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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIXTEENTH MEETING  
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 6 March 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. L.D. THOMSON (Australia)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. BENSMAIL
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. F.J. DÁVILA Mr. A.N. MOLTENI
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. L.D. THOMSON Mr. A.J. BEHM Ms. M.S. WICKES
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. P. NOTERDAEME Mr. P. BERG Mr. G. VAN DUYSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. G.A. MACIEL Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. I. PETROV Mr. I. SOTIROV
<u>Burma:</u>	U SAW HLAING U THAUNG HTUN
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<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. L. SOLA VILA Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. V. TYLNER Mr. L. STAVINCHA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. M. EL-BARADEI Mr. N. FAHMY
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. T. TERREFE

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. B. D'ARBOVILLE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. S. KAHN  
Mr. H. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. FEIFFER  
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Mr. J. FOELMANN  
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Mr. H. MÜLLER

Hungary: Mr. H. DOMOKOS  
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY  
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia: Mr. A. KAMIL  
Mr. M. SIDIK

Iran: Mr. H. FARTASH  
Mr. D. CHILATY

Italy: Mr. N. DI BERNARDO  
Mr. M. MORENO  
Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Japan: Mr. H. OGISO  
Mr. T. NONOYAMA  
Mr. T. IWANAMI  
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES  
Miss A. CABRERA

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. RAHHALI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN

Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria:

Mr. O. ADENIJI

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Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

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Mr. C. ENE

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Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. B. FONSEKA

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. A.M. VAVILOV

Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV

Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN

Mr. I.P. PASECHNIK

Mr. O.K. KEDROV

United Kingdom:

Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

Mr. P.H.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A. FISHER  
Mr. C. FLOWERREE  
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY  
Mr. R. MIKULAK  
Mr. I. FILSON  
Mr. M.L. SANCHES  
Mr. H. DALEY  
Mr. B. KILLIAN

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT  
Mrs. R. LISBOA DE NEGER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ  
Mr. B. BRANKOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU  
Mr. M. LOPOMBO  
Mr. B. BASUMBA

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): As I understand it, this is the first plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament during the month of March and, consequently, with the distinguished representative of Australia in the chair. Being the first speaker this morning, I should like to extend to you, Mr. Chairman, my most sincere congratulations and my firm belief that, under your leadership the work of the Committee on Disarmament during this month will proceed efficiently and effectively.

Since this is the first time that I take the floor during the 1979 session of the Committee on Disarmament I would also like to extend my greetings to all distinguished delegations of the Committee. In doing so I wish to extend a special word of welcome to the delegations of those countries which are taking part in these multilateral disarmament negotiations for the first time.

The purpose of my intervention today is to express the views of the Swedish Government on the present status of the negotiations regarding a comprehensive test ban treaty. I will in that context discuss the progress report of the seventh session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events. This report is presented to the CD today. Finally, I should like to make some general and preliminary remarks with regard to document CD/4 which contains views and suggestions on a possible approach in the CD to the question of nuclear disarmament.

The highest priority must be accorded by the Committee on Disarmament to the question of a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapons test. Although a test ban treaty does not, in our view, in itself constitute a disarmament measure it would be highly instrumental in the efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation.

The present status of the CTB question gives cause for grave concern on the part of the Swedish Government. Sweden, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, prepared a draft treaty text and submitted it to the CCD in March 1977. We later welcomed the announcement in mid-1977 that the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom were engaged in trilateral talks on the subject. The fact that at long last substantive negotiations had started inspired great expectations, and we placed much trust and confidence in the negotiating Powers. From reports that reached us we got the impression that the negotiations were progressing fast and we were led to believe that their conclusion could be attained within a relatively short period of time. Today it is regrettably clear that recent developments in the matter do not come up to earlier well-founded expectations.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The Swedish Government is deeply disappointed at the lack of final results in the trilateral talks which has further delayed the multilateral CTB negotiations.

This, I believe, represents not only the view of the Swedish Government, but that of numerous other Governments, as well as hopes and aspirations all over the world. Suffice it to recall that the international community has at its highest political level -- the United Nations General Assembly -- repeatedly appealed to the three States to submit a draft treaty on a comprehensive test ban to the multilateral negotiating body. Particular importance was attached to resolution 32/78 of 12 December 1977 in which the General Assembly at its thirty-second session urged the three nuclear-weapon States to expedite their efforts as to enable the CCD to submit a draft CTB treaty to the United Nations special session devoted to disarmament. The support of the three nuclear-weapon States for this resolution constituted a clear expression of their political will and a commitment to initiate multilateral negotiations in advance of the special session.

