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FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVENTEENTH MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 8 March 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. L.D. THOMSON (Australia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. BENSMAIL
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. F.J. DAVILA
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. L.D. THOMSON Mr. A.J. BEHM Ms. M.S. WICKES
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. P. NOTERDAEME Mr. P. BERG Mr. G. VAN DUYSE Mr. P. LAVALLEYE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. G.A. MACIEL Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. I. SOTIROV
<u>Burma:</u>	U SAW HLAING U THAUNG HTUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. R. HARRY JAY Mr. J.T. SHIARD
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. RU ^{OV} ZEK Mr. V. TYLNER Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. M. EL-BARADEI Mr. N. FAHMY
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. G. ALULA
<u>France:</u>	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER

Mr. S. KAHN

Mr. N. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER

Mr. J. PÖHLMANN

Mr. H. MÜLLER

Hungary:

Mr. H. DONCKOS

Mr. C. GYÖRFFY

Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia:

Mr. A. KAMIL

Mr. M. SIDIK

Mr. J. DAMANIK

Iran:

Mr. M. FARTASH

Mr. D. CHILATY

Italy:

Mr. N. DI BERNARDO

Mr. M. MORENO

Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Japan:

Mr. M. OGISO

Mr. T. NONOYAMA

Mr. T. IWANAMI

Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya:

Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROELES

Miss A. CABRERA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco:

Mr. M. RAHHALI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIJN

Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria:

Mr. O. ADENIJI

Mr. K. AHMED

Mr. T. OLUMOKO

Pakistan:

Mr. H. HUMAYUN KHAN

Mr. M. AKRAH

Peru:

Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA

Mr. H. PAĆ

Mr. M. KRUCZYK

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. C. ENE

Mr. V. TUDOR

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. B. PONSEKA

Miss M.L. NAGANATHAN

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. S. STRÖMBACK

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. A.M. VAVILOV

Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV

Mr. Yu.V. KOSTENKO

Mr. H.G. ANTIUKHIN

Mr. I.P. PASECHNIK

Mr. O.K. KEDROV

United Kingdom:

Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. C. FLOWEREE
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. M. DALEY
Mr. R. MIKULAK
Mr. M. SANCHES
Mr. J. FILSON

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mrs. R. LISBOA DE NECER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ
Mr. B. BRANKOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU
Mr. MUNZA LOMPOMBO
Mr. BOLUMBU BASUMBA

Mr. MARKER (Pakistan): Permit me to express, on behalf of my delegation, our pleasure at seeing a distinguished representative of Australia preside over the deliberations of the Committee on Disarmament. We are sure that, under your able guidance, the important work which is on our schedule this month will be successfully accomplished.

Today, I would like to express Pakistan's views regarding the formulation of the agenda and programme of work of the Committee, and also to say a few words on the question of the highest priority in the field of disarmament — the need for nuclear disarmament.

Pakistan is of the view that the Committee on Disarmament is, as the Final Document of the special session stated, "the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum". As such, the negotiating mandate of this Committee covers all matters which can be negotiated in the multilateral context, including all the recommendations for specific action in various areas contained in the Programme of Action of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. We therefore believe, that, in adopting its agenda, the Committee must clearly establish this wide range of its responsibilities. At the same time we are not unaware of the need to ensure that, in our agenda and programme of work, sufficient precision is introduced so as to enable the Committee to conduct concrete negotiations at each stage of its work. These two goals can be reconciled by adopting an agenda which would, on the one hand, outline the main areas of the responsibilities of the Committee on Disarmament, and on the other, mention under each one of these main areas those specific subjects to which priority has been accorded by the United Nations General Assembly or by Member States.

Those amongst us who participated in the special session will recall that, immediately prior to its formal adoption, the programme of action of the special session was divided into various parts under a number of headings. Pakistan would suggest that the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, in order to underline its broad mandate, should enumerate these areas of responsibility of this body. I may mention that among these areas were: nuclear disarmament, non-use of nuclear weapons, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear-weapon-free zones, zones of peace, other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, reduction of military budgets, confidence-building measures, disarmament and development, disarmament and international security, and, finally, general and complete disarmament. In the programme of the special session, and more particularly at the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, this Committee has been entrusted with certain more specific responsibilities for negotiations during the current year. These

(Mr. Marker, Pakistan)

responsibilities, as I said in my previous interventions, include firstly the elaboration of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the negotiation of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the conclusion of a convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons. These tasks should be reflected under the relevant areas of the Committee's responsibility that I have mentioned, and some other subjects may be added, in response to the specific proposals put forward by Member States during the current session of the Committee.

