

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 25 February 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. S. Turbanski

(Poland)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia: Mr. R. ROWE
Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium: Mr. M. DEPASSE
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma: U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. R.J. ROCHON

China: Mr. QIAN JIADONG
Ms. WANG SHIYUN
Mr. LI WEIMING
Ms. GE YIYUN
Mr. SUO KAIMING
Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG

Cuba: Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I. HASSAN
Mr. A. MAHER ABBAS

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:
Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. G. MONTASSIER
Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:
Mr. H. ROSE
Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:
Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary:
Mr. D. MEISZTER
Mr. F. GADJA
Mr. T. TOTH

India:
Mr. M. DUBEY
Mr. S.K. SHARMA

Indonesia:
Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO
Ms. P. RAMADHAN
Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO
Mr. ANDRADJATI

Islamic Republic of Iran:
Mr. N.K. KAMYAB

Italy:
Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. G.A. BRACESI
Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan:
Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. T. KAWAKITA
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

Mexico:
Mr. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:
Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER

Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH

Mr. L.O. AKINDELE

Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Mr. J. RYCHLAK

Mr. A. KARKOSZKA

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Mr. A. CRETU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Mrs. E. BONNIER

Mrs. A.M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. T.F. DMITRITCHEV
Mr. Y. KOSTENKO
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH
Mr. G. ANTISIFEROV
Mr. G. VASHADZE
Mr. V. KROKHA

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. B.P. NOBLE
Mr. J.F. GORDON
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. N. CLYNE
Mr. H. CALHOUN
Mr. N. CARERRA
Mr. P. CORDEN
Ms. K.C. CRITTENBURGER
Mr. R. HORNE
Mr. R. NORMAN
Mr. J. HOGAN
Mr. L. MADSEN
Mr. R. WATERS
Mr. J. DOESBURG

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKI EKANGA-RABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: The Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference continues today its consideration of item 1 on its agenda entitled "Nuclear test ban". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

May I welcome in the Conference the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency Eivinn Berg, who will be the first speaker today. The State Secretary has visited us on previous occasions and I am glad to wish him a useful stay in Geneva.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Norway, Hungary, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and the United States of America.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency Eivinn Berg.

Mr. BERG (Norway): Mr. President, distinguished members of the Conference on Disarmament, may I first thank you, Mr. President, for your very kind and warm words of welcome extended to me and my delegation, and permit me also to express my satisfaction at the honour and privilege afforded me to address this important negotiating body in the field of disarmament. May I extend to you, the distinguished representative of Poland, my congratulations on your assumption of the Presidency. I am pleased to see you as the first President of the Conference on Disarmament. The redesignation of the Committee to a Conference was in fact part of a resolution that my country had the honour to introduce during the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

With your permission, Mr. President, I should like first, to make some rather brief general observations before addressing some of the concrete issues on the Conference's agenda.

Despite some recent encouraging developments the international scene is still unfortunately characterized by the absence of a broad and constructive international dialogue and by the fact that certain crucial bilateral negotiations on nuclear arms remain suspended.

Against this background the multilateral efforts made by the Conference on Disarmament are becoming increasingly significant, underlining the growing importance and responsibility of this Conference. I cannot therefore emphasize strongly enough the importance attached by the Government of Norway to the crucial negotiations in this Conference.

We are confident that no efforts will be spared by the members of this global negotiating body in order to secure concrete progress in the important issues now before the Conference. If this can be achieved, it would meet, I think, the deep desire of people everywhere for enhanced security through real and constructive arms control negotiations.

I like to emphasize this particular point because it is part of a concept of security policy which I believe is widely shared, namely that arms control and disarmament are as vital and important to the security of nations as the maintenance of adequate military defence measures.

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

Consequently, we all have strong and real interests in pursuing arms control and disarmament through negotiations. We have therefore also an obligation and a mutual interest in protecting our various fora of dialogue and negotiations from the adverse effects of shifting political relations in the international climate.

As a result, since disarmament is in the interest of all parties, we have consistently made the point that the conduct of negotiations should not be put in jeopardy by attempts to exact political concessions or as a means of pressure or reward.

The curbing of the arms race both in the nuclear and conventional field represents a fundamental challenge to us all.

Against this background it is a matter of considerable satisfaction to my Government that the Stockholm Conference is now in progress and that a date has been set for the continuation of the important MBFR talks in Vienna. In our view these two Conferences complement each other in the sense that building confidence through concrete measures and providing at the same time for an improved conventional balance are conducive to military and political stability.

In our efforts to curb the risks inherent in a continued nuclear arms build-up, the Norwegian Government continues to attach the greatest importance to the now suspended or discontinued bilateral negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and on the reduction of strategic arms (START). It is our view that we should be prepared to demonstrate flexibility and that any serious initiative that may serve to reopen these negotiations should be carefully considered indeed. We should aim in these negotiations at verifiable reductions in the total number of intermediate-range and strategic nuclear arms to the lowest possible and balanced level of forces, taking into account, of course, the security needs of the parties concerned.

As I have already stated, it is the hope of my Government that the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament will bring about substantial progress in the important questions on its agenda, to which I shall now address myself briefly.

Through the able leadership of Ambassador McPhail of Canada, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons managed in 1983 to make progress. In our opinion, multilateral agreement on a comprehensive chemical-weapons ban is today a priority disarmament issue. What is needed now is to elaborate a comprehensive draft convention.

It is also to us very encouraging that progress was made during the 1983 session on issues relevant to the incorporation of a prohibition on use in the scope of the convention. This would, I think, complement the prohibition in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. As to the vital question of verification of destruction of chemical stocks, the successful and impressive demonstration by the United States in Salt Lake City in November 1983, at which Norwegian experts were present, has proved that a system based on a combination of remote sensing and on-site inspection can work efficiently. We also look forward to the forthcoming demonstration in the Federal Republic of Germany concerning these issues.

