

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 28 February 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. S. Turbanski (Poland)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. B. OULD ROUIS

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. D. CAPUTO

Mr. J.J. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER

Mr. R. ROWE

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma:

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. J.A. BEESLEY

Mr. R.J. ROCHON

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG

Ms. WANG SHIYUN

Mr. LIANG DEFENG

Mr. LIN CHENG

Mr. YANG MINGLIANG

Mr. LU MINGJUN

Cuba:

Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. I. HASSAN  
Mr. A. MAHER ABBAS

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. G. MONTASSIER  
Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
COL. DR. F. SAYATZ  
Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER  
Mr. F. GADJA  
Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY  
Mr. S.K. SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO  
Ms. P. RAMADHAN  
Mr. ANDRADJATI

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N.K. KAMYAB  
Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI  
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mr. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.-O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKILLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI  
Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Dr. A.R. RITSEMA

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK  
Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. T. STROJWAS  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. J. RYCHLAK

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mrs. E. BONNIER  
Mrs. A.M. LAU  
Mr. H. BERGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN

Mr. S.V. KOBYSH

Mr. G. ANTSEFEROV

Mr. G. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

Mr. J.F. GORDON

Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS

Mr. N. CLYNE

Mr. H. CALHOUN

Mr. N. CARERRA

Mr. P. CORDEN

Ms. K.C. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. R. HORNE

Mr. R. NORMAN

Mr. J. HOGAN

Mr. L. MADSEN

Mr. R. WATERS

Mr. J. DOESBURG

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKI EKANGA-RABEYA

Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament  
and Personal Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of  
the Conference on  
Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: The Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference starts today its consideration of item 2 on its agenda entitled, "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

At the outset, may I extend a warm welcome to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Mr. Dante Caputo, who will address the Conference today as first speaker. In doing so I wish him also a fruitful visit to Geneva.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Argentina, the Federal Republic of Germany, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and India. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Mr. Dante Caputo.

Mr. DANTE CAPUTO (Argentina)(translated from Spanish): Mr. President, it gives me particular pleasure to see you presiding over these deliberations as the representative of Poland, a country with which the Argentine Republic has long enjoyed a deep friendship. It is only right to acknowledge the efficiency with which you discharge your responsibilities, as well as the valuable collaboration of the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Jaipal.

On 10 December 1983, the day of his inauguration, Dr. Raúl Alfonsín, the President of the Argentine Republic, in a message before both Chambers of the National Congress said:

"We shall conform to the national tradition in favour of the peaceful settlement of disputes, repudiating all threats of the use of force. We shall support efforts designed to halt the arms race, sharing as we do the world's concern about the risk of conflicts involving nuclear weapons that could mean the end of human civilization and even the destruction of the environmental conditions that make life possible on this planet. We have pledged that our own technological capability in the nuclear field will never be applied to purposes other than those of peaceful development, and we shall keep that pledge in absolute good faith."

These words of President Alfonsín defined the policy which the Argentine Republic will pursue in this field: to favour the peaceful settlement of disputes; to support such disarmament measures as may be agreed upon, in particular those relating to nuclear disarmament; and to encourage the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I wish to reaffirm those principles before this multilateral negotiating body so that the Governments represented here may take official cognizance of the positions we shall maintain on matters that are of equal concern to all.

The present international situation is marked by a serious deterioration in relations among States. The confrontation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America has reached levels similar to those of what was once called the "cold war", which, it may be recalled, was characterized by an uncontrolled arms race and constant political and diplomatic attacks by the disputing parties. Thus, we have seen a multiplication of political and military pressures and threats to the independence and territorial integrity of developing countries. Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia alike have been and continue to be the scene of political and military interventions in the domestic affairs of the States in those areas.

(Mr. Dante Caputo, Argentina)

At the same time, against a background of emphatic and sweeping statements of support for the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force as laid down in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, one of the military alliances, arguing that it needs to redress an imbalance in Europe, has begun the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in that region, while the other, invoking the same reasons, vows to respond with similar deployments.

I do not intend to judge the merits of either position, except to observe -- not without surprise -- that the arguments advanced by both parties do not refer to a dispute on a specific question, but to strategic considerations based on an alleged military imbalance or on the search for an also alleged military superiority. I use the term "alleged" in both cases because, since the Second World War, every increase in the military capabilities of the two alliances has been explained in similar terms. Once again we see with distress that on the strength of certain questionable strategic doctrines a new stage in the nuclear-arms race has begun which will make even more precarious and feeble the distance between peace and war, between life and death for mankind.

Apart from the qualitative change that is being introduced in existing weapon systems, it is serious indeed to see weapons of an undoubtedly strategic nature being deployed in the territory of States which do not possess such weapons. The danger of this kind of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons thus becomes crystal clear. On what political arrangements will this deployment be based? Who will have the responsibility of taking decisions concerning the use of such weapons? Will, perhaps, the recipient States be passive witnesses to the presence of such weapons or, on the contrary, will they be granted some participation in the final decisions that we hope will never be taken? In the latter case it is evident that, although at first sight the number of Powers possessing nuclear weapons would remain unchanged, the number of countries having power of decision over nuclear weapons would have increased significantly. These questions seriously worry us, as we are sure they worry all those who, like ourselves, strenuously oppose the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

While the Superpowers and their allies hold one another responsible for the existing situation, the great majority of countries of the international community are mere spectators of this regrettable process, which not only increases even further the size of the huge arsenals of nuclear weapons already in existence but also heightens insecurity and the danger of nuclear war:

Stagnation and paralysis prevail in the consideration of almost all these issues. Major dialogues have been interrupted. Mistrust and suspicion mark the relations between the Great Powers, and create a climate in which negotiations requiring a minimum of good will and constructive spirit as a sine qua non can hardly prosper.

This Conference on Disarmament has a fundamental role to play in the search for the road to a peace based on law and justice and not on the quantity and sophistication of armaments. Obviously, this body is not an autonomous entity independent of the Governments composing it. It is they, and especially the members of the two great military alliances, who must demonstrate by deeds and not words that their repeated utterances in favour of disarmament and peace are truthful and sincere, and not mere rhetorical exercises designed solely to improve their own image and to embarrass the adversary.

(Mr. Dante Caputo, Argentina)

At this point in my statement, I should like to address a direct appeal to the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. The Argentine Republic regrets the interruption of the bilateral talks on various types of nuclear weapons that were being held in this city. We do so not only on humanitarian grounds, but also as an interested party, since our own survival is at stake. The private nature of these talks prevents us from commenting on what has taken place there. However, I do wish to state that, as a non-aligned country, we cannot accept that the diplomatic confrontation between the two Powers be continued at this Conference as a new stage in this renewed "cold war". In this negotiating body, countries are represented which, like mine, do not belong to the two military alliances that divide Europe. We are, nonetheless, entitled to demand that those participating in the work of this body should regard us as partners in the joint venture of disarmament. Mutual accusations and criticisms no longer convince anybody. The best proof of serious intentions is willingness to contribute to a genuine process of negotiation at this Conference. At the present moment, the Conference on Disarmament is the only disarmament mechanism open for constructive dialogue between the great Powers. We therefore, expect from them a positive attitude to work on issues of fundamental importance for mankind.

