

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Tuesday, 23 August 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. J. Morelli Pando (Peru)

## PRESENT AT TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORTAN

Australia:

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. QUIEROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Mr. V. BOZHKO

Burma:

U. TIN KYAW HLAING

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL

Mr. R. SUTHERLAND

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN

China:

Mr. QIAN JIA TONG

Mr. TIAN JIN

Mr. PAN ZHENQIANG

Ms. W. ZHIYUN

Mr. L. CHENG

Cuba:Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. S.E. EL REEDY  
Mr. I. ALI HASSAN  
Ms. W. BASSIM  
Mr. A. ABBAS

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YCHANNES

France: Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic: Mr. H. ROSE  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Ms. H. HOPPE  
Mr. F. SAYATZ

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. F. ELBE  
Mr. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary: Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. T. TOTE

India: Mr. M. DUBEY  
Mr. S.K. SHARMA

Indonesia: Mr. N.S. SUTRESNA  
Mr. I. DAMANIK  
Ms. F. RAMADHAN  
Mr. M. JALALUDDIN  
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI  
Mr. B. MULYANTO  
Mr. JANUSI

Islamic Republic of Iran: Mr. N. KAZEMI KAMYAB  
Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy: Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. E. D. GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. R. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI

Kenya: Mr. P. NOUGI MWAURA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO  
Mr. P. MACEDA RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI  
Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. ACKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. J. OBOH  
Mr. A.N.C. NWAZOMUDOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDALE

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. J. MORELLI PANDO  
Mr. C. CASTILLO

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. T. STROJWAS  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Ms. G. JONANG

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. B. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. G. VASHADZE  
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN  
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV  
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

United Kingdom:

Mr. I. CROMARTIE  
Ms. J.I. LINK  
Ms. J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. M.D. BUSBY  
Mr. J.E. McATEER  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Mr. R.L. HORNE  
Mr. R. MIKULAK  
Mr. R. SCOTT  
Mr. J. TIERNEY

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 236th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Today the Committee will take up item 8 of its agenda entitled "Consideration and adoption of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations". Of course, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other question relating to the Committee's work.

At the outset, allow me to extend a cordial welcome, on behalf of the Committee and from myself, to His Excellency Ambassador Qian Jia Tong, the new representative of China in the Committee on Disarmament. Ambassador Qian Jia Tong is the first representative of China who will be dealing exclusively with disarmament questions. This demonstrates the special interest of his great country in a matter which is of vital concern to mankind. I wish Ambassador Qian Jia Tong a very successful mission in his new post and I wish to convey to him the assurances of full co-operation in the performance of his duties.

I should like to inform the Committee that, after the list of speakers has been closed, I intend to suspend the meeting and convene an informal meeting in order to deal with an outstanding question. As you will recall, we have yet to decide how to consider agenda item 7 entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

It is also my intention to put before the Committee for consideration today all the reports of the subsidiary bodies which have met during the 1983 session. We shall first consider the three reports of the Working Groups which adopted them last week. At the end of this plenary meeting we shall consider the reports of the two groups which adopted their reports yesterday.

The Committee has before it the reports of the three Ad Hoc Working Groups which concluded their work last week. These reports are contained in documents CD/412 in the case of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, CD/414 in the case of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons and CD/415 in the case of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

With reference to these documents I would suggest that we invite the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups to introduce the reports of their Groups. I would then put before the Committee for adoption the reports of the three groups. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Today I have the honour to submit to this Committee the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban contained in document CD/412.

Chapters I and II deal with the organization of work of the Group. Chapter III gives a survey of the substantive work done by the Group during this year's session. Chapter IV refers to conclusions and recommendations. I would like to make some remarks concerning chapters III and IV.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Firstly, the work of the Group as well as its report show that issues of verification can only be considered and solved in close connection with the scope of the treaty envisaged. Thus the Group discussed questions pertaining to the scope of prohibition, including nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, as well as to the participation of nuclear-weapon States. Paragraph 10 of the report reflects the different positions held with regard to the scope of prohibition in a future nuclear test ban treaty.

Secondly, pursuant to its programme of work, the Ad Hoc Working Group held a structured discussion of the issues connected with verification of, and compliance with, a nuclear test ban. Paragraphs 13 to 18 show the areas of agreement and disagreement in this field. There was a common view on the basic elements of a verification system of a nuclear test ban. Accordingly, paragraph 13 states that "it was generally recognized that such a system should be based on a combination of national and international measures and could include, inter alia: (a) national technical means; (b) international exchange of seismic data; (c) procedures and mechanisms for consultation and co-operation; (d) multilateral organ or organs of States parties; (e) procedure for complaints; (f) on-site inspection".

Many delegations underlined in this regard that the means of verification presently available were sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty. They reaffirmed the conclusion drawn by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1972 that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem had been so fully explored that only a political decision was necessary in order to achieve final agreement. Some delegations disagreed.

Thirdly, the Working Group discussed and examined various documents which had been submitted by different countries. Many delegations especially welcomed the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" (CD/346) tabled by the Soviet Union and the "Draft treaty banning any nuclear weapon test explosion in any environment" (CD/381) submitted by Sweden. In the view of those delegations, the documents mentioned above not only identify issues of a nuclear test ban in a comprehensive way, but provide sufficient material to proceed without further delay to negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty.

When drafting its report, the Group endeavoured to draw conclusions on its work, and to make recommendations with regard to the further approach of this Committee to the elaboration of a nuclear test ban treaty. Some delegations expressed views to the effect that the Group should continue working under its existing mandate. A large number -- perhaps, I might even say, the overwhelming majority -- of delegations held that the Working Group had fulfilled its mandate and that it should therefore be changed in order to enable the Group to proceed without further delay to negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty. In this connection, the view was expressed that the Committee should take up this matter at the beginning of its 1984 session.

As the outgoing Chairman of the Working Group, I would like to thank all delegations which participated in its work. The whole debate in the Group was, in spite of all differences of view, characterized by a businesslike approach on all sides.

Through you, Mr. Chairman, I should also like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the secretariat, especially Mr. Victor Sliptschenko, for the very efficient support they have given to us. That includes our appreciation for the excellent performance of the interpreters.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Allow me to add some remarks on a comprehensive test ban in my capacity as head of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic.

Together with the overwhelming majority of countries, the German Democratic Republic, now as before, regards the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests as a matter of the highest priority. This, by the way, is also true of our approach to the elaboration of the relevant section of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Such a programme can only be meaningful if it provides for a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests as a priority measure in the first stage of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The international community would not understand that debates and discussions on such a treaty are being held endlessly. The purpose of our work has been clearly formulated in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament as well as in many other resolutions of the General Assembly. These documents include a request that we should elaborate a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests without further delay.

Moreover, the overwhelming majority of States, including three nuclear-weapon States, are legally committed to negotiate to that end. This obligation is clearly stated in the treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It was only some days ago that we commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the conclusion of this treaty.

Out of the three depositaries of this treaty only one — the USSR — is at present prepared to proceed to negotiations as called for in the Moscow Treaty. Convincing proof of this are the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", submitted by the Soviet Union at the beginning of this year's session.

However, in spite of all efforts made by most delegations, the Committee on Disarmament is still prevented from holding negotiations. Its relevant subsidiary organ is confined to mere discussions. Sometimes one may even get the impression that one side is very eager to focus the attention of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban on technical questions and to convert it into an institution for exchanging views on seismological details. When the side in question regards a complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests as only a long-term goal and the time not propitious to negotiate a corresponding treaty, the discussion of technical problems might be used as a smokescreen to cover the lack of political will.

Thus, my delegation fully shares the opinion expressed in the report that there is a close relationship between political negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty and technical work on a verification system and that the latter should not be carried out as if it were a separable, open-ended exercise that could go on indefinitely so as to take account of every scientific and technological advance. Technical questions should not be used to postpone negotiations on a treaty endlessly.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

But it is high time for such a treaty. In recent years, the means of verification have been immensely improved due to technical progress. Moreover, solutions for the basic issues of a treaty were agreed upon in the course of the trilateral negotiations. It is very regrettable that two parties to these negotiations seem to ignore those results and are even partly retreating from them instead of exploiting these achievements in a constructive way.

As a striking example in this regard, I would like to refer to the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In the Working Group we had long and, I must say, heated debates on that issue. But a solution to this question had already been offered in the trilateral negotiations. A moratorium on those explosions would take into account the interests of all sides. Moreover, it would serve the over-riding goal of rapidly concluding a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

In conclusion, I would like to reaffirm the position of my delegation that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban should be enlarged at the beginning of the 1984 session with a view to starting negotiations on such a treaty.

Mr. Chairman, allow me finally some words on a question which increasingly attracts the attention of this Committee -- the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Recent news underlines the topicality of this question. We have in mind the establishment of an outer space command, the on-going development of particle-beam weapons for use in outer space, the planned creation of a space-based ABM system and other activities by the United States of America. Taking into account this situation, my country welcomes and supports the new initiative of the Soviet Union to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth. Only recently, the USSR has unilaterally declared that it will not be the first to send anti-satellite weapons into outer space. This moratorium is further proof of the constructive approach of the Soviet Union towards the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is our hope that the other side will respond in the same manner.

Furthermore, we hope that the latest Soviet initiatives will stimulate the work of our Committee. Here, as in other fields, it is necessary to proceed to negotiations. We, therefore, advocate that the mandate to be elaborated for a working group on outer space should correspond to this goal.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban for his statement introducing the report of that Group. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons on behalf of its Chairman, Ambassador Lidgard.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Thank you very much for giving me the floor. As you mentioned yourself I will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons on behalf of the Group's Chairman, Ambassador Lidgard, who has had to leave early in order to take up other duties.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons decided this year, at the suggestion of the Chairman, to establish two subgroups called Group A and Group B. Group A was to consider the subject of radiological weapons in the so-called traditional sense, while Group B would deal with the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

Mr. Busby of the United States delegation undertook to act as co-ordinator of Group A, while Mr. Nazarkin of the Soviet delegation assumed the same task for Group B. Mr. Nazarkin was succeeded as co-ordinator in the second part of this year's session -- what we normally call the summer session -- by Mr. Prokofiev of the same delegation.

The time available in the first part of this session was, as we all know, short, but the two Groups began over-all consideration of the two issues allotted to them. This more general discussion continued in the Groups for a short time at the beginning of the second part of the session. But after that they successively entered into three-week-long periods of intensive discussions. Group A began, followed by Group B.

The Working Group has discussed in plenary the question of linkage between the so-called traditional radiological weapons and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. This issue was debated only after both Groups had completed their intensive work periods.

All other issues of substance were considered in the two Groups. It would be going too far to enter into all the details, but it may be mentioned that Group A had to deal with questions like "definition", "peaceful uses" and "compliance and verification". Group B particularly discussed the "scope" of a prohibition, also in a broader sense of that term. The report of the Ad Hoc Working Group (CD/414) reflects the particulars of these discussions.

Groups A and B reviewed very thoroughly the subjects that fell within their respective mandates. These are complex, which, no doubt, is one of the reasons that progress towards consensus was limited in both Groups. However, it is the impression of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group that knowledge of the issues, including their details, and also of the positions of delegations has increased considerably during this year's session. A good basis has been laid for further work in the 1984 session of the Committee. If the Committee now follows the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Working Group, it will, at the beginning of its 1984 session, re-establish the Working Group and in that context consider the prospects for progress in the work of the Group.

Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to pay tribute to the co-ordinators of Groups A and B, Mr. Busby for the first-mentioned Group, and Mr. Nazarkin and Mr. Prokofiev for Group B. They have devoted themselves to their tasks with admirable skill and, not least, patience. They have contributed decisively to the great utility of the deliberations of their respective Groups. On behalf of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group I express deep gratitude to these three outstanding diplomats. I venture to suggest that the Committee on Disarmament also stands in debt to them for their tireless efforts, ultimately on its behalf.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I will certainly not neglect to express thanks to the staff of the Secretariat. It has become customary to do so because of the outstanding quality they manifest year after year: skill, devotion to duty and judgement. Special mention must be made of Mr. Lin, who, as secretary of the Working Group, with his knowledge and experience, greatly contributed to the successful conclusion of its work.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekeus, for his statement introducing the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I have the honour to submit to the Committee on Disarmament the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, to which is annexed a draft of the comprehensive programme which is the result of the Group's work during 1983 (CD/415).

In this connection, I should like to add that, as frequently happens when reports are prepared hurriedly, a few corrections will have to be made to the document in question. I have therefore requested that it should be re-issued as soon as possible.

Since, as you know, I have had the privilege of presiding over the Working Group since 1981, this is the second time I have had to present a document of this kind. As you may recall, at the 172nd meeting of the Committee, which took place on 20 April 1982, I submitted to this multilateral negotiating body the draft which it transmitted to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the text of which appeared in appendix I of the special report forwarded to the Assembly on that occasion.

The draft now before the distinguished representatives of the States members of the Committee has been formulated bearing in mind the request made by the General Assembly in paragraph 63 of the Concluding Document of the second special session to which I have just referred, in which the Committee was asked to submit "a revised draft comprehensive programme of disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session". Account has also been taken of paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session held in 1978, in which, as you will recall, the Assembly declared that the Programme should encompass "all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated".

In view of the fact that the Working Group's report is very brief and its text self-explanatory, I shall confine myself now to making a few remarks of a general nature which may contribute to a better evaluation of the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament annexed to the report.