The recent announcement by the United States Secretary of State that the United States will table a comprehensive draft convention in the Conference on Disarmament concerning a chemical-weapons ban, is of particular significance to the forthcoming negotiations. The Norwegian Government warmly welcomes this as an important disarmament initiative.

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

In this connection I would add that Norway also welcomes the important and positive statement of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Victor Issraelyan, on 21 February, when he declared the readiness in principle of the Soviet Union to consider in a positive manner the proposal on the permanent presence at the special facilities on stock destruction of the representatives of international control.

It is the sincere hope of my Government that the positive attitude reflected by the United States and the Soviet Union in these important announcements will indeed contribute significantly to expediting the work of the Conference in this high-priority field of disarmament.

The Norwegian Government has also noted the proposal of 10 January of the East European countries for a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe, and welcomes it as a confirmation of active interest on their part in a chemical weapons ban. However, it is the view of my Government that a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, implemented on a world-wide basis and hence also in Europe, would more adequately meet the need for further measures to supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

I would leave you in no doubt that Norway is determined to contribute to this urgent task of the Conference. We therefore plan to present new results of our research programme on verification of a chemical-weapons convention during the second part of this year's session. The Norwegian research programme will be terminated in 1986, when we plan to submit a set of concrete and specific proposals for sampling and verification procedures for the implementation of a chemical-weapons convention.

A very important item on the international disarmament agenda is a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. If it could be achieved, it would contribute to halting the nuclear arms build-up and to promoting non-proliferation efforts. Such a ban should prohibit all nuclear test explosions in all environments on a permanent basis. A future test ban should therefore also in our view include nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The deliberations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban in 1982 and 1983 have in our opinion been useful, even though the mandate has been limited to issues relating to verification and compliance. The deliberations have confirmed that a global seismological network should play a prominent role in a verification system of a nuclear-test ban.

For several years, as you will know, the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) has undertaken research with a view to contributing to the work of the Conference on Disarmament on the establishment of a global seismological network. Our scientists have taken an active part in the elaboration of the draft of the third report of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts, which we hope can be approved at the next session of the Group. The continuation of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts is of great importance for the further refinement and development of a global network. As a contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament NORSAR is continuing its research on the use of modern telecommunications technology for this very purpose.

It is the opinion of the Norwegian Government also that the time has now come to finalize a convention on radiological weapons. Such a convention would be a limited, but nevertheless welcome arms-control measure. In the current international climate, such a convention would have a positive effect on the multilateral

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

disarmament process. The Norwegian Government believes that a radiological weapons convention can be based on the joint USSR-United States proposal of July 1979 and on the results of subsequent negotiations in this Conference.

The prohibition of attacks on civilian nuclear facilities is another issue that should be vigorously pursued. The conclusion of a radiological weapons convention must not lessen our resolve to make progress also on this question.

Norway considers that an extension of the arms race into outer space could threaten military stability both in space and on earth, while at the same time jeopardizing civilian uses of outer space. Every effort should therefore be made to prevent such a development.

Several important international treaties limit or prohibit various military uses of outer space. There is, nevertheless, a need to examine recent technological developments in relation both to existing obligations and to the need for further international legal instruments. In this regard I would like to add that we have studied with interest the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth.

Norway welcomed the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to include prevention of an arms race in outer space as an item on its agenda in 1982. In our view, the Conference on Disarmament could start its substantive work along the lines of the mandate proposed last year in document CD/413. I would hope also that the Conference can agree on a mandate for a subsidiary body for this crucial question as soon as possible during the present session. For our part we would like to follow closely the substantive work of the Conference on Disarmament while drawing on our own technical expertise in this complex field.

Finally, I would like to stress once more the appreciation of the Norwegian Government concerning last year's decision to increase the membership of this negotiating body by no more than four States and to inform the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the agreement reached as to the selection of new members. We have noted with satisfaction that the adopted programme of work for the first part of this year's session includes a reference to the question of selecting additional members.

I do not need to emphasize again the great importance attached by my country to the question of full membership in the Conference on Disarmament. As an active observer, we have consistently sought to contribute to the negotiations in this forum. As a full member -- and through the establishment of a permanent disarmament delegation -- here in Geneva we would be determined to contribute even further to the work of the Conference. In the meantime, Mr. President, I can promise you and your distinguished colleagues that Norway will continue actively to support all aspects of the multilateral disarmament process within the responsibility of this prominent international negotiating forum.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Norway for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Meiszter.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Since this is the first time that I speak at a plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, I wish at the outset to express my sincere thanks to you, Comrade President, and to all my colleagues for the kind words of welcome addressed to me. I hasten to assure you that I greatly appreciate the numerous signs of goodwill and friendly assistance, and that the Hungarian delegation continues to be always ready to co-operate with everyone in our common search for realistic ways and means of achieving tangible results in the field of disarmament.

It is with particular pleasure, Comrade President, that I extend to you my warmest congratulations, and express the Hungarian delegation's satisfaction at seeing in the chair of this important forum so distinguished a representative of a socialist country which is linked to Hungary by proverbial ties of centuries and the traditional amity of the two peoples. Your diplomatic skill and wisdom, and the manner in which you have been discharging your awesome responsibilities, have already won you the well-deserved appreciation of the whole Conference.

I wish to convey special thanks to Ambassador Jaipal and Mr. Vincente Berasategui for their advice and helping hand extended to me when I started my first steps around the Conference on Disarmament. It is always reassuring to know that one can rely on their great experience and the kind assistance of the secretariat under their direction.