From the beginning, the agenda of this body has included the most important questions of our time, on which the least has been done: the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and, as a first step to that end, a nuclear-weapon-test ban. All other questions, however important in themselves, pale by comparison. They are mere palliatives, collateral measures or, in any event contributions of considerable value but, ultimately, not essential to an effort which, if it fails in its main purposes, will be nothing more than a deceptive illusion that will not change the iron-clad dilemma confronting mankind: to eliminate nuclear weapons or perish.

It is true that the nuclear issue is particularly intricate and difficult to tackle and, naturally, to solve. Furthermore, we have been told this over and over again. What we cannot accept is that those considerations should justify inaction and negative positions. The peoples of the world clamour for -- more than clamour, they demand -- the complete removal of the threat of annihilation from their horizon and from their future. No demand is more just or more legitimate than that. Is it, perhaps, necessary to remember the truism that having lived through Auschwitz and having been in Hiroshima, enable one to know that what is unimaginable is possible?

Never in all the history of mankind, has there been a time when the obliteration of all life on this planet, the disappearance of every form of civilization, the very extinction of the human race, loomed as a real and tangible possibility, as is the case today.

From this it follows that there is no political issue that could justify the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon is qualitatively different from other weapons. The prevention of nuclear war is, therefore, a question requiring urgent treatment. Notwithstanding these indisputable facts, our Conference witnesses the failure of efforts to elicit from the Powers possessing nuclear weapons guarantees that they will not use them or threaten to use them against those not possessing such weapons. With one exception, to so-called "assurances" that have been unilaterally proclaimed up to now rather seem to be permissible scenarios for the use or threat of use of weapons that may end civilization as we know it.

(Mr. Dante Caputo, Argentina)

This grave situation concerns us all. The nuclear arms race has entered a stage in which the risk of war has reached unacceptable levels and world public opinion is justifiably alarmed. The two Superpowers bear the principal responsibility for avoiding a nuclear war. Both should initiate consultations, with the assistance of other States, in order to increase confidence, avoid conflicts and tensions and develop an acceptable modus vivendi. It is, therefore, incumbent on the two Superpowers to establish the political bases for a climate of respect and understanding in which it will be possible to negotiate measures of genuine disarmament. This Conference is an ideal forum for such consultations. Its structure and procedures offer the appropriate framework for efforts, preferably of an informal nature, that can generate the political impetus needed to arrive at compromises and agreements in the negotiations, compromises and agreements that today are, more than necessary, vital.

Besides making this request which, if we rely on the public statements of both Superpowers, should be accepted without difficulty, the Argentine Government considers that in the matter of preventing nuclear war and related matters it is not enough to proclaim that this is a common concern of the entire international community.

Let me recall that in the Peace Memorial Park of Hiroshima the monument bears the inscription: "Rest in peace, the error will not be repeated". But today, who guarantees this promise? Unfortunately, men seem to have two types of logic: that of peace, sensitive to humanistic arguments, and that of armaments, solely sensitive to the arguments of power politics, conceived as a threat. These two types of logic, however, never meet. Those that act according to one or the other do not listen to each other, do not even hear each other, and probably despise each other. What is the use, then, of our arguments if they cannot penetrate the logic of the other, precisely of those that have the real capability to halt the arms race? What capability have we, what means are at our disposal, to penetrate with our humanistic reasoning the reasoning of power and threat? Is there anything in our power that we can do, beyond lamenting, condemning and foretelling a nuclear apocalypse.

It is, therefore, inescapable that those that stand defenceless before the huge nuclear arsenals in existence should make the weight of their opinions and aspirations felt. In this regard, I wish to inform the Conference that the President of the Argentine nation, Raúl Alfonsín, has addressed himself to the Chairman of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries, the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in order to propose consultations within the Movement on these subjects. The purpose of such consultations will be to prepare for concerted international action at the highest possible political level, so that the non-aligned positions may receive the attention they undoubtedly deserve.

I have already stated that one principle of our policy is the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. As you know, the development of a new method of uranium enrichment was recently announced in Buenos Aires. This advance, achieved through the ability and effort of Argentine technicians, will have undoubted beneficial effects which will transcend our frontiers through co-operation with other countries.

The constitutional and democratic Argentine Government has guaranteed the peaceful uses of this advanced technology to which only a small number of industrialized countries had up to now gained access. In order to give this guarantee all the credibility it deserves, consideration is now being given to the enactment of legislation that will shortly ensure the exclusively peaceful use of

(Mr. Dante Caputo, Argentina)

nuclear energy in our country. This guarantee will adequately answer the unjustified expressions of alarm at a scientific achievement that has nothing to do with the military use of nuclear energy. It needs to be recalled that a uranium enrichment plant has many civilian applications. The assumption that it may be used for other purposes should be emphatically rejected, especially since the purpose of the Argentine programme is to assist in the economic development of a country which, like ours, has been making extensive use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In this respect, as in others, the Argentine Government is open to the broadest international co-operation. But this is a two-way street. And international co-operation seems to work in one way only. I wish, therefore, to make it clear that we shall not accept any discrimination whatsoever with regard to our nuclear programmes, whose peaceful content cannot be questioned. Nor shall we countenance monopolies or undue restrictions, which were already categorically rejected in 1966 by my predecessor in President Illia's Government, Dr. Miguel Angel Zavala Ortiz, who was responsible for setting the guidelines of an Argentine nuclear policy that has remained unchanged to the present day.

Unfortunately, the international situation in this field also leaves much to be desired. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was designed to establish an acceptable balance of responsibilities and obligations between nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. Such a balance presupposed, on the one hand, the renunciation of nuclear weapons and greater co-operation in the field of peaceful uses, and, on the other, specific steps towards disarmament and, in particular, nuclear disarmament. But, what has been the result since the Treaty was opened for signature in 1968? The renunciation of nuclear weapons was extended by that instrument to explosions for peaceful purposes. To allay the preoccupations and concerns of the developing countries with respect to this prohibition, the Treaty provided for an international service for the conduct of such explosions which to date has not been established, so that the prohibition is at present absolute. Neither is the international control system equal for all. While a great majority of countries are subject to the IAEA safeguards, a number of industrialized countries enjoy the benefits of a special system designed to protect their industrial secrets. The obligations to promote international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses have been countered by even greater restrictions than those provided for in the Treaty. In Article VI of that instrument, the Parties undertook "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

There is no need to specify to whom this provision was mainly addressed. What have been the results achieved? While, fortunately, the club of nuclear-weapon Powers has not been enlarged, the military expenditures of both alliances grew from \$US 236 billion in 1968 to approximately \$US 435 billion in 1982. In 1968 the strategic nuclear forces of both Superpowers Parties to the Treaty had approximately 5,400 nuclear warheads at their disposal. In 1982 that figure exceeded 18,000 nuclear warheads. In the face of this regrettable reality, any speculation aroused by the mere commissioning of an uranium enrichment plant becomes discredited.

I should not like to conclude without stating that the Argentine delegation will co-operate closely in the negotiations that are undertaken in this Conference, in accordance with the presidential guidelines on which I have just commented.