One such area for priority consideration by the Committee is that of nuclear disarmament. The Final Document of the special session, in more than one paragraph, has reaffirmed that the goal of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race has the highest priority. This is not surprising since the very first resolution of the United Nations was for the prohibition of nuclear armaments. It would have been relatively easy then to dismantle such few nuclear weapons that had been produced, and to devise effective measures to prevent their further production and development. Proposals and counter-proposals for this purpose were put forward at the time by the Soviet Union and the United States, but, unhappily, they were not seriously pursued. Instead, in the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust and incipient conflict, attempts were intensified by one of the Powers to retain its strategic advantage and by the other not to be left behind.

Now the two Powers have attained approximate parity in nuclear arms and, as everybody knows, they have the capability not only to annihilate each other but to destroy all civilization. The world continues to live under the cloud of this balance of terror. But strategic balance will not be a durable means for ensuring the world's security. Not only is it inherently unstable, but its maintenance necessitates the consumption of an ever-increasing proportion of the world's material and human resources.

It is therefore natural that we should welcome the initiative taken by one of the major nuclear-weapon Powers to initiate the discussions of nuclear disarmament within this Committee. The task, as we all know, is complex and involves, firstly, measures to halt and reverse the arms race, secondly, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and, thirdly, prevention of the spread of these weapons.

As regards the question of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race, the international community has placed primary emphasis on the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Pakistan continues to hope that this treaty will be concluded during the current year, and effectively prevent the further testing of nuclear weapons, especially by those Powers which have reached an advanced stage of sophistication in the development of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Marker, Pakistan)

The paper submitted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in document CD/4 addresses itself to various aspects of the question of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. The Pakistan delegation would like to welcome this paper warmly. We are particularly interested in the acknowledgement in the proposal that the nuclear arsenals of the various Powers are not equal, and that the disparity in these arsenals would require different kinds of contributions from each of the nuclear-weapon Powers at different stages of the negotiations for nuclear disarmament. Secondly, we also welcome the practical suggestion implied in the paper that, in view of the disparity in nuclear arsenals, the initiation of negotiations for nuclear disarmament need not be prevented by the absence of one of the nuclear-weapon Powers from these negotiations. My delegation agrees with the statement made by Ambassador Issraelyan when introducing document CD/4 that such negotiations for nuclear disarmament within the Committee will not constitute an obstacle to negotiations being held outside this forum, such as the bilateral USSR-United States negotiations on strategic armaments; but that the negotiations in this Committee could very well complement and facilitate the talks being held elsewhere and vice versa.

At the same time, it is important to ensure that the discussions of nuclear disarmament within this Committee or elsewhere do not become a cover for the further controlled expansion of the arms race. Pakistan welcomes recent indications from both the Soviet Union and the United States that a SALT-II accord is in the offing. We sincerely hope this is so. At the same time, we would be remiss if we did not express the hope that the SALT-III agreement will be reached with greater dispatch and that it will include significant quantitative reductions in strategic armaments as well as call a halt to their qualitative development.

My delegation expresses the hope that concrete steps will soon be taken to reduce the balance of weaponry presently deployed in certain parts of the world, particularly in Europe. We look forward to the reactions of other parties to the important initiative of the French Government for a European security conference which could consider reductions in the immense arsenals presently deployed on this continent.

Once confidence is created that nuclear disarmament will not compromise the security of any of the five Powers concerned, it is more than likely that negotiations could be initiated on the various aspects of disarmament indicated in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the special session.

(Mr. Marker, Pakistan)

One of the essential means for creating such confidence, both among nuclear-weapon Powers and non-nuclear-weapon States, is to secure agreement for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The Final Document has called for consultations leading to an international agreement for the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war. We hope that in the near future circumstances will make it possible for this Committee to advance to this subject. My delegation also considers as relevant the idea that each of the nuclear-weapon Powers undertakes in a binding form not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. A proposal for this purpose has been made by the socialist countries in the context of Europe. We hope this concept can be applied to all nuclear-weapon Powers in all regions of the world.