It gives me pleasure, Comrade President, to associate myself with the warm welcome which you extended to the distinguished State Secretary of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eivinn Berg.

Finally, I wish to commend your predecessor for the leadership he provided and the task he fulfilled with great approval.

I have come to head my delegation with no particular background and expertise in disarmament affairs. However I am possessed with the desire to contribute my best towards representing and realizing in practice the foreign policy of the Hungarian People's Republic, which is aimed at strengthening peace and international security in every conceivable manner, most of all by way of arms reduction and disarmament. I am not unaware that the present conditions are not propitious for my aspiration. Recent years have been characterized by a continual sharpening of international political and military tension. Confrontation has been on the increase, sovereign States in various parts of the world have become victims of military interventions, unceasing attempts have been made to upset the balance of power and to obtain military superiority.

The unfavourable development of the international situation has been most conspicuous in Europe. The deployment of American medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe, in close proximity of the borders of the socialist countries, among them my own country, has entailed far-reaching consequences for peace and security not only in that continent but also in the world as a whole. As a direct consequence of that sinister step it has become impossible to continue negotiations on such weapons. Its adverse effects have soon become apparent also at other fora of arms limitation and disarmament.

In view of such developments the States Members of the Warsaw Treaty were obliged to take appropriate counter-measures in order to preserve the balance of military forces, to safeguard their security. The Hungarian Government considered and considers those measures justified and necessary.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

Even in situations where defensive counter-measures are forced upon us, the Hungarian People's Republic, like the other States Members of the Warsaw Treaty, will not cease to make every effort aimed at curbing the arms race, decreasing political and military tension, preventing dangers that threaten peace, and maintaining contacts and dialogue as indispensable prerequisites.

Let me recall at this juncture that the President of our Presidential Council, in his statement before the General Assembly during the last session, firmly reiterated our faith in the peaceful coexistence of States with differing social systems. For us -- he said -- "coexistence means active co-operation and a constant strengthening of mutually advantageous political, economic and cultural relations among peoples and governments. During the past 10 or 15 years, we have gained considerable experience in this regard, and it is my understanding that our partners have no reason to feel disappointed either."

In a world fully saturated with highly sophisticated nuclear weapons which carry in themselves the risk of the devastation of our entire civilization, nuclear disarmament is undoubtedly the most pressing task for us all, and measures capable of preventing nuclear war must be accorded the highest priority. The Hungarian Government, therefore, attaches the greatest importance to the renunciation of the first-use of nuclear weapons. The unconditional commitment by the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances has already set the example. Now it is the turn of the other nuclear-weapon Powers, that so far have not assumed similar obligations, to follow suit. We are convinced that a cluster of such obligations, especially if embodied in an international legal contractual framework, could be a major step towards relieving tension in the world, and strengthening the sense of security of the great majority of States that have long ago renounced the possession of nuclear weapons.

Let me emphasize in this context that the States Members of the Warsaw Treaty are ready to go even further than that, and proposed last year the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force, whether nuclear or conventional. That proposal was addressed to the States Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but the treaty would be open to every other State of the world. It is evident that such a treaty would be a substantive contribution to lessening the danger of war and strengthening confidence in general.

On the road to nuclear disarmament it would be a first step of major significance if the nuclear-weapon States could agree to freeze, under appropriate verification, all their nuclear arms in both qualitative and quantitative terms. The concrete proposal of the Soviet Union to that effect could serve as a proper basis for negotiations, as a comprehensive approach to the prevention of a new build-up of nuclear arsenals. On the basis of such a nuclear freeze, further negotiations could be developed with the aim of reducing and eventually eliminating all nuclear-weapon stockpiles, and thus eliminating forever the threat of nuclear war.

The Hungarian Government continues to maintain that within the complex of nuclear disarmament measures the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests must be treated with the greatest urgency. Such a prohibition would prevent the qualitative upgrading of nuclear weapons and the emergence of new and more sophisticated systems of such weapons. We believe that the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly and the Swedish draft treaty tabled here last summer, as well as the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated in this body, could serve as a sound basis

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for negotiations and eventual early agreement on the subject. We have for long been convinced that the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would promote negotiations on the whole range of nuclear and non-nuclear disarmament problems.

I have already devoted much time to questions of nuclear disarmament, even though I have only touched upon the most urgent ones. That, however, serves to reflect the great emphasis which the Hungarian Government has always laid on those issues, and the urgency and priority that we attached to that complex problem. This fact does not in any way detract from our will and readiness to pursue concrete and meaningful negotiations on every other problem before the Conference on Disarmament.

As a matter of fact we have for a long time been an ardent advocate of urgent measures aimed at the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of such weapons, as well as the prohibition of other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. We are firm in our belief that on the basis of the various drafts and the great expertise concentrated in this body, negotiations could and should be conducted in earnest in order to eliminate the growing danger stemming from chemical and other weapons of mass destruction.

Before concluding this initial review of my Government's position on some of the major issues facing the Conference, I wish to underline the great importance we attach to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We are aware of the rapidly growing danger of the militarization of that limitless environment. Therefore we have fully supported the initiation of urgent negotiations on the basis of the proposal made by the Soviet Union at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly on the prohibition of the stationing in outer space of weapons of any type, and expressed our support also for the new Soviet proposal concerning negotiations on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth.

The basic position of the Hungarian People's Republic has always been and continues to be the same: we are ready and willing to negotiate and conclude agreements on the limitation, reduction or prohibition of weapons of any kind on a just and reciprocal basis, and in full conformity with the principle of equality and equal security. My Government has on numerous occasions given evidence of its resolve to find commonly acceptable solutions, to make adjustments, and to come to reasonable compromises.