Furthermore, in two different resolutions the General Assembly at its thirty-third session made urgent appeals to the three States to expedite their negotiations. Many Governments, including my own, have recently with increased emphasis made appeals in the same direction.

It is a matter of acute concern for the international community that, in spite of the great urgency of the matter, the three nuclear-weapon States have not concluded their CTB negotiations and that there is no firm indication as to when the results thereof can be expected.

We are all aware that certain extremely difficult problems in the negotiations have in fact been successfully resolved by the joint efforts of the three negotiating Powers. At the same time the importance of a successful conclusion of the negotiations has been underlined by recent developments. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the remaining difficulties can also be solved.

While the conclusion of a CTBT has been delayed, the testing of nuclear explosions, and thus the development of nuclear weapons, have continued unabated. Observations and analyses made at the Hagfors Observatory in Sweden showed that in all 48 nuclear explosions were conducted in 1978. Two out of three Chinese explosions were conducted in the atmosphere, spreading radioactive particles throughout the northern hemisphere. This addition of radioactivity -- although small -- to our environment is unacceptable.

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Ten nuclear explosions were observed to have taken place in the United States, while six French and two British explosions were recorded. Twenty-seven of the nuclear explosion tests during 1978 were carried out by the Soviet Union. To judge from the numbers, this is the most intense testing by the Soviet Union since the partial test ban treaty went into force in 1963. This significant increase in testing is evidence of the need for a rapid conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

In order to enable the CD to fulfil the task assigned to it by the United Nations General Assembly in respect of such a treaty, it is of crucial importance that it possesses a clear understanding of the present status of the trilateral negotiations. For that reason I reiterate the suggestion made in this Committee on 24 January by the Swedish Foreign Minister to the effect that the three Powers give the members of the Committee a full account of the remaining difficulties. That could be done in a closed meeting.

After these general remarks on the CTB matter, I will now turn to the progress report of the seismological expert group. The Swedish delegation finds the work of the expert group to be a most valuable contribution to efforts to establish a monitoring system acceptable to all. The progress report before you is the result of considerable work carried out by scientific experts from a number of countries around the world. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts was established to specify the characteristics of an international data exchange with the objective of multilateral co-operation in the verification of a CTBT. We had the satisfaction of seeing that a number of States outside the CD also took part in the Group: Austria, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand and Norway. We also very much welcome the participation of Mexican experts and the representatives of WMO.

The work of the Group concerns the verification of a test ban and is of vital importance for the whole CTBT question.

The experts provided us already in 1978 with a very solid report (CCD/558), in which they unanimously proposed a data exchange between some 50 stations around the globe, using WMO channels for data transmission and some special data centres for the handling and analysis of the data. In this way States would be provided with basic information for evaluating compliance with the CTBT. This proposal already in itself was a significant contribution to the solution of the verification problem.

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The experts are now in the process of preparing a second report which elaborates on the data exchange in technical detail and outlines experimental investigations.

In the progress report now before us it is suggested that a report on these matters should be given to the CD before the end of its session this summer.

I therefore formally propose that the CD takes note of the progress report and takes a decision on the dates of the next meeting.

I now want to say a few words on working paper CD/4, submitted by seven States members and introduced by Ambassador Issraelyan on 6 February.

My delegation has taken note with great interest of this working paper containing views and suggestions on a possible approach in the CD to the question of nuclear disarmament. The proposal of the seven socialist States to initiate consultations and negotiations on nuclear disarmament in this Committee addresses itself to the most urgent priority item in the programme of action adopted by the General Assembly's special session devoted to disarmament. That in itself makes it an important proposal. At the same time the working paper involves a number of very complex and delicate questions. Some of these were commented on by Ambassador Issraelyan in his statement on 6 February.

The Swedish Government is still in the process of considering various important aspects of the proposal, and I am therefore not prepared to make any detailed and precise comment on it today. I would, however, already at this stage like to make some remarks of a general and preliminary nature.

Concrete and substantial nuclear disarmament measures are necessary for many reasons, some of which are still more compelling today than they were only a few years ago. From many points of view disarmament negotiations, and particularly those relating to nuclear arms, are the concern of all nations. Global and regional security is profoundly affected by the ongoing arms race and conversely by any substantial measure of control and disarmament which can be achieved. When the leading military Powers decide to conduct negotiations on the basis of limited participation, as for instance in the case of the strategic arms limitation talks, these negotiations have a bearing on the ultimate security of other countries as well. All countries have a legitimate interest in their initiation, conduct and eventual results.

