

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 11 August 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. J. Morelli Pando

(Peru)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. TAFFAR
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. J. CARSALES Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R. STEELE Mr. T. FINDLAY
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. A. ONKELYNX Mr. J.M. NOIREFALISSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV Mr. V. BOZHKO
<u>Burma:</u>	U TIN KYAW HLAING U THAN TUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. R. SUTHERLAND
<u>China:</u>	Mr. LI LUYE Mr. TIAN JIN Ms. WANG ZHIYUN
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. L. SOLA VILA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. S.E. EL REEDY Mr. I. ALI HASSAN Ms. W. BASSIM
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Ms. H. HOPPE

Mr. F. SAYATZ

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. W.-E. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY

Mr. S.K. SHARMA

Indonesia:

Ms. P. RAMADHAN

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N. KAZEMI KAMYAB

Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI

Mr. M. KONISHI

Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Mr. K. TANAKA

Kenya:

Mr. W. WABUGE

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. S.-O. BOLD

<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. M. CHRAIBI
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. J. RAMAKER
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. G.O. IJEWERE Mr. I.E. AYEWAH Mr. A.N.C. NWAZOMUDOH Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. M. AHMAD Mr. T. ALTAF
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. J. MORELLI PANDO Mr. C. CASTILLO Mr. V. ROJAS
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. S. TURBANSKI Mr. T. STROJWAS Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. I. DATCU Mr. T. MELESCANU
<u>Sri Lanka:</u>	Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mr. H. BERGLUND Mr. R. EKEUS Ms. A. BRAKENHJELM Mr. H.O. ZETTERSTROM
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. V. ISSRAELIAN Mr. B. PROKOFIEV Mr. N. VASHADZE Mr. G. BERDENNIKOV
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Mr. I. CROMARTIE Mr. L. MIDDLETON Ms. J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. R. SCOTT  
Mr. J. TIERNEY  
Mr. R. MILTON  
Mr. J. DOESBURG

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA  
Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 233rd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee will continue today its consideration of item 7 of its agenda, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". Members who so wish may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mongolia; China, Argentina, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Federal Republic of Germany and Venezuela.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Mongolia, His Excellency Ambassador Erdembileg.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, allow me sincerely to welcome you to the office of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August and to wish you success in the discharge of the responsible duties of that office.

I should also like to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, who guided the Committee's work last month.

The Mongolian delegation had occasion to set forth its views again on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space on 19 April of this year, during the spring part of the Committee's session. Today I should like to make certain comments in order to explain our position on this question in greater detail. Before beginning my statement I should like, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, formally to introduce the working paper in document CD/410, which has today been distributed to members of the Committee.

In this document the Mongolian delegation has tried once again to demonstrate the importance and urgency of the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to give an assessment of the present situation in the Committee on this issue. I would also note that we have tried to explain the need for the speediest possible starting of negotiations on the substance of the issue within the framework of the Committee, and, to that end, for the setting up without further delay of an ad hoc working group with an appropriate mandate. The Mongolian delegation hopes that the ideas and observations contained in its working paper will be carefully studied and commented on during the Committee's further consideration of item 7 of its agenda.

The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which was included in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament only relatively recently, is becoming one of theatre and greater urgency. The active interest in this question of the overwhelming majority of delegations has greatly increased, and even during the spring part of our session we were near consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this question.

However, discussion of the matter has been dragging on, while the threat of the conversion of outer space into a theatre for an unrestrained arms race has markedly increased. In the United States a decision has been adopted concerning national space policy in which a large part is played by the use of outer space for military purposes.



(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The United States' intended large-scale use of space combat systems is connected primarily with the deployment in outer space of weapons based on new physical principles, in particular laser and high-energy weapons, and also traditional types of weapons.

Under the programme for the so-called triad of space-based laser weapons, intensive work is being done in the United States on the development of the basic elements of space laser weapons. The "Alpha" programme provides for the development of a powerful chemical laser; under the "LODE" plan, an optical system is being devised which will "increase the effect of the laser beam on the target", while the "Talon Gould" project is for the development of a system of detection and tracking and guiding the laser beam to the target. Large companies like Lockheed, Rockwell, TRW and others are engaged in this work.

The United States is considering the possibility of the application of the reusable space shuttle system to anti-satellite and other military purposes.

The United States is also developing an airborne missile system using the F-15 military aircraft in order to carry out attacks on artificial earth satellites.

Lastly, on 23 March 1983 President Reagan announced in the United States the beginning of work on a large-scale and highly effective anti-missile defence system with space-based elements. All this constitutes a dangerous step, opening the way to a new arms race in outer space. It is disguised with misleading arguments about the need to strengthen the United States' strategic defence. In reality, however, it implies the further development and improvement of the United States' strategic offensive forces, and in a very specific direction, that of acquiring the potential to deliver a first nuclear strike.

There is one other factor which, in the Mongolian delegation's view, bears witness to the urgent need to set up in the Committee without delay an ad hoc working group to conduct negotiations on item 7 of the agenda and reach agreement on the text of an appropriate international treaty, taking into account the proposals that have been made. The existing system of multilateral and bilateral agreements and treaties limiting the possibilities for the extension of the arms race to outer space could well be undermined by the efforts to create space types of weapons. Here is one example which is a good illustration of this. Even before the United States administration's announcement of its intention to start implementing a programme for the development of a highly effective large-scale ABM system, the world community was alarmed by reports in the United States press about work at the Lawrence laboratory in Livermore on the development of a powerful X-ray laser belonging, according to staff working at the laboratory, to the "third generation" of atomic weapons.

The principle on which this laser is based requires the use of atomic explosions to produce the energy for a powerful flow of X-rays.

According to workers at the laboratory, this laser system could be deployed in outer space, where lasers and nuclear charges could be placed in orbit aboard artificial earth satellites.



(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

This alarming information was repeated in April this year even after the announcement of the decision to start work on the development of a large-scale highly effective ABM system. Judging by recent statements in the influential United States newspaper, the Christian Science Monitor, those working on the new programme, and in particular the well-known Edward Teller, are in favour of the development of laser devices which will use the X-rays produced by the explosion of nuclear charges deployed on space satellites.

I should like to point out that plans for nuclear explosions in space will assuredly jeopardize the observance of the international treaties and agreements that are in force, safeguarding outer space from being turned into an arena for the arms race.

Those who are obstructing the establishment of an ad hoc working group, and thus the starting of concrete negotiations, justify their action by arguing that discussion of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is pointless. In particular, Vice-President of the United States George Bush, in his statement to the Committee at the beginning of this session, said in this connection: "Clearly, the conditions do not exist which would make negotiations appropriate."

The Mongolian delegation does not share this view. It will be easier and simpler to block possible channels for an arms race in outer space before the appearance and deployment of space types of weapons. In our approach to item 7, we see as the priority task the closing off of possible dangerous channels for the arms race in good time, instead of waiting passively until they begin to be used for filling the arsenals of States with new types of weapons.

Paragraph 39 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament clearly emphasizes the need for negotiations "on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes".

This provision of paragraph 39 is particularly relevant in connection with outer space, the peaceful use of which is one of the most important prerequisites to the solution of the global problems of all mankind.

During the discussion of this item at plenary meetings it has been said that a convention on the prevention of an arms race in outer space would be ineffective because of the "vagueness" of its scope.

This apprehension is based on two false assumptions. The first is that the parties to the future treaty or agreement will endeavour at all costs on the first opportunity to violate it -- will do everything in order not to feel bound by its limitations.