In conclusion, Comrade President, allow me to recall another short passage from the statement which the Head of our Presidential Council delivered last September before the General Assembly: "The Hungarian Government, wherever its possibilities permit, assumes its share of responsibility and selects the alternative of dialogue and negotiations rather than confrontation. ... We are convinced that there is no disputed issue that could not be solved peacefully, by way of negotiations."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement, for his friendly reference to Polish-Hungarian relations as well as for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Depasse.

Mr. DEPASSE (Belgium) (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. President. My first duty must be to thank you and the other members of the Conference who have taken the floor before me and conveyed their best wishes to the new members of the Conference on Disarmament in 1984. With your kind assistance, we may indeed be able to respond to the wishes addressed to us. I should also like to congratulate you very warmly on your Presidency, which you exercise with as much kindness as authority. I have been most struck by the very warm feelings expressed around this table with regard to your country, and should like to associate myself with them. When thinking over what I would say this morning, I leafed through an old work on Belgian independence and checked up on a childhood memory. The Belgian revolution in its early days owed much to Poland, and the greatest Belgian historian of the turn of the century, Henri Pirenne, wrote the following: "On 29 November 1830 the Warsaw Uprising prevented Czar Nicholas from sending his troops to crush the Belgian revolution". I believe that since then we have always found ourselves on the same side of liberty and national independence; the depth and warmth of the relations between our two countries have never been a matter of doubt for anyone. I should also like to express the respect which my delegation feels for State Secretary Berg who has honoured this Conference with a statement of great substance.

The Committee on Disarmament has a reputation for sterility and the fact that it has been converted into a Conference is probably not sufficient to generate the productivity which it has lacked so far. That can only be the result of a method of work which concentrates efforts on topics offering the best chances for progress and which deals with them with restraint and respect for consensus.

The Belgian delegation is not very interested in procedural discussions. It did not participate in the debate on the draft agenda or in that which has not yet been concluded, but which is, I hope, soon to end, on the names of our subsidiary organs.

I shall take this opportunity to say that I am glad that I do not have any language problem in French in calling you Monsieur le Président, and I do not see what you have gained by being called "Mr. President" rather than "Mr. Chairman". I believe that this is true for the other languages too.

I must say that the Belgian delegation has some difficulty in understanding why the delegations of the socialist countries have run the risk of potentially long and acrimonious discussions in proposing amendments which, personally, I have found rather frivolous and whose import, even on a tactical level, is rather hard to grasp. For us, in these procedural matters, the good is often the enemy of the best, and perfectionism should be rejected. It was with great pleasure that I listened to the Ambassador of Yugoslavia praising the virtues of the principle of continuity in procedural matters.

To go on to more serious matters, we believe that in a tense international situation such as that facing us today, rhetoric and accusations are unproductive. Where the agreement of all is necessary to make progress, anyone who offends the dignity of his partners can legitimately be suspected of jeopardizing the calm atmosphere essential to the progress of the entire undertaking. In this connection, I would recommend the distinguished representative of the USSR to refrain henceforth from expressing his views -- as he did in his statement of 7 February 1984 -- on what is or is not the will of the Belgian people. I should like to assure him that those responsible for my country's policy devote most of their efforts to ascertaining and expressing the will of the Belgian people.

(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

A glance at the calendar of meetings of the Conference on Disarmament, reveals that the latter will be able to devote 10 weeks during the spring of 1984 to eight items. On the assumption that the Conference meets every day without exception, elementary division leads to the conclusion that if the work is divided on an arithmetical basis, we shall have available six and a half working days per item.

We therefore have to choose between dispersing our efforts, which would undoubtedly lead to failure on all of those topics, and selectivity, which holds out some hope of success in some of them.

Belgium would like the organization of the work of the Conference on Disarmament to be guided by a desire to give priority to the topics in respect of which the Conference can, in all objectivity, expect substantial progress to be made towards the negotiation of multilateral agreements guaranteeing specific measures for arms control or effective disarmament. The key word here is "negotiation".

It is the antithesis of declaratory diplomacy on which we can no longer have illusions and which has no place here.

I imagine, moreover, that it was probably on the basis of similar criteria that our secretariat had already deleted from the draft agenda which it had prepared several items in respect of which it was clear that a debate could not at present lead to positive results. That work should be continued in order to enable us effectively to concentrate our efforts solely on those topics which seem likely to be fruitful.

Such an effort, such an approach is all the more necessary since the Conference on Disarmament is now the only universal forum open to calm negotiation, the only one which has the potential to be productive, in the disarmament sphere.

In the view of the Belgian delegation, the problem of chemical weapons is especially ripe for genuine negotiation.

A clear basis for negotiation exists. The report of the Working Group submitted by Ambassador McPhail describes it adequately. All our States, in one way or another, have reaffirmed their desire to conclude work rapidly, and this was reflected by the wording of a mandate for a working group, ad hoc committee or subsidiary body, on the content of which we are unanimous.

The United States announced that it would shortly submit a draft treaty to us: this should help us to formulate more easily, in all its aspects, the text of the convention which we shall recommend our States to implement. To this end, of course, the United States must make haste to submit this document.

Some questions which recently still gave rise to polemics have developed in a satisfactory manner; with regard to the central problem of verification of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons, we certainly noted a breakthrough in the statement made on 21 February by the distinguished representative of the USSR. I found that statement particularly encouraging because it clearly goes in the direction of the conclusions which I drew from attending the Workshop organized by the United States Administration at Tooele. In my opinion, the conclusions of that Workshop are quite straightforward.

(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

The first is that effective verification of the destruction of chemical weapons in an industrial facility is possible on condition that the constraint of verification is taken into account at the design stage of the facilities to be set up. In other words, if the planning office which designs the destruction facility takes account of these constraints, the facility becomes wide open to verification; otherwise, it remains opaque.