However, the first step which can and should be taken in this field is the elaboration of a convention to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. I have dealt at length with this subject in my previous intervention in this Committee and I shall not repeat myself. At the same time it is relevant to underline that unless the non-nuclear-weapon States are assured, in a binding and credible fashion, that their security will not be threatened by nuclear weapons, the goal of non-proliferation and therefore of nuclear disarmament will continue to elude the world community. We hope that sufficient time will be allocated in the programme of work for the current year to enable a consideration of the draft conventions on this subject submitted by Pakistan and the Soviet Union during the last session of the General Assembly. We shall, in the near future, request formal circulation of our document in this Committee.

The goal of nuclear disarmament, as I have said, must include ways and means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to States other than the five nuclear-weapon Powers. The danger of nuclear proliferation haunts various parts of the world. If States such as Israel and South Africa acquire a nuclear-weapon capability, it would produce significant consequences not only for peace and security in these regions but would threaten international peace as a whole. It would certainly erode the efforts of the international community to build a viable structure of non-proliferation.

(Mr. Harker, Pakistan)

The danger of nuclear proliferation, unfortunately also exists in the region of south Asia. The countries of the region, and the world community, are only too well aware of the fact that a nuclear explosion has taken place in this region. The statements made by the Indian Government, regarding the "peaceful" nature of this explosion, would carry more conviction if India was prepared to respond more positively to the many initiatives that have since been taken for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Nor is our concern allayed by the fact that significant and sensitive parts of the Indian nuclear programme remain outside any international safeguards.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, our nuclear programme is entirely peaceful, and is operated under international safeguards. If India is genuinely concerned about the danger of proliferation, as we in Pakistan are, it could accept at least some of the initiatives that we have suggested mutually to assure each other on this question.

Pakistan would suggest that India should accept the proposal, endorsed by the United Nations, to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in south Asia, involving the renunciation of the acquisition of nuclear weapons as well as the international inspection of all nuclear facilities that exist in all the countries of south Asia. Secondly, Pakistan would be prepared to accept the application of full scope safeguards to all its nuclear facilities on a reciprocal basis, if India also indicates its acceptance. Thirdly, if India were to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Pakistan will be only too happy to follow India's lead in the matter.

The Committee on Disarmament must play its part in promoting ways and means of excluding nuclear weapons from those areas where they do not exist at present. Otherwise the so-called nuclear balance will continue to be threatened from new quarters. This is one of the many reasons why Pakistan attaches so much importance to the subject of nuclear disarmament.

Mr. DOMOKOS (Hungary): I would like to take this opportunity to extend to you my congratulations on the assumption of your office and express my conviction that the work of our Committee will be as successful under your chairmanship as it was in February. This assumes a special significance, since during this month we have to consider matters of substance that are before the Committee on Disarmament.

In my present statement I would like to deal with certain aspects of a single subject, namely, nuclear disarmament, and particularly with working paper CD/4 submitted jointly by seven socialist States, and then to touch upon the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of scientific experts.

The attention of the multilateral deliberative and negotiating disarmament forums has so far been concentrated mainly on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and on limiting and completely banning nuclear explosions. This was justified in the past and will be justified in the future as well.

In our days when the most urgent task is to halt the nuclear arms race, we can not forget that making the Non-Proliferation Treaty universal in the real sense of the word has become a substantial precondition for avoiding the danger of a nuclear war. The efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States, as well as the close co-operation among States parties to the NPT, have contributed a great deal to the result that there has been no case of the use of nuclear weapons during the last 34 years.

However, the danger of proliferation still exists, and States with nuclear ambitions may emerge from time to time. Growing scientific and technical knowledge and the increasing economic capability of countries make it possible in principle for more States to decide to go nuclear. All this can increase the real danger. That is why we attach special significance to the second review conference of the NPT, which offers another possibility of strengthening the non-proliferation régime. We also hope that the preparations for the conference will have the result that further States, including the so called "near-nuclear States", will accede to the Treaty.

There can be no doubt that the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty would offer another possibility of halting and eliminating the nuclear arms race. It is not by chance therefore that the successful completion of the trilateral talks is also being repeatedly urged in this Committee. Accomplishing the complex tasks of nuclear disarmament is a time-consuming exercise. Apart from the CTB treaty, which is a vital element in halting the qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms

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race, I cannot omit stating that there is an urgent need for such measures, which are able not only to stop, but also to reverse the arms race, and which can ultimately lead to nuclear disarmament. We should start without delay the preparations of negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. However, one may ask if it is worth wasting our time and energy on the preparation of such negotiations when we have not even reached a CTBT.