I should like to begin by emphasizing that the proposed programme is much less ambitious than the draft submitted in 1982 to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as will be obvious to anyone comparing the two documents. Furthermore, as indicated in the report, the texts of some paragraphs remain pending, as does the placing of others. Opinions continue to differ on the advisability of including certain paragraphs, taking into account the need to avoid duplication. Agreement has not yet been reached on the important question of stages of implementation. There was also insufficient time to examine the draft introduction which, as Chairman of Working Group I of the special session of the Assembly held in 1982, I ventured to prepare at the time, so that if it were decided to use it for the revised draft programme now being transmitted to the General Assembly, a number of substantive changes would obviously have to be made in order to adapt it to the contents of the new document. Finally, it may be said that all delegations, explicitly or tacitly, have reserved the final position of their Governments until such time as the latter have had the opportunity to study the programme as a whole and reach a decision on it.

Nevertheless, despite all the limitations which I have just summarized, I consider that the draft programme, the fruit of the hard work by the States members of the Ad Hoc Working Group, may be of great value in enabling Governments, to gain

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

a clear idea, from a text entirely free of brackets, of the most that can be aspired to at the moment in this field if it is wished, as seems obviously desirable, that the comprehensive programme of disarmament, whose formulation has been under way for over three years, should receive the unanimous approval of all States Members of the United Nations.

The procedure followed in the Working Group for the formulation of the text proves this beyond doubt. In all cases where it was not possible to arrive at formulas acceptable to all on the basis of the draft programme returned by the second special session of the Assembly, together with the additional material arising from that session and new proposals submitted during the discussions of the Working Group, in order to reach agreement it was necessary to resort to the inclusion of the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of 1978 without any change whatsoever.

Consequently, I think that the General Assembly will have to bear this very much in mind when, after carefully considering and analysing the content of the new text of the draft programme (in the preparation of which, it should be stressed here, the Working Group took it as an unvarying rule that the programme should not retreat in any way, however minor, in relation to the Final Document), it has to decide on the line it will adopt on the question.

In my opinion, when that time comes the General Assembly will have to choose between the following two alternatives: either to adopt the draft, despite its slimness, at its thirty-eighth session, after resolving the pending problems by whatever procedure is considered most suitable, such as, for example, the setting-up of an ad hoc sub-committee or working group which would work simultaneously with the First Committee of the General Assembly; or to return it to the Committee on Disarmament. In the latter case, however, it must be well aware that it would be vain to think that the multilateral negotiating body would be able to take up the matter again with any reasonable prospect of success within a period of at least three years.

I should not like to conclude without drawing attention to the persons named in paragraph 7 of the Working Group's report, who deserve special mention because of their valuable contribution to the work of the Group during this year. I refer to Ambassadors Francois de la Gorce (France), Baruch Grinberg and Borislav Konstantinov (Bulgaria), Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva (Brazil), Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan) and Curt Lidgard (Sweden), who acted as Co-ordinators of the contact groups mentioned in that paragraph.

Finally, I should like to express our gratitude (I put it in the plural because I am sure that I am faithfully expressing the feelings of the Working Group as a whole) to all members of the secretariat, both visible and those invisible, who have most efficiently made it possible for us to carry out our work. I shall conclude by repeating, with reference to the Secretary of the Group, Ms. Aida Levin, what I said about her last year when I stressed her unfailing objectivity, her knowledge of disarmament issues, her outstanding drafting ability and her lively intelligence, which is such a ready source of universally acceptable formulas, all of which qualities she has once again so amply demonstrated on this occasion.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for his statement introducing the report of that Group.

I would now suggest we should proceed to the adoption of the reports of the ad hoc working groups, whose texts will, as is customary, be incorporated in full

(The Chairman)

in the report of the Committee. Firstly, the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, which is contained in document CD/412. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Committee adopts the report of this Ad Hoc Working Group.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): As I understood it, the Committee is already coming to the adoption of all three reports of the working groups. I have a number of comments concerning the report of the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. When we come to the adoption of that report, I should like to take the floor to make them.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): Document CD/412 is thus adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): We shall now consider the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons (CD/414). If there is no objection, I shall take it that the report is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): The third report is contained in document CD/415 and has been prepared by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Committee adopts the report of this Working Group.

I understand that the representative of Mongolia wishes to take the floor.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): First of all, permit me to express, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, our gratitude to the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, for the considerable work he accomplished in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. We also wish to express our gratitude to the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Harald Rose, and to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus, who replaced Ambassador Curt Lidgard, for their efforts with respect to the submission of the reports of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons respectively.

Now permit me to make the following comments concerning document CD/415.

As the members of the Committee on Disarmament are aware, in 1981 the Mongolian People's Republic submitted a new proposal for the conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force in relations among the States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

A document concerning this Mongolian initiative was circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament. This proposal by Mongolia was reflected in a joint document by a group of socialist countries, document CD/245.

During the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Mongolian delegation proposed in the relevant working committee the wording for this Mongolian proposal that is to be found in document A/S-12/36, annex I.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The Mongolian delegation took the floor in the Committee on Disarmament on several occasions during the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and called for the inclusion in the document which that subsidiary organ was engaged in drafting of appropriate mention of the Mongolian proposal. We proposed in the Working Group a formulation containing the idea of the conclusion of appropriate agreements or of a convention on a global or regional basis for the purpose of preventing the use of force in relations among States. However, because of the objections by certain delegations, our views have not been reflected in the annex to document CD/415.

We reserve the right to revert to this question when that document is examined in the future, whether it be in the Committee on Disarmament or in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

In conclusion, I should like to draw the attention of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament and of the secretariat of the Committee to page 17 of document CD/415, where the foot-note proposed by one delegation has been omitted from subparagraph 4 (a), South-East Asia.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): As Chairman of the Working Group, I should like to explain that the point he has just made is one of those that are covered by the general explanation which I ventured to make in my earlier statement when I said that, as frequently happens because of the speed with which reports are prepared, a number of errors have unfortunately crept into the distributed text; however, these errors will be rectified in the new edition of document CD/415 which is in the course of preparation. Among these errors, I repeat, is the one which the distinguished representative of Mongolia has quite rightly mentioned.

Mr. SUPRESNA (Indonesia): I feel that I have to make my own comments on the statement just made by the distinguished representative of Mongolia, specifically on the formulation on South-East Asia as contained in document CD/415.

I would recall that this particular formulation has been negotiated and adopted by a small contact group comprising the delegations of Mongolia, India, Indonesia, Australia and Burma as requested by the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Garcia Robles. As my delegation recalls, there was no specific agreement attaching to that particular formulation or foot-note to that particular paragraph. Secondly, if I may, I would also recall that this particular paragraph was already negotiated in New York during the second special session devoted to disarmament by the countries of the region, including North Vietnam, but time did not permit us then to come up with a formulation free of brackets. In subsequent developments after the Second Special Session, there was a visit to Djakarta by His Excellency the Mongolian Minister for Foreign Affairs. In the joint statement issued by the two Ministers for Foreign Affairs, there was a specific reference to the need for and importance of, a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality for South-East Asia.

With this clarification I hope that this point will be reflected in the records of this meeting.

Mr. FINDLAY (Australia): The Australian delegation, as was mentioned by the distinguished representative of Indonesia, also participated in the consultations on the item on South-East Asia and I can confirm the understanding of my Indonesian colleague that there was complete agreement on this text at the time and there was, at that stage, no mention of an asterisk or reservation being placed on this text.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Permit me to comment on the statement just made by the distinguished representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Sutresna.

The Mongolian delegation did not participate in the consultations on the matter now at issue in the small working group. To be sure, we did receive the wording for the subparagraph which has been mentioned from the delegation of Indonesia and we expressed our views on it.

With regard to the raising of the question in bilateral discussions during the visit to Indonesia of the Mongolian Foreign Minister, Mongolia's approach to the matter consists in support for the idea of a creation of a zone of peace, stability and co-operation in South-East Asia.

The wording in subparagraph 4 (a) on page 17 of document CD/415 differs from what I said earlier.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): I would also wish to make a brief comment on the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. In the first place, I am grateful to the Chairman of that Group for his very sober, concise and impartial statement on the work of his Group and on the report. I would also wish to pay tribute to delegations for the hard work they put in during this month's condensed period of intensive negotiating efforts and this tribute goes, of course, most particularly to the Chairman of the Group. When I put my name on the list to make a brief statement, it was my intention to give the interpretations of my delegation on certain formulations of the report that contain ambiguity, but I am satisfied to note the same interpretations are shared by the Chairman, as reflected in his statement. He has rightly stressed that, as of this juncture, the acceptance of parts of the entire document on the comprehensive programme of disarmament cannot be expected, and it cannot be expected until all the outstanding questions have been resolved and the complete text is available to delegations and Governments. He has also stressed the material, the very good material in part, which we have worked out over the past couple of weeks, and which should be preserved on an equal footing with the previously elaborated text and should not replace it. I also agree with the options which the Chairman, Ambassador García Robles, has outlined as to the further course we should take. I have some doubts whether a more substantial negotiating progress can be achieved at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly in view of the workload of that session, but I basically agree with the interpretations in his text.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): In the light of what has just been said, I should also like to make a very brief statement, first of all to thank Ambassador García Robles for the very clear statement which he has just made to us on the results of his Working Group, and also to thank all those who have helped him, all those who have associated themselves with his efforts to achieve results.

The document which he has introduced to us shows signs of insufficiency and merely confirms the complexity of the task of formulating a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We have spent a very long time without work, I would say, at this session, and at the end there has been a very sharp acceleration of efforts. The texts have not arrived until very late and in these texts certain paragraphs remain to be formulated, certain paragraphs have not been discussed, or the position of certain paragraphs remains to be determined. Furthermore, formal reservations have been entered concerning some paragraphs. In other words, although the document may be considered useful and, as Ambassador García Robles has pointed out, less ambitious in scope than the previous text, and now that the ambiguity has been removed in our exchange of views, as Ambassador Wegener has just pointed out, the document submitted to us is merely one effort among others to achieve a universally acceptable formula one day.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

The particular reason why I have asked for the floor at this point is to comment on action which might be taken on this document submitted today, and I should like to refer especially to what might be done at the forthcoming General Assembly. We know how heavy the General Assembly's work programme is, especially in the First Committee, and we know that several delegations, regularly and still very slowly, are considering the possibilities of improving the work, making the First Committee's efforts even more effective, and somehow rationalizing the efforts and work undertaken in New York. I do not know whether the introduction of such a complex topic as this one, which would merit negotiation in itself — very arduous negotiation, is fully in keeping with feelings in New York on the organization of work in the First Committee. I am venturing to sound a kind of warning note at the end of this session, in this case for the benefit of Ambassador García Robles, because it is after all his dossier. At this point I should simply like to limit my observations to thanking Ambassador García Robles once again for the effort which he is making in this particularly difficult field.

Mr. TIN KYAW HLAING (Burma): With your permission, Mr. Chairman, may I refer to page 17 of the text relating to South-East Asia concerning the zones of peace. My delegation took part in the discussions on the text and at the end of the discussions expressed the view that it would be prepared to go along with the consensus of the delegations which Ambassador Robles has named.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): On behalf of the Committee, I should like to thank the chairmen of the ad hoc working groups, who have guided their work so ably.

I should like to bring to the attention of members the list of communications from individuals and non-governmental organizations circulated in document CD/NGO.8, and in particular the publication entitled "We can avert a nuclear war" sent by William Epstein and Lucy Webster, which contains the deliberations of the Pugwash Conference held last year.

We have recently received a communication from the World Council of Churches, transmitting the text of the declaration on peace and justice adopted by the sixth assembly of that organization, which was held in Vancouver, Canada, between 24 July and 10 August 1983. In this communication, our attention is drawn in particular to the section on "Weapons and nuclear disarmament" in the declaration. This communication will also be included in the list of communications received from other non-governmental organizations.

On the list of speakers for today are the representatives of Belgium, the United Kingdom, Egypt, the United States of America, India and Nigeria.

I give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Belgium, His Excellency Ambassador Onkelinx.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): I should first of all like to perform a very pleasant duty in welcoming to our midst the new representative of the People's Republic of China. I shall never have the opportunity of working with him as I shall be taking leave of the Committee on Disarmament this week, but I am delighted that the great country of the People's Republic of China has decided to designate a special ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament. I should like to wish him every success in his new post.

It is not without nostalgia that I take the floor for the last time in the Committee on Disarmament, where I have had the privilege of sitting for the past four years.

For a much longer period I have regularly followed international activities relating to arms control and disarmament. That is why I have taken the liberty of addressing some very brief general remarks to the Committee as I bid it farewell.

If one looks back at the decade of the 1960s and the disarmament bodies which were at work then, one may well wonder whether our Committee has not, over the years since its establishment in 1979, been losing its essential nature as a negotiating forum to become a deliberative assembly, reviewing all the discussion topics relating to disarmament, often in an abstract, not to say doctrinaire, manner and in an atmosphere which has not always been free of polemics.

The international political climate of the 1980s is not, of course, unrelated to this development. Putting aside this scarcely favourable environment, however, I think that it is essential, if the Committee is to have a brighter future, to reflect on its specific role in the international concert, the organization of its discussions, its methods of work and its negotiating procedures.

In the absence of a more technical slant in future, and of greater concentration on the most promising topics of negotiation, I greatly fear that, even in a better political climate, the Committee will remain quite as unproductive, imprisoned in its sterile debates and its often paralysing methods of work.

It is not too late to turn over a new leaf. On topics on which consensus became apparent (and even in the very short term there are several of these, to mention only chemical weapons, radiological weapons and the nuclear test ban), the Committee could resume the process of drafting international instruments, a process that was launched so well in the 1960s and early 1970s, but has since fallen into decline.

This concentration on the promising topics of negotiation should not rule out the in-depth consideration of other fundamental questions, such as the prevention of war, particularly nuclear war, or outer space. But these discussions aimed at identifying and exploring issues should not take pride of place over genuine negotiation, where it is feasible.

