

# COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 14 April 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. van Dongen

(Netherlands)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES

Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia:

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. B. GRINBERG

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U TIN KYAW HALING

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN

Miss C. de VARENNES

China:

Mr. LI LUYE

Mr. TIAN JIN

Mrs. GE YUYUN

Cuba:

Mr. P. NUÑEZ MCSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE

Miss K. SINEGIORGIS

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. B. D'ABOVILLE

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Mr. M. NOTZEL

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. B. DARMOSUNTANTO

Mr. N. WISNOEMERTI

Mrs. P. RAMADHAN

Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA

Iran:Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. C.M. OLIVA

Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA

Kenya:

Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD  
Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI  
Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN  
Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. A.N.C. NWAOZOMUDOH  
Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU  
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland:

Mr. H. JAROSZEK  
Mr. J. ZAWALONKA  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS  
Mr. G. GZEMPINSKI



Sri Lanka:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Mr. L. TOADER

Mr. A.T. JAYOKODDY

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Mrs. I. SUNDBERG

Mrs. A.M. LAU-ERIKSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN

Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN

Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN

Mr. G.N. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

Mr. B.P. NOBLE

Mrs. J.I. LINK

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

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Mr. M. BUSBY

Mr. P. CORDEN

Mr. W. HECKROTTE

Mr. R.L. HORNE

Mr. R. MIKULAK

Mr. J. HOGAN

Mr. J. MARTIN

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

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	Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO
<u>Yugoslavia:</u>	Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
<u>Zaire:</u>	Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA
<u>Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:</u>	Mr. R. JAIPAL
<u>Deputy Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament:</u>	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

re-open the 212th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the outset, allow me to welcome in the Committee the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, His Excellency Mr. Henryk Jaroszek, who is well known to the members of the Committee because of his vast diplomatic experience, in particular in United Nations affairs. Before being assigned to his important duties as Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, he served as Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations and held important posts in various United Nations bodies, including that of Chairman of the First Committee, and in his capacity as representative of his country in New York was also involved — deeply involved, I may say — in disarmament questions. Deputy Minister Jaroszek is listed to speak today and I am sure that members of the Committee will follow his statement with special interest. May I now call on His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland to take the floor.

Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): Mr. Chairman, let me at the outset express my sincere appreciation and thanks for your very kind words of welcome to me. I would like also to associate my delegation with the congratulations already expressed to you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this important body for the month of April. I am confident that under your skillful guidance this Committee will be able to make the so much needed progress in its work.

It is a privilege for me indeed to be able to address the Committee on Disarmament, the important and respected multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Poland has consistently attached great significance to the Committee's endeavours and to those of its predecessors for over two decades now. It is with a feeling of pleasure and pride that I recall my own participation in its work, as chairman of my country's delegation in the late 1960s. You were very kind to refer to my involvement in disarmament matters. At present, when two policy lines are competing, that of confrontation and armaments on one hand, and that of peaceful co-existence and disarmament on the other, the Committee has a very important role to play and there can be no doubt which line it should follow.

Poland and other socialist States — as, I am sure, the international community at large — have been gravely alarmed and disappointed at the unprecedented delay and loss of time in working out the Committee's agenda for 1983. It is, indeed, regrettable that some States should deem it appropriate to bring this body to a virtual standstill over the legitimate proposal of an overwhelming majority of its members to include in the agenda — pursuant to the broadly supported resolution of the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly — the all-important question of the prevention of nuclear war. We would like to hope that with the compromise solution reached on the agenda and the resumption of business by the working groups, nothing should now stand in the way of the Committee's productive work.

Obviously, its pace will be largely determined by the evolution of the international climate. At present, that climate is characterized by tensions generated, as they are, by the confrontation and armaments-oriented policy of the NATO alliance, a policy espoused and implemented with particular dedication,

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resent United States administration. On the other hand, there are highly encouraging indications in all parts of the world of the will to work for peace and return to détente. This has been manifested in particular by the Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty of 5 January 1983, as well as by the documents adopted at the recent Seventh Conference of Heads of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries in New Delhi.

The principal threat to world peace and international security stems from the imperialist policy of strength, pressure, interference in the internal affairs of States and encroachment on their national independence and sovereignty.

A part of this policy and its instrument are the ever-expanding armaments programmes pursued by the United States, both in the nuclear and the conventional fields, with a view to gaining military superiority. They bring the world dangerously close to nuclear catastrophe. A particular danger derives from the United States preparations to deploy in Western Europe a new generation of nuclear missiles, persistently carried on despite the pretended arms control formulas of a "zero option" or an "interim solution". Such schemes clearly aim at seriously upsetting the existing balance of forces, both in Europe and in global strategic terms. The so-called "interim solution" would result in a clear NATO superiority in nuclear warheads. It could therefore hardly be construed as designed to create premises for an agreement with the Soviet Union. It should not be a surprise to anybody that it has not been accepted. The just solution of the question of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe should exclude the deployment of new American missiles while ensuring the maintenance of a military-strategic balance at an ever decreasing level.

The latest ordinance of President Reagan authorizing the development of entirely new weapons systems, involving an intensive militarization of outer space, further testifies to the scope and long-term character of United States awesome armaments designs.

The threat of a nuclear conflict in which — as it is widely realized — there could be only losers and no winners, is highlighted by the repeated references in United States official quarters to the dangerous doctrines of "limited", "protracted" or "winnable" nuclear wars, launched and spread around with an evident aim to rationalize the irrational — the use of nuclear weapons. The international community can therefore hardly be misled by Washington's claims that its latest doctrine is innocent and purely defensive and seeks nothing but to render nuclear weapons obsolete. That doctrine must and will be taken for what it is — a step aimed at ushering in a new and frightful dimension of the arms race, of the highest immediate danger to mankind.

Speaking of Europe, for which the impending spiral of the nuclear arms race has particularly grave implications, one cannot overlook the fact that a country actively promoting NATO military designs shows ever less restraint in reviving the revanchist schemes that, in effect, aim at undermining the political and



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ope, the basic premises of peace and security on our continent. The negative consequences of these tendencies for the political climate and for détente and co-operation in Europe have been indicated in the communiqué of the recent Prague meeting of the Foreign Ministers of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

Grave as the international situation is, however, it still carries — as I have observed — a prospect of possible reversal of the negative trends in international relations. Indeed, political forces and civic movements standing up against the nuclear menace are becoming ever more numerous and active. The socialist States, as well as the non-aligned countries, are more firm than ever in speaking up, and acting, to stop the international situation from sliding down the nuclear collision course. We note that next to formidable peace and anti-nuclear movements in western Europe and the United States, political parties, including some of those in power, are becoming vocal in insisting upon a nuclear freeze and effective disarmament.

The political declaration of the Seventh Non-Aligned Summit Conference succinctly describes the present-day situation by saying that "Disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, is no longer a moral issue: it is an issue of human survival".

Against that background, it becomes clear why the socialist States and the Group of 21 set so great a store by the agenda item in this Committee on the prevention of nuclear war. Its importance has been accurately summed up in document CD/341 of the Group of 21 which states that all nations have both the right and the obligation to work collectively to dispel the danger of a nuclear holocaust. It has also been forcefully underlined in document CD/355 of a group of socialist States.

As is well known, it was on the initiative of the USSR that the United Nations General Assembly adopted at its thirty-sixth session the "Declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe". The call to prevent nuclear war was approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. At the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Soviet Union undertook a unilateral commitment on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, a step of the highest significance.

Realizing the potential for nuclear conflict held by the increasingly ominous confrontation between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty States, the socialist countries have been persistently looking for ways to alleviate and ultimately eliminate this confrontation.

In the Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted in Prague last January they came out with a concrete and realistic alternative to the course of confrontation. Among other things, they proposed to the NATO States the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. The treaty would be open to all other interested States.

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Central to such a treaty would be a mutual commitment of the States members of the two alliances not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other, hence not to be the first to use military force at all. This commitment could be made to cover third countries also. It is evident that the conclusion of the proposed treaty would have a positive impact on the course of international affairs, and in particular on disarmament efforts. It would greatly help to restore mutual confidence, an indispensable premise of any effective disarmament effort.

At the meeting in Prague a few days ago, the Foreign Ministers of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty considered further measures to be taken for the implementation of this initiative. They noted the interest with which the proposed treaty has been received by Governments and public opinion throughout the world. The stated intention of the NATO countries to examine the proposed agreement has also been acknowledged. The ministers expressed the hope that the examination will be constructive. It is the intention of the socialist States to co-operate closely with all interested countries in a productive consideration of various aspects of the proposed agreement, including those concerning the scope and content of possible obligations, their relationship to commitments under the United Nations Charter, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, as well as other bilateral and multilateral agreements and, last, but not least, the question of securing compliance with the treaty obligations. To this end, the participants in the Prague meeting deemed it useful to continue bilateral contacts with the States members of NATO and with other States, while also taking into consideration the possibility of dealing with some questions multilaterally at a level and in forms acceptable to all.

I have taken the liberty of speaking at some length on the topic of the proposed two-alliance treaty on the non-use of military force in view of its expected positive effect on the international situation, and in particular for maintaining and enhancing the policy of dialogue and understanding in Europe and in the world. Needless to say, it would also greatly increase the prospects of success of this Committee's endeavours.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to turn now to another pressing, high-priority item on the agenda of this body, namely, the question of the elimination of chemical weapons. As is well known, that question has traditionally figured prominently among the disarmament issues on which my country has focused its attention, both around this conference table and in the United Nations. At the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, I had the opportunity of putting on record Poland's satisfaction with the productive results which this organ, through its subsidiary body, had been able to score in 1982. Indeed, we hope that also in 1983, despite the regrettable delay in the reactivation of the chemical working group, it will prove possible to make a meaningful advance towards the long-overdue goal of a multilateral convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

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1 of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which — as well as the Committee — addressed also a number of other priority items on the agenda of the Committee, urged this body to accelerate the elaboration of an international convention on banning and liquidating chemical weapons. We believe that constructive proposals and important concessions, especially with regard to the scope of prohibition and verification in a future convention, made by the USSR, both at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and again last February in the Committee on Disarmament, should greatly help in achieving early, positive results of the Committee's nearly 15 years of efforts. The question of chemical weapons has its specifically European aspect, too. There is the prospect of the imminent deployment by the United States of the most lethal, binary weapons in Western Europe, on the territory of some of its NATO allies. Bearing this in mind, in the Prague Declaration the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty offered a constructive, practical and far-sighted proposal. It provides for practical steps, parallel to the efforts of this Committee, to be taken in order to rid Europe of these weapons of mass annihilation. Poland and other States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty welcome the interest shown in this idea on the part of a number of European countries. Building upon this understandable interest, the socialist States are prepared to initiate meaningful contacts with all interested States, including States members of the NATO alliance, in order to arrange for a common consideration of practical problems with a view to achieving the goal of a Europe free from chemical weapons. This readiness of ours has been reaffirmed by the Foreign Ministers of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty meeting in Prague last week.

We have no doubt in our mind that the successful outlawing of these weapons from the continent of Europe would greatly contribute to the comprehensive ban on chemical weapons which we in this Committee have been tirelessly seeking for more than a decade.

I have referred in my statement only to selected matters connected with some of the priority items on the Committee's agenda. In the opinion of the Polish Government, these are matters of immediate urgency and utmost importance. Poland continues to stand determined to make its active and constructive contribution towards the cessation of the arms race, disarmament, the restoration and consolidation of détente and of the climate of confidence in international relations as well as the development of broad peaceful co-operation among States. This determination is based upon the invariable principles of the foreign policy of the Polish People's Republic, upon our historical experience and best-conceived national interest. This policy is being carried out in close collaboration with our allies, in co-operation with the non-aligned countries and all other States that are willing to go along this path.



The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. The Chair has five more speakers on the list for this morning — the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Sri Lanka, Kenya and the United Kingdom, and I now call on the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Thielicke, to take the floor.

Mr. THIELICKE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, the head of my delegation, Ambassador Dr. Herder, will soon take the opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of April. Permit me today to address two items on our agenda.

This week is devoted to a consideration of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, which is by no means a new item.

Since 1975 it has been discussed at the sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, in this Committee, in its predecessor and in other forums. Its urgency has been emphasized in quite a number of United Nations resolutions. Comprehensive and detailed draft treaties and working documents have been tabled by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament. Together with many other delegations, we have responded to arguments casting doubts on different aspects of the proposed approach.

So, there is no shortage of ideas concerning the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction. But the question might be asked, why, then, have we not come to an agreement in this field?

Why have appropriate, business-like negotiations not even started, and why has it not been possible to set up a group of experts? Obviously, here as in other cases, one side is not yet ready to embark on such negotiations. Thus, one possible road to forestall the arms race has not been sufficiently explored, and no positive action has been taken.

But the vicious circle is going on -- new weapon systems provoke the creation of new dangerous warfare doctrines, undermine existing arms limitation agreements and ongoing negotiations, and, last but not least, lead to the channelling of ever more resources from peaceful to military purposes. In this forum of course it is not necessary to elaborate this in detail. Suffice it to mention one example which clearly illustrates this dangerous process. Only recently the Administration of the United States announced its intention to begin what was called an "aggressive" research and development programme on a ballistic missile defence system which is supposed to materialize toward the end of this century. Such a programme, obviously, is part and parcel of plans to achieve military superiority by creating in parallel an offensive nuclear first-strike capability as well as a defensive strategic potential which are to complement each other and make possible "successful" limited or protracted nuclear wars. At the ongoing Berlin International Scientific Conference, "Karl Marx and our time -- the struggle for peace and social progress", the Head of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, emphasized that "the most recent plans of the United States to convert also outer space into a missile platform would only open the doors to another escalation of the arms race and increase the risk of war on Earth".

In advancing such a new AFM project, its inventors obviously hope to take advantage of the state of the art in the field of the military application of lasers, particle beams, microwave devices and others. It is alleged that the military use of such weapons and devices would be confined to purely defensive purposes, a kind of surgical operation against other weapons.



(Mr. Thielicke, German Democratic Republic)

but this seems to be only the tip of the iceberg. Particle-beam weapons, for example, could hardly be denied to have a mass destruction potential. Nearly two years ago, the head of my delegation, Ambassador Dr. Herder, underlined in this Committee:

"Generally it is emphasized that particle-beam weapons should be used for defensive purposes against such targets as satellites and missiles. Very often it is forgotten that they could have a mass destruction capability against biological targets as well. Such a weapon could be space-based and operate like a large-scale neutron bomb. In this context a United States official was quoted as saying, 'This would destroy a population without breaking a single brick'." (CD/PV.136, 9 July 1981).

So, there is a clear necessity to prevent such dangerous concepts as particle-beam weapons, infrasonic weapons or weapons based on certain types of electromagnetic radiation from entering military arsenals as new weapons of mass destruction.

To embark upon serious work in this regard, we advocate the establishment of an expert group to clarify questions connected with the scope of a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of new kinds and systems of weapons of mass destruction and to review developments in this field, as called for by paragraph 77 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Scientists all over the world are concerned about the escalating arms race, particularly its qualitative aspect. Ever more they express their readiness to shoulder their responsibility for peace and disarmament. Another proof of this was a round-table conference which took place last week in Berlin, the capital of the German Democratic Republic, organized by the World Federation of Scientific Workers. About 40 scientists and peace researchers from 15 countries, including the United States and West European countries, addressed the subject, "Science and the qualitative arms race". Particular attention was directed to preventing the misuse of new discoveries and scientific and technical achievements for military purposes, including the creation of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. It was stressed that the use of science and technology for exclusively peaceful purposes should become a basic ethic principle.

Diplomats and politicians earnestly concerned about the future of mankind cannot afford to neglect such appeals.

Let me summarize. To tackle in a practical manner the question of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, my delegation favours the following approach:

(a) The adoption of a declaration by the permanent members of the Security Council as well as militarily significant States concerning the refusal to create new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction;

(Mr. Thielicke, German Democratic Republic)

(b) The establishment of an ad hoc group of experts;

(c) The conclusion of a comprehensive or "umbrella" agreement which would be supplemented by a list of single types and systems of prohibited new weapons of mass destruction;

(d) The conclusion of single agreements on the prohibition of specific new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, if this is deemed necessary.

Before I conclude, allow me to make some remarks with regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons. In the course of this session my delegation has already commented on recent regional initiatives which have been motivated by the danger of the production and deployment of new kinds of chemical weapons. At their recent Prague meeting, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty member States further developed the proposal to free Europe from chemical weapons. The Ministers expressed the readiness of the socialist countries to consider with other interested States practical questions related to this objective. This would especially apply to the scope and sequence of the relevant measures, the content of the commitments and verification of their observance.

In this connection I should like to draw your attention to the proposal made by my country on the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe.

These proposals have met with interest and response in many European countries. At the same time we heard here in this Committee arguments according to which the proposals in question would be bound to distract attention from a comprehensive solution of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The recent Prague meeting gave an unequivocal and pertinent answer to those arguments in stating that "the Warsaw Treaty member States continue to maintain that the radical solution of the problem of the prevention of chemical war would be the prohibition and the destruction of chemical weapons on a global scale". It was emphasized that the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone, as a parallel measure, should facilitate the achievement of this goal.

As far as the further negotiations on a chemical weapons ban in this Committee are concerned, my delegation outlined on 22 February its approach aiming at beginning a new phase in our negotiations. In the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, we noted with interest the ideas of its newly appointed Chairman, Ambassador McPhail of Canada, on the further proceedings of the Group. We will support all efforts directed at reaching quick results in drafting a chemical weapons convention. Having this in mind we see much merit in a kind of "double approach", i.e. to draft in the Working Group and its contact groups the basic provisions of the convention on which there is agreement, and to proceed with the clarification of unresolved questions as well as the elaboration of detailed provisions connected with the implementation of the convention.

In the Working Group, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic will actively take part in such work and elaborate on the issues in question.

At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of April. I would like to assure you of the full support of my delegation in your efforts to achieve the results commonly desired.

My words of appreciation go also to Ambassador Skalli of Morocco for his efficient activity displayed as the Chairman for the previous month.

I would, in addition, like to join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Jaroszek, whose statement today was a contribution of great value to our work.

In my statement today, in connection with the item inscribed in our programme of work, I would like to deal with the qualitative aspects of the arms build-up and those of disarmament.

Let me start with a quotation. It goes like this: "... nothing was needed but the political will to make the Treaty and to carry it out." I am sure that there is nothing extraordinary in this statement, as we could witness similar ones here in the Committee on Disarmament, not to mention about other disarmament forums. Consequently, there is nothing interesting about the fact that it was made here in Geneva. But nevertheless what makes the above-mentioned statement so significant in the eyes of my delegation as to cite it, is that it was made in September 1933, that is, half a century ago, in the Assembly of the League of Nations, two months after the World Disarmament Conference had broken off as a result of the failure to come to an agreement, on other things, about a treaty on qualitative disarmament.

I do not want at this juncture to dwell upon the highly hypothetical question of how far different would have been the path of subsequent events in the 1930s had the conference adopted the treaty on qualitative disarmament. Let me rather point out that although 1933 is separated from 1983 by 50 years and -- I do not hesitate promptly to add -- by the second world war, with all the differences one can find many similar features in comparing the international situation now and then: similar rapidly deteriorating international relations, a similar continuing build-up of armaments, similar skyrocketing military expenditures, a similar stagnation of international trade and disorder in monetary relations, and a similar concern about the future on the part of world public opinion. And one should add legitimately to the similarities, the same lack of agreement or, to be more precise, the same lack of political readiness of some to come to an agreement about the limitation of the qualitative arms build-up and about qualitative disarmament. Even some of the arguments used nowadays to oppose qualitative disarmament seem to be really similar, as if the years that have passed since that time and the severe lessons of subsequent events have left them untouched.

Having made these introductory remarks, I would like to state the aims of my statement today: I would like to refute, on the one hand, those arguments which, alluding to the paramount character of national security, try to approve the justness of the qualitative arms build-up carried out to the detriment of international security, and on the other hand those counter-arguments which deny the feasibility of a comprehensive or specific approach to qualitative disarmament negotiations, referring to technical difficulties of different nature.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

affairs in the field of qualitative disarmament from the point of view of efforts which have been displayed to that end, we might have the impression that significant steps have been taken in this field. As a proof of that point, it may be recalled that on the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction, Malta initiated resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly as far back as 1969. Since 1975, when the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of an international agreement on that question and submitted a draft of it as well, the General Assembly has been dealing regularly with the question and adopted several resolutions. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and this Committee have been considering the question since 1976. In spite of the fact that some delegations rejected the approach of the socialist States aimed at a comprehensive treaty, parallel with special agreements to be concluded on specific weapons, the Committee on Disarmament held a number of informal meetings on the subject with the participation of experts, although it is only to be regretted that certain members failed to agree to the establishment of a group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question.

Another set of examples of efforts to curb qualitatively the development of new weapons can be identified as well: there are agreements of that kind like the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, the 1972 ABM Treaty, the 1974 threshold test-ban Treaty and the 1979 SALT II Treaty.

But if we consider the above-mentioned disarmament efforts, not in themselves, but in the degree to which they contributed to curbing the qualitative arms build-up, the whole situation is far from being satisfactory. If, for example, we take into consideration that after a quantitative arms build-up carried out in the course of the early 1960s, one of the great powers shifted the emphasis to qualitative factors, and has generated and maintained the process which was characterized by Edward Teller as "a race of technology", a process which until recently has not ceased to yield order-of-magnitude improvements of destructive capabilities. The sole multilateral negotiating body in the same period of time, because of the unwillingness of certain delegations, has not been able to address adequately the problem of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, either in a comprehensive or in a specific manner.

As for the agreements cited above as curbing the qualitative arms build-up, it speaks for itself that one of the parties to the partial test-ban Treaty still, in 1983, considers as a long-term objective the obligations assumed by the provisions of Article 1, subparagraph (b), of the Treaty. The threshold test-ban Treaty and the SALT II Treaty have not entered into force because of the reluctance of the same State to ratify them, and probably no one fails to recall that the fate of the ABM Treaty was brought into question not so long ago.

In order to assess the situation, let me review those technological developments initiated by one of the great powers which could not but generate a qualitative arms race in the past 10-15 years. In general, one may state that throughout that period of time developments were not characterized by revolutionary breakthroughs but by persistent and more or less steady advances in all the systems that constitute the whole range of strategic offensive armaments and anti-missile and space defensive systems.



(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

In more concrete terms, I would like to enumerate the following areas:

A major qualitative development called multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) resulted in the early 1970s in a substantial increase in the number of deliverable warheads on land-based and sea-based missiles.

Another development has been a significant increase of missile accuracy during the 1970s. That increased accuracy is to be further improved by the deployment of manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles (MARVs) in the 1980s. As a result of technological refinements, a twofold efficacy improvement in warhead yield has been carried out.

Significant advances were made in the field of anti-submarine warfare ensuring the attainment of a near real-time detection and location of submarines.

The air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles represent another technological development realized in the 1970s.

A new "stealth" technology has been developed during the same period of time which, by reducing the radar cross-section of bombers and cruise missiles, enables them to penetrate enemy air defence systems.

An additional item among major qualitative developments is the research and development of a ballistic missile defence system culminating in the high-level statement made on 23 March of this year about the objectives of the programme. This is a subject on which my delegation had ample opportunity to dwell in a statement made on 15 March.

Research and development have been carried out at an accelerating pace to achieve such near-term capabilities as ground-, air-, and space-based laser weapon systems.

One should not fail to add that the 1970s brought about such weapons as the enhanced radiation weapon (nuclear neutron weapon) and the binary chemical weapon.

As a logical result of the review of what has taken place in the field of military technology of strategic importance in the last 10-15 years, the question nearly automatically arises: How does the State that initiated so many new rounds in the arms race wish to have its security interest safeguarded by the utilization of those qualitative developments? The basic principle and endeavour behind those developments can be understood if we place the whole complex of technological advances in a double context: the first one is the characteristics and capabilities of those weapons; the second one is the effect they have on strategic concepts.

Having scrutinized the qualitative developments, we can state that as a result of the qualitative build-up during the period under review, more accurate, sophisticated and flexible weapon systems have emerged, breaking those technological limitations which earlier made nuclear weapons unthinkable as useful instruments of political and military power. As a result of that process and of some other changes in political-military concepts, greater emphasis than ever before has been placed on the possibility of fighting and winning nuclear wars to render the nuclear threat more credible. The above-mentioned process characterized by the continuous shift -- using the authors' terminology -- "from deterrence to counterforce strategy" is raising several questions.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The socialist countries, in statements delivered at the highest level, made it clear a long time ago that they oppose deterrence, that is, the basing of security on the nuclear threat, and they treat it as a situation historically and technologically imposed upon them. At the same time we should not forget that while the doctrine of deterrence at least reckoned with some kind of equality between States concerning possibilities, the shift in strategic concepts raises well-founded concerns as the qualitatively new weapon systems, both those already developed and those under development, fully coincide with the prerequisites of a pre-emptive first strike. Thus they can only be evaluated as an endeavour to obtain absolute strategic superiority. As a matter of fact, the following requirements necessary for a pre-emptive first strike are enumerated in the 1981 SIPRI Yearbook: "Most of an enemy's retaliatory capability must be destroyed quickly, efficiently and without warning. This requires offensive weapons which either reach their targets very quickly or can approach their targets without detection. It requires highly accurate and reliable weapons which possess a high one-shot kill probability". Further, it points out the necessity of the defence of both military and civilian targets against those retaliatory forces which do remain.

And thus we have come to the quintessence of the subject, namely whether the qualitative arms build-up at present being carried out really enhances the security of the State involved, and in what manner it influences the security of other nations and international stability as a whole. First of all, there is a solid empirical basis to prove that any kind of superiority, be it quantitative or qualitative, is only a temporary one. One can suppose that this axiom will retain its validity in the future as well. At the same time, the present endeavours to gain qualitative superiority are radically different from earlier ones as they direct the arms race along the path of an ever-growing increase in the relative advantages of a pre-emptive first strike. Thus, doubts about future intentions are becoming stronger than ever, resulting in a situation characterized by a total lack of confidence and general insecurity. A situation like this may become fatal in a military or political crisis. Even without bold fantasy one can imagine what consequences it would have in the event of false alarms, especially if, as a result of the deployment of new types of ballistic missiles in western Europe, the warning time were to be reduced to six minutes, a time-frame which has been necessary on several occasions to identify false alarms. All that means that such aspirations not merely fail to recognize the principle of equality and equal security which was generally agreed on in various treaties, but, as we can see, they are detrimental to the security of the State involved. It might sound paradoxical but it is true that a relative increase in qualitative superiority actually brings about a decrease in national security. The world has reached the stage in the development of military technology where the strengthening of national security cannot be artificially separated from the strengthening of international security. It is our firm conviction that in the period to come, national security can be enhanced only in organic connection with international security, and not through a qualitative arms build-up but through a qualitative arms limitation and disarmament. In order to achieve that aim, qualitative arms limitation and disarmament must be an integral part of disarmament

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

efforts so as to plug efficiently all future channels of the qualitative arms race. Such an approach should not exclude the qualitative limitation and prohibition of concrete types and systems of weapons. On the contrary, such an approach requires, for example, the negotiation and conclusion of a set of individual agreements. Another example of a comprehensive manner of handling the problem is to be found in resolution 37/77 B, in which the General Assembly called for the renunciation of the use of new discoveries and scientific and technical achievements for military purposes.

In the Political Declaration adopted in Prague on 5 January of this year, the leading representatives of the Warsaw Treaty member States emphasized that "the arms race is advancing into a qualitatively new and much more dangerous stage involving all kinds of weapons both nuclear and conventional and all types of military activity and affecting virtually all regions of the world" (CD/338, p.2).

In view of the great dangers inherent in a new round of the qualitative arms race, the world simply cannot afford to let meaningful negotiations on the subject be further blocked by some States which make allusions to technical problems of definition, classification or identification, as has been the case in the Committee on Disarmament in connection with new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. I do not think it is difficult to recognize that there are qualitatively new types and systems of weapons which are of strategic importance. The disarmament community should be able to match the challenge posed to world security by these weapons if States give up routine-like arguments over-emphasizing technical difficulties and abandon counter-arguments opposing real and meaningful negotiations. This is not an easy task, but results will justify our efforts if we succeed.

As an epilogue, permit me to single out the example of MIRV warheads to show what the world community might gain from curbing the qualitative arms race. Recently several politicians in the United States have realized that the technologically generated arms race might backfire. They are proposing a wide variety of steps to solve the problem. Former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in an essay published in Time magazine on 21 March, recommends a dramatic new approach to face the challenge of technology. His proposal deserves the utmost interest, not only because his plan would scrap all MIRVs and instead deploy single-warhead missiles, but because he was one of the foster-fathers of the MIRVs. One feels tempted to imagine how much the world could have gained had the decision-makers at the appropriate moment been able to resist the temptation of the illusion of greater security through technological superiority. Concerning the waste of material resources, it is a difficult and probably time-consuming task to evaluate it. One is probably not wrong in guessing that it is not a small amount of money. It is easier to tell the time-factor: it is nearly 20 years since the decision to put MIRV warheads on United States submarine-launched ballistic missiles was taken in 1964. It might mean as well that qualitative disarmament in that particular field lags behind the arms build-up by at least 20 years or, to put it in another way, it has taken nearly 20 years after identification to recommend concrete actions to abandon these weapons, an argument which is not really in favour of those opposing the comprehensive and preventive approach to new types and systems of weapons. The simplest task is to estimate how much the world community should win from it in terms of security, though security is not a category in the realm of the exact sciences. The answer is: incredibly much.

\_\_\_\_\_ thanks Ambassador Komives for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming chairmen. I now call upon the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Jayakoddy, to take the floor. You have the floor, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. JAYAKODDY (Sri Lanka): As this is the first time that the Sri Lanka delegation is addressing this Committee in the month of April, permit me to associate my delegation with the congratulations and welcome that have been extended to you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee for April. The effective manner in which you are presiding over our deliberations, Mr. Chairman, deepens our confidence in your wise and experienced handling of the manifold duties of the chairmanship of this Committee. My delegation wishes you further success and assures you of its fullest co-operation. Permit me also to extend my delegation's sincere appreciation to distinguished Ambassador Ali Skalli of Morocco for his outstanding stewardship of the chairmanship of this Committee in the month of March. The elegant skill and understanding with which he successfully guided this Committee's work was indeed confirmation of the excellence of the international diplomacy of the Kingdom of Morocco, for which all of us here have the highest regard. My delegation thanks distinguished Ambassador Skalli sincerely for his valuable contribution. Allow me also to extend a warm welcome to the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, His Excellency Mr. Henryk Jaroszek, and express our appreciation of the contribution he has made to this Committee's work.

Mr. Chairman, as I may not be in Geneva for a few days next week, I seek the indulgence of the Committee to address it on item 7 of our agenda, the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

At last year's summer session of this Committee, the delegation of Sri Lanka expressed in detail its views on item 7, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We tried to highlight what was taking place in the development of weapon systems that are designed for use in outer space. We emphasized that at least one system had reached operational capability, and that other weapon systems would fast reach their full development and thus become operational. Our concern was that these new weapon systems would soon be integrated into military doctrines and strategies that included their use, thus converting outer space into an arena of the arms race.

My delegation concluded that if the arms race in outer space had not commenced, then it was very close at hand, and if no concrete, urgent action was taken now to prevent it, the world would find itself very soon in the midst of a situation that would be far more complex and dangerous than what we face today.

In recent months, particularly during the last few weeks, there has been an incessant flow of information, analysis and comment which confirms that the apprehensions and fears that have been expressed in this Committee and outside it about the extension of the arms race into outer space have not been exaggerated. Many distinguished representatives in this Committee last year, and during the current session, have presented us with striking evidence of developments that are inevitably leading the world into an arms race outside this planet. I shall not try today to regale this Committee with details of these developments as we are now quite familiar with what is happening and what we can expect in future years up to and into the next millennium. I shall restrict myself to quoting a few sentences from an article entitled "The decisive frontier" appearing in Omni magazine in November 1981 in which the author, Mr. Jerry Pournelle, says as follows: "It is an unpalatable truth, but we must face it: before the end of this century -- probably in this decade -- space weapons will end the balance of terror that has made nuclear war all but unthinkable for the last 36 years. They will make



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ose undamaged victor could dictate terms to a disarmed and helpless loser". I have no comment to offer on these words except to say I hope the author will not be proved correct. Since preparing this text I have seen this morning's Herald Tribune and it is worth quoting from an article by Flora Lewis on a recent conference held in London: "A small group of people, including some top experts on space war, has held a conference near here on the military use of space. Their chilling conclusion was that the military space age has arrived and cannot be revoked. The questions remaining are whether there will be weapons in space and war in space".

