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FINAL RECORD OF THE THIRTY-THIRD MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 13 June 1979

Chairman: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. BENSTAIL
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. A. DUMONT Miss N. FELYRE PEMABAD Mr. C.A. PASSALACQUA
<u>Australia:</u>	Sir J. PLIMSOLL Mr. L.D. THOMSON Mr. A. BEHN Ms. H. WICKES Ms. B. ALLAN
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. P. NOTERDAEME Mr. G. VAN DUYSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. A.C. DE OURO PRETO
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. I. SOTIROV Mr. C. HALACHEV
<u>Burma:</u>	U Saw HLAING U Thein AUNG U Thaung HFUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. R. HARRY JAY Mr. J.T. SNIARD
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. V. TYLNER
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI Mr. H. EL-BARADEI Mr. N. FAHIY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F.M. TSCHAI

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HENDER
Mr. W. KOETTER
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. J. POHLMANN
Mr. H. MÜLLER

Hungary:

Mr. H. DOMOKOS
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN
Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia:

Mr. A. SANI
Mr. D.B. SULEMAN
Mr. I.M. DAMANIK

Iran:

Mr. K. RADJAVI
Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
Mr. M. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Japan:

Mr. H. OGISO
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. T. IVANANI
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya:

Mr. SHITEMI
Mr. A. JEP ODENDO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Miss A. CABRERA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDENBILEG

Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco:

Mr. H. CHRAÏBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN

Mr. A.J. ILLERBURG

Nigeria:

Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO

Pakistan:

Mr. J.K.A. MARKER

Mr. H. AKRAM

Peru:Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA

Mr. H. PAC

Mr. H. KRUCZYK

Romania:

Mr. C. LILIE

Mr. V. TUDOR

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. S. STROMBACK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN

Mr. H.V. PESTEREV

Mr. M.G. ANTIUCHIN

Mr. M.M. BELOUSOV

Mr. E.D. ZAITSEV

Mr. V.P. PERFILIEV

Mr. A.I. TILOURENIKOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUTHERHAYES

Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. G.M. SEIGNIOUS

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE

Mr. T. BARTHELEMY

Mr. D. KOELMAY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Mrs. R.L. DE NEGER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRIHUNEĆ

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

Assistant Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJORNERSTEDT

The CHAIRMAN: Before giving the floor to the first speaker on my list I would like, on behalf of the Committee, to extend a warm welcome to Mr. George Seignious, the head of the delegation of the United States of America, who joins the Committee today as representative of his country.

It being the first time that Mr. Seignious is among us, I am sure that the Committee welcomes him as warmly as I said and that the members will pay great attention to what he is going to say to the Committee today.

Mr. SEIGNIOUS (United States of America): I am pleased and honoured to be able to address the principal multilateral disarmament negotiating body at this special moment in the history of our efforts to halt the buildup of nuclear armaments. I had hoped to speak at the Committee's inaugural session, in what would have been my first appearance before an international audience following my assumption of responsibilities as Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Unfortunately, my confirmation hearing before the United States Senate prevented me from meeting you then.

But I can imagine no more propitious time to come before you than now, with the events of the Vienna Summit fresh in my mind. I was personally moved as I witnessed the signing of the SALT II agreements. It is indeed an act of statesmanship, and a momentous occasion for the entire world, when the leaders of two nations which have the capacity to destroy each other, and in doing so to contaminate much of this planet, choose instead to work together to limit the nuclear arsenals they have within their power.

This is no small accomplishment, and it has not been an easy task.

SALT II took over six years to complete. I can appreciate the impatience many of you have felt with the pace of the negotiations. But the agreement we have achieved is one of enormous complexity -- the text, with agreed statements and common understandings, is 78 pages long; and the issues involve the basic security, indeed the survival, of our two nations. Moreover, we have reached agreement on a complex package of restrictions and obligations which not only are mutually acceptable but also meet the critical test of adequate verifiability. Having participated in the negotiations and in the deliberations of my Government in Washington, I can testify personally to the sense of determination and responsibility

(Mr. Seignious, United States)

with which both sides have carried out this momentous task, and I can testify that this determination and responsibility will continue as we seek deeper reductions and increased restraints in SALT III.