The CD was constituted as the principal forum for disarmament negotiations pursuant to the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly. The CD should in principle be fully utilized for the implementation of the programme

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of action contained in that document. Against this background, the Swedish Government welcomes the multilateral approach to nuclear disarmament negotiations contained in the working paper. Paragraph 48 of the programme of action embodies another fact of principal importance with respect to nuclear disarmament which applies regardless of the method of negotiation. In accordance with this paragraph, nuclear-weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals bear a special responsibility for achieving nuclear disarmament.

An important consequence of this principle is embodied in paragraph 52 stating that the USSR and the United States should conclude a SALT II agreement at the earliest possible date, and let it be followed promptly by further SALT negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of and "qualitative limitations" in strategic arms. Urgent and vigorous pursuit, to a successful conclusion, of ongoing negotiations and urgent initiation of further negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States are subsequently called for in the Final Document.

To sum up, as I see it there are three important aspects which must be evaluated in relation to the working paper CD/4. The first aspect is the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union bear a special responsibility for the process towards nuclear disarmament. The second is the question of the substance of possible multilateral negotiations. The programme of action enumerates in paragraph 50 the specific sectors where agreement at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification are urgently required. In this context I would like to recall the Swedish working paper of 30 January 1978, in which we identified five stages by which nuclear disarmament would have to be attained. The third aspect is the method or complementary methods of negotiations chosen to achieve concrete results. We are, I repeat, aware of the fact that an undertaking along the lines of working paper CD/4 involves numerous extremely difficult political and technical problems. At this juncture I will merely state that the Swedish delegation will follow this issue with great attention and is prepared to take part in possible consultations. We intend to revert to the matter with more detailed comments at a later stage.

Mr. OGISO (Japan): First of all, on behalf of my delegation, I would like to congratulate your Excellency on your assumption of the high office of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament. I am confident that, under your leadership and competent guidance, this Committee will prove to be most successful.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to His Excellency Ambassador Rozas, who guided this Committee for the month of February to a successful adoption of the rules of procedure.

As we start deliberations on the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events, I should like to express the views of the Japanese Government on the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty which has the highest priority in the negotiations of this Committee.

Needless to say, nuclear disarmament is the most urgent task in the field of disarmament, and the first step toward achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament is a comprehensive nuclear test ban. A comprehensive nuclear test ban will contribute to halting the endless nuclear arms race by preventing the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, and enhancing nuclear non-proliferation by opening the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty to non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is, in spite of its inherent inequality, the most important existing international legal framework for preventing nuclear proliferation and, as such, with a view to preventing nuclear proliferation, many non-nuclear-weapon States -- including Japan -- have acceded to the Treaty. The Treaty stipulates that the non-nuclear-weapon States must renounce nuclear armaments, but nuclear-weapon States, in their turn, undertake "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". That is why the nuclear-weapon States have been strongly urged to realize a comprehensive nuclear test ban at the earliest opportunity.

The Government of Japan has stressed that it is the lack of political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States that has hindered the realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In this respect, it was considered a forward-looking political decision by the leaders of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States when they started tripartite negotiations on CTB in March 1977.

It was an expression of the expectations of the world for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty that the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament urged in paragraph 51 of its Final Document that the negotiations on "a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would be an

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integral part of the treaty" should be concluded urgently. It is particularly so in the light of the nature of this document which was adopted by consensus.

Responding to such expectations, the distinguished delegate of the United Kingdom in his capacity as a representative of the tripartite negotiating parties made two progress reports to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Namely, he stated on 16 March 1978 that "Substantial progress has been made towards agreement on the provisions of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which would be an integral part of the treaty. A number of important points have already been agreed; on some outstanding issues, the differences between the positions of the participants have narrowed", and he further stated on 8 August 1978 that "It can be reported with satisfaction that significant progress has been made in recent months in several areas of the negotiations. The delegations have proceeded beyond an exchange of views on their basic approaches and principles and are now addressing elements of agreement that have emerged as well as specific points that remain to be resolved".