The Mongolian delegation, like many other delegations, considers that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is in the interests of the security and development of absolutely all States. It is on this common interest that all the multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements concluded up to now have been founded.



(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Secondly, the proponents of this view assume that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove the violation by one State or another of the obligation it had assumed not to deploy weapons in outer space. Of course, there is no perfect verification system, nor can there be. Every agreement in the sphere of disarmament contains an element of trust. But the opposite is also true. No attempt at obtaining a strategic advantage by violating the treaty would pass unnoticed. The possibility of individual violations is not excluded by any of the agreements now in force in the sphere of disarmament. But with the existing verification measures we believe that it would be impossible to secure strategic advantages without the other parties to the agreements being aware of it.

At the present stage of the discussion of item 7 of the agenda it is unlikely that anyone is unconvinced of the urgency of this issue. The overwhelming majority of delegations, if not all, are in favour of its discussion in some form or other. The Committee has nearly reached a consensus on the mandate of an ad hoc working group, which represents a positive outcome of the work done in the Committee under your guidance, Mr. Chairman, as well as under the chairmanships of the distinguished representatives of Nigeria and Pakistan.

At the same time, we are disturbed at the lack of results in the contact group dealing with the question of the mandate of the future ad hoc working group.

As you know, the group of socialist countries has adopted a definite position on the question of the mandate of the future working group. Basically we believe that it is necessary to begin negotiations with a view to drafting a treaty or treaties on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This firm position is reflected in document CD/272, which was submitted by the Mongolian delegation. The Group of 21 also has the same object in mind and its position is clearly set forth in document CD/329.

However, delegations of the group of Western countries are still not ready to agree to such a constructive approach to the consideration of this question, and its solution in a positive way. It is for this reason that the Committee has already lost so much time.

If, during the time remaining before the closure of this session, the Committee does not manage to reach agreement on the question now under discussion, we shall at that stage see no other solution but to inform the world community of the actual state of affairs and to give the reason for the situation that exists in the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the consideration of item 7 of its agenda.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of China, His Excellency Ambassador Li Luye.

Mr. LI LUYE (China): Mr. Chairman, first of all, allow me in the name of the Chinese delegation to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament for the current month. I am convinced that, under your experienced and efficient guidance, the Committee will be able smoothly to fulfil its heavy tasks in the remaining month of the summer session. You can expect full support and co-operation from my delegation. I also wish to take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan for the excellent and effective guidance he provided in conducting our business last month.

Today, I wish to make a few comments on a question of general concern, the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

With the rapid advance of space science and technology, people have come to see more and more clearly the immense potentialities that the peaceful uses of outer space have for promoting the scientific, technological, economic and cultural development of all countries, as well as for enhancing international co-operation. We are all encouraged by the prospects of conquering and utilizing the universe of mankind. On the other hand, however, people are concerned about the continuing escalation of military activities in outer space, and particularly about the development of outer space weapons. In the countries that possess the most advanced space technologies, "space war" weapons, which once existed only in the realm of science fiction, have now found their way from the designing board and laboratory into the stage of experimentation for use, and will probably be deployed in the not too distant future. Information provided by well-known international research institutes has shown that over a decade ago, one space power, the Soviet Union, had already started research and development on anti-satellite weapons. In 1982, the Soviet Union further carried out an anti-satellite weapon test in co-ordination with the test launching of its intercontinental ballistic missiles and anti-ballistic missiles tests. The other space power, the United States, is also stepping up its research into anti-satellite systems and is developing a research programme into space-based lasers as anti-ballistic missile weapons. The Soviet Union is said also to have a similar programme. Both are currently working on particle-beam weapons. All this shows that outer space is becoming a new arena for the superpowers to engage in arms expansion. By carrying the arms race into outer space they are opening the way for a hitherto relatively calm outer space to become a scene for military confrontation, which will inevitably increase instability and the danger of war.

We are now standing at a crossroads: either we take measures to halt an arms race in outer space so that the utilization of this common heritage of mankind can be for peaceful purposes to the benefit of all, or we allow it to become a theatre for the arms race and thus present an even greater threat to the whole of mankind. The Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which was held last year, also expressed grave concern about the expansion of the arms race into outer space, demanding that effective measures be taken as soon as possible to prevent the increasing militarization of outer space and an arms race therein.



(Mr. Li Luye, China)

China has consistently maintained that the exploration and use of outer space must serve peaceful purposes. The increasing militarization of outer space constitutes an obstacle to its peaceful use. Efforts must be made to halt and reverse such a dangerous trend. In our view, the question of the militarization of outer space consists mainly of the following two aspects. On the one hand, various kinds of space weapons are being developed by the two major space powers. Their success in this field will result in a tremendous threat to peace and security. Therefore, it is of immediate urgency to adopt measures to prevent the testing, production and deployment of such weapons. On the other hand, there exist some one thousand military satellites which belong to the three-C system, i.e. command, control and communication. Most of these satellites belong to the two States which possess the largest arsenals and have already become an important component part of their respective military systems in their rivalry for world domination. They constitute the basis of their military superiority. In a word, the existence and emergence of either outer space weapons or military satellites do not conform with the purposes and objectives of the "demilitarization of outer space" or the "use of outer space solely for peaceful purposes". Therefore, in principle, they should be prohibited or restricted. Of course, military satellites are a relatively complicated issue in that they can serve both military and civilian purposes. Some countries believe that these satellites should not be prohibited because they have certain stabilizing effects. Although it cannot be denied that some of these satellites can play a certain role in the monitoring of the implementation of disarmament agreements and in giving advance warning in the event of a surprise attack, we cannot ignore the fact that the absence of limitations and restrictions on these satellites will by no means help check the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, between the two superpowers. We believe, therefore, that at present we can start by prohibiting all outer space weapons. The question of how to limit and restrict military satellites, however, should also be dealt with in the future, in an effort to reach the final objective of the demilitarization of outer space.

It should be pointed out that, as regards the demilitarization of outer space and the prevention of an arms race therein, the superpowers which possess the most advanced space technology and are engaged in intensifying contention for supremacy have special responsibilities.

Based on the above position, our delegation maintains that the Committee on Disarmament, in accordance with the relevant resolution adopted at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, should speedily establish an ad hoc working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.



(Mr. Li Luye, China)

The mandate of the working group would be to negotiate and elaborate an international legal instrument on the prohibition of the research, production, deployment and use of all types of outer space weapons. Some delegations have already expressed their views as to what outer space weapons are. We on our part are now studying this issue and are willing to exchange views with other delegations so as to reach a precise and scientific definition of these weapons. As to the number and specific form of the international legal instruments to be concluded through negotiations, we are flexible. We can also agree to starting our negotiations first on the prohibition of outer space weapons already in trial production.

Now, we have only two weeks left before the closure of this session of the Committee on Disarmament. In spite of the repeated consultations, regrettably, a working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space has still not been established. Many States have been pressing for an agreement on the mandate of the working group, so that substantive negotiations can begin earlier. There is no excuse for the Committee not to live up to the expectations of the international community which urgently demands the curbing of an arms race in outer space.