Although a great amount of attention has been devoted to SALT by the public media, I believe it would be worthwhile to say a few words about the major provisions of the new agreement. SALT II consists of three basic parts -- a Treaty that runs until 1985, a Protocol that lasts through 1981, and a Statement of Principles for further negotiations.

As you know, the Treaty sets an over-all limitation of 2,400 for each party on its strategic forces, reductions to reach this over-all ceiling must be carried out within six months of the agreement's entry into force, with further reductions to a ceiling of 2,250 to be completed by the end of 1981. The Treaty also imposes subceilings affecting heavy bombers equipped for long-range cruise missiles and launchers of missiles carrying multiple independently targetable warheads, or MIRV.

The Treaty limits the qualitative race in weapons technology by banning the flight-testing or deployment of more than one new type of intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM; it prohibits the development of a rapid-reload capability for launchers for this type of missile; and it bans certain new nuclear weapons systems which now are feasible technologically, but which have not yet been developed or deployed. An example is ballistic missiles on surface ships. The Treaty bans any increase in the number of warheads on existing types of intercontinental ballistic missiles while setting a ceiling of 10 warheads on the one permitted new type of these missiles.

The Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It lasts, as I noted earlier, until the end of 1981. Basically, the Protocol places temporary limits on certain weapons systems. It prohibits the flight-testing and deployment of air-to-surface ballistic missiles; it bans the deployment of mobile intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and flight-testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles from such launchers. It also bans the deployment of sea-launched and ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges of over 600 kilometres.

The Statement of Principles charts the course for the next phase of SALT, in which we are committed to seek further numerical reductions and qualitative limits. Resolution of the temporary limits in the Protocol will be an agenda item for SALT III.

(Mr. Seignious, United States)

No description of SALT II would be complete without giving some indication of the complexity and pervasiveness of its verification provisions. These are an essential part of the obligations established by the Treaty and the Protocol. Let me mention a few of them.

As in SALT I, interference with national technical means of verification is prohibited, as is deliberate concealment that impedes verification of compliance. Precise definitions and counting rules have been incorporated to solve such problems as determining which missiles are to be counted as IIRV and which are not. For the first time in the history of negotiations on strategic offensive arms, the United States and the Soviet Union have exchanged information setting forth the numbers, by category, of their respective strategic offensive nuclear forces limited by SALT. This basic data, to be exchanged twice a year, will ensure that each nation has confidence that the other is applying the provisions of the agreement in the same manner. It will also provide a clear agreed baseline from which further reductions can be made. The United States-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, established in SALT I, has been maintained as a mechanism for working out procedures for implementation of the agreements and for resolving questions of compliance.

These are the main provisions of the agreement signed yesterday at the Hofburg in Vienna. I would like now to share with you my thoughts about the significance of the SALT II agreement, looking first at its more specific consequences and then considering some of the broader implications.

First, SALT II places a firm ceiling on United States and Soviet strategic force levels, thereby setting an upper limit to the competition in strategic forces and precluding an unconstrained race for superiority. It begins the process of reductions -- also a first in the history of strategic offensive arms negotiations.

Second, an important start has been made at curbing the qualitative race in strategic weaponry. This aspect of the arms race is the most intractable. Restraining it is a task for which we must constantly redouble our efforts, lest technology escape our ability to devise policies and methods to set rational limits. I believe that we have an opportunity to arrest the high-speed technological advances that are being made in weapons systems. For the sake of all of us, we must not let this opportunity pass. We do not intend to.

(Mr. Seignious, United States)

I will make no claim today that SALT II brings this part of the arms race to a halt, but it does take some very important first steps.

Third -- and this is a direct consequence of the first two points -- SALT II strengthens strategic stability and reduces the risk of nuclear war. It does this by providing a framework for preservation of essential equivalence in strategic offensive forces, while at the same time reducing the area of uncertainty, and thus the potential for miscalculation, about what the other nation is doing. Force planning on both sides will be able to proceed with the knowledge, for example, that the other party will have no more than a given number of strategic missile launchers, or no more than a given total of strategic warheads, between now and 1985. Without SALT II, this would not be the case. In a broader sense, the very achievement of SALT II contributes to stability by demonstrating the continued will and ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to negotiate limits to their military competition.

This brings me to the fourth point. The agreements signed in Vienna specifically commit the United States and the Soviet Union to continuing the ten-year SALT process -- without interruption and with the aim of achieving significant reductions in strategic offensive arms, as well as further qualitative limitations.