For my country, the prevention of the extension of the arms race into outer space is a major political issue of our times. It is both a political issue and a disarmament issue. Inherent in the political issue is whether the international community intends to shut off outer space once and for all from the arms race and thereby preserve it for peaceful purposes. Having saturated this planet with enough explosive and incendiary power to blow it up and roast it many times over, do we now intend to invade the heavens with new weapon systems so as to protect and safeguard our nuclear arsenals down below? There are philosophical and moral aspects to the issue, but they are not for this forum and therefore I shall bypass them. But we must face up to the political issue that is involved and we, as the Committee on Disarmament, the only forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations, are the appropriate body to negotiate on it as a disarmament issue.

Sri Lanka, a country without any space capability for the present or the foreseeable future, has welcomed with appreciation the achievements of all space powers in their civilian space programmes. We hope that they will continue and benefit the world as a whole. It therefore comes as a disappointment to us to know that a State with major space capabilities has decided to commence research on an anti-ballistic missile system to be used for defensive purposes in outer space. The concept underlying the system envisaged is not new and has been around for several years in different forms. But what is new and significant is that the decision to start research amounts to beginning the first stage in a familiar four-stage process with regard to new weapon systems. It begins with research, which of course comes out of what is felt to be a perceived need. Then follows development, with simulated testing followed by acquiring operational capability. Inevitably, there then arises the pressure to deploy. Once deployed and forming part of strategy and tactics, there is proliferation, quantitative and qualitative. And after a time-lag during which unlimited resources would have been spent will come moves to dismantle and eliminate the system, either through bilateral negotiations or perhaps as an item on the agenda of work of this Committee because more reliable, more effective, more destructive systems have been developed.

The decision I referred to, coming as it does at a time when concern and apprehension about the extension of the arms race into outer space are high and widespread, complicates even more the complexities that are involved in safeguarding outer space for peaceful purposes. We hope that reason, and the awareness of the responsibility that goes with being a State with major space capabilities, will prevent action that can lead to an extension of the arms race into outer space.

This Committee last year and earlier in this session has addressed item 7 both in plenary and in informal meetings. At the thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, too, the issue has been examined. To my delegation it appears that there are at present three different approaches to the issue prevailing in the Committee. Let me take them up in ascending order.

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I regretfully characterize as the passive or do-little approach, suggests that item 7 remain on the Committee's agenda and that it is of some importance. At the same time, it is said that item 7 is a highly complex issue, very technical, and that the Committee has no experience of negotiating disarmament issues relating to outer space. Inherent in this approach is the view that the item be discussed and debated further in the Committee both in plenary and informal sessions, but there is no willingness or readiness to recognize the need for setting up a subsidiary body of the Committee to negotiate on the issue. If this approach is followed by the Committee the outcome would be that all of us could have excellent opportunities for spelling out 1,001 scenarios of coming star-wars and perhaps transform this Committee into being a learned society on outer space. But the Committee will make no progress in tackling the substance of the issue. The Committee's immobility in adopting any meaningful action will be matched on the outside with the intense pursuit of developments which will make it even more difficult to initiate action, as desired by the great majority of States, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

My delegation regrets the continuation of this approach in the Committee. To limit ourselves to debating, discussing and exchanging of views on what is manifestly a serious concern about preventing a danger to humanity before it grows more threatening and irreversible, is an abdication of our responsibilities towards the living and the generations that are to follow. In the early years after the Second World War, countries such as mine were either newly independent or still colonies, and we had no voice in disarmament negotiations. We were innocent bystanders whilst the nuclear arms race started and gathered momentum. The mushroom-like clouds from the nuclear-weapon tests lifted and we found ourselves hostages of the nuclear-weapon States. But now the picture is significantly different. We have found seats in this forum -- the only forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations -- and it is our intention to act vigorously and persistently in pressing for meaningful action towards preventing an arms race in outer space before it is too late. My delegation is not alone in this. The majority of States members of this Committee have told us that they cannot rest satisfied with the passive approach of doing little. They have called for a more positive attitude to be shown. We trust that this call will not be rejected.

The second approach that we find, the intermediate one, contains more positive elements. It encompasses the desire to set up a subsidiary body of this Committee to negotiate an agreement related to one weapon system that is now operational or to a restricted number of aspects of the entire issue of preventing an arms race in outer space. The chief characteristic of this approach is that it fragments and compartmentalizes the main issue and presses for urgent action on aspects that it identifies as of highest priority. But it fails to give due consideration to the fact that in the prevention of an arms race in outer space there are many aspects that are interrelated and linked inextricably, aspects that must be taken up together, and that fragmentation contributes to delaying and avoiding a comprehensive look at the entire issue. Once again the argument of complexity and lack of expertise in the Committee on negotiating disarmament relating to outer space arises, but this in itself cannot be an insurmountable obstacle.

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My delegation welcomes the initiatives that have come from a number of States that can be identified as supporting this intermediate approach. These initiatives have helped to give better shape and direction to our deliberations and to shed light on the complexities that we shall face. But my delegation wishes to stress that a partial, fragmented approach avoids the main issue, viz., addressing ourselves to preventing an arms race in all its aspects, and I repeat, in all its aspects, in outer space. The information that has been presented to this Committee this year and last year, what is known publicly about developments that are now under way, the consequences of such developments and the repeated concern that has been expressed by the international community cannot be ignored or responded to by partial measures alone.

I now come to the third approach with which my delegation is fully associated. The elements in this third approach, the comprehensive one, are:

- (i) It looks at the issue as a single integrated one that is made up of several aspects;
- (ii) It addresses itself to sealing off outer space in its entirety as an arena of the arms race;
- (iii) It calls for the setting up of a subsidiary body of the Committee as the vehicle for carrying out negotiations to draft an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent the extension of the arms race into outer space;
- (iv) It is flexible in its formulation, providing for taking up on a priority basis, if that is called for, particular aspects of the issue within a comprehensive, all-inclusive framework;
- (v) By being comprehensive it is not discriminatory or weighted to one side, and
- (vi) It has the expressed support of the overwhelming majority of States members of the United Nations and in this Committee.

This approach, in our view, offers the best prospects for this Committee to respond as it should in working for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Group of 21 proposed this approach in this Committee last year and it is presented in document CD/329. It will be recalled that at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly a group of non-aligned and neutral countries and a group of socialist countries co-sponsored resolution 37/83 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which was adopted by 138 votes in favour, 7 abstentions and one against. Paragraph 6 of that resolution states that the General Assembly

"Further requests the Committee on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its session in 1983, with a view to

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undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

The United Nations General Assembly has thus in clear terms communicated its request to this Committee. We are aware that in certain circles it is fashionable to attach little weight to United Nations General Assembly resolutions and to give them a minimum of attention or even less consideration. But the General Assembly still remains one of the main channels by which the wishes of member States can be communicated to this Committee. If we in the Committee pay little regard to the requests of the General Assembly, we might be confronted with a situation where all States Members of the United Nations would want membership in this Committee, or may choose to come here as observers, to get their concerns heard. My delegation defends very strongly the autonomous character of this Committee and its right to order and organize its work in independent fashion. But this Committee does not work in a world of its own -- in a vacuum that it might choose to create for itself. It works in the international political environment and must be responsive to and reflect the concerns of the overwhelming majority of mankind. It must listen to and respond constructively to what comes out of the annual gathering of States' representatives at the United Nations. It must therefore respond positively to resolution 37/83.

In this Committee there is very broad support for the approach contained in the Group of 21's proposal. This support comes not only from the Group of 21. The group of socialist countries in this Committee, which have submitted their own proposals here and which were co-sponsors of General Assembly resolution 37/83, I believe hold a view not different from that held by the Group of 21.

It is my delegation's view that the deliberations of this Committee on item 7 up to now have provided adequate substance and demonstrated strong political will to set up a subsidiary body, an ad hoc working group, on the basis of the Group of 21 proposal, with the kind of mandate suggested in document CD/329. The setting up of ad hoc working groups is now a tested and proven method for deepening this Committee's work on an agenda item, and for moving from the general area to the specifics of an issue. As we all know, disarmament negotiations when conducted through a subsidiary body of the Committee envisage a preliminary stage when we must deal with defining the issue with clarity and precision, identifying aspects and focusing on interrelationships and linkages. It involves fixing elements and priorities and profiling components with a view to giving the proper weight, dimensions and recognition to all aspects of the issue. The essential prerequisite of agreeing on language, to be sure that we all attach a common meaning to the words we use, must be heavily underlined at the beginning. The Committee has accumulated invaluable experience and expertise in negotiations through the subsidiary bodies. In calling for the setting up of an ad hoc working group on item 7, the Group of 21 proceeds from this experience. The lack of success on some items in ad hoc working groups need not deter us from choosing similar mechanisms for resolving the issues that still confront us.

May I now say a few words about the complexity of the issue and the need for technical expertise. Every issue that comes before us is complex and in different degree they all call for technical expertise. Several delegations in the Committee have already expressed their intention and even readiness to come before this Committee with the technical expertise that may be required on item 7. It is the view of my delegation that the members of the Committee can decide and organize



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the form and modalities by which it can benefit from technical expertise. No single method or form needs to be considered sacrosanct to the extent that it must be adopted because it was the mode in the past. The Committee must not be bound by past practice alone. It should be inventive and innovative in deciding on the modalities of securing the technical expertise that it may require.

My delegation therefore hopes that the Committee this year will reach a consensus on the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the basis of what is proposed in document CD/329. In the event of this being realized, my delegation would suggest that the ad hoc working group address itself to the following:

Firstly, negotiations to draft a comprehensive agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prohibit

(a) The stationing in orbit around the Earth, on any celestial body or at any other location in outer space of any weapon which has been designed to inflict injury or cause any other form of damage on the Earth, in the atmosphere or on objects placed in space; and

(b) The testing, production, deployment or use of any space-based, air-based or ground-based weapons system which is designed to damage, destroy or interfere with the functioning of any space-craft of any nation.

It is hardly necessary to emphasize that this work involves examining and establishing adequate and effective measures for verifying compliance with the terms of any agreement or agreements that will be negotiated.

Secondly, the ad hoc working group would start examining the feasibility of extending article IV of the outer space Treaty of 1967 to include a ban on all kinds of weapons from space, including all weapons based in space for use against any target and all anti-satellite weapons regardless of where they are based.

We are confident that such a start is feasible and reflects the desire of the United Nations General Assembly as expressed in resolution 37/83. The Committee, in our view, has an excellent opportunity either to begin on a meaningful course of action or to remain deadlocked and divided on the issue.

Finally, may I address a few words, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, to the distinguished representatives of the United States and the USSR. Your countries possess the major space capabilities. Through the excellence of your scientific, technical and technological cadres and the willingness of your two governments to invest very large resources, even in times of unprecedented world economic turmoil, you have contributed immensely towards realizing what is perhaps mankind's oldest dream -- discovering, exploring and benefiting from outer space. You have the biggest responsibility in preventing outer space from becoming a new arena of the arms race. That responsibility can be truly carried out by a resumption of your bilateral talks that faded away in 1979, and by assisting this Committee fully to initiate and follow through active, meaningful work on item 7 of the agenda. My delegation is confident that both your countries will respond positively to the challenge and the opportunity that is before you.

thanks the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Jayakoddy, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman for the month of March and to the Chairman for the month of April.

Distinguished delegates, it has in the meantime become apparent that we shall not be able to conclude today's debate before 1 o'clock. Since there are not only two more speakers on the list, but also a number of procedural items to be dealt with, the Chair would therefore propose that we deal with the procedural items now, and ask the distinguished representatives of Kenya and the United Kingdom to reserve their interventions until 3.30 this afternoon, when the session will be resumed. This would also imply that the Contact Group on Principles of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament could only take place after — immediately after — the closure of this afternoon's continued plenary session, and that the meeting of the informal working party on procedures which was scheduled for 3.30 this afternoon will also commence only after the closing of today's formal session. If that can meet with the approval of delegates, I would then propose to invite the Committee now to consider two requests for participation in our work received from non-member States.

I have requested the secretariat to circulate draft decisions which are contained respectively in Working Papers Nos. 96 and 97. In conformity with the practice followed by the Committee, we shall take up those requests in chronological order. The first request is from Denmark; it is dated 6 April 1983, and the relevant draft decision is contained in Working Paper No. 96. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the draft decision in Working Paper No. 96. 1/ Is there any objection?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The second request, dated 7 April 1983, has been received from Viet Nam and the draft decision appears in Working Paper No. 97. 2/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee adopts the draft decision. Is there any? — the USSR.

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1/ "In response to the request of Denmark (CD/376) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Denmark to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups established for the 1983 session.

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1983 session the representative of Denmark is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Denmark."

2/ "In response to the request of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (CD/377) and in accordance with rule 34 of the rules of procedure, the Committee on Disarmament decides to invite the representative of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to make a statement on item 4 of the agenda, 'Chemical weapons', at the 213th plenary meeting, to be held on 19 April 1983."

Mr. Nazarkin (Chairman of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should like to suggest a small drafting amendment to the text that has been distributed. I think it would be advisable to insert the words "the representative of", so that the third line of the text reads: "to invite the representative of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam ...".

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Mr. Nazarkin for that proposal. Would that small correction meet with any objections? It appears not -- is there any delegation wishing to take the floor on this proposal? The distinguished representative of China, Mr. Tian Jin, you have the floor.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, the Chinese delegation wishes to make the following statement.

Concerning the request made by Viet Nam to allow it to send someone to speak at the Committee on Disarmament on the International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War held in Ho Chi Minh City, we have had occasion to express our views. We do not think it necessary to bring up such a specific question time and again. Since other countries made no objection to the request by Viet Nam to make a statement at one of our plenary meetings, the Chinese delegation went along with the consensus. However, the Chinese delegation would like to reiterate that China's position towards the requests of non-member States to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament is consistent and unchanged and that it is also known to all the delegations.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of China for his contribution and I understand that it does not constitute an objection to a consensus decision on this issue. May the Chair therefore take it that the Committee adopts the draft decision?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Thirdly, the secretariat has circulated today at my request a timetable for meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during next week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and may be adjusted as we proceed. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts this timetable.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: In addition to the meetings scheduled in connection with the Committee's work, I may also note that informal consultations have been convened by the Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in Conference Room I next Tuesday at 4 p.m. Finally, distinguished delegates, the Chair has been asked by several delegations to summarize the debates, both formal and informal, that took place on the issue of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, and believes that it would indeed be useful to do so.



(The Chairman)

After the debate that took place in the plenary sessions of the Committee on 5 and 7 April and last Tuesday's informal exchange of views, it has once again become clear that a number of delegations hold the view that the existing mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group is too narrow and that its scope should therefore be widened. Other delegations are of the opinion that the present mandate has not nearly been exhausted and that a great deal of useful work can still be done under this present mandate. Consequently, no consensus has emerged on a revision of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, either by drawing on the proposal tabled by the Group of 21 in 1981 (document CD/181), since then revised by India, or on the draft proposed by the group of socialist countries in Working Paper No. 95.

While recording this conclusion, which of course does not rule out further informal contacts on this issue, it would be remiss not to note some constructive trends that in my view emerged from our consultations. It became clear that:

- (a) making further progress towards a nuclear test ban remains the undisputed goal of the Ad Hoc Working Group, and that
- (b) the substantive elaboration of essential prerequisites for a treaty is recognized as specifically contributing to this goal.

Those delegations which supported the present mandate at the time of its conception, a mandate that lays emphasis on issues relating to verification and compliance, continue to do so. At the same time, these delegations have confirmed that they do not intend in any way to bar other delegations from forwarding views on particular issues that, in their opinion, have a bearing on the verification and compliance aspects of the prospective treaty as a whole. This flexibility would seem to open the way for a broadly ranging substantive examination by the Working Group, under its present mandate, of most, if not all, essential and relevant issues relating to that point on the agenda.

The Chair firmly hopes that the clarification thus obtained will assist the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group in carrying out his important task in a constructive spirit.

Mr. NUNEZ MOSQUERA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has taken note of the summary you have just given us, and I should like to state that we deeply regret that, in spite of the extensive support given to the proposal of the Group of 21 contained in document CD/181, it has not proved



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in the Committee on the establishment of a working group to negotiate on provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance and the final clauses of a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests.

Since we are discussing questions of procedure, I should like to take advantage of the occasion to ask you a question about a proposal made at an earlier plenary meeting by the distinguished alternate representative of Mexico, acting in her capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21, when she requested the Chairman of the Committee to hold consultations at informal meetings with a view to the setting up of two working groups on item 2 of our agenda, one on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the other on the prevention of nuclear war. My delegation would be grateful if you could tell us, Mr. Chairman, as far as you are able, how you intend to proceed with respect to that request.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of Cuba for his intervention and is pleased to reply to Mr. Nuñez Mosquera's question. This matter is indeed the subject of informal consultations; it will be further discussed at a meeting of the co-ordinators of the various groups and China which is scheduled for tomorrow morning, when this will be a specific issue to be dealt with in that informal consultation. The Committee will, of course, be informed as early as possible of the plans that exist or may emerge in that respect. The distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic has asked for the floor: I am pleased to give it to him.

Mr. THIELICKE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, you just made a statement on the mandate of the nuclear test ban Working Group. Could I request you kindly to distribute that statement?

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair will be pleased to comply with that request. If there are no further requests for the floor at this moment, I will suspend the meeting until 3.30 this afternoon.

The meeting was suspended at 12.45 p.m., and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

is resumed. ----- plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament

The Committee will now listen to those speakers who very kindly agreed to defer their statements this morning in view of the time limitations imposed upon us, and I am pleased to call upon the first speaker for this afternoon, Mr. Don Nanjira of Kenya. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, it is amazing how paradoxes and paradoxical situations have become so overwhelmingly numerous in the discussions and negotiations held on the problems of disarmament, development and international security. The expression "great powers" or "major powers" is a political expression which, for the past 38 years at least, has been associated with those States members of the international community which, because of their "greatness" in wealth and political status and power in the world, and the "victorious" role they played in the Second World War, were given the heavy and primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. So, they proudly accepted their baptism of "custodians of the peace", the "victorious powers" and the like. And obviously, proudest among them were two which, for very obvious reasons, assumed the super-name of "superpowers". It is fascinating to note the definition of the expression "superpower". An authoritative dictionary has defined superpower as power, especially mechanical or electric power on an extraordinary scale secured by the linking together of a number of separate power systems, with a view to more efficient and economical generation and distribution.

If I may paraphrase this definition, it is not difficult to see the conditions for the successful functioning of a system to which the superpowers belong. First, they ought to cultivate trust and confidence in each other and collaborate through contact, consultation and co-ordination, as well as harmonization of their activities. Secondly, they should not use their potentials and potentialities for destructive purposes. And thirdly, they ought to aim at efficiency and not extravagance, as well as sharing their possessions with others for peaceful purposes.

For, what greatness is there in being wealthy in the midst of poverty, inequality and human misery? What greatness is there in talking about world peace and security and in claiming to be a custodian of the peace when insecurity surrounds all, and wars and armed conflicts occur while the great and the powerful watch and are unable to assure even a durable cease-fire? What greatness is there in squandering colossal amounts of money on armaments which are incapable of buying enduring peace and security?

Sentiments have been expressed herein and elsewhere that "1983 is going to be a crucial year for disarmament". But, if I may ask, what is going to make 1983 "a crucial year" for disarmament, and when exactly will this be? Will the year be "crucial" for disarmament, or for armament? How can it be "crucial" for disarmament when the war of words and tensions in East-West relations and over nuclear weapons are already exceptionally intense? We are already in mid-April, and before long the summer will arrive, and soon thereafter, in the autumn, we shall have to report to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the work of

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will Committee for 1983. What will have happened by then? Shall we be in a position to present to the General Assembly this coming autumn a revised text of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, even with less brackets than it has now? If we cannot answer this question in the affirmative, then why talk about 1983 being a crucial year for disarmament? Surely, we would be better off to wish that 1983 be a critical year for disarmament. But words alone will not bring this about. The significance of such a year for disarmament can only lie in action — the type of action that has been called for by the recently concluded seventh summit Meeting of the non-aligned nations and the type of action that is called for by those who are genuinely and seriously interested in disarmament negotiations.

It so happens that the Committee on Disarmament has a list of "permanent" areas of work, better known as the "decatalogue", and that the flexibility of the Committee's rules of procedure allows us to address any of the items in the decatalogue at any time and in any form we deem fit. A grand design indeed. But supposing we did not have such rules of procedure, how on earth would we have justified the kind of situation that persisted in this Committee for seven to eight long weeks? If the Committee cannot agree on mere procedural issues for such a length of time — and I would add here that it was 16 weeks altogether, if we take into account the informal consultations that were held on the Committee's agenda and work programme for 1983, beginning on 30 November 1982 in New York — if it has taken so long and to date we have not been able to resolve these issues the way we should, then I wonder how long it will take us to agree on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty; I wonder how long it will take us to agree on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; I wonder how long it will take us to agree on a comprehensive programme of disarmament; I wonder how long it will take us to agree on the prevention of nuclear war, to mention but several of the issues before the Committee for negotiation, and, most of all, I wonder how long it will take us to agree on and attain complete and general disarmament under effective international control.

Procedure, then, and the lack of commitment on the part of some, as well as their unwillingness to negotiate and translate into concrete action their utterances and even decisions and resolutions of the international community, have become the greatest enemy and the greatest impediments to progress in the work of this Committee. By the time the Committee convened on 1 February for the first part of its 1983 session, I had sensed the mood reigning then among the delegations and that was why I hastened to make my delegation's first statement at the very first meeting of this session of the Committee. In that statement, I said, among other things:

"Thus ... I have the following practical proposals to make: —

One: we should dismiss, i.e., decide on, procedural issues as soon as possible and adopt our work programme for this session of the Committee this week ...

Two: ... I hold the view that the existing subsidiary bodies should be re-established on an automatic basis at the beginning of every session of the Committee, unless a decision is taken to the contrary prior to the convening of the session, which decision would, for instance, call for the suspension or abolition of a given subsidiary body of the Committee."

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That sentiment was expressed once again by the Yugoslav delegation a month and two days later, on 3 March, and has since then been cited as the Yugoslav proposal, in the following words:

"The Committee should, in the view of my [i.e. the Yugoslav] delegation, reach an agreement most urgently ... Such an agreement should stipulate that, once an item has been placed on the agenda or a working group with an already existing mandate established, they should be automatically renewed at the beginning of each year's session of the Committee."

My delegation looks forward impatiently to participating in discussions aimed at enhancing the competence of the Committee on Disarmament to tackle the questions brought before it for resolution. No one who is genuinely and seriously concerned about the early conclusion of the work of this Committee — the single multilateral Committee charged with the heaviest responsibility of paving the way for the very survival of humankind itself — can be proud of the Committee's performance, when it takes 15 weeks to finalize its agenda, and 16 weeks to finalize a work programme for its current session. One hopes that that will never happen again. We hope that the Committee will find and indeed devise a better and faster way of disposing of such difficulties. We hope, Mr. Chairman, that you will do your utmost to secure agreement on procedural issues before the Committee meets for its summer session. Even if it would mean your initiating now informal consultations on the agenda and work programme for the Committee's summer session of 1983, my delegation would fully support such a move. Even if it would mean subjecting these questions to a separate discussion now, in order to avoid future procedural wrangles on these issues within the Committee, I would fully support such a move. Even if it would mean adopting now a procedural rule which would obligate the Committee to decide at its previous session on the agenda and work programme for the Committee's next session, I would fully support such a move.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you most sincerely on your assumption of the Committee's chairmanship for the month of April. I am fully aware of the valuable contribution your delegation has made to the work of the Committee. My delegation hence looks forward to the impartial and effective leadership you will be giving us during this session and indeed in the intersessional period. I pledge to you, Sir, the fullest co-operation and support of the Kenya delegation.

Permit me also, Mr. Chairman, to express the deep and sincere gratitude of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador Skalli of Morocco, for the outstanding job he did during the month of March. We are proud of his untiring efforts which resulted in the removal of the impasse and in the meeting of minds on the agenda and work programme for the Committee's spring session of 1983.

The item concerning disarmament and development is almost dormant on the agenda of the Committee. In fact, it is so very rarely talked about in the Committee that it appears as if it were non-existent! Thanks to the efforts of a few observers, however, delegations are reminded about the item from time to time. And here, permit me to pay a sincere tribute to the work done by Mr. and Mrs. Whittle of the Quaker Liaison Office in Geneva. Peter and Margaret Whittle have regularly and consistently organized informal get-togethers to discuss issues of disarmament,



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including the fundamental question of disarmament and development. I very much appreciate your efforts, Mr. Chairman, and my delegation urges you and of course the Whittles, whom I don't see -- I thought they would be here this afternoon -- and I urge you, Mr. Chairman, and I urge them to continue with your efforts and their involvement because I do know that the sentiments and words expressed at meetings -- those meetings which Mr. and Mrs. Whittle organize at their house -- those words and those sentiments do not fall on deaf ears as they do so often in this Committee.

Let us make no mistake about this: the talk about peace and security has little or no meaning, and world peace and security are unattainable, unless and until the problems of poverty, hunger and inequality, malnutrition and ignorance, illiteracy and ill-health, unemployment, you name them all -- the socio-economic problems that cause human misery -- are tackled and resolved. Ignorance breeds fear and violence; hunger breeds desperation and violence; poverty and inequality breed envy, demoralization, crime and violence; unemployment breeds deprivation, want, civil disobedience and violence. Poverty, hunger, ignorance, inequality and their derivatives breed insecurity, and the latter always calls into being, always prompts national as well as international consequences.

Today, then, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, and of course under rule 30 of the Committee's rules of procedures, I wish to address myself to the question of disarmament and development. I must hurriedly add that, as a delegation, we attach the greatest importance to this item VII on the Committee's decalogue. The reduction of military budgets, item V of the decalogue, is closely related to item VII. We shall discuss it here and elsewhere, in the appropriate forums of the United Nations. To the great surprise of many of us, some delegations herein participating have refused to acknowledge the close interconnection that exists between disarmament and development. They have even argued that attainment of socio-economic development and of the over-all New International Economic Order is not, and cannot be, an objective of our disarmament negotiations! For those delegations, the advice is simple: take trouble to consult the numerous and relevant literature, including United Nations documentation on the subject. Let us look at a few examples.

For many years, the General Assembly of the United Nations has called for the reduction of military budgets in favour of the social and economic development of all nations and peoples, but in particular of the developing countries. Already in 1950, in its resolution 380 (V) of 17 November 1950, for instance, the General Assembly stressed, in operative paragraph 2, point (2) (d), the necessity for every nation to agree "to reduce to a minimum the diversion for armaments of its human and economic resources and to strive towards the development of such resources for the general welfare, with due regard of the under-developed areas of the world". For ten years, between 1954 and 1964, the call for reductions in military budgets was constantly made at the United Nations, and whether the reductions would be made unilaterally or through legally binding international agreements, the central message was always the same: it makes absolute sense to deploy the scarce resources (human, material and financial resources) on socio-economic development rather than for destructive purposes.

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An ~~unanimous~~ resolution, 1516 (XV) adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December 1960, the Secretary-General of the United Nations was requested to examine, among other things:

The national economic and social consequences of disarmament in countries having different economic systems and being at different stages of economic development, as well as in different economic situations, in order to absorb the human and material resources released from military uses;

The possibility of adopting corrective measures with respect to structural imbalances in national economies through, inter alia, expanded capital assistance to underdeveloped countries;

The impact of disarmament on international economic and trade relations, and especially its impact on the trade of the underdeveloped or developing countries; and

The utilization of resources released by disarmament for the purpose of economic and social development, in particular of the developing countries.

The question of reductions in military expenditures was also the subject of a proposal contained in a memorandum on disarmament presented by the French delegation as far back as July 1955 at the so-called Geneva Summit of July 1955, which was attended by the Heads of State of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The French initiative was most welcome, because it proposed that the resources made available by reductions in military budgets be used in whole or in part to assist underdeveloped countries. Another similar initiative was crowned with a General Assembly resolution 914 (X), adopted later in the same year (1955), in which a request was made for the publication and exchange of information regarding military expenditures and budgets, and the States concerned, especially Canada, France, the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom -- which had become members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission that was formed on 19 April 1954 -- were urged to study the French proposals for the allocation of funds resulting from disarmament for improving the standards of living everywhere in the world but in particular in the developing or less developed countries. The subsequent years saw many other calls for such allocations and reallocations for socio-economic development.

But unfortunately, the popularity of the idea of reducing military expenditures was overshadowed by a new phase of the arms race. The turning point occurred in 1962. On the one hand, tensions in East-West relations intensified the mistrust between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty alliances and thereby prompted an acceleration of the arms race. (Today, 20 years later, we seem to be experiencing a similar situation!) On the other hand, around 1962 decolonization had reached a point of no return and had, in fact, become an irresistible force on the international scene. Thenceforth, the demands for decolonization, disarmament and development became very closely interrelated and had, as they have now, their fortress in the third world.

Since then, the most earnest call for disarmament in favour of development, in particular of the developing countries, has always come from the third world. Only very rarely indeed, as I have said, does one hear of a genuine pronouncement on the issue from the countries of the North. When Mr. Andreani of France addressed this Committee on 10 March 1983, he raised my hopes, but he did not, unfortunately,

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elaborate on his remark. He said: "The question of disarmament and development today constitute the two main objectives of co-operation between the nations. Mrs. Gandhi has just reaffirmed this at the opening of the summit meeting of the non-aligned countries". Again, two important statements emanating from the North which were among the very few well-balanced and meaningful statements delivered at the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament touched on this issue. One was by Mr. Claude Cheysson, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the other was by Mr. Helmut Schmidt, the then Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In his statement, Mr. Cheysson said in part:

"Lastly, can one speak of the third world and its independence without also speaking of development? .... My Government believes that it is time to begin the transfer to development of the human and financial resources now fuelling the arms race .... I want to say that among the many inequalities to which the third world is condemned by the international order — or rather, the present international disorder — the inequality in security is one of the most shocking. To provide for their security, too many third world countries must draw upon their necessary minimum for life, whereas the superpowers finance their over-  
armament by skimming off the top of their higher quality of life ....".

Talking about what he called the "open challenge", Mr. Helmut Schmidt said in part:

"An impenetrable web of secrecy sows the seeds of mistrust and impedes the conclusion of concrete agreements .... This year, for the third time my country has submitted its figures to the standardized reporting system of the United Nations for military expenditure .... Up to now the countries of the Warsaw Pact have not participated at all .... I appeal to all Governments to join in these important efforts aimed at greater openness in military expenditure ....".

We very much hope to hear more from those two Governments and indeed from the other governments of developed and industrialized as well as centrally planned countries, on the questions of reduction of military expenditures (budgets) and the interconnection between disarmament and development.

I stress this point because the available and competent literature contains shocking revelations on global expenditures on the arms race and on armaments in general. In his statement, for instance, to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly on 12 October 1979, Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, President of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba and President of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries, said inter alia:

"According to statistical data, as I stated at the inaugural session of the Sixth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, world military expenditures amount to more than \$300 billion a year. This sum could build 600,000 schools, with a capacity for 400 million children; or 60 million comfortable homes for 500 million peoples or 30,000 hospitals, with 18 million beds; or 20,000 factories, with jobs for more than 20 million workers; or an irrigation system

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for 150 million hectares of land that, with the application of technology, could feed a billion people. Mankind wastes this much every year on military spending. Moreover, consider the enormous quantities of young human resources, technicians, fuel, raw materials and other items. This is the fabulous price of preventing a true climate of confidence and peace from existing in the world ...".