Furthermore, greater self-restraint should be exercised by all members in discussions of a political or doctrinal nature. There are other bodies in the international system to which such exchanges, often recriminatory in nature, may be confined. In particular, the Committee does not seem to me to be the appropriate forum in which to make speeches denouncing the military efforts and programmes of one side or another. Speeches of that kind are not likely to influence negotiations, nor are they convincing when made by States whose military effort is at least as great as that of the State which is being accused.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

In an effort to improve the climate of our work, moderation in the language of one side will often help to increase the flexibility of another side. Without such a spirit of moderation and self-restraint, negotiations will always prove more difficult. Furthermore, the negotiations on any given topic should proceed at their own pace. We should not accept that the conclusion of a negotiation depends on the relative value attached to it in comparison with other more ambitious disarmament measures. On this tortuous path of disarmament, any chance of concluding an agreement must be seized. If, in the 1960s and 1970s, we had not "delinked" topics in this way, we should not today have the already significant agreements that were concluded during that period.

What we need most urgently is genuine negotiation which will enable the Committee to make its contribution to restoring a less worrying, less alarming international situation. I hope that in 1984 we will be able to witness such a trend.

I shall not then be sitting in the Committee, but I shall nevertheless remain a most attentive and close witness, as I shall be continuing in my duties as Permanent Representative of Belgium in Geneva.

The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tindemans, when addressing the Committee last June, announced the creation of a post of Special Ambassador of Belgium to the Committee on Disarmament. I have pleasure in informing you today of the appointment to that post of Ambassador Marcel Depasse, who will be participating in the work on disarmament at the next General Assembly and will join you all here in your work from the beginning of the 1984 session. I am sure that here Ambassador Depasse will meet with the same spirit of warmth, co-operation and friendship, both among delegations and from Mr. Jaipal and members of the secretariat, as it has been my good fortune to experience over the past four years. In bidding you goodbye, I would wish the members of the secretariat and of every delegation good health and success in their work. May 1984 restore a calmer international atmosphere accompanied by concrete results in disarmament efforts, particularly within our Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement. I should like to express to Ambassador Onkelinx, on behalf of the Committee and speaking for myself, our gratitude for his important contribution to our work. Ambassador Onkelinx has been associated with disarmament activities for a long time, even before his country became a member of the negotiating body. He has proved himself a very able diplomat, whom we shall miss, also because of his personal qualities. Allow me to convey to him and his family our best wishes for future happiness and success.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, His Excellency Ambassador Cromartie.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I will devote my statement today to chemical weapons and I should like to begin by expressing the warm thanks of my delegation to Ambassador McPhail and the Canadian delegation for the hard work which they have put into the Chemical Weapons Working Group this year and for the very substantial report which the Working Group adopted last night.

In spite of the unfortunately slow start to our substantive work this year, we have, in the view of my delegation, made some encouraging progress in the field of chemical weapons. We have seen the presentation of a number of substantial working

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papers, which get down to the real detail that is necessary at this stage of our work. We have also seen agreement on a useful substantive record of the present state of our negotiations. My delegation believes that annex 1 to the Working Group's report sets out clearly the position on many of the substantive provisions that will be needed in a chemical weapons convention, and that it will enable Governments to analyse in depth the areas where an effort to achieve solutions is now required. We can see the shape of a convention emerging and we have an outline for our future work. I should also like, Mr. Chairman, to thank the hard-working co-ordinators of the contact groups for their efforts; the detailed descriptions contained in their reports of common views and of differences of opinion will need to be considered carefully, with the main report of the Working Group, in the preparations to be made for next session.

Mr. Chairman, before going on to review the more positive aspects of our work this session on chemical weapons, I must express a certain disappointment that attempts to come to grips with some key issues of the Convention, and in particular the important area of the destruction of stockpiles, have not met with an adequate response from all members of the Committee. My delegation welcomed the tabling of document CD/387, which offers a practical model of a verification system for the destruction of stockpiles. We hoped that this would provoke a full discussion of all aspects of this important issue. We were therefore disappointed that Contact Group A of the Chemical Weapons Working Group did not make a serious effort to deal with this key issue, but instead spent much of its time examining in depth rather minor points of the Convention, such as the question of the transfer of stockpiles to another State for the purpose of destruction.

Fortunately, Mr. Chairman, in the other Contact Groups more substantive work was done on the central issues with which the Groups were entrusted. My delegation particularly welcomed the elaboration in Contact Group B of fact-finding procedures for use in connection with verification by challenge, together with the further work on the related issue of the structure of a consultative committee. Challenge inspection and fact-finding procedures are clearly vital elements of the verification regime of the chemical weapons convention. They are the safety-net which will allow States to call for international investigation of any problems which they have with any aspect of the convention. We look forward to further work in this area next year.

Interesting ideas also emerged from the work on the question of use of chemical weapons in Contact Group C. We welcome the clear statement which has now been made that all delegations can accept that the convention should ensure that the use of chemical weapons is banned. We are grateful to Mr. Akkerman for his tireless efforts to find a way of expressing this underlying agreement, which will not weaken the Geneva Protocol. This is, indeed, my delegation's own major preoccupation when examining the question of including use in a chemical weapons convention. We are concerned that during the first 10 years of the life of the Convention, when stockpiles are being run down and destroyed, obligations undertaken by States under the existing regime, under the Geneva Protocol, should be preserved and should be extended to States parties to the new convention, which are not parties to the Geneva Protocol. After the 10-year period, when everyone is satisfied that chemical weapons stocks have been destroyed, we would then wish to see all States parties to the new convention subject to an obligation not to use chemical weapons in any armed conflict in any circumstances, regardless of whether they are parties to the Geneva Protocol. We believe that the work of Contact Group C has tried to address this problem, and we hope that all delegations will consider carefully during the

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recess the type of approach outlined in the Contact Group's report. We should come back next year ready to come to grips with this problem, on which we seem close to reaching agreement.

Under Mr. Lundin's able guidance, Contact Group D also produced some very useful results on definitions, although my delegation was disappointed at the unwillingness of some delegations to become engaged in a serious discussion of a possible list or lists of key precursors. The report, nevertheless, contains much food for thought, not least in the area in which my delegation has taken a special interest, the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. Delegations will by now have seen the working paper my delegation has tabled, showing the information we have so far received, from other delegations to the Committee on Disarmament, and also from non-member States, on the production levels of the key precursors listed in our earlier paper CD/353. We would very much welcome further information in this area from other delegations, and we hope that at the beginning of the next session such information will be forthcoming. It is perhaps too early to draw any firm conclusions from the information received, but the results to date, recorded in the revised table, suggest that the procedures we have proposed in CD/353 would affect only a relatively small number of factories in the world. While delegations are holding discussions with their chemical industries on the question of civil production, we would like to suggest that they should also inquire about any production of super-toxic lethal compounds for civil uses. We would expect such uses to be extremely limited, because the very high toxicity of these compounds makes them difficult to handle. This information would help us to assess more clearly the practicality of proposals already on the table for limitations on the production of these compounds for civil purposes, and to enable us to see whether other means of verifying their production for civil purposes could be devised.

In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I listened with interest to the statement on chemical weapons made at our last plenary meeting on 18 August by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union; I should like to make some preliminary comments on some of the points he made. My delegation welcomes the agreement by the Soviet Union to include in the future convention a provision for a declaration within 30 days of stocks of chemical warfare agents and munitions specifying the relevant chemical names and toxicities. A requirement for full detailed declaration of stocks immediately after the convention comes into force will contribute to the confidence that will be needed to enable States to ratify the convention, and to sustain it during the long transitional period of 10 years proposed for the destruction of stocks.

Unfortunately, however, the reverse is true of the Soviet proposal that parties to the convention should only be required to start the elimination of facilities for chemical weapons production eight years after the convention comes into force. If we have understood their proposal correctly, the declaration of the location of production facilities would not necessarily be required until a year later, that is to say, nine years after entry into force. During these long periods other parties to the convention would seem to have no assurance that chemical warfare agents were not being produced at these unknown locations. My delegation finds this position hard to square with the proposal of the German Democratic Republic, supported by the Soviet Union, that the destruction of plants for the production of binary weapons should begin within six months, and be completed within two years after the convention enters into force. The components of binary weapons are necessarily immediate precursors in the synthesis of the super-toxic agents they are designed to generate; and, in at least some cases, they are also precursors in the normal

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route for their synthesis. It seems to my delegation, therefore, illogical that plants for the production of these compounds should be treated differently according to whether the final product is a binary chemical weapon, or a chemical weapon in which the agent is preformed. If the periods of six months and two years are appropriate in the former case, they would seem also to be appropriate in the latter. My delegation agrees with the Soviet view that the declaration and destruction of production facilities, and the verification to provide sufficient confidence to other parties that they have been eliminated, require further consideration.

I was disappointed that the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union was unable to give further clarification of his Government's proposal for international inspection of the destruction of stockpiles on a quota basis. My delegation has always made it plain that we are fully prepared to give careful consideration to the ideas of other delegations, and to work together to find mutually acceptable solutions to the problems which remain in our negotiations; but it is difficult to work for such solutions when one has no more than a general concept of the position of other delegations. If we had a clearer idea of what is meant by inspection on a quota basis, and by the new Soviet idea of a differentiated approach to verification of destruction of stocks, then we would be able to see whether a solution could be found to this important question. My delegation therefore hopes that at the beginning of the next session we shall hear in detail how these approaches to the verification of destruction of stockpiles would be put into practice. Without such clarifications, further progress in this area will be difficult.

Finally, I should like to turn to an important general point. The verification regime of the convention, taken as a whole, will need to provide sufficient confidence to potential parties that its provisions will be strictly observed; in the first place to enable it to enter into force at all; and then to sustain it, through the exceptionally long transitional period of 10 years, and thereafter on a permanent basis. I say, "taken as a whole", because the confidence among parties and potential parties, that the verification provides them with an adequate degree of assurance, that the convention is being fully respected, will need to be built up from several interdependent elements. One element of primary importance must be provision for a system of verification by challenge, which would also provide a reliable recourse to States which are suspicious or dissatisfied about the implementation of the convention by other parties. Nevertheless, we see a risk that the repeated use of challenge could create a climate of distrust, and thus undermine the very confidence which is so important for the continued life of the convention. It seems to us, therefore to be vital that the convention should in addition, include a system of routine inspections which would not involve any element of suspicion or accusation, but would take the weight off the ultimate safety-net of verification by challenge. As my delegation has already indicated in its working paper CD/353, we believe that the system of routine verification should comprise four distinct elements:

Verification of the destruction of stocks;

Verification of the destruction of production facilities;

Monitoring of production of super-toxic chemical agents for permitted purposes; and

Verification of non-production of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

I have already reviewed the substantive discussion that has taken place this year on the first and last of these elements, i.e. the verification of destruction of stocks and the verification of non-production of chemical weapons; but we have not reached any conclusions and a great deal more needs to be done. We have not yet seriously tackled either of the other two elements. Obviously, if the Convention is to permit the production and retention of small quantities of super-toxic substances for protective purposes, this will have to be subject to stringent international control to ensure that this exception is not abused. Perhaps even more important to confidence in the Convention will be the provision of adequate assurances that the existing facilities for the production of chemical weapons, and the super-toxic compounds that go into them, have been definitively eliminated and cannot be used secretly to replenish stocks that have been ostentatiously destroyed. These four elements, along with the element of verification by challenge, will ultimately need to be considered together, because they will, together, be needed to build up and sustain the required level of confidence in the convention that we are negotiating. As confidence is indivisible, so we must look very carefully at the verification regime as a whole. My delegation hopes that this will be the priority task of the Chemical Weapons Working Group at the beginning of our next session. My delegation will give careful thought to these problems during the recess, and we hope that all other interested delegations will come back in February with comprehensive instructions to enable us to make rapid progress in this area, which will be of decisive importance to the success of our joint endeavours.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt): The Group of 21 wishes to state its views regarding the question of the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 7, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

Throughout the 1982 and 1983 sessions, the Group of 21 has consistently maintained that the establishment of such an ad hoc working group with an appropriate mandate offers the only practical course for the Committee to fulfil its responsibility under this item. It was in this spirit that the Group of 21 proposed during the 1982 session the following draft mandate for the proposed ad hoc working group, as contained in CD/329:

"Reaffirming the principle that outer space-- the common heritage of mankind -- should be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, and in order to prevent the extension of an arms race to outer space, and prohibit its use for hostile purposes; the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group to undertake negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement/or agreements -- as appropriate -- to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. The Ad Hoc Working Group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Committee on Disarmament".

At its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority resolutions 37/83 and 37/98, in which the Assembly specifically requested the Committee to establish an ad hoc working group to negotiate an agreement or agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

It may be observed from the pattern of voting in the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, that no Member State voted against the establishment of an ad hoc working group with such a mandate. This was in consonance with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which stated in paragraph 80 that:

"In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations be held in accordance with

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies".

During the 1983 session of the Committee, consultations were held under the auspices of the Chairman with a view to reaching a consensus on a mandate for the ad hoc working group. In these consultations the Group of 21 was confronted by a position consistently held by members of the Western group, which sought to restrict the mandate of the proposed ad hoc working group to identifying "through substantive examination, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space". While the Group of 21 expressed its readiness to accept such a task, as a necessary initial stage in the work of the ad hoc working group, it maintained that the mandate should spell out the ultimate objective of the ad hoc working group, namely to reach an agreement or agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, as specifically requested by the General Assembly. The Group of 21 still displayed flexibility and showed willingness to accommodate the States in question.

To this end, it submitted various alternative drafts and proposed amendments to the draft mandates submitted during the informal consultations. For example, on 1 August 1983, it proposed the following draft mandate:

"In discharging its responsibilities as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group under item 7 of its agenda entitled 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space'.

"In carrying out its task, the Ad Hoc Working Group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and -- in the first instance -- identify, through substantive examination, issues relevant to the conclusion of an agreement or agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, and report on the progress of its work to the Committee on Disarmament."