We earnestly hope that obstacles standing in the way of reaching a CTB treaty will soon be abolished. It therefore seems appropriate and justified to start right away laying the basis for further negotiations on nuclear disarmament by preparing a proper framework through preliminary consultations on it. After creating the preconditions, the Committee may start negotiations on its substance without losing time. That is why the proposal of the socialist States contained in working paper CD/4 is timely and logical.

Working paper CD/4 submitted by seven socialist member States is a practical reflection of the priority tasks in the field of disarmament enumerated in the Final Document of the tenth special session and reiterated in a concentrated form by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session. It is a comprehensive proposal to start consultations and negotiations on a multilateral basis on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles up to their complete destruction.

The proposal touches upon generally-recognized priorities and contains concrete ideas. It embraces in complexity the major subjects in the field of nuclear disarmament which, in our judgement, should take a central place in the future work of the Committee.

At the same time flexibility is one of the main merits of the proposal. It avoids pressing rigid ideas and considerations as to the ways and methods of conducting preliminary consultations and at a later stage negotiations on the subject. It is to be discussed and formulated by the Committee itself, together with such aspects as the degree of participation of individual nuclear-weapon States in particular measures, with due account of the quantitative and qualitative arsenals in the possession of the States concerned.

In our view, the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum, since four of the five nuclear-weapon States are represented in it together with a considerable number of non-nuclear-weapon States having the possibility to contribute to progress towards nuclear disarmament. However, the participation of China will be indispensable to ensure a substantial advance.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

The proposal is by no means meant as a substitute for other on-going bilateral and multilateral negotiations, but represents a new additional initiative for disarmament efforts where wider participation is desirable and useful.

As one of the sponsors of that working paper, I was satisfied to hear the positive remarks made by several delegations, the latest being that of the distinguished representative of Sweden, on our joint initiative. My delegation would be glad to hear comments and suggestions from other delegations of the CD, representing nuclear-weapon States, and non-nuclear-weapon countries. That could help in working out the most suitable forms and framework of consultations aimed at preparing and starting negotiations on substantive issues of nuclear disarmament within the shortest possible time.

Many questions may be asked about the details and alternatives raised by the working paper. I would not like to go into them, since they have been clarified in an exhaustive manner by my distinguished colleague Ambassador Isrraslyan in his statements on 6 February and at the present meeting. We are confident that the sponsors of the working paper will be ready to answer further questions which may arise and to conduct informal consultations in any required form.

At the same time it is the position of my delegation that questions of nuclear disarmament, by virtue of the importance of their implementation, should take their due place in the work of the Committee in accordance with the proposals contained in working paper CD/4. This should be given proper attention when the Committee draws up the programme of its work even for the present part of its annual session, and to reserve sufficient time for appropriate consultations, preferably in April.

As is known to all the delegates to the Committee on Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic events has made considerable progress in the work entrusted to it by the relevant decisions of the CCD and CD.

The Ad Hoc Group continued work at its seventh session on the elaboration of the principal scientific and technical guidelines for setting up and running the international seismic data exchange system so that this global network of data exchange could be established and put into operation after the entry into force of the treaty banning nuclear explosions in all environments.

As we can see from the progress report submitted by the Ad Hoc Group to the Committee, there has been considerable progress in working out the contents of the chapters of the final report. Judging by the preparations mentioned in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the progress report, we can rightly hope that all the work of the

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

Ad Hoc Group will be completed in good time. My delegation supports the idea that the Committee should approve the suggestion made by the Group in paragraph 7 of the progress report concerning the date and duration of its next and -- we hope -- final session, with a view to giving the experts sufficient time to prepare their drafts.

I would like to take this opportunity to explain the position of my delegation concerning some ideas expressed in the Group and in the Committee by certain delegations to the effect that the experimental exercise of the seismic data exchange system might be held concurrently with or before the entry into force of the CTB treaty.

My delegation, like many others, is of the opinion that the seismic data exchange system as a means of verification is subordinated to the future CTB treaty, that it is to contribute to verification of the implementation of the treaty, and can by no means be considered a precondition to the conclusion of the treaty.