This is the last time I shall be speaking in this Committee. Mr. Qian Jiadong, Ambassador for disarmament affairs, has been appointed by the Chinese Government to head the Chinese delegation here. I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express my thanks through you to all the delegations for the co-operation and support rendered to me personally as well as to the Chinese delegation. I look forward with pleasure to meeting you again on other occasions. I hope there will be continued progress in the work of our Committee as a result of the concerted and unswerving efforts of all delegations. I also wish to thank Ambassador Jaipal and Mr. Berasategui and other members of the secretariat. My thanks also go to the interpreters, the translators and other members of the staff for their assistance.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, His Excellency Ambassador Carasales.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Allow me first of all to express the satisfaction of my delegation in seeing you presiding over the work of our Committee during the month of August. You are the representative of a Latin American country which, like Argentina, is a member of the non-aligned movement and one with which my country maintains the most cordial and friendly relations, as it has done since the beginning of our existence as an independent

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

country. You personally have been Peru's Ambassador in Buenos Aires. All these circumstances reinforce our satisfaction in seeing you presiding over our Committee this month and you may therefore count on the fullest and broadest co-operation of the Argentine delegation. At the same time I should like to express my delegation's appreciation of the very efficient way in which the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, guided the work of our Committee last month. His brilliant chairmanship of the Committee was certainly no surprise to anyone, since we are all familiar with his qualities.

We have just heard the statement of the representative of China, Ambassador Li Luye, who bade farewell to this Committee. I should like to say that we very much regret that he is leaving us and that we shall remember with warmth and appreciation his valuable contribution to the work of our Committee and his cordiality at all times as the head of the delegation of the People's Republic of China in the Committee on Disarmament.

In my statement today I shall refer to organizational and procedural aspects of the functioning of the Committee on Disarmament and in particular to the question of the establishment of subsidiary bodies.

I should like to make it clear from the outset that the lack of concrete results from the work of the Committee on Disarmament is not due basically to its working methods or to any failure on the part of delegations to make constant efforts. The relative ineffectiveness of the Committee is due to other causes, causes of substance, which we all know but about which the Committee itself can do very little.

However, this situation should not prevent the Committee from periodically considering whether the way in which it conducts its activities is the most efficient and if the time available during its sessions could not be put to better use. This year the Committee is carrying out such an exercise, and I should like these comments to be a contribution to this joint undertaking.

The experience of the past and what has been happening this year show that the Committee spends -- one could almost say wastes -- a large part of its time on protracted and difficult negotiations concerning the setting up of working groups and the drafting of their mandates.

What should be an essentially procedural matter and easy to resolve has been becoming an operation of extreme complexity involving questions of substance which in reality have nothing to do with the matter and on which delegations expend the greater part of their energies. It has been assumed -- wrongly, in my view -- that the setting up of a subsidiary body of the Committee necessarily implies that there exists "a basis to negotiate a draft treaty", to use the words of rule 23 of the rules of procedure. No account has been taken of the



(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

fact that this is one -- assuredly the most important, but in any event only one -- of the possible tasks a subsidiary body may have, as is clear from rule 23 itself since it uses the word "including". What the rule indicates as the basic reason for the establishment of a subsidiary body is that the Committee "deems it advisable for the effective performance of its functions".

This erroneous perception of the meaning implicit in the establishment of a working group is what has led some delegations, the most reluctant as regards the Committee's possibilities for action, to insist on the drafting of mandates which limit the future work of the group to the utmost. We all know the immediate opposition that is aroused by any mention in the mandate of a working group of the words "negotiations" or "convention" or "treaty". This negative attitude in turn provokes a reaction among those delegations which want the work of the groups to have a specific objective and which then insist on the inclusion of these key words in the relevant mandates.

There thus occurs a clash between opposing positions, a clash which either results in an unproductive paralysis or, if it is finally resolved, ends with the drafting of an ambiguous mandate which each delegation thereafter interprets as it wishes.

It is difficult for my delegation to understand the suspicion which appears to be aroused by the word "negotiations" or the word "agreement".

There can be no possible doubt that the mission of the Committee on Disarmament is to "negotiate" and not to deliberate. The oft-quoted paragraph 120 of the Final Document could not be clearer in this respect since it attributes to the Committee the status of "single multilateral negotiating forum" and calls it expressly a "negotiating body".

There is no question, therefore, that the sole task of the Committee on Disarmament is to negotiate, and that the Committee ought to negotiate on the items appearing on its agenda. Furthermore, if the Committee, after sufficient thought and consideration, has decided to include an item on its agenda, it is to be presumed that that is in order to do the only thing that the Committee can do in connection with it, namely, to conduct negotiations. The Committee does not place items on its agenda in order to deliberate or, much less, to leave them there untouched, as if placing them on the agenda were a mere formality.

On the other hand, negotiation is a diplomatic activity which can be understood either in a broad sense or in a narrow one. In a broad sense there is no doubt that negotiation is a lengthy and complex process passing through many stages, from the preliminary or exploratory ones to the most concrete ones. That is what a working group ought normally to do, whether or not the word "negotiation" is explicitly included in its mandate.

Again, if the task of the Committee is to conduct negotiations -- and about that, I repeat, there is no doubt -- the ultimate objective can be no other than the conclusion of an agreement or agreements on the subject in question. Such an agreement may be reached either sooner or later: it may take one year, five years, 10 years or even longer, depending on how the negotiations proceed, but it cannot be denied that the ultimate objective must be to reach an agreement.



(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

This much having been said -- about which there ought not to be any disagreement -- it is clear that there can be differences of opinion as to the right moment to embark specifically on the actual negotiation of the terms of a draft treaty. It is realistic to recognize that these divergences of views exist and that each Government has the right to hold its own position in this connection.

What does not seem right is to allow these differences of appreciation, which may be justified or not but in any case cannot be ignored, to influence from the very beginning the manner in which the Committee deals with the items on its agenda, resulting, very often, in an inactivity or paralysis on matters which are universally recognized as of the utmost importance and urgency for the future of mankind.

There are many examples of this situation. What, concretely, has the Committee done about item 2 of its agenda concerning nothing less than the "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"? What results has it to show to the international community five years after it decided to take up the consideration of this subject? At the beginning of 1982 the Committee decided to add to its agenda item 7, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". After two annual sessions what, concretely, has it done in this connection? We are still discussing whether to set up an ad hoc working group and what its mandate should be. And I very much fear that the same thing is happening with respect to the item on "Prevention of nuclear war".

The Committee on Disarmament does not exist in a vacuum. It forms part of a set of instruments which the international community uses in order to consider and find solutions for the most important problems that affect it. There is no doubt that disarmament is among the most urgent needs of the day and the responsibility of the Committee is therefore very great. Its work is followed with keen interest by the whole world and especially by all those who are concerned -- very rightly, it must be said -- about the present situation and the steps which must be taken to overcome it.

Against this background, what answer can the Committee on Disarmament give to the questions being asked about its work? It should not be forgotten that the Committee annually gives such an answer through its reports to the General Assembly.

So, then, with respect to items 2 and 7 of the agenda which I mentioned earlier, all that the Committee can point to as evidence of its action in the matter of two such crucial issues is the following: two weeks a year; I repeat, "two weeks a year", that is, four plenary meetings a year, in which it is merely assumed that the statements of representatives should refer to those two items. And we all know that that is not always the case and that, furthermore, such statements, unconnected with one another, do not properly constitute a debate, for their purpose is usually merely to place positions and viewpoints on record.



(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

Obviously, a negotiating body cannot direct its actions according to the effect they may have on public opinion, but at the same time, in my view, it is undeniable that we cannot ignore the repercussions which these actions or lack of actions may have among those who are interested. The Committee ought to act on the basis of solid reasons but should in addition take into account the fact that it cannot with impunity offer public opinion year after year such a meagre output from its work, particularly on subjects such as nuclear disarmament or the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

As is usual in such cases, the diagnosis of the state of affairs is easy. What is difficult is to find a solution to it. We have to ask ourselves the following question: is there any way in which the Committee can organize its work so that, without prejudice to the positions which the various parties maintain regarding questions of substance, those questions can really be dealt with, can form the subject of permanent and not sporadic consideration, which will lead step by step towards the final goal which is set by the specific responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament?