The second conclusion is that the importance of a human presence for verification purposes in a destruction facility depends on the sophistication and reliability of the equipment. The greater its reliability and sophistication, the smaller the importance of the intrusion of human beings.

At Tooele, a permanent human presence is essential not only during the destruction stage but above all during the maintenance and setting of the instruments; otherwise, the reliability of the verification is negatively affected. The day may perhaps come when the automatization of the instruments will make it possible to do without this permanent human presence, but that does not seem the case today.

That is why my delegation was very pleased by the statement made by Ambassador Issraelyan on 21 February. His statement amounts to a breakthrough on a fundamental point, but we do not think that it is enough to justify euphoria on our part. For differences on essential issues still exist, particularly with regard to the means to be utilized to verify effectively in future the non-production of new chemical weapons by the industry.

We think these differences can be resolved.

Belgium, which has a large chemical industry, is prepared to accept a verification system which combines systematically organized random inspections with ad hoc inspections in the case of a challenge procedure. The USSR proposes a different system, based on prohibition of the production of certain, especially dangerous products, but verification would be carried out solely on the basis of the challenge procedure initiated in the event of suspicion.

We fear that the weakness of such a system could be that it reserves inspection exclusively for cases which are already the subject of controversy, and therefore having political undertones, whereas we prefer a routine system that would avoid controversy.

The discussion on this point should therefore be continued, account being taken in particular of the proposals submitted by the Minister of State, Mr. Luce, to the Conference on 14 February 1984.

Assuming that these conceptual difficulties are resolved, considerable effort and a great deal of perseverance and flexibility will still be necessary to work out the structure for a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons. It would be a mistake to underestimate the effort which remains to be made to achieve that goal.

Belgium has always been in favour of the early conclusion of a convention prohibiting radiological weapons. Such an agreement would be modest but significant. We suggest that this issue should be separated from the prohibition of attacks against civilian nuclear facilities, which seems to us much less advanced. It might be possible, in an agreement on radiological weapons, to undertake to negotiate without delay on the prohibition of attacks against civilian nuclear facilities, a subject to which my country attaches great importance in view of the size of the civilian nuclear industry in Belgium.

(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

In our opinion, at present none of the other major items on our agenda meets the conditions that would already enable the Conference to formulate synallagmatic and binding international instruments. That is to be regretted and efforts should be made to create conditions that would make it possible to break the present deadlock, particularly in the entire field of nuclear disarmament and space.

With regard to the central area of nuclear disarmament, the best and perhaps the only serious basis for progress would undoubtedly be the resumption at Geneva or elsewhere, in the most appropriate form and doubtless, as discreetly as possible, of the INF and START negotiations between the United States and the USSR.

Indeed, the Belgian delegation cannot reasonably hope that any truly fruitful discussion can be undertaken here and now, in other words publicly, on the subject of nuclear disarmament when the breaking-off of the central negotiations between the two main protagonists has been followed by verbal clashes and recriminations, unfortunately reflected in several statements here.

I should like to warn my colleagues: in the nuclear field, it seems to me that no substantial progress is possible unless relaxed and confidential (confidentiality and confidence have more in common than alliteration) talks are resumed between Moscow and Washington with regard to the INF and START negotiations.

At the most, we can hope to promote such talks by concentrating on an analytical search for elements that would make it possible to achieve progress on a series of issues mentioned here by many delegations, in particular the prevention of an arms race in outer space (Belgium voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 38/70 and proposed to the Conference on Disarmament, on behalf of the Western countries, a draft mandate for a working group (document CD/413) which remains on the table), the nuclear-test ban and the prevention of nuclear war. It was already from that standpoint that last year my country submitted document CD/380 on the elaboration of confidence-building measures, and document CD/411 proposing a method of work for the prevention of nuclear war.

Such an approach will make it possible to define the scope of the negotiations, and if they can take place more rapidly than we believe possible, we will be the first to welcome the fact.

In the atmosphere of uncertainty which affects international relations, when negotiation has been interrupted on questions as fundamental as strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, it seems to us that the systematic exploration of concrete possibilities for negotiations is the only area capable of bringing about any improvement in the international environment.

It is in that spirit that Belgium approaches the deliberations of our Conference in 1984, and those of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, and it is in that spirit too that it will resume the Vienna MBFR negotiations. It is convinced that the success of one of those negotiations would have a positive impact on the others. It considers that if the Conference on Disarmament could by the end of the year submit a preliminary draft of a convention covering chemical weapons, it would have already deserved well of the international community.

(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

In conclusion, I should like to recall that all the representatives in the Conference on Disarmament heard the moving statement made here by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Even leaving aside the question of the verification of the allegations in that statement, as my office obliges me to do, the heart-rending and pressing nature of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons cannot have escaped anyone whose heart is in the right place.

I see this as yet another reason why all necessary efforts should be deployed to achieve without delay the final elimination of such inhuman armaments.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Comrade President, first of all, allow me to join the list of speakers who spoke before me to welcome here in this room the State Secretary of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eivinn Berg. My delegation would like to introduce a working document of a group of socialist countries entitled "Improved effectiveness of the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons", which bears the symbol CD/435.