We take this obligation with the utmost seriousness.

The achievement of agreement in SALT II, with a commitment to continuing the process in SALT III -- and this is my fifth point -- is a measure of the determination of the United States and the Soviet Union to fulfil their obligation under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a Treaty which a predecessor of this Committee, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, played a central role in shaping. As you know, article VI commits the parties to good-faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. My Government is deeply conscious of its obligation to the more than 100 nations parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which have forsworn nuclear weapons. Their continued restraint, and that of other non-nuclear-weapon States, is essential to preventing a dangerous multiplication of the risk that conflict or miscalculation could lead to nuclear war. We are hopeful that SALT II, and the commitment to continued pursuit of nuclear disarmament which it embodies, will encourage those States which have not yet acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to do so.

(Mr. Seignious, United States)

My sixth point has to do with verification. The SALT II Treaty and Protocol and their negotiating history demonstrate that any agreement which substantially affects the military security of a nation must contain provisions which give the parties full confidence in their ability to know whether other parties to the agreement are meeting their obligations. SALT II meets this test.

Finally, it is my ardent hope and firm belief that SALT will provide a powerful stimulus to other efforts to enhance the security of all nations through the limitation and reduction of arms, rather than through their continued accumulation. The links between the process of SALT and other disarmament efforts are neither rigid nor always clear. Disarmament is not an interlocking puzzle, in which pieces must be put in place one at a time in a fixed sequence to complete the whole. I see it as a mosaic -- each piece contributes to completion of the total design, further enhancing our perception of what remains to be done. SALT is a major piece of the mosaic. Its placement sharpens our vision of the pieces still needed and strengthens our resolve to complete the design.

My Government is determined to pursue with renewed vigour efforts to achieve agreement on the full range of arms control issues which are the subject of current negotiations. As announced in the Summit Communiqué yesterday, President Carter and President Brezhnev have agreed to active continuation of the search for mutually-acceptable agreement in the negotiations on anti-satellite systems. The two Presidents also reached agreement at Vienna that United States and Soviet representatives will meet promptly to discuss resumption of the talks on questions concerning arms limitation measures in the Indian Ocean and to discuss questions related to the next round of negotiations on limiting conventional arms transfers.

In the multilateral area, I would hope particularly that the achievement of SALT II will be a spur to progress towards agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe and to fresh thinking about how to achieve mutual restraint in the deployment of theatre nuclear weapons. As you are aware, my Government, in concert with its NATO allies, is already giving careful consideration to the latter problem.

(Mr. Seignious, United States)

Three of the arms control negotiations in which my Government is now engaged are aimed at producing the basis for international conventions, open to signature by all nations. For that reason and because of their intrinsic importance, these negotiations are of special interest to this Committee.

First, in the comprehensive test ban talks, the United States and its British and Soviet negotiating partners are persevering in their efforts to achieve agreement on a treaty which will prohibit all nuclear weapons tests in all environments, with an integrally related protocol prohibiting peaceful nuclear explosions. A number of difficult issues remain to be resolved in the critical area of verification. Here in Geneva, the delegations are continuing their work at this very moment, but much difficult negotiating remains before them. My Government is conscious of the impatience of the international community with the pace of negotiations. It shares with all of you a sense of urgency about achieving a comprehensive and durable ban, with effective verification, which attracts the broadest possible international support.

Second, United States and Soviet negotiators will meet here in Geneva next month to resume their work on a complete, effective, and adequately verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. Their objective is agreement on a joint initiative for presentation to this Committee. Much has been accomplished, but serious difficulties remain, again principally in the crucial area of verification. My Government considers it imperative that efforts for greater progress should be intensified. We understand the sense of urgency which the Committee on Disarmament and the rest of the international community attach to these negotiations, and we intend to do everything possible on our part to move them forward. We also understand the desire of many members of this Committee to involve the CD more directly in work on a CW convention, and we are giving careful thought to this question.

Finally, as you know from the Summit Communiqué, bilateral agreement has been reached on all major elements of a treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling, and use of radiological weapons. We hope to be able to present a joint initiative to this Committee for its consideration in the near future. This ban will fill a gap in the set of multilateral agreements dealing with those weapons

(Mr. Seignious, United States)

which are defined as weapons of mass destruction. It will be a significant achievement, and one further step along the road to ensuring a more secure international environment.