(Mr. Dante Caputo, Argentina)

Without prejudice to the protection of our national interests with all the zeal that they deserve, we shall show all the flexibility needed to arrive at the indispensable agreements. At the same time, we hope that those that can and should set in motion a global process of disarmament will do so without further delay.

My Government pledges its firmest support for the work of this Conference, in the certainty that it will thus contribute to a vigorous and sustained action that will ultimately bear fruits despite the drawbacks and difficulties it is encountering in this truly inauspicious period.

Pope John Paul II launched an appeal to mankind, urging all nations to work for peace in order to eliminate hunger and the threat of nuclear annihilation. Preaching in favour of an easing of widespread tension, on the observance of Peace Day, he said that, as a result of the interruption of the talks on the reduction of armaments, the world had reached a radical confrontation of positions. He added that mutual mistrust multiplies the harmful effects of ideological struggles and exacerbates the already serious local conflicts in which various countries, some of them very small, are steeped in bloodshed every day.

He then referred to the pathetic situation of the poor countries, with their catastrophic debt burden, lack of food and increased mortality, especially among children, and said that it was due to mankind's lack of awareness of "the fundamental brotherhood of peoples and persons".

I beg you in the name of reason and civilization, let us realize that the nuclear-arms race will ultimately turn our earth into a planetary gas chamber.

We must not forget that the time at our disposal is short. The minutes that separate us from a nuclear holocaust are steadily growing fewer. We must therefore intensify our efforts to the maximum before it is too late.

It is very hard for us to imagine the state of mind of those who irresponsibly play the game of nuclear holocaust. And to those deluded souls who believe in the possibility that a nuclear war can be won, I would point out that the survivors of such a war will not even have time to envy the dead.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to the President, and in particular for the friendly reference to Polish-Argentinian relations.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, I welcome the opportunity to address the first statement of my delegation this year to the representative of Poland, our great neighbour country. Nobody in Germany, nobody in our generation can be oblivious of the tragic dimension of the relationship between our two peoples. But the best among us, on either side of the frontier, do not only mourn the suffering, the injuries and the humiliations of the past. Indeed, both the more sombre pages of our history and our shared European heritage make it incumbent upon us to turn resolutely to the tasks of the future and, in a spirit of reconciliation, work for a Europe that, in all its parts, enjoys lasting peace and justice. My many personal exchanges with you, Mr. President, have convinced me that you place your work in such a noble perspective, and I am honoured to pay tribute to you as you preside over our work.

My delegation gratefully recalls the contribution Ambassador Jorge Morelli Pando has made as the outgoing chairman over the last few months.

I am privileged, Mr. President, to be the first to take the floor after the Conference has heard the presentation of His Excellency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic. I am thus also the first to congratulate him upon his statement and to express my delegation's gratitude for his readiness to honour the Conference by his presence so soon after his newly-elected Government has taken office. In its new, dynamic policy the Government of Argentina will be able to draw upon the rich resources of respect and friendship which this great Latin American nation traditionally enjoys.

Mr. President, as of 7 February of this year our Conference has resumed the proud name of earlier periods of multilateral disarmament history. It thereby corresponds to the growing expectations of the peoples of our time. A larger audience will now look to us for higher standards of performance. This is a challenge; and, as many speakers have stressed in the past few weeks, we must thus heighten the demands which we place upon ourselves. In the first instance, this is certainly true in terms of results, which we should strive harder to achieve. But I would submit that it is also true in terms of methodology. A number of statements which we have heard, especially in the very early part of this annual session, make me wonder whether there is a sufficient amount of common understanding as to the nature of our dialogue. It is all too readily stressed by many orators that the Conference on Disarmament is the only universal negotiating body in the field of disarmament. But we all know this to be true only with one important modification: that our plenary meetings where we all develop the broader security policy perspectives of our Governments and the principles of our negotiating stance do not constitute negotiations in a narrow sense. In fact we have to acknowledge that our Conference has a dual nature: comprehensive pronouncements of policy in public meetings, and technical negotiating activities in private sessions alternate and interact, fertilize one another. However, this interaction can only function if our public statements abide by certain ground rules, if they set the stage suitably for intended or ongoing negotiations. These ground rules are simple: they are the rules of rational, argumentative discourse.

In some of the earlier statements, I submit, these ground rules have been unnecessarily violated. They have been violated in a triple manner.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Too often, we hear one-sided accusations of other members of this Conference. Long lists of alleged new weapon systems or actions designed to prove hostile intent are cited, and often the speaker seems to convey the impression that his own country has no weapons and no military budget at all. This form of selective evidence is non-argumentative and proves no point at all. A mature audience like the one around this table wishes to base its judgement on all relevant facts of a given security situation; on a sober description of the forces on either side, and on the degree of their balance; on over-all political and military behaviour instead of selected utterances out of context.

Again, the same or other speeches choose to restate positions which have already been discussed at great length in this Conference, as if they had never been submitted to argumentative scrutiny before. How can rational discourse and, later, negotiated disarmament prevail, if the same views are repeated over and over, without any mention of relevant counter-arguments as they have already come forward? Would intellectual honesty not demand that a new presentation of a particular policy would be taken as an opportunity to deal rationally with counter-arguments to acknowledge their worth or to disprove them where possible? Those delegations who present their arguments in good faith and try to promote argumentative discourse must feel relegated to a "dialogue de sourds" if, in such speeches, they are confronted with totally unchanged views, as if their counter-arguments had never been proffered.

A third methodological deficiency appears in statements which endlessly cite, in support of their views, from the open literature, newspapers or politicians in societies which are characterized by an open information system. Of course, in such open societies any number of views are expressed in the most diverse manner. They are part of a large opinion-shaping process where decisions are taken by responsible citizens in a well-regulated process of democratic decision-making. Here again it would be a necessity of argumentative fairness, but also proof of the ability of the speaker to discern the real relevance of political processes, to provide a more balanced comprehensive picture of opinion.

My plea for a more argumentative, rational discourse among ourselves is not designed to lecture anybody, but rather to sensitize colleagues to the new challenges to which we have to respond.

But I have also introduced these methodological reflections in order to be able to demonstrate better the deficiencies of one particular contribution to our debates. I refer to allegations in the Soviet statement of 7 February 1984 -- since then echoed by delegations of other members of the Warsaw Pact -- that recent deployments of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in some Western European countries have "drastically aggravated military confrontation in Europe" and heightened the risk of a nuclear war. The Soviet delegation also maintained, in a curious reversal of arguments, that it was in reality the United States which left the negotiating table dealing with these weapons, and that, in addition, the aforementioned deployment was effected against the will of the European peoples on whose soil they are now stationed in very limited numbers.