The socialist countries consider the prohibition of chemical weapons one of the most important tasks in the field of curbing the arms race and disarmament. One more demonstration of their keen interest in this problem is the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty Organization member States to the NATO member States, advanced on 10 January of this year, aimed at freeing Europe from nuclear weapons. On the initiative of the socialist countries, the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session adopted resolution 38/187 A, which urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations in order to achieve accord on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date and, for this purpose, to proceed immediately to drafting such a convention for submission to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session. With a view to fulfilling this task, a group of socialist countries today tables document CD/435, containing its proposals for the most effective work of the subsidiary body on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

It is suggested that the working organ undertake the formulation of the text of the convention so that a draft convention, or a draft containing agreed and formulated provisions together with suggested formulations for provisions which have not been agreed as yet, could be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session as called for by the relevant resolution. The subsidiary body should make maximum use of time and the possibility of continuing its work after the spring and summer parts of the session should be considered. Taking into account the new title of this forum and the advanced stage of negotiations

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

on chemical weapons, the subsidiary body should be given a title of Ad hoc Committee on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Its possible subsidiary bodies and system of their functioning, based on a schedule or timetable, is also proposed in document CD/435. Namely it is suggested, that the following working groups could be established within the Ad hoc Committee:

- Working Group on purposes and scope of the convention, which could deal with definitions and criteria, formula of basic undertakings, non-production, permitted activities, non-use of chemical weapons, relevant monitoring measures, preamble and final provisions, etc.
- Working Group on the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons and destruction of production facilities, which could deal with initial declarations, intermediate measures, destruction and monitoring.
- Working Group on compliance with the convention, which could deal with international verification on challenge, national measures of implementation, functioning of consultative and preparatory committees, consultations and co-operation, complaints procedure, etc.
- Working Group on the structure of the convention, which could deal with the position of articles, their sequence, annexes, agreed understandings, etc.

The order of the elaboration of the various provisions of the future convention in the working groups has to take into consideration their importance, inter-relationship, logical sequence and the structure of the convention. It has to be determined right at the beginning of the Committee's work, taking into account also the practical possibilities of participation by delegations of member States of the Conference on Disarmament in this process. Meetings of the Committee convened to decide on the programme of work and other organizational matters, for the review and appraisal of results achieved in the working groups and for the preparation of reports of the Conference could take place as necessary, but, as a rule, about once every two weeks. Working groups or their subsidiary bodies could meet at least two or three times a week. The work of all these bodies could be very flexible, in accordance with requirements, and would be based on an advance schedule of meetings as mentioned above, covering the whole period of the spring session. Organization of work for the summer part of the session should also be specified, albeit in a general form. It is also stressed that in distributing the chairmanships of subsidiary bodies of the Committee on Chemical Weapons the principle of balanced representation of various groups should be preserved.

In tabling these proposals, the group of socialist countries is motivated exclusively by a willingness to make decisive progress in the elaboration of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Given the political will of all countries participating in the negotiations to prohibit this type of weapons, the tasks ahead could undoubtedly be solved in the interests of curbing the arms race and strengthening international security.

Comrade President, before I conclude, allow me as the Co-ordinator of the Socialist Group to say a few words on the statement just made by the distinguished representative of Belgium. The group of socialist countries has never called the proposals and amendments of the group of Western countries frivolous; we always study them with all sincerity and patience. This is the only way to conduct a disarmament negotiation seriously. We hope that the delegation of Belgium will also do the same and will not jump to hasty conclusions.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the chair of the Conference on Disarmament at its inaugural 1984 session. Our pleasure in seeing you presiding over this distinguished body is heightened when we recall the great contributions which the Polish people have made to the great American dream. From Pulaski to Paderewski, we have been enriched by our Polish heritage -- in our culture, industry and institutions. So, Mr. President, we have an appreciation of Polish contributions to my country and your contributions to our Conference as its inaugural President. It is appropriate also to pay tribute to the last Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador Jorge Morelli Pando of Peru, who so ably guided our work last summer and skillfully handled the important transition from Committee to Conference.

May I also associate my delegation with the warm welcome which you extended on our behalf to the distinguished Norwegian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Mr. Eivinn Berg. He is a close personal friend and a familiar face in this chamber and we are pleased to have him with us again. Moreover, as usual, he has left us with much food for thought and sober reflection.

I should like to take this occasion to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues in the Conference: Ambassadors Butler of Australia, Depasse of Belgium, Beesley of Canada, Lechuga Hevia of Cuba, Alfarargi of Egypt, Kebede of Ethiopia, Meiszter of Hungary, Sutowardoyo of Indonesia and Dhanapala of Sri Lanka. I extend to them, through you, Mr. President, the firm pledge that my delegation will give its best efforts, in close co-operation with each of them, to resolve the crucial issues before us, so that we together may effectively discharge our solemn responsibilities to achieve meaningful progress in the field of multilateral disarmament.

Mr. President, we have resumed our efforts in this historic city of Geneva under a new name -- we are now the Conference on Disarmament. But the issues entrusted to our responsibility, and their importance, remain unchanged. And our charter also remains the same: to search out practical and effective ways of reaching agreements among nations that will enable a more peaceful and secure world to emerge.

All of us at this table today, whatever our differences -- and they are real and important -- hold in common a shared belief: that we shall all benefit if we can reduce the level of arms -- be they nuclear, chemical or conventional.

Of course, reduction in arms alone is not sufficient to resolve the fundamental differences that give rise to tensions between men and nations -- tensions which, tragically, have all too often resulted in the resort to arms. But we trust that all of us at this table share a deep commitment and a great desire to work together to make it possible for this and future generations to live in peace together -- not only through arms reductions but also through a reduction in the tensions which underlie the reliance on weapons for security.

Alas, the evidence is abundant that it is terribly difficult to translate our objectives -- vital as they are -- into concrete progress. But try we must -- patiently, and persistently, searching out those areas where progress is possible now. And in those areas where agreement eludes us now, we must seek to lay a sound and reliable basis for future choices by the Governments we represent.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

In this regard, let there be no mistake about where the United States of America stands. As President Reagan said in his State of the Union Message a few weeks ago, "A lasting and meaningful peace is our ... great goal."