I did, on that occasion, count the number of applause given in the General Assembly in support of President Castro's assertions: there were 17 applauses and a long standing ovation at the end of his statement. That was in 1979, and barely three years later -- by the end of 1982 -- the total world expenditures on armaments had increased by more than 200 per cent; it amounted to 650 billion United States dollars. Imagine the amount of developmental activity for peaceful purposes the \$650 billion could accomplish. Is peace assured now more than it was in 1979? Of course not! On the contrary, the world was a safer place to live in then than it is now. What a paradox! It is incredible; it is insane, it is indeed inhuman that \$650 billion should be squandered per year on the arms race, when tens of millions of people throughout the world live in absolute poverty, when more than 800 million people suffer from chronic hunger and malnutrition, when more than 900 million people -- close to 1 billion people -- are illiterate, when 250 million children are deprived of school education, and when 1,500 million people are denied medical facilities.

In 1982 alone, 23 States -- the 16 members of the NATO and the 7 members of the Warsaw Treaty military alliances combined -- spent \$260 billion, which was 40 per cent of the total amount of money squandered on armaments in that year alone. China spent \$110.5 billion on armaments in 1982, and that was 17 per cent of the total amount of dollars spent on armaments last year. The rest of the members of the international community spent \$247 billion on armaments in 1982, i.e. 38 per cent of the total military expenditures in that year. These shocking revelations also indicate that the total military expenditures of 1982 were much more than the total income of 1.5 billion people living in the 50 poorest countries of the world. Furthermore, it has been established that the price of one modern fighter plane would suffice to inoculate 3 million children against major childhood diseases. The price of one nuclear submarine with its missiles would provide 100,000 working years of nursing care for old people. Also, more than \$1 million per minute is spent on the arms race. And the total world military spending per day is currently \$1.66 billion.

But despite these colossal amounts of dollars wasted annually on the crazy arms race, no genuine security has been bought so far, and the clear indication -- the truth -- is that the more the expenditures on armaments, the higher will be the interests and unemployment of the developed countries, the lower will be the economic growth and productivity growth rates of these countries, the higher will be inflation, the more the human misery and, consequently, the less the security of all peoples and nations.

So far I have been examining the financial resources wasted on the arms race. Let me now say something about the human resources squandered on the arms race. Currently, about 50 million people are directly or indirectly engaged in military activities all over the world. A breakdown in this figure indicates that 25 million people serve in regular armed forces; 10 million in paramilitary forces; 4 million are civilians; 5 million are workers directly engaged in defence production; and 500,000 scientists and engineers are engaged in military research and development. This includes the world's topmost scientists and engineers and in fact the figure



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represents, as we all know, 20 per cent of all qualified scientists and engineers in the world. The total annual expenditure on military research and development is about \$35 billion. This is about 25 per cent of the total annual expenditure on all research and development. And as we all know, the monopoly in the world's total research and development rests with a handful of countries — the Soviet Union, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Japan. The other personnel directly engaged in military activities throughout the world number 5.5 million people.

The third dimension of the scarce resources squandered on armaments consists in non-renewable energy and mineral resources. Anybody interested in finding out details about the use of these resources for military purposes should read the competent study made by E.E. Hughes and others, entitled Strategic resources and national security: an initial assessment (publ.: Menlo Park, Stanford Research Institute, 1975). There is a general consensus, even in other documentation dealing with the same subject, including the United Nations study contained in document A/36/356 and The global 2000 report to the President: entering the 21st century (publ. Government Printing Press, 1980), vol. II, pp. 206-207. All these studies indicate that 5 to 6 per cent of the total global consumption of petroleum is used world-wide for military purposes; and that from 3 to 11 per cent of the vital minerals are used world-wide for military purposes in this order: copper - 11.1 per cent; lead - 8.1 per cent; aluminium - 6.3 per cent; nickel - 6.3 per cent; fluospar - 6 per cent; zinc - 6 per cent; silver - 6 per cent; the platinum group - 5.7 per cent; tin - 5.1 per cent; iron ore - 5.1 per cent; mercury - 4.5 per cent; chromium - 3.9 per cent; tungsten - 3.6 per cent and manganese - 2.1 per cent.

International trade in arms consumes about \$26 billion per year. It has been estimated that, on average, 1 United States tax dollar in 6 is devoted to military expenditure, which means that at the present levels of military spending, the average taxpayer can expect over his lifetime to give up 3 or 4 years of his income to the arms race. And yet this will not at all bring him peace and greater security. It has also been estimated that if the current world expenditure on armaments of \$650 billion per annum continues, then by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the total annual global military expenditure will be \$2 trillion. And yet this will not bring mankind greater peace or greater security!

And so, if I give you all these facts and figures, it is not because I want to overwhelm you with them; it is not because I want to bother you with them. No; it is because I want to share with you and with everybody else seated around this table, my strongest conviction that genuine and lasting world peace will never ever be found in military competition; it will never ever be found in military confrontation and conflict which currently dominate relations among nations. Rather we must seek enduring world peace and security through consultation; we must seek it through conversation, through compromise; through confidence-building efforts and trust; through co-operation and understanding and good will among nations, and we must seek it through commitment to political agreements and decisions taken in the political, military and socio-economic fields. Reductions in military spending and the redeployment of the resources squandered on the arms race to social and economic development would not only increase the prospects for resumed growth in the world economy; they would also convert to civilian uses the scientific, technological and technical resources now being used for destructive military purposes. Such reductions would also be consistent with the repeated call of the international community for structural changes to be brought about in the existing unjust and inequitable system of international economic relations. They would, in short, facilitate and accelerate the attainment of the New International Economic Order.

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Those who oppose spending more resources on development rather than on armaments always associate the expression "development" with the developing countries and believe that the talk about socio-economic development favours the developing countries and should be their business. Anybody who holds this view is terribly wrong. Granted that the South is characterized by underdevelopment whose constituent elements include poverty, chronic hunger, disease and squalor, the fact still remains that there is no society on earth and no country in the world which does not experience poverty. Even in the midst of the overdevelopment, wastage and affluence of the North, poverty is not at all lacking. It is, paradoxically, one of the greatest evils of affluence. Most of the people in the world are poor because they inhabit countries in which per capita national income and output in general are very low relative to population. In the affluent countries, very many people are poor, not because of low per capita income, but because of the unjust system of distributing or dividing output among the country's residents and also because of governmental policies of wastage -- for instance, wastage of resources on the arms race.

This is why the resounding outcry against armament favours the social and economic development firstly of all nations and their peoples, and then in particular of the developing countries. Why "in particular of the developing countries"? Why should the North assist in the socio-economic development of the developing countries? The reasons for such assistance are many and varied and are very well known to all of us. The question of greater equality between the North and the South, between the "haves" and "have-nots", between the peoples of the various countries, has been very widely recognized and proclaimed as the main and fundamental moral imperative of our time.

From time immemorial, the history of family relations, of international relations and of community relations is full of the recognition and application of the principle that the interests of the community, whether that is a family, a community of a nation or all nations, must be protected by all, and that the rich and powerful have a socio-moral obligation to assist the poor and the weak. Abraham Lincoln, that eternal model of justice and equality, once said, 121 years ago: "I hold that while man exists, it is his duty not only to improve his own condition but to assist in ameliorating mankind's ...".

Secondly, if the scarce resources spent by the North on the arms race were to be diverted and reallocated to the South, the resources would substantially improve the South's per capita gross domestic product, industrial employment and capital stock, and would provide significant economic gains for all regions of the world, including the most developed region among them, i.e., the North.

Thirdly, the South provides an enormous market for the North. The South also has many markets in the North. In the field of raw materials, for example, the North consumes far more aluminum, copper, nickel, platinum, tin, rubber, manganese, tungsten and cobalt than the over-all demand of these commodities in Africa, Asia and Latin America combined. And yet it is these third world regions that are the main producers of these minerals. I must hasten to add that the economies of the developed countries increasingly depend on the ability of the developing countries both to purchase the former's exports and to supply them with important raw materials, including in particular those minerals which the developed countries use for military purposes. With the intensification of the arms race, the North's

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consumption of minerals and energy (petroleum) for military purposes has in fact been steadily and dramatically growing, particularly its consumption of aluminium, titanium, beryllium and other relatively exotic minerals. In energy terms, petroleum is much more important for the military sector than for the economy as a whole. Most people are not aware of this fact. And most of the oil is, of course, imported from the third world.

Fourthly, the question of national security and national interests is a complex and sensitive issue, which entails domestic as well as foreign policies, especially in the military, political and economic spheres. Therefore, the mutuality of political, strategic and economic interests and vulnerability, as well as national security interests and the shrinking of the world by modern science and technology, dictate that the North should help the South overcome its economic problems and this in turn will help to improve the international political climate and to bring about universal political stability and peace.

The close relationship existing between disarmament and development was recognized by the international community long before the adoption of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, for instance, the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade adopted on 24 October 1970, stipulated as follows:

"Progress towards general and complete disarmament should release substantial additional resources which could be utilized for the purpose of economic and social development, in particular that of developing countries. There should, therefore, be a close link between the Second United Nations Development Decade and the Disarmament Decade".

The provisions in the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, adopted on 5 December 1980, are more specific, and the attainment of development through disarmament was recognized as an important objective. Paragraph 39 of the Strategy for the 1980s reads thus:

"There is a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter. Therefore, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and should contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries".

The relevant provisions of the Final Document are too well known to be cited here by me, but what is important is not the existence of these paragraphs, including paragraphs 16, 35 (which is identical with paragraph 39 of the Third Development Strategy), 89 and 90, but the application of these provisions -- the translation into concrete action of the relevant paragraphs and chapters of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament of the United Nations Charter and of any other document adopted by the International community. The time to act is now!!



The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Kenya for his contribution and in particular for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming chairmen. His generous words of praise to my predecessor are of course well deserved. As for the present Chairman, he can only promise that he will do his utmost not to disappoint the distinguished representative.

I should like to add that Mr. Don Nanjira's words of appreciation for the work of Mr. and Mrs. Whittle were, I believe, a timely reminder of the fact that this Committee does not work in a vacuum, and a well-deserved tribute to the efforts of the many non-governmental organizations and individuals, whatever their political, geographical or ethnic background, who often, without official recognition, have dedicated themselves to the cause of disarmament. I thank Mr. Don Nanjira for this reminder and would like to associate myself with it.

This having been said, I now give the floor to the next speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Cromartie. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I wish this afternoon to speak briefly on the subject of radiological weapons, which figures on our programme of work for this week, and to introduce the working paper (document CD/374) which was on our tables this morning, setting out the views of my delegation on certain questions relating to the scope and definition of a radiological weapons treaty. This paper was in fact the fruit of our reflections on the discussion that took place in the radiological weapons Working Group in the spring session of last year, but it did not seem appropriate to introduce it until the Group had begun its substantive work again. Fortunately this is now the case, and I believe that it is now timely to share these thoughts with the Committee.

The working paper deals first with the definition of radiological weapons as we believe they were originally conceived by the joint authors of the draft treaty tabled in 1980. There are obvious difficulties in defining a weapon which does not exist; but it seems to us that the key features of such a weapon would be that it would function by dispersing or disseminating radioactive material in the environment, and that it would be so designed that the primary danger would arise from exposure to the dispersed radioactive material. The means of dispersion might be an explosion but our definition must include sprays, aerosols or any other method of dispersing radioactive material in large quantity.

A major point of difficulty in defining a radiological weapon lies in how to make clear that nuclear weapons are excluded from the treaty. It has not so far been possible to find language acceptable to all delegations on this point. The United Kingdom delegation has, as the Committee will be aware, made some suggestions as to a "positive" definition, but neither this definition nor others which have been put forward have been found to be wholly satisfactory. We have come to the conclusion that the "positive" definition which some delegations wish to have may be unattainable. Those put forward so far are really "negative" definitions in another guise. We have not been able to find a method of saying only what a radiological weapon is, without at the same time saying what it is not. The United Kingdom delegation would prefer, therefore, that the definition adopted should specifically exclude nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in so many words, i.e. that we should have what has been termed in the Working Group a "negative" definition. Such a definition has, in our view, a greater possibility of being unambiguous and unmistakable in intent.



(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

The working paper that we have tabled also considers the scope of a treaty as it relates to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. I will only summarize briefly the arguments on this point because they are set out fully in the paper. Firstly, we draw attention to the fact that the question of attacks on nuclear electricity-generating stations are already covered in the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, and to the risk of confusion if this question were also dealt with in another legal instrument. Secondly, we argue that there are fundamental dissimilarities between the use of radiological weapons and attacks on nuclear facilities which make it inappropriate for these two matters to be dealt with in a single legal instrument. In the first case, an attack would employ a weapon or means of dispersal specifically designed to disseminate radioactive material, and this material would presumably be contained in the weapon itself. In the second case, an attack on a nuclear facility, not only is the radioactive material not delivered by the weapon system, but the immediate vehicle of attack could be a weapon of a conventional type which would not, of course, be banned by the treaty. We find serious conceptual difficulties in bringing together these two ideas. We conclude that the fact that both the use of radiological weapons and attacks on nuclear facilities would have the effect of causing damage by dispersal of radioactive material is too narrow a reason for attempting to prohibit them within a single legal instrument.

Finally, our paper comments on the differences of view which were expressed in the Working Group last year among those delegations which wish in principle to see a prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities included within the scope of the treaty. In particular it draws attention to the differences as to whether military facilities should be excluded from the treaty, and whether there should be a lower limit on the size of facilities which should be included in any prohibition. It seems to my delegation that these questions must be resolved if any progress is to be made.

However, the fact that we have agreed that there should be further exploratory discussions with this aim in mind and that these should be held separately within the radiological weapons Working Group should not be taken as acceptance on the part of my delegation of the idea that the Committee on Disarmament is necessarily the most appropriate body in which any subsequent negotiations on attacks on nuclear facilities, if such were agreed to, should be completed. We retain, as hitherto, an open mind on this question.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I should first of all like to express our gratitude for the distribution this afternoon of the text of the statement you made at our meeting this morning. In connection with that statement concerning the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, the Mongolian delegation, on behalf of the group of socialist countries, would like to state that we understand that statement as expressing the intention of the Chair, in accordance with the Committee's decision of 29 March, to continue its efforts to reach a positive solution to the question of the broadening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. We of course assume that the discussion of the question of the broadening of the mandate of the Working Group will continue, and that the Committee will continue to have that matter constantly under its purview until it is finally settled. On that basis, we consider your statement, Mr. Chairman, as an interim report, for which we are extremely grateful to you.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, shortly before suspending today's plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, you said that in your view there was a lack of consensus on the broadening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. You also said that you had noted certain constructive elements and a greater flexibility on the part of the delegations which are opposed to the broadening of the mandate and that this would allow the Ad Hoc Working Group to hold a wide-ranging substantive consideration of the questions within its competence.

My delegation has already expressed its view regarding the urgent need to broaden the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. I regret to have to state that we find it difficult to be optimistic about the future of the work of that Group. You spoke about flexibility on the part of certain delegations, Mr. Chairman. If that flexibility is constant and real, what, then, prevents it being adequately expressed in a specific mandate? The only thing that appears to be preventing this the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body from initiating appropriate negotiations towards the conclusion of a treaty on that subject -- a treaty which the international community is demanding more and more urgently -- is the persistent and systematic opposition of two delegations to the starting of such negotiations in this Committee.

But there are other questions also. In your statement today, Mr. Chairman, you said that certain constructive trends had emerged in the course of the discussions at the Committee's formal and informal meetings, and in this connection you indicated in your point (b) that it had become clear that "the substantive elaboration of essential prerequisites for a treaty is recognized as specifically contributing to this goal". I would like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, what these words mean. Are you trying to tell us that verification is an essential prerequisite for the Ad Hoc Working Group to be able to negotiate? You also said that the delegations opposed to the broadening of the mandate "do not intend in any way to bar other delegations from forwarding views on particular issues that, in their opinion, have a bearing on the verification and compliance aspects ...". It would seem that the magnanimity of those delegations that are opposed to the broadening of the mandate has made them forget two things. The first is that rule 30 of our rules of procedure says that "it is the right of any member State of the Committee to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Committee at a plenary meeting and to have full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention". I think it is necessary to recall that this rule applies also to the subsidiary bodies -- that is, to the ad hoc working groups, and in this instance to the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. The second point is that last year, in the report which the Committee on Disarmament submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, it was recognized that the Working Group was going to discuss questions related to verification and compliance. In this connection allow me to recall paragraph 9 of the report of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, which states: "It was generally recognized that in the examination of issues relating to verification and compliance, consideration should be given to all relevant aspects of a nuclear test ban". What, then, is the meaning of the statement that the delegations that are opposed to the broadening of the mandate will not bar the discussion of other issues within the framework of the Working Group?

In order not to prolong this meeting, allow me to conclude by indicating the position of the Group of 21 concerning the urgent need to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In that connection I should like to recall the views of the Group of 21 on the elements which should constitute such a treaty, as set forth in document CD/223. We believe that multilateral negotiations on a nuclear test-ban treaty should be undertaken without further delay. The object of such a treaty should be the general and complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests by all



(Mr. García Moritan, Argentina)

states in all environments and for all time. It should be equitable and non-discriminatory so as to be able to win universal adherence.

It is almost 20 years since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty. There have been 50 General Assembly resolutions indicating to us the urgent need to conclude such an instrument. This is the negotiating body par excellence; the means for negotiating is the Working Group. In order to function properly and begin negotiations, the Working Group must have a specific mandate. It is up to this Committee to give it such a mandate. If there is a political will to negotiate an instrument, this Committee should do so. Otherwise, the Committee will, in time, be responsible for the choice between the following alternatives which are inexorably taking shape: either a treaty is concluded prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests or the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons will inevitably increase.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Mr. García Moritan for his contribution and would like to reply briefly to the questions that were asked. First, it is, of course, clear to all members of the Committee that the summary which the Chair presented this morning is, and remains, the view of the Chair -- the view of the situation as seen from the Chair in its exclusive responsibility. It does not present or pretend to represent everyone's views around the table; it is not what I would call a negotiated document. Secondly, the foremost intention of the Chair was to go a little beyond the mere statement that on the question of a possible revision of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban no consensus could be found so far. Such a bold statement would, in the view of the Chair, have the effect of a purely negative statement, and might have given the erroneous impression that therefore work on that very important issue was virtually impossible. This is not the view of the Chair. However unsatisfactory the present mandate may be in the eyes of some delegations, it still allows for a quantity of useful and necessary work to be done, while -- and this is of course open to all members of the Committee -- informal contacts, consultations or whatever is necessary, can simultaneously be pursued to see whether perhaps now or later a revised mandate could come into operation. The Chair could only state that this, at present, is not the case, while indicating that even so -- and particularly in view of the many words of regret that have been expressed around this table at the fact that we have lost so much time in discussion of procedure that little time remains for the work on substance -- there is an amount of work on substance that can be done under the present mandate. The Chair believes that it voiced the opinion of many around this table that it is time we got down to that substantial work. It is, of course, true that when I used the word prerequisite, I meant it in a fairly general sense: there are a number of subjects, a number of elements that will be of importance to any form of nuclear test ban which will, hopefully, eventually emerge and on which useful work can be done. It is equally true that, under rule 30, any subjects can be brought up by any delegation in this forum or in its subsidiary bodies, but if we apply that rule too widely, why, then, would a working group need a mandate? In fact, I believe the mandate serves the purpose of orienting the work of a working group towards a specific target and as such, is of importance and, it is only too true, must be a negotiated document. I shall leave my comments at that, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles. You have the floor Sir.



Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, my delegation had from the outset interpreted the statement you made to us this morning in the way you have just indicated, that is, as one through which you hoped to encourage the members of the Committee by showing them that in spite of all the difficulties some useful work could still be done in this sphere. My delegation shares that view and would simply add that what the distinguished representative of Argentina has just said is an accurate reflection of the facts. This subject is different from many others in which the delegations that it is customary to call those of the East are on one side while those of the West are on the other side. Here, as we all know, the delegations of the Group of 21, the delegations of the socialist countries and a number of delegations from western Europe and other countries have for many years been anxious to secure progress on this matter of the total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

I share and applaud the aim you had in mind in your statement, Mr. Chairman, but I should like at the same time to express certain reservations with respect to it. The first paragraph is merely factual, and calls for no comment. The second paragraph says the following: "After the debate that took place in the plenary sessions of the Committee on 5 and 7 April and last Tuesday's informal exchange of views, it has once again become clear that a number of delegations hold the view that the existing mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group is too narrow and that its scope should therefore be widened". This is a very concise but current description, and it is also right that this description should come before that of the other position, since it is, I believe, the position of some 35 or 38 delegations. You then describe the position that is principally that of two delegations, in the following way: "Other delegations are of the opinion that the present mandate has not nearly been exhausted and that a great deal of useful work can still be done under this present mandate". I do not know whether this description satisfies the other group -- that very small group I mentioned, but that is a matter for them to decide. Your statement, Mr. Chairman, continues: "Consequently, no consensus has emerged on a revision of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, either by drawing on the proposal tabled by the Group of 21 in 1981 (document CD/181), since then revised by India, or on the draft proposed by the group of socialist countries in Working Paper No. 95". Your statement then goes on as follows: "While recording this conclusion, which of course does not rule out further informal contacts on this issue, it would be remiss not to note some constructive trends that in my view emerged from our consultations. It became clear that: (a) making further progress towards a nuclear test ban remains the undisputed goal of the Ad Hoc Working Group" -- no one can object to that -- "and that (b) the substantive elaboration of essential prerequisites for a treaty is recognized as specially contributing to this goal". Here everything depends, as the distinguished representative of Argentina said, on what is meant by "essential prerequisites". But since it is up to each delegation to interpret this as it sees fit, I would have no difficulties with this either. After that, however, I believe that, as you did in the second paragraph, you ought to have begun by saying something about the position of those delegations that want to broaden the mandate. I shall tell you what I would have said had I been in your place. I would have begun by saying the following: "Those delegations which consider that the present mandate should be revised, stressed that they do not intend in any way to bar other delegations from stating their views on the verification and compliance aspects of the prospective treaty. They reaffirmed that they only desired that the mandate be drafted in terms consistent with paragraph 31 of the Final Document, which provides that 'the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement'". The paragraph would then have continued with what you have said: "Those delegations which supported the present mandate at the time of its conception, ...". I would then have concluded with your last paragraph: "The Chair firmly hopes that the clarification thus obtained will assist the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group in



(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

carrying out his important task in a constructive spirit". I would simply add that since reference has been made here to informal meetings, it might perhaps have been advisable to complete that reference by expressly mentioning the suggestion made by a distinguished member of the Group of 21, which was supported by a number of delegations, including my own, that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group should begin, through informal consultations with the various members of the Group, to try to find a way out of the impasse which has unfortunately been reached.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Garcia Robles for his remarks. Without wishing to turn this meeting into a dialogue between individual members and the Chair, I would like to say that the Chair never cherished the illusion that a summing up of this character would be, to the letter, acceptable to every single delegation around this table, nor would the Chair claim to be capable of doing work to absolute perfection, certainly not when matching itself against such long-standing experts as yourselves. But the Chair is very glad to note that at least the general intention of its summing up could find approval. The distinguished representative of the United States of America has asked for the floor. Ambassador Fields, you have the floor.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I find it personally distasteful to have to exercise a right of reply to statements made in the Committee by distinguished visitors who come here to present the views of their governments; however, I cannot let stand unchallenged inaccurate allegations directed against my country and the security policies of my Government. Hence, I feel compelled to respond to the remarks made this morning by the distinguished Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland. He inaccurately characterized the security policies of my Government as an attempt to achieve military superiority and to undermine the political and territorial realities in Europe. He also questioned the sincerity of the United States Government's proposals designed to reduce the burden of armaments in the world, and particularly in Europe.

We regret the tone and content of this statement and the distortions that it unfortunately contains. My delegation categorically rejects these assertions. United States national security policy and the NATO intermediate-range nuclear force decisions are designed to meet a very real threat to our security and the security of our allies. That threat results from the unprecedented military build-up of the Soviet Union.

A statement such as we heard today may serve the political interests of some countries. Indeed, it appears to be another in a lengthening list of such statements. But it is not a constructive way to seek solutions or advance the substantive work of this Committee. That can only be done within the negotiating process. In the INF negotiations, to which the Deputy Minister referred, my Government recently presented a new proposal for an interim solution designed to improve substantially the chances for success in the face of rejection by the Soviet Union of the zero-option solution, which remains our real goal. It was a proposal which was arrived at after months of patient negotiations, extensive consultation with our allies and careful study of all options to achieve progress on the long and difficult road to a real reduction in nuclear arsenals. As is well known, it was the immediate object of public criticism by the Soviet Foreign Minister. This also is not helpful. Instead of polemics and rhetoric, we should negotiate to arrive at an accommodation. Instead of statements such as we heard today, we should address the real problems of peace and international security in a serious way at the negotiating table.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I have asked for the floor, Mr. Chairman, in order to make some comments on the statement you made at today's meeting. The Soviet delegation takes note of your report on the state of affairs as regards the broadening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. We do not agree with certain aspects of your statement, in particular your assessment of the numerical relationship between the delegations for and against the broadening of the mandate, and also your remarks on the need to elaborate the prerequisites for a test-ban treaty, as contained in your point (b). However, in view of your explanation that your statement did not claim to reflect the views of all delegations in the Committee, I shall not dwell on these aspects. I should like to go on to the principal assessment you gave and, precisely, to your conclusion that at the present time there is no consensus in favour of the broadening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. Naturally, this situation can hardly satisfy us. Quite the contrary. We therefore expect you, Mr. Chairman, to use your energy, diplomatic skill and artistry to bring the question of the broadening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group to a positive conclusion. The remarks you have made in this connection at this part of our meeting have inspired in us a certain hope on this score. If the question of the revision of the mandate is settled in April, this will make it possible for the Working Group to begin working on the basis of a new mandate from the very first days of the summer part of the session, and this should bring us nearer to the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The Soviet delegation also wishes to say that even before the mandate is broadened it intends to continue actively participating in the work of the Group on the basis of the interpretation of the existing mandate which you gave this morning. We particularly noted your statement that the delegations that are opposed to the broadening of the mandate do not intend to bar other delegations from expressing their views on particular issues that have a bearing on the future treaty. We presume that these delegations, too, for their part, will express their views on those issues.

In conclusion, I should like once more to stress that of course no broadened interpretation of the present mandate can be a substitute for the broadening of that mandate itself, a question on which the Committee took an appropriate decision on 29 March 1983.

Mr. DUARTE (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, I do not intend, Sir, to review the declaration which you made this morning: other delegations before me have done that and if I were to attempt to comment on the declaration there would certainly be many traits in common with those that were made before by Ambassador García Robles and Mr. García Moritán. I take it, Sir, as you stated this morning, and as you repeated this afternoon, that these are your views and I respect your views, although my delegation does not always agree entirely with them.

I would only like, at this moment, to express the wish and the hope that your declaration, even if it does contain many aspects which are not completely shared by many delegations around this table, will contribute to making this Committee progress in endeavours which are very important to all of us around this table. My first wish is that the continuation of the efforts to improve the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group will be pursued by you in your capacity as Chairman, with the utmost energy, and I trust that you will do exactly that. The second is that the Working Group will continue to exert its efforts, even with a mandate that is considered by an overwhelming majority of us as inadequate, that it will continue its work, and that the result of whatever endeavours we continue in the Working Group will bring us closer to a treaty that will ban all nuclear-weapon tests.



Mr. SKINNER (Canada): Mr. Chairman, my statement will be very brief indeed: it was simply to associate my delegation with the remarks of Mr. Duarte of Brazil about the helpful contribution you have made in your statement. The dimensions of the statement's helpfulness, I think, is readily apparent by the exchange of views we have had on this subject this afternoon. As we have seen, it is an exceedingly difficult issue, a very controversial one. Thank you for your efforts.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Skinner, for your kind words to the Chair. Ambassador Maung Maung Gyi, you have the floor.

Mr. MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma): Mr. Chairman, I shall be brief. I have today listened carefully to the distinguished representatives who have spoken about the mandate of the Working Group and the statement made by you with regard to this matter. One conclusion that we can draw from this is that there is no consensus with regard to the mandate, and for this reason, to be objective, the real issue that concerns us now is that you, as well as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, should devote your endeavours with a view to enhancing the mandate. While this is going on, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that it will not be possible to continue the substantive work of the Group. That is what my delegation believes.

Mr. ALTAF (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, just to say a few words on your statement, even if you have reiterated that it essentially remains your statement. I should like to draw a degree of satisfaction from the fact that what I see as the main feature of the statement, which is the observation on page 2 that "This flexibility would seem to open the way for a broadly ranging substantive examination by the Working Group, under its present mandate, of most, if not all, essential and relevant issues relating to that point on the agenda", has remained unchallenged. I hope that this expression can be built upon by the Chairman of the Working Group while drawing up the programme of work.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his statement. If there are no further speakers, then I should like to announce that, as agreed this morning, the Contact Group on Principles of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet in this conference room immediately after the adjournment of this plenary meeting. Although time is short I believe that the Chairman would still appreciate the meeting to take place. The Group which will deal with proposals for the improved and effective functioning of the Committee will also meet immediately, but instead of meeting in the secretariat offices it will meet in Conference Room C.108 next door.

It remains for me to announce that the next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 19 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.213  
19 April 1983  
ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 19 April 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. van Dongen

(Netherlands)



## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. OULD-ROUIS

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARSALES

Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia:

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Ms. C. FUNES-NOPPEN

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. B. GRINBERG

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U TIN KYAW HLAING

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN

Miss C. de VARENNES

China:

Mr. LI LUYE

Mr. TIAN JIN

Mrs. GE YUYUN

Cuba:

Mr. L. SOLA VILA

Mr. P. NÚÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Mr. J. JIRUSEK

<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. I.A. HASSAN Mr. A.M. ABBAS Miss. W. BASSIM
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Miss K. SINEGIORGIS
<u>France:</u>	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE Mr. B. D'ABOVILLE Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. H. THIELICKE Mr. M. NOTZEL
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. F. ELBE Mr. W. ROHR
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. T. TOTH
<u>India:</u>	Mr. M. DUBEY Mr. S. SARAN
<u>Indonesia:</u>	Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO Mr. N. WISNOEMERTI Mrs. P. RAMADHAN Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA
<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. M. ALESSI Mr. C.M. OLIVA Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. R. IMAI Mr. M. KONISHI Mr. K. TANAKA
<u>Kenya:</u>	Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
	Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. S.O. BOLD
	Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. A. SKALLI
	Mr. M. CHRAIBI
	Mr. O. HILAIE
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
	Mr. J. RAMAKER
	Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. A.N.C. NWAQZOMUDOH
	Mr. J.O. OBOH
	Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
	Mr. I.E.C. UKEJE
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. T. ALTAF
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. P. CANNOCK
	Mr. V. ROJAS
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. ZAWALONKA
	Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
	Mr. T. STROJWAS
	Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. T. MELESCANU
	Mr. L. TOADER
<u>Sri Lanka:</u>	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
	Mr. H. BERGLUND
	Mr. J. LUNDIN
	Mrs. I. SUNDBERG

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Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN

Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN

Mr. G.N. VASHADZE

Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN

United Kingdom

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

Mr. B.P. NOBLE

Mrs. J.I. LINK

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L. FIELDS

Mr. M. BUSBY

Mr. P. CORDEN

Mr. W. HECKROTTE

Mr. R.L. HORNE

Mr. R. MIKULAK

Mr. J. HOGAN

Mr. J. MARTIN

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER

Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA

NON-MEMBER STATESViet Nam:

Mr. NGUYEN THUONG

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BHERASATEGUI



The Committee open the 213th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee starts today its consideration of item 7 of its agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". As usual, members of the Committee wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Sweden, Kenya, Algeria and Mongolia.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 212th plenary meeting, I shall presently give the floor to the representative of Viet Nam, Ambassador Nguyen Thuong. But before we start the meeting may I, from the Chair, express my sympathy to the delegation of the United States of America, whose Mission in Beirut was the victim of an act of indiscriminate terrorism resulting in a heavy loss of life. I think we can all agree that such acts of terror are to be condemned and can in no way contribute to the pursuit of peace, a cause to which we, as diplomats, are all dedicated. May I also ask the distinguished representative of the United States to convey my condolences to the families of the victims of that attempt. May I now, in accordance with the decision taken at the 212th plenary meeting, invite the representative of Viet Nam, Ambassador Nguyen Thuong, to take the floor.

