 Geneva Protocol and view it as an attempt to divert attention from the principal task in this area, which is the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and, at the same time, to create a smoke-screen to conceal the unwillingness of some States to resolve this major problem.

#### (Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Our delegations will not only vote against draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.60 themselves and call upon others to do likewise but will also see to it, in the most serious way, that attempts to revise the existing agreements banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and to poison the already aggravated atmosphere in the relevant negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament are not succesful.

<u>Mr. PHAM NGAC</u> (Viet Nam): The delegation of Viet Nam wishes to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 and L.60. The prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons is a matter to which my people is very sensitive, having suffered from the first large-scale chemical warfare in history in which 100,000 tons of toxic chemicals were sprayed over a very large area of our land, causing unforseeable harmful effects, both immediate and long-term, to our people and environment. Even now, more than 10 years after chemical weapons were used in the Viet Nam War, the indirect effects of chemical weapons on American servicemen and their children are still very much in the news. It is not necessary to say how great are the effects directly inflicted on the Vietnamese people. My people, generation after generation, continue to suffer from this kind of murderous weapon.

That is why my country fully supports the efforts to prohibit chemical and bacteriological weapons, for the same reason that my delegation joined in sponsoring draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.15 and L.24.

My delegation cannot, however, vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 and L.60, and indeed we shall vote against them, for reasons known to this Committee for many years now.

#### (Mr. Pham Ngac, Viet Nam)

Those draft resolutions were clearly of political origin aimed at white-washing the chemical warfare conducted by the United States in Viet Nam and are an attempt to cover the production of new kinds of chemical weapon, such as binary weapons.

<u>Mr. NUNEZ MOSQUERA</u> (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish). I should like to explain very briefly the vote of my delegation on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 and L.60. My delegation is firmly in favour of the full prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles thereof in the arsenals of States.

As part of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, my delegation is in favour of the strict observance of the obligations contained in those instruments.

Nevertheless, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 pursues objectives which we cannot support. First, by referring in the third preambular paragraph to efforts to develop appropriate fact-finding mechanisms, this draft resolution is attempting to support in actual fact the so-called fact-finding panels, which some of the sponsors are trying to promote in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament for the convention being negotiated there on chemical weapons, and obviously, as is proposed here, the composition of this panel discriminates against the non-aligned countries.

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 also tries to conceal, by the reference it makes to chemical warfare, the need for an explicit prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, herbicides, defoliants and so forth, which were used on a large scale in the war against the peoples of Indo-China.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.60, I will simply say that this is a further repetition of something about which we have already heard a great deal. Therefore, my delegation will vote against draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 and L.60.

<u>Mr. DEPASSE</u> (Belgium) (interpretation from French): The Belgian delegation wishes to explain its view very briefly on the four draft resolutions before us. Obviously, we will vote in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 and L.60, which we sponsored. However, the delegation of Belgium will not be able to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.15. If we do not vote against that draft resolution, it is in order to avoid giving rise

#### (Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

to any malevolent interpretation of the fact that Belgium is against the excellent principles contained in operative paragraphs 1 and 3, but Belgium is shocked by the inclusion in this draft resolution of operative paragraph 4, which makes an implicit and pernicious distinction between, on the one hand, the chemical binary weapons which the United States is contemplating, which are supposed to be bad, and the supposedly good ones which the USSR is supposed to be producing, thereby increasing its already terrifying arsenal day by day.

As regards binary weapons, the facts are well known and were perfectly well set forth by Mr. Emery, the representative of the United States, on 31 October last, and I do not intend to repeat his statement here.

I should like to take advantage of this opportunity to say that, unlike what we have heard from the representative of Poland, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.60, which is a sequel to an earlier draft resolution, is an attempt to organize the vigilance of the international community with regard to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the rule of international customary law.

The CHAIRMAN: Since no other delegation wishes to speak at this time, we shall now take action on the draft resolutions contained in cluster 9. We shall take up first draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1. This draft resolution was introduced by the representative of the United States of America at the 36th meeting, on 9 November, and is sponsored by: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Netherlands, Norway, Sierra Leone, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay.

A recorded vote has been requested.

#### A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia

Against: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam

<u>Abstaining</u>: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Cyprus, Ethiopia, India, Madagascar, Mexico, Mozambique, Romania, Yugoslavia

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 was adopted by 99 votes to 14, with 13 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.15. This draft resolution was introduced by the representative of the German Democratic Republic at the 39th meeting, on 15 November, and is sponsored by the following countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Viet Nam.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, In favour: Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

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Against: United States of America

<u>Abstaining:</u> Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Liberia, Luxembourg, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.15 was adopted by 75 votes to 1, with 51

abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: We turn now to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.24, which was introduced by the representative of Poland at the 39th meeting, held on 15 November. It is sponsored by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rwanda, Spain, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Uruguay and Viet Nam.