We all are aware of the fact that the seismic data exchange system consists of highly complicated machinery which will comprise not only particular seismic stations but specially-equipped international data centres and a sophisticated communication network. Therefore it can be used for an experimental exercise in its final, global form, when all its elements are functioning simultaneously in a complex way, otherwise it may easily show a false picture. This global network can be set up and tested only after the entry into force of the treaty.

Testing a system not properly constituted and consisting of differently equipped national seismic stations may produce deficient and disputable data. A possible defective final product of the experimental exercise may discourage certain States or give a pretext to others to keep away from the treaty, and that would by no means serve the cause of the nuclear disarmament.

It is well-founded reasoning also, that until the conclusion and entry into force of the CTBT we would not know which countries parties to the treaty would participate in the final system and how the network has to be completed.

These are the ideas and considerations I wanted to express in connexion with the questions of nuclear disarmament and the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): A few days ago the Committee on Disarmament adopted its rules of procedure. Members of the Committee noted with great satisfaction the positive results of prolonged, intensive consultations, which had taken almost a month's work. Consultations are at present proceeding on the preparation of the Committee's agenda and programme of work. In the course of these consultations, as also during the discussion on the rules of procedure, a constructive spirit and willingness to co-operate are being displayed. All this cannot but give rise to a certain satisfaction with the Committee's activity.

But matters can be viewed from a different angle as well. Indeed, more than six weeks of work and almost one-half of the duration of the present session have already gone by, and yet the Committee has not, strictly speaking, even embarked upon its principal task-- that of conducting negotiations on questions of the limitation of the arms race and of disarmament. This fact gives rise not merely to dissatisfaction but to serious concern.

In its statement on 24 January this year, at the opening of the Committee's session, the Soviet delegation emphasized that questions of procedure and organization of the Committee's work should not be overestimated and should not take too much time; they should be solved as soon as possible, we stressed, so that the Committee might successfully start the consideration of questions of substance. The Soviet delegation is again insistently advocating that the Committee should, without losing any time, begin negotiation here and now on the substance of disarmament problems. The questions whose examination was recommended by the General Assembly to all States and, in particular, to States members of the Committee are well known, and we consider that the final settlement of organizational matters should not have the effect of further delaying consideration of these problems.

We believe that circumstances for their effective consideration are on the whole favourable. Indeed, the Soviet-United States negotiations on SALT-II, which are to set a specific limit to the further stockpiling of the most destructive and expensive types of weapons, are nearing completion. In the words of Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the entry into force of a SALT agreement "will mean that

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

the process of curbing the arms race, a process embarked upon at the initiative of the USSR, is continuing". This agreement will probably also help to revive other negotiations now being conducted in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race such as those on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

It is widely recognized that the most urgent question in present conditions is that of starting negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament. As L.I. Brezhnev stressed in his pre-election speech on 2 March this year, "we consider this to be an exceptionally important matter and are prepared to start such negotiations".

Today the Soviet delegation would like to revert to working paper CD/4, submitted to the Committee on 1 February by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, concerning negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

We are doing so, first, because delegations have manifested interest in our proposal. Specific questions have been asked about its substance. We have been requested to supply further details on a number of points contained in our proposal and, if possible, to develop them in more concrete terms.

Secondly (and this, of course, is the most important point), we are convinced that the problem of nuclear disarmament is the priority issue for the Committee, which is under a duty to revert to it again and again.

On behalf of the sponsors of working paper CD/4, the Soviet delegation would like to express thanks to the delegations of Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Sweden and others who have welcomed the proposal submitted with regard to starting negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We agree with those delegations which described it as a step towards the implementation of the relevant recommendations adopted by the General Assembly both at its special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-third session.

Other delegations have promised to study working paper CD/4 with care and to express their views on it at a later stage. We shall await their statements with interest and will, of course, answer the questions they may put in future.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The motives of the sponsors of working paper CD/4 were explained in sufficient detail in their statements before the Committee. Allow me to answer the questions that were put to us in connexion with the proposals contained in this document. We have answered certain questions of a more specific nature in the course of our contacts with individual delegations. Others are of more general interest. It is with these that we should like, with your permission, to deal now.

The time-frame of the proposed programme. It has been pointed out to us that working paper CD/4 says nothing about the "agreed time-frames" for the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their complete elimination, mentioned in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the special session. The view has been expressed that this might be an oversight on the part of the paper's sponsors and could be rectified.