Mr. NGUYEN THUONG (Viet Nam) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to offer you my congratulations on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee. I am certain that, thanks to your experience and your diplomatic skill, you will be able to guide the work of this Committee to the hoped-for results. I should also like to express my deep gratitude to the distinguished members of the Committee on Disarmament for granting me the possibility of speaking at this plenary meeting. For reasons which you know, my delegation was unfortunately deprived of that possibility during the years 1980-1982. Nevertheless, we have always followed with great interest the discussions taking place in this room and the multifaceted work of the Committee, which is of the utmost importance for peace and for the present and the future of all mankind.

The agenda of the Committee on Disarmament contains many important questions. However, as the countries of the non-aligned movement, of which Viet Nam has the honour to be an active member, stated at their last summit meeting, which was held in New Delhi: "... while nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, efforts should be made to conclude without further delay a treaty banning chemical weapons". Viet Nam is convinced that the question of the prevention of a nuclear war is at the centre of the work of this important multilateral negotiating body: it is clearly the most urgent of all the world problems of the present time, a problem common to all peoples regardless of differences of social systems, way of life or ideology. All States Members of the United Nations ought to respond to the appeal of the United Nations General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament and take, as soon as possible, adequate measures for the prevention of war, and in particular nuclear war, thereby safeguarding from that danger the very existence of mankind. The Committee on Disarmament ought to spare no effort to reach an agreement on the practical measures to be taken towards that end.

At the same time, the Committee also has before it a question to which the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, like all the non-aligned countries and many other countries, pays very close and sustained attention, namely, the question of the

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prohibition of chemical weapons. No other people in the world in recent decades has suffered as much as the people of Viet Nam the horrible and lasting consequences of the use of toxic chemical substances in war. This barbarous weapon of mass extermination ought to be prohibited as soon as possible.

In connection with this urgent need for a strict prohibition of chemical weapons, I feel it to be my duty, as the representative of the people of Viet Nam and of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, to present to this Committee in this statement some additional information concerning Viet Nam's experience, which is still continuing, of the long-term consequences of the massive and repeated use of chemical substances in the war in Viet Nam during the years 1961 to 1971. I am doing so in the fervent hope that after hearing me the Committee and the countries represented here will be even more determined to spare no effort to accelerate the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, so that the tragedy which struck my country may never be repeated anywhere, against any people.

As you know, an International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War: The Long-Term Effects on Man and Nature, was held in Ho Chi Minh City at the beginning of this year. The symposium dealt with a subject which is far from being an outmoded theoretical exercise. The emotion caused in recent months in many European countries by the transfer of toxic wastes from the Seveso factory, and the apprehensions of countless veterans of the Indo-Chinese war in America and Australia are evidence of the present-day relevance of the problem. The Ho Chi Minh City symposium was attended by more than 160 scientists and experts, nearly half of whom came from 21 foreign countries, including the United States of America, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, India, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Mongolia, to mention only those countries that are members of this Committee, and in one week the participants heard 72 scientific reports and papers and held very frank exchanges of views, both at plenary meetings and in working groups the rapporteurs of which were all well-known foreign scientists, American, English and Dutch. The symposium was strictly a working conference of scientists whose object was not only to make an objective assessment of existing scientific information but also to identify and encourage the research-work needed and to promote international co-operation to that end. The final summary report of the symposium, which was adopted unanimously, was put before the Committee on 21 February 1983, and shortly thereafter, in order to take advantage of the presence in Geneva of a well-known scientist from my country, Professor Dr. Ton Duc Lang, a meeting was arranged between him and the experts in this Committee, during which he presented additional information on the results of the symposium. In that connection, I should like to say that we are very grateful to the delegations which took part in that meeting, and we should also like to thank the secretariat of the Committee for its help in organizing the meeting.

As was indicated at the symposium, various compounds of toxic chemical substances were used in Viet Nam, including in particular dioxin, a substance known for its great toxicity. The total quantity of all these herbicides and defoliants used against my country is estimated by different scientific authorities at some 100,000 tons. According to the United States biologist, Arthur H. Westing, this total included 57,000 tons of the famous agent orange, containing up to 170 kg of the terrible dioxin. Other authorities even put forward the figure of 500 kg.



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These toxic chemical products which were sprayed on a vast scale, in strong concentrations and in large quantities, have caused serious damage to the environment of South Viet Nam: 43 per cent of the forests were destroyed, including 70 per cent of the coconut groves and 150,000 hectares of tropical forests, and 13 per cent of the agricultural land, which it has not yet been possible to restore in spite of the passage of 10 years. Ecological systems were seriously damaged. The systematic sprayings over vast areas of South Viet Nam totally or in large part destroyed extensive areas of forests in the provinces of Tien Giang, Ben Tre, Cau Long, Hau Giang and Minh Hai and in the environs of Ho Chi Minh City. This fact was already noted in 1974 by a group of American scientists from the Academy of Sciences who considered that, as a result of the extensive damage caused to the forests, the process of natural recovery could take 100 years and even more in certain regions.

The massive and repeated sprayings over large areas changed the structure of the soil, reduced its fertility and caused a decline in agricultural production, aggravating the difficulties of feeding the population. Many areas, such as the valley of A Sau, formerly populated with an abundant and varied fauna and covered with rich forests and other useful vegetation, were transformed into infertile savannahs covered with wild grasses and secondary vegetation of little economic value, as a result of which many species of animals, both large and small have completely disappeared and there remain only hordes of small rodents, which are disease-carriers.

Thus, the tropical forests in the areas heavily sprayed with herbicides are on the point of disappearing. The destruction of foliage, the considerable reduction in the country's forest areas and the contamination of the soil have caused changes in the water run-off system, aggravating further the periods of flood and drought.

Considerable damage, difficult to remedy, has also been caused to the river, maritime and coastal ecological systems. Certain types of aquatic animals have disappeared and reserves of sea and river fish have been considerably reduced.

As a result of all these harmful effects of toxic substances on nature, Viet Nam is at present confronted with an extremely difficult task, that is, how to restore the fertility of the soils and transform these dead savannahs into crop-growing areas or to repopulate them with animal species and useful plants.

The famous operation known as the chemical clean-up of the jungle, through the use of herbicides containing a high proportion of dioxin, also had harmful effects, which are still continuing, on the health of the Vietnamese people: 2 million Vietnamese have been victims, of whom 3,500 have died and the rest are still today suffering their consequences. Professor Ton Duc Lang gave a scientifically detailed report on this subject during his meeting with the distinguished experts from delegations; I shall therefore be brief in this connection.

Numerous investigations and tests by Vietnamese scientists confirm that the massive use of these toxic substances containing dioxin has had extremely harmful

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population inhabiting the regions concerned, including the children born there. Even a number of years after contamination, genetic aberrations and abnormalities have been found among the victims.

At the Symposium, 12 reports were submitted giving strong evidence of a direct link between the use of chemical substances and the increased number of congenital abnormalities, monstrosities and malformations among children born in the areas that were sprayed with such substances.

Thus investigations in the province of Ben Tre, which was subjected to massive and repeated sprayings, show that in comparison with the pre-war years, the number of extra-uterine pregnancies has increased six to eight times, the number of sterile marriages eight times, and the number of congenital abnormalities and monsters among new-born children 10-15 times. These are terrible figures.

In the opinion of our experts, the use of chemical substances has also caused an increase in the frequency of cases of cancer of the liver. In a Hanoi hospital it has been noted that between the period 1955-1961 and the period 1962-1968, the incidence of cancer of the liver among persons subjected to those sprayings increased from 2.89 per cent to 9.07 per cent. Furthermore, many statistical investigations carried out in different countries have shown the carcinogenic effect of dioxin in minute doses (in particular the work done on behalf of the Dow Chemical Company and the work of the cancer research group of the Environmental Protection Agency). Studies made in recent years in Viet Nam have also shown that the incidence of primary cancer of the liver among subjects exposed to sprayings with defoliants is five times higher than among subjects not so exposed.

These facts represent only a small part of the information contained in the reports submitted at the Ho Chi Minh City Symposium. While further research is still needed on certain aspects, at the conclusion of the Symposium everyone was agreed that the use of herbicides and defoliants in the Vietnamese war had resulted in grave and harmful long-term consequences for man, nature and the economy of Viet Nam. Professor Arthur W. Galston of the United States said so as long ago as on 9 February 1977 at a Congressional hearing, when he stated that he was convinced that the destructive effects of toxic chemical products on Viet Nam, including the environment and the country's entire civilization, were unforeseeable.

The International Symposium held at Ho Chi Minh City, nearly half of the participants in which came from foreign countries, in its conclusions appealed to the international community to take urgent measures to help the Vietnamese people to eliminate the terrible consequences of the use in war of herbicides and defoliants. We believe that we can count on international co-operation in the solution of this problem, a very difficult one and extremely costly in material and financial resources, clearly far beyond the possibilities of our country. We believe that this will be for the benefit both of the Vietnamese people and of mankind as a whole.



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If the Committee on Disarmament, I should like to emphasize how much these preliminary results of the Symposium underline the importance and urgency of finding a successful solution to the problems posed in this sphere of chemical weapons.

It seems to me that at the present time a sound basis exists for the speedy drafting of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons: a number of important documents and concrete and practical proposals have been submitted, including in particular the document entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction", presented by the Soviet Union, a document rich in constructive ideas for solutions to the specific problems connected with the prohibition of such weapons. Many countries among the Group of 21 have also put forward useful ideas.

Allow me, on the basis of the results of the Symposium, to put certain thoughts before the Committee. In my view, the prohibition of chemical weapons should be universal; each State party to the convention should undertake never and in no circumstances to develop, produce, acquire in any way, retain, transfer or use chemical weapons, and to destroy its stocks of them or redirect them into authorized purposes as well as to destroy or dismantle facilities for the production of chemical weapons.

As regards the question of what chemical substances should be prohibited, my delegation considers that the future convention should prohibit all chemical substances for purposes of war without, however, placing unnecessary difficulties in the way of the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes.

Certainly, the future convention ought to contain provisions giving an assurance of its strict application. As regards the question of what specific methods of verification should be used with respect to the various aspects of the activities prohibited, my delegation is of the view that verification measures should be effective but should not be such as to lead to interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States or the creation of obstacles to the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes; in other words, they should be very carefully thought out from every point of view. Thus what is needed is a rational and effective combination of national and international means of verification.

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that all the States members of the Committee on Disarmament, through their distinguished representatives here present, will make greater efforts in order to complete as soon as possible the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which is urgently called for both by the lesson of the tragedy of the Vietnamese people and by the interests of all mankind.

The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, for its part, would like to be able to take a more active part in the drafting of this future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We could thus make available to the Committee the knowledge we have acquired and the results of the research being carried out by our Vietnamese experts, among others, on the basis of the experience suffered by the Vietnamese people, the harmful consequences of which are still being felt even today in the lives of our people.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Nguyen Thuong for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the Committee and to the secretariat. The next speaker on my list is the distinguished delegate of Sweden, Mr. Hyltenius, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. HYLTIENIUS (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, the agenda of this Committee may be seen as a reflection of the most urgent problems in the field of disarmament. It contains a number of items which have been with us for many years and which still await a solution. It would seem that the longer an item has to wait for real negotiations the harder it is to come to grips with it. Few would deny that the technical problems and complexities of disarmament questions have become greater over the years.

It is against this background that one should see the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Today I shall devote my statement to that item. It has been referred to the Committee on Disarmament by overwhelming majorities in the United Nations General Assembly. The support for the request to the Committee on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc working group to deal with this matter comes from all political quarters. It was, furthermore, clear at the UNISPACE Conference last summer that the question of the increasing militarization of outer space was a major concern for the participating countries. This was clearly expressed in the final report of the Conference, in which it was recommended that this Committee give high priority to this grave concern.

The Committee on Disarmament should take concrete action on this item in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions and with the Committee's role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

It is in the interest of maintaining stability and preventing the unleashing of another round of the arms race that the Swedish delegation urges that an ad hoc working group be established without delay. We cannot accept the assertion that negotiations on this matter would be to the disadvantage of any country. On the contrary, we are convinced that further delays will complicate an already very complex problem to the disadvantage of us all.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the earth and the stationing of such weapons in outer space or on celestial bodies. Several other treaties limit or prohibit various other military uses of outer space, for instance, the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty, the SALT I Agreement and the ABM Treaty. Nevertheless, it is obvious that a number of conceivable

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military uses of outer space, which are likely to have destabilizing or otherwise threatening effects, are not covered by existing international legal instruments. There is, therefore, a need to identify areas and activities which so far have not been covered, in order to consider to what extent there exists a need for international agreements aiming at the prevention of undesirable developments in this field.

There is, in the opinion of the Swedish delegation, still a good chance to tackle these problems, but time is quickly running out. Rapid technological developments do not wait. As in so many areas, disarmament negotiations are likely to become more complicated for every lost month. Action must be taken before financial and political investments in new weapons systems become so important that the process becomes irreversible.

It is an understatement to say that the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space is a complex one. Apart from the many technical intricacies, there are the problems of distinguishing between civilian and military applications and between the stabilizing and destabilizing effects of various military space functions.

Another dimension is the distinction between whether a spacecraft is geared to "active" or "passive" military use. So-called "killer satellites" and space-based ABM or BMD systems are examples of devices which are designed actively to interfere with the adversary's military capabilities.

Obviously there are important military applications of space technology which contribute to a more stable military balance and a lower risk of war, in particular between the two major alliances. I have in mind, for example, military satellites, which are used to provide early warning of missile launches, and satellites for verification of arms control agreements and for fast and reliable communications. There are, however, certain developments which give cause for particular concern. One such trend is that of efforts to acquire or improve the capability to destroy one another's satellites. Another concern is that an increased launching capacity, for instance in the form of re-usable space vehicles, may also be used for the further militarization of outer space.

As the military balance is becoming increasingly dependent on satellites for communications, command, control and intelligence, the ability of such functions to survive is also becoming increasingly threatened by the development of anti-satellite weapons systems. The Soviet Union has launched a number of interceptor/destroyer satellites during the last several years and, in earlier years, also fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS), and the United States is planning to begin operational testing of its ASAT system in 1983. Moreover, both Superpowers are investigating the possibility of using high-energy laser and particle beams for ASAT applications.



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... the problem of lacunae in existing international agreements regarding the prohibition of military uses of outer space. It seems natural that one of the first tasks of an ad hoc working group in the Committee on Disarmament should be to analyse such gaps in present treaties against the background of existing and conceivable military applications of space technology. The next step may be to determine which of the space systems or activities should be prohibited or subject to regulations. It would seem natural to the Swedish delegation that, for example, anti-satellite weapons systems should be banned. Perhaps, as a complement to such a prohibition, in order to exclude the possibility of the military use of otherwise legitimate civilian space vehicles, it might also be desirable to ban certain activities, for example, the destruction of satellites of other countries. We have noted with interest what the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. van den Broek, said in this context in his statement in this Committee on 29 March, and we will carefully consider it.

My delegation has taken note with great interest of the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. However, the draft gives rise to some important questions, such as, for instance, how to define the concept of "weapon" in this context. This issue would obviously have to be tackled at an early stage.

As is well known, many satellites form integral parts of weapons systems which are not themselves stationed in outer space. Perhaps, for practical reasons, we may have to focus on such systems or "weapons" as are intended for warfare exclusively in outer space. Such weapons, as we know them today, are based on the earth. The discussion must, therefore, encompass all weapons which are meant to be used in outer space and not only those which are stationed there.

As long as the leading military powers build their security on a precarious nuclear balance and hold the rest of the world hostage, it is vitally important that nothing should upset this balance. The peoples of the world demand serious disarmament proposals from the Superpowers in order to reach a balance at lower levels of armaments. Instead we have learned with grave concern that the United States plans to embark upon a research and development programme with the ultimate goal of obtaining the capability of destroying ballistic missiles launched by the adversary. The only safe way of avoiding the nuclear threat is to abolish the nuclear weapons. To develop and deploy weapons for the purpose of obtaining the capability of destroying the adversary's strategic missiles while keeping one's own strike capability intact, would create a dangerously unstable situation. This would be the case at least as long as only one party has such a capability. It should also be



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noted in this context that such a major undertaking would entail the spending of enormous funds and a waste of precious scientific resources. The initiation of such a research and development process will be destabilizing in itself and increase the level of nervousness and tension. It would also initiate research for similar weapons in other States and lead to countermeasures, and hence give rise to a new cycle in the senseless arms race.

The SALT I and II agreements between the Superpowers acknowledged the right of the parties to use national technical means to verify compliance with their provisions. In addition the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space refers exclusively to national technical means of verification. However, it is hardly likely that such a limitation would be accepted by the international community. If a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space is to stand a chance of being universally adhered to, it must have a system of international verification. A first step in this direction was taken by France in advancing the idea of an international satellite monitoring agency. This is a matter of principle to many countries. Moreover, it must also be realized that the present virtual duopoly of the two Superpowers in this technology is about to be broken.

The further development of anti-satellite weapons is a most threatening perspective. The Swedish Government, therefore, attaches great importance to the early initiation of negotiations with a view to prohibiting the establishment of such systems and the dismantling of existing ones in order to preclude such a new phase of the arms race. We cannot share the view that if one of the Superpowers has acquired a certain lead in one area, the other should be entitled to catch up before any negotiations can be embarked upon in that field. The experiences so far of "the bargaining from strength" philosophy are anything but encouraging. My Government acknowledges the need for an over-all balance in the military field, but that balance must be sought and achieved at lower and not higher levels of armaments. If one Power or a few Powers have achieved a certain capability, which may become threatening to others, negotiations should start without delay in order to do away with such unilateral advantages. As we all know, experience shows that once a new military technology has become established, the temptation to exploit it in

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and deployment of new weapons in most cases becomes irresistible. The case of anti-satellite weapons is not likely to be any exception.

Although there is clearly a need for multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, this, of course, does not exclude the possibility of the two leading space Powers negotiating between them on matters of particular bilateral interest in this field. This view is consistent with the opinion my delegation and many others have expressed regarding other disarmament questions also, such as a nuclear test ban and the prohibition of chemical weapons. Sweden, therefore strongly urges the United States and the Soviet Union to resume their bilateral talks with a view to finding solutions to some of the most pressing problems in the field of space warfare, notably the prevention of anti-satellite warfare.

Sweden was able to co-sponsor both General Assembly resolutions last autumn on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Resolution 37/83, submitted by non-aligned and socialist countries, contained, inter alia, a clear request for the establishment of an ad hoc working group in the Committee on Disarmament with the task of opening multilateral negotiations on this item. This is important. Negotiations must no longer be delayed. Resolution 37/99 D, adopted on the initiative of western countries, put special emphasis on the need to tackle the problem of an emerging race in anti-satellite weapons. This seems to us to be the most immediate concern. Both resolutions, therefore, had merits which we considered important. The distinguished Ambassador of Sri Lanka, in his statement of 14 April, made a clear presentation of the possible approaches to the decision now facing the Committee on this matter. As far as the Swedish delegation is concerned, it is flexible on the organization of a forthcoming negotiation within an ad hoc working group in this Committee. A constructive proposal regarding the establishment of such a working group has been made in document CD/329, submitted by the Group of 21.

Security is basically a political concept. Security problems must, therefore, be solved not by increased armaments or confrontation between adversaries but in co-operation and negotiations between parties for their mutual advantage and our common security. Time is getting short, but it is still possible to prevent an arms race in outer space if negotiations start now. If this fails, all countries will suffer. All countries thus have a legitimate interest in this matter. An overwhelming majority among them demand negotiations in this Committee before it is too late. Such a demand must not pass unheeded.

Mr. Chairman, it would not be an understatement to say "security" have the widest usage in contemporary inter-State relations. And yet the principles which should govern peaceful relations among nations enjoy the widest disregard, the widest violation within the community of nations. The talk about disarmament and international security is not novel either, but one wonders whether and where a line can be drawn in reality between disarmament and international security on the one hand, and armament and international insecurity on the other!

On several occasions already, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, has expressed his serious concern about the paying of lip-service to issues of the greatest importance to the survival of mankind. In the statement he delivered to this Committee on 15 February last, for instance, the Secretary-General re-emphasized the point he had made in his first annual report dated 7 September 1982, namely, that the escalation in the arms race was and is guaranteed by the lack of a credible and effective system of international peace and security. What was essential, he stressed, was "to find ways to enhance the collective security machinery afforded by the United Nations Charter and by the Security Council in particular". We could not agree more with the Secretary-General. The fact is that the League of Nations had to collapse the way it did precisely because it had not been founded on a sound and solid system of collective security. Any architect who starts with, and aims at, constructing what he believes to be a strong and durable roof for a house but neglects to lay the required solid foundation for it engages in a futile construction exercise. No wonder, then, that the Second World War, like the First World War before it, could not be prevented.

Most regrettably, the United Nations, like the League of Nations before it, also lacks an effective collective system of international security. No wonder, then, that the United Nations has not succeeded in its primary responsibility of preventing all kinds of war and assuring enduring peace and security. As Keeper of the Peace, the United Nations is still to evolve an effective machinery for the peaceful resolution of international disputes and for the effective governance of the behaviour of sovereign States in their relations with one another. The structure and system of the United Nations are such that only some of its Members bear the primary task of maintaining international peace and security. The argument, then, that the United Nations has failed as Keeper of the Peace because of the behaviour of certain of its Members, who have not discharged their responsibilities the way they should, is not only logical; it is indeed sound and credible.

In short, the system of international peace and security envisaged in the United Nations Charter has not been fully and successfully applied primarily because the provisions of the Charter have not been strictly adhered to. Thus, as it has been argued time and again, the Second World War resulted from the lack of a system capable of ensuring lasting peace and security. We, like the other Members of the international community, are charged with the responsibility of making the system work and thereby preventing a third world war from erupting. The First World War was a European war and we all know the reasons that led to it. The Second World War was broader in character and scope than World War I, but the main war stage still remained Europe, and we all know the reasons that led to that war. But we all know that a third world war would not be limited to one region. We all know that the battleground for such a war would be every inch of our earth, and its victims would be mankind itself. We all know that World War III would not only result from "grave reasons"; it would not only result from politico-military and security reasons. Such a war would result from a combination of factors, a combination of reasons, some of which would be simple and honest mistakes; others would even be irrational, trivial and ridiculous, such as mere suspicion and mistrust; mere miscalculation among the supposed custodians of world peace and security; mere misuse of scientific and technological achievements of our day, and the mere arrogance of power by certain States members of the international community, and of course, the resulting arms race and violations of the United Nations Charter.

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Other factors and reasons of a more serious nature from which a new world war could result would certainly include the existing economic imbalances and inequities between the rich and the poor; between armament and underdevelopment; between the "haves" and the "have-nots" of the North and South; between the evolutionary and the revolutionary; and, of course, the East-West conflict in the third world — the sole battleground for all the 140 or so armed conflicts and wars which have occurred since the end of the Second World War.

Dag Hammarskjöld was right when he expressed his strong conviction that a third world war could very easily have started in the Congo, now Zaire, in 1960. One thing is certain, however, and is universally recognized: World War II was fought for six years; World War III would last for less than six days, and it would annihilate the greatest and most precious gift of all time — our very life!

If, then, one talks about the relationship among disarmament, development and international security, what exactly does one mean? Well, the answer to this question is necessarily complex because the question itself is a complex one. First, we must establish what these expressions actually mean. What is disarmament? What is development? What do we mean by "security" or "national interests"?

In my intervention of 14 April 1983, I dwelt at length on the close interconnection that exists between disarmament and development. Today, I wish to address myself to the question of the international system of security and how it is closely interconnected with the questions of disarmament and development. These interconnections are better described as a "triangular relationship".

For all practical purposes, disarmament is the process of reduction in the size of, and expenditures on, armed forces; of the destruction or dismantling of weapons, whether deployed or stockpiled; of the progressive elimination of the capacity to produce new weapons, and of the release and integration into civilian life of military personnel. The ultimate objective in this process is, of course, general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Development is, on the other hand, a multidimensional process involving the reorganization and reorientation of entire economic and social systems. It aims at attaining improvements in incomes and output. It involves radical changes in social, institutional and administrative structures, as well as in popular attitudes and even in customs and beliefs. It also aims at the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality (in the distribution of income and wealth as well as of status and power), and the eradication of absolute poverty. Poverty is part of inequality because poverty and wealth are the two extreme positions of income distribution in society. And as I have said before, no contemporary society, irrespective of its economic development, social situation, political system, or anything else, is free of inequality.

My understanding of "national interest" is that it is whatever a nation feels to be essential to its security and well-being. National interests are thus national goals, the first among them being the maintenance and protection of national security.

National security refers, as we all know, both to physical and to psychological security, which security may be subject to threats, both internal and external. The constituent elements of national security include: the promotion and maintenance of national economic and social welfare, the preservation of national health and safety; the promotion and maintenance of national integrity, national independence and the liberty of peoples to choose their own economic and political destiny and their cultures, and to exist with others; freedom from the fact and menace of military attack and freedom from the fact of menace.



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Thus, for any system of international security to be viable, it must recognize, and adhere to the aforementioned constituent elements of national security. It must also recognize and respect the right of all to exist in freedom and stability, justice and equity, and in safety. Genuine and lasting international peace and security thus essentially means equitable socio-economic development and survival, as well as recognition of the multidimensional interdependence which must exist between and among nations. This fact was recognized by the international community when it agreed to the following paragraph in the Second United Nations Development Strategy for the 1970s:

"(6) In the conviction that development is the essential path to peace and justice, Governments reaffirm their common and unswerving resolve to seek a better and more effective system of international co-operation whereby the prevailing disparities in the world may be banished and prosperity secured for all."

In summary, then, disarmament is a means to an end, the end being lasting world peace and security; but disarmament must be attained first and disarmament will never be an effective vehicle to that end unless the unavoidable triangular relationship existing among disarmament, development and security, i.e. survival, is fully and unreservedly recognized and promoted by all. Disarmament must also be recognized as a vehicle for attaining the New International Economic Order, since the latter is the instrument whose main objective is to bring about structural changes in inter-State relations, with a view to eliminating the inequities existing in the current international economic relations. Continued disagreement on disarmament, as indeed on development issues, can only intensify the arms race and the conflicts so dominant these days in inter-State relations, and thereby render impossible the attainment not only of the New International Economic Order, but in particular of a lasting world peace and security.

Development is a process which entails social and economic changes in society, and the ultimate goal of development is to attain justice through an improvement in the quality of life for all; the provision of the basic material requirements for a productive and dignified existence for all; and the granting to everyone of equal opportunities fully and effectively to participate in the economic and social progress and to share in its benefits. Development is, hence, by definition, a global necessity and possession unlimited to any region or some regions of the world. Development of the poorer countries of the South, through disarmament, will certainly bring benefits to the North as well, whereas an arms escalation will bring social misery to all nations and peoples. Development represents the entire gamut of changes by which an entire social system, tuned to the diverse basic needs and desires of individuals and social groups within that system, moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory, and towards a situation or condition of life regarded as materially and spiritually "better".

What, then, must be done to attain, promote and maintain an enduring system of international peace and security? What sacrifices must be made for this cause? There is a lot that can and must be done to attain this goal. We need, all of us, first and foremost, to develop a sense of genuine belonging to the disarmament process; a sense of duty to this process; a sense of commitment to disarmament negotiations; a sense of urgency in the disarmament process; a sense of hatred for the arms race, and a sense of survival through disarmament. We need, all of us, to recognize the close relationship existing between disarmament, development and survival. We need to abide strictly by the United Nations Charter provisions. No system of durable international peace and security is possible without the genuine co-operation in the establishment of such a system and the positive involvement of the United States and the USSR and their respective military alliances. Of the 50,000 or so nuclear weapons existing in the world today, 95 per cent belong to the United States and the USSR. These weapons have the power of some 1 million Hiroshima

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bombs. Ten thousand of these are deployed for use in Europe. Sixteen thousand of them are strategic, capable of crossing the globe in only 30 minutes and landing within a few hundred yards of their intended targets. Of course, all the facts are not easy to determine, because they are not freely accessible. But we know what the consequences would be, if an accident, or a miscalculation, or even a deliberate pressing of the war button were to occur in the nuclear field.

Thus, no system of world peace and security can last for long if it does not recognize the important role which disarmament must play as the fundamental means to over-all human survival, and if the super Powers and the other militarily significant Powers refuse to undertake serious and genuine negotiations leading to the conclusion, as soon as possible, of binding international legal instruments in the field of disarmament. The "linkage" approach, whereby progress on one disarmament aspect, for example in a limited forum, is conditioned by the results of the talks on another aspect of the disarmament process, has so far proved to be very obstructive to progress in general. The terms of reference of the various negotiating forums should provide the sole necessary guidelines for such negotiations.

Our talk about security should not be limited to the military aspects of security. The fact is that military aspects are but a small fraction of over-all security. As I have stated before, no arms escalation can or will ever lead to genuine and enduring security. The non-military aspects of security entail the provision of the basic conditions for peaceful relations between and among States: global co-operation leads to global economic stability and welfare and that means global security; global equitable distribution of resources, and global co-operation on safeguarding the environment. We cannot afford to ignore all these factors.

Perhaps there is no better measure in the global quest for peace than through the enhancing of the effectiveness of the United Nations as Keeper of the Peace. It has been estimated that more than 120 wars were fought in 71 States between 1945 and 1971 and that since the Second World War, 30 million or so people have died in armed conflicts, and all this during the time that the United Nations has existed as a political organization charged with the primary responsibility of keeping the peace. Making the United Nations effective essentially means stopping all wars and conflicts from occurring. It means enforcing and applying the original security role given to the United Nations in Chapter VII of its Charter, under which the United Nations must take action with respect to "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression". It means applying the "enforcement" provisions of Articles 12, 26 and 39-51 of the United Nations Charter, which require the Security Council to take action.

Enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations as Keeper of the Peace also means that the General Assembly must be given and must play an increasing role in the maintenance of international peace and security as envisaged in Article 11 of the Charter, and in numerous resolutions of the General Assembly. Let me refer to only three of them. In its resolution 290(IV), adopted in 1949, and entitled, "Essentials of peace", the General Assembly stated that disregard of the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations "is primarily responsible for the continuance of international tension ...".

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

In its resolution 380(V), adopted at its 308th plenary meeting on 17 November 1950, and entitled, "Peace through deeds", the General Assembly declared that all goals for lasting peace and security were attainable, provided all Governments and members of the United Nations strictly observe their obligations under the Charter, and demonstrate by their deeds their will to achieve peace. In the same resolution also, the General Assembly reaffirmed that, whatever the weapons used, any aggression, whether committed openly, or by fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power, or otherwise, "is the greatest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world".

Of particular importance, and relevant to my argument for enhancing the role of the United Nations in keeping the peace, is resolution 377(V), adopted by the General Assembly at its 302nd plenary meeting on 3 November 1950, and entitled "Uniting for peace". We all know the circumstances that led to the adoption of that resolution. Many have argued that the United Nations Security Council lacks the power to act, that it lacks the teeth to bite with, or even gnaw wars and conflicts in the world, precisely because of the use of the veto. The "Uniting for peace" resolution was thus designed to enable the United Nations to act by getting around the stultification of the veto power. The relevant paragraph of the resolution provides that:

"The General Assembly, ...

A.

1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace or security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations;".

This is one of the most meaningful resolutions the General Assembly has ever adopted. The misuse and abuse of the veto power has grown with time. The right application of the "Uniting for peace" resolution would contribute to the enhancement of the effectiveness of the United Nations in its peace-keeping duties. Similarly, the original mandate of the Military Staff Committee should be restored, and the Committee's role in the maintenance of international peace and security, as envisaged in Articles 26 and 47 of the Charter, should be enhanced. Unless, therefore, the United Nations is given the central authority of deterring conflicts and wars through the enforcement of the Charter provisions, the achievement of a viable system of international peace and security will continue to be remote. Many good resolutions have been adopted, and good statements delivered on the strengthening of the United Nations as an instrument of peace. The problem, however, has been in their application.