Ladies and gentlemen, last night when the President arrived back in Washington, he reported promptly to the Congress. I would like to share with you part of his thoughts as presented in that address. President Carter said:

"I come in a spirit of patience, of hope, and of reason and responsibility.

Patience -- because the way is long and hard, and the obstacles ahead are at least as great as those which have been overcome in the last 30 years of diligent and dedicated work.

Hope -- because I am able to report to you tonight that real progress has been made.

Reason and responsibility -- because both will be needed in full measure if the promise awakened in Vienna is to be fulfilled, and the way opened for the next phase in the struggle for a safe and sane world."

All of us share a common goal -- peace with security. If each of us uses the talent, the imagination, the intelligence and the perseverance that we individually may have and that you, the major nations of the world, have as a resource, then surely you share the views of both President Carter and President Brezhnev when they agreed that there is a common bond for survival, a common bond for the reduction in the arms race and a search for the ability -- for the sake of our children and grandchildren -- to live in a secure world.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): An event of great political significance took place yesterday at Vienna: the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was signed during the course of the meeting between L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and J. Carter, President of the United States.

The Treaty which was signed in Vienna is the result of long and strenuous efforts by both sides. The new treaty is realistic and concrete. The Treaty in essence establishes quantitative limitations on arms and curbs their qualitative improvement. It should be noted in particular that the Treaty is based on the principle of parity and equal security. Provision is made for the reliable verification of the fulfilment of all obligations under the Treaty by both sides.

Speaking in Vienna, L.I. Brezhnev stressed that "Each provision -- I would even say, each word of the Treaty -- has been weighed and thought over dozens of times. Naturally, it is a compromise; it could not be otherwise. Each side would like the text of the Treaty to be somewhat different, more suitable for its interests, but each side had to give ground on some points, taking into account the partner's legitimate interests".

The SALT II Treaty was not built up from scratch, for it is the logical continuation of such most important agreements concluded in recent years as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and others. The SALT II Treaty is the outgrowth of the first important Soviet-United States agreements in the field of strategic arms -- the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive weapons (SALT I) which were signed on 26 May 1972. It is based on the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War which is a most important agreement in the history of Soviet-United States relations.

In 1972 a first step was made towards ending the race involving the most destructive weapons -- the race which threatened to reach a quantitative and qualitative level where "guns fire by themselves". Agreements aimed at slowing down the arms race in the nuclear missile field entered into force for the first time in the post-war period.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Even at that time, in 1972, it was agreed that the USSR and the United States would continue negotiations with a view to deepening and expanding the agreements that had been signed.

In the course of the Soviet-United States summit negotiations in 1972 and 1973 it was noted that the SALT I agreement, which was to expire in five years, should be followed by a SALT II agreement. What was meant was a comprehensive treaty which would bring about both a reduction in the levels of strategic offensive weapons and a further limitation of their qualitative sophistication. The outlines of the SALT II agreement were defined in the course of the summit negotiations at Vladivostok in November 1974.

In the long run the efforts made for many years have yielded results. A detailed and carefully balanced agreement has been elaborated. The document signed at Vienna represents the most significant step that has ever been taken to curb the arms race. For several years -- on a number of important aspects through 1985 -- it creates specific obstacles to the stockpiling of the most terrible and costly types of weapons.

The Treaty signed yesterday and other joint documents have been published in the press and are already being commented upon widely throughout the world. In this connexion there is probably no need to dwell on particular details of the documents which were signed. I should only like to emphasize that the SALT II agreement establishes for each side an equal total number of strategic weapon delivery vehicles of 2400 and the obligation to reduce this number to 2250 within the period of validity of the Treaty. The Treaty also introduces other limitations for various types of strategic offensive weapons. The limitations on these weapons are not only quantitative but also qualitative. The Treaty provides for effective control over compliance with all its provisions based on unhampered verification by national technical methods.

The agreement drawn up is significant for a number of reasons. It is undoubtedly an important stage in the process of developing relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, which itself contributes to improving the international climate.