I do not consider it useful to go over the INF controversy at this juncture, and thus to duplicate discussions that ought to be held elsewhere. I would, however, use the methodological yardsticks which I have just recommended to criticize the way in which the distinguished Soviet delegation has broached the topic. If these allegations sank in, a dangerous myth would be created which has to be dispelled at an early point. Such a myth could only originate, precisely, because the allegations are faulty in methodology, marked by a selective omission of facts.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

But we should demand that, if the INF problem is treated, the facts be represented fully and in a balanced manner. If the Soviet delegation wishes to criticize the Western INF deployments -- it is perfectly within her rights to do so -- then it would also have to speak of its own huge, totally unprovoked armament in the same weapons category since 1976; of the fact that even since December 1983 more weapons of the same type (namely at least 27 SS-20 missiles with 81 nuclear warheads) have been deployed than NATO has set out to install; that, in addition, a whole array of new Soviet nuclear weapons have been deployed in various countries of the Warsaw Pact; that, contrary to the Warsaw Pact, the West has continued to state its readiness that all INF weapons would be withdrawn at the earliest possible point if agreement on an acceptable balance of forces is reached between the parties; that even for the very small NATO deployment, and in identical numbers, other nuclear warheads have been withdrawn from the deployment countries; that in the fall of 1983 NATO unilaterally decided to withdraw 1,400 nuclear warheads from European soil; that the decision, to go through, reluctantly enough, with limited armament measures on the NATO side was in each case the consequence of a serious public debate and unequivocal majority decisions of all the constitutional organs involved; and finally, that the Western side continues to be ready at the negotiating table to resume constructive negotiations while the Soviet Union, contrary to her own calls for negotiations without pre-conditions in so many domains, and to broad appeals from the international community, still chooses to stay away.

In this case as in others, an arbitrary selection of facts leads to arbitrary conclusions. On an important problem of this nature, we should ask to be served better. We should all refuse to fall victim to a dangerous and unfounded myth.

As far as the INF issue is concerned, the reality is that the Soviet Union has attempted through a number of years to create a Euro-strategic superiority, enhancing its conventional capabilities in Eastern Europe, in order to obtain an instrument of political power for the direct exercise of pressure on the free democracies of Western Europe. However, the Soviet Union had to recognize that even in the longer term she possesses no realistic prospect that Western Europe would content itself with a lower security status. The real issue is not precisely how many weapons are stationed on one or the other side of a tension-ridden demarcation line, but whether the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance succeed, by way of patiently negotiated compromise, to agree on a balance of forces in Europe which ensures a lasting stable equilibrium at substantially lower levels of armament without a one-sided monopoly, and the prevention of hegemonic ambitions. We will not cease to hope -- and work -- for eventual Soviet acceptance of this concept of parity and peace.

I would like to leave this field of the methodology of our work with a note of regret that our first full month of activity has not been sufficient to overcome the procedural hurdles which once again we have managed to place in our way. My regret is the stronger since I feel that the flexibility and margin of manoeuvre which many delegations -- including my own -- possess, has not yet been fully exploited, notwithstanding, needless to say, your own commendable efforts. On the procedural side, we may well need to rethink our present approach, and in that respect I wish to express my approval for a number of suggestions proffered recently by Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia. I find his call for a greater amount of continuity of our work -- and our working organs -- persuasive and practical.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Turning now to the important agenda item of chemical weapons I would like to voice the gratification of my delegation with the considerable momentum that has recently been instilled in our work. All of us are eagerly anticipating the comprehensive draft convention which the United States delegation will soon submit, certainly as a major accelerating factor of our work. My delegation is also highly gratified with the proposals introduced by the Soviet delegation on 21 February. The readiness of the Soviet Government to accept the continuous surveillance of the chemical weapons destruction process by international on-site inspection is most encouraging. The Federal Government, by the voice of its Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister, has welcomed this step in one of the crucial areas of our negotiations where an accord is still outstanding. My delegation hopes that the Soviet proposals can swiftly be translated into concrete terms. In this process, and while we consider in greater detail the requirements of on-site inspection in the destruction phase of the operation of the future convention, we will also have to visualize the inherent relationship between that particular aspect of verification and the other important verification problems to be solved. There is a logical bond between the activities of inspectors in that first important phase, and the treaty obligations we have to work out on the involvement of the international inspectorate both in the verification of future non-production of chemical weapons, and in the case of on-challenge inspections. My delegation welcomes the recent proposal of the Soviet Union in the expectation that the Soviet delegation will demonstrate a similar co-operative attitude at the time when these other aspects of verification come up for detailed consideration and negotiation.

The United States announcement of a comprehensive draft, the Soviet statement of 21 February, the helpful procedural suggestions contained in Working Paper CD/435, the Working Papers introduced in the last few weeks, among others by the delegation of the United Kingdom and my own, taken together with the swift agreement of all delegations on a forward-looking negotiating mandate for the future committee on chemical weapons, entitle us to look into the future of our work with some realistic optimism, hoping that the one "ray of hope" which Ambassador Issraelyan had perceived earlier in our session can soon broaden into lasting sunshine.

Mr. President, before demonstrating the readiness of my own delegation to contribute vigorously to this new phase of our negotiations on chemical weapons, let me briefly deal with two related developments in the chemical weapons field.

While this Conference embarks on a new phase in the attempt to ban chemical weapons forever, there continue to be chilling reminders that huge arsenals of these gruesome weapons still exist, and that there may be new incidents involving their production and use.

My delegation has taken note with preoccupation of the accusations which the Foreign Minister of Iran has levied on 16 February of this year in our very midst regarding the use of chemical weapons on the national territory of Iran. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical weapons in war. For a long time, my Government has insistently maintained that all and every allegation of the use of chemical weapons in violation of international law, wherever they are raised, must receive the same careful investigation and clarification. As regards an instrument for such investigation, there is the possibility of recourse to the mechanism with which the international community has endowed itself on the basis of United Nations resolution 37/98 D. This instrument is, as a matter of course, also available to the Government of Iran.

In his statement of 21 February, Ambassador Issraelyan has again referred to the recent proposal of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty on a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe. When this proposal was first publicized, my Government underlined as its positive feature that the Soviet Union and her allies were giving new emphasis to the significance of the chemical weapons topic. However, while

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

agreeing wholeheartedly that Europe should be freed of the menace of chemical weapons as soon as possible, I would again like to stress the priority importance which the Federal Government attributes to the negotiations on a world-wide, comprehensive and reliably verifiable interdiction of all chemical weapons in this Conference. Our negotiations, we all agree, are now in an advanced state, and everything that would slow them down or serve to dissipate our energy should be avoided. Our further negotiations must concentrate upon the still outstanding issues, especially in the realm of verification. Regional solutions would undoubtedly work to the detriment of this global perspective. Were they to be given precedence, injustice would also be done to the countries of the Third World which are rightly fearful, on the basis of past experience, of the chemical weapons threat to their parts of the world. They would not understand that this vital topic of negotiation would be, wholly or in part, taken out of their hands. All countries have the same right to be freed from the scourge of chemical weapons. Since verification problems are essentially identical, in some aspects even larger, in regional contexts, my Government also has doubts as to whether the corresponding language of the Warsaw Pact offer contains any indication of willingness of the authors to deal with verification issues in an adequate way. On the other hand, my delegation is ready at all times to pursue all available contacts, including bilateral contacts, that promote the efforts of the Conference to arrive at a world-wide chemical weapons convention with the appropriate verification mechanism.

Let me now turn to some contributions which my delegation wishes to make to our ongoing chemical weapons negotiations process in this annual session. I would first like to introduce a Working Paper that deals with the question of the transfer of super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors. The paper is now before us and bears the symbol CD/439. With this Working Paper my delegation wishes to provide an input into the current discussions on "Prohibition of Transfer" and "Permitted Transfer".