For some time now an idea has been circulating informally in the Committee which in my view could constitute an adequate response to the above question. It is perhaps not the ideal answer but it is certainly the only one which will enable the Committee to emerge from the impasse in which it frequently finds itself. It is a formula comprising two measures very closely connected one with the other, which may be summarized as follows: (1) the Committee should set up a subsidiary body for each item on its agenda (and even two or more subsidiary bodies if the item is such that a separate consideration of the questions involved in it is desirable) and (2) these subsidiary bodies, presumably working groups, should have a simple and general mandate, for example, "to consider item X of the Committee's agenda, entitled ...", with, perhaps, in addition, an express reference to paragraph 120 of the Final Document.

The mandate would not expressly include the offensive words "negotiation" and "convention", but it would be understood, given the nature of the competence of the Committee, that these would be its method and its ultimate goal, at an appropriate moment.

Each working group would naturally have a chairman, and its first action would be to consider its programme of work. It is foreseeable that in this connection there will be differences of views and that it will not always be easy to reach a consensus. But it is not correct to claim, as has been done, that in this event nothing will have been gained for the divergences of views in the Committee will simply have been transferred to the working group. The situation is different. The working group will have a chairman whose job it will be, if not exclusively at any rate primarily, to hold continuous consultations with persistence and determination to try to reach agreement on the programme of work. There can be little doubt that such a method would in any event have far greater chances of success than has been the case with the practice prevailing up to now.

Under the guidance of its chairman, the working group would proceed step by step all the time from the holding of preliminary discussions to the conclusion of an agreement, as circumstances, progress in the work and the will of member States permitted. For it is a rule of procedure of the Committee that

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

it should conduct its work by consensus and this consensus can be expressed with equal vigour and value either in the plenary Committee or in a working group. The countries involved are the same in both cases and their delegations will adopt the same positions. No working group can move faster than its members wish, nor can it do so behind the back of the plenary Committee. Anyone who maintains this is merely playing with words.

If it adopts this procedure the Committee will be concerning itself actively with each and every item on its agenda and no item will be left in limbo or be put off to the "Greek Calends". In each case progress will be made to the extent possible but there will be someone specifically responsible for guiding this process, namely, the chairman of the working group. And there will be an annual report which will faithfully reflect what the Committee is doing and will record, for the information of the General Assembly and the public at large, the gradual progress of the work towards the final objective. I think it is indisputable that the Committee would in this way be discharging its responsibilities better than it is doing at the moment, in particular with regard to certain fundamental items on its agenda. And with this procedure no one will be renouncing positions firmly held on one aspect or another or taking decisions of substance of any kind through the establishment of a subsidiary body. There will be no justification for the urge which some delegations have at present to control rigorously, from the very outset, what a working group can do and cannot do, as if working groups were autonomous bodies and their own delegations did not form part of them. This would not prevent the Committee from time to time, perhaps for the purpose of presenting reports, considering in plenary meeting the progress made in the work of each group, but in any event that would only mean a difference of level in the expression of views which could equally well be expressed in the working groups.

I could dwell further on this idea but my purpose has been merely to bring it forward for consideration, so that delegations can think about it and comment on it at an appropriate time.

This is not the only measure which, in my delegation's view, the Committee could consider in order to make better use of the time available to it. Sooner or later the Committee will have to accept the fact that, as the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, it cannot be in recess for six months a year. The Committee should remain in session throughout the year. Certainly, this does not mean that it should hold plenary meetings 12 months a year, but it does mean that in cases where there are concrete negotiations under way on an item on its agenda, negotiations which there is no reason whatever for interrupting, the relevant working group should be able to continue working without an interval of five months in its meetings. This is not incompatible with participation at a given level in the meetings on disarmament held in New York. Nor is it incompatible with periods of recess for purposes of leave, return to home capitals and the renewal of instructions. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which is so often cited as an example of the kind of activity the Committee should be conducting on all the items on its agenda, must now suspend its work for five months, and it is legitimate to wonder whether that must necessarily be so.

There are other aspects of the functioning of the Committee which my delegation would like to refer to, but I shall confine myself on this occasion to the two questions I have mentioned during this statement. I think that both



(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

are very important. The Committee cannot go on incessantly, year after year, repeating these interminable procedural exercises over whether or not working groups should be set up and what mandates they should have, while the questions of substance are ignored. Nor can we allow ourselves the luxury of working only part of the year when the problems before us call for urgent solution. I do not know whether the thoughts I have expressed contain suggestions that are useful or acceptable to all, but I am certain that if we continue the present practice this will be to the detriment of the prestige and even the credibility of this Committee. We ought to make every possible effort to prevent that.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, His Excellency Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all express sincere good wishes to you in the Chair of our Committee for the month of August, a position so much more responsible since we are entering the final stage of our work for this year. I would also like to express thanks and the highest appreciation of the work of our preceding Chairman, Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan, who did his utmost in trying to smooth out the sharp edges of the programmes on our agenda. Allow me also to say goodbye to one of our colleagues, the distinguished Ambassador of China, who has just announced his departure from the Committee. However, it is to my satisfaction to know that we shall remain colleagues in our other duties, that is, the duties of permanent delegates to the international organizations in Geneva, which post, I hope, the distinguished Ambassador of China will continue to hold.

Allow me to focus my attention on one of the very important questions of disarmament -- the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

As was stated at the meeting of heads of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty held recently in Moscow, they consider it necessary to start as soon as possible negotiations on the prohibition of the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space and thus to prevent the extension of the arms race to this sphere.

The Soviet Union proposed a draft treaty banning the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. At the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 82) held in Vienna last summer, the overwhelming majority of countries said they were worried about the issue.

But primarily because the United States was not willing to countenance anything stronger, the final report of the Conference merely expressed general concern.

The conclusion in 1967 of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies closed the possibility for the placing in outer space of weapons of mass destruction. This Treaty prohibits the creation on celestial bodies of military bases, installations or fortifications, as well as the testing of weapons of any kind and the conducting of military manoeuvres. However, from the legal point of view, the possibility remains of the placing in outer space of such types of weapons as are not covered by the definition of weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

We are now witnessing attempts to make use of this possibility. Science and technology have made such a progress that it is now practically possible to create laser weapons based in space.

It has been disclosed that the Pentagon is funding research into a laser beam system for use as a weapon in space. This could conceivably be ready for flight testing by 1993, at a cost of \$30 million. Major-General Donald Lamberson, responsible for directed-energy weapons to the United States Under-Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, told a Congressional committee in March that new Pentagon studies would define for the first time "the scope of the remaining uncertainties as to whether an effective weapon system can be achieved and the size of the risk involved in a greatly accelerated programme." The Pentagon has so far committed about \$900 million for the five years 1982-1988.

The novelty of beam weapon systems -- "brand new weapon forms that have never been developed and deployed before," as Major-General Lamberson called them -- suggests that they will draw little upon existing weapons systems technology (although they may draw extensively upon NASA's space shuttle programme to test the components).

However, this is only one side of the possible use of outer space for military purposes. There are already technical possibilities also for setting up and stationing in outer space military facilities which could strike against targets on the earth's surface or in its vicinity. And it is commonly known that specific projects are being worked out for setting up laser and beam weapons systems also for that purpose. So we cannot pay attention to only one system in outer space; we have to prohibit any kind of weapon in that environment. This would be the only really effective solution to this question.