In June 1963, for instance, President John F. Kennedy had the following to say about the United Nations at the American University in Washington, D.C.:

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

"... to strengthen the United Nations, to help solve its financial problems, to make it a more effective instrument of peace, to develop it into a genuine world security system ... capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of insuring the security of the large and the small, of creating conditions under which arms can finally be abolished ... This will require a new effort to achieve world law ...".

President Kennedy had been even more explicit in his belief and trust in the United Nations, when he delivered his inaugural address in January 1961. He said:

"To that world assembly of sovereign States, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of support -- to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invective -- to strengthen its shield of the new and the weak -- and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run ...

So let us begin anew -- remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belabouring those problems which divide us. Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms -- and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations ...

And if the beachhead of co-operation may push back the jungle of suspicion, let both sides join in a new endeavour, creating, not a new balance of power, but a new world of law, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved. In your hand, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure of our course".

That was a mighty statement, and President Kennedy must be very uncomfortable in his grave with the present performance of "that world assembly of sovereign States", as keeper of world peace and security.

The talk about disarmament, development and international security is incomplete if it does not include the role of the non-aligned movement in that triangular relationship. As I have indicated on other occasions, neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism have always attributed the existence of "underdevelopment" and the dependence of the South primarily to the historical evolution of a highly unequal international capitalist system of poor country-rich country relationships. The co-existence of the rich and poor nations in an international system dominated by such unequal power relationships between the rich and the poor renders all efforts by the poor nations to be self-reliant and independent in their development efforts not only difficult but almost impossible.

The non-aligned movement is 22 years old. But at its first summit meeting held in Belgrade in 1961, the movement declared, inter alia, that:

"War has never threatened mankind with greater consequences than today. On the other hand, never before has mankind had at its disposal stronger forces for eliminating war as an instrument of policy in international relations".

Thus, from its very inception, the non-aligned movement did see a clear relationship between disarmament and international security on the one hand, and between these and socio-economic development on the other. The Belgrade declaration stressed the top priority the movement attached, as it is now, to the necessity of preventing nuclear war, and the arms race in general. By deciding to send an official



(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

of the Superpowers -- Moscow and Washington, D.C. -- to urge them to cease nuclear testing, the non-aligned movement thus took the first step ever towards a world-wide nuclear disarmament. The movement's very birth was, in fact, a rebellion against the arms race instituted by the world war in East-West relations.

Already in 1940, Jawaharlal Nehru talked about complete disarmament and its relationship to development and international security. He said, inter alia: "Disarmament ultimately depends on far-reaching changes in the political and economic structure of the world leading to a removal of the basic causes of war". Nehru continued with his tireless campaign for peace throughout the 1950s. In 1954, for instance, he wrote in National Herald about the arms race which he described as "the way to madness, and the great men who contest our destinies are dangerous self-centred lunatics, who ... will rather rain death and destruction all over the world than give up their petty opinions and think and act aright ... Peace and co-operation and well-being for all the peoples of the world were well within grasp. But the gods perhaps envied the lot of man and drove him mad ...". Thus, the topic of disarmament has been on the agenda of practically every non-aligned summit meeting since the birth of the movement. And we are all familiar with the pronouncements on this subject of the recently concluded seventh non-aligned summit meeting.

The third world is right to be articulate on the question of disarmament because the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the very survival of mankind so require, and because, as is very well known, the third world has been the battleground of all wars waged since 1945. We all have a stake in disarmament and common security entails collective responsibility.

From the foregoing, it is evident that security cannot be guaranteed either by the use of force or by military preparedness. Security can never and will never be bought by military hardware, by billions of dollars, or by mere advanced technological attainment. The very notion of security means that excessive and extravagant military spending is not only a waste of scarce resources in the midst of an ever-deteriorating global economic crisis -- resources which are so very badly needed for productive social and economic purposes -- but such spending merely enhances insecurity, and all the chances of war. And this is the paradox, years ago, military spending on armaments was much less than it is today; and yet the world was a safer place to live in. Now, military expenditures have reached insane proportions, and yet the world is a much more dangerous place to live in than it was then!

Let us, then, all work for the translation of the Final Document provisions into concrete action. Let us all work for the progressive strengthening of the peace-keeping role and machinery of the United Nations. Let us all work for the removal of local and global tensions in relations among nations. Let us all work for the eradication of poverty and deprivation, and inequality and hunger and malnutrition and ill-health, and under-development. Let us all work for the establishment of national and regional security arrangements and assurances; for the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Let us all work for the political and economic security of every nation. Let us all work for our common survival in dignity through our common disarmament, our common development, and our common security. Permit me now, Mr. Chairman, to express the deep and sincere gratitude of my delegation to Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal, the distinguished Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament, for the constant assistance and advice he has given us during our deliberations. And I would also like to express my appreciation to his deputy, Mr. Berasategui, and all the other members of the secretariat for the great devotion and patience which they have demonstrated in rendering services to this Committee. My delegation is fully appreciative of all these valuable services. I also wish to thank the interpreters, the engineers and everybody else who has participated in the provision of valuable services to us. I want them all to know that we do not at all forget what they are doing; we do not take for granted what they are doing. We value their services very much.

ian thanks Mr. Don Nanjira for his statement, for his kind words addressed to the Chair and for his very generous words of thanks to the secretariat, the interpreters, the technicians and all members of the staff servicing this Committee. May I now call upon the next speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of Algeria, Ambassador Oul Rouis. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. OUL ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, since the beginning of this session the Algerian delegation has had the opportunity to express its views on the various items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. I shall confine myself today to offering some comments on the subject of item 7 of our agenda, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Recent years have been marked by the appearance of signs foreshadowing a new phase in the militarization of outer space.

The extension of the logic of conflict to outer space, now considered by the strategists of the major powers as a potential battlefield, could not but engender a race in the development of space weapon systems.

The current programmes of research and development relating to anti-satellite interceptor systems, laser weapons and particle-beam weapon systems are all part of this perpetual endeavour to secure military superiority.

The integration of outer space into the strategic concepts of the major powers greatly reduces the distance between the fictional "star wars" scenario and the sphere of reality.

These dangerous shifts further complicate the disarmament equation. There is no doubt that an arms race in outer space will have unforeseeable consequences for the security of the world, unless the international community, in a healthy reaction, succeeds in preserving outer space, and the peaceful activities for which it provides support, from the warlike antagonisms of the major powers.

This is still possible, for, unlike nuclear disarmament, where the goal is to eliminate weapons which unfortunately exist, it would seem that space weapons are not yet operational.

We therefore consider that it is neither naive nor idealistic to believe that there is still time to prevent the conversion of outer space into a future battlefield.

It is still possible, if the powers in question show political will and embark upon a process of negotiation with a view to the adoption of concrete measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

This task is urgent, for experience in disarmament matters shows that, once it has been started, the arms race in a given sphere develops in an action-reaction spiral and makes it all the more difficult to adopt measures to stop the escalation and reverse the trend.

The injunctions of the international community in favour of this objective are numerous.

Almost five years ago the General Assembly, meeting at its first special session devoted to disarmament, stated in its Programme of Action, which was adopted by consensus, that further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in order to prevent an arms race in outer space.



(Mr. Oul Rouis, Algeria)

In its resolutions 36/99 and 36/97 C, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to undertake negotiations on this question. That request was, moreover, reiterated by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, in its resolutions 37/83 and 37/99 D.

Speaking at the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, held at Vienna last August, the Secretary-General of the United Nations echoed the concerns of the international community in declaring that the growing militarization of outer space was alarming and inviting the forces of reason and peace to oppose what would be a dangerous escalation of the arms race.

The same Conference adopted by consensus a report which places the emphasis on the maintenance of peace and security in outer space, and in which it urgently recommends the competent bodies of the United Nations, and in particular the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament, to give this matter the requisite attention and high priority.

Apart from the fact that it runs counter to the efforts being made by the international community to put an end to the arms race and to prevent nuclear war, the extension of the arms race to outer space can and should be avoided for certain very obvious reasons.

It ought to be avoided in the first instance because it is likely to increase the risks of the breakdown of international peace and security.

It ought to be avoided, secondly, because it is unacceptable that a small number of States should not merely cause danger to all mankind by reason of the huge nuclear arsenals they hold but in addition place the security of all States at risk by converting the common heritage of mankind into an advanced defence position for their own security.

It ought also to be avoided because that is an essential precondition for the development and continuation of international co-operation in the sphere of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

Lastly, it is no secret to anyone that space programmes for military purposes absorb vast resources whose size is in shocking contrast with the meagreness of the financial flows devoted to what is known as development aid.

There can be no doubt that the Committee on Disarmament, the only multilateral disarmament negotiating body, is the proper place for multilateral negotiations on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The discussions which took place in this Committee on this question at the last session had the merit of showing the interest that exists in achieving the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Delegations were able to conduct a very broad exchange of views on the substance of the question as well as on the structural framework for dealing with item 7 of the agenda.

Almost all delegations stressed the need to set up a working group on this item; unfortunately, differences of views about its mandate prevented the establishment of such a group at the last session.



(Mr. Oul Rouis, Algeria)

Anxious to help promote disarmament in all possible ways, the Group of 21, in document CD/329, submitted a draft mandate for an ad hoc working group on this question.

Basing itself on the principle that outer space, which is recognized as the common heritage of mankind, ought to be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, the Group of 21 proposed a mandate which favours a global approach designed to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

The Algerian delegation, for its part, continues to support that proposal, which it recommends anew.

On the eve of the unleashing of an arms race in outer space which would assuredly be as dangerous as it would be costly, it seems to us that the best way of eliminating this danger is the global approach, which recognizes the interdependence of all aspects of this question and takes into account the interests of all parties to the negotiations.

While we do not wish to minimize the difficulties of the task confronting the Committee on Disarmament, we nevertheless find some of the arguments that have been advanced for putting off the negotiation of an international instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects unconvincing.

It has first of all been claimed that this is only a theoretical possibility because the weapons in question do not yet exist. It is surely hardly necessary to point out that in matters of arms, the temptation to convert theoretical possibilities into reality is great because it is inherent in the dynamics of the search for military superiority.

The argument has been put forward of the complexity of the issue and the lack of experience in this field. This should in no way prevent the Committee from embarking on negotiations on this matter, taking advantage of all the experience gained in this sphere, particularly during the bilateral negotiations, as well as calling upon all the requisite expertise. It is, moreover, to be noted that putting off the negotiations because of the complexity of the question would mean deferring the solution of this matter indefinitely, because it is obvious that these problems become more complex as time passes.

The argument of complexity and technical difficulties is very often used to cover the unwillingness of certain powers to engage in negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament.

As to the Algerian delegation, we are firmly convinced that the will to negotiate is primarily something political. Although technical difficulties may possibly explain the slowness of a given negotiating process, they cannot affect the essentially political nature of the process itself.

In establishing a working group with a global mandate, the Committee on Disarmament would be responding to the appeals of the United Nations General Assembly as well as to the demands of our peoples, who insist that measures should be taken to prevent outer space becoming a battlefield endangering the very survival of mankind.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, my statement today will be devoted to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the item the Committee is to discuss this week in accordance with its programme of work. It is to be noted that the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is becoming all the more urgent and pressing in view of the dangerous trend towards the conversion of outer space into a theatre for such a race.

If we look at history and turn some of its pages, we shall be convinced anew of the importance and timeliness of the efforts that have been made to prevent outer space being used for military purposes.

Three months after the beginning of the space era in the history of mankind, which was opened by the launching of the first Soviet satellite in March 1958, the USSR put before the United Nations General Assembly at its thirteenth session a proposal on the prevention of the use of outer space for military purposes and on international co-operation in the matter of the exploration of outer space. That was the first proposal in the history of mankind for the limitation of military activity in outer space. With the active participation and significant contribution of the socialist States and other peace-loving countries, certain international legal instruments now in force, limiting the use of outer space for hostile purposes, were worked out and concluded, for example, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, of 1963, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, of 1967, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, of 1979, and others.

Important provisions aimed at limiting military activity in outer space were included in the strategic arms limitation agreements reached between the USSR and the United States in the 1970s -- the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Salt-I Agreement. These constituted an impressive achievement in this sphere, substantially limiting the use of outer space for military purposes. The agreements contained qualitative limitations concerning specific military space systems. Thus, for example, in the United States -- USSR ABM Treaty of 26 May 1972, the parties undertook "not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based".

The conclusion of these agreements constituted real steps forward in the demilitarization of the celestial bodies and a positive limitation of the use of space for military purposes. However, the existing limitation measures are not complete, because there is no effective international instrument placing a reliable barrier in the way of attempts to extend the arms race to outer space.

It has unfortunately to be observed that those who want to militarize outer space in order to secure absolute supremacy are hastening to take advantage of the absence of such measures of prohibition. It is no secret that the United States has prepared a vast programme in this sphere the basic principles of which have been confirmed by a special presidential directive. In this programme, outer space is regarded as a theatre for military activities and a special military space command has been set up to take charge of operations there.

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A particular danger resides in the preparation of innumerable projects for the development of space weapons designed to attack targets in outer space, in air space and on the earth. Among these, special priority has been given to the development and deployment in space of anti-ballistic missile defence systems, based in particular on the use of the latest scientific and technological achievements in the sphere of laser and charged particle technology.

As you know, the Washington administration has announced the start of work on a large-scale and highly effective anti-missile defence system using military vehicles in space. This programme of extensive military preparations in outer space provides for the establishment of 100 military orbital stations equipped with laser and particle-beam weapons and also sensors for detecting ballistic missiles. It is planned to spend \$500 billion on these purposes. We believe that if the United States carries out these plans that will mean in fact the deployment in space of anti-ballistic missile defence systems for the purpose of destroying the strategic weapons of the other side, that is, depriving it of the possibility of taking retaliatory measures. In essence what this amounts to is the intention to create a strategic first-strike potential.

A large part is also played in these plans by various manned spacecraft capable of carrying out purely military tasks in the placing in orbit of space-earth strike systems, anti-satellite systems and reconnaissance, navigation and other types of satellite for military purposes under the orders of the United States military space command. As has been stated in the Western press, out of 331 planned flights of such craft, more than a third will be destined for military tasks.

The idea of the militarization of outer space in violation of the agreements existing in this sphere did not come from the minds of contemporary science-fiction writers but originated in the highest military and political circles of the United States. For example, it has been said more than once in American military circles that, depending on the results of its work in the sphere of anti-ballistic missile defence systems, the United States might ask for the revision or even the renunciation of the Soviet-American treaty of 1972 that was concluded at the same time as the SALT-I Agreement. As we understand it, both sides legally recognized at that time that mutual restraint in the development of anti-missile defence systems would permit progress to be made in the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons as a whole. Thus there is now in effect a threat to remove one of the cornerstones of the entire strategic arms limitation process.

I should like to add that the carrying out of a programme for the development of a "perfect" ABM system in space would constitute a violation of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of 1972. Under article V of that Treaty, the parties undertook not to develop, test or deploy in space ABM systems or components. Furthermore, the distinguished representative of the United States confirmed this in his statement to the Committee on 2 September 1982.



(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We also wonder how such actions can be in conformity with the provisions of other important international treaties and agreements. As is stated in the United States press with reference to such authorities as the "father" of the hydrogen bomb, the physicist Edward Teller, the provision of the energy for the powerful X-ray lasers necessary for the proposed ABM system is possible only through nuclear explosions in space. The magazine Newsweek, in its issue of 4 April 1983, in particular states: "Although information on the X-ray laser remains classified, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory reportedly created an X-ray pulse with the system in a recent underground test in Nevada".

Thus, questions are now being raised about the fulfilment of obligations assumed under two important international legal instruments, namely, the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in three environments, including outer space, and the 1967 Treaty on the non-deployment in outer space of weapons of mass destruction.

We believe that any violation of generally recognized international legal norms will entail far-reaching consequences.

What dangers do we see in the arms race in outer space?

In the first place, military space vehicles would cause extreme destabilization of the strategic situation. Plans for the development of so-called "perfect" defence systems against strategic missiles are nothing but a screen covering the real intentions of the authors of these plans. Talk about their defensive purpose is deliberately designed to deceive public opinion.

In the second place, the deployment of military vehicles in space would lead to the creation of yet another type of global weapon, the creation of an excessive military first-strike potential which would inevitably increase the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war.

In the third place, as I have already said, an arms race in outer space would entail colossal material expenditures.

Fourthly, and this should be particularly emphasized, the new programme for the development of a "defensive" ABM system violates the specific system of international legal norms to which I referred earlier.

The Mongolian delegation, like the majority of other delegations in the Committee, is firmly in favour of the adoption of constructive measures aimed at the prevention of the extension of the arms race to outer space. There are on the negotiating table in the Committee on Disarmament a number of documents which could serve as the basis for the detailed consideration of and the conduct of negotiations on the substance of the issue. In particular, the Soviet delegation submitted a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space (document CD/274). The Mongolian delegation

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submitted a proposal on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this subject (document CD/272); the group of delegations of the non-aligned and neutral States put before the Committee a draft mandate for the ad hoc working group (document CD/329); a document on arms control and outer space (CD/320) was submitted by the delegation of Canada.

We believe that towards the end of the second part of its 1982 session the Committee was very near to the achievement of a consensus on the setting of an ad hoc working group to discuss questions connected with the prevention of an arms race in outer space on a solid basis, with the participation of qualified experts. This did not happen, however. Certain delegations, and more precisely one delegation, blocked the setting up of an ad hoc working group, declaring that it was necessary to hold an exhaustive discussion of the views of all delegations and to carry out extensive preparatory work of substance. The Mongolian delegation, like many other delegations, is in favour of the practical consideration of the substance of the issue, that is to say, the conduct of genuine negotiations. All the necessary prerequisites exist for this. Apart from the working papers containing specific proposals to which I have already referred, the Committee has been considering item 7 of its agenda from every point of view for more than two years now, both at plenary meetings and at informal meetings. We believe that the majority of delegations have expressed their views on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this connection I should like particularly to draw attention to the statement made by Ambassador Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka at our last plenary meeting, which contained a whole series of practical and useful suggestions which could form the subject of careful study and further consideration in the initial phase of practical negotiations in the Committee.

The Mongolian delegation, which is in favour of the speediest possible starting of actual negotiations, hopes that the Committee will soon agree on a mandate for the ad hoc working group. The wording of the mandate should, in our view, be based on the provisions of resolution 37/83, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. In the course of the negotiations, all existing proposals and possible future initiatives should undoubtedly be taken into account.

At the same time we consider that the main object should be a comprehensive solution of the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This does not mean that we wish to leave to one side the question of the prohibition of anti-satellite systems.

To conclude, I should like to make some comments on item 4 of the agenda.

By contrast with the consideration of other substantive issues, the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons in this Committee have made considerable headway as far as the scope of the work done is concerned. Like many other delegations we believe that if all participants in the negotiations were prepared to contribute to the successful completion of the work on a convention prohibiting chemical weapons this year, that would be a completely attainable objective.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

we see it, is that the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons should be conducted in a practical way. In this connection we wish fully to support the proposal made by a number of delegations for a parallel approach consisting, on the one hand, of the formulation of those key provisions of the future convention on which there is a coincidence or similarity of views and, on the other hand, in close connection with this work, the continuation of the search for mutually acceptable solutions to questions on which there are still divergencies of views. We think that such an approach will speed up and bring us significantly nearer to agreement on the final text of a convention.

As regards questions of substance, the Mongolian delegation would like particularly to note certain constructive proposals that have been made during the present session. I am thinking primarily of the support given by the Soviet delegation to the proposal of a number of non-aligned and neutral States for the inclusion in the future convention of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, of the Soviet proposal for a renunciation of the production of chemicals with the methy-phosphorus bond, and of the proposal of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic for the declaration and liquidation of stocks of binary weapons during the initial phase after the entry into force of the convention. These proposals are undoubtedly extremely important from the point of view of facilitating the negotiations on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

After the prolonged interval between the end of January of this year and last week, the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has at last managed to resume its work. The Mongolian delegation would like to express the hope that under the chairmanship of Ambassador McPhail of Canada this Working Group will be able to complete the task before it.

The Committee on Disarmament has today heard the important statement of Comrade Nguyen Thuong, the Ambassador of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. In that statement he dwelt in detail on the results of the International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War: The Long-Term Effects on Man and Nature, which was held in Ho Chi Minh City from 13 to 20 January 1983. The Mongolian delegation wishes to express its gratitude to the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam for its noble efforts and its great contribution to the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

We consider that the statement by the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam usefully supplements the document which was distributed in the Committee at this session (CD/349), and will serve an important source of information in the consideration of questions of substance in the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.



The CHAIRMAN: The Chairman thanks Ambassador Erdembileg for his contribution, and his statement concludes the list of speakers for today. Is there any other delegation that wishes to take the floor?

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you for your words of condolence addressed to the United States delegation for the heavy loss of life in the terrorist bomb explosion at our Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. I shall convey them to the bereaved families and to my colleagues in the Department of State.

It is a tragedy of our time that diplomatic personnel and establishments have become the target of terrorists. This reflects the callous and cynical disdain which terrorists have for those who are the conduits of international dialogue, who seek solutions to the problems which those same terrorists cite as the reasons for their acts. Civilized people everywhere must reject such mindless acts.

May I also, through you, Sir, extend the heartfelt appreciation of my delegation to the many other colleagues who have similarly expressed their shock and sympathy over this vicious and cowardly act. Let me assure you, Sir, and the Committee, that, as President Reagan said, this criminal act against a diplomatic establishment will not deter us from our goals of peace in the region.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chairman thanks Ambassador Fields for his statement and will be glad to comply with his request.

Is there any other delegation that wishes to take the floor? If not, I may recall that we have already agreed, at our 207th plenary meeting, when the programme of work of the Committee was adopted, to close the first part of the session on 29 April. The Chair has been holding consultations with the co-ordinators of the various groups and with individual delegations concerning the opening date for the second part of the 1983 session. As a result, a consensus seems to be emerging in favour of 14 June as the most appropriate date to start the second part of the annual session. If there are no objections, may the Chair take it that the Committee agrees to that opening date?

It was so decided

The CHAIRMAN: Concerning the closing date of the 1983 session, the general feeling seems to be that this question should be decided during the second half of July, when we shall have a better idea of how the work of the Committee is proceeding.

Before we adjourn this plenary meeting, I should like to inform the Committee that, in consultation with the co-ordinators as well as individual delegations, it has been agreed to devote an informal meeting, on Monday, 25 April, at 3 p.m., to consideration of the question of the establishment of working groups under item 2 of the agenda. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee agrees to that informal meeting.

It was so decided

THE CHAIRMAN: In connection with item 7, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", the Chair has also been conducting consultations on how best to consider this item, taking into account the limitations of time and the large number of meetings requested by the various working groups. After careful consideration of all possible alternatives, it has been agreed with the co-ordinators and other interested delegations that, after listening to the members listed to speak at our plenary meeting on Thursday next, we will suspend the plenary meeting and continue in an informal meeting to examine how best to consider item 7. After an exchange of views on that question, we could then resume the plenary meeting in order to give members an opportunity to express views for the record, in the light of the discussion held at the informal meeting. Since we may need to devote some time to the item under consideration, the secretariat will also make arrangements to provide for an extended meeting of the Contact Group on Principles of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which was originally scheduled to meet at 3 p.m. As the new arrangements concerning item 7 might take additional time, that Contact Group would meet immediately after the plenary adjourns.

The Group of 21 contact group on chemical weapons will meet on Wednesday, 20 April, at 9.45 a.m., in Room C.108.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 21 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH PLENARY MEETING  
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 21 April 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. van Dongen

(Netherlands)



## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. TAFFAR
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. J.C. CARASALES Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. D. SADLEIR Mr. F. STEELE Mr. T. FINDLAY
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE Mr. P. BERG Miss HARROY
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. L. GOTZEV Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. B. GRINBERG Mr. P. POPTCHEV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI U TIN KYAW HLAING U THAN TUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. G.R. SKINNER Miss C. de VARENNES
<u>China:</u>	Mr. TIAN JIN Mrs. GE YUYUN Mrs. WANG ZIYANG Mr. LIN CHANG
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mrs. M. SLAMOVA Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. A.M. ABBAS  
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. M. COUTURE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. T. TOTH

India: Mr. M. DUBEY  
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO  
Mr. N. WISNOEMERTI  
Mrs. P. RAMADHAN  
Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA

Iran:

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. R. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA

Kenya: Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. ECLD  
Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI  
Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN  
Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. A.N.C. NWAQZOMUDOH  
Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK  
Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland:

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. L. TOADER

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mrs. I. SUNDBERG  
Mr. R. ANGSTRÖM



Representatives:  
Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN

Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN

Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN

Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

Mr. G.N. VASHADZE

Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. B.P. NOBLE

Mrs. J.I. LINK

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L. FIELDS

Mr. P. CORDEN

Mr. R.L. HORNE

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J. DURHAM

Venezuela:

Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 214th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the outset, may I welcome His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Mr. Lyuben Gotzev, who is listed to address the Committee today as the first speaker. The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs is a career diplomat with a vast experience in multilateral diplomacy, and in particular United Nations affairs, and I am sure that the Committee will follow his statement with particular interest.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 7 of its agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". As usual, members of the Committee wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

In connection with item 7, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", members will recall that the Committee agreed at our last plenary meeting that, after listening to the members listed to speak today, we will suspend the plenary meeting and continue in an informal meeting to examine how best to consider item 7. After an exchange of views on that question, the Committee will resume its plenary meeting in order to give members an opportunity to express views for the record, in the light of the discussion held at the informal meeting.

May I recall that we also agreed that the Contact Group on Principles of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would meet immediately after the plenary in this conference room. Unfortunately, the Chairman of the Contact Group, Ambassador Grinberg, will not be able to convene the meeting for reasons of health, and consequently the meeting of the Contact Group is cancelled. I am sure that all members join me in wishing Ambassador Grinberg a quick recovery so that he can join us again soon.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Bulgaria, India, Australia, Egypt and China. It is now the Chair's pleasure to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, His Excellency Mr. Lyuben Gotzev. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. LYUBEN GOTZEV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, I have the honour of addressing the Committee on Disarmament for the first time. Therefore, allow me at the outset to congratulate you and, through you, all representatives of member States.

The attention and hopes of many Governments and above all of millions of people throughout the world have been turned towards Geneva, not only because it is here that the important Soviet-American negotiations to limit and reduce strategic arms and to limit nuclear weapons in Europe are being held, but also because here is the site of the main multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations which has been entrusted by the international community with so many important tasks. Your work is a highly noble, difficult and responsible one. May I, however, be allowed not to withhold from you our disappointment that for the fifth consecutive year this Committee has been unable to accomplish some progress in the elaboration of international agreements limiting armaments. A great deal of time is still devoted to discussions on procedural and organizational matters, something that is being misused by some delegations so as to divert attention to secondary and less urgent issues. In our opinion, in many cases drafting work is being impeded or delayed by certain Western delegations. The Bulgarian delegation will continue its efforts to overcome such shortcomings so that the Committee's long-standing commitment to the cause of disarmament does yield results.



(Mr. Lyuben Gotzev, Bulgaria)

Bulgaria attaches particular importance to the activities of the Committee on Disarmament and strives to take an active part in them. You are all familiar with the consistent policies pursued by socialist Bulgaria in favour of peace, understanding and co-operation in the Balkans, in Europe and in the world.

The necessity of exerting efforts to halt the arms race and bring about disarmament is, today, immeasurably greater than ever before, since the forces of confrontation and militarism have succeeded in inflicting major harm on détente, in aggravating the political environment and increasing the danger of war. There can be no other task facing all States, their Governments and political leaders more noble than that of militating against war, so as to arrest the current menacing turn of events and bring them back to the avenue of détente and mutually beneficial co-operation, and to arrive at a solution to the problem of the limitation and reduction of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments.

In a recent speech devoted to foreign policy matters, the first Party and State leader of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, stated, inter alia: "We are endeavouring to ensure and we believe that war can be prevented, that peace can be strengthened. We are deeply convinced that peaceful co-existence is the only sensible alternative to thermonuclear war, that it corresponds to the interests of all States and peoples, of all mankind".

In another speech Mr. Zhivkov said: "Turning the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone would correspond to the interests of the peoples of the Balkans. This would constitute a tangible contribution in the healing of the international atmosphere, in the gradual transformation of Europe into a continent free from nuclear weapons; this would be yet another victory for the cause of peace".

For the people and Government of Bulgaria, a significant expression of this policy course are the latest proposals and initiatives put forth jointly with the other socialist States at the Prague meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

As is well known, the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member States considered, earlier this month, subsequent steps to carry out these proposals and initiatives, as well as practical measures concerning negotiations with States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other States, on the fundamental problems related to the preservation of peace, disarmament and security in Europe and in the world. Both documents have been circulated in this Committee. I was informed that they are enjoying their place and share of attention in your discussions and are valued for their merits.

We in Bulgaria have welcomed with satisfaction the announcement that your Committee, although only after lengthy discussions and negotiations, has adopted the proposal of the socialist countries and the countries of the Group of 21 to include on its agenda a question entitled: "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

It is our deep conviction that there is no problem more topical in today's world politics, in the everyday thoughts and preoccupations of all citizens of the globe than that of the prevention of nuclear war.

Allow me to dwell in my statement today briefly upon this major issue. I take this opportunity today also because next week, when it is to be dealt in accordance with your programme of work, I shall not be able to be among you.



(Mr. Lyuben Gotzev, Bulgaria)

task of preventing a nuclear war in a clear-cut way is based on the following premises which, we believe, are worth recalling here.

First, nuclear weapons have specific characteristics which set them apart from all other weapons.

As is known, there are people in the West who deliberately minimize the magnitude of the consequences of a possible nuclear war. Those few but influential people calculate the probable number of human losses in a nuclear exchange at several dozen million lives alone. Such so-called "optimistic" calculations are meant, of course, to allay fears and to condition the population in the West to accept nuclear war as a thinkable alternative. The same objectives are pursued by the publicity given to strategic doctrines based on the possibility of waging and winning "limited nuclear wars", "protracted nuclear wars", etc.

We, for our part, share the generally recognized view that unlike any other weapons nuclear arms, taking into account the stocks accumulated so far, have the potential of killing all the people of the world many times over and maybe even of annihilating all life on our planet. By its very nature, nuclear war cannot be limited. Any use of nuclear weapons will inevitably escalate into a full-scale nuclear war whose fatal consequences will affect the whole world.

Secondly, the danger of nuclear war is real, present and increasing alarmingly.

The danger of nuclear war is not new, but in recent years it has been growing at an alarming rate. What makes today's situation different from yesterday's?

During the 1970s, when the policy of détente reached its peak, trends in international relations were positive. A series of bilateral and multilateral agreements were reached in the field of disarmament and other areas, and co-operation among nations was constantly on the increase. In such an atmosphere of trust and confidence, the prospects for eliminating the threat of war and attaining lasting peace were real and promising.

At present, however, one of the leading nuclear-weapon powers is deliberately trying to undo the positive achievements of the past and is pursuing a policy of rearmament and confrontation, of attaining military superiority and a position of strength and domination. With the support of its close allies, the United States has now embarked on a new round in the arms race which will lead to a further accumulation of weapons of mass destruction.

In assessing the reasons for the present state of affairs, one has to pay particular attention also to the imminent emergence of new types and systems of weapons. I understand that last week the Committee took up this problem and a number of statements have referred to how science and technology are subjected to the development of ever more sophisticated weapons. May I just mention the introduction of the MX missile and the development of several other weapons of a new, advanced generation in the United States. This could be interpreted, as is rightly pointed out by many knowledgeable people, including members of the United States Congress, as the adoption of a first-strike nuclear strategy. The unveiling in Washington of plans based on "Star Wars" scenarios has evoked frightening visions of a future world which will be constantly tottering on the brink of nuclear annihilation.

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ze also the serious consequences for world peace which will flow from the planned deployment of new American medium-range missiles in some countries members of NATO. A part of these missiles are clearly first-strike weapons and may usher our continent and the world into a period of greatly increased risks of nuclear war.

Thus, it is clear beyond any doubt that the danger of nuclear war is real and present. It is also intolerable. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that everything should be done to eliminate this danger without delay.