At the same time the Treaty is not only in the interests of the two States. The conclusion of the Treaty is in the interest of the peoples of the entire world, for the achievement of this agreement leads to the strengthening of international security in general. The threat of a nuclear war will diminish. Mutual trust will grow.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

It is important that SALT II is not an end but another significant step towards further curbing the strategic arms race. Taking into account their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons -- to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament -- and also having as their goal the achievement of general and complete disarmament, the USSR and the United States have agreed to begin -- immediately after the entry into force of the SALT II Treaty -- active negotiations on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. In the course of their meeting in Vienna, the leaders of the USSR and the United States signed a joint statement on the principles and basic guidelines of further negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms.

The universal interest in and support for the efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States aimed at achieving this historic agreement are well reflected in the documents of the most authoritative international organization of the world today -- the United Nations. The Final Document of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly which was held in summer 1978 urges that a SALT II agreement should be concluded at the earliest possible date and that it should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations. The session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission that has just completed its work in New York also stressed the importance of the strategic arms limitation negotiations.

In their discussion of other questions connected with the solution of problems of curbing the arms race and of disarmament, the leaders of the USSR and the United States expressed their support for the Final Document adopted at the United Nations General Assembly special session devoted to disarmament. The sides expressed their support for the convening of a second United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament, and for that session to be followed by the convocation of a world disarmament conference, with universal participation, adequately prepared and at an appropriate time.

We proceed from the premise that both the Treaty which was signed yesterday and the discussions which took place between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States will also help to stimulate other negotiations which are being conducted on questions of curbing the arms race and on disarmament, including those in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament.

This refers above all to the negotiations on the most topical problem of disarmament -- nuclear disarmament. The joint Soviet-United States communiqué stresses that the leaders of the USSR and United States committed themselves

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

to take major steps to limit nuclear weapons with the objective of ultimately eliminating them, and to complete successfully other arms limitation and disarmament negotiations¹.

In particular the examination in the Committee on Disarmament of the question of ending the nuclear arms race and of nuclear disarmament, including specific proposals submitted on the question, will, in our view, promote the solution of this problem.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a serious threat to international security. The States which are already in possession of nuclear weapons bear a special responsibility in the matter of displaying restraint. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an exceptionally important problem. The participants in the Vienna meeting stressed that the USSR and the United States are in favour of the further strengthening of the régime of **non-proliferation** of nuclear weapons and confirmed their resolve to continue to comply strictly with the obligations they have assumed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The two sides expressed their intention to co-operate closely with other countries with a view to the successful conclusion of the 1980 Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and called upon all the States which had not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Measures such as the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States also contribute to the limitation of the nuclear arms race. As is known, this question is also on the agenda of the Committee. In our view, the specific proposals made to this end by a number of States, including the Soviet Union, offer a sound basis for the elaboration of appropriate international agreements even at this session of the Committee on Disarmament.

The conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general cessation of nuclear-weapon tests will be an important step towards limiting the nuclear arms race. The urgency of this question has been repeatedly emphasized in the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, as well as in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It was noted at the meeting in Vienna that some progress had been achieved in the trilateral negotiations on the elaboration of an international treaty providing for a complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests in any environment and an associated protocol. The sides reaffirmed the intention of the Soviet Union and the United States to work jointly with the United Kingdom for the early completion of this treaty.

The development of new types and systems of weapons and, above all, of weapons of mass destruction greatly threatens peace and universal security. That is why

(Mr. Iskraelyan, USSR)

progress in the negotiations on this question is of special importance. As is known, some progress in this direction has been made in the past. These were but first steps. The Soviet delegation believes that the Committee on Disarmament has good possibilities to achieve now, at the current session, tangible results in this field. As is known, in the final document of the Vienna meeting the Heads of State of the USSR and the United States confirmed with satisfaction the achievement of bilateral agreement on the basic elements of a treaty on the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. "An agreed joint proposal" -- says the Final Document -- "will be presented to the Committee on Disarmament this year". After considering this joint proposal, the Committee could submit to the United Nations General Assembly a specific text of an agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons. This will be no small contribution to the limitation of the arms race in new dangerous areas and will demonstrate the effectiveness of the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1979.

We further hope that the favourable climate created by the successful conclusion of the Soviet-United States Summit will also contribute to progress in such an important field as the prohibition of chemical weapons. The leaders of the USSR and the United States reaffirmed the importance of a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, and agreed to activate their efforts with a view to the preparation of an agreed joint proposal for submission to the Committee on Disarmament.