Obviously, in this realm a fine balance must be maintained between the dangers inherent in the transfer of super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors -- the danger that the fundamental prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons be circumvented -- and the unencumbered functioning of international trade in chemical products. We have been encouraged to undertake a new search for such an equilibrium point by our impression that these two conflicting principles have not been adequately balanced in all of the proposals for transfer limitations that are already before the Conference.

The question of which chemical products should be regarded as key precursors of super-toxic lethal chemicals is fundamental to the formulation in a chemical weapons convention of a transfer ban and of the provisions for permitted transfer. Underlying the present Working Paper is our long-held view that a narrow definition must apply to the term key precursor.

In the view of my delegation chemicals should be defined as key precursors only if: they have particular significance to the relevant provisions in a chemical weapons convention; they constitute characteristic chemical compounds at the final technological reaction stage for the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals; and they are not used, or are used in minimal quantities only, for permitted purposes. To us, this definition appears particularly relevant for the international measures of verification of the non-production of chemicals for use in chemical weapons because it strictly limits the range of chemicals which might be covered by controls. Thus, legitimate interests of the chemical industry are duly taken into account.

Our definition implies that controls, and any limitation of production, shall extend only to the transfer of substances for "protective purposes". According to our proposal, the transfer for "permitted purposes" between States parties will not be limited.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

With regard to the transfer of super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors for protective purposes, permitted transfers between States parties should be limited to the allowed production level. Notification to the Consultative Committee of any transfer of such super-toxic lethal chemicals or their key precursors shall be required.

As in a previous Working Paper, CD/326, which purports to set out the views of my delegation on various aspects of verification, the present Working Paper couches its recommendations in prescriptive language. My delegation thereby hopes to facilitate the consideration of the problems raised in the most concrete terms possible, in keeping with the now agreed mandate for the work of the committee on chemical weapons, which emphasizes that the future convention should be developed and worked out in requisite detail.

As delegations are aware, the Federal Government, on the basis of an invitation extended at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, intends to hold a Workshop for the discussion of problems of verification relating to the destruction of stocks. I take pleasure in making this invitation more concrete by informing you that the Workshop will now take place from 12 to 14 June 1984 at Munster in northern Germany. A formal letter of invitation to each head of delegation will be sent soon. In co-operation with the President of the Conference for the month of June (who is at the same time the Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons and who is already informed) we intend to establish the closest possible connection between the Workshop and the ongoing negotiations at this Conference. We expect the Workshop to make a practical contribution to the problems of verification of the destruction of stocks, illustrated by the situation at a small national destruction facility. My delegation realizes that this invitation takes on a new significance in the aftermath of the proposals of the Soviet Union relating to the verification of the destruction of stocks. This gives us the hope that all delegations find it possible to participate in the event.

My delegation does not intend to concentrate its work during the current session uniquely on chemical weapons, notwithstanding the primary importance of that subject. We also hope to make contributions on other important agenda items. Among these, we share the sense of urgency which attaches to item 3 of our agenda, the prevention of nuclear war and all its related aspects. There is not the slightest doubt that the importance of preventing war has been immensely heightened by the nuclear phenomenon. Our work, however, must be based on realistic assumptions as to where the dangers to peace in our era loom, and should aim at a comprehensive strategy designed to make war in all its forms increasingly less likely and indeed impossible. As I had occasion to point out at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, my delegation is ready to embark on a thorough argumentative process on the problem of the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war, with a view to operational solutions, in any work format that seems appropriate to this Conference, and we are looking forward to an early commencement of that important endeavour. My delegation likewise intends to make specific contributions during this spring part of our session to the problems of nuclear testing and radiological weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the thoughtful and thought-provoking statement and the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): First of all allow me to welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Mr. Dante Caputo, who has addressed our Conference. We listened to his statement with great interest and are going to study it attentively.

It is my intention to introduce today document CD/437 which contains the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty member States to the member States of NATO to free Europe from chemical weapons. This proposal, as is stated in the document, was presented at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 January of this year to the embassies of the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United States, Turkey and France.

The member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization proposed to the member States of the NATO to hold in 1984 a meeting of plenipotentiary representatives for a preliminary exchange of views on the question of freeing Europe from chemical weapons. The group of socialist countries considers that, besides lessening substantially the risk of chemical war in Europe, the implementation of such a partial measure of a regional nature would contribute to the efforts undertaken on a world scale aimed at the acceleration of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which continues to be the ultimate aim of the Warsaw Treaty Member States. Hence, this proposal is not meant to compete with the efforts to eliminate chemical weapons on a global basis but to facilitate them. And this I would like to underline and stress again after what has just been stated by the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, who expressed fears that there should be nothing that should slow us down or dissipate our energy in negotiating the total prohibition of chemical weapons. We are certain that our proposals will only increase our energy in trying to reach the final goal.

The readiness of the socialist countries to contribute to the early elaboration of the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons by deeds, not words, has been once more clearly demonstrated by the constructive proposal of the Soviet Union on the verification of the elimination of chemical-weapon stocks advanced by Ambassador Issraelyan in his statement of 21 February.

In advancing this proposal, the Warsaw Treaty Organization proceeds from the fact that the danger of the use of chemical weapons, particularly in Europe, increases in the conditions of the present aggravation of the international situation. The presence of chemical weapons on the densely populated territory of Europe poses an extreme danger to all European States and especially to civilian population. It is estimated that in the event of a conflict involving the use of chemical weapons the ratio of lethal casualties among servicemen and among civilians could be one to twenty.

The obligations of States with regard to the chemical-weapon-free territory, which would be defined in the accord, could include, for example, the declaration of the presence or absence of chemical weapons on that territory, the inadmissibility of the deployment of chemical weapons where there are no such weapons at present, the freezing of these weapons, the withdrawal or scrapping of the existing stocks of chemical weapons, and the renunciation of their production, acquisition, entry into and transfer to States located within that territory. In working out the accord the interested States can, as it becomes necessary, co-ordinate mutually acceptable adequate forms of verification.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

This proposal, if implemented, would undoubtedly strengthen European security, reduce the threat of war and facilitate the consolidation of mutual trust and the improvement of the over-all political atmosphere. The Warsaw Treaty countries are introducing this proposal in the Conference on Disarmament in order to underline again our interest in the elimination of all chemical weapons. Given the importance of the problem, the Warsaw Treaty Member States expect that the governments of the NATO countries will approach this proposal with all attention and seriousness.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President, it is with great pleasure that I join in the congratulations addressed to you, Comrade Turbanski, on your assumption of the first Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. It gives us deep satisfaction to note that this important office is being exercised by the representative of a country with which the German Democratic Republic is linked by close and fraternal bonds. We are united in the common goal to build a socialist society and to strengthen world peace. Together we stand against any manifestation of revengism. It would not be exaggerated to say that it is mainly due to your diplomatic skill and experience that our Conference was able to quickly adopt its agenda and work programme. Since your Presidency is drawing to its end, it is certainly fully justified to state that during its first month the Conference has been in good hands. May I also express through you, Comrade President, our thanks to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Jorge Morelli Pando of Peru, for his tireless efforts to move us a step forward in our responsible task.