The Bulgarian delegation believes that if this Committee is to contribute to the achievement of this objective, it should embark on the consideration of the item on the prevention of nuclear war with maximum concentration, and with no preconditions or linkages with other issues. In an academic exercise the issue of nuclear war can, of course, be considered in a very broad context and there can hardly be a problem of international politics which would not be found to be in some sort of relationship to it. However, the Committee does not have a theoretical but a practical task; and it is a negotiating and not a deliberative body. Therefore, in our opinion, this forum should try to limit itself to the identification and elaboration of such measures alone which have a direct bearing on the elimination of the nuclear threat.

Having said this, I should like at the same time to emphasize that our over-all approach to the question of nuclear war is not a narrow one. Consequently, the socialist countries are firmly against any war, be it nuclear or conventional, and they have come forward with several initiatives for practical measures aimed at the total prohibition of the use of force in international relations, both in the regional context of Europe and on a global scale.

Of particular importance and topicality in this respect is the recent proposal by the Warsaw Treaty member States, addressed to the countries members of NATO, to conclude a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. In the communiqué published after the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty member States held on 6 and 7 April in Prague, it was stated that the problems related to the proposal for a treaty on the renunciation of the use of military force could be considered on a multilateral basis, on a level and in forms that would be acceptable to all. It is to be hoped that the countries concerned will take a constructive approach to this proposal.

In the document submitted by a group of socialist countries, an attempt has been made to outline a possible framework for the Committee's action under the item on the prevention of nuclear war. The principal practical measures suggested in that document include:

(a) the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons. This has already been done unilaterally by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's decision, taken in the current complicated international setting, is yet another reaffirmation of the USSR's peaceful policy course, of the markedly defensive character of its military doctrine. This decision corresponds to the vital

(Mr. Lyuben Gotzev, Bulgaria)

ch have every right to insist that the other nuclear-weapon powers, too, should follow the example of the Soviet Union and undertake clear-cut obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This would be an expression of goodwill and readiness for co-operation, of a military policy which is genuinely proceeding from defensive objectives only, and which is taking into account the security of all States. So, if all other nuclear-weapon powers act accordingly, this would in practice amount to the full prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

The same effect could be achieved by the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a measure which enjoys the full support of the socialist States;

(b) a freeze by all nuclear-weapon States on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery as well as on the production of fissionable material for the purpose of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons. Such a first step would prepare the ground for the reduction and, eventually, the elimination of all nuclear arsenals;

(c) the declaration by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions. This measure would greatly facilitate the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, which is of key importance in the efforts to stop the qualitative development of these weapons.

What these measures have in common is above all the fact that they can effectively contribute to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. In addition they are ripe for solution, and enjoy undeniably broad international support. What is needed to put them into effect is the political will of the States concerned.

Clearly, there may be other useful steps. We are ready to discuss any other multilateral measures which could contribute to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war, such as measures for the prevention of the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, of surprise attack, etc.

The identification of the whole range of such steps can best be done in an ad hoc working group to be established by the Committee on Disarmament with a view to conducting negotiations for their elaboration.

The Bulgarian delegation is willing to co-operate with all delegations for the speedy establishment of such a body and the immediate starting of its work.

Allow me to conclude by expressing the opinion that with the inclusion on the agenda of the item on the prevention of nuclear war, the Committee on Disarmament has set before itself a new, most responsible and challenging task whose solution will require multiplied efforts on the part of all delegations in the unique art of disarmament negotiations. To solve this task is to fulfil a historic responsibility. I wish you, dear colleagues, every success in your future work.



r thanks His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Mr. Lyuben Gotzev, for his contribution and for the kind good wishes addressed to this Committee.

I now call on the next speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of India, Ambassador Dubey. You have the floor, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. DUBEY (India): Thank you Mr. Chairman, for giving me the floor.

I would begin by welcoming in our midst His Excellency Mr. Gotzev, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria. We have heard his statement with great attention and we will give it the most serious consideration in our work here.

During the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in June-July 1983, the delegation of India submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly. For reasons well known to all, the special session ended in failure, without adopting a single meaningful measure for the prevention of nuclear war and for disarmament. The proposal from India was transmitted to the thirty-seventh regular session of the General Assembly for consideration and necessary action. The proposed draft convention was also circulated among the members of the Committee on 23 July 1982, in document CD/295.

At the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, India along with 20 other countries co-sponsored a draft resolution entitled, "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", which called upon the Committee on Disarmament "to undertake, on a priority basis, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances", taking as a basis the text of the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. This resolution (37/100 C) was adopted by 117 votes in favour, 17 against and 8 abstentions. It was supported by two of the five nuclear-weapon States, China and the Soviet Union. It was also supported by Sweden, which in the past had abstained on similar resolutions. Two other countries which had voted against previous resolutions on the subject decided to abstain instead. Thus, support for the idea of prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances has been growing steadily each year.

The case for a total prohibition on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons rests on strong moral and legal grounds. It is morally and ethically abhorrent that a State or group of States should seek to pursue its national security by means which constitute a threat of mass annihilation. Often, it is said that as a result of the nuclear threat, mankind is on the brink of self-extinction. This kind of statement erroneously conveys a sense of inevitability of the nuclear threat and the meek submission of all the nations to this threat. The fact is that it is a handful of nations, armed with nuclear weapons, which threaten the world with mass destruction. The majority of the nations of this world are not perverted participants in some kind of a multilateral suicide pact. They are the involuntary intended victims of a strategy of mass annihilation.

Recently, one distinguished visitor to this Committee justified a proposal put forward by his country in the context of the ongoing bilateral negotiations on medium-range weapons as being based on a moral position. We are glad to note that a major nuclear-weapon power regards morality as a valid consideration in such

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light of this avowed moral position, it is difficult for us to see how this country or any other nuclear-weapon State could possibly object to a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons.

The option to use nuclear weapons, which is what the strategy of nuclear deterrence is all about, is often justified in terms of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which guarantees nations the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations". But can the right of self-defence be extended to justify the destruction of the entire planet, the annihilation of the whole of mankind? And in any event, will there be anything left to defend once nuclear war breaks out? It is, therefore, a mockery of the United Nations Charter, a blatant perversion of its high principles, even to suggest that it sanctions the use of nuclear weapons. The Charter of the United Nations was conceived as a blueprint for mankind's survival, not as its death-warrant, as some here would seem to suggest.

If two nations or two groups of nations are at war, the consequences of that war should be confined to the belligerents. If any nation, as a matter of policy, decides not to be involved in a conflict among other States, it has the right to be spared the consequences of such a conflict. No one questions this principle. In fact it is applied almost routinely to matters relating to relations among States in contemporary international life. Why is it that this principle is suspended when we come to deal with nuclear weapons? After all, in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the entire membership of the United Nations stated collectively and unanimously that a nuclear war would have "devastating consequences for belligerents and non-belligerents alike". Can any nuclear-weapon State or any State allied to it guarantee that the effects of the use of nuclear weapons would be strictly limited to the national or regional boundaries of States possessing nuclear weapons or those protected by their so-called "nuclear umbrella"? A vast number of studies have been conducted in this field, and the unanimous verdict of these studies is that such control over the effects of the use of nuclear weapons is not possible. The excellent comprehensive study on nuclear weapons conducted under the aegis of the United Nations (A/35/392) provides ample proof of this undeniable fact, were such proof needed.

States which oppose a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons claim their right as sovereign nations to pursue their security interests as they deem fit. We all hold our sovereignty very dear to us. We also know that the sovereignty of one State or group of States is as inviolate and inalienable as that of other States. But in the name of this self-same principle of sovereignty, I would like to ask: who gave a handful of nuclear-weapon States the right to trample on our sovereignty, the sovereignty of the vast majority of nations which are non-nuclear-weapon States? What principle justifies the placing in jeopardy of the vital security interests of our States? No, those who justify the option to use nuclear weapons on the basis of the principle of sovereignty are in fact engaged in its perennial negation.

It is for this reason that in the Declaration adopted by the Seventh Non-aligned Summit Conference in March this year, it was stated that "Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war. They are instruments of mass annihilation. The Heads of State or Government therefore find it unacceptable that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be held hostage to the security interests of a handful of nuclear-weapon States".

It is thus obvious that the use of nuclear weapons would violate the principles of the United Nations Charter. It would also be a crime against humanity. These words are carefully chosen, because they are based on legal provisions relating to



(Mr. Dubey, India)

referring as a basic source to the Hague Conventions of 1907, the fundamental tenet of which is the prohibition of wanton or indiscriminate destruction. The Geneva Conventions of 1949, which updated and reinforced the Hague Conventions, impose obligatory restrictions on all belligerents to ensure the essential requirements for the minimum well-being and sustenance of the civilian population. Reviewing these provisions, the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, based in the United States, came to the conclusion that "The use of nuclear weapons of any type would inevitably result in massive violation of both the 1907 and 1949 rules".

It has sometimes been argued that there are no explicit legal instruments specifically forbidding the use of nuclear weapons and hence their use is legitimate. Have we really come to such a deplorable and anarchical stage of human behaviour that we will refrain from acting in a prejudicial and irresponsible manner only if we are legally enjoined upon to do so? Is there not a positive obligation imposed on us by higher morality and the dictates of the survival of the human species which ought to prevent us from engaging in activities whose inevitable outcome is going to be the extinction of the human race? In the third century B.C., an emperor of India, Ashoka, had the following definition of religion engraved on a stone pillar. It reads in Sanskrit: "Dharam dharti sa dharmah", which means, "Religion is that which holds the world together". Is it not, therefore, our sacred duty or religion to take a modest step towards holding the world together by banning the use of nuclear weapons? For those who would not be satisfied with anything less than a legal argument, I can do no better than once again quote from what the Lawyers' Committee has to say in this regard:

"Aware of the continuous evolution of war technology, the 1907 Hague Regulations contain a general yardstick intended exactly for situations where no specific treaty rule exists to prohibit a new type of weapon or tactic. In such cases, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and rule of the principle of the laws of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience. In short, this general rule, known as the Martens Clause, makes civilized usages, the demands of humanity and the dictates of public conscience obligatory by themselves -- without the formulation of a treaty specifically prohibiting a new weapon".

To claim legality for the use of nuclear weapons would make utterly meaningless the efforts pursued throughout the entire past century to limit the consequences of armed conflict through the laws of war. Some may still argue, however, that in the era of "total war" in which we live today, even such fundamental rules may have to be disregarded if this improves the chances of victory or at least the avoidance of defeat. This argument, the Lawyers' Committee reminds us, "was urged in another context by some of the Nuremberg defendants, and indignantly rejected by the International Tribunal. The Tribunal's judgement warns that this Nazi conception of total war would destroy the validity of international law altogether". The "total war" that the defenders in the Nuremberg trial were talking about ended in victory for some and defeat for others. But "total war" in the form of a nuclear holocaust will leave no victors and vanquished and will result in the extinction of the entire human race. In the context of such a "total war" which threatens the present and succeeding generations, this legal argument is not only invalid but also utterly irrelevant.



(Mr. Dubey, India)

it put forward against the proposed ban on the use of nuclear weapons which should also be disposed of. It has been said that a legal commitment not to use nuclear weapons is not verifiable and hence cannot be enforced. This, I submit, is an absurd argument. There are indeed very few legal commitments which are verifiable. If this argument of only verifiable commitment being enforceable is applied strictly, then most of our treaties, conventions and contractual commitments would have to be declared infructuous and the whole body of international law will be shorn of its substance. I shall cite just one example to bring out the absurdity of this argument. The nuclear-weapon States, which have been resorting to this argument, are also the ones which have loudly trumpeted the solemn assurances that they have given to non-nuclear-weapon States, selectively and conditionally, of course, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Are these assurances verifiable? Even if these assurances, or the negative security guarantees, are embodied in legal instruments, could they possibly be verified? Where is, then, the question of only verifiable legal commitments being enforceable? In another context, under the terms of the Additional Protocols to the Tlatelolco Treaty, nuclear-weapon States have undertaken legal obligations not to use nuclear weapons against the Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. No provisions have been made to verify such obligations. Does this mean that the nuclear-weapon States do not regard the commitments they have made in the context of this Treaty as valid or enforceable?

Before concluding, I would like to emphasize that the proposal advanced by the non-aligned countries for a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is in no way a substitute for a genuine process of nuclear disarmament. As the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament acknowledges, the only effective guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of such weapons. What we seek to achieve through the proposed convention is the reduction of the risk of nuclear war, pending nuclear disarmament. Even this limited goal, you will agree, is critical for human survival.

The Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, at their Seventh Summit Conference, lent their strong support to the proposal for concluding an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. They "in the name of humanity demanded an immediate prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States". They called upon the nuclear-weapon States to agree on the proposed international convention on the subject. The draft convention proposed by a number of non-aligned countries is before this Committee, and we hope that the appeal to nuclear-weapon States emanating from New Delhi will not go unheeded and will provide an impetus to the consideration of this subject by this Committee. Two nuclear-weapon States have already responded in a positive manner to this initiative. We await the considered reaction of other nuclear-weapon States.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of India for his contribution and now calls on the next speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Sadleir.

Mr. SADLEIR (Australia): Mr. Chairman, may I join in welcoming the Deputy Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, His Excellency Mr. Lyuben Gotzev, to the Committee. We have listened to his statement carefully and will study it closely.

Today I address myself to the question of chemical weapons. At the outset I should like to express my delegation's satisfaction that the lengthy and unnecessary complications which prevented a start on work in this important and promising area have been resolved, and that the Ambassador of Canada, Mr. McPhail, has been appointed Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. My delegation congratulates him on his appointment and looks forward to working closely with him at this session.

Ambassador McPhail has promised to speed our work, putting the focus on negotiation. In this he deserves our full support. Frankly, his task is no easy one. In the first place, proceedings have passed beyond the testing but still relatively straightforward phase of identification, to the much harder stage of trading off firmly held positions. Secondly, important procedural brakes are active.

Under the last Chairman, various circumstances, including the General Assembly's special session on disarmament, conspired to give the Committee on Disarmament something of a free run on chemical weapons. We were able to schedule concentrated periods of work, even outside the regular spring and summer sessions. We were able to take advantage of an imaginative idea of Ambassador Sujka for contact groups, convened with maximum informality. My delegation, with many others, went on record in favour of that approach.

Since then, several delegations have legitimately pointed out that to do business only in English, as happened in the contact groups last year, placed them at a disadvantage. Accordingly, they have asked for full interpretation services. As a result, the contact groups are better serviced and better managed, but they have lost something of their informality — in a sense their youth, innocence and dynamism. It is my delegation's strong recommendation that some element of this be restored and that contact group co-ordinators be allowed, as they see fit and as the need arises, occasionally to resort to informal methods of business. There is a further good reason for this, namely, the absolute limit on the number of rooms available in any one week for full secretarial services, and the ferocious competition for them. The competitiveness will only increase. It would be an enormous pity if progress towards a ban on chemical weapons became the price we had to pay. If the secretariat is able to provide additional facilities, notably increased availability of interpretation, this would be a real contribution.

When I last spoke on the question of chemical weapons, on 8 February, the United States delegation was on the point of tabling its detailed views on a chemical weapons convention. We have since studied these with profound interest: there is no doubt that the substantive matter which is to be found in document CD/343 will advance our negotiations. On 22 February, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union announced a new policy of his Government under which it could agree to include a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in a future treaty. This, too, is a major development, and one which my delegation welcomes as advancing our efforts in the elaboration of an international convention to ban chemical weapons.



(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

The issue of promoting use is the central problem in a cluster of questions bearing on the scope of a future convention. I turn now to some of these questions.

The first point at issue is what chemicals are covered in a chemical weapons ban. Diagrammatically one could represent as a large square all the chemicals in production in the world, and then shade in, say, a quarter of the square to represent the toxic chemicals. Since almost all of these have legitimate civilian or commercial applications one could represent the very small remainder in a darker colour. An even smaller subdivision therein would represent the most acute chemical weapons threat, i.e., the supertoxic lethal chemicals, or nerve agents. Unfortunately, having neatly categorized chemicals in this way, we are unable simply to use the model for prohibition. First, in our smallest, darkest corner -- mainly those chemicals of very high toxicity which have only one purpose, that is, to be used in war, we must section off a fraction for permitted purposes, such as medical or protective research. An oblong in that same corner, not covering all of it and sticking out into the much larger area of permitted toxic chemical production, would represent those chemicals with the methyl-phosphorus bond, most being, recognizably, nerve agents but some having civilian uses. In the larger toxic area would be found chemicals like phosgene with proven effectiveness as weapons but now produced in huge quantities for sound economic reasons. And there would also be other chemicals like herbicides and riot-control agents which may have military applications but which need to be stockpiled for non-hostile purposes.

Since it is not possible to isolate individual chemicals to be prohibited, those who have long negotiated on this issue have evolved the concept of the "general purpose criterion". While agreement on this concept is incomplete, there is broad consensus that the criterion excludes from the prohibition those chemicals produced, possessed or used for non-hostile purposes. The problem with the criterion is that it is a subjective one, as is inherent in the very concept of purpose or intention. It needs to be supplemented by other criteria, including the toxicity criterion, to make manageable and even understandable what purposes are and are not covered by the prohibition. In the view of my delegation, early attention needs to be given to the question, beginning with the very definition of the terms "chemical weapon" and "non-hostile purposes". Criteria or lists could be drawn up as part of this exercise, initially to simplify the negotiating task; perhaps eventually such criteria or lists might be integrated in some way into the treaty itself. Delegations will be familiar with the "understandings" associated with the Environmental Modification Treaty, negotiated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Although not incorporated in ENMOD itself, they do provide a frame of reference. We need something similar here.

The general purpose criterion encapsulates the real objective of the proposed convention: to ban the use of chemicals as weapons. The chemicals themselves are not weapons: as I have stated, in almost every case they have legitimate economic purposes. The effort put in to transferring chemicals from one purpose to another -- "weaponizing" them, if you like -- might to some extent be checked by a prohibition on the manufacture, stockpiling, etc. of chemical weapons. But the use of chemicals as weapons can, in the last resort, only be checked by a ban on use itself; this is logical. Until chemicals are actually used, they may be, or seem to be, or be held to be chemicals manufactured or stockpiled for permitted purposes.



(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

The arguments for not following this logic and for rejecting the concept of a prohibition on use really boil down to one: there is already in place a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Other arguments flow from this — that ambiguities could arise in relation to the Protocol, or the Biological Weapons Convention which derived from it. Delegations might wish to refer to two comprehensive statements in this regard, one by the head of the Polish delegation in 1981 (CD/PV.138) and the other by Ambassador Onkelinx of Belgium last month (CD/PV.206).

I do not intend now to attempt a detailed counter-argument, particularly as I addressed the matter last year (CD/PV.168). It might help delegations, however, if I simply tabulate some of the major points made in support of including a prohibition on use in a future convention. These derive from statements by the Ambassadors of Argentina (CD/PV.167), China (CD/PV.118), Indonesia (CD/PV.169 and 180) and Pakistan (CD/PV.171). Since our five delegations have in recent years worked together on this issue, I trust they will excuse my borrowing from them in this way. The points that I might tabulate are the following:

1. A new convention containing a distinct ban on use would be truly comprehensive;
2. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, rather than being weakened in this regard, can be strengthened;
3. Treaties build on each other: there are numerous precedents;
4. The 1925 Protocol logically should have ended the use of chemical weapons, but unfortunately it did not — indeed the potential for the use of chemical weapons exists under the Protocol;
5. The Protocol did not anticipate that the concept of "war" would evolve into the larger concept of armed conflict;
6. The Protocol allows for ambiguity on the chemicals to be covered;
7. The protocol is limited (by reservation and interpretation) to no first use, and to States that are parties to it;
8. The logic of future verification mechanisms (verification is not itself provided for under the Protocol) is that use should be included in a future ban.

I have mentioned logic more than once, for example, in the additional argument that the general purpose criterion should lead to including a ban on use. The logic of the concept that the future convention should base itself on purpose rather than capability should lead to the inclusion of a ban on use: it is use which transforms purpose from something subjective and debatable to objective reality. On the other hand, there are arguments, good ones, that chemical weapons capability itself should also be restricted by the future convention and here, too, logic leads to including a ban on use. Without a restraint on chemical weapons capability, the convention might actually add to the risk that States could develop a threatening chemical posture, within the law. The threat of use will be much more apparent than the threat of manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and so on.



(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Verification is the main one. Let me assure those delegations which have expressed the fear lest the verification cart be put before the convention horse that the correct order is being observed. The chemical weapons area is a good example of the proposition that disarmament and arms limitation conventions aim to increase security, and that verification contributes to this as a consequence. States give up partially and/or temporarily some of their national security when they adhere to a convention so that they might benefit from a general consequential improvement in security. The reassurance that the process is worth it comes largely through the methods available to them of verifying that all States are complying. In the sphere of chemical weapons, there will have to be an extended and delicate period during which States reduce their chemical weapons profile, actual or potential. There will be asymmetries and uncertainties. There will be a need to ensure — in stages or phases — that complex obligations are being honoured. How this verification is achieved will require continuous regulation in the course of negotiating the convention, but it will of course be subordinated to the objectives of the convention itself.

There has been a wide measure of agreement that the future convention must provide a means to verify that chemical weapons have not been used. The basis of this agreement is that the 1925 Protocol's prohibition on use has no verification mechanism. It might be possible to verify something under one convention which is prohibited in another but, to put it mildly, that would be untidy. My delegation argues a simple proposition: let the future convention ban the possibility of the use of chemicals as weapons, and let it provide a verification mechanism to ensure compliance with this ban.

I said earlier that we were moving into negotiations proper. This is a stage which calls for flexibility. The Soviet delegation has indicated the maximum flexibility on this key question. The United States delegation earlier, in its detailed views submitted as document CD/343, also demonstrated an adjustment of its position on the issue of explicitly prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. The French delegation, too, has recently considered ways in which its own concerns, as well as the concerns of those seeking a ban on use, might be met by some formula which affirmed the enduring validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. My delegation is ready to negotiate on this issue. We sense that the basis for consensus is there: one which protects the undeniable and lasting achievement of the Protocol and yet one which will of itself effectively ensure against the use of chemical weapons.

Concretely, my delegation proposes that in our new negotiating phase we do not, as in the past, exclude "use" from our terms of reference. On the contrary, we should build it in, by brackets, unwritten agreement or any other device. As we proceed, we should ask ourselves: what would inclusion of a specific reference to use involve? What would be the legal and other implications? What verification procedures would be affected? I do not discount the possibility that as a Committee we shall eventually conclude that a specific reference to use is not necessary in the prohibition itself. But such a conclusion should only come after we have convinced ourselves — and have a consensus to this effect — that our future convention will rule out the use of chemicals as weapons.

~~The Chairman~~ The Chair thanks Ambassador Sadleir for his contribution and has taken due note in particular of his remark on the services of the secretariat. Ambassador Sadleir has put his finger on what, indeed, does seem to be a problem of some considerable importance, and we will take this up with the secretariat.

I now call on the next speaker on our list, the distinguished representative of Egypt, Mr. Ibrahim Hassan. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. HASSAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, this is the first time the delegation of my country is taking the floor at a plenary meeting during this month. For this reason, allow me first of all to express our pleasure at seeing you presiding over the activities of our Committee during this month of April. Although I was among the last delegates to offer you congratulations, I may be among the first to convey to you our admiration and appreciation of the constructive efforts you are exerting and the wise way in which you are conducting the work of our Committee.

I should like also, on this occasion, to express to Ambassador Ali Skalli of the brother country of Morocco our great gratitude and our appreciation of the high ability and great wisdom which characterized the performance of his duties when he was Chairman of this Committee last March. The success of Ambassador Ali Skalli in overcoming, with the Committee, all the difficulties that have obstructed its way, is new evidence — if any were needed — of his wide experience and his many capabilities, while being at the same time a source of pride to all of us and especially to my delegation.

I should like also to take this opportunity to associate myself with those who have preceded me in welcoming Mr. Gotzev, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, to whose statement before this Committee today we listened with great interest.

I shall deal in my statement today with item 7 of the agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

When man succeeded, more than a quarter of a century ago, in conquering outer space for the first time, the whole world welcomed this important event which asserted the creative power of man and his ability to open up new horizons for exploration, development and construction, thus ensuring prosperity and well-being for the whole world. Since that remote date, Egypt has been among the States that have drawn attention to the importance of action for reaching international agreements on establishing the proper international legislation so as to ensure the use of this new breakthrough for the benefit and well-being of man and for peaceful purposes along and to exclude outer space from the sphere of rivalry and competition among the major powers and of military uses and the arms race.

When the leaders of the non-aligned countries convened at their first summit meeting in Belgrade in September 1961, they issued their final statement which included in its paragraph 17 the following: "The participating countries call upon all States in general, and States at present exploring outer space in particular, to undertake to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes". Since that time, the efforts exerted have succeeded in achieving positive steps on this path, and it has in fact been possible to conclude a number of agreements dealing with some aspects pertinent to outer space, the most important of these



(Mr. Hassan, Egypt)

being the 1963 Treaty on the partial banning of nuclear-weapon tests and the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

In spite of the importance of these agreements and other measures that dealt with the subject of outer space, they remained, on the whole, insufficient to establish an integrated international legal system providing a real guarantee against the use of outer space for military purposes and excluding it from the arms race. This has given the world the opportunity to witness, in the last few years consecutive attempts to militarize outer space, and the involvement of the States possessing the greatest technological potentials in a race for the creation and development of space equipment with a view to achieving military and strategic goals which would give them supremacy in the field of the arms race between them.

The Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament drew attention to these gaps when it said, in its paragraph 80, that "In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies".

There is no doubt that the risks of the permanent threat of seeing the arms race spread to outer space do not apply solely to the Superpowers, which possess the greatest technological potential in this field, but in fact represent a serious threat also to the security of the whole world. Perhaps the risks to which the States of the third world are exposed surpass those which threaten the developed countries, because the latter possess the requisite means of defence and protection, while the developing countries lack the potentials and technological means to ensure their security and to protect their people.

For this reason, while recognizing the special responsibility falling in this field on the Superpowers, we insist on the fact that the task of negotiating the halting of the arms race in outer space should remain in a collective multilateral framework.

Before the subject was raised in the Committee on Disarmament, there were attempts to bring the issue of the peaceful uses of space and preserving it from the arms race before the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. However, some objected to this, arguing that the subject is beyond the terms of reference of that Committee and is fully within the competence of the Committee on Disarmament.

Hence, all hopes were placed on the Committee on Disarmament as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Then there were the resolutions of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, convened in Vienna in August of last year, which were adopted by consensus and which emphasized this role while calling upon the Committee on Disarmament to undertake the proper steps to prevent an arms race in outer space, clearly indicating the need for the participation of all nations, and especially those possessing the greatest space potential, in contributing actively to the achievement of this goal.

(Mr. Hassan, Egypt)

The Committee's session last year was an opportunity for a broad exchange of views on the importance of action to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space, and it was obvious that interest was given to the risks issuing therefrom and the increasing threats to international peace and security it represented.

The United Nations General Assembly also, in its resolution 37/83, which was supported by 138 States and sponsored by my delegation with a number of non-aligned and socialist countries, including 21 States members of this Committee, requested the Committee on Disarmament "to establish an ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its session in 1983, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

During the Committee's session last year, the Group of 21 called for the setting up of a working group which would deal with item 7 of the agenda, and it submitted document CD/329 containing a draft mandate for such a group. The Group of 21, in its suggestion, called for the adoption of a comprehensive approach in dealing with the subject, so that it could be examined in its various aspects with the necessary flexibility and allowing the negotiation of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Those who at that time opposed the setting up of a working group argued the new character of the subject and its complexity, with its intricate technical aspects, and called instead for it to be dealt with at informal meetings and sessions called "instructive", with a view to exchanging views and information about it. We nevertheless cannot but disagree with this opinion, for the following reasons.

Informal meetings of the Committee cannot be a substitute for a working framework for the carrying out of its basic task which is that of negotiating agreements on disarmament. The working group has proved to be the best framework to achieve this goal.

Most—if not all—of the subjects with which the Committee is concerned are by essence complex subjects where technical aspects interfere with political considerations; but this fact has not prevented us, in the past, from attempting to make progress in these subjects and try to reach agreements about them, and we must not be prevented from doing that now or in the future.

While we are living in a period when man is becoming increasingly anxious as a result of the dreadful armaments on land, in the air and at sea, and when efforts to stop and curb this race are faltering, we are requested today to undertake steps to ensure the prevention of the extension of this danger to new horizons, which threatens the future and the security of mankind.

Our race against time calls upon us to speed up the pace of our action and step forward to assume our responsibilities—today rather than tomorrow, without hesitation or delay.



The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of Egypt for his contribution and for his warm and generous words addressed to the Chair and to the distinguished Chairman for the month of March, Ambassador Ali Skalli.

May I now call on the last speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of China, Mr. Tian Jin. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first time for the Chinese delegation to make a formal statement at a plenary meeting in the month of April, please allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship for the current month. We are confident that with your vast experience and under your able guidance, we shall be able to achieve further progress in our work for the month. We would also like to thank Ambassador Skalli, the Chairman for last month, for his contributions. His diplomatic skills have left a strong impression upon us.

At the meeting this morning the distinguished Ambassador Sadleir of Australia made a comprehensive and convincing statement on the reasons why prohibition of use should be included in the future chemical weapons convention. The Chinese delegation supports his statement. It is our hope that the Committee on Disarmament will arrive at an early agreement on the important subject of the scope of the future convention, so as to speed up the pace of negotiation and elaboration of the convention. It is in this spirit that the Chinese delegation has tabled a working paper today concerning the scope of prohibition, namely, the question of the prohibition regime of the convention. We hope this paper will soon be distributed in different languages.

Now, I wish to make a few comments on this subject.

Over the last few years, there have been fairly deep differences of opinion between countries on the question of whether or not the scope of the future convention should contain a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. The Chinese delegation is pleased to note that quite a number of delegations have come to accept the idea of including such a prohibition. However, there are still some delegations which express varying degrees of reservation and doubt on the subject. One of the questions they have raised is, if such a prohibition is included in the future convention, what will its relationship be with the prohibition regime of the 1925 Geneva Protocol? My delegation believes a solution to this question can be found.

First, in statements in the plenary and again in the contact group, quite a number of delegations have pointed out that the prohibition regime of the 1925 Geneva Protocol should be in line with that of the future convention. We associate ourselves with this view. Should there be any difference between the two, problems would arise which would be similar to those we encountered during negotiations when the prohibition of use was not supposedly to be included in the scope of the convention. For instance, it would be necessary to differentiate which areas come under the prohibition regime of the Protocol and which would



(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

come under the regime of the future convention; then it would be necessary to solve the problem of verification of compliance with the Geneva Protocol prohibition regime. As everyone knows, such matters involve many complicated issues, making their solution rather difficult. However, all the above difficulties could be resolved, if a prohibition of use of chemical weapons were to be included in the future convention, and it could be brought in line with that of the Protocol, because on the common ground of the two regimes, any failure of compliance with one regime would simultaneously be a failure of compliance with the other. And this failure of compliance could be dealt with according to the verification or other possible relevant provisions of the future convention.

Secondly, how to bring these two prohibition regimes in line with each other? It is our view that this can be done on the common basis that both regimes prohibit the direct and indirect use of the toxic physiological effects of chemical substances for fighting purposes. (Here we do not refer to biological warfare, because it is outside the scope of our present debate.)

Such a basis not only conforms to the obligations provided for in the Geneva Protocol, but is also in full accord with the "general purpose criterion" of the future convention. At the same time it can suitably resolve the differences of opinion on herbicides and irritants, that is, it prohibits their use for fighting purposes while permitting their use for purposes of peace and law enforcement. And it naturally follows that research, development, production, transfer, acquisition by other means and stockpiling which are in conformity with these two purposes are also legal.

Thirdly, as we have previously pointed out, the best way to unify the two regimes is to use the concept of "chemical warfare agents" in the definition of chemical weapons to be included in the convention, and also to include its definition in the convention. This concept of "chemical warfare agents" embodies the fundamental characteristics of chemical weapons and also reflects the content of the "general purpose criterion". As such it can aptly become the basis for unifying the two prohibition regimes mentioned above. In our view, the term "chemical warfare agents" sums up in the most precise and appropriate term the whole concept of the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol (of course, this does not refer to biological warfare either). And what lies at the centre of the prohibition by the future convention is exactly "chemical warfare agents", whether they be super-toxic lethal, lethal, other harmful substances or any other kind of substance, as long as they are used for fighting purposes.