Anything else would be simply a waste of time, which is running against us. President Reagan has proposed that we start investigating whether in the next century technology may offer a solution to security that does not rest on the prospect of mass and mutual death. But this is nothing other than an attempt to cover the reality, a dangerous step toward the militarization of space.

The decision by President Reagan to start research on the creation of a global ABM system based in space would undoubtedly give new impetus to the arms race in outer space. The Soviet-American ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing and deployment of ABM systems and their components based in space. As is well known, each development of a new type of weapon starts with research, which forms an organic part of the development stage. We are afraid that the United States President's decision breaks the provisions of the important Treaty on the limitation of ABM systems. One should also fully take into account the fact that the development of a new ABM system in the United States would result in the creation of a highly unstable and dangerous situation.



(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

We have also heard and read arguments that the best place for a future war is outer space, not only because it is distant but also because the United States can permanently hold the lead. What can be said in response to such a thesis? As I have already said, the party and State leaders of the socialist countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty stated that they "resolutely stand for the maintenance of a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. But in the interests of peace and self security the States in question proclaim that in no case will they allow anybody to achieve military superiority over them". And this is what both sides should realize -- that there is no kind of scientific wizardry to assure superiority anywhere. It would also be wise if this fact were realized by the United States. It would also be wise to bear in mind the words of Richard L. Garwin, who helped build the H-bomb and has worked for 32 years on exotic weapons and defence development. He said recently, "Space wars are not an alternative to war on earth." Military systems in space are in fact designed to produce military advantages on the ground. We cannot but agree with several members of the United States Senate and Union of Concerned Scientists saying "It will be far more difficult to keep weapons out of space once testing begins". And if we take into consideration how much the weapons race taken into outer space would cost, we cannot escape the fact that it would undoubtedly become the most costly armament programme ever undertaken.

There is still time to do something to stop this madness. But for that we need concrete negotiations.

The best way to do that is to set up the working group and to start serious negotiations based on the principle of equality and equal security. The fact that we must do something concrete is fortunately understood by many delegations. For example, in document CD/375, "Prevention of arms race in outer space", prepared by France, it is very clearly written that "the 1967 Treaty on outer space deals very inadequately with the problems posed by the arms race in outer space. The only limitation placed on military activity in outer space is the prohibition, in the first paragraph of article IV of the Treaty, of the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction".

Such a Treaty in its time was a great step forward. But the time has come to extend the prohibition to any other weapon which can be used in outer space. This is also reflected in the French document, although we cannot agree with the formulation that "The Treaty thus, on the contrary, authorizes other military uses of outer space". There is not a single word about such an authorization in the Treaty. It would be more correct to say that the prohibition of the placing in orbit only of nuclear weapons or other weapons



(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

of mass destruction contained in the Treaty was misused for the development of other weapons not defined in the Treaty. I repeat, misused, but not authorized by the Treaty.

So, I think there is a common agreement that something concrete must be done. But concrete negotiation cannot start at plenary meetings, formal or informal ones.

Let us, then, establish an ad hoc working group and begin serious negotiations, because it will be far more difficult to keep weapons out of space once their testing begins and once they become a part of the military arsenal of some State.

In this connection, I would like to evaluate the efforts of the United Nations aimed at the exploration of outer space for peaceful purposes only. As you know, there has been functioning in the United Nations for many years the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The work of this Committee and of its two sub-committees, the one scientific and technical, and the other legal, deserves the maximum attention of all Members of the United Nations. And you know that it has already brought concrete results. I would like to mention the agreements which modify the co-operation of States in outer space. These are, in particular, the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which I mentioned earlier, the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space and the 1979 Agreement concerning the moon and other celestial bodies. I think that nobody can doubt the usefulness of these documents. It is only regrettable that after many years of existence of the Committee -- it is more than 20 years -- such results are not more plentiful. It is well known that because of the lack of interest of Western countries, and especially of the United States, and because of their lack of a positive approach, it has not been possible to achieve the international legal regulation of long-distance research of the earth from outer space, nor has it been possible to adopt a legal definition and delimitation of space. We are of the opinion that this -- I mean the co-operation of States in the peaceful exploration of space and the regulation of concrete questions -- is a sphere in which States should also concentrate their attention and efforts. We, in the Committee on Disarmament, could help quite a lot in the endeavours to ensure the peaceful use of outer space by preparing a treaty prohibiting any possible misuse of that environment for military purposes.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish) I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency Ambassador Issraelyan.



Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):  
Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation would like to dwell upon item 7 of the agenda,  
"Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

The Soviet Union consistently advocates the elaboration of international legal rules protecting outer space against various aspects of the arms race. As far back as in 1958, soon after the launching of the first Soviet artificial satellite, which marked the beginning of the space era, the USSR put forward a proposal for the prohibition of all types of military use of outer space without exception, on the basis of strict observance of the principle of equal security and the non-admission of military advantage for any side.

In the following years, on the initiative of the Soviet Union and with its active participation, international agreements were elaborated and concluded aimed at the use of space only for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind.

The Committee on Disarmament has been dealing with the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space only relatively recently -- since the last session. The inclusion of this item in the agenda was necessary because in spite of the existing agreements and treaties there are still wide gaps whereby outer space can be filled with lethal weapons. In this connection, the concern of the States members of the Committee reflects the legitimate concern of the entire international community, alarmed at the ominous prospect of the transformation of outer space into a potential theatre of military activities.

The rapid development of military space technology has made the extremely important task of firmly preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space a priority international problem. The maintenance of peace and security in outer space has tremendous significance for the preservation of peace on earth. In the final analysis, any space weapon has a terrestrial orientation. War in space will not be an alternative to war on earth; it will be a mere prelude to war on our entire planet.

Mr. Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in his reply to the address of a group of American scientists and public figures emphasized that "prevention of the militarization of outer space is one of the priority problems facing mankind, and much here on earth will depend on whether it is solved".

The militarization of outer space would complicate the international situation as a whole, increase distrust in the relations between States, create obstacles to international co-operation in the sphere of the peaceful use of space, reduce the prospects for the limitation of the arms race in other fields, have a destabilizing effect on the strategic situation and inevitably increase the probability of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

But even if not used for its primary purpose, military space technology causes tremendous damage, depriving the international community of immense funds and material resources. For example, during the current fiscal year, the United States has increased the allocations for the development of space weapons systems up to \$2 billion. The deployment of combat systems of space weapons would cost hundreds of billions of dollars. At a time when many countries need material assistance for their social and economic development, expenditure of truly astronomical sums on the arms race in outer space is nothing but the robbery of peoples.



(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Some delegations, hindering the starting of negotiations on item 7 of the agenda, argue that at present there are no specific types of weapons designed for use in and from outer space.

Such an approach seems to us incorrect. Common sense and logic call for the preventive prohibition of new types of weapons before their deployment, creation and development. The facts show that we are on the threshold of the appearance of space types of weapons. At present the United States is completing the development of an anti-satellite missile system (ASAT) on the basis of the F-15 fighter plane. There is no doubt that the deployment of anti-satellite weapons will threaten both peaceful activity in space and the existence of national systems of communication, control and command, which would lead to the most dangerous destabilization of the strategic situation.

It is also known that the United States is developing directed-energy laser- and particle-beam weapons, which it is planned to deploy in space. Their main task would be the destruction of space-, air-, ground- and sea-based targets. If anyone thinks that the appearance of laser weapons in space is possible only in the distant future, he is mistaken. The appearance of laser space weapons in the 1980s and 1990s is not improbable. According to information from the American press agencies published in the International Herald Tribune of 27 July 1983, the United States Air Force recently tested a laser weapon against real targets. An airborne laser device destroyed five "Sidewinder" missiles over the testing ground in the state of California. There is no doubt that after this weapon is fully developed it will be tested in outer space. Space-, air- and ground-based objects may become its targets.