A request has been made that draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.24 be adopted without a vote. May I take it that the First Committee adopts the draft resolution?

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.24 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.60, which was introduced by the representative of France at the 39th meeting, held on 15 November. It is sponsored by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Uruguay and the United Kingdom. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

- Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, In favour: Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Topago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Zambia
- Against: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mongolia, Poland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam
- Abstaining: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burma, Chile, Congo, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Madagascar, Mexico, Nicaragua, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.60 was adopted by 83 votes to 17, with 30 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I call now on delegations wishing to explain their votes after the voting.

Mr. SUTOWARDOYO (Indonesia): The Indonesian delegation wishes to explain its votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 and L.60.

Indonesia is a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and has always supported all efforts aimed at strengthening the Geneva Protocol. Consistent with this position, my delegation voted in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 and L.60.

At the same time, my delegation wishes to express the view that the objective of ensuring the most effective possible constraints on chemical and bacteriological weapons could be most effectively reached by a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as is now being elaborated by the Conference on Disarmament.

The affirmative vote of my delegation on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 and L.60 should not be interpreted as being in any way contrary to my Government's position, as just mentioned.

<u>Mr. ROWE</u> (Australia): Australia abstained in the vote on the draft resolution on chemical weapons in document A/C.1/39/L.15, introduced by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic. Australia is strongly in favour of and has actively worked for the prohibition of chemical weapons. Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.15, however, does not meet our concerns with regard to the scope of a future chemical weapons convention in that it fails to refer to the inclusion in such a treaty of a ban on use.

It has been evident in the Conference on Disarmament for some time now that a large number of States now accept the need for a provision concerning use. The draft resolution, in our view, is deficient also in that it singles out one particular type of chemical weapon for non-production and non-deployment when, in fact, these weapons will be covered by the new convention. Indeed, the call in operative paragraph 4 for States to refrain from producing and deploying binary and other new types of chemical weapons is not a verifiable measure without a strict verification system of high standards, which will have to be negotiated as an integral part of a chemical weapons convention.

#### (Mr. Rowe, Australia)

We are also unable to endorse the references made in the draft resolution to chemical-weapon-free zones, precisely because these would take as much time to negotiate and verify as the convention being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. They would, therefore, detract from rather than assist in the ongoing work in the Conference.

It is the Conference on Disarmament and those negotiations which are being carried out in it that, in Australia's view, offer the best hope for reaching international agreement on a comprehensive chemical weapons convention, and Australia will continue to give its full support to that endeavour.

<u>Mr. KEISALO</u> (Finland): Finland voted in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 and L.24, and abstained in the votes on draft resolutions L.15 and L.60. We did this because of the following considerations.

The Government of Finland attaches particular importance to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. As long as a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons has not been worked out, this remains the only international instrument prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. The Geneva Protocol makes no reference to the verification of its provisions. This lack of credible assurances concerning the verification provisions must be corrected in the future ban on chemical weapons. In our view, this should be done either by parties to the Geneva Protocol in a common effort, or in the context of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the comprehensive ban.

In this context I wish to refer to the chemical weapons verification capacity that has been developed by Finland in recent years. As we have stated before, this capacity will be placed at the disposal of the international community in accordance with an agreed verification procedure. In the mean time, it is of the utmost importance that the authority of the Geneva Protocol be upheld. Therefore, we deeply deplore the fact that chemical weapons have reportedly been used. It is the considered view of the Government of Finland that all States must strictly abide by the Protocol.

I should like to add that these considerations will also determine our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46.

<u>Mr. ISSRAELYAN</u> (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation wishes to make the following statement in regard to the voting on a number of draft resolutions relating to the question of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union views the prohibition and destruction of this form of weapon of mass destruction as one of the most important tasks facing us in the field of disarmament. As a result of the persistent efforts of my own country and other socialist and non-aligned countries over recent years, within the framework of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, it has been possible to achieve a certain amount of progress in terms of agreements on a number of important questions relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons. Frankly speaking, certain prospects have opened up for the conclusion of appropriate international conventions. Our concern that the carrying out of this task should be accelerated is clear from the many initiatives put forward by us in the course of these negotiations. I have in mind primarily a draft which was presented two years ago to the Conference by the Soviet Union and which contained fundamental provisions for a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. The Soviet Union has repeatedly broadened this initiative in the light of the development of the negotiations and taking into account the positions of many other countries that have also put forward constructive proposals. That is particularly true of this very year, 1984.

The Soviet Union views the draft resolutions submitted to this Committee on this problem in the light of our deep concern to see a rapid solution of the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, in order to ensure that such weapons will never be used anywhere. We think that the goal of the prohibition of chemical weapons is best served by draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.15, of which the Soviet Union is a sponsor.