In the last round of consultations, the draft mandate contained in document CD/413 was submitted by its authors for consideration. The Group of 21, in a further attempt to reach an agreed mandate, proposed to amend the second paragraph of the proposed mandate so as to read as follows:

"The Committee requests the Ad Hoc Working Group to identify, in the first part of its 1984 session, through substantive examination, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space" (the underlined words constitute the amendment proposed by the Group of 21).

Such a formula would, if accepted, have led to the establishment of an ad hoc working group, and allowed it to carry out the task of identifying issues relevant to an arms race in outer space during the first half of the session. Following this, the Committee would be in a position to review the situation and hopefully be able to agree on the substantive mandate of the ad hoc working group. To the deep regret of the Group of 21, this proposal, moderate as it is, was not accepted by the authors of document CD/413, who have proceeded with the formal introduction of their proposal as a draft mandate for the ad hoc working group.

The Group of 21 feels it necessary to put on record these developments, about which it wishes to express its deep disappointment. The Group of 21 considers the mandate contained in CD/413 as inadequate, since it failed to spell out the objective to be reached by the ad hoc working group, namely, the negotiation of an agreement or agreements aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

The Group of 21 believes that the absence of a time-limit in the mandate proposed in CD/413 may only plunge the proposed ad hoc working group into unnecessarily prolonged discussions on a number of unspecified issues.

Nevertheless, in view of the urgent need of initiating action in connection with the task of preventing an arms race in outer space, the Group has decided not to prevent the adoption of CD/413, if all other groups are willing to accept it.

In such a case, the members of the Group of 21 would participate in the ad hoc working group to be established, on the understanding that its mandate constitutes only an initial stage. The Group of 21 would, therefore, reserve its right to raise the question at any time and in any manner it deems appropriate, in the light of the course of discussion in the ad hoc working group, and it would then ask the Committee on Disarmament to fulfil its responsibility in providing the ad hoc working group with an adequate mandate.

This is the last time I shall be addressing the Committee on Disarmament since my turn of duty is due to end in a few weeks. My successor, Ambassador Saad El Farargi, is not new to the field of disarmament. He was a delegate to the First Committee from 1973 to 1977, Rapporteur to the Committee on the review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament, as well as Rapporteur of the Preparatory Committee for the First Special Session devoted to Disarmament, in 1976 and 1977 respectively. He was also consultant for the United Nations Disarmament Centre in 1978.

As for myself, I shall remain in touch with United Nations work on disarmament, in my new capacity as Director-General of the Department of International Organizations.

On a personal note, I must say that I have thoroughly enjoyed my work during the past three sessions in the Committee. I have been particularly impressed by the intellectual quality and professional excellence of representation in the Committee. I have also enjoyed the courtesy and human warmth of my colleagues.

The failure of the Committee to make any meaningful achievement cannot in any way be attributed to any lack of devotion or competence on the part of the Committee. On the contrary, the Committee has been functioning with zeal and enthusiasm, despite the adverse international political realities which are the sole cause of the absence of progress in the field of disarmament. In these circumstances, it becomes vital for one to seek a ray of hope; one may find this in the ever-growing public awareness of the perils inherent in the present arms race and its possible consequences. Let us hope that the universal demand for disarmament, as manifested among all the peoples of the world, will ultimately be translated into concrete achievements that can indeed free this generation and generations to come from the fear of nuclear war and global conflagration. Let us hope that man's wisdom will ultimately prevail over his greed, and that his instinct for self-preservation will prevail over the forces he himself has unleashed for self-destruction.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank all my colleagues in the Committee for their full co-operation. I also wish to thank Mr. Jaipal for his invaluable role and advice, together with all his staff, as well as the interpreters. I wish them all the very best.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and wish to express to him on behalf of the Committee our sincerest gratitude for the important and outstanding contribution he has made to this negotiation body on disarmament. I am sure that we shall all remember with great gratitude this

(The Chairman)

contribution by Ambassador El Reedy, as well as his diplomatic and personal qualities. We hope that in his new post he will enjoy the same success and make the same kind of contribution as he has made to disarmament.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States, Mr. Busby.

Mr. BUSBY (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, before beginning my statement allow me to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation for the dedication and hard work displayed throughout the session by the three Working Group Chairmen, whose reports we have adopted today. Ambassador Rose, Ambassador Lidgard and Ambassador Garcia Robles. I might observe that, with regard to the work of the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and in particular document CD/415, the substantive exchange that we heard this morning in connection with its adoption makes the remarks of Chairman Garcia Robles regarding the character of the draft text all the more relevant. Its tentative nature is not, in my opinion, a denigration of his efforts but rather its very existence is a tribute to his ability.

I would also like to associate my delegation, Sir, with your own remarks in welcoming the distinguished Ambassador of China to our Group and with the fond farewell that you have given to Ambassador Onkelinx and Ambassador El Reedy. In addition, I would like to thank Ambassador Ekéus for the kind words he addressed to me personally and indeed take this occasion to express my own gratitude to other distinguished colleagues who have in previous meetings commented favourably on my own modest efforts this year. They are remarks which are certainly sincerely appreciated.

It is again time to review the work of the Committee, to see what we have accomplished, and where we have fallen short, during this session.

Today, I intend to speak only about the Committee's efforts to ban chemical weapons. My delegation's views on the other areas of the Committee's work will be presented at the next plenary meeting. I would like to offer some general comments on the Committee's work on chemical weapons in 1983, then comment on some recent statements made by other delegations, and finally advance some ideas about next year.

Let me begin with some general remarks. The results of the 1983 session in the chemical weapons field have been meagre and quite disappointing to my delegation. This is true despite the best efforts of the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador McPhail, and a number of other delegations, including my own.

The accomplishments of 1983 lie largely in the realm of better organization of work. For this we all owe a great deal to Ambassador McPhail. Under his leadership the tendency toward fragmentation of the discussions has been reversed. The Committee has been able to deal comprehensively with key problem areas and to consolidate work on related issues of scope, declaration, and verification in each area. Furthermore, for the first time the Committee has an agreed document which records the areas of convergence and divergence and can thus serve as a generally accepted basis for future work.

Certainly, useful and important work has been carried out by the four contact groups as well. We very much appreciate the efforts of the contact group co-ordinators. Some progress was made in crystallizing and recording convergence where it previously existed only in nascent form. However, except in the area of non-use of chemical weapons, little headway was made in finding mutually acceptable solutions to unresolved issues. It is notable that delegations which have held strong views on the non-use issue have displayed a spirit of co-operation and flexibility to enable progress to be made. We hope this spirit will continue and that remaining issues in this area, as well as others, can be resolved.

(Mr. Busby, United States)

Having pointed to these positive aspects of our work, I must admit at this point that my delegation is, however, somewhat frustrated. We shared the general optimism that existed at the beginning of the 1983 session, when it was widely believed that great things were possible. Our Vice-President visited the Committee, and we introduced a comprehensive document designed to help intensify the work of the Committee. Later we introduced another major paper and brought a number of experts to Geneva. We participated actively and constructively in the deliberations. And yet, an effective ban is not much closer today than it was a year ago. We should determine the factors which may be responsible for this lack of progress.

Most importantly, some key delegations have not been sufficiently prepared or willing to take an active part in discussion of some of the main issues. This fact has been pointed out eloquently in recent statements by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands and today the distinguished Ambassador of the United Kingdom. My delegation is also deeply concerned about this development. In order to negotiate, delegations must know each other's views.

For our part, we note there has as yet been no detailed reaction by certain key delegations to either of the major papers we have put forward this year. Nor has there been any detailed response to the important proposals made by the Federal Republic of Germany in document CD/326 and the United Kingdom in document CD/353. Only in the last week, when the work of the contact group on stockpiles had been completed, did the Soviet delegation begin to clarify for the Committee its proposal for verification of stockpile destruction by inspection on a quota basis. It must be remembered that they made this proposal over a year ago, and questions about it have been on the table ever since.

Furthermore, my delegation cannot understand why the Soviet delegation, which ardently professes its interest in completing a convention as soon as possible, refuses to discuss the subject of chemical weapons production and filling facilities. When the Working Group took up this issue, that delegation remained totally silent, neither presenting its own position nor responding to questions from others. The statement of the Soviet delegation on 18 August made quite clear their view that this subject should not even be discussed until all other issues have been resolved. We do not see how such an attitude can help accelerate the Committee's work.

Moreover, a hardening of the Soviet position has been quite noticeable in the last few weeks. We have discovered that matters thought to be agreed, for example, in Contact Groups B and D, are apparently no longer acceptable to the delegation of the Soviet Union.

My delegation is also very disturbed about the failure of the Committee to re-establish the Chemical Weapons Working Group promptly at the beginning of the 1983 session. Matters totally irrelevant to the work on a Chemical Weapons ban were allowed to intrude. Two months of potential work were lost. This must not be allowed to happen again.

In addition, we are concerned that at this session there was a proliferation of meetings, and increasing formality took the place of a more productive form of work. To some extent we seem to be substituting the appearance of activity for real negotiation.

(Mr. Busby, United States)

Let me now say a few words regarding the assertion of the Soviet delegation on 18 August that somehow my own delegation has been holding up progress.

Contrary to the assertions of the Soviet delegation, the lack of progress is not due to United States plans to produce binary chemical weapons. My delegation has fully explained the reasons for this interim measure to protect its national security in the absence of an effective agreement. We have welcomed discussions on our modernization programme and have gone to great lengths to ensure that our own proposals include provisions to ensure that binary weapons are completely covered by the ban, including the verification aspects. The United States has observed a moratorium on chemical weapons production for 14 years. Can the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union say the same for his country? We have made it quite plain that, rather than producing chemical weapons, we would prefer a sound agreement and we are willing to work hard to achieve it. It may be, as the Soviet representative said on 18 August, that the Chemical Weapons negotiations will be killed. But I can assure you it will not be the United States delegation that kills them.

In this connection my delegation deplores the unseemly ad hominem attack on the Vice-President of the United States made in the recent Soviet plenary statement. Such remarks do not belong in the Committee. I hope they will not be repeated.

Furthermore, the problem is not a lack of willingness on the part of the United States delegation to meet Soviet concerns about the intrusiveness of on-site inspection of stockpile destruction. The United States Working Paper of 5 July (CD/387) includes several important new elements for just this purpose. We now recognize the importance of co-operation between national and international personnel. We are now prepared to use data generated during routine facility operations for verification purposes. We have agreed that efforts must be made to minimize interference with the operation of a destruction facility. And, we are now prepared to restrict verification to the actual destruction step. In our view, these important steps to satisfy Soviet concerns seem to have been ignored by that delegation.

Nor is the lack of progress due to United States reluctance to draft treaty texts. Drafting of treaty texts cannot proceed any faster than resolution of key issues. While drafting can sometimes help clarify issues, in this case the issues have been clear for several years. My delegation's concerns about beginning to draft treaty texts at this stage have been explained previously, and I need not repeat them today. I would only say that these concerns have been heightened by developments in Contact Group A, which dealt with stockpile-related issues. In that group drafting of treaty texts on minor questions was substituted for efforts to resolve key questions.

I now want to respond to a number of the substantive suggestions made in the Soviet plenary statement on 18 August.

My delegation recognizes the generally constructive nature of the Soviet remarks on various substantive issues related to chemical weapons stockpiles.

(Mr. Busby, United States)

We welcome Soviet willingness to provide a detailed declaration of the contents of stockpiles, along the lines advocated by a majority of delegations, including my own. It is to be hoped that the remaining unagreed points can be quickly resolved.

We also welcome the Soviet proposal for the establishment of special storage sites at stockpile destruction facilities and for the monitoring of these sites by systematic international on-site inspection on a quota basis. In this connection, we would like to ask the Soviet delegation to clarify which stocks would be located at the special storage sites. In addition, would all stocks be moved to these locations promptly after entry into force? Or would the special storage sites contain only some of the stocks at any given time, for example, those stocks to be destroyed in the next stage of the schedule for stockpile destruction?

We also listened with interest to the explanation of the Soviet concept of inspection on a quota basis for stockpile destruction, particularly the criteria which were given. As outlined in the United States Working Paper CD/387, our conclusions are different. But the criteria on which the United States conclusions are based are similar. For us a major problem with the Soviet approach is that the actual level of verification would not be known until after entry into force. We are being asked to undertake a commitment to disarm without having an agreement on verification levels. We would expect the Soviet delegation to take this concern into account.

On the other hand, the proposals to single out binary chemical weapons stocks and production facilities for specially severe treatment seem to my delegation to be extraordinarily one-sided. They can only be seen as efforts to preserve Soviet Chemical Weapons capabilities while eliminating those of the United States. What else is one to think of the Soviet proposal whose effect would be to eliminate totally United States binary production facilities within two years after entry into force and not even to begin elimination of Soviet Chemical Weapons production facilities until eight years after entry into force? Surely the Soviet delegation recognizes that such proposals cannot advance the work of the Committee.

I promised to make some suggestions for making the Committee's work more productive next year.

Clearly, it will be essential for delegations to come with instructions which will enable them to negotiate on all of the issues. We think that the five-months recess should provide adequate time for thorough preparation.

We believe that the working group should be re-established promptly when the Committee on Disarmament reconvenes, regardless of the status of other procedural issues and other working groups. Work on a chemical weapons ban must not be held hostage to disputes over unrelated issues. We must not repeat the sad experience of this session.

In our view the Working Group must next year try to come to grips with each of the four major problem areas: scope of prohibition, including non-use; stockpiles; chemical weapons production facilities; and non-production of chemical weapons, particularly in the chemical industry. We would favour continuing the type of broadly based contact groups instituted in 1983. The record of the negotiations prepared under the leadership of Ambassador McPhail, and the reports of the 1982 and 1983 Contact Groups should be the starting-point for this work.