My delegation has listened with great attention to the address of His Excellency Mr. Dante Caputo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic. From his statement it became apparent that Argentina attaches vital importance to the questions of strengthening peace and preventing nuclear war.

I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues, the distinguished Representatives of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. I wish them the best of success and look forward to constructive co-operation.

The Conference on Disarmament started its work under conditions of complicated international relations. The threat of a nuclear catastrophe has considerably increased. This is why we join all those delegations which consider concrete measures to avert a nuclear inferno to be the most urgent task of the present time. People all over the world expect such measures because they are aware of the devastating consequences of nuclear war.

What is necessary is a broad coalition of reason and common sense. The Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, recently reaffirmed the German Democratic Republic's approach in this regard as follows:

"World politics should not get out of control. We will joint with all those who are guided by the realization that there is no reasonable alternative to the policy of peaceful coexistence between States having different social systems, with all those who sincerely desire peace."

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

A reversal of the negative trends in the international situation is necessary. To bring it about requires above all that the actions of those who bear political responsibility are guided by reason, thoughtfulness and predictability.

On many occasions, the German Democratic Republic, like the other socialist States, has furnished practical proof of the reliability of its peace policy.

On the basis of their Prague and Moscow declarations of last year, the States members of the Warsaw Treaty have submitted concrete and realistic proposals.

They were, and they continue to be, ready to consider the legitimate interests of all sides in honest negotiations. This includes being open to all useful ideas, no matter from which side they may come. In this connection I may recall the readiness of the German Democratic Republic to join in the establishment in Europe of a zone free from battlefield nuclear weapons. For the same considerations, on the occasions of Prime Minister Trudeau's recent visit the German Democratic Republic supported his proposals to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

During the debate, several speakers have already referred to the close interrelationship between developments in Europe and the world as a whole, and rightly so.

On the European continent, the situation has considerably deteriorated as a result of the deployment of United States medium-range missiles. It has put in jeopardy all that had been achieved in terms of stability and co-operation during the 1970s. A new situation has emerged. This fact cannot be obscured by the verbal peace assurances of those who, by deploying the missiles, have opened another round in the arms race, which they even celebrate as a victory.

The far-reaching Soviet proposals were rejected and the urgent appeals by the world public ignored. By the way, the numerous mass rallies in Western Europe against United States medium-range missiles render absurd the assertions that the decision was based on a "democratic process".

The only aim of the United States was to instal qualitatively new weapons for a nuclear first strike. With the deployment, the basis for the negotiations was removed and the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty were forced to take countermeasures.

It is necessary to return to the situation as it existed before the deployment of United States medium-range missiles in Western Europe.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The struggle for peace, arms limitation and disarmament must be further increased, now more than ever before.

The Stockholm Conference offers a chance to come closer to reducing military confrontation.

Together with the other States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, the German Democratic Republic advocates far-reaching steps to build confidence and to strengthen security.

We consider as priority measures the conclusion of a treaty on the renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, a freeze on nuclear weapons and military budgets, as well as the freeing of Europe from chemical weapons.

At the same time, we are in favour of complementing and extending the confidence-building measures adopted at Helsinki in 1975.

On the other hand, proposals that are aimed at perpetuating the arms race, while making it only "transparent", are not likely to enhance confidence and security. And it is surely not conducive to building confidence and promoting the East-West dialogue if one side openly calls for a revision of the political realities that have emerged as a result of the Second World War and post-war developments in Europe. Such attempts are inconsistent with the Helsinki Final Act and directed against European security.

Leading representatives of NATO's major Power, who in recent years were openly advocating concepts of various kinds of nuclear warfare, have recently stated that such a war cannot be won and must never be fought.

Modifying an old proverb, one might say that due note has been taken of the message, but what is decisive is to match words with deeds.

In this connection, it is necessary to ask the following questions:

Has the United States so far made even one single cut in its programmes which are directed at gaining military superiority and creating a nuclear first-strike capability? Is it not rather a fact that the funds for the hugest armaments programme ever are being increased considerably year by year?

Is the United States willing to conduct negotiations in good faith on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security?

In a word: Is the United States ready to desist from the policy of strength and of militarizing international relations?

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

These very questions themselves make it clear that verbal assurances about readiness for understanding without positive changes in policy will not bring us any step closer to arms limitation and disarmament.

It is not for the sake of polemics when we mention this, but to avoid confusion. When inviting readiness to conciliation, one must not mix up addresses.

A reliable yardstick to measure the position of States towards burning questions of our time is their approach to central issues in the field of arms limitation and disarmament dealt with by the United Nations General Assembly.

How can one talk about readiness for dialogue while neglecting the will of the overwhelming majority of States at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly by casting almost 30 negative votes on resolutions aimed at the cessation of the arms race?

No less disquieting are attempts to belittle the importance of those United Nations resolutions for the Conference on Disarmament. This brings us to the character and the working method of our Conference, whose role has increased objectively in view of the tense international situation. Hence, we cannot accept endeavours to proceed on the motto of the "lowest common denominator", that is, practically to submit to the will of one single State.

To do justice to the increased role of the Conference on Disarmament rather means:

First, immediately to take up negotiations on such significant questions of our agenda as the prevention of a nuclear war, a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as well as the prevention of an arms race in outer space. For this purpose, appropriate subsidiary bodies with negotiating mandates are necessary. Document CD/434 tabled by the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on behalf of a group of socialist countries meets these requirements.

Second, to make consistent use of any signs indicating the chance of reaching agreement. That also means that drafting work on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should start without further delay.

Third, it is necessary to approach the question of verification in a serious manner. To put it bluntly: so long as the question of verification is artificially played up and used as a tool against negotiations, any substantial progress is endangered. The purpose of verification is to strengthen confidence. But the approach adopted by one side to this question has brought about confrontation and created distrust over the last years and has deadlocked disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

We wish to emphasize that in view of the real danger of a nuclear inferno and in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, adequate measures to prevent a nuclear war should be the most important task for this Conference to agree upon.

The Declaration on the Condemnation of Nuclear War adopted by the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly (resolution 38/75) at the initiative of the Soviet Union carries considerable political and moral weight. It urges States to draw practical conclusions for their policy, including their activities at this Conference.

The Group of Socialist Countries, as well as the Group of 21, in documents CD/355, CD/406 and CD/341, submitted their proposals for negotiations.

The Conference should act immediately and establish an appropriate subsidiary body.

Like many other countries, the German Democratic Republic attaches decisive importance to the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. During the debate, speakers have already referred to resolution 38/183 B, which was initiated by my country and Cuba at the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The resolution commends the unilateral declarations of the USSR and of China and invites the other three nuclear-weapon States to proceed in a similar way.

With a view to evading this demand, reference is frequently made to conventional armaments. This is untenable, because there exists a military parity between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO in the field of conventional weapons too. Furthermore, the States members of the Warsaw Treaty have repeatedly reaffirmed their defence doctrine and consequently proposed to the NATO countries to conclude a treaty on the renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. We still wait for a positive reaction.