Document CD/4 indeed says nothing about time-frames for the implementation of the programme as a whole or of its various stages. This was done deliberately. In putting forward a proposal on starting negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament (and this is precisely the purpose of the working paper), we tried to display the greatest possible flexibility and to refrain from fixing, let alone imposing, specific dates or time-limits. To take a realistic view, the conduct of appropriate negotiations and the implementation of a programme of nuclear disarmament is by no means an easy matter, as it entails prolonged efforts and concordance of positions. That is why we left the question of time-limits open, on the principle that it should be subject to agreement between the participants in the negotiations. In our paper it is stated that the cessation of the production, the reduction and the destruction of nuclear weapons "should be carried out by stages on a mutually acceptable and agreed basis", which, of course, also applies to possible time-frames. Furthermore, paragraph 50 of the Final Document refers to "agreed" time-frames. The only time-limit which we consider appropriate to propose at this stage concerns the beginning of consultations and of negotiations on the substance of the problem. We consider that the consultations could be started already in the course of the Committee's spring session and the negotiations before the end of 1979.

Degree of participation by individual nuclear-weapon States in the proposed measures. I would remind the Committee that it is emphasized in document CD/4 that the degree of participation of those States in measures at each stage should be determined "taking into account the quantitative and qualitative importance of the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and of other States concerned". The same condition is mentioned in paragraph 49 of the Final Document of the special session. We consider it to be important. Indeed, the meaning of this provision can be reduced to the principle that, as levels of nuclear strength are gradually reduced, the existing military balance should remain undisturbed. In other words, no prejudice should be caused to the safety of any State. That is why it is wise to take into account the arsenals of both nuclear-weapon States and of the other States concerned.

What would the degree of participation of individual nuclear-weapon States be in practice? Obviously it could vary according to the volume of weapons being reduced, taking into account the condition mentioned above. The volume of measures at all stages, commencing with the first, for nuclear-weapon States should be specified in the course of the forthcoming negotiations. This will certainly be one of the principal objectives of the negotiations. In any case, the need to guarantee the non-impairment of the existing balance in the field of nuclear strength is inescapable.

The question of the relationship between the proposed negotiations and the Soviet-United States negotiations on strategic arms limitation. These negotiations are unquestionably closely related in content, although there also exist substantial differences between them. The SALT negotiations are concerned with strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. The proposed negotiations are broader in nature, covering the entire range of nuclear weapons, including the cessation of their production, the reduction and the destruction both of the weapons themselves and of the means of their delivery. It goes without saying that the preparation and conduct of these latter negotiations must not prejudice current and future SALT negotiations; they could take place in parallel.

Participation of all (or not all) nuclear-weapon States in the negotiations and in the preparatory consultations. We confirm quite definitely that all States without exception which possess nuclear weapons must participate from the very outset in the proposed negotiations, whose object is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. These negotiations will be so fundamental in nature and so broad in scope, and have such radical consequences that the non-participation of even one nuclear-weapon State would seriously undermine them by destroying the link with the actual situation in the world, would tend to maintain distrust and, in the final analysis, would affect their results.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Furthermore, it should be remembered that our proposal presupposes the participation in the negotiations of a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States. Such States are widely represented in the Committee on Disarmament, which seems to us to be the most appropriate forum for conducting the negotiations. These States have a direct interest in the nuclear question and have, as we know, specific proposals of their own. The participation of these countries makes the presence of all nuclear-weapon Powers at the negotiating table all the more imperative.

The preparatory consultations are another matter. In suggesting that they should be conducted within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament, we were aware that China is not as yet represented in this body and that there are no signs of its coming here in the near future. The latest events in south-east Asia have merely confirmed this. Nevertheless, in order not to delay the preparation of the negotiations, we agree to begin it without China. The preparatory work would include, above all, determination of the range of questions of substance to be considered in the negotiations, i.e. their agenda or programme, and also various organizational matters relating to the conduct of the negotiations (time-limits, procedure, etc.).

Here we come to the question of how to approach the preparation of the negotiations. Some delegations were interested in our views on that point. In our opinion, it would be necessary, for a start, to hold a discussion in the Committee on the document proposed by the group of socialist countries. It would be logical if the Committee's agenda and programme of work took this into account. A broad exchange of views would make it possible to bring to light the possibility of working out agreed proposals concerning the start of negotiations.

It would, of course, be interesting for us to hear the views of other members of the Committee regarding methods of conducting the preparation of the negotiations. We do not wish to impose our ideas in this matter; our position is open.