We have mentioned but some questions of disarmament, and particularly those which are on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and which will undoubtedly be influenced positively by the Vienna meeting. The positive impetus of the Vienna meeting will, of course, affect other negotiations on the limitation of the arms race which are being conducted through other channels and in other forums.

The Soviet delegation which has come out in the Committee with a large number of proposals was prepared, together with other countries members of the Committee, to proceed without delay to the elaboration of specific agreements on this and other aspects of the vital question of ending the arms race and on disarmament. This would be our concrete response to what we consider to be the fully justified expectations which have been generated in the world by the historic meeting in Vienna and its results.

Mr. PÖHLMANN (Federal Republic of Germany): First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like to welcome you personally as head of the Brazilian delegation to the Committee on Disarmament and to congratulate you on the assumption of the chair of the Committee for this month. On behalf of my delegation I wish you the best success.

I also take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to the new heads of delegations: Ambassador Dumont of Argentina, Sir J. Plimsoll of Australia, and Ambassador Radjavi of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We look forward to co-operating closely with them.

At the outset of my short intervention, I wish to thank Mr. Seignious, head of the United States delegation, and Ambassador Issraelyan, head of the Soviet delegation, for informing this Committee about the summit meeting held in Vienna a few days ago.

On behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany I would like to welcome the signing of the SALT II agreement and express my congratulations to the representatives of the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany considers this agreement a major step towards nuclear disarmament and an important contribution to stabilizing East-West relations. We have heard with satisfaction that the two countries are going to pursue their negotiations with the aim of preparing the ground for further agreements, thereby complying with the recommendations of the Final Document of the United Nations special session devoted to disarmament.

We are convinced that the signing of this agreement will contribute to a climate favourable to further progress in arms control and disarmament. SALT II is thus of great relevance in enhancing our work here in the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. SUMNERHAYES (United Kingdom): I wish to thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his statement. We have listened with great interest to his report of the meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev, which resulted in the signing of the SALT II agreement.

The British Government welcomes the conclusion of negotiations and the signing of the SALT II agreement. My Government has long supported efforts to achieve strategic arms limitation. It hopes that the Treaty will now be ratified. My Government attaches particular significance to this Treaty in the context of the

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be reviewed in 1980. The signing of this agreement is evidence of the desire of the two major nuclear-weapon Powers to curb the vertical proliferation of strategic nuclear weapons.

We have also studied with interest the contents of joint communiqué issued at the Vienna summit. We have noted that several items of direct relevance to the work of this Committee were discussed at this meeting. My delegation hopes that the signing of the SALT II agreement, and the discussions which took place in Vienna, will give an impetus to this Committee in its attempt to resolve many other pressing problems in the field of arms control and disarmament.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): The Committee on Disarmament has just heard two important statements by the distinguished representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States announcing the conclusion and signature of another strategic arms limitation agreement -- SALT II.

Thus one more step has been made to avert a nuclear catastrophe and to consolidate international security and mutual confidence between the two great Powers. After a difficult negotiating process lasting seven years, a sense of responsibility for the peaceful development of the world has led the USSR and the United States to put their signatures to an important agreement --- an agreement which, for the first time in the history of mutual relations of the two Powers, seeks not only to raise a barrier to the arms race but also to lead to significant cut-backs in inventories of nuclear weapons.

On behalf of the Polish Delegation I should like to extend to the delegations of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America our warm congratulations. In its statement of 18 June, the Government of the Polish People's Republic placed on record the satisfaction and gratification of the entire Polish people over that historic act which we could all follow on television.

The signature of SALT II -- I am sure -- has been welcomed by public opinion everywhere, for it strikingly coincides with the universal aspiration to secure for this and for future generations life in a peaceful and disarming world. Indeed, we look forward with anticipation that the SALT II provisions relating to future disarmament measures will be followed up with a sense of responsibility and political goodwill. By advancing the cause of general and complete disarmament they will safeguard the security of all States and of all political groupings.