(Mr. Busby, United States)

I noted earlier the problems of proliferation of meetings and of increasing formality of meetings. It may be that having fewer meetings would facilitate progress by enabling delegations to focus their attention, rather than being compelled by circumstances to spread themselves too thinly. We would also urge that greater use be made of private efforts by the co-ordinators of contact groups to clarify problems and develop solutions. Such consultations cannot and should not become a substitute for the work of the contact groups or the Working Group; but they may help to overcome obstacles to progress.

Finally, as pointed out by the Soviet delegation on 18 August, consideration needs to be given to how to make better use of the time available. We share that view and I would today like to introduce a formal initiative from the United States delegation designed to facilitate the Committee's work next year.

As you know, my delegation attaches great importance to the efforts of the Committee on Disarmament to find a common approach to verification of the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, which is one of the principal obstacles to agreement. The need to resolve this issue as soon as possible has also been stressed recently by the delegations of the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and other member States.

To help accelerate the negotiations, the United States is today inviting member and observer delegations to participate in a workshop to be held at the United States chemical weapons destruction facility at Tooele, Utah. The workshop, which is scheduled for mid-November, will provide a first-hand look at actual procedures used by the United States for destruction of chemical weapons. It is our intention that it will also provide a forum for discussion of various means of verifying destruction of chemical weapons. A working paper outlining the arrangements for the workshop is being distributed today.

In addition to touring the destruction facility and being briefed on its operations, participants will also observe a mock on-site inspection exercise. That exercise will employ actual equipment installed at the destruction facility.

I would like to emphasize that the workshop will not be constructed solely as a platform for United States views. It will provide an opportunity for a wide-ranging discussion of all points of view regarding verification of destruction. It could also provide an opportunity for discussion of other issues closely linked with stockpile destruction, including those raised in the Soviet plenary statement of 18 August. To facilitate a balanced discussion we are inviting a number of delegations with particular interest and expertise in this field to make presentations.

We intend to circulate a more detailed agenda and would welcome suggestions from delegations, with a view to making the workshop as useful as possible. Furthermore, we hope that other countries with destruction facilities, including the Soviet Union, will also consider inviting delegations to their facilities.

As we end the 1983 session, I sense that the frustration and disappointment felt by my delegation are shared by others. But I also sense that we all share a common objective and a desire to achieve it as soon as possible. I trust that delegations will return in 1984 resolved and prepared to make it a year of accomplishment. My delegation certainly will.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement.

Distinguished representatives, because of the hour and if there is no objection, I shall suspend this plenary meeting until 3.30 p.m. this afternoon.

The meeting was suspended at 1.05 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): We shall now resume the 236th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

I would suggest that the Committee should hear the statements of those members who were unable to take the floor this morning. I accordingly give the floor to the representative of India, His Excellency Ambassador Dubey.

Mr. DUBEY (India): Allow me first of all to say how pleased my delegation is to welcome in our midst the distinguished Ambassador of China for Disarmament. I extend to him the full co-operation of my delegation. We are going to miss the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt from the next session of our Committee; I would like to echo the tribute that you paid to him for the outstanding contribution that he has made to the work of our Committee. The statement that he made this morning was an eloquent testimony to the untiring efforts that he has been making to see that some progress is made in important areas in the field of disarmament. My delegation and I personally wish him great success in the new role that he is going to take up after going back to Cairo.

Over five years ago, the General Assembly of the United Nations, in the first special session of its kind, made an unprecedented declaration in the long history of mankind. It was a declaration made by consensus and without a single reservation, to the effect that mankind was confronted with the unique threat of annihilation in the event of nuclear war. The General Assembly resolved, therefore, that the removal of the danger of nuclear war was "the most acute and urgent task of the present day".

The States Members of the United Nations and, in particular, those of them that possessed nuclear weapons, were required to submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations their views and suggestions for the avoidance of nuclear war. At its last session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled "Prevention of nuclear war", requesting the Committee on Disarmament "to undertake, as a matter of highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of a nuclear war". This resolution of the General Assembly was also a consensus decision, as it should be, for it is designed to prevent a paramount danger through collective measures and action.

The manner in which the Committee on Disarmament has dealt with this extraordinary request of the General Assembly concerning the very survival of mankind has been a source of the utmost regret and dismay. I am taking the floor today to give expression to this sense of dismay and to tell the sad story of how the Committee on Disarmament has been prevented from dealing with the most critical issue of concern to mankind.

(Mr. Dubey, India)

We have before us the preliminary draft report of the Committee (Working Paper No. 103/Add.1) on the item "Prevention of nuclear war". This draft will certainly undergo several changes before it is adopted by the Committee. But its dismal conclusion will remain the same: and it is that because of the procedural hurdles raised by a group of countries, the Committee on Disarmament, during the entire 1983 session, failed to devote any serious attention to an issue affecting the very survival of the human race.

The subject, as my delegation has had the opportunity of repeatedly pointing out, derives its urgency from the realization by millions of people all over the world that human life and civilization, as we know it, are faced today with an unprecedented threat arising from the massive accumulation of nuclear weapons. The Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries, representing more than two thirds of mankind, in their meeting in New Delhi earlier this year, echoed in one voice the dreadful prospect of extinction of the human race when they said, "the greatest peril facing the world today is the threat to the survival of mankind from a nuclear war". What has lent an added urgency to this all-pervading concern about human survival is the present new round of the nuclear arms race and the open talk in some nuclear-weapon States of actually using nuclear weapons and winning a nuclear war.

It was the reflection of this concern that the non-aligned and neutral nations in this Committee proposed in their working paper CD/341 the inclusion in the agenda of a new item on the prevention of nuclear war, and suggested the most appropriate modality, i.e., the establishment of an ad hoc working group to carry out negotiations on this subject. The mandate for such an ad hoc working group was also put forward and the attention of the Committee was drawn to the enormous wealth of documentation and studies already available, on the basis of which negotiations could be undertaken in the proposed working group. One would have thought that this was an obvious procedural requirement and would have been accepted as a matter of course without much loss of time. Considering that so much ground work had already been done, it was not unrealistic to hope that by the end of this session of the Committee, an ad hoc working group would have been set up and at least the phase of preliminary discussions leading to actual negotiations would have been completed.

But the innocuous proposal of the non-aligned and neutral States in the Committee was opposed for two months with the sort of fanciful argument that one usually associates with a lawyer pleading a losing case. Eventually the proposed item was incorporated as a part of an already established item, but this prolonged and entirely unnecessary exercise naturally made one sceptical about the commitment of some States to the prevention of nuclear war.

As though this delay was not enough of a farce, the rest of the annual session was devoted to an equally absurd and dialectic exercise on whether this negotiating body should undertake negotiations! The Committee was dragged into this kind of a futile exercise in spite of the fact that the very inclusion of the item on the agenda implied the commitment of the States members of the Committee to

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negotiate on the subject. The mechanism of an ad hoc working group was opposed in spite of the fact that it is a well-tested and generally accepted procedure adopted by the Committee for handling negotiations on all the various issues before it.

All kinds of lame excuses and far-fetched reasons were advanced for not agreeing to the establishment of an ad hoc working group. In spite of the supreme urgency of the question of the prevention of nuclear war, it was argued that the subject was not mature enough for proceeding directly to negotiations. In the beginning, it was stated that there was just not an adequate number of concrete proposals on which negotiations could begin. Subsequently, when concrete proposals started flowing in, it was pointed out by the same countries that it would be necessary first to classify and sort out these proposals before starting the negotiating process, as though, classification and exploration of methods is itself not a part of the negotiating process.

Towards virtually the end of this session, these countries advanced the ingenious and extraordinary suggestion of informal meetings for structured discussions on the prevention of nuclear war. Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to ask: why informal meetings, where no records are kept, in the analytical exploration of the full scope of measures for preventing nuclear war? Why not a working group for the entire period of the annual session for precisely the same purpose? Does the survival of mankind merit, for some member States, no more at present than an indefinite number of informal meetings?

The fact is that the very suggestion of informal meetings reflects a desire merely to debate rather than to reach agreement through negotiations on a set of measures for the prevention of nuclear war. It is an attempt to play with the subject rather than seriously deal with it. It is a clever device to convey a semblance of concern with a matter which just cannot be ignored in view of the upsurge of public opinion in these countries, while pursuing their dangerous doctrine of security through a balance of terror.

In spite of these considerations and in spite of the strong belief that the establishment of a working group was the most natural and logical way to proceed with this matter, a large number of delegations, including my own, approached the suggestion for informal meetings during this year in a constructive spirit. We expressed our readiness to join in informal meetings if these meetings were to be followed by negotiations as from the next session in the only appropriate subsidiary body of the Committee, i.e., a working group. A majority of the countries represented in the Committee accepted this as a compromise in the hope that at least some useful discussion would take place in the Committee during this session and actual negotiations would commence from the next session. However, the other group of countries rejected this compromise also, for reasons that carried little conviction.

The hollowness of the argument that a series of informal meetings were required for sifting suggestions and for analytical exploration, before the actual negotiations could begin, was exposed when the delegations making the suggestion refused to reach any understanding on the creation of an ad hoc group even from the beginning of the

(Mr. Dubey, India)

next session of the Committee. If any further proof was needed of their lack of seriousness and their reluctance to negotiate purposefully, this was provided by the working paper contained in document CD/411, submitted in the name of some of these countries.

This working paper is the most blatant travesty of the concern expressed by a large number of delegations in this Committee as well as the millions of conscientious people throughout the world on the grave issues of the impending and continuously growing threat of nuclear holocaust. This paper confuses the urgent task of the prevention of nuclear war with everything under the sun even remotely connected with the existence of differences or tensions among nations. This is a deliberate attempt to diffuse the issue of the prevention of nuclear war by introducing into the discussion on the item every conceivable subject ranging from Articles of the United Nations Charter to the rules of international conduct, from various doctrines of security to domestic legal reforms. We can go on discussing this cluster of non-issues for several decades to come without coming to the main issue of the prevention of nuclear war.

While stating that these are non-issues in this context, my delegation does not intend to minimize their importance. We are prepared to discuss them in their proper context as we have done in the past. We, however, refuse to be enticed into a repetitive exercise deliberately designed to divert us from our immediate concern. The very first item suggested in the working paper presented by these countries is the assessment of the risk of nuclear war. This once again shows that, in spite of their having subscribed to a large number of resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly to the effect that the danger of nuclear war must be averted by all means, these countries are persisting with the insane doctrine that the piling up of nuclear weapons and the escalation of the nuclear arms race need not pose any threat or involve any risks of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

No military doctrine, no security consideration, no principles of the Charter and no individual rights in a nation State can justify the continuation of a situation where this planet is living on borrowed time and where mankind, with each passing day, is coming closer to the stage of total annihilation.

A large majority of the delegations in this Committee have been waging a struggle in this Committee and in the General Assembly to avert that situation. Numerous fervent appeals have been received by the Committee from ordinary people from different parts of the world, urging the Committee to get on with the task of negotiating practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Why then are these few States bent upon holding the whole world hostage to their dangerous and illusory security doctrines? Is the prevention of nuclear war really against their national interest or security?

As if the situation was not unreasonable enough, the same group of countries opposed even the idea of the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament conducting consultations prior to the commencement of the next annual session on establishing a working group with an appropriate mandate. This is surely an abuse of the rules of consensus, because under the rules of procedure the Chairman is free to conduct

(Mr. Dubey, India)

consultations on organizational matters. My delegation would insist that the Chairman should not be prevented from carrying out his normal functions, and indeed we expect him to do so and to report on the results of his efforts to the next session as soon as it convenes.

Mr. Chairman, this is the tale of frustration and dismay that we have to carry to the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. We have to bring to the attention of the General Assembly the systematic attempts to subvert the negotiating functions of the Committee on Disarmament. The General Assembly cannot allow this most critical issue before mankind to stagnate in the procedural quagmire of this Committee. It will either have to take effective measures for enabling the Committee to get on with the crucial task of negotiating measures for the prevention of nuclear war, or make its own arrangements for dealing with this issue of life and death for mankind.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, may I, on the occasion of my first intervention in the plenary during the month of August congratulate you on the efficient manner in which you have discharged your responsibilities. Your country, Peru and Nigeria enjoy the best of friendly relationships as members of both the Group of 77 and the non-aligned movement. On behalf of my delegation, I would also wish to thank Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan for his successful chairmanship of the Committee during the month of July. We welcome to the Committee Ambassador Qian Jia Tong of China and look forward to working with him. We are sad to say farewell to Ambassador McPhail of Canada, Ambassador Onkelinx of Belgium and Ambassador El Reedy of Egypt, whose companionship and wise counsel we shall miss.

In my statement today, I shall confine my comments to the following:

- (a) negotiations for a chemical weapons convention; (b) prevention of an arms race in outer space; (c) prevention of nuclear war; (d) effective measures to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and (e) organizational matters.

My delegation regrets to observe that the Committee, towards the end of the current session, has slid into the same quagmire of lack of purpose and flexibility which was its lot at the beginning of the 1983 session. The Committee has relapsed into a rather untoward complacency which is getting more and more ominous for our future work. We cannot hide our apprehensions when we observe that our early hopes of a rapid elaboration of a Chemical Weapons convention are becoming more and more illusory as the major parties concerned continue to stall negotiations on a future convention that would constitute a major breakthrough and inspire more fruitful efforts in disarmament negotiations.

The same sorry state of affairs can be discerned in our efforts so far on the "prevention of an arms race in outer space". Until now, agreement has not been reached on an acceptable mandate of a future working group whose principal objective would be to insulate outer space from the ever-destabilizing arms race by reaching an agreement on a generally binding instrument that would ensure that outer space is preserved as a common heritage of mankind and not another arena of military

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

and ideological confrontation. It is the belief of my delegation that, in spite of the major responsibility of the Superpowers with regard to outer space, the subject remains a collective and multilateral one on which States share the responsibility to take appropriate measures. Paragraph 80 of the Final Document amply demonstrates this, and I quote:

"In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations be held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies".