We have heard it argued that the question of holding negotiations on nuclear disarmament is allegedly not yet ripe, that the situation is at present unsuitable for negotiations of that kind. It is said that some of the nuclear-weapon Powers have reservations, doubts and even objections in this respect. What can be the answer to this? We have already stated more than once that we entertain no

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illusions concerning the possibility of a quick solution being found to the whole set of nuclear disarmament problems, but consider that the start of negotiations on this matter should not be delayed any further. We foresee that these negotiations will be difficult and prolonged. But allow me to ask: what negotiations in the sphere of disarmament have not given rise to difficulties, and which of them were completed in a few days or weeks? On the contrary, it is known that many bilateral negotiations-- and multilateral ones, too-- in the sphere of disarmament fail to yield the desired results for a long time.

The conduct of negotiations on disarmament questions is itself a positive phenomenon in international politics. Only those who rattle the sabre, who seek the further aggravation of the international situation, the arms race, the unleashing of wars-- only they reject attempts to strive, in the course of political negotiations, for a mutually acceptable solution that would be in the interests of mankind. That is why arguments about the alleged non-existence of suitable conditions for the conduct of negotiations on nuclear disarmament are absolutely without foundation.

In conclusion I should like to dwell briefly on certain doubts which sometimes make themselves felt, even if they are not expressed by our interlocutors. I shall not waste your time in refuting assertions about the "insincerity" or "lack of seriousness" of document CD/4.

Apprehensions are sometimes expressed to the effect that consideration of the proposal submitted by the socialist countries might allegedly deflect the Committee's attention from such urgent problems as the banning of nuclear weapon tests or the prohibition of chemical weapons. We can say straight out that such apprehensions are without foundation. We are not in the least inclined to minimize the urgency of, for example, the conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The solution to this problem ripened and, to a great extent, was evolved in the course of the negotiations familiar to us, and every effort should be made to complete its solution. But can the broader problem of the cessation of the production and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons be removed from the Committee's agenda? Can discussion of this vital problem be postponed indefinitely? Working paper CD/4 submitted by the group of socialist countries calls, precisely, for the starting of negotiations on this matter.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, please allow me first of all to convey to you the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of duty as the presiding officer of the Committee. We look forward to a fruitful month under your guidance.

Please allow me also, since I was unavoidably absent from Geneva practically for all the month of February to convey, through you, my great appreciation of the work done under the Chairmanship of your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Argentina.

The progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events which is now before the Committee calls for no more than a procedural decision on the timing of the next session of the Group. I shall express the view of my delegation on that question shortly.

In the meantime, however, please permit me to put in its proper context the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts. When the Group was set up almost three years ago, it was in realization of the vital importance which the technical aspects of the issue of verification would have in stimulating agreement on and in the operation of a CTBT. The Ad Hoc Group has in its previous reports and, in particular, the report contained in document CCD/558, clarified many aspects of the technicalities of an international data exchange network involving several stations located around the world. My delegation is grateful for and is appreciative of the valuable contribution which the Group of Experts has thereby made to the solution of one of the problems which ostensibly are quoted as holding up the conclusion of a CTBT. Such a network of seismological stations which will permit a truly international participation in the verification procedure of a CTBT will, we hope, be appropriately located in all hemispheres. We can already foresee the necessity for the experts to give attention in their recommendations to ways and means of diffusing technical knowledge for effective participation by areas where, by their own earlier observation in document CCD/558, there exists a gap which has to be filled for an efficient network.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

The relationship between the work of the scientific experts and negotiations on a CTBT was aptly summarized by the spokesman for the three negotiating Powers when he informed the CCD last year that there was agreement among them that the guidelines for setting up and running the international seismic exchange should be laid down in an annex to the treaty and that the detailed organizational and procedural arrangements for implementing the international exchange should be worked out after the entry into force of the treaty, drawing of course on the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Group. Thus, the practical application of the data exchange network, through experimental exercises, was not immediately seen and cannot be seen now as providing a reason for holding up the conclusion of a CTBT, very useful though these exercises will be. Indeed, the whole issue of verification of which the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts is only a part, albeit an important part, has been -- in the view of my delegation -- considered to the point where we think it should no longer provide an excuse for further delay in the submission of the draft of the tripartite negotiators. A combination of the various means available -- national, international and on-site, when determined to be necessary for double assurance -- should have provided an adequately verifiable guarantee of compliance. What is lacking, we believe, is a will to conclude these negotiations. Technical solutions can be devised only for technical problems; a political decision is necessary for a political issue.