No less than three resolutions of the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly urge a freeze on nuclear-weapon arsenals and mark out routes towards this goal. Such a step would not only create confidence but would also promote the reduction of nuclear weapons.

One should not dismiss any important initiative aimed at the prevention of nuclear war by raising the objection that this idea allegedly has no consensus potential. On the contrary, what is necessary is to display readiness for business-like negotiations to examine relevant ideas in this field and to find mutually acceptable solutions.

I may recall that the delegation of Mexico, for instance, proposed in the First Committee of the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly the incorporation of the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in an internationally binding legal instrument (A/C.1/38/PV.3, page 26). This and other ideas deserve careful examination.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

To enter into negotiations on and conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty becomes ever more urgent. The third NPT Review Conference scheduled for 1985 underlines their political topicality. We expect the Western depositaries to take specific steps with a view to negotiations in accordance with the commitments undertaken under the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is to be welcomed that in our debate many speakers have emphasized the priority of the issue. We hope this commitment will also be reflected in a determined advocacy of the establishment of a subsidiary body with a clear negotiating mandate. Draft treaties are on the table.

It would certainly not serve the cause of a comprehensive test ban to stress its priority and at the same time to keep a subsidiary body busy with noncommittal discussions of verification questions. International practice so far has shown that it is not possible to go from verification to a complete nuclear-test ban.

It should be recalled that all countries represented at this Conference in 1978 approved the principle contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, according to which the form of verification should be determined by the scope of the agreement concerned.

It is not verification that is at stake. We share the conclusion drawn by the delegation of Sweden here on 17 February that there are no technical obstacles to verification of a comprehensive test ban. Thus, the Conference should no longer allow itself to be misused as a screen to conceal lacking willingness of one side. The Conference should not subject itself any longer to the will of one nuclear-weapon-State; rather, that State is called upon to reconsider its position and to clear the road for negotiations in the framework of a relevant subsidiary body.

We share the opinion of the majority of delegations that the Conference's responsibility has increased in relation to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. By elaborating a programme of gradual nuclear disarmament it could also promote bilateral and regional negotiations and give them an important impetus.

The prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon is a special and important aspect of nuclear disarmament. Resolution 38/185 C adopted by the last session of the United Nations General Assembly at the initiative of the German Democratic Republic stresses the growing concern about the production of this weapon.

There are clear indications that this weapon is to replace the obsolete nuclear warheads that are now being removed from Western Europe amidst a great propaganda effort.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

No time must be lost in elaborating measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. We agree with all those delegations which pointed to the great urgency of this matter. Those States that voted in favour of resolution 38/70 will hopefully support the establishment of a subsidiary body whose task is defined in paragraph 7 of the above-mentioned resolution.

The two nuclear-weapon Powers that refrained from approving the resolution are invited to display the necessary flexibility to enable the immediate opening of treaty negotiations in the framework of the corresponding subsidiary body. Sufficient material is at hand to proceed in this way. In particular, we have in mind the draft treaty submitted last year by the Soviet delegation. That is why we see no sense in pretending that here we face a completely new problem and that it is necessary for this Conference to consider this issue from a theoretical angle. The mere examination of existing agreements would be of no practical value.

It is quite logical that negotiations on a new treaty should take into account all legal instruments which already exist. We cannot but hope that suggestions for a review of proven agreements are not in fact designed to question their validity and to impede the elaboration of new agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Expectation of progress on a chemical weapons ban have grown. They are justified only if all sides are ready to do serious work on the convention. That means, above all, starting drafting work immediately. My delegation has always supported this demand, and has made concrete proposals, for instance on 22 February 1983.

At the previous meeting, the Czechoslovak delegation, on behalf of a group of socialist countries, made a number of important suggestions concerning the future method of work of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons. They are intended to help attain a new quality in our work. To carry on long-drawn-out discussions of some partial questions would only delay the formulation of the text of the convention.

To make swift progress it is necessary to display willingness to accommodate interests and to seek solutions which are acceptable to all sides.

At this juncture, we would like particularly to commend the constructive attitude of the USSR. New evidence of this constructiveness is the preparedness of the USSR to accept in principle international continuous on-site inspections in connection with the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, as announced by Ambassador Issraelyan on 21 February. In the interest of an early elaboration of the convention, we now expect a similar readiness for compromise on the part of the United States.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

On the same day when the USSR once again demonstrated its willingness for conciliation, the United States attempted, by means of a report handed over to the United Nations, to step up its slanderous campaign about the alleged use of chemical weapons. This gives rise to the question of whether such action can be reconciled with assurances of one's own willingness for businesslike negotiations.

The proposal to free Europe from chemical weapons submitted by the German Democratic Republic and the other States members of the Warsaw Treaty on 10 January 1984 is evidence of these countries' resolve to remove the threat of such weapons from the European continent. It reflects their firm determination to avert the danger of chemical war by practical measures which can be agreed upon and implemented very quickly.

Regional efforts to eliminate chemical weapons would promote negotiations on their elimination on a world-wide scale. The one does not preclude the other. The German Democratic Republic is prepared for negotiations with interested States on a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe. My country adopts a positive attitude towards all reasonable proposals which are directed at gradually freeing Europe from chemical weapons.

Undoubtedly, in view of the present complicated international situation, the Conference is faced with difficult tasks. We have no alternative but to resolutely work for their solution.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for warm references to the fraternal relations existing between Poland and the German Democratic Republic as well as for the kind words addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today, does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

May I advise members who intend to address the plenary in the coming days to inscribe themselves as soon as possible, since we have only one speaker for the plenary meetings on Thursday and Tuesday next.

May I now put before the Conference three draft mandates dated 28 February for the re-establishment of ad hoc subsidiary bodies. The secretariat has already circulated the relevant texts for consideration by the Conference. I suggest that we take them up one by one, following the order of the items on the Agenda.

The first draft mandate deals with the re-establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary body on chemical weapons, and it includes also the question of the appointment of its Chairman.

If there is no objection I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft mandate.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): I think it was understood that we should adopt this draft mandate together with a statement by the President, already agreed upon in an informal meeting. My delegation has not received, together with the documents, this draft statement by the President. I would request that we have both statements before us, before we take a final decision.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil, and would like to explain that this statement was circulated at the informal meeting: it will be read out immediately after the decision on the mandate has been taken, as was agreed. Would this satisfy the distinguished representative of Brazil? I thank you.

Then I take it that there is no objection to adopting the draft mandate 1/ for the re-establishment of the ad hoc subsidiary body on chemical weapons?

It was so decided.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): I would like to make a comment on the decision that has just been taken concerning the draft mandate for an ad hoc subsidiary body on chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I would suggest that you make this comment after I have read the statement of the President. Thank you.

I wish to draw attention to paragraph 3 of the decision just taken by the Conference on the re-establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary body on chemical weapons which states:

"The term 'ad hoc subsidiary body' is used in this connection pending a decision by the Conference on the designation to be adopted with due urgency within two weeks for its subsidiary bodies without prejudice to existing practice in this regard".

It is my intention to begin consultations immediately in order to reach consensus on the question of designation.

It is understood by the Conference on Disarmament that the same designation be given to all the subsidiary bodies established directly under respective agenda items unless the Conference, in specific cases, decides otherwise.