The speeding up of talks on this problem in the Conference on Disarmament is the objective also of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.24.

However, we are firmly convinced that draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.60, introduced by France, far from promoting the solution of the problem of eliminating the threat of chemical weapons, serves the efforts of those who keep on creating new obstacles to the solution of this extremely important question. It is they who are placing reliance on the further build-up of chemical weapons and the manufacture of new types of such weapons. It is they who, in the negotiations in

#### (Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

the Conference on Disarmament, adopt an obstructionist course. Hiding behind externally pleasing words about the need to ensure the non-use of chemical weapons, they in actual fact are trying to torpedo, to undermine, one of the most important international agreements in this field, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, by the unconstitutional creation of verification machinery.

Our deeply negative attitude to this scheme is reflected in the letter sent by the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations Secretary-General. That letter is to be found in document A/38/131. The Soviet delegation again confirms that position. We repeat that the attempt to solve this question by creating machinery to verify the Geneva Protocol, by means of the adoption of a resolution by the United Nations General Assembly, is completely illegal since it is in contradiction with the position of many States that are parties to the agreement in question. Furthermore, use is being made of the votes of countries that to this very day have not become parties to the Geneva Protocol.

We therefore resolutely oppose the imposition on the United Nations Secretary-General of illegal functions which, under the Charter, he cannot appropriately carry out, and for our part we shall firmly oppose this.

We are convinced that draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1, co-sponsored by the United States, is by its nature similar to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.60. Therefore, the Soviet delegation voted against draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.60 and A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1. Those two draft resolutions, like similar resolutions adopted on the initiative of the very same countries at previous sessions, can do nothing but harm to the negotiations on disarmament and to the cause of international co-operation. Like those other resolutions, they do nothing to help the cause of disarmament nor will they ever do so. They will remain in the annals of the United Nations as a monstrous demonstration of the policy of confrontation and of an anti-Soviet and anti-socialist propaganda campaign.

Businesslike negotiations aimed at achieving mutually acceptable solutions to all the questions involved in the prohibition of chemical weapons, including the question of verification machinery, on the basis of mutually acceptable decisions, are the only true path to the creation of generally agreed machinery for the verification of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

As regards the verification machinery, propagandized in draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 and A/C.1/39/L.60, no matter what attempts may be made by the

#### (Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

sponsors of these draft resolutions to picture this machinery as an achievement, it will be a stillborn child, and I hope that in the future no one will mourn its passing.

<u>Mr. OYARCE</u> (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): As it has done on previous occasions on similar draft resolutions, the delegation of Chile abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.60, because of legal concerns. The draft resolution in question would establish a precedent that, in my delegation's view, would be detrimental to a principle of public international law reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

My country is a party to the 1925 Protocol, and we believe that the best way to overcome the shortcomings of that instrument would be precisely to speed up the renegotiation, at the Conference on Disarmament, of a comprehensive convention, prohibiting the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

<u>Mr. ALI</u> (Bangladesh): My delegation wishes to explain its vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1, A/C.1/39/L.15 and A/C.1/39/L.60, on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

The Bangladesh delegation has in the past emphasized a number of times that effective measures should be taken to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

#### (Mr. Ali, Bangladesh)

My delegation has voted in favour of draft resolutions L.10/Rev.1, L.15 and L.60 on various aspects of this item. While some of the paragraphs of the draft resolutions contain positions that are one-sided and contradictory, we believe that the underlying spirit of the draft resolutions is in conformity with the common aspirations of mankind, namely, to prohibit the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and to promote negotiation to achieve that objective. That underlying spirit needs to be encouraged for the common good of humanity.

We have voted in favour of these draft resolutions in that spirit, and our positive vote does not imply endorsement of any negotiating position of the principal contenders.

In our general statement we had also mentioned that the Conference on Disarmament would be able to take a major initiative in this regard, and we are still hopeful that something will emerge soon.

<u>Mr. AL-BOAININ</u> (Qatar) (interpretation from Arabic): My delegation would like to correct its vote on draft resolution L.16. We should like to change the abstention recorded to a vote in favour.

<u>Mr. AL-KHUBAIZI</u> (Kuwait) (interpretation from Arabic): My delegation wishes to record its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1 since it was absent during the vote for technical reasons.

<u>Mr. Al-QAYSI</u> (Iraq): I wanted to make a statement, not in explanation of vote, but in connection with the introduction of my delegation's submission of document A/C.1/39/L.75, "Amendments to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.46," as revised. May I proceed to do so?

The CHAIRMAN: There are no further delegations wishing to speak in explanation of vote. The representative is therefore fully entitled to make his statement.

<u>Mr. AL-QAYSI</u> (Iraq): I know the hour is late and that each and every one of us is eager to have this meeting adjourn in order to be able to look forward to an enjoyable holiday tomorrow. I shall therefore take very little of the Committee's time.