Since the Committee on Disarmament last met, many of us worked together in the First Committee at the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. A large number of issues and resolutions were discussed and debated in that body, but not, I might observe, with unalloyed success. While this record reflects the difficult realities of the world in which we live, it also provides a pertinent lesson: that to be successful here in the Conference on Disarmament, our efforts need to be sharply focused on those specific matters where agreed solutions to agreed problems are possible.

Foremost among these matters is a guiding principle underlying the United States approach in seeking arms control and arms reduction agreements. That principle underlies all meaningful agreement -- that is the need to design effective verification and compliance measures for such agreements.

This is indeed one of the four principles referred to by President Reagan in 1981 as governing our approach to arms control and disarmament, and I should like to recall these today. First is the principle of pursuing genuine, significant reductions in weaponry, including the elimination of entire categories of weapons, where possible, second is the need for balance by imposing equal obligations on all parties. The third principle mandates that any agreement be an integral part of the larger objective of a comprehensive policy of national and international security. And finally, there must be an integral, effective verification regime to ensure compliance with each agreement achieved.

These principles apply directly to the negotiation of an effective and verifiable convention banning the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for their destruction.

If successful, our negotiations here would eliminate an entire category of weapons by imposing equal obligations upon all parties to destroy all existing stocks of chemical weapons and to undertake never to develop, produce, stockpile or transfer such weapons, in any manner inconsistent with the terms of the treaty. Moreover, the foundation of such a treaty would be an effective verification regime to ensure that the obligations of States parties are undertaken faithfully and, thus, instilling high confidence that the objective of the instrument has been accomplished. And finally, there is no doubt that such a treaty would serve to strengthen both national and international security.

With regard to the principle of verification in our chemical weapons negotiations, let me welcome as a sign of progress the statement of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union in our last plenary meeting on 21 February 1984. We are pleased that the Soviet Government will be prepared to agree, in our negotiations on the verification regime for the destruction of all existing stocks of chemical weapons, to the "permanent presence at the (destruction site) of the representatives of international control" and to the use of technical monitoring devices at such sites to augment that verification process. My delegation will be actively exploring the importance and significance of the statement of the Soviet Union. Edmund Burke once said that "every prudent act -- is founded on compromise", and we note that our Soviet colleagues seem to be exercising that degree of prudence which, if continued, will help to create a firm foundation upon which we together can construct a meaningful instrument to ban chemical weapons once and for all.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Mr. President, let me recount briefly the status of our chemical weapons negotiations. Most colleagues will recall that the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, delivered an address to the Committee last February, in which he stressed the importance which the United States attaches to the negotiation of an effective and verifiable ban of chemical weapons. Following the Vice-President's remarks, my delegation introduced a comprehensive paper outlining our "detailed views" on the contents of a chemical weapons convention (CD/343). Verification played a central role in the formulation of those views. Indeed, the Soviet Union had recognized the importance of verification in their "Basic provisions envisioned to form the basis of a chemical weapons ban" (CD/294). Subsequent to an exchange of views on issues in the Chemical Weapons Working Group in the spring part of our 1983 session, my delegation introduced, in the summer part of our session, a second working paper which provided an illustrative, comprehensive review of on-site inspection procedures for the verification of the destruction of chemical stockpiles (CD/387). This paper was designed to further our search for understanding of a mutually acceptable solution to this important component of the general verification approach in the negotiation of a chemical weapons ban.

In order to provide a multi-dimensional demonstration of how these procedures could be implemented in an actual chemical weapon destruction facility, we invited our colleagues -- both members and observers -- to participate in a workshop at our chemical agent munitions disposal site at Tooele, Utah, on 15 and 16 November 1983. The 25 States that attended will agree, I believe, that the information and briefings provided at the Workshop, coupled with the tour of the actual destruction facility, were of considerable benefit in developing an understanding of what is required to provide an effective monitoring system to verify chemical weapons stockpile destruction and an appreciation of the ease and manageability of its implementation under actual circumstances.

On 17 January 1984, Secretary of State, George Shultz announced in his address to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm that, in coming months, the United States will be presenting in the Conference on Disarmament a draft treaty for the complete and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons, on a global basis. In particular, our draft treaty will be a comprehensive text, containing, among other things, requirements for the effective verification of compliance with the terms of the convention. My Government has undertaken this formidable task in the belief that our work in this Conference can be enhanced by our effort. This will be seen by our colleagues, I believe, as yet another sign of the continuing interest of the United States Government in the achievement of an effective and complete ban of chemical weapons and a genuine desire to expedite the attainment of this important objective.

But this commitment should by no means imply that the work of this Conference in resolving the many remaining issues should be held in abeyance pending the introduction of our draft text. On the contrary, our efforts to reach common understandings and agreement on the many unresolved issues should be redoubled now -- especially on key verification issues yet undecided, because without agreement on these matters, dear colleagues, there can be no treaty.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Another matter before this Conference on which my delegation has expended considerable effort, particularly during the last two years, is that of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. Vice-President Bush stressed in this chamber the view of the United States that an agreement to ban radiological weapons offers the prospect of a modest but real step forward that could eliminate a potentially dangerous type of weapon. He noted the importance of this preventative approach to disarmament and urged us to move ahead with all due speed to conclude the negotiations of the treaty.

In my intervention on 30 August 1983, I voiced my concern that, despite our efforts and those of other delegations, it appeared impossible to achieve real progress because of the views of certain delegations. Some view this effort as unworthy because there are no radiological weapons in being or because such a treaty is of insufficient importance to be concluded.