Furthermore, if no decision is taken at the end of two weeks, a provisional designation should be agreed upon pending a definitive decision by the Conference.

It is also understood that no decision as to designation will have financial or structural implications.

I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia.

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1/ Decision contained in document CD/440.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation would like to explain, on behalf of a group of Socialist States, how the group understands the last paragraph of the decision just adopted, regarding the subsidiary body on the negotiation of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

We understand that the words "without prejudice to existing practice in this regard" in this paragraph means that the term "ad hoc subsidiary body" will be used temporarily, without prejudice to the full application of rule 23 of the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to submit now for consideration by the Conference a draft mandate for an ad hoc subsidiary body on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. 2/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft mandate.

It was so decided.

May I now turn to the draft mandate for an ad hoc subsidiary body on the comprehensive programme on disarmament. 3/

As agreed yesterday at our informal meeting, this ad hoc subsidiary body will meet during the second part of the annual session. I take it that there is no objection to the adoption of the draft mandate.

It was so decided.

That concludes our business for this plenary meeting. However, with your kind permission I would like to make a statement before we conclude.

This being the last plenary meeting under my Presidency, permit me to take this opportunity to make just a few remarks before we adjourn.

Although at the end of this first month of the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament we may have rather little to report, I hope you will share the view with me that the time we spent here was not wasted. In the three weeks of our work we had seven plenary meetings with 38 speakers taking the floor, and nine informal meetings with detailed discussions concentrated on the agenda, the programme of work, and subsequently on the establishment of subsidiary bodies.

Without going into details of, and trying to sum up, the plenary discussions I would say that while touching upon the gravity of the present international situation, speakers have debated all aspects of the broad and complex disarmament problems. We have rightly agreed to put on our agenda with new emphasis the problem of the prevention of nuclear war, as a separate item. The debates over the last years, and particularly during the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament, have clearly shown the importance that the delegations of the

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2/ Decision contained in document CD/441.

3/ Decision contained in document CD/442.

(The President)

overwhelming majority of States represented in this room do attach to the question of the prevention of nuclear war. It was indeed gratifying to me, both as President of this Conference and as Poland's representative, that the proposal of a group of socialist States to make the question of the prevention of nuclear war an independent item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament has from the very beginning received strong support and endorsement from the Group of 21, non-aligned and neutral delegations, which thereby led to its relatively speedy approval. Our long informal discussion yesterday, with the Group of 21 playing a leading role, which has just allowed the establishment of three important subsidiary bodies, I regard as yet another example of a constructive dialogue. It was equally rewarding to see the delegations of the Western group displaying goodwill and a sense of political realism that contributed to a consensus.

In my opening statement three weeks ago I voiced my profound trust and hope in connection with the general expectations the international community associated with the commencement of this session of the Conference on Disarmament. Even more hope and more trust is required today. But trust is not enough. We should realize that the adoption of the agenda is not "a success" but our first and elementary duty if we are to move ahead. At the same time, our deliberations have shown clearly the dimensions of mistrust still to be overcome, the depth and magnitude of the gap between the respective positions.

I personally regret not to have been able, due to lack of time, to conduct more informal meetings and exchanges of views that would lead to the establishment of subsidiary bodies on a nuclear-test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race, prevention of nuclear war or the prevention of an arms race in outer space. These are, indeed, urgent matters and burning disarmament problems. I have no doubt that my friend and colleague, Ambassador Datcu of the Socialist Republic of Romania, who will sit in this chair in the month of March, will spare no effort to have these matters settled to the satisfaction of all of us. All my good wishes accompany him in this endeavour. He can certainly count on my full co-operation.

These are the few general reflections I wanted to make. Whatever good we have achieved at the beginning of this year's session, we have achieved it together, in a common effort.

I thank all of you for the kind co-operation, help and advice that you have given me in discharging my duties. May I add my special thanks to the co-ordinators of all political groups and to the distinguished Ambassador of China for their particularly friendly and sincere advice displayed in the course of numerous rounds of consultations. Let the spirit of co-operation of the commencement of this session, displayed in discussions on organizational matters, prevail in all our future substantive negotiations.

My very cordial thanks go to Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal, the Secretary-General of the Conference, and to his Deputy, Mr. Vincente Berasategui. I for one shall always think with great appreciation and respect of the exemplary efficiency which they have demonstrated in the performance of their important functions. Finally, I extend my heartfelt thanks to the members of the secretariat, to the interpretation and translation services for their hard work and dedication.

(The President)

It has been an honour for me to represent my country, Socialist Poland, as the first President of the Conference on Disarmament. It has been a personal honour for me to sit behind this table. I wish to thank you very much for all the kind references you have so generously addressed to my country and the Polish people and for your warm words directed to me personally.

That concludes my statement. Does anybody wish to take the floor?

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I think it would be wrong of me to let this occasion pass without speaking briefly in response to you, as co-ordinator for the month of February of the Western group of countries.

As has been said many times, this is a first for you, the first President of the Conference on Disarmament; if I may say so, it has also been a first for me, and it has been a great honour and a great pleasure to work with you during this month.

Please accept, from the Western group, our expressions of gratitude and appreciation for the good start that you have given us. I think that it is true that throughout this month the interpretation that I have given to you of the will of the Western group has at all times emphasized our fundamental concern with substance, and, as a consequence, of our determination to deal with matters of procedure as swiftly, as rationally and as clearly as possible, and I believe that we have done that.

The group which I today represent is therefore satisfied with the decisions we have taken up to this stage and we are indeed grateful to you for enabling us to do that and to make those decisions possible.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): I would like to address to you a very brief statement of thanks as co-ordinator of the Socialist countries.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his very kind and brief statement.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): On behalf of the Group of 21, I would like to thank you very much indeed for your guidance and your Presidency in this very difficult and important first month of the session of 1984. I personally, as well as, I am quite sure, all the members of the Group of 21, especially appreciated the sound judgement, the good spirit and constructive attitudes you have shown, which I think have significantly alleviated our work. Sometimes when one is reflecting, the problems could, I am afraid, have been much worse if we had not had the benefit of your very wise approach to some quite sensitive and difficult problems. So, once again, Mr. President, thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT: I thank very much the representative of Sweden for his statement and I now give the floor to the representative of China.

Mr. QIAN JIADONG (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, I would like to join the previous speakers in conveying to you our appreciation and gratitude for the achievements made in the first month under your presidency at this session. We all expected that the unfortunate situation we faced last year would not be repeated, and under your able guidance this desire of ours has to a certain extent been realized. Compared with last year, it should be said that this year we have already made a good beginning. Lastly, I would also like to thank you for your kind words addressed to me personally.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China again for his kind words and for his co-operation.

I am afraid of repeating the mistake I made in asking if there was anyone who wished to take the floor, which stemmed from my trying to be too democratic. Before concluding, however, I understand that there is no other member who would wish to take the floor at this meeting.

Before adjourning, I would like to inform the Conference that the Ad Hoc Subsidiary Body on Chemical Weapons will meet in this chamber on Wednesday, 29 February 1984, at 3 p.m.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 1 March at 10.30 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.