In the opinion of United States experts, many of the key types of technology necessary for the development of combat space systems already exist. Other, more sophisticated types of technology for the conduct of war in space are being developed in research programmes. The press has published information about such projects as the stationing in space of huge mirrors which would aim a laser beam at missiles and destroy them during flight. The possibilities are being discussed of implementing the project of Edward Teller. The project envisages the creation of a powerful space-based X-ray laser which would have as its energy source the radiation resulting from the explosion of a "small nuclear charge launched into orbit".

The creation of space weapons is being intensified. Large sums are being allocated for their development. According to information in the magazine Aviation Week and Space Technology, the United States Defense Department's plan envisages a more than twelve-fold increase in the amount spent on the development of laser systems for use in and from space by 1988.

During the current session of the Committee, our anxiety concerning the negative consequences of an arms race in outer space has increased still further as a result of the decision taken by the United States administration to begin developing a global anti-missile defence system which could be deployed in space. This was the subject, in particular, of the speech made by President Reagan on 23 March 1983.



(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The decision to develop a new space-based ABM system is an extremely dangerous step which opens up a new avenue for the arms race in outer space. The implementation of this decision would inevitably destabilize the strategic situation in the world and would thus increase the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. There is a strict linkage between offensive and defensive systems of strategic weapons. This linkage was recognized by the official United States representatives at the SALT talks. If this linkage is upset by one side, that will inevitably lead to the adoption of retaliatory measures by the other side. As was pointed out by the eminent Soviet scientist, Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences E.P. Velikhov, whatever the efficiency of a new ABM system, whatever the degree of its reliability in destroying missiles, efforts would immediately be made to improve them, precisely in order to overcome this system. The arms race would be raised to a new and more dangerous level, and military confrontation would become still more threatening. Academician E.P. Velikhov stated that "the so-called defensive weapon would be followed in space by the offensive one. This would represent the greatest threat to the security and sovereignty of all peoples on the planet, since the system would be deployed over their heads, in their sky".

The development of a global ABM system, while intensifying the strategic arms race as a whole, inhibits the adoption of new measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In addition to that, it inevitably undermines the foundation of the treaties and agreements existing in this field. The decision to develop a new ABM system is contrary to the 1972 Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems. According to the Treaty (article V), the parties undertook "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based".

It cannot be excluded either that in an attempt to implement the decision of President Reagan certain technical projects might be adopted which would jeopardize the implementation of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 banning nuclear explosions in outer space. We have already mentioned one project which envisages nuclear explosions in outer space in order to provide X-ray lasers with energy. In connection with this project one of the participants in the negotiations which resulted in the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, Mr. Averell Harriman, not long ago stated the following: "I am disturbed to hear consideration of discarding the limited test ban to test nuclear weapons for use in outer space in the naive belief that war in space will not reach back to earth". (International Herald Tribune, 28 July 1983).

The facts and examples stated above, in our view, quite convincingly show what a tragedy it would be for mankind if outer space were transformed into a source of disputes between States, and more particularly a sphere of military confrontation between them. Only a complete lack of understanding of a heavy responsibility and extreme madness can lead to a policy whereby the space over man's head contains a threat to his very existence.

The draft treaty submitted by the Soviet delegation on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space is designed to prevent such a threat. We proposed that States should undertake not to place in orbit around the earth objects carrying weapons of any kind, install such weapons on

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celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. According to the draft the parties to the treaty should use space objects in accordance with the principles of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and in the interests of maintaining peace and security and developing co-operation and mutual understanding. The Soviet draft was met with understanding by the international community. In its resolutions 36/99 and 37/83 the United Nations General Assembly urged the Committee on Disarmament to work out an appropriate international agreement. On this basis, the delegations of the socialist countries in the Committee already have for two years now been advocating the establishment of an ad hoc working group to elaborate a treaty or treaties.

We are prepared to go even further-- to agree on the prohibition in general of the use of force both in outer space and from outer space in respect of earth. The Soviet Union is ready to enter into negotiations on these subjects without delay. Our proposal for the holding of a meeting of Soviet and American scientists and experts to discuss the possible implications of the creation of a full-scale ABM system also remains in force. I wish to recall also that at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly the Soviet side reaffirmed its readiness to resume bilateral Soviet-American talks on anti-satellite systems.

This is the essence of our position on item 7 of the agenda - not to start an arms race where there has been none, and to put a stop to it where it is now taking place. The Soviet delegation believes that further delay in starting negotiations on item 7 is inadmissible. Even during the short time since the inclusion in the Committee's agenda of the item on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the ominous scripts of "star wars" have been embodied in quite real military space programmes.

Mr. Andropov stated in his reply to the address of the group of American scientists and public figures, "We have now reached a truly decisive moment: either the States concerned must immediately sit at the negotiating table and start to elaborate a treaty banning the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, or the arms race will spread to outer space".

This position corresponds to the interests of the overwhelming majority of peoples and States. The international community is becoming more and more clearly aware of the danger looming over it. The scientists of various countries have been warning mankind of the possible implications of the extension of the arms race to outer space. A special declaration on this subject was adopted by Soviet scientists. A number of scientists from the United States and other Western countries have also condemned the plans for the development of a full-scale ABM system. More than 100 United States congressmen and 40 eminent scientists and arms control experts have sent letters to President Reagan calling for immediate agreement with the Soviet Union on the establishment of a bilateral moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite weapons in outer space. The letter of the congressmen states: "We are deeply concerned at the threat of an arms race in outer space and are convinced that it is in the United States national interests to avoid it. Such an arms race will threaten our security and undermine international stability and the possibility of achieving future agreements in the arms control field".

The representatives of 36 academies of sciences resolutely advocated a peaceful outer space in the declaration they signed in Rome in September 1982.



(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Finally, the secretariat of the Committee on Disarmament has received in recent weeks hundreds of letters from representatives of non-governmental organizations and private persons demanding the adoption of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. Here is one of them, and it is echoed by thousands of others. United States citizen Mrs. L.E. Cole from Tempe writes: "I add my voice to the millions of Americans who long for peace. Please do what you can to achieve agreement among delegates attending the Committee on Disarmament -- particularly for a treaty aimed at banning weapons of any kind in outer space. I understand there is a possibility that a working group might be set up to draft such a treaty".

The Committee can no longer disregard the desire of mankind for the boundless ocean of space to remain clean.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is closely linked with the prevention of nuclear war and the limitation of the arms race in its principal manifestations. These questions are at the centre of the attention of the world community and of many international forums, including the Committee on Disarmament. There were recently published in the Soviet Union the replies of the Minister of Defence of the USSR, Marshal Dmitri Ustinov, to questions put by a TASS correspondent, replies which express the Soviet point of view on a whole range of these issues. The replies of the Minister also explained the USSR position regarding the talks with the United States on nuclear arms limitation in Europe and on strategic arms limitation and reduction. Marshal Ustinov also gave the Soviet assessment of the state of affairs at these talks and their prospects.

The Soviet delegation has transmitted the text of the replies of the USSR Minister of Defence to the questions of the TASS correspondent to the secretariat for distribution as an official document of the Committee. We hope that the replies of the USSR Minister of Defence will be carefully studied by delegations.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, I intend to share with the Committee a certain number of observations on the subject of chemical weapons. At our next plenary meeting I plan to speak on the subject of radiological weapons. Later this month, I intend to resume the topic of prevention of nuclear war. My delegation last spoke on that topic on 7 July. Several delegations have referred to our statement, in part extensively. Their comments were welcome, and it is the plan of my delegation to continue the discourse on these important matters at an early date.