I am sure that, we all are going to study carefully the documents which were signed in Vienna yesterday by the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States. In my preliminary remarks, however, I should like to refer briefly to some conclusions which, in the view of my delegation, can be drawn from that momentous event.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

...First, the two great Powers have confirmed in Vienna that they are fully aware of their responsibility for the peaceful development of the world and that they are determined to take a creative and active part in that development;

Second, the SALT II negotiating process has confirmed that the security of States can be assured without sustained military rivalry and an arms race. This has its obvious and important implications for the prospects of peace and of the socio-economic development of all States;

Third, the SALT II provisions relating to verification indicate that one can work out effective solutions which enhance the sense of security without compromising the other interests of States;

Fourth, the agreed guidelines for the next stage of the nuclear disarmament process, which are contained in the Statement of Principles to govern the SALT III negotiations, have major implications for the opening-up of new possibilities for the multilateral disarmament efforts pursued here, in the Committee on Disarmament, and elsewhere; and

Fifth, the new political climate generated by the signature of the SALT II agreement augurs well for prospects of important progress in the bilateral talks concerning chemical weapons, as well as the trilateral negotiations concerned with nuclear test ban.

I am sure that these conclusions will not be lost on the Committee on Disarmament as well. Indeed, the new momentum of disarmament negotiations must find its distinct reflection in the work pursued in this body. In the view of my delegation, the Committee is now more than ever duty-bound to accelerate its work in areas which have direct relevance to the Vienna agreement. That includes, in the first place, the question of negotiations to halt the production of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament. That also includes the question of the negative guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. Last but not least -- it includes our priority items: prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the elimination of chemical weapons.

My delegation is confident that the Committee on Disarmament will not miss the opportunity which has been opened up by the SALT II agreement, and which will be reinforced by its early ratification. We are confident that the cause of general and complete disarmament will be significantly advanced. My delegation is prepared to co-operate with all members of the Committee in facilitating that objective.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I should like first of all to express my delegation's gratitude to Mr. George H. Seignious II, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, for the valuable information he presented to us in the statement he has just made concerning the immediate background and content of the Treaty which, as the fortuitous culmination of the long cycle of negotiations which have become known as SALT II, was signed yesterday at Vienna by the Chiefs of State of his country and of the Soviet Union -- a historical event at which President Brezhnev and President Carter were the principals and which Mr. Seignious had the honour of witnessing.

Our gratitude also goes to the distinguished representative of the other State party to the Treaty which I have just mentioned, Ambassador Issraelyan, who in his statement made a number of supplementary points that are certainly valuable for the correct evaluation of this Treaty.

The importance of the statements we have just heard is all the greater in the light of what has been said to the effect that the Treaty in question is regarded not as an end in itself but as a point of departure for the third round of negotiations, namely, SALT III which should lead the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals to effect reductions and qualitative limitations of those arsenals that are truly meaningful in the disarmament context.

My delegation considers that bilateral negotiations like these and multilateral negotiations such as those we are endeavouring to engage in here are not competitive and even less incompatible and that, on the contrary, they should be regarded as complementary and mutually beneficial. For this reason we are convinced that, in accordance with the spirit of the Final Document approved by the first General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, and particularly paragraphs 27 and 114 of that Document, it would be highly desirable and of mutual advantage if -- just as the two Superpowers are kept fully and appropriately informed of any points on which agreement may be reached here -- the Committee on Disarmament, which it has been agreed by consensus constitutes the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", should similarly be regarded as the rightful recipient of all documents of the type that have just been signed at Vienna.

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

We consider that the Committee on Disarmament and its States members have the right -- not only with a view to facilitating their task but also placing them in a position to make a more useful contribution to the common cause -- to take note officially of any documentation of this nature in its entirety.

In view of what I have said above, my delegation expresses the hope that the delegations of the two States engaged in the SALT negotiations will be able to transmit to the Secretariat of the Committee the text of the Vienna documents, the Treaty and its annexes, with a view to their reproduction for information purposes as official documents of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): the Mongolian delegation has the honour to inform the members of the Committee on Disarmament that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic has today, 19 June 1979, made a statement expressing wholehearted support for the new Soviet-United States agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, signed yesterday at Vienna by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and by J. Carter, President of the United States of America.

In accordance with the instructions received from the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic I would request you, Mr. Chairman, to arrange for the distribution of the above-mentioned statement by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation will submit this document immediately to the Secretariat of the Committee for distribution, and will take advantage of the opportunity of making a statement at one of the Committee's next meetings.