The question then arises where do we go from here? Will this part of the session of the CD end once again without its starting work on a CTBT? Here I share completely the views expressed by my distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union when he says that, important as the work which the CD has done over the last six weeks has been, we cannot escape the fact that we really have not got down to substance. It would be a pity if the Committee were to wind up at least this part of its annual session without really getting down to substance.

The answer to that question in my delegation's view no longer rests exclusively with the tripartite negotiators on a CTBT. The CD is now master of its agenda; it has within its ranks a fourth nuclear-weapon Power to whom the contents of a CTBT are of great and intimate concern. In other words, if it was believed that the old CCD could be presented with a tripartite draft to which it would then apply mere cosmetics as its sole contribution to the elaboration of the treaty, the CD -- even with its present physical composition, not to mention its

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potential composition going by the name plates -- cannot be expected to be satisfied with such a role. My own delegation will certainly be greatly interested inter alia in the duration of a CTBT, the review procedure, the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, to mention only a few. From what we have gathered secondhand, I dare say our views on these issues are not necessarily the same as those of all or some of the tripartite negotiators. Will it therefore not be in the interest of participation by all its members on the basis of full equality, and here I am quoting rule 3 of the rules of procedure, if we were in this Committee to begin to exchange views first hand on the proposed text?

I hardly need reiterate the importance which my delegation, as party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, attaches to the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon testing as a beginning of the assumption by the nuclear-weapon States of their obligation by which they undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. We have said it often in the past, and it bears repetition, that Nigeria as party to the NPT finds it increasingly difficult to press other non-nuclear-weapon States to become parties when, despite the pleas of the international community, as expressed in the Final Document of the Special Session, the nuclear-weapon States proceed at a speedier rate to conduct tests. We believe in non-proliferation, but we do not believe in the divine right of some to remain nuclear-weapon States. The statistics on nuclear explosions conducted in 1978 which, with her characteristic clarity, were given by Mrs. Thorsson, the distinguished leader of the Swedish delegation, in her statement on 6 March, were to say the least most shocking. Will the Committee continue to be satisfied with optimistic statements on an almost completed draft when all the facts point to a certain understanding -- or so it seems to us -- to delay a CTBT while waiting for another "agreement" which, because of its own long delay, is being increasingly seen by some observers as capable of being nullified by technical advance. Can we wait until that treaty is presented to the international community with fanfare before we expect to receive a draft CTBT? This is, I think, a dilemma to which we should most seriously address ourselves, and it is not one which, judging by the statement we have just had from the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union -- it is not one which is of concern only to the non-nuclear-weapon States. I noticed with considerable interest his concern that something positive should emerge, in this respect, during the course of the work of the Committee.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

I shall conclude by reverting to the approval sought by the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on the dates for its next meeting. Several views have been expressed by members of the Committee on the timing of the second part of the annual sessions of the Committee. Even while rule 7 throws the issue open, the Secretariat should not, as I understood it did in this case, propose to the Expert Group dates which may pre-empt the Committee's decision on its own working period. My delegation believes that the Ad Hoc Group should meet and submit its report at a time when it can be reasonably expected that the CD will be able to consider the report with all the seriousness it deserves. Perhaps late June to early July should be a more realistic date in this connexion.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his statement and for his kind remarks addressed to my predecessor and myself.

I would point out that we still have an hour at our disposal and I would wish to use this time to make a proposal for your consideration. We have, this morning, had a number of important and authoritative statements and I think that they have all, in one way or another, touched on the next stage of our work which is the drafting of the agenda and programme of work --- a stage which I indicated at our previous meeting that I myself was very anxious to see us move on to. One distinguished delegate reminded us this morning that we do not have eternity at our disposal.

If the Committee would make no objection, I would now propose that we recess to hold an informal meeting in some five minutes' time. I would then wish to put some views before you in relation to the drafting of the agenda and the programme of work.

Is there any objection?

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 12.00 p.m. and resumed at 12.55 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: I would simply like to announce that we shall meet again on Tuesday morning to hear statements and to conduct other business but, with the concurrence of the Committee, I shall convene an informal meeting at 3 p.m. on Monday, 12 March 1979.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.