Almost one year has passed since the distinguished delegate of the United Kingdom said in his report to the CCD that substantial progress had been made. I appreciate the serious negotiations continued by the three parties concerned during that period. But the Committee on Disarmament has not so far received any results from the tripartite negotiations. If the Committee on Disarmament, as a negotiating body, cannot start concrete negotiations on the urgent task of a comprehensive nuclear test ban when it has completed its work on organizational matters such as the rules of procedure and agenda because the results of the trilateral negotiations have not been submitted to it, it would be a most disappointing situation, not only for this negotiating body which was opened and blessed by high-ranking dignitaries including many foreign ministers, but also for world public opinion. Of course we do not totally ignore the arguments that elucidation of the details of the outstanding issues in the negotiations may complicate the efforts of the parties concerned. I would, however, like to remind the Committee that this explanation was made by the representative of the

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negotiating parties almost one year ago, and that it is considered that general agreements have already been reached on important and basic points.

While expecting that the current tripartite negotiations will be concluded urgently and negotiations on a treaty text will be started expeditiously in this Committee, I should like to express the views of my delegation on some of the questions which are of particular interest to my country in formulating the draft treaty.

It may be inferred from the views expressed at the CCD by the States which are especially concerned that the main outstanding issues concerning a comprehensive test ban are the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the question of verification. As to the issue of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, my delegation has consistently taken the position, as I have repeatedly said in my past interventions, that no nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be conducted unless an agreement is reached on appropriate international arrangements for supervision and procedures to prevent loopholes. If the comprehensive test ban allows peaceful nuclear explosions, there would be a risk that non-nuclear-weapon States might acquire the techniques for nuclear explosions under the guise of peaceful purposes, and that nuclear-weapon States will find ways round the ban on nuclear-weapon testing.

We now assume that agreements, at least in principle, on the suspension on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, similar to those Japan has always maintained, have been reached, in the light of the progress report made by the distinguished delegate of the United Kingdom on 3 August last year in which it is stated that "The three negotiating parties are agreed that the treaty should establish a ban on any nuclear weapon test explosion in any environment and that the provisions of a protocol which would be an integral part of the treaty, would apply to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes"; and this was confirmed by the United Kingdom delegate in his statement on 24 January this year at this Committee.

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With respect to the question of verification, there are two issues: (1) on-site inspections, and (2) seismic data exchange. As regards on-site inspection, the Japanese delegation considers that in addition to verification by seismological methods, which I will touch on shortly, and other national means, it will require on-site inspection as a supplementary means to ascertain verification when there is any doubt. Nevertheless, if detailed agreements are reached facilitating seismological means of detection and verification by other national means, the need for on-site inspection may be somewhat less than if there is no such agreement. In this respect, there may remain the possibility of considering the method of "verification by challenge" as proposed by Sweden.

As my delegation proposed at the CCD on 3 March 1977, the establishment of an international system of seismic data exchange through which all seismic data can be collected without delay will be necessary in order to detect and identify underground nuclear tests. In this connexion, I should like to pay tribute to the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on seismic events which has been making positive contributions under the auspices of the CCD and the CD since August 1976. In particular, my delegation welcomes the close co-operation between the Group of Experts and the World Meteorological Organization which has been worked out by the participation of the representatives of WMO at the seventh session of the Ad Hoc Group this year.

The distinguished delegate of the United Kingdom in his progress report on 16 March last year stated that "The USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States share the widely-held view that an international exchange of seismic data will play a major role in verification of compliance with the Treaty", and added that "They agree that the guidelines for setting up and running the international seismic exchange should be laid down in an annex to the treaty, and that the detailed organizational and procedural arrangements for implementing the international exchange should be worked out after the entry into force of the treaty, drawing on the recommendations contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Group". The experimental exercises of the seismic

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data exchange system, as was proposed by the Group, will contribute to the drawing up of the "guidelines" to be provided in an annex to the CTB treaty. It will also make the prompt implementation of the provisions of the CTB treaty possible after its entry into force, since the experimental exercises will facilitate the formulation of what the United Kingdom progress report called the "detailed organizational and procedural arrangements" as soon as possible after the treaty enters into force or, as the case may be, they will make such arrangements come into effect concurrently with the entry into force of the treaty. From this point of view, it would be a significant contribution for progress towards the conclusion of the CTB treaty if the Committee, at an appropriate stage following the proposal of the Ad Hoc Group, decides to hold experimental exercises of the seismic data exchange system before the entry into force of the treaty.

It may also be necessary to consider the establishment of a standing committee of experts from which advice may be made available regarding the scientific and technical problems of verification, including the international data exchange system.