The Nigerian delegation will therefore continue to urge the space Powers to harken to the collective voice of peace-loving humanity and show much-needed flexibility with a view to implementing General Assembly resolution 37/83, adopted at its thirty-seventh session, which requested the Committee on Disarmament "to establish an ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its session in 1983, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race ... in outer space".

It is for this reason that the Nigerian delegation took the initiative to work towards the establishment of a contact group on the subject. While we appreciate the efforts on the part of all members of the Committee in their response to the setting-up of the contact group, it is disappointing to note that we are not yet sure whether there will be an agreement on the mandate. The only redeeming feature is that there are proposals to work on.

On the question of the "prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", consensus has so far eluded the Committee as to how best to proceed on this agenda item. In the view of the Nigerian delegation, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, as called for in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, continues to be the most urgent priority issue of our time. Even though the Nigerian delegation subscribed to the "via media" suggested by the Group of 21 towards the latter part of the current session — all with a view to recording some modicum of success within the Committee — regarding the holding of a cluster of informal meetings, it is our firm conviction that the objective of such informal meetings should at the very outset be well-defined, namely, the setting-up of a working group on this subject early next session. This is because we believe that a working group offers the best guarantee of a proper handling of this crucial issue which touches on the very survival of mankind.

In my intervention on 23 March this year regarding the question of negative security guarantees, I reiterated the position of my delegation that nuclear-weapon States should give unconditional assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States that have undertaken firm commitments not to develop, produce or acquire nuclear weapons. We still retain the belief that those countries outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be given conditional assurances regarding non-first use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

The possession of nuclear weapons by any State constitutes a grave threat to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, we are concerned that nuclear-armed States may attempt to practice nuclear blackmail; that is, to extort political concessions by threatening to use nuclear weapons in the event that these concessions are not granted. The possibility that non-nuclear-weapon States should feel so threatened as to procure nuclear weapons of their own depends not only on the type of threat but also on its level. If non-nuclear-weapon States feel so threatened by existing or potential nuclear Powers as to consider developing weapons of their own, we feel it is only reasonable to reduce the incentive to proliferate by enhancing their sense of security.

My delegation notes with appreciation the open declarations made by two nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. We urge all remaining nuclear-weapon States to emulate the courage of those two States, especially the commitments contained in document CD/278 of 7 April 1982. In that document, one of the nuclear Powers concerned stated that it had already on its own initiative and unilaterally declared that at no time and in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons.

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 36/95, which appeals to the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the necessary political will to reach agreement on a common approach which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character, it is the hope of my delegation that the nuclear-weapon States will consider the reasonable demands voiced by a great number of non-nuclear-weapon States and demonstrate genuinely and honestly their political will to shoulder their responsibilities with a view to ensuring progress in security assurances negotiations.

My delegation naturally wants to see the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. We who have undertaken the firm commitment not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons need not only guarantees against nuclear blackmail but also a strong commitment from the nuclear-weapon States that they will not resort to nuclear war as a means of resolving conflicts. These assurances have to be legally binding and above all made with a deep sense of honesty and confidence.

We urge the States with the biggest nuclear arsenals to take the lead in reducing their nuclear weapons. It has been stated on several occasions that the theory of nuclear deterrence no longer holds; nor does that of a retaliatory strike. The Superpowers should approach this question of security guarantees with all seriousness of purpose. The vast majority of mankind may not possess nuclear weapons, they may be poor and hungry, but they have a right to life. And I think they have a right to be protected, or at least should be given the assurances that their right to security is recognized.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

As a matter of fact, and as well expressed by my distinguished colleague, the Ambassador of Brazil, in his statement of 9 August 1983, "the whole question of the extension of negative security assurances must be seen as part and parcel of the commitment to end the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament. There can be no effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons if the nuclear weapon States continue to cling to the notion that such weapons should be their exclusive and perpetual property, to the detriment of the security of all other countries", thus bringing about what we have termed "nuclear apartheid".

On the eve of our summer recess, may I share with my distinguished colleagues a thought of Herr Willy Brandt as expressed in an article in a recent issue of the International Herald Tribune concerning the principle of common security? I quote:

"Although our eastern neighbours belong to the other alliance and although they have a governmental and social system that we reject, WE CAN ONLY SURVIVE TOGETHER WITH THEM".

Mr. Chairman, we do not know of any delegation around this table that would not share that well-informed view. It is a call to sanity. It is, therefore, a matter of particular concern to my delegation and, we believe, to most non-nuclear-weapon States, that neither of the two major alliances gives adequate consideration to disarmament proposals submitted by the other.

Our intention here is not to point accusing fingers at any one of the nuclear-weapon Powers. We only wish, as we are winding up the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament, to urge the Superpowers to exercise a willing suspension of disbelief. We call on them as technological and military giants not to let down the international community, which is looking up to them for viable initiatives on disarmament issues.

Finally, I wish to comment briefly on a matter of organizational interest. By April this year I was aware that I had to be in Belgrade during the month of June as a member of my country's delegation to UNCTAD VI. I was also aware that it would be my delegation's turn to co-ordinate the activities of the Group of 21 during the same month, as well as being the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament. In other words, I was expected to wear three hats at the same time during the month of June. In view of the excessive burden this implies, I felt that I could arrive at a suitable arrangement with my other colleagues who are my alphabetical neighbours in the Committee on Disarmament, that is, Pakistan and Peru. Fortunately, and in a spirit of co-operation, the two delegations, Pakistan and Peru, were prepared to swap places with me. However, the Ambassador of Pakistan had to be in Belgrade at the same time as me, so he could not take part in the arrangement.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

I then approached the secretariat about the agreement reached between the Peruvian delegation and the Nigerian delegation. I was surprised when the secretariat said it was not possible, giving the impression that the canon laws governing the alphabetical rotation of chairmanship were immutable. I was surprised because I felt that the accident of the alphabet, which is merely being used in order to retain an orderly system of rotation, could not be so repressive in its effect as to work against a minor modification of procedure which could not possibly hurt anyone, especially where there is an agreement among those directly concerned. After all, administrative arrangements are made to simplify the process of human interaction; they are not made to make life unnecessarily difficult.

As it turned out, I had to shuttle between Belgrade and Geneva in order to carry out my assignments in both places. But it was at a great personal cost in time and money. When one remembers that only last year in this very Committee one delegation was allowed to hold the post of chairmanship for more than a month one begins to wonder how immutable the canon laws governing the rotational system really are, and how much objectivity is applied in their interpretation. We hope that the contact group on the effective functioning of the Committee on Disarmament will examine situations such as this when it is not possible for an Ambassador to be in Geneva at a time when it is his turn to take up the chairmanship of the Committee. In this connection, it must be recalled that not all delegations have full-time disarmament ambassadors.

Having said this, Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you and, through you, the delegation of Peru, for your kindness and the spirit of co-operation shown by you and members of your delegation to the Nigerian delegation at a time when we needed your sympathy and understanding.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have no further speakers on today's list, but I believe that the representatives of China and the Soviet Union wish to take the floor.

I give the floor to His Excellency Ambassador Qian Tong.

Mr. QIAN JIA TONG (China): Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the floor. My intervention will be very brief. This is the first time that I am attending a meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. I have come late, but I am glad that I am still in time to join you, Mr. Chairman, and other representatives in the final work of this session. I have put my name down to speak this coming Friday; I shall then, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, make a review of the Committee's work during this session. Here, I shall confine myself to expressing my heartfelt gratitude to you, Mr. Chairman, for the welcome you gave me this morning and through you, to the representatives of various countries for the same welcome they have extended to me here and elsewhere. I would like also to take this opportunity to express my good wishes to you, Mr. Chairman, and the representatives of various countries.

Disarmament is a task which is both important and difficult. The fact that the Chinese Government has decided to appoint an ambassador specially for disarmament affairs demonstrates once again the importance it attaches to disarmament. I am very happy that the Chinese delegation has always enjoyed a good relationship with various delegations and the secretariat of the Committee on Disarmament. The kindness that the Chairman and the various representatives have expressed to me is a great encouragement. My delegation and I would like to maintain a close link with various delegations and with the secretariat in our future work, in the hope of achieving progress in the field of disarmament with our joint efforts.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation has always attached and continues to attach great significance to the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The question of the terrible and real danger of the extension of the arms race to space is one of exceptional importance. As is known, the Soviet Union has already expressed on more than one occasion the idea of prohibiting the use of force altogether, both in space proper and as regards the earth.

In this connection, the Soviet delegation would like to draw the attention of States members of the Committee to the new initiative put forward by Mr. Y.V. Andropov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in a conversation with United States senators on 18 August of this year. First of all, the Soviet Union considers it necessary to reach agreement on the complete banning of the testing and deployment of space-based weapons of whatever kind for use against targets on earth, in the atmosphere and in outer space.

Further, the USSR is prepared to resolve in the most radical fashion the question of anti-satellite weapons, to reach agreement on the liquidation of the anti-satellite systems that already exist and to prohibit the creation of new systems.

The Soviet Union has already submitted detailed proposals on this issue for consideration at the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly. We have requested the secretariat of the Committee to circulate the relevant material as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

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Furthermore, the Soviet authorities have taken an extremely important decision:

"The USSR undertakes not to be the first to put into outer space anti-satellite weapons of whatever kind, that is, it is introducing a unilateral moratorium on such launches for as long as other States, including the United States of America, refrain from the deployment in space of anti-satellite weapons of any kind".

Our decision is yet another concrete and convincing proof of the Soviet Union's goodwill in the matter of strengthening peace and the security of peoples.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): The Chairman of the Committee will have to undertake consultations before the commencement of the spring session next year on organizational questions which will have to be solved in order to enable the Committee to begin its work in the best possible circumstances. Prominent among these questions is that of the procedure to be followed for considering the item on our agenda relating to the prevention of nuclear war, but this question, although very important, is not the only procedural one which, in the opinion of my delegation, should be the subject of consultations before the commencement of the spring session.

As we all know, the Committee spends an excessive proportion of its time on questions of a procedural nature. I believe that anything that can be done to save time will be of benefit to the Committee's specific work on substantive items.

For this reason, my delegation wishes to express its support for the request by the Ambassador of India that the Chairman of the Committee should hold consultations before the commencement of the spring session and should subsequently report on his results. In my opinion, this is a perfectly appropriate initiative and in fact does not require the approval of an express mandate by the Committee, since it is within the very nature of the Chairman's responsibility to undertake consultations of this kind.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I have taken very careful note of the suggestion made by the representative of India and supported by the representative of the Argentine Republic. As you can see, the purpose of this suggestion is that the Chairman of the Committee should undertake consultations with a view to ensuring that the item on the prevention of nuclear war should be dealt with from the beginning of the first part of the 1984 session. As far as I personally am concerned, I appreciate the suggestions by the representative of India and the representative of the Argentine Republic, and wish to state my intention to fulfil until next February, among other requirements of the office, any mandates that the Committee may wish to entrust to me. I should in fact say that I had already thought of making on this subject the statement which I shall now make and which I think is timely.

A proposal made informally by the Chair was intended to be, and in fact for most members of the Committee constituted, a not fully satisfactory but sufficient basis for an initial understanding, for an acceptable common minimum, with a view to the effective and progressive consideration of the fundamental item on the prevention of nuclear war.

(The Chairman)

I also wish to make it plain that my obligation as Chairman to suggest solutions, including solutions on which it is difficult to reach a consensus but which are feasible, is clearly distinguishable from my position as representative of Peru, which continues to be fully consistent with the position of the Group of 21.

In saying all this, I wish to recall that this is a question situated at the root of the mandate which this Committee has to fulfil and furthermore the item includes an aspect which we might term symbolic, because if this Committee was incapable of promoting and achieving certain urgent and essential measures to contribute to the prevention of the undoubted risk of a nuclear war, it would simply not be fulfilling its mission.

I would now suggest that we invite the chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups on Chemical Weapons and Negative Security Assurances to submit the reports of their Groups.

I give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador McPhail.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): As we have indicated to the secretariat in the last couple of days, my intention is to speak both as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and as representative of Canada.

As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group I have the honour to table document CD/416, which has been distributed this afternoon, a few moments ago; it is the result of very strenuous and, I think, laudable efforts of the secretariat facilities which have been put in place since we completed our work last night between 6 and 7 p.m. That document embodies the 1983 report of our Group to the Committee on Disarmament. The report and its annexes have been agreed to by all members of the Working Group and this, I believe, augurs well for future work in achieving a ban on chemical weapons.

I want to comment for a few minutes on what the Working Group has accomplished this session to supplement what the report itself indicates in detail.

You will all recall that General Assembly resolution 37/98 B urged the Committee on Disarmament "as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its session in 1983, the elaboration of ... a convention ... with a view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date."

The resolution summarizes the collective wish of the international community; and I believe that we have, through the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, clearly shown the measure to which this body has successfully sought this year to fulfil the resolution's purposes.

Translated into specifics, the Working Group's objective can be said to have been defined both substantively and procedurally on the basis of the sentiment that underlies that resolution. Substantively, of course, the goal was to achieve the negotiation of a verifiable convention banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and requiring the destruction of existing stockpiles and means of production, thus finally eliminating the threat of the use

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of these weapons for all time. More precisely, our substantive task in 1983 was to achieve further consensus, if not full agreement, on the issues that still divided delegations. Procedurally, our task was to reach agreement on the structure of a convention and on the elaboration of provisions in their proper order so that the process of negotiation could be brought to an early conclusion.