Consequently, the concept of "chemical warfare agents" in itself contains the basis for unifying the prohibition regimes of the two international instruments.

The Chinese delegation has always advocated using the concept of "chemical warfare agents" in the future convention. In the course of the previous negotiations, many other delegations have also submitted working papers on the definition of this term. At this stage, when we are attempting to examine and settle the question of the relationship between the two regimes, the adoption of this concept becomes even more necessary. It is our belief that by straightening

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

out the relationship between these two regimes, we will be in a better position to achieve an agreement on the question of the scope of the future convention. The Chinese delegation stands ready to exchange views with all other delegations on this issue.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of China for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the outgoing and incoming chairmen.

This concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor? If such is not the case, I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Committee in five minutes' time to examine how best to consider item 7 of the agenda.

The meeting was suspended at 12.20 p.m. and resumed at 5.05 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 214th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is reconvened.

Is there any delegation that wishes to take the floor? This does not seem to be the case. Therefore, in pursuance of consultations undertaken, the Chair would announce that it is pursuing further consultations on the question of the handling of item 7 of the agenda with a view to arriving, at an early stage during the summer part of the session, at a formal decision to be taken by this Committee on how item 7 of the agenda is to be further handled, including a possible decision on the formation of a working group and the definition of its mandate.

We then come to the final point, which is the informal paper on the timetable of meetings to be held by the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the week 25-29 April 1983. The secretariat has circulated this informal paper and as usual it is a tentative timetable which may be subject to changes if needed. In that connection may I note that demands for meetings have been so high for the next week that the secretariat has been able to secure this programme only on a tentative basis. I may recall that the Trade and Development Board, the Economic Commission for Europe and other bodies are meeting at the same time, and that our own requirements need to be harmonized with requests by those bodies. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts this tentative timetable.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, this is not an objection but a question for clarification. On Friday, 29 April, when, presumably, the Committee will be closing its spring session, I see that there will be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban, at 3 p.m. There is nothing indicated, even tentatively, about a provision for closing the session on that day. Does this mean, therefore, that in the event of the Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban ending at 8 p.m., or even 11 p.m., on 29 April that we would anticipate meeting on 30 April formally to conclude the session? I just wanted to find out as this is important, Sir, for certain delegations, including mine, and I would appreciate some explanation as to how we are to interpret this.

Chair reply to the distinguished representative of Kenya that we are not closing the session; we are entering into the recess between the spring part of the session and the summer part of the session, but it is still the 1983 session, and therefore no formal closing is required.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Thank you Mr. Chairman. I agree with that, but I presume that the Chairman will make some final remarks, at least to formally go into recess. That is the practice, is it not? We would expect that, Sir.

The CHAIRMAN: That would indeed be a correct expectation by the distinguished delegate of Kenya — and any such remarks would be made at the close of the last formal plenary meeting, on Thursday next.

Mr. SKINNER (Canada): Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make a brief observation about the programme for next week. The first thing I would like to do is express my gratitude to the secretariat for squaring a virtually impossible circle. I recognize how difficult this has been for them because of the conflicting demands upon their time and resources, particularly the interpreters, as well as the question of rooms, and so on. I am particularly sensitive about this question myself because I am afraid our delegation is one of the main instigators of the difficulties the secretariat has had. That is, of these meetings, you will notice that a good part of them are associated with the work of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. I think we all agree in this room that these meetings are indeed necessary, despite the difficulties they are causing not only to the secretariat but to each one of our delegations. You will notice, I think, that each contact group of the chemical weapons Working Group is now scheduled to meet twice before the winding up of business on Wednesday. This, I think, is an achievement on the part of the secretariat. There is, however, one exception, and that is Group B of Mr. Duarte. As you said yourself, Mr. Chairman, this schedule is a notional schedule and we will discuss with the secretariat whether it is indeed possible to have a second meeting of Group B. If this is the case, we would try to inform members of the Committee through the secretariat, in due course.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Canada. Are there any other speakers? If that is not the case then it remains for the Chair to announce that the next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 26 April at 10.30 a.m. Ambassador Erdembileg, you have the floor.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): I apologise for interrupting you, Mr. Chairman. Basically I agree with what the distinguished representative of Kenya said, and I should like simply to develop his thought. I entirely agree with you that we are not closing the current session but merely suspending it for a time. Nevertheless it might perhaps be more logical if we were in fact to end the first part of the Committee's session with a plenary meeting, so as not to give the impression that after the plenary Committee has declared a recess, some working groups seem to be going on working.



(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We could perhaps, therefore, transfer the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban planned for Friday at 3 p.m. to Thursday, 28 April, at 10.30 a.m. so that we can hold the final plenary meeting on Friday afternoon. We would then be concluding the first part of this session in an orderly manner.

If other members of the Committee object, we shall of course not insist on our proposal. But the main thing I wanted to draw attention to is that we ought to avoid a situation where, in spite of the declaration of the interruption of the session, the activity of the ad hoc working groups, that is to say, the work of the session, is nevertheless continuing. From the organizational point of view that would seem to us illogical.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks Ambassador Erdembileg for his statement and may perhaps be permitted to react to it, off the cuff.

I may recall what I said when this tentative work programme was introduced — that it was very much tentative and, the demand of meetings being enormous, largely because the Committee lost a considerable amount of time in the earlier part of the spring session, an effort has been made, a very laudable effort, by all working groups to achieve as much work as possible on substance in the remainder of the month of April. I do see a slight problem — and can sympathize with the wish of certain delegates to end, as I believe the expression was, "with a flourish", and with a plenary meeting, but I take the liberty of reminding the distinguished representative of Mongolia that many, in fact the majority of the members of the Committee on Disarmament have a large number of other obligations and a very pressing time-table — particularly true for the month of April — when many important meetings take place simultaneously. I would rather fear that many of the members of the Committee would find it difficult to readjust their conference schedules at fairly short notice, to such an extent that we could change the customary day of the plenary meeting from Thursday to Friday. Nevertheless, the Chair is quite prepared to consult members on this and to explore the possibilities, but it must in all fairness warn that it may prove to be very difficult and that in fact the perhaps less than elegant ending of the spring session is one of the unfortunate results of the fact that during earlier months we lost a great deal of time over procedure. This is perhaps a relatively modest price we have to pay for that. If there are no other speakers the meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.

# COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.215  
26 April 1983  
ENGLISH

## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Tuesday, 26 April 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. van Dongen

(Netherlands)

GE.83-60994

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia:

Mr. D. SADLEIR

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Mr. P. BERG

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. L. GOTZEV

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. B. GRINBERG

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U TIN KYAW HLAING

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

Miss C. de VARENNES

China:

Mr. LI LIUYE

Mr. TIAN JIN

Mrs. GE YUYUN

Mrs. WANG ZIYANG

Mr. LIN CHENG

Cuba:

Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mrs. M. SLAMOVA

Mr. A. CIMA



Denmark:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE

Ms. K. SINEGIORGIS

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. N.S. SUTRESNA

Mr. N. WISNOEMERTI

Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO

Mrs. P. RAMADHAN

Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA

Iran:

Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI

Mr. M. KONISHI

Mr. K. TANAKA

Kenya:

Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN

Mr. J. RAMAKER

Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. A.N.C. NWAZOMUDOH

Mr. J.O. OBOH

Mr. L.O. AKINDELE

Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK

Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland:

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Mr. L. TOADER

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Republics:1st

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN  
Mr. G.N. VASHADZE  
Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. B.P. NOBLE  
Mrs. J.I. LINK  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L. FIELDS  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. R.L. HORNE  
Mr. J. DURHAM

Venezuela:

Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI



THE CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 215th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee starts today its consideration of the question of the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, which is inscribed as part of item 2 of the agenda of the Committee. However, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Argentina, China, Morocco, Japan, Czechoslovakia, Nigeria and the United States of America, and may I now invite the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Carasales, to take the floor. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Disarmament is at present considering the questions of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the prevention of nuclear war and in particular how to deal with these two subjects procedurally. I shall refer in this statement to both topics.

Representatives will recall that at the beginning of last year the inclusion in our agenda of a new item on the peaceful use of outer space was not easy. Furthermore we were told bluntly at that time that that in no way meant agreement to give substantive consideration to this question in a working group because that would be premature and because the complexity of the subject was such that it would be necessary first to identify the areas in which useful work might be done.

We were obliged then to accept the procedure which appears to have become customary where there is no political will to initiate negotiations, namely, the holding of informal meetings. My delegation has growing doubts as to the real value and usefulness of these meetings of which no proper record is made and which usually consist simply of a repetition, often in a diffuse and disorderly way, of positions and views already expressed at plenary meetings. They appear to be simply a subterfuge designed to fill time and to give the impression -- a very poor one, it is true -- that something is being done. This way of approaching the consideration of an item presupposes that the question is not urgent and that the Committee has years in which to begin to deal with the subject in greater depth.

In 1982 informal meetings were held to consider the existing and foreseeable situation in outer space and the subject was also referred to repeatedly in formal statements. One thing constantly emphasized at those meetings by the vast majority of delegations was the urgent need to act promptly in this matter, with the utmost speed, because the range of activities then developing in outer space and of those that seemed likely to be carried out in the immediate future was expanding at such a rate that it would soon be too late -- if it was not so already -- to adopt measures to put a stop to or regulate those activities. As usual, a minority of delegations gave no sign of sharing that appreciation and showed no interest in bringing nearer the moment when the international community represented in this Committee on Disarmament would apply itself seriously to this objective.

Barely a year has passed since those discussions and I am wondering if there can be any doubt that the situation that so many of us warned against has occurred and that, as regards outer space, developments of various kinds have taken place, all of them increasing the possibility and likelihood of the use of outer space for warlike purposes.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

in spite of the repeated declarations at every level of the need to preserve outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes, it has already become militarized to such a degree that the delegation of France was able to say, in the interesting document, CD/375, which it put before us, that of the three possible roles it identified for outer space, the first, "that of absolute sanctuarization or demilitarization, is something that is no longer possible. It is therefore unrealistic to try to revert to such a situation."

I very much fear, in view of the reluctance of some delegations to allow the Committee on Disarmament to discuss this item in substance, that the day is not far off when we shall be told: the arms race in outer space is a reality and there is no longer the possibility of pursuing the goal of preserving it for purely peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind.

The Group of 21 was always forthright as regards the need to set up a working group to conduct negotiations on item 7 of our agenda, and in September 1982 it submitted document CD/329 containing a draft mandate for such a group, a proposal which my delegation of course fully supports. The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic had earlier submitted document CD/272 containing a similar proposal.

Certainly, the mere establishment of a working group does not of itself guarantee useful and much less successful work. But at least the possibility exists and experience has shown that to be so. The Committee has not yet found any better method for dealing in depth with the questions on its agenda. It has already become clear that informal meetings lead to nothing concrete. This is why the setting up of a working group is interpreted -- rightly, in my view -- as a clear sign that the Committee has decided to tackle the subject seriously. A working group may function effectively or not -- time will tell -- but what I am certain of is that if we do not set up a working group and continue to confine ourselves to casual conversations and informal consultations, the item will simply remain on the agenda, giving the illusion that the Committee is dealing with it whereas in reality little or nothing is being done.

When we talk about setting up a working group it is -- obviously -- on the understanding that the group will have a meaningful mandate. For no one is against working groups "in principle". Reservations appear with respect to the desirability of setting up a given group and its function.

I have not the slightest doubt that the negotiation of a mandate for an ad hoc working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space will not be easy. The question of the mandates of working groups is becoming an exercise absorbing a large part of the best energies of the Committee on Disarmament. The position of some delegations is habitually such that we may well ask ourselves what is the real meaning of their acceptance of the establishment of a working group when they insist that the mandate of such a body should be so limited that its practical consequences for the achievement of effective measures of disarmament are virtually nil. Its work may be useful as an illustration for the representatives who take part in its discussions, but it contributes very little to the negotiation of international agreements on disarmament, which is the essential task of our Committee.

We should ask ourselves if the time has not come to change the practice followed by the Committee on Disarmament up to now, which is that of deciding in each case, with absolute precision, what a working group may do and what it may not do. This practice means that the group starts with its hands tied, and it then spends a good deal of its available time trying to secure the broadening of its mandate.



(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

g run, be more productive to establish working groups with simple mandates merely assigning to them a given item, without going into details?

The group could then devote itself exclusively to the subject assigned to it and could decide, as its work proceeds — and we should not forget that the rule of consensus always applies — what it can hope to achieve and what is not yet possible. The process of the work itself will decide the rate of progress that is possible towards the ultimate objective, which can be nothing other than the negotiation of one or several international agreements. But before that goal can be reached, many intermediary stages must be passed through, and the working group can accomplish them gradually, according to the progress and the convergencies of views achieved, without being limited from the outset by a restrictive mandate and without then having to spend a large part of its time discussing the amendment of that mandate.

Resolution 37/83 of the last session of the General Assembly clearly reflects the thinking of the international community on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Its various paragraphs plainly indicate the urgency of this task and what is expected of the Committee on Disarmament in this connection. The number of votes which that resolution won is important, but what is more important, I believe, is the realism and timeliness of the thinking that inspired it. It is certain that there are few subjects where time is such a vital factor as it is in the matter of outer space. Outer space is a new world that is already being used, and not always for peaceful purposes, but whose possibilities for military use, both direct and indirect, are increasing day by day. Every hour of delay in tackling the regulation of this sphere will be lost for ever and may prove fatal.

As has already been noted a number of times, the military use of satellites is already a reality. Some 75 per cent of the satellites in orbit in 1980 had a military purpose, and an extremely high proportion of military communications are conducted by means of satellites.

Attempts have been made to convince us that military satellites are good and positive. We are told — and I recall a statement made on 29 March last — that "these satellites have a stabilizing effect" and that they ought therefore to be protected. We were also told that "for the foreseeable future the complete demilitarization of outer space is not at all a good idea. It would, of course, not be very realistic either".

This last statement is perhaps "realistic" — to borrow the term — but I beg to disagree with the claim that the complete demilitarization of outer space would not be a good idea. I think that it would be. The satellites carrying out tasks connected with the verification of compliance with disarmament agreements could very well be controlled by an international agency. But military satellites can also carry out a vast range of tasks whose ultimate results would be an increase, at times very substantial, in the destructive capacity of a combat force. My country has had a direct and painful experience of the consequences of the military use of satellites.

The questions of the peaceful use of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in that sphere should be dealt with in a comprehensive manner. The problems are many and various, and in our view there is no reason for determining preferences and priorities now, as some want to do in connection with anti-satellite systems,



(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

particularly when the objects which it is intended to protect, military satellites, can fulfil hostile functions far too important to warrant their immunity and impunity.

From the procedural point of view, many of the comments I have made in connection with the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space could equally well be applied to that of the prevention of nuclear war.

Both items refer to the future in so far as the goal is to "prevent" something which has not yet happened but which could very well happen. There is the difference that, if either of these possibilities were to become a reality, the extent of the consequences would in the second case be even more catastrophic.

As the Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries stated at their seventh summit meeting held recently in New Delhi, "the greatest peril facing the world today is the threat to the survival of mankind from a nuclear war". The New Delhi Message likewise contains a paragraph pointing out that "the non-aligned countries, speaking for the majority of the world community, want an immediate halt to the drift towards nuclear conflict which threatens the well-being not only of humanity in our times but also of future generations as well".

At the root of the problem there is an undeniable fact. As the Political Declaration of New Delhi says, "Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war. They are instruments of mass annihilation." Until full recognition is given to this essential difference between nuclear weapons and other types of weapons and between nuclear war and other types of war, and until the logical conclusions are drawn from this difference, the nature of the question of the prevention of nuclear war will be distorted and all the efforts based on the unique character of nuclear weapons will be fruitless.

Document CD/341 of the Group of 21 is explicit as regards the nature of the problem and the way to deal with it, namely, through the setting up of a working group with an adequate mandate.

I shall not, therefore, dwell further on this question, so as not to repeat ideas already expressed. Furthermore, I spoke about this matter in my statement of 28 February last. The need to adopt the measures advocated by the Group of 21 is, in my view, indisputable.

I feel obliged, however, to state that what has happened so far with respect to items 2 and 7 of our agenda, which concern two issues of the utmost importance for the future of mankind, does not, in my view, constitute a model of what the action of the sole multilateral negotiating body in this sphere ought to be. When the attention of the international community, justifiably and deeply concerned at the possibility of an arms race in outer space and even more at that of the outbreak of a nuclear war, is directed with well-founded expectations towards the Committee on Disarmament in the hope of seeing a serious and thorough consideration of these problems and the gradual emergence of concrete and realistic measures for dealing with them, it is deplorable that all the Committee can offer is protracted and meaningless discussions on procedural questions: the inclusion of the item in the agenda, whether or not a working group should be established, the formulation of mandates with or without substance. The international community has the right to expect something different from the body to which it has given specific and unique competence in order precisely that it should not repeat once more another round of sterile debates but should find practical solutions to the problems of the world today.

The Committee on Disarmament has a tremendous responsibility. If it does not manage to fulfil that responsibility fully and effectively, that will be no victory for anyone but the defeat of all.

Mr. Li Guoqiang (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, at today's meeting, the Chinese delegation would like to submit some of our views on the question of the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament.

At the beginning of this session, many delegations requested that the issue of the prevention of nuclear war be included in our agenda. This is a reflection of the ardent desire of the people of the world to oppose the nuclear arms race and to prevent nuclear war. The recent non-aligned summit meeting also appealed for urgent and practical measures to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. We hope that the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament on the question of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war will give this priority item a new sense of urgency and vitality, so as to contribute to promoting the process of nuclear disarmament and the lessening of the danger of nuclear war.

China has always attached great importance to the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament. In our view, to assure the effectiveness of the measures against nuclear war, one must first be clear about the source of the threat of nuclear war. In its reply to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 28 April 1982, on the prevention of nuclear war, the Chinese Government pointed out that "the threat of nuclear war comes from the two Superpowers which are intensifying their nuclear arms race and stepping up their deployment and preparations for a nuclear war". This fundamental view of the Chinese Government is by no means based on our subjective presumption but rather on an objective evaluation of the present state of the world's nuclear armaments and the international situation.

One of the main features of the current international situation and world armaments is that the two Superpowers possess far greater military strength than the rest of the world. They are relying on this enormous military strength to engage in rivalry all over the world. They not only possess the most advanced massive conventional armaments but also have the largest nuclear arsenals. Their military build-up has far exceeded the military forces needed for their national defence and security. Yet even under such circumstances, a full-scale arms race and particularly a new round of the nuclear arms race between them has once again been gathering momentum. The present round of the arms race is centred on qualitative competition. As a result, while the number of delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons may be somewhat reduced and some weapon systems may even become obsolete, the number of nuclear warheads will increase substantially; the accuracy and the ability to survive and ability to attack military targets will improve to an unprecedented level; and new breakthroughs in the means and capabilities of command, communication and control in a nuclear war will be achieved through their respective new weapons updating programmes. All these important qualitative improvements will again multiply their nuclear strike capabilities. These facts have shown clearly to the world that the two Superpowers are preparing themselves for a nuclear war, and only they have the capability to launch such a war.

(Mr. Li Luye, China)

Historical facts and present reality demonstrate that the growing threat of war comes not only from the acceleration of the arms race and the increase in armaments, but what is more important, it comes from the policy pursued by the States that possess such weapons and are engaging in the arms race. For many years, the two major Powers have used their massive armaments, and especially their nuclear arms, as an important means for external expansion and rivalry for spheres of influence. This is the main reason why the two Superpowers are trying desperately to achieve military superiority, especially nuclear superiority, which is causing an increased danger of nuclear war. In our opinion, the identification of this fundamental reason will be of key importance to the formulation of measures to prevent a nuclear war.

At present, the two major nuclear-weapon Powers are both stepping up their deployment of nuclear weapons and preparations for a nuclear war. Under the pretext that it does not have sufficient nuclear armaments, one has openly declared that it is readjusting its nuclear strategy to build up its nuclear strength on the basis of attempting to win a nuclear war. Although the other appears to be quite active on the question of preventing a nuclear war, yet it has quickened its tempo of nuclear arms expansion instead of slowing it down. In addition, it has already deployed large numbers of new types of medium-range missiles which are targeted on European and Asian countries. The two Superpowers have based their foreign policies on nuclear blackmail. They are talking about preventing a nuclear war, yet what they have been doing is just the opposite. Such discrepancy between words and deeds constitutes the greatest obstacle to nuclear disarmament and the formulation of measures to prevent a nuclear war.

While opposing the threat of nuclear war, people must also be aware of the real threat posed by conventional war to various countries. Since the Second World War, many wars and armed conflicts in different parts of the world have been fought with conventional weapons. Besides, with the rapid development of military technology, modern conventional weapons are highly injurious and destructive. The two nuclear-weapon Powers, while intensifying their nuclear arms race, have also been updating and expanding their conventional armaments and preparing for a conventional war. They are both reinforcing their war command mechanisms and increasing their capacities for projecting troops to other regions. At present, certain sovereign States are still victims of aggression and military occupation by conventional forces. This is a harsh fact that cannot be overlooked. Therefore, it is also important to reduce the threat of conventional warfare. There exists no unbridgeable gap between a conventional war and a nuclear war, but a possibility for the former to escalate into the latter. We therefore hold that during our discussion on the prevention of nuclear war, we have to pay due attention to the question of reducing the threat of conventional war. This is in no way to understate the importance of preventing nuclear war, but more effectively to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war.



(Mr. Li Luye, China)

prevent war, either nuclear or conventional, the Superpowers that possess the largest arsenals and have the capability to launch a world war should be asked to undertake their special responsibility earnestly. They should immediately stop the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and take the lead in reducing their colossal arsenals. They should and can do this to prevent nuclear war. However, what has been done in this respect is far from encouraging. It has been noted that during the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear weapons, neither is willing to make any concession and both find their excuses in maintaining "equilibrium" and "equal security". Consequently, the negotiations are deadlocked. And in this multilateral forum, one Superpower advocates that "a freeze on nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon States will help prevent the threat of nuclear war". Apparently, in their eyes, the concepts of "equilibrium" and "equal security" are not applicable in their relations with other nuclear-weapon States, still less with other States of the world. While emphasizing "equilibrium", they are in fact trying to maintain their nuclear superiority over the other countries. Their "security" is based on the insecurity of other countries. Therefore, it is not conducive to reducing the threat of nuclear war if we do not identify the source of the threat of such a war, but generally call for all the nuclear-weapon States to undertake nuclear disarmament without distinguishing between the nature and size of the nuclear forces. On the contrary, it will become a shield or an excuse for the Superpowers to refuse to shoulder their special responsibility.

Of course, the other nuclear-weapon States also have a share in the responsibility for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. But we cannot ignore the fact that in the world today, those countries with few nuclear arms are facing the same military threats as all the non-nuclear-weapon countries. As far as China is concerned, it is faced with the threat of massive conventional armed forces deployed along its borders as well as the threat of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we have to maintain our necessary defence capabilities while stepping up our economic construction. This is entirely different in nature from the nuclear arms build-up by the Superpowers.

What is more, from the first day we possessed nuclear weapons we solemnly declared that we would not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and undertook unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. This amply shows the defensive character of our limited nuclear force. Therefore, we are prepared to assume an obligation to reduce our nuclear weapons according to agreed ratios following substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two Superpowers.

Up to now, various countries have advanced specific ideas and proposals for preventing nuclear war. In our view, pending the realization of nuclear disarmament, a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons can serve to reduce the danger of a nuclear war. The pressing demand of the non-aligned countries for

(Mr. Li Luye, China)

the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of use and threat to use nuclear weapons is justified and reasonable. If the nuclear-weapon Powers are sincere about reducing the danger of a nuclear war, it will not be difficult for them to assume the obligation of non-use. On the other hand, in view of the large quantity and high quality of today's nuclear arsenals, a prohibition of use by itself cannot completely remove the danger of a nuclear war. During the second special session on disarmament of the General Assembly, the Chinese delegation proposed that the two States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals stop the development and production of nuclear weapons, and reduce by one half the number of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, thereby creating the conditions for all the other nuclear-weapon States to halt the development and production of their nuclear weapons and hence to proceed to the proportional reduction and eventual destruction of all such weapons. This is an important measure for reducing the threat of nuclear war.

In view of the above-mentioned root cause of the threat of nuclear war, we are of the opinion that the prevention of such a war not only requires us to take disarmament measures but also requires each country to adhere strictly to the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and the norms of international relations. A point of particular importance is that no country should use military force to commit aggression or engage in expansion against another country. In this connection, some delegations have emphasized that all States must comply with Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State in international relations. This is absolutely justified. We express the hope that during its summer session the Committee on Disarmament will further discuss the ways and means to prevent nuclear war.

Mr. SKALLI (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first time that I have the pleasure of taking the floor under your chairmanship at a plenary meeting of the Committee, allow me to offer you my warm congratulations on your accession to that chairmanship and to tell you how pleased my delegation is to see you directing our work with such talent and efficiency. The perception, wisdom and courteous authority you have shown have undoubtedly been to good effect and have resulted in the progress the Committee has made this month.

With your natural goodheartedness, Mr. Chairman, you have not missed a single occasion to praise the part I was able to play during the period of Morocco's chairmanship of our Committee. I believe that that is in large part due to the great friendliness you have always shown me and for which I am extremely grateful.

Allow me also to take this opportunity in my turn to thank all those delegations which have been so generous in their words of praise for my chairmanship. While expressing my great gratitude I should like to say how much their words have touched me.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to deal in my statement today with the question of the prevention of nuclear war and also that of "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee on Disarmament is today beginning its consideration of the question of the prevention of nuclear war.

The Moroccan delegation has already welcomed the agreement reached in this Committee on the inclusion of that item in our agenda. We can well be pleased with this happy initiative, which should enable us without further delay to undertake serious negotiations on a subject of whose gravity we are all aware.

It is obvious that the primary problem confronting mankind today is that of its own survival. Indeed, the threat of the annihilation of all life from the earth as the result of a nuclear war seems to us an absolutely real one, and the greatest peril threatening our world.

The source of this unprecedented threat lies in part in the frenzied arms race we are witnessing, which is out of all proportion to the security needs of the States engaging in it. When we know that the destructive power of the States possessing nuclear weapons has reached a capacity to annihilate the entire population of the planet dozens of times over, we cannot but wonder what is the true significance of this flouting of logic and common sense on the part of those who are continuing feverishly to develop their nuclear arsenals, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Furthermore, some nuclear-weapon powers are trying to gain credence for ideas that are, to say the least, dangerous, like the doctrine of deterrence or the possibility of a limited nuclear war.

Is not all this, in the last analysis, designed to prepare for and justify the use of nuclear weapons? My delegation has already stated before this Committee that it cannot share these ideas which, it is obvious, seriously threaten international peace and security.

In its working paper on the prevention of nuclear war, document CD/341 of 4 February 1983, the Group of 21 declared in this connection:

"Doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being the cause of the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation in the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations ... Concern for common security and global survival should be the basis of international peace rather than the concept of deterrence".

The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which was adopted by consensus and whose validity is still recognized by all countries, states in its paragraph 47 that nuclear weapons are those which pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. That paragraph also declares that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons.

The Final Document also states, in paragraph 18: "Removing the threat of a world war -- a nuclear war -- is the most acute and urgent task of the present day".



(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

Should we remain indifferent to the warnings and the many appeals made to us or should we, on the contrary, react and take the measures necessary to remove the threat of extermination hanging over us?

It seems to my delegation that we must take such action in order to spare the world a catastrophe which would certainly affect, if not annihilate, belligerents and non-belligerents alike.

Just recently the General Assembly, in its resolution 37/78 I, requested the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

In its working paper CD/341, the Group of 21 recommended the setting up of an ad hoc working group to undertake negotiations to that end. The Moroccan delegation considers that that is the best way for our Committee to accomplish its task.

The Moroccan delegation earnestly hopes that the consultations under way on this subject will be crowned with success so as to enable us to begin the work of substance on this crucial matter.

The question of the security assurances which should be given by the nuclear-weapon Powers to the States not possessing nuclear weapons is one of fundamental importance for the latter countries. It is only fair that the countries which have voluntarily renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons should be concerned about their own security. They are therefore entitled to expect that that security should be reliably ensured.

The efforts that were made towards this end for many years produced the results which you all know, namely, resolution 255 of the Security Council and the unilateral declarations by the five nuclear-weapon Powers. But these results are rightly considered inadequate and in many ways unsatisfactory because neither resolution 255 nor the unilateral declarations offer real and credible assurances.

It was for that reason that the General Assembly, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, after noting the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States, urged them "to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Since 1979, the question of so-called negative security assurances has been on the agenda of this Committee, which set up an ad hoc working group to conduct negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements for that purpose, on the basis of paragraph 59 of the Final Document, which I have just quoted.

During a preliminary phase, the Ad hoc Working Group sought to identify the various elements of the undertakings not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. At its more recent sessions the Ad hoc Working Group has concentrated its attention on and devoted its efforts to the question of elaborating a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

In that connection the Moroccan delegation would like to recall that it has constantly supported the idea of the adoption of a legally binding international instrument, which might take the form of an international convention. Such a convention would, in our opinion, provide the non-nuclear-weapon States with tangible protection from the nuclear threat.

We are, moreover, pleased to note that in the Ad Hoc Working Group there is no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention, although we are perfectly well aware of the difficulties still standing in the way of the formulation of such a convention.

Since it has still not been possible to find a common formula acceptable to all, the Ad Hoc Working Group has very wisely given thought to the possibility of interim arrangements. In that connection, my delegation has already had occasion to speak in favour of the adoption of a resolution of the Security Council which could, in our view, constitute a valuable interim arrangement, pending, of course, the conclusion of effective international arrangements, which remains our primary objective in the matter.

We believe, indeed, that it is extremely desirable for the Ad Hoc Working Group to continue to try to find a formula acceptable to all and for the various solutions envisaged in this connection to be explored further, with a will to succeed in resolving the issue.

Everyone is agreed on the importance of this question. Unfortunately, four years of negotiations have not led to any positive results. The progress made during this period has been purely marginal and in no way commensurate with the entirely justified concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The responsibility for this lies primarily and particularly with certain nuclear-weapon Powers, which are quite obviously concerned above all with their own security interests and deliberately ignore those of others.

Many delegations, including my own, have frequently expressed their anxiety and apprehensions in this connection. In a statement I made before the Committee in June 1981, I said that at the conclusion of the discussions which had taken place in the Working Group my delegation had had the impression that certain nuclear-weapon Powers were more concerned about their own security than about that of the non-nuclear-weapon Powers. And yet it was for the benefit of the latter that the Ad Hoc Working Group was set up, with a mandate to negotiate international security arrangements. We are still hoping that our apprehensions and doubts will soon be dissipated; for the States which have voluntarily renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons rightly expect the Powers which possess such weapons to provide them with quite clear tangible assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Since the impasse now reached is in large part due to the fact that there are fundamental divergencies in the security perceptions of the nuclear-weapon States and in the content of their unilateral undertakings, it is up to those States to make further efforts and to improve the substance of the present assurances, so that the Committee can reach agreement on this essential matter.

It should be recognized that it is unreasonable to ask the non-nuclear-weapon States to make further concessions and further sacrifices. In any event my country,

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the non-proliferation Treaty has committed itself to a non-nuclear-weapon status, finds it inconceivable that additional commitments should be expected from it.

But however important it is, the question of the granting of so-called negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States cannot make us forget the need for and the urgency of nuclear disarmament. In fact, as we see it, there can be no complete and absolute assurances so long as nuclear weapons continue to exist. As the Group of 21 rightly stated in document CD/280, which it submitted to the Committee last year, "The most effective assurances of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons".

Nuclear disarmament, the task to which the international community attaches the very highest priority, is in our view the only thing that will restore a climate of confidence and guarantee peace and security in the world.

My delegation appeals to the nuclear-weapon Powers to show the political will necessary to reach a satisfactory agreement on the question of negative security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon countries. This would undoubtedly be in the interests of all.

In an important statement he made to the committee last year, the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard, very properly drew our attention to the fact that a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States had referred to the relationship that exists between the attitudes of the nuclear-weapon Powers and the risk of horizontal proliferation.