The verification system of the CTB treaty will be more effective and strengthened if, in addition to the international system of seismic data exchange, concrete agreements could be reached on facilitating verification by national means such as the setting up, on a reciprocal basis, of appropriate numbers of "black boxes" or tamper-proof automatic stations, and observation by satellites, as I stated on 17 August last year in the CCD.

In concluding my remarks, I should like to remind the distinguished delegates of resolution 33/71C adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session, and strongly appeal to all States, and in particular, all nuclear-weapon States, to refrain from conducting any testing of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

I should also like to urge France, which has joined this Committee, and China, which has not so far attended it, to participate actively in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Today I wish to make some remarks on the following issues. I wish to introduce a technical working paper in the field of seismology. I intend to make some observations on the last meeting of the Ac Hoc Group of seismological experts, and I shall touch upon our work during the spring session.

Scientists in the field of seismology have developed several methods of identifying seismic events, that is to say, of distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions. Most of these methods have been described in one or more of the numerous working papers of the CCD as well as in the first report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events. Although several acceptable seismic identification methods exist nowadays, the search for other methods and the testing of existing methods continues. It is desirable to have a wider choice of independent and verified seismic identification methods to reinforce confidence in the identification of a particular event.

One of the methods discussed in the past is to make use of the fact that an explosion and an earthquake behave differently at the source. An explosion can be characterized by a sudden outward motion in which energy is radiated equally in all directions. With an earthquake this is not the case, the energy radiation depending upon the position of the plane along which shear motion occurs in the earthquake source. Theoretically, it would therefore be possible to distinguish between an earthquake and an explosion by measuring the motions, and especially the initial motions of the direct waves around the source of the seismic event.

The practical possibilities of using this particular identification method has now been studied by Netherlands experts, who came to the conclusion that the method can only be used under certain restricted circumstances. The study is described in working document CD/7 now being tabled. It is clear from the study that one cannot use the method altogether on its own with confidence for the identification of seismic events, but it can provide valuable additional support for the conclusions of other seismic identification methods. It is also shown that the effectiveness of the method depends very much on the location of the event with respect to the seismic stations of the monitoring network.

We in the Netherlands considered it worthwhile to present to you this study on an additional identification method which could be useful in a future international seismic network in the context of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

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During the last two weeks the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events held its seventh session. Quite some progress was made in the Group and in its sub-groups on a number of technical details of the international seismic system which will be needed in the context of a comprehensive test ban treaty. In its work, the Group based itself, of course, on the first report of the Group, CCD/558. As we can see in the latest progress report of the Group, a rather substantial delay is requested for the submission of its second report. Although there may be some valid technical reasons for this delay -- in particular to develop a number of technical annexes to the report -- my delegation wishes to express concern at the pace at which progress is being made. We are under the impression that other than technical reasons were also involved in requesting the delay.

My delegation would have hoped that the work of the Group could have been finished somewhat earlier, thus making it easier for countries to start the requested preparations and technical tests of elements of the future system. Such small-scale tests could be very helpful in obtaining a better idea of which resources a country needs to participate in the final system. The second report of the seismic Group, which should describe quite a number of regulations and instructions, would have been very helpful in assessing these aspects. Considering the fact that a draft CTB treaty could be presented to the CD within a few months -- I hope -- it must be clear that my delegation can only reluctantly agree to a postponement of the presentation of a second report to the summer. I also hope that the report will contain clear-cut recommendations.

Several members of this Committee have proposed the holding of a so-called "experimental exercise", that is, a test of the whole future seismic system to be used in the context of a CTB. In fact, the first report of the seismic Group recommends such an experimental exercise. This would be a complete test-run of a duration of about one year of the necessary seismic network -- data gathering, communications, analysis in data centres and at the national level, etc. -- to see whether the system works well, to ascertain what the problems are and what capabilities the system has to deter underground nuclear explosions under test ban conditions.

Now, the practical problems of having such a complete exercise are rather substantial. The seismic network exists only partly at the moment. Moreover, experts from one nuclear-weapon State have maintained that such an experimental exercise can only be held after the CTB treaty has entered into force, otherwise one would not know which countries would participate in the final system and one could not make a final assessment of the system.

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At first sight, there is some logic to that last argument; but only some. If one waits with an experimental exercise until the CTB treaty has entered into force, there will be no time for such an exercise. As soon as there is a treaty, one must possess the means to verify compliance with it. Therefore, the seismic system must be established immediately after the entry into force of the treaty. There is then no time left for experiments.