The report of the Working Group reflects the method designed to meet these objectives. Apart from the standard introductory parts, the report does innovate: the Working Group agreed to set out, as it has in an annex, in one single document, the substance of provisions for a chemical weapons convention. This document indicates the consensus reached earlier and during this session, and sets out remaining differences clearly, where further work is needed, so as to reveal how best the Committee can proceed to the final elaboration of a convention. We thus developed an integrated or internally consistent procedure whereby each provision is intended to be presented in a logical hierarchy, progressing from the general to the particular; and whereby each provision is accompanied by an indication of the control or verification measures appropriate to it.

This record, as it now appears in the annex to the Working Group report, is a distillation of the highest common factor of agreement and the lowest necessary index of disagreement; throughout the annex, areas where positions have yet to be reconciled are indicated by indentation.

The text, an integrated and systematic document structured according to a uniform format, thus allows others, in capitals or elsewhere, to see precisely what the situation is. It is, of course, a document to which all in the Working Group have agreed. This gives it particular significance in a negotiating context for our further work. It hardly need be said that, since this document records the provisions of the convention in terms of their concepts, the language it contains is not directly transportable to the final text of the convention itself.

However, simultaneously with the process I have just described, and complementary to it, four contact groups were charged with addressing selected principal areas where consensus was lacking. These groups were as follows:

Contact Group A: Co-ordinator, Mr. J. Cialowicz, Poland, on the monitoring of the destruction of stocks and basic content of declarations required;

Contact Group B: Co-ordinator, Mr. S. Duarte of Brazil dealing with issues related to the resolution of compliance questions;

Contact Group C: Co-ordinator, Mr. J. Akkerman of the Netherlands on the prohibition of Use;

and Contact Group D: Co-ordinator, Mr. J. Lundin of Sweden on definitions.

The reports that these contact groups produced, along with the groups' terms of reference, are also appended to the Working Group's report as annex II. Not only is the substance in the conclusions of those reports reflected in annex I recording the provisions of the convention to which I referred, but the

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Contact Group reports themselves contain language which can be utilized for the actual drafting of a convention. Here, I want to note -- and do so emphatically -- dedication and skill of all four contact group co-ordinators and the valuable role their groups have played in delivering over-all consensus on the document which is now before us.

I have spoken of process and method. These were aimed at achieving substantive ends. The Working Group did not solve all substantive problems. But here too, there was some progress. In certain areas, the intensive examination of comparable positions revealed greater coincidence of view than had previously been apparent; for example, agreement was reached on the use of chemical names in the declaration of stocks, and the usefulness of on-site automatic instruments in assisting other techniques of verification. In other areas, new proposals came forward, and these were **incorporated** into our common document. There were, for example, United Kingdom proposals for monitoring of non-production, and separate Soviet proposals on prohibition of use, on prohibition of compounds containing the methyl-phosphorus bonds, and on details required in declarations of stocks. There was a proposal by Egypt on assistance in the event of a violation. There was also the United States detailed views paper, which allowed a comparison to be made with the Soviet text, containing the outline of a treaty, tabled at last year's session. I mention only a few of the many contributions, such as those contained in a Soviet statement last week, which have been made only late in the year and will thus require further examination. The full list of such proposals appears in the Working Group's report.

But I wish to emphasize once more that there are indeed major areas where agreement must be reached for there to be success. These are clearly indicated, I think, in the document before you. The Working Group has not solved these matters, but at least unequivocal agreement has been reached on where work needs to be focused.

I am sure that among us there is no illusion that through process alone disagreements will simply fall away without hard decisions being made in capitals. Moreover, it is natural to expect that when such decisions come, they will be based on perceptions of the balance of advantage, in national security terms, of accepting in whole or in part yet to be agreed provisions which, however difficult in themselves to accommodate, are the necessary price for a greater gain.

In this context, and whatever the substantive or process achievements of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons this year, particular satisfaction should be drawn from the manner in which the Group performed its business. We dealt with problems, facts and issues. The discussion was sober and restrained. In short, the approach was businesslike. This in itself was a necessary confidence-building measure; and this reason alone justifies, I suggest, the effort we have collectively put into the Working Group's activities this year. We must build upon these efforts, and I commend for the Committee's approval, the three steps recommended by the Working Group in the final paragraph of its report, in order that a ban on chemical weapons may be finalized at the earliest possible time. In this respect, I understand that there are consultations now among a number of delegations which, when the Committee considers its own report on this matter, may permit it to have included a recommendation about the precise nature in which the negotiation may be resumed late this year or early next year, and that is a matter to which my delegation intends to revert to when the appropriate portion of the text of the Committee's report is considered.

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I conclude then this statement with what should by rights have come first: an expression of my gratitude for the unstinting co-operation of all delegations as these complex negotiations have unfolded, and with a very special word of thanks for the secretariat, Mr. Bensmail, his staff and interpreters, whose willing support contributed materially to our endeavour.

Mr. Chairman, I have just spoken before the Committee as Chairman of the Working Group. I want now to speak as Canadian representative. I do so also as one of the several survivors of four years of Committee activity who are now departing; and I do use the word "survivor" advisedly! I wish to speak, therefore, in a somewhat personal vein as well, to share with you a perspective on where we have come from, where we are and where we seem to be going.

I would like to join the colleagues who have congratulated you, Sir, on assuming the Chair for the month of August. The end of the session is always demanding, and much is expected of the Chair in guiding our collective endeavour to completion. You and your distinguished predecessors have played a pivotal role in maintaining a high standard of proceedings in the Committee. The final days will not be easy, but under your leadership I am confident that we will be equal to the task.

There is what some would call a tradition that representatives in this body give their assessment of what has -- and what has not -- been accomplished at session's end. I have on past occasions put forward my Government's views on the Committee's performance in the light of its role and limitations. And I have certainly commented on how we believe its organizational shortcomings might be overcome. I stand by those remarks but those are not the points I want to touch on today. I propose instead to place my own experience in a larger context, and, perhaps unlike some of my colleagues who have spoken previously, I do think that I want to offer you a message of confidence and hope.

We can look back to 1982, a year of debate certainly, and also of confrontation. Outside the Committee, it was exemplified by the unfinished nature of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament and, with few exceptions, a general absence of negotiations. In the General Assembly, where the international community searched for a common voice with which to speak, competing -- and therefore mutually negating -- resolutions on disarmament proliferated. Each of us can identify the causes of the decline in the international negotiating climate that year; and each of us can identify the consequences for the Committee.

It is against that background that 1983, from the outset, was termed by many to be a critical year for negotiations. The Canadian Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Allan J. MacEachen, speaking to this body at its opening session in February, called 1983 a year of opportunity for the Committee. His presence, like that of other statesmen who have spoken here this year, underlined the expectations of the international community; and his call for early action was certainly echoed by others.

There has indeed been early action on some of the difficult issues -- certainly not enough action, nor with sufficient results to be much cause for self-congratulation, but early action none the less.

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But if 1983 was a year of opportunity to be fulfilled for the Committee, perhaps the greatest accomplishment this year was to demonstrate in a concrete fashion what many have said, others have hoped and all have intended: that the Committee on Disarmament should maintain a powerful potential to negotiate.

The Committee has been sometimes criticized as a forum where comment is freely given, but without commitment. This view gave rise to the fear that, should the consensus rule be broken, the Committee's proceedings would drift further in the direction of debate, thereby putting into eclipse its negotiating function. That this fear is waning, as I believe it is, is the result of the experience of 1983.

Over the years, the Committee has frequently appeared to be something of a battleground between proponents of arms control pure and simple, and those who stress the connection between arms control and international security, be the connection a formal one in defined strategic terms or a more pragmatic one in the sense of political realities. This fundamental difference is not one which can be said to separate the various groups around this table from one another. Often, instead, there are nuances within groups which reflect those two differing approaches.

I understand why my Hungarian colleague spoke as he did a week ago, of the lack of progress he sees in the results here in the Committee as he departs Geneva; but as a practitioner like him and not as an eternal optimist, I pose the question: is there not now evidence of some significant dilution of the fundamental cleavage to which I referred? My intent is not to argue that one or the other side has begun to prevail; rather, it is to suggest that, perhaps on the basis of the extensive informal meetings -- I repeat the extensive informal meetings, of the past five years, there is now a greater readiness to comprehend and accommodate the position of the other side than heretofore appeared to be the case. If true, this obviously applies more to certain areas than to others, but it is no less significant because this is so.

It is not too much to suggest, then, that a new consensus is emerging which shows that this institution can work -- and work well. I would refer to an interesting supporting phenomenon: we have ceased to hear such frequent appeals for the display of "political will", which often meant the simple rallying by someone to the point of view of someone else; instead we have witnessed true evidence of "political will" in the efforts of those to reconcile different points of view on a balanced basis. In this sense, true political will means not the will to expostulate, but to negotiate.

Our collective will to negotiate in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons is an example.

The Working Group was given a mandate to negotiate, and by negotiate, I mean convene with others with a view to obtaining compromise of differences and agreement on commitment. What the Working Group has achieved is significant progress towards the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention through negotiation on matters of substance and form as well as procedure. For the process of compromise to work required each delegation to observe a rule, unwritten though it may be but essential in its observance to the success of any negotiation: that negotiation be conducted with the temptation to engage in debate held firmly in check. That compromise was achieved is all the more remarkable because the issue of chemical weapons is sometimes an emotional one, and perhaps rightly so; and this aspect is matched by the issue's technical complexity.

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No one is fully satisfied, nor should one be. In the Working Group, unresolved issues, some fundamental, remain. There are indeed unresolved issues standing in the way of resolution of issues confronting all our working groups. In one or two of these groups, the issues are so long-standing as to appear to be permanent fixtures, immovable objects, which no procedural lever is likely to pry loose. In such instances, the time is ripe for us to have a hard look at how much further we can go without either insisting on fresh instructions from capitals or else applying more broadly still the unwritten rule of compromise and negotiation I referred to earlier -- the holding in check of debate which is not in itself an ingredient of the negotiating process.

It is said "that the past is prologue" and so often it is true. This said, in the Committee on Disarmament we can be satisfied that the ground has been well prepared in some areas, but in others, less so.

Some interpretation is needed. Many, perhaps even most, of the Committee's "negotiations" are in fact "the negotiation of an agreement to negotiate". We would all no doubt acknowledge that the process is arduous and patently this body remains deeply divided on matters of substance, even if disagreements are expressed in procedural terms. Nevertheless, in this respect too I suggest there are grounds for anticipating a better future.

The establishment a year ago of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban (NTB) -- even without a mandate to negotiate -- was a source of some satisfaction. The search for agreement to create a similar body on outer space has been unsuccessful thus far but the movement was in the right direction. The experience of the NTB Working Group, and its related body, the Seismic Experts Group, shows that the absence of a negotiating mandate need not be, at a certain stage, an impediment to progress. Consider, for example the proceedings in the NTB Working Group on the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. It was not, of course, the purpose of those discussions to reach coincidence of view, but I am sure that most would agree that the matter was dealt with substantively and in depth, so that when the time does come to negotiate, the task will be easier.

Once again, however, one cannot stop with the observation that a better display of political will has permitted us to progress. There is an impediment, a kind of counterpart argument, that prevents us from maximizing our potential.

There have been proposals over the years for negotiations which are unlikely to get us very far. What they have done is to consume large amounts of time, and it may be legitimate to ask whether the effort to dispose of them is justified by the result.

Surely it is not too much to expect that Governments -- all Governments -- approach the Committee's agenda and work programme with the same spirit of flexibility needed to advance negotiation of substantive issues themselves. In a negotiating body, which this Committee is intended to be, surely it is not an impingement upon the prerogatives of sovereignty to press forward in whatever area broad support for action exists without making progress contingent upon success in other matters where consensus is lacking.

In a few areas, the Committee has progressed beyond "the negotiation of an agreement to negotiate": Radiological weapons is such an area, where political choices must now be made if there is to be success, and it is especially true of the work on chemical weapons: the process of setting out areas of agreement and

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disagreement is now sufficiently complete to permit the commencement of the last phase of negotiations, where work will be intensified, uninterrupted hopefully and systematic, culminating, if successful, in a chemical weapons convention. My point is that the "pre-negotiation" phase, if it may be so called, is now complete. The way is now open to negotiate in substance, and in earnest. I do not deny the difficulties: to enter this phase takes courage, for it implies a reaffirmation of a common commitment to final success, and implies equally a renewed readiness to explore the possibility of trade-off and compromise. We are at that point. Let us tackle such difficulties, as we all intend to; and, more generally, let us set aside still more emphatically procedural linkages of the kind that reduce the work of the Committee to the order of lowest common denominator.

That leads me to the third observation about the Committee's work. The negotiating process here is often as concerned with means as with ends, and that is not surprising. Disarmament -- however the term is interpreted -- is not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end. I began my detailed remarks by referring to the fact that arms control and international security are now viewed more frequently in joint terms. There is general acceptance that the arms control process, no matter how difficult or slow, is essential to international security, and indeed to national security; but what is more fully taken into account, I believe, now is that security must be mutual, just as arms control must be reciprocal.

Put somewhat differently, this means that international security is a shared responsibility.

That shared responsibility is what this Committee is about, and I find it heartening that this perhaps too sophisticated sounding concept has taken greater hold in our recent deliberations. For example, the necessity for reasonable verification of reasoned obligations has become a common theme in our negotiations.

Beyond that, the Committee has the capacity to lift international security and arms control issues out of regional contexts, and to give them a global negotiating focus. That, too, has to do with means as well as ends, and reflects the uniqueness and value the Committee has or could have. One illustration is of course our work on the NTB, where a ban, once envisaged in an East/West context, has now brought under its purview the entire globe. The first practical steps towards establishing a global seismic network to monitor an eventual ban are already in train. In the case of our negotiations on chemical weapons, the universal scope of the ban, now much beyond its exclusive application to the Superpowers, has brought challenges to be sure, but also opportunities to enhance substantially the nature of the final agreement.