Before I proceed to the substance of my statement, I would like to comment on the announcement by Ambassador Li Luye that his country will henceforth be represented by a special Ambassador for disarmament. My delegation is gratified that China thus honours our Committee, holding out the promise of even more significant contributions to our work, in keeping with the role of China as one of the major participants in world affairs, and in keeping with its status as a nuclear-weapon power. The price we have to pay obviously is the disappearance of Ambassador Li Luye from our midst. I am comforted that his continued presence in Geneva will allow us nevertheless to benefit from his wisdom and his many human qualities.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

My delegation has repeatedly used this tribune to document its particular interest in the early conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. The exposed situation of my country on the dividing line between contrasting political, social and military systems explains the apprehension which the possible use of chemical weapons evokes. In the Federal Republic of Germany, therefore, chemical weapons are a subject of extensive and serious public discussion. In addition, the Government has been exposed to several comprehensive parliamentary questions on this topic. I would venture to say that there is hardly a country represented in this Committee which is at present conducting a comparable broad public discussion on this particularly barbarous weapons category.

You all know that, as long ago as 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany renounced the production of chemical weapons in an international Treaty and admitted international controls verifying the non-production of such weapons on its territory. It is therefore a matter of logic and continuity that we should strive with singular fervour for a universal, comprehensive and adequately verifiable prohibition of all chemical weapons. In the view of my Government, the conclusion of a chemical weapons ban is a matter of extreme urgency.

If we look back upon the long, difficult negotiating years, and especially to the past annual session, we cannot but be struck by the blatant contradiction between the declared will of delegations from all political quarters to arrive at the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, and the relatively minor degree of practical movement in terms of real progress. At the beginning of the session, my delegation nourished the hope that negotiations would bring a breakthrough and that we would be able to present to our public at home concrete results or at least some tangible momentum. In reality, partial agreement in areas of rather peripheral significance is all that we can show. It is a painful insight in this last month of our annual work that the breakthrough has not materialized. This evaluation of our present annual work is particularly disappointing since the preconditions for progress were uniquely present.

Firstly, the Committee on Disarmament had found in Ambassador McPhail a Chairman who has untiringly worked for the further progress of our negotiations, aided by his dynamic personality, his professional competence and a singular degree of commitment. The same can be said of the chairmen of our contact groups, our colleagues Mr. Cialowicz, Mr. Duarte, Mr. Akkerman and Mr. Lundin.

Secondly, the Committee has at its disposal a valuable and detailed array of documentation, providing a comprehensive basis for further negotiations. I would like to cite in particular the comprehensive United States working paper, document CD/343, the Soviet "Basic provisions" as contained in document CD/294 and, as an important background paper, the USSR/United States joint report dated July 1980; the United Kingdom paper concerning verification of non-production, document CD/353, and finally, our own national contributions on issues of verification, documents CD/265 and CD/326. Fundamentally, there is no important part of the future chemical weapons convention which has not been dealt with extensively in the existing working papers. In a different context I have concluded from this state of affairs that the time for additional national papers is now over and that the legitimate quest for profile by various individual delegations should now be replaced by a common effort to register tangible progress at the common negotiating table.



(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Why have these propitious circumstances faded away before our eyes? Why has progress eluded us? Do we have to choose a different negotiating method?

Looking back upon the annual session, of which so little remains for our work, one is impressed by the fact that one group of States has insistently chosen silence in the face of the essential issues of a future chemical weapons ban. We must seriously ask whether this silence betrays a new policy of delaying the conclusion of a chemical weapons ban, or what else might be the cause for such failure to contribute to our common efforts at bridging diverging positions. There is really no use indulging in ritual affirmations, together with other groups of States, that the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban are promising, if, concurrently, the necessary efforts are missing to move negotiations ahead. It is equally futile to call, in a ritual manner, for the political will in favour of genuine negotiations and for formal drafting exercises if one is not oneself equipped with the necessary political flexibility, enabling one in the interest of necessary compromise to relinquish untenable positions and to move in the direction of new, shared positions. Indeed, it is futile to limit one's own contribution to ongoing negotiations to a sterile rehashing of known views.

My delegation feels strongly that the time has come for an appeal to all participants to show a greater measure of political flexibility and to document such flexibility by practical contributions. That is the prerequisite for progress.

In a recent statement, Ambassador Imai of Japan underlined the priority of the destruction of existing stocks. Indeed, the current decisive danger emanates from existing chemical weapons stocks and from those chemical weapons production facilities which make for the proliferation of stocks, or at least could do so. In consequence, their destruction, reliably verified, constitutes, in our view, the central task for the entire chemical weapons negotiating complex. There is at least a certain measure of agreement among ourselves on this requirement, and there are also in this central area a number of elements which work towards consensus in substance. We should seriously ask ourselves whether it would not be worthwhile to achieve, in the first instance, a solution to these two interrelated problems -- the destruction of stocks, and of production facilities. I would indeed suggest that the chemical weapons Working Group should, on a priority basis, concentrate on these elements of consensus, and my delegation would be ready to undertake a compilation containing such elements for the benefit of the Working Group. These elements of consensus could then be "recorded" in the proposed manner. If we do succeed in this central area in achieving partial progress, and registering it in written form, we shall have accomplished a great step, facilitating and accelerating the work of next year's session.

In this connection, I am pleased to comment on the impressive working paper by the delegation of the United States of America in which procedures for the verification of the destruction of stocks are graphically described, based on the example of an existing destruction facility. The particular value of this

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

working paper resides in the fact that it testifies in a particularly practical form to the possibility of effective international surveillance during the destruction process. It makes evident that control by international inspectors entails no undue burden for the signatories to the future convention. My delegation is therefore surprised that the views of Western countries on the destruction of stocks has drawn only critical and rather unhelpful comments from the representatives of socialist States, most recently in the statement of the distinguished delegate of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda, of 28 July 1983. These negative views are, however, developed without the benefit of any constructive counter-ideas on the part of the socialist representatives. This dilatory and superficial treatment of the topic of the destruction of stocks and its verification is in blatant contradiction with the urgency of eliminating those threats that stem from the existence of the present chemical arsenals. We must seriously deal with the issues of the international verification of the destruction of stocks. Here, more than elsewhere, it is totally insufficient to reiterate positions that harbour no consensus potential, and, for the rest, to remain motionless on established positions.

Advocating the concentration of our work on one key problem area of the future convention does not imply any less emphasis upon the important issues of, for example, the prohibition of transfer or other elements, such as, especially, the important issue of non-production and the details of a verification system relating to non-production. However, our position on these issues is well known, since my delegation has in working paper CD/326 submitted detailed suggestions for the verification of non-production. In particular, in these papers, my delegation has developed a control system of a low level of intrusiveness over the industrial production of organophosphorus compounds on the basis of random inspections. For its part, the United Kingdom delegation has shown a pragmatic path towards the verification of non-production in working paper CD/353.

My delegation would counsel seriously against any attempt to solve the problem of non-production by other means than a pragmatic approach. Obviously, a high degree of expert knowledge is required to avoid loopholes in the future convention. On the other hand, we should not unduly blow up the scientific complexities of non-production, thus building roadblocks on the way to the early conclusion of a convention. It appears highly advisable to conduct our discussion on non-production under the auspices of genuine relevance in arms control terms, and to structure our debate in a more goal-oriented fashion.