As I am taking the floor for the first time at the very beginning of the Committee's summer session I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the post of Chairman of the Committee and wish you success in the discharge of your responsibilities.

The Mongolian delegation has today listened with great attention to the very important statements made by the USSR and United States delegations, and would take this opportunity of sincerely welcoming in the Committee and congratulating the USSR delegation as well as the United States delegation, which at this meeting is being represented with distinction by Mr. G. Scignious II, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, on the successful results of the Vienna summit meeting whose significance extends well beyond the framework of bilateral Soviet-United States relations.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): My delegation would like to express its support of the appeal just made by the distinguished representative of Mexico to the United States and to the Soviet Union, to make available to this Committee any documentation pertaining to SALT II. I should also like to use this occasion to state that the Swedish Government has already expressed its appreciation and satisfaction of the conclusion of the important agreement on SALT II.

We share the hope which has been expressed here that this agreement will also give impetus to other disarmament negotiations, and I am thinking there, in particular, of the comprehensive test ban treaty.

I should also like to express our sincere gratitude to Mr. Seignious, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and to Ambassador Issraelyan, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union in our Committee, for having given us this very interesting report of the conclusion of the SALT II agreement. We consider it very essential, with regard to this Committee's important task to negotiate disarmament agreements, that it is kept fully informed of negotiations going on in other fora.

As I have said, we fully support the appeal by the distinguished representative of Mexico.

Mr. SEIGNIOUS (United States of America): I pledge that I will dispatch to this Committee copies of the United States version of the SALT Treaty tomorrow.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): I am taking the floor on the understanding that the list of speakers on this question is exhausted. If that is so, I would like cordially to thank the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, Mongolia, Sweden and Mexico for their kind words about the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet delegation. I wish to assure you, my dear colleagues, yet again, that the Soviet delegation will spare no effort to co-operate closely with you in difficult and perhaps even lengthy quests, with each passing day, for the achievement of agreements designed to consolidate peace and security and co-operation among all the delegations represented here in this Committee and in the whole world.

The CHAIRMAN: As there are no more speakers on my list I should like to propose to members of the Committee, as we have a few procedural questions pending, that we suspend this meeting and reconvene, in approximately ten minutes, in an informal meeting of the Committee.

The meeting was suspended at 4.50 p.m. and resumed at 5.40 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: According to the rules of procedure of this Committee, the Chairman of the Committee, in consultation with delegations should present a proposal on the organization of our work. After holding consultations with different groups and different delegations, and also in informal meetings, the Chairman came to the conclusion that a consensus has emerged concerning the organization of our work as it is presented in the informal paper circulated to all delegations of the Committee.

This being the case I shall read out the decision of the Committee, taken by consensus and related to the organization of our work.

"In compliance with rule 28 of its rules of procedure, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following programme of work for the second part of its 1979 session;

21-22 June	Nuclear test ban
25-29 June	Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
2-6 July	Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
10-13 July	New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
16-27 July	Chemical weapons
30 July-3 Aug.	Nuclear test ban
	Consideration and adoption of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In adopting its programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its rules of procedure".

In adopting this programme of work the Committee has decided to split one of its items into two parts, namely, the item concerning the nuclear test ban. It was agreed that the first part would be devoted to an exchange of views and (formal or informal) proposals that delegations wish to present to the Committee. During the second part of the consideration of the item, among other things, the Committee will receive, take note, and comment on the report of the experts on seismic events.

In addition, bearing in mind the understanding reached during the first part of the 1979 session, negotiations should proceed informally, to help the Committee reach an agreement concerning the procedure to be applied when dealing with the item on chemical weapons. Those negotiations, requested during the first part of this session, have already started; they are proceeding and it is my hope that, in the very near future, we can come to a conclusion concerning these aspects of the item on chemical weapons.

(The Chairman)

If no other delegation desires to take the floor I take it that it is the wish to the Committee to adopt the programme of work as has been established, with both the understandings indicated previously.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Thursday, 21 June 1979, at 10.50 a.m. During this time consultations will be continuing and, as I stated before, if there is a possibility of convening an informal meeting this week on the procedural aspects of dealing with chemical weapons I shall propose to members of the Committee to do so.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.