This potential has been more fully realized recently by what I suggested earlier was the development of a new consensus. There may be now a greater willingness to come to grips in the negotiating process with the solid, difficult issues, in global terms. There may be, in addition, a spirit of preparedness, not quite so present before, to acknowledge not simply that agreed means of adequate enforcement lie at the heart of any viable arms control treaty, as we believe they do, but also that the time is not right for the most abstract or all-embracing forms of discussion to be pressed to the exclusion of more pragmatic measures.

There is no substitute for realism, especially in the world in which we live. Without ever losing sight of our eventual and over-all objectives, the need to build element by element -- which does not mean piecemeal -- has lately received more attention. Our approaches are less monolithic certainly; but shifts in common interests or likemindedness are occurring, which may augur well for the Committee's

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efforts in such diverse fields as radiological weapons and conventional weapons. Here once more, political will and lack of it are taking on new, more balanced meanings, which -- ultimately -- may give rise to more equitable international security arrangements. At a minimum, they will put into sharp relief, in ways which have not occurred in the past, those who are resisting reasoned arrangements and why.

I have little doubt that some will take a bleaker view than I. But concerned as I must be with Canadian objectives, I think, we have not done badly. Despite some initial procedural difficulties, the NTB Working Group did get down to substantive issues. Outer space, another Canadian priority issue, hopefully will soon have the organizational means to be properly addressed. And as I have said, we can together take some satisfaction in what has been achieved in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

Prime Minister Trudeau has said that security is an elusive concept. It is not only a matter of weaponry. It is a matter of perception. We are grappling with both these aspects, through discussion and through negotiation. As perceptions become clearer, so perhaps do chances for success improve on matters of weaponry. That is the final meaning of the new consensus which I have suggested today.

My personal experiences in this body have been many and rewarding, and for this I have all the membership to thank.

When I began, I spoke of a message of confidence and hope. I do not deny our collective shortcomings, the institutional weaknesses of this body, or the direct effect events outside this chamber have on our efforts within it. But I also reaffirm the three encouraging trends which together are the basis of what I have called the new consensus: the emergence of true political will, the will to negotiate; the recognition that international security is a shared responsibility, and hence a new willingness to come to grips with difficult issues such as practical measures to enforce arms control agreements; and the development of a new realism, developed through discussion and negotiation alike, that has improved our chances of reaching agreement. None of these trends is so firmly established that we can take them for granted: quite the contrary. All must be nurtured if they are to take root; but they exist none the less, and they constitute the nascent state of the momentum and negotiating dynamics which, until now, this Committee has so severely lacked.

For four years I have participated in the great adventure to which this Committee needs most humbly to dedicate itself -- the adventure of building peace. The three trends I discussed now suggest we may be headed in the right direction

May the Committee succeed, which is to say, may we all succeed.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador McPhail for his statement and for introducing the report of his Group. In doing so, I wish to convey our deep gratitude for his important contribution to the work of the Committee. Ambassador McPhail has been an outstanding Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and also an able representative of his country in this Committee, of which he has been Chairman. In bidding him farewell, I hope that in his new post he will remember the colleagues and friends he is leaving here. We shall all miss him, not only for his diplomatic skill, but also for his personal qualities.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Negative Security Assurances, Ambassador Ahmad.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): It is my honour to present to the Committee on Disarmament the Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons contained in document CD/417. The report is divided into the traditional four parts: introduction, organization of work and documentation, substantive negotiations, and conclusions and recommendations.

In carrying out the task entrusted to it, the Ad Hoc Working Group bore particularly in mind its special report to the Committee prepared in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/281/Rev.1) presented last year. The Working Group had held no meetings since that report until it was re-established in 1983, whereupon the prospect of further progress on this issue was debated.

The Working Group took into account, *inter alia*, previous recommendations and existing proposals, as well as resolutions 37/80 and 37/81 of the General Assembly. Though the importance of effective security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was reaffirmed, the general positions of delegations remained unchanged. It was widely held that there was an urgent need to reach agreement on a "common formula" which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. There was also no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention; however, the difficulties involved were also pointed out.

The Chair put forward various proposals as to the direction the Working Group could take, and other delegations put forward proposals as well. However, the conclusions of the Working Group continue to speak for themselves: "Negotiations on the substance of the effective arrangements revealed that specific difficulties related to differing perceptions of security interests of some nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States persisted and that the complex nature of the issues involved in evolving a common formula acceptable to all continued to prevent agreement on such a formula, as well as on an international convention. Under these circumstances," the report continues, "no progress was achieved." Against this background, the Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament that at the beginning of the 1984 session consultations should take place in order to determine the most appropriate course of action, including the resumption of the activities of the Working Group itself.

On a personal note, I must once again express my disappointment and concern at the failure of the Committee on Disarmament to make any substantive progress towards evolving an agreement on this question which would be satisfactory to all concerned, particularly to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Before I conclude, I would like to express my deep and sincere gratitude to the members of the Working Group for their co-operation, which was indispensable for the work of the Group.

I must also put on record my great appreciation for the efficient support and assistance provided by the secretary of the Working Group, Mr. Cassandra, and his associates in the secretariat. Their valuable contribution particularly facilitated the consideration and final adoption of our report.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the Chairman of the Working Group on Negative Security Assurances for the statement he has just made introducing the report of his Group.

We should now proceed to the adoption of the reports of the Ad Hoc Working Groups. Firstly, the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which is contained in document CD/416. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Committee adopts the report of this Ad Hoc Working Group.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): We shall now consider the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Negative Security Assurances contained in document CD/417. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the report is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): The secretariat has requested the floor. Mr. Jaipal has the floor.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): With reference to the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Nigeria regarding his chairmanship in June, I wish to state for the record that the secretariat was informed by the Nigerian delegation of its understanding with the Peruvian delegation. Thereupon the secretariat inquired of Ambassador Peter Cannock of Peru if he would take the Chair in June under rule 10 of the rules of procedure. Unfortunately Ambassador Peter Cannock regretted that he could not do so and preferred to wait for Peru's turn in the month of August.

Mr. CASTILLO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): According to the information available to the delegation of Peru, the Group of 21 adopted by consensus, that is to say without any objection, the following agreement: the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament in the month of June would be held by Nigeria, in July by Pakistan and in August by Peru; as to the Group of 21, co-ordination would be exercised in June by Peru, in July by Nigeria and in August by Pakistan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Permit me to express on behalf of the Soviet delegation and in connection with the adoption of the reports of the working groups gratitude to the Chairmen of the working groups, Comrade Rose, Ambassador McPhail, Ambassador Ahmad, Ambassador Robles, and Ambassador Lidgard. They did, indeed, no small amount of work and, if we did not achieve the desired results, they are, naturally, the least to blame. But I have not taken the floor merely for an expression of thanks. I was not present for today's statement by the United States delegation

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devoted to chemical weapons and it is only now that, having been able to familiarize myself with it, I would like to make a few comments. I am doing this not because I seek a confrontation with the United States delegation or with any other delegation, but because we have to continue next year work on the banning of chemical weapons. I am making my comments in a spirit of goodwill and I would like the United States delegation and a number of other delegations that share its approach to try to understand our position too.

Firstly, the United States representative said, in particular, "We note there has as yet been no detailed reaction by certain key delegations to either of the major papers we have put forward this year". Perhaps we have indeed not come forward with a detailed response or commentary to the document from the United States delegation. But permit me to ask the United States delegation and a number of other Western countries the following questions. Why have they what I would call such an ambitious attitude with regard to their own documents? Why are they silent for many years with regard to other delegations' proposals? Why, for example, have the delegations of the United States or of other Western Powers not commented in detail on the draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the delegation of India? Why have the delegations of Western States not commented on the draft international agreements on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States proposed by a group of socialist countries and by Pakistan? I do not recall there having been any detailed commentary on those, not just working papers, but draft international agreements. The representatives of Western States said merely "en passant" that those initiatives were not acceptable to them, that they were inopportune, and so on. But when there appears a document from the United States delegation or from a number of other Western States, everybody must comment on it in detail. Why? What if our attitude to those documents was, on the whole, negative and we expressed that negative attitude in general form? Why should we be obliged to do it in detail? Are we in a court, that we should have to justify ourselves or submit factual evidence? For our part, we do not make such demands of others. Why, for example, did the United States delegation not present in plenary sessions a detailed opinion concerning the Soviet draft basic provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons? If my memory serves me right, our document was also referred to "en passant".

Another point:

"It must be remembered that we made this proposal over a year ago on the quota and questions about it have been on the table ever since. Only in the last week, when the work of the contact group on stockpiles had been completed, did the Soviet delegation begin to clarify for the Committee its proposal for verification of stockpile destruction by inspection on a quota basis. It must be remembered that they made this proposal a year ago, and questions about it have been on the table ever since."

Well, to begin with, that is inexact. We have explained our position on verification on a quota basis in quite some detail during bilateral consultations with numerous delegations. And it is especially surprising to us that the

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United States delegation, with which we held consultations in particular and openly set out a whole range of criteria and whose reaction we awaited and are still awaiting, should raise this question. The delegation of the USSR has repeatedly emphasized that we have a precise idea of the general principles of verification on a quota basis, and we have repeatedly set out those general ideas. As regards details, we have repeatedly invited all delegations to reflect with us on the most efficient and, at the same time, unobtrusive way of conducting systematic international checks on the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons not on a permanent basis, but on the basis of individual systematic inspections, that is on a quota basis.

A third matter: "My delegation cannot understand", it was said today, "why the Soviet delegation, which ardently professes its interest in completing a convention as soon as possible, refuses to discuss the subject of chemical weapons production and filling facilities". I wish to say that we have a position on this subject and that we have expressed it. We took into account the views of other delegations and we made on 18 August a statement which, of course, everybody will remember. But I have a question of my own: is it not true that the United States delegation has repeatedly declared and continues to declare, including in its statement today, that it will not proceed to the formulation of a draft convention until such time as all questions have been settled? In other words, the entire convention is in suspense. When we say that we wish to suspend one question and are ready to resolve all the others, we are told that it can't be done, that an answer must first be given on the issue concerning which we are proposing the continuation of negotiations.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, our negotiations are negotiations among States with equal rights. But some delegations are suggesting to us that such negotiations were conducted in evil colonial times and not in our day.

One more topic, that of binary weapons. According to the distinguished representative of the United States, Mr. Busby:

"On the other hand, the proposals to single out binary chemical weapons stocks and production facilities for specially severe treatment seem to my delegation to be extraordinarily one-sided. They can only be seen as efforts to preserve Soviet chemical weapons capabilities while eliminating those of the United States."

Nothing of the kind. The United States already has sufficient stockpiles of chemical weapons; its chemical munitions total 3 million units. And we are opposed to binary weapons not because we do not have such weapons and find ourselves in a worse position. As you know, the world has already been a witness on several occasions to a situation in which new types of weapons have appeared in the United States and the Soviet Union has, after a while, been obliged to acquire them too. The same could happen in the present situation. And we fear that, because the appearance of binary weapons in the United States -- and that means in other States too -- will inevitably complicate the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Many delegations share this opinion. It is incomparably more difficult to monitor chemical binary weapons; they represent a qualitatively new step in the development of lethal chemical weapons.

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I was far from making an uncomplimentary remark about the Vice-President of the United States, whom I know personally. The only thing that was said was this: here, within the confines of this Committee, the Vice-President of the United States advocated, or spoke in favour of, the speeding-up of negotiations on the elimination of the threat posed by chemical weapons. Isn't that true? A few months later, the same person cast a deciding vote in favour of the implementation of a programme which is killing those negotiations. Isn't it true that he cast the deciding vote for the implementation of a programme which, from our point of view, is indeed killing the negotiations?

Finally, there sounded in Mr. Busby's last statement a note which really made me prick up my ears. I would like to think that I made a mistake, that I misunderstood the United States delegation. It seemed to me that the tone was once again that of an ultimatum: unless all delegations agree on all issues, there will not be any definition, any formulation of a draft convention next year either. Now that makes me prick up my ears.

I should like to conclude my short statement not in a spirit of confrontation but by an appeal to a number of delegations to show understanding for the positions of other States, respect for their opinion, due attention to their proposals. We have never said that there is nothing in the United States proposals that would be acceptable to us. The examples given here by Mr. Busby are on the whole, it is true, correct. But would the United States delegation not agree that we have made far greater steps towards its position than it towards ours, particularly on such important key issues as the conducting of systematic international inspections in situ and the like? All those present here will agree that the USSR delegation took serious account of the positions of the non-aligned States: at the beginning of this year, we declared our willingness to include a provision concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in a future convention. Those are really substantive steps and we await the same steps from the United States and its allies. I think that if understanding is shown for the position of each country, including my own, progress will certainly be possible. But if attempts are made, so to speak, to twist each other's arms, then the negotiations will simply stagnate.

My statement has probably been somewhat confused, but it was, I hope, intelligible.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): Thank you, Sir, for your statement. On behalf of the Committee, I should like to express our gratitude to the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups on Chemical Weapons and Negative Security Assurances for the skill with which they have performed their important functions. Because of the hour, I would request that we limit our attention to two matters to which I shall now refer.

Firstly, the informal meeting originally scheduled for tomorrow afternoon will be convened at 11 o'clock tomorrow, Wednesday, in the morning. It would

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appear that at this juncture it is too late to set up a drafting group as had been planned. Consequently, it would be better to consider the draft substantive paragraphs in informal meetings and not in the proposed drafting group. I hope that we shall be able to complete our drafting work at these informal meetings by Thursday morning. There will therefore be three informal meetings: on Wednesday, tomorrow, at 11 a.m. and 3 p.m., and on Thursday the 25th at 10.30 a.m.

Secondly, the Group of 21 will meet tomorrow at 10 a.m. in this room.

The next plenary disarmament meeting will be held on Friday, 26 August, at 4 p.m.

The meeting is adjourned.

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