But, notwithstanding the views of these few colleagues, serious efforts have been made to bring this long-standing initiative to fruition. Proposals to strengthen the multilateral complaints mechanism put forward by both the Swedish and United States delegations appeared to meet with broad approval. Moreover, there has been some progress in resolving the question of whether additional legal protection should be afforded to nuclear facilities against military attack. Certainly, there was a willingness to continue the discussion of ways to deal with this issue. All of these optimistic developments came to naught at the hands of a few delegations who argued that this potential treaty is too unimportant to occupy our time.

I think it is fair to state the obvious question: if progress on real, albeit modest, measures is not possible in this Conference, will it ever be possible to make progress on more far-reaching measures? Or more practically stated: are we so surfeited with disarmament treaties at such an advanced stage of negotiation that we can dismiss so cavalierly measures of lesser importance? My delegation considers that any agreement which eliminates an entire category of weapons -- albeit conceptual in form -- has importance to this Conference and to mankind. If we can but save one future life by taking what to some may appear to be an unimportant step now, are we not thereby being faithful to our duty?

With regard to the nuclear facilities issue, my delegation stands ready to undertake a full examination of all the complexities involved in this difficult issue. And I repeat that willingness today. It should be possible to proceed promptly to a solution of this issue, but progress in this area should not stand in the way of concluding the radiological weapons treaty.

Another area in which verification is of cardinal importance is that of a nuclear-test ban. My delegation is prepared to resume the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a nuclear-test ban where it left off last summer. In our view, discussion of significant aspects of the issue of verification and compliance for a nuclear-test ban has scarcely begun and a vast amount of essential work remains to be done. Those who say that the original mandate has been exhausted cannot produce one major element of agreement on a comprehensive verification regime for a potential nuclear-test ban treaty. Let me assure my colleagues that, without such a regime, any future test-ban treaty will be unverifiable and, therefore, unacceptable to the United States Government. Why then, do we not get down to the task at hand and do serious work on this vital subject? We only delay the objective which everyone seems to be seeking, each in his own way, by our continued inaction.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

In the related, more technical work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on an International Seismic Data Exchange System, the Group has nearly completed its third report and has begun preparations for follow-on experimental work. The proposed experiment would take advantage of the new authority granted by the World Meteorological Organization to make use of the global telecommunication system to exchange so-called Level I data. My delegation strongly supports such experimental efforts, which provide important, "hands-on" data to validate theoretical estimates of seismic data exchange capabilities for a global data-sharing system. This important Group continues to render a valuable service in an area of great relevance to the verification of a future nuclear-test ban and we do not serve our professed interests by failing to give the Group our fullest support and co-operation. Therefore, it is the ardent hope of my delegation that many States will choose to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

On the question of additional arms control arrangements that might apply to the environment of outer space, my delegation remains prepared, as it was last year, to join in a consensus of our Conference to establish a working group with the mandate proposed by the United States and a number of our colleagues in document CD/413, and supported by the Group of 21.

I would also like to welcome the adherence of China to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, as announced by Ambassador Qian Jiadong in his statement to the Conference on 16 February. China's ratification of this Treaty is an important step because, for the first time, all five nuclear-weapon States are pledged not to station nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

With regard to other items on our agenda, my delegation is prepared to join our colleagues in serious work on the question of the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, on negative security assurances and, when the Conference judges it propitious, on a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

And we should not forget the efforts which were begun last year by the group of "wise men" on arrangements affecting the institutional aspects of our Conference. Our new beginning offers us a unique opportunity to consider appropriate ways of improving our methods of work. If we could but find a more practical and streamlined approach to the annual ordeal of preparing our report to the General Assembly, we would have taken a giant step forward. The "wise men" technique has demonstrated its value and consideration should be given to employing this method of filtering new ideas and recommendations for enhancing our institutional effectiveness.

We must realize, however, that our problems cannot all be laid on the doorstep of faulty procedures or insufficient work methods. Indeed, we ourselves are part of the problem. All too often we waste our time and energy -- and frequently our political capital as well -- on trivia and minutia. The sad spectacle of last year's spring part of our session should be painful to the memory of each of us. It not only reflected our preoccupation with trivia, but it revealed a deeper and more disturbing aspect of the problem. Linking issues and working groups is unrealistic and it smacks of pressure politics. This tactic is truly unworthy of the world's single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament and we were gratified by the many statements made this year that decried the use of this odious tactic. I gladly add the voice of my delegation to those who oppose artificial linkages in this forum and sincerely hope that we will never slip back into that baser mode.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Mr. President, indeed, our name is new, but our challenge is as old as mankind. We must continue our determined quest to find the key to the achievement of that delicate balance between security and disarmament. The maintenance of that balance will ensure peace and stability. The task is formidable but the reward is worthy of our very best efforts. So let us together put our shoulders to the wheel and our minds to creative endeavour, for then surely we shall succeed.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement, for the kind words addressed to the President and for his kind reference to the historical link between the peoples of the United States and Poland.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

That does not seem to be the case.

As agreed last Tuesday, I intend to convene this afternoon at 3.00 p.m. an informal meeting of the Conference to continue our consideration of some outstanding organizational questions. May I suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting and resume it immediately after the informal meeting in case we might have to take decisions on those questions. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.20 p.m. and reconvened at 5.50 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: As you know, we have nothing to formalize at this plenary meeting as we had hoped. It therefore remains for me to announce that the next plenary of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 28 February 1984 at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 5.52 p.m.

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100

Figure 1. Schematic representation of the experimental design. The subjects were divided into two groups: the control group (CG) and the experimental group (EG). The CG was divided into two subgroups: the control group (CG) and the control group (CG). The EG was divided into two subgroups: the experimental group (EG) and the experimental group (EG). The CG was divided into two subgroups: the control group (CG) and the control group (CG). The EG was divided into two subgroups: the experimental group (EG) and the experimental group (EG).