I should like to make three basic points. First, our amendments in document A/C.1/39/L.75 still apply to the revised text of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.46. We shall get in touch with the Secretariat to work out the modalities for the necessary drafting changes to be made in the format of L.75 in

#### (Mr. Al-Qaysi, Iraq)

order that it may be distributed to delegations as L.75/Rev.l so that all delegations in the First Committee may be clear as to what they are voting upon when the time comes to do so.

Secondly, the revisions made by the delegation of Iran to its draft resolution in A/C.1/39/L.46 will certainly be studied by my delegation in order to assess the right balance that should be brought before the Committee. This particular point will definitely not escape our attention, and if need be we shall take the necessary measures within the framework of our own amendments in the interests of correct balance.

Thirdly and lastly, we feel that we owe the delegations here the obligation to explain the basic thrust of our amendments taken as a whole - which, as I did indicate, still apply to the revised version of A/C.1/39/L.46.

I should like to recall that on at least two occasions in this Committee we have heard from the delegation of Iran that the issue before the Committee is not If that of a war, but that of a weapon. In that regard I have two points to make. it is an issue of a weapon, why do we need another draft resolution at a time when we have just voted on three or four draft resolutions on chemical weapons? The issue, therefore, is not that of chemical weapons; the issue is indeed that of a If I need any evidence to corroborate that perception by the Iraqi war. delegation, we witnessed it this evening when the revisions made to draft resolution L.46 - which, we were told by way of introduction, were made because a vast majority of delegations in this Committee considered the Iraqi amendments as not relevant to the substance of the draft resolution. That particular statement does not seem to tally with the import of the revisions that were made, because the very revisions made pull the rug out from under the feet of the argument that the Iranian draft resolution, as originally conceived, was a draft resolution on a It is certainly a draft resolution on a war. weapon.

With that remark, I shall end by indicating briefly to my colleagues that we consider it of the utmost importance that they should be quite clear as to what they will be voting upon when the time to do so comes, and we earnestly hope that the drafting technicalities will be worked out soon and that ample time will be given before we vote on the proposals before us. I would not like to go into specifics at this juncture, taking into consideration the lateness of the hour. We shall have ample time to consider the question, and we are ready to co-operate with the Chairman and with all our colleagues in the Committee.

# A/C.1/39/PV.46 93-95

The CHAIRMAN: There are no further delegations wishing to speak in explanation of vote. The Committee has therefore concluded its consideration of all the draft resolutions in cluster 9 with the exception of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46, which will be taken up in due course.

#### ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: As cluster 9 of draft resolutions was on the programme of work for Friday, 23 November, and as we have concluded consideration of and action upon the draft resolutions in that cluster today, we shall be able to cancel the meeting scheduled for Friday.

#### (The Chairman)

We shall meet again on Monday at 11 a.m. because there will be consultations on Monday morning. But I want also to indicate the way we shall proceed in the two last days allocated to the agenda items on disarmament.

We shall revert, on Monday morning, first to cluster 6, with draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.18, L.33 and L.71. We shall then proceed with the group of draft resolutions in cluster 7 which have not yet been acted upon, that is, A/C.1/39/L.22, L.40, L.64, L.66 and L.69/Rev.1. We shall then proceed to cluster 10, with draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.1, L.3, L.37 and L.61. We shall then proceed with cluster 11; the draft resolution will be introduced on Monday by the Chairman of the Committee on the Indian Ocean.

It is therefore my hope that as of Monday morning delegations will be prepared to take action on all those draft resolutions in the order that has been indicated, one cluster after the other, until the end, which I hope may come even before the concluding date allocated for disarmament items, which is Tuesday afternoon.

Besides all this, we have pending draft resolutions that have not been acted upon from previous clusters: A/C.1/39/L.26, L.30, L.45, L.46 and L.67. Because some of those draft resolutions have financial implications or because they are still subject to consultations, they will be the last ones to be voted upon after we have concluded consideration of and action upon all the draft resolutions that I indicated previously.

Are there any questions concerning this arrangement?

<u>Mr. CARASALES</u> (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I do not wish to question any of the arrangements read out. My delegation fully agrees with them. What I would like to say is that we indeed share your hope, Sir, which we hope will come to pass, that this Committee will finish its work on the disarmament items on the scheduled date, that is, on Tuesday, despite our not having a meeting on Friday. I think we have made sufficient progress so as not to need a meeting on Friday, but my delegation, like many others, is very interested in keeping to the closing date for the work of this Committee on the disarmament items and I understand that that is also the intention of the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: I hope that we shall not comply exactly with the time allocated to us, which would mean concluding all disarmament items on Tuesday afternoon, but that we shall conclude them on Tuesday morning. The next meeting of the Committee will be on Monday at 11 a.m. in this room.

# The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.