It must indeed be recognized that the credibility of the non-proliferation regime is being placed in doubt by the behaviour of the nuclear-weapon States themselves. Those who have adhered to the regime have lost their faith in it. Those who have not adhered to it, seeing the experience of the others, are hardly tempted to follow their example.

For in fact this international legal instrument has in practice proved to be ineffective and discriminatory.

It is ineffective because it has no real meaning for the States to which it was supposed to give assurances and advantages so as to prove to them that it was pointless for them to plunge into the nuclear arms race and to show them the benefits they would derive from adhering to the non-proliferation regime. Unfortunately, neither of these two objectives has been attained.

The non-proliferation Treaty is discriminatory because what it does in effect is to establish a club of countries arrogating exclusively to themselves the possession and production of nuclear weapons.

In order to coax and entice the other States into resigning themselves to such a situation, the nuclear-weapon Powers have dangled before their eyes the rewards of the security they would obtain, together with access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses.

But what has happened in reality?



(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

The powers already possessing nuclear weapons have continued with impunity to possess, test, produce and stockpile nuclear weapons without the slightest limitation or constraint. The States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty find themselves with their hands tied because they have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons without at the same time securing access to the advantages of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Are not these States justified in thinking that in adhering to the Treaty they have simply been swindled?

This being so, has not the time come to reconsider the Treaty with a view to making it more credible and better able to ensure the security of all States?

We would then have a treaty which, instead of creating an exclusive club of countries which retain entire freedom of action in the matter of nuclear weapons after persuading other States to renounce the possession of such weapons for all time, would provide sure and reliable assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States, strengthen the non-proliferation regime and open the way to nuclear disarmament.

To conclude, the Moroccan delegation would like to make one observation on the subject of the adjective "negative" which we sometimes attach to the word "assurances".

In fact, as you all know, effective international arrangements are commonly called "negative security assurances" in the jargon used by our Committee. True, that is merely a question of style, but my delegation has always wondered why such assurances have been called "negative". I cannot hide from you the fact that my delegation has always felt uncomfortable at the use of the word "negative" in company with the word "assurances", since it seems to us there is a veritable contradiction between these two terms.

Furthermore, the word "negative" in our view has a pejorative sense, whereas assurances ought and must essentially be something positive, and not only for the States which benefit from them but also for those which provide them.

Although the word "negative" was employed by contrast with the expression "positive assurances" which we use elsewhere, it would certainly in this case have been better to speak of passive assurances or, simply, security assurances.

As I have just said, this is a matter of form and not of substance, but it is nevertheless of some importance if we want the words we use to express appropriately and correctly the ideas we wish to convey. Perhaps some of our eminent colleagues, members of this Committee, who are very distinguished linguists, might be good enough to give some thought to this question and to provide us with a more adequate formulation. My delegation will certainly be grateful to them for the attention they may kindly give to this observation.

from French): The Chairman thanks the distinguished representative of Morocco, Ambassador Ali Skalli, for his statement and for the very kind and, indeed, far too generous words addressed to himself -- words valued all the more in that they were based on feelings of friendship which the Chairman greatly appreciates.

[Speaking in English] The next speaker on the list for today's plenary meeting is the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai, whom I now invite to take the floor.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor today primarily to introduce a working paper entitled "Verification of compliance in arms control and disarmament agreements" which unfortunately is not available as yet, but I am told that it will be available today as document CD/379. I believe that this subject has relevance to all the items taken up by this Committee.

But first of all, since this is my first intervention in the plenary this month, I would like to start by congratulating you, Mr. Chairman, on your assumption of the important office for the month of April. My delegation is very much pleased that under your experienced guidance the Committee on Disarmament is making steady progress. I would also like to take this opportunity to express our sincere appreciation to the Chairman for last month, Ambassador Skalli of Morocco, who exerted such great efforts to lead the Committee out of a very difficult procedural impasse.

I do not need to re-emphasize here the importance of verification procedures in any disarmament agreement. Without proper arrangements in this respect, it is very difficult to work out effective and credible disarmament accords. In this sense, verification is an integral part of any such agreement. At the same time, verification is a complex matter, as many of us who have had experiences in either its formulation or its implementation have been made painfully aware.

There are a number of reasons for this situation, and one might enumerate some of them in the following manner. For one thing verification is most closely connected with the specific prohibition and/or other commitments undertaken in an agreement, which, needless to say, are the main theme of any such agreement. Secondly, verification measures, which are often heavily technical, are the actual interface between the letters of the agreement and the functioning real world. As such, verification measures have to encounter various restraints and limitations, of a technical, legal and other nature. In other words, and in most of the cases, there have to be strong feedbacks from viable and effective verification possibilities to the main body of the text, especially with regard to scope. Here, I would like to recall a very fine working paper on the subject presented to the Committee on Disarmament by the Canadian delegation in 1981, namely, document CD/167 and its appendix. Although the paper was presented in connection with chemical weapons, it also represented one of the most comprehensive descriptions of the various methodologies involved. That paper with its appendix stated that absolute verification, or 100 per cent effectiveness of verification, although desirable, is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. The problem then is: "how many per cent uncertainty may be acceptable in what case?", and here, in addition to the consideration of political judgement, one has to exercise a certain amount of cost/effectiveness judgements as well. What complicates the matter further is that different techniques of verification have different curves of so-called diminishing returns vis-à-vis the input of increasing costs and efforts. One has to work out a delicate balance between priorities and the relative importance of particular provisions of treaty commitments against the cost/effectiveness of the

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associated verification measures, and here, obviously, I am not talking only of monetary cost, but include in this concept social and political costs.

The third reason for the complexity arises from the somewhat philosophical approaches to the verification exercise themselves. Within the community of verification experts, there has been a long-standing debate as to whether or not the exercise in question is a game played in a hostile atmosphere between the two adversaries. This is the so-called zero-sum approach, in which the verification side's loss is a gain on the side of those who carry out violation strategies. Of course, this game theory approach has problems of its own, in that loss and gain may not be assigned the same value. Another approach is to focus our attention on that aspect of verification which is related to the confidence-building measures. This idea has a number of merits; for example, in reality, the effectiveness of verification will greatly increase with good co-operation from those whose activities are being verified. This is the basis on which national activities, including record-keeping and report-making and, if and when appropriate, some measures of national self-inspection, can be very useful. Although it is obvious that these national measures cannot take the place of international on-site inspection, they can nevertheless greatly facilitate international inspection, if carried out in good faith. It will allow us to plan random-based international on-site inspection more effectively, and may contribute to reducing the number of such inspections required. In some cases, such international co-operation is a prerequisite for fact-finding. The minimum stipulation along the line of such co-operation is an undertaking not to wilfully obstruct the employment of national technical means. One can realize also that the effective discharge of verification measures would greatly increase the co-operative atmosphere and would be conducive to the furtherance of the cause of disarmament in general.

This leads us to another and possibly more basic reason for the confidence-building measures type approach, namely, that any disarmament agreements have to be based on a measure of mutual confidence among the contracting parties, and that verification is a means to maintain such confidence, and to restore it whenever there arises a case of suspicion of violation of the agreement by any one of the parties. Unless there is this basic element of confidence, in other words, if an agreement is to be based on deep suspicion among the parties, it is difficult to see that any disarmament agreement could be workable. In this sense, verification is often conceived of as a means to deter violation by providing credible technical means to detect possible violations. This means that verification measures should be able to deal with various scenarios of possible violations and, I should add, with an adequate level of confidence of detection capabilities. It also means that the text of an agreement should be very clear as to what activities are prohibited and, as the case may be, what specific actions are promised with regard to, say, the disposal or destruction of the existing stock of prohibited material or weapons. This is because the scenarios for possible violations are different from one prohibited item to another, and thus different concepts of verification approaches should be already in the minds of those who write the text of an agreement. When one takes this confidence-building measures approach to verification, then there are two things that stand out very clearly. They are: (a) a trend of suspicious events, including continued attempts to avoid verification application, may be



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a more serious symptom of violation of confidence than an isolated case of suspicious evidence, and (b) the parties should co-operate toward quick restoration of confidence by accepting ad hoc on-site inspections whenever sufficiently well-established challenges are presented.

Another pertinent question is what happens when and if violation has been definitely proven to have taken place. This is undoubtedly a very delicate issue, for one thing because it means that the basic confidence upon which the disarmament agreement has been built may no longer hold. One may talk about retaliation or abrogation, but that means that the agreement itself was a failure, although such measures will obviously have to be retained as the last resort of deterrence. One may be able to talk about the application of sanctions, but historically, sanctions under such circumstances are a very complicated matter, including the institutional problems of their implementation. What complicates the situation further is the question whether one can talk about conclusive evidence of violation or not. Some problems regarding the use of prohibited weapons, or their deployment, may be easier to handle, because these are often cases of counting a number of discrete events. I would, however, not overly discount the difficulties involved in these cases either. More troublesome are the cases in which measurement of material plays the major role.

Here, allow me, Mr. Chairman, to indulge in a bit of technical discussion. In any scientific exercise of measurement of bulk material, one has to first take a representative sample from the bulk. Whether or not this sample represents the chemical or other composition of the entire bulk is an issue in which a certain degree of uncertainty is inevitable. The sample is then put to measurement or analysis in which various instruments are employed. There is no such thing as absolutely accurate measurement or analysis, and they are always associated with a certain error band or range of uncertainties. The compound effects of instrumental and human uncertainties can become of considerable order, especially with those instruments actually employed in the field. Then, again, verification procedures carried out on random sampling bases can provide confidence only on a probability basis. One makes such statements as "the material produced (or destroyed) was so many tons plus or minus so many kilograms, and I make this statement with 90 per cent certainty". Similar problems of the representativeness of samples have been raised a number of times regarding the use or after-effects of certain chemicals in the actual areas of hostilities.

I have no intention of over-emphasizing the technical problems of this nature, and indeed in many cases, or, I should say, most cases, arrangements have been devised adequately to circumvent these particular problems. But all solutions worked out have accepted this uncertainty range and probability statement, and therefore the need for international co-operation to keep the uncertainties to the minimum as the starting point. It might be important to be always aware of this point when we talk about various modes of verification.

The above discussion about inherent uncertainties associated with random on-site inspection does not necessarily lead us to the need for continuous and resident on-site inspections all the time, which is undoubtedly very costly and very cumbersome. The "black box" approach is one of the devices to circumvent this difficulty, and can be very effective in certain cases. I will merely mention

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era employed as part of IAEA safeguards, which takes a picture of plutonium-containing fuel movements (but nothing else) as an effective black box actually in use.

In fact, there are many cases in which direct access to the material, equipment or facilities in question is genuinely not recommended. I would mention only four examples. The object in question may contain militarily sensitive information, the revelation of which might endanger national security or invite an undesirable proliferation of such technology. The arrangement adopted in the SALT negotiations regarding MIRVed ICBMs is an example of how to solve this type of problem. Secondly, the material or facility may involve grave safety hazards. Highly radioactive nuclear material can be an example. In this case, the measurement of radiation energy and calculation back to the composition of various isotopes in the nuclear fuel takes the place of direct measurement. The third example is when the material or facility is located in the middle of an industrial complex, in association with other activities which are not included in the disarmament agreement, and often full of proprietary information. The problem can be solved, for example, by designating a limited area of permitted access and designing the plant in such a way that all the necessary measurements may be taken in these access-permitted areas. The fourth and last example is the well-known one of underground nuclear testing, where seismic signal analysis is adopted as the major instrument of detection.

I do not want to plunge the Committee into any further technical issues. The whole purpose of exposing distinguished delegates to the above brief discussion is to emphasize certain types of complications which the verification procedures may involve, so that when the job is given to the technical experts to work out the details, the original agreement should have sufficient clarity in defining the scope of the prohibition and its interaction with verification procedures to allow the technical community to proceed with the given assignment with as clear and objective an approach as possible. For one thing, the most important characteristic of effective verification is that it is objective and can keep the extent of reliance on subjective human judgements to the minimum possible.

In our working paper, we have also taken up the problem of undeclared or clandestine activities, as follows:

"On the first instance, only those activities that are meaningfully verifiable may be included in the scope. In this context, in most of the cases only those materials and facilities declared by a State party may effectively be taken up for the purpose of verification activities. Undeclared or clandestine activities, materials or equipment do not usually come into the picture except when they happen to affect visibly the portion under verification activities, or happen to be detected through national technical means.

"At the same time, verification should be so designed that effects from clandestine activities, if any, are bound to become as visible as possible so that by-challenge verifications may be triggered. It is the basic assumption of the arms control and disarmament agreements that any undeclared or clandestine activities are also prohibited".

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

In summarizing the considerations regarding clandestine activities, there are all the more reasons why (i) routine, random on-site inspections have to be carried out, preferably based on records and reports to be prepared by the national control system, (ii) national technical means have to be encouraged, and (iii) whenever a plausible challenge has been made, the parties in question should arrange for an ad hoc on-site inspection so that the particular issue may be dealt with immediately and, as I said at the outset, so that the basic confidence embodied in the original disarmament agreement may be quickly restored.

In our working paper we have also touched upon the question of an international body which would be given the task of co-ordinating the various verification activities. To what extent such a body should be authorized to conduct various verification-related activities, including checking national reports, dispatching international inspectors, receiving information obtained by national technical means, carrying out an analysis of collected data, and making a preliminary evaluation of the results of such analysis, may depend upon the nature and scope of individual disarmament agreements.

There is one thing that needs to be emphasized, however, and it is that the existence of such an international body is very much desirable and may indeed be necessary in order to maintain any particular verification scheme as a viable, effective and ongoing component of the disarmament regime.

It was based upon this firm conviction that Japan proposed, during the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the formation of an international verification unit within the framework of the United Nations, which should, as a first step, begin to accumulate all available information and knowledge on verification techniques and applications. And I would like to remind the distinguished delegates that Japan at that time submitted a working paper entitled "Strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification".

In an attempt to introduce our working paper on the subject of verification, I have taken the liberty of emphasizing some of its salient points. This is because we believe that verification is a very important subject, and that it probably forms the central issue in our negotiations both on chemical weapons and on a nuclear test ban, and on whatever other disarmament measures the Committee on Disarmament may take up in future. One cannot talk about verification in the abstract because, as I said earlier, the subject is so closely interlinked with the specific commitments. At the same time, it is very difficult to talk about disarmament measures which are not linked with specific measures of verification. None of us are naïve enough to claim that by solving the issues of verification and compliance we have almost finished the work on a disarmament agreement. At the same time, it seems to me that by looking very closely at these issues and achieving agreement on a substantial portion of them, we shall indeed make very major progress towards the achievement of the goal.



thanks the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Uemura, for his contribution and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman for the month of March, Ambassador Ali Skalli, and to himself.

The next speaker on the Chair's list is the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda, whom I now invite to take the floor.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, my delegation spoke extensively on the prevention of nuclear war on 12 April. Today I would like to touch briefly upon one more aspect of this problem, namely, ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy. This item has recently been placed high on the agenda of international relations although, unfortunately, not yet on the agenda of this Committee.

Czechoslovakia belongs to these countries which are, already now, vitally interested in the peaceful development of nuclear energy. Geological oil and natural gas reserves in my country are extremely limited and offer no hope of a substantial increase in output. Most of the hydroelectric energy resources which can be exploited economically are already being utilized. In the case of coal-mining, which has been our major source of energy, the prospects for further growth are also very limited. Current forecasts drawn up in Czechoslovakia for the period to the year 2000 show that the future development of our fuel and energy structure should be based primarily on the expansion of nuclear power. And this is by no means a forecast for the distant future. Already this year we are about to reach a limit beyond which any increase in energy consumption will have to be covered by nuclear power.

There are at present two nuclear reactors functioning in Czechoslovakia. An additional six reactors are to be put into service between 1983 and 1986.

Special attention is being paid to the smooth and safe functioning of nuclear power plants both in our domestic legislation and in our relations with our neighbours. At the end of last year we signed an agreement with Austria which envisages a considerable and regular exchange of information and the carrying out of consultations aimed at maintaining the safe operation of nuclear power plants in the proximity of our common borders. Let it be noted that this is the first agreement of the kind between two States with different social systems.

But it is certainly not only my country which has problems with the shortage of energy resources. Rather, this has become a universal phenomenon. The world's needs in energy have gone up more than 10 times since the beginning of the twentieth century and they continue to rise by 4-5 per cent each year. At the same time, it is clear that the constant depletion of the limited reserves of organic fuel will soon bring about a significant gap between the required and available quantities. This gap will not be bridged by the so-called alternative energy resources such as the energy of wind or of the tide, solar energy, etc., since their efficiency is low. Hence, before a new source of energy is found there is only one solution -- the development of nuclear energy.

From the historical point of view the nuclear power industry is a very young branch. The first nuclear power plant in the USSR produced electricity just three decades ago. Since then that industry has witnessed a dynamic development and today it produces electricity in many countries. By January 1981 there were more than 250 nuclear power plants all over the world, with an aggregate power of about 140 million kilowatts which is expected to rise to 300 million kilowatts by 1985. The Tenth Congress of the International Conference on Energy which took place in Istanbul in September 1977 estimated that the aggregate power of all nuclear power plants in the world in the year 2000 would amount to 1,300-1,650 million kilowatts.

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nuclear power plants are, if I may say so, distributed throughout the world irregularly. Most of them are situated in western Europe, principally in France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The nuclear power plants in these countries represent about 25 per cent of all nuclear power plants in the world. The USSR, the United States, Canada and Japan also have an efficient nuclear power industry. It is also being actively developed in a number of socialist countries.

The dynamic development of the nuclear power industry entails the danger of the possible release of radioactive substances and the radioactive contamination of wide areas through the deliberate destruction of nuclear power plants.

According to specialists, the destruction of one such plant with a power of 1 million kilowatts would be comparable to the radioactive contamination resulting from the explosion of a 1 megaton bomb as far as the short-term effect is concerned and would be tens of times higher for the period of a year or more. A different set of radioactive isotopes would make the consequences of nuclear contamination through the destruction of nuclear facilities more lasting as compared with the consequences of the explosion of a nuclear weapon.

According to B. Ramberg, an American specialist who deals with the problem in his book entitled Destruction of nuclear energy facilities in war, the radioactivity remaining from a nuclear weapon of 100 kilotons is lower than that resulting from the destruction of a reactor of 100 megawatts. Upon the destruction of a reactor of 580 megawatts doses exceeding the highest admissible level would be formed within an area of 10,000 km<sup>2</sup>. Some 60 days after the destruction of a reactor, there would be 100 per cent mortality within 70 km from it.

Mr. Ramberg also says that had nuclear power plants existed during the Second World War in Europe, the major part of its territory would not be suitable for human beings.

For these reasons, the Czechoslovak delegation considers that the question of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy is organically linked to the problem of the prevention of nuclear war. It has in fact been discussed in the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums for several years. It goes hand in hand with the proposals of many countries advanced in the Committee. Thus, the statement of the Group of 21 (document CD/187) issued in connection with the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor on 7 June 1981, says that the Group of 21 "considers that this unprecedented attack, and the untenable reasoning used to justify it, are matters of special concern to the Committee on Disarmament".

It has also been discussed within the United Nations and is dealt with in several resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

We consider that the Committee on Disarmament is the best place for multilateral negotiations on this problem. My delegation has also taken an active part in the Committee's discussion on the protection of peaceful nuclear facilities. The only thing we objected to and continue to object to is the linkage between this problem and that of the prohibition of radiological weapons. We consider that these are two different questions which are at different stages of negotiation. The prohibition of radiological weapons is a thoroughly studied subject which is now at the stage of the preparation of a treaty, while the problem of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy is, as far as specific considerations are concerned, in its initial stage.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

All attempts to combine these two questions into one international agreement cause many difficulties and have represented, for four years already, an obstacle to the elaboration and adoption of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

We would like to express our satisfaction at the fact that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has started its deliberations and is dealing, at least for the time being, with these two problems separately. We welcome the creation of the two respective subgroups.

It is our considered view that during the summer part of the Committee's session we should put aside all disagreements of a procedural or legal nature and focus on the substantial consideration both of the problem of the safe development of nuclear energy and of the prohibition of radiological weapons.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to join those who have taken the floor before me to congratulate you on the occasion of your assumption of office as the Chairman of our Committee for the month of April. You have left no one in doubt about your qualities as an experienced diplomat and a great leader. We have seen, under your Chairmanship, and as demonstrated this morning, that it is possible for this Committee to start its work at 10.30 a.m. sharp. May I also seize this opportunity to place on record our appreciation of the very valuable contribution made to our work by your predecessor, Ambassador Skalli of Morocco, who took sufficient pains to ensure that we adopted our agenda during his tenure of office in March after almost two months of procedural problems.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall confine my short remarks on this occasion to two main subjects on our agenda, namely, chemical weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

On the first topic, chemical weapons, I would like first of all to express our thanks to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador McPhail of Canada. Like his predecessor, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, he has approached his task with remarkable seriousness of purpose and sense of direction. His method has made it possible to minimize drift and interminable arguments. It is our fervent hope that the expectations expressed by various delegations regarding the elaboration of a convention aimed at a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons will not be misplaced.

My delegation is of the view that the extensive work carried out in the month of January this year within the chemical weapons Working Group and in which technical experts participated, the many proposals of various delegations, including those of the Superpowers and the ongoing deliberations of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons constitute a sound basis for concrete negotiations that could produce a comprehensive ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The distinguished representative of the



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USSR, Ambassador Issraelyan, in his intervention on 12 April said, "The Committee is on the eve of the decisive stage of the negotiations aimed at the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons". I hope that the two Superpowers will demonstrate with concrete results that the adage "to whom much is given much is expected" holds true for them too.

Let me reiterate my delegation's firm conviction that the technical issues of verification and compliance are not insurmountable, and that the time has now come for the two Superpowers to demonstrate with a sense of urgency the much-needed political will with a view to reaching agreements on a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty under effective international control.

In the process of working out the details of a convention, my delegation favours a general purpose criterion rather than selecting certain substances only for prohibition. In the view of my delegation, the latter could provide a fertile loophole. Though most of the chemicals or substances in this regard may not be weapons in themselves, one can liken them to nuclear facilities which may be military or peaceful, depending on who is making the declaration. Most delegations seated around this table have expressed willingness to proceed seriously with progress on a convention banning chemical weapons. In particular it is reassuring to note that the Soviet Union has indicated flexibility on its once-hardened position and also the United States delegation's detailed proposals made at the beginning of this session have come a long way to providing a live picture of a future chemical weapons convention. So the ball is now in the Committee's court; we have the ingredients for what looks like a chemical weapons convention. My delegation therefore urges the Committee to seize the bull by the horns now.

It is the belief of my delegation that the present momentum in favour of the elaboration of a chemical weapons ban should be maintained. In order to advance the cause of our work on this question, may I suggest that a chemical weapons convention drafting group be set up within the Committee. Such a body, made up of representatives of various groups within the Committee, should be charged with the responsibility of elaborating a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty. Such a drafting group should concern itself with identifying those areas where agreement has been reached, while the remaining provisions can be inserted in the draft as soon as final agreement on them is reached. We should not let this momentum slip away. The merits of this proposal, we believe, are psychological and procedural in nature; by collating those areas where there is a consensus, it will help to focus attention on those topics needing further treatment.

I would now like to address another agenda item of the utmost priority to all mankind, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Although the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, in resolution 37/83, requested the Committee on Disarmament to "establish an

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its session in 1983, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space", it is a matter for regret that this Committee has not even started setting forth on the hard and difficult road of result-oriented negotiations.

Events in recent years have shown that the extension of the arms race to outer space poses a real threat to international peace and security. For instance, the growing rivalry between the two Superpowers over the development of space-based anti-satellite defence systems such as destroyer systems or ASAT has introduced a new dimension into space warfare prospects. The destabilizing consequences of such space weapons with regard to international security and the maintenance of our fragile peace are only too obvious.

In the opinion of my delegation, the increase in the use of anti-satellite weapons, high energy lasers and particle-beam weapons runs counter to the spirit and letter of the outer space Treaty of 1967 and other relevant legal instruments whose objective is to promote the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

At this point, my delegation feels concerned about the announcement coming from Washington earlier this month urging American scientists to forsake the three-decade-old doctrine of deterring nuclear war through the threat of retaliation and instead pursue a defensive strategy based on space-age weaponry designed to "intercept and destroy" incoming enemy missiles. According to the opinion of some experts, this proposal "raises the spectre of an arms race in space which ultimately could be more expensive and dangerous than the one taking place on earth". In a reaction the Soviet leadership was quoted as saying, "Should this conception be converted into reality this would actually open the floodgates of a runaway race of all types of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive".

The arms race is a live issue and one should approach the problem of disarmament with a sense of realism and honesty. Nobody doubts that the United States is the richest country on earth but my delegation believes that a proposal for a \$2 trillion military expenditure for a five-year period is, to say the least, disturbing, especially in a world where most people can hardly afford three square meals a day, and where ignorance and disease ravage societies that we consider members of the same human family.

Let us think of the funds to be involved in such a monumental and ambitious project; let us think of the tests that will be carried out -- and here we chide ourselves thinking of a nuclear test-ban treaty! Unfortunately, figures are not available to know how much the other Superpower spends on its own "defence", if the word defence can be appropriate in this context.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

lor C.A. de Souza e Silva of Brazil eloquently spoke of vertical proliferation among the Superpowers in his statement to this Committee. Inventing a weapon to destroy another weapon only draws back the hands of the clock of disarmament. A defensive arms race would only escalate the offensive one already under way. Each side would feel compelled to increase the number and destructiveness of weapons with which to penetrate the defences of the other.

My delegation feels that instead of the star war epitome, the two Superpowers should engage in serious, objective and honest negotiations to achieve a meaningful disarmament and peace.

Since virtually no "scientific wizardry" on the part of either one of the two Superpowers can assure any long-term superiority in absolute terms, let the Superpowers hearken to the voice of reason by undertaking meaningful negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament and other forums with a view to concluding an effective and comprehensive treaty aimed at preventing the further militarization of outer space. It is therefore in this context that my delegation fully endorses the views of the Group of 21 as contained in document CD/329 to the effect that negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space should aim at concluding "an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects". We would also like to associate ourselves with those delegations that have called for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the issue under an appropriate mandate.

In the opinion of the Nigerian delegation, the voice of reason suggests that the Committee take immediate measures aimed at engaging in practical negotiations in order to elaborate a comprehensive agreement to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space, in consonance with the provisions of United Nations General Assembly resolutions 37/83 and 37/99 D, if outer space, the common heritage of all mankind, is not to be turned into a cataclysmic battlefield.

Now is the time to establish, firmly and legally, outer space as a common heritage of mankind. May I conclude by calling to mind the words of Harry Truman: "All through history it's the nations that have given the most to the generals and the least to the people that have been the first to fall".

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair thanks the distinguished representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Ijewere, for his contribution and for the kind and well-deserved words addressed to the Chairman for the month of March and the good wishes to the Chairman for the month of April.

The last speaker on the Chair's list is the distinguished representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields, to whom I now give the floor.



is of America): Mr. Chairman, as we come to the close of our spring session, permit me a brief survey of the state of the Committee from the perspective of the United States delegation.

This session began on a high note with the visits to the Committee by many distinguished government officials, including the Vice-President of the United States, the Minister for External Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, and the Foreign Minister and Deputy Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. These important visitors were followed later by the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, the Minister of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, the Director of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, and the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Norway. The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland and the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria joined this distinguished host of visitors and also addressed the Committee. Aside from the prestige of their respective high offices, each brought to the Committee their expressions of respect and encouragement for the Committee. For our part, Vice-President Bush brought a major new initiative on chemical weapons to the Committee. However, despite the auspicious beginning and the attention devoted to our work, the Committee wasted almost two months of precious time -- virtually two-thirds of its spring session -- on futile debate. Consideration of agenda items and procedural arrangements were linked to important substantive measures awaiting its consideration. This was a deplorable situation which prevented any real progress for this half of our 1983 session. Our performance this spring can only serve the interest of our critics and depreciate their opinion of our role as a negotiating body. Let us learn a lesson from these mistakes, lest we, as Santayana cogently warned, "are damned to repeat them".

We have, however, taken some small steps in this session. Our agenda finally settled, we re-established our working groups, elected their chairmen, and finally began to settle down to the substantive work of the Committee.

The achievement of a ban on chemical weapons, a priority item for the Committee -- and certainly of my delegation -- got off to a promising start. The Working Group, under the capable leadership of Ambassador McPhail of Canada, moved quickly to organize itself and set about the important task of resolving differences. Continuing the extremely useful method of work begun under Ambassador Sujka last year, contact groups were established to focus on key issues. The Working Group is considering the wealth of material developed on this subject -- and, in particular, the "basic provisions" tabled by the Soviet Union last summer (CD/294) and the United States "detailed views" tabled this year on 10 February (CD/343). The Chairman, aided by his consultations and the energetic work of his contact group leaders, has placed us in a good position to make significant progress in the coming summer session. Let us all dedicate ourselves to this vital task.

Similarly, the radiological weapons Working Group, under the skilled chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, has been organized into two sections -- one to continue work on the traditional convention under negotiation in the Committee, and one to deal with the collateral question of attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities. This approach will hopefully move the Committee toward creative solutions to the problems which face it. Again, the prospect of progress is at hand, so let us grasp it firmly.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

negative security assurances and a comprehensive continuing under the experienced chairmanships of Ambassadors Ahmad of Pakistan and Garcia Robles of Mexico, respectively, have tended to rely more on informal consultations in pursuing these goals but seem to be now in an operational mode. The same can be said for the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban under the chairmanship of our departing colleague, Ambassador Herder. I would be misleading you, Mr. Chairman, however, if I expressed any satisfaction regarding the work of this particular Group. Today, it still has not reached agreement on a programme of work and, thus, has not yet begun consideration of the important issues under its mandate. My delegation hopes that the Working Group will settle this procedural problem once and for all at its next meeting so that this important Group can begin useful work at our summer session.

We have also had useful and informative discussions on the subjects of the prevention of nuclear war and outer space. Informal meetings on these subjects have reflected the keen interest of some delegations in the immediate creation of working groups with full negotiating mandates and a more cautious approach to these subjects by other delegations. The Committee has through this process made some progress in reconciling these opposing approaches. My delegation has tried to keep an open mind on these questions, but has not, as yet, heard compelling arguments that we have definitively established the existence of a dangerous void in international law which demands the urgent attention of the Committee or a precise focus on concrete issues on which negotiations can take place. It seems to my delegation that there is a perception by some delegations that the creation of a working group somehow in and of itself solves these complex and often obscure problems. If we were to accept this approach, we would have a proliferation of working groups -- well beyond the resources of most delegations in the Committee to cover adequately. We believe it would be better to concentrate on the completion of the work before us, while at the same time exploring the substantive issues relating to these complex subjects on which we can develop a common approach. As the sole multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, we must always be vigilant to those areas where disarmament negotiations are necessary and appropriate.

I began my statement on a somewhat pessimistic note. Our performance has not been something of which we could be proud. But let me end on a note of optimism. We are now facing a six-week recess. I believe that there is at this time a common view as to our tasks during the summer session. Unlike last year, when we faced a shortened session, we will have a full 11 weeks of concentrated effort to move forward on the issues confronting us. The procedural questions are, hopefully, behind us, and I detect in the Committee a strong desire to approach the coming session in a workmanlike fashion and get down to serious business. I pledge my delegation to this effort.

As this will be the final intervention of my delegation in plenary for this spring session, I should like, through you, Sir, to extend the congratulations and best wishes of my delegation to Ambassador Gerhardt Herder on his new posting as the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic to the United States. He leaves the Committee after over eight years of distinguished service here, and he will be well remembered for his efforts. We are happy that he is going to Washington and know that he will be an effective member of Washington's diplomatic corps. We wish him the very best.

r thanks the distinguished representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields, for his contribution. That concludes the Chair's list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor?

If such is not the case, it remains for the Chair to announce that the next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 27 April, at 10.30 a.m. Once again we shall be faced with a situation where, for technical reasons, it will be impossible to interrupt the meeting for lunch and to go on in the afternoon. I would therefore once again appeal to delegations to enable the Chair to start the meeting on time.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.