In contact group C, under the brilliant leadership of our Dutch colleague, Mr. Akkerman, a consensus on the inclusion of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the future convention is imminent. There is now agreement in substance that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons



(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

will be included in the future convention, and that the verification system will also cover chemical weapons use. We still have to work out a formulation which will accomplish the inclusion of the use prohibition in the convention in correct relationship to the present rules of international law. One possible solution could consist in a proviso which would juxtapose an unambiguous prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and the acknowledgement that such provision would reaffirm and strengthen the interdiction of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In the view of my delegation it is regrettable that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 has, by virtue of the manifold reservations attached to it, de facto degenerated into a prohibition of the first use of chemical weapons only. It would have been a noble task for the Committee on Disarmament to eliminate the many ambiguities which result from the multitude of reservations to the Geneva Protocol by a constructive further development of law in the direction of an absolute interdiction of use. It is worthwhile to remind ourselves that such an evolution was in fact called for by the Geneva Disarmament Conference in the 1930s. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether the issue of the further evolution of international law in terms of a categorical prohibition of use -- if indeed a consensus of States to this effect cannot be reached during the current round of negotiations -- should be assigned to a later review conference which could deal with this problem, say, at the conclusion of the chemical weapons stock destruction phase.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that my delegation strongly advocates a negotiation procedure which tackles problems in a manner more clearly structured, gradual, and better adapted to the priorities. This would be a more promising path towards the solution of outstanding problems. Simultaneous work in all areas over-extends the Working Group and the contact groups. This, in our view, is one important lesson of the past couple of weeks. For many years now the Committee on Disarmament has been facing the challenge of working out a comprehensive and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, aimed at the elimination of this entire weapons category for all time. To this day, we have not responded to the challenge as we should. I would like to appeal to all delegations, in a solemn fashion, to make the utmost effort so that the Committee does not lose its credibility in this crucial domain.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): I should like first of all to express my thanks and appreciation to the delegation of Venezuela whose withdrawal from the list of speakers has allowed me to make a statement now, which I promise you will be very short and will in any case end before 1 o'clock.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

I should like, Mr. Chairman, to express my delegation's gratitude for the skilful way in which you are guiding our work and to assure you of our full co-operation during the rest of your period of chairmanship. With reference to the statement made by Ambassador Li, I should like to say that I am in the same situation-- I shall be obliged soon formally to take leave of the Committee on Disarmament, but I, too, shall remain as Permanent Representative in Geneva. I shall have the opportunity to make a statement on this subject at another meeting, and in view of the lateness of the hour I shall say no more about it at the moment.

I wish to introduce document CD/411, which has just been distributed, on behalf of the delegations of Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Belgium.

The inclusion on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament of the item, Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, reflects the growing concern of our States at this alarming problem. This concern has been confirmed in particular by the statements made in the Committee during this session by leading figures from our countries. The importance we attach to this question and our desire to find concrete solutions to it were expressed in this very room in particular by Mr. Genscher, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. van den Broeck, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and, very recently, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country, Mr. Tindemans.

We now have before us several important proposals which should enable us to tackle the problem as a whole in a systematic way. In this context, I should like to express our appreciation of the interest shown on all sides in the contributions of the Federal Republic of Germany, contained in document CD/357, and of Belgium, contained in document CD/380.

The task confronting the Committee on Disarmament is particularly great in this sphere.

While aware of the organizational difficulties constantly besetting the Committee on Disarmament, I cannot but express my regret at our inability to embark more rapidly, from the beginning of this part of our session, last June, on our work of substance on this subject. The time remaining before the closure of the Committee's 1983 session is now too short for us to do anything more than make a first general survey of the problem. In any event, purely procedural considerations ought no longer to be an obstacle to our efforts towards the substantive examination of the issue.

The purpose of document CD/411 is to make possible a structured discussion of the question of the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

Although the Committee's time-table is at present very full, we could initiate this discussion at informal meetings in the coming days, and it could be continued in an appropriate manner at our next session.



(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

Our task would then be to identify, among the elements constituting the notion of the prevention of nuclear war, that element or those elements with respect to which the Committee on Disarmament could, at the right time, fulfil its negotiating role and, to that end, agree on the most appropriate procedures for such negotiations.

Our draft is also designed to ensure that all proposals relating to the prevention of nuclear war should be examined systematically by the Committee on Disarmament.

We consider it essential that during the initial phase of our work all the possibilities for preventing war, and in particular nuclear war, should be clearly identified. We cannot at this stage prejudge the outcome of such a consideration or the possibilities for concrete action by the Committee. This would unfortunately be the case if we were arbitrarily to limit the sphere of our investigations or if we were here and now to decide on procedural formulas so vague that they would not enable us to negotiate specific measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

This remains our common objective. We ought therefore to see to it that we have adequate means for attaining it.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I have no further speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Since delegations have concluded their statements, I should like, on behalf of the members of the Committee, to express our regret that henceforward we shall no longer have the pleasure of the presence of Ambassador Li Luye of China in our midst. We very much appreciate his valuable co-operation and contributions, and look forward to collaboration with his successor. I am sure that we shall continue to maintain personal contacts with Ambassador Li Luye.

The Secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a time-table of meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies for next week. As usual, the time-table is purely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. The time-table was prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the Working Groups. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Committee is prepared to adopt this time-table.

The representative of the Soviet Union has the floor.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you Mr. Chairman: I have no objections, but I have two questions. The first question concerns the closure of the Committee's 1983 session. I simply cannot remember if we have taken a formal decision for the Committee to complete its work on a given date. If we have not done this, I should be grateful if we could do so at the Committee's first meeting next week, on Tuesday. My second question — well, we all seem to assume, at any rate in our conversations and consultations, that we shall end our work on 26 August; if that is the case, then I would like to know when the secretariat will have completed the preparation of the first sections of the Committee's draft report. If that were to be done, let us say, next week, that would help us to complete our work in time. But I feel bound to express a certain concern. Looking at this time-table I see that the working groups,

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

all except one, which is to complete its work on 15 August, will not have completed their work before the end of next week. This, I repeat, is a little worrying, since there is a danger of going on into the following week. I think, therefore, that since we have so few working days left, we should bear this fact in mind, and I would ask that the first sections of the Committee's draft report, which is always so expertly prepared by the secretariat, should be submitted to us as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I would like to say to the representative of the Soviet Union that the Chair intends to make a statement precisely on that subject; if, after I have made that statement, you still have certain questions, I shall gladly give you the floor again.

So, then, the Chair understands that the time-table as presented is approved.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): The Chair considers that the information given has been sufficient and I shall therefore pass on to other matters.

I should like to remind members of the Committee that, in accordance with our programme of work, we ought next week to consider the reports of the working groups and resolve outstanding organizational problems. I intend to adhere to the time-table as closely as possible, and I hope that members of the Committee will co-operate with me in this matter, especially by showing flexibility as regards the acceptance of compromise solutions. I should also like to urge the working groups to complete their reports so that the Committee can consider them next week. The secretariat will circulate its own draft report at the beginning of next week, probably on Monday. It is my intention to arrange informal meetings next week in order to complete the consideration of organizational matters.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has asked me to announce that the meeting of the Group scheduled to take place tomorrow, Friday, 12 August, at 10.30 a.m., has been put off to 12 noon so that the first complete draft text which the Chairman of the Group wishes to circulate will be available in Conference Room V. The Working Group will at the same time receive the reports of contact groups A and D.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 16 August, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.