It is therefore clear that such an exercise is only useful before the entry into force of a CTB treaty. My Government still hopes that a multilateral CTB will be concluded and signed this year. This leaves very little time for preparations. It is more difficult to predict when the treaty will enter into force.

We have now three options: (a) We start the exercise now; (b) A full scale experimental exercise will never be held; (c) The decision to hold an exercise is taken as soon as the multilateral CTB treaty shapes up.

In principle my delegation prefers option (a). However, apart from the technical problems inherent in starting such a project very soon, there does not seem to be agreement at present on such a line of action. Since, on the other hand, all seem to agree that an experimental exercise would be useful, to follow option (b) would be a pity. We should therefore consider the possibilities of option (c). I could imagine that, after the submission of a trilateral draft CTB treaty to the Committee, it will soon become clear which countries do seriously plan to join the multilateral test ban treaty. Between that time and the entry into force of the treaty, quite some time will be left. It would really be regrettable if that period were not used for an experimental exercise or, perhaps, smaller-scale experiments. Such experiments would clearly help in establishing the final seismic network at the time of the treaty's entry into force. My delegation would certainly be interested in hearing the views of other delegations on this matter.

I would now like to make a few comments on our work during the remainder of this spring session.

We are all aware of the fact that the disarmament agenda in general -- I am not referring only to this Committee -- is heavily loaded for the coming years. Preparation of review conferences, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the inhuman weapons question, etc. make it more and more difficult to spend sufficient time on particular CD subjects, certainly for smaller countries. However, we would

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not be fulfilling our obligations in this Committee if we were to stop our work too easily during other conferences, except of course during the General Assembly and other very important meetings. We must not regard the CD as a stop-gap between other gatherings.

Even taking this into account, there is not much time left during the spring meetings. After time-consuming consultations on the rules of procedure, we are now starting the process of developing a substantive agenda. This is an important matter, and I would not be surprised if it took us quite some time. Then we have to agree on a programme of work. This could mean that not much time is left in the spring session for substantive discussions.

Normally speaking, we can only decide on our programme of work after the adoption of the agenda. Nevertheless, it is possible to reserve already now some periods in the spring for substantive discussions on matters we all agree must be tackled in any case. We are doing just that already this week, as we are concentrating on the report of the seismic Group.

In the past too we often spent a week on discussions, formal and informal, on one subject. For a preliminary exchange of views this could sometimes be sufficient. A serious discussion, however, would be impossible in such a short time frame. It would therefore be better to concentrate on one or two items during a longer period of several weeks.

Taking all this into account, I wish to suggest the following. As I said earlier in this Committee, it is perhaps better to delay negotiations on the nuclear test ban until the trilateral talks have produced results. However, in our view, the other item on the priority list of the Committee, the chemical weapons question, is ripe for serious discussion. A widespread feeling exists in this Committee that the CD must now start work on this issue. There is only a slight difference of opinion on how to handle the CW problem. Proposals have been made to establish an ad hoc working group. We have no objection to that idea, but we have the impression that not all countries are willing to take that step now. For my delegation, it is more important to start discussions on the substance of the chemical weapons problem than on the mandate of a possible working group. You will remember the Netherlands working paper CD/6 in which my delegation proposed substantial discussion on a general outline of an agreement on CW without the absolute necessity of setting up a working group. Indeed, we could also do our work in informal meetings of the Committee itself. It is clear, however, that we will need quite some time for such an exercise, and I would therefore like to suggest spending the period of 26 March to 12 April on the CW question.

Mr. PFEIFTER (Federal Republic of Germany): My delegation welcomed the decision taken by this Committee on 22 February this year to devote the week from 5 March to 9 March to the consideration of the progress report submitted by the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts.

We learn from the report that the discussion of the various chapters of the final report achieved progress. My delegation hopes that, as a result of the in-depth discussion of the questions involved, the submission of the final report will be possible at the time envisaged by the experts.

The seventh session of the Ad Hoc Group which ended last week succeeded in clarifying additional items. It covered new ground and led to some progress.

A large part of the task entrusted by the CCD in May 1978 -- and confirmed by the CD on 15 February 1979 --- to the experts now seems to be accomplished. An additional number of detailed questions with regard to an international seismic data exchange system have been clarified.

In this context, the participation of two representatives of WMO was of particular value as they were able to give new information on the WMO communication network. They made it possible to arrive at a realistic assessment of the data transmission capabilities of the WMO system.

We welcome and support the offer of the Swedish Government to establish a temporary data centre which will deal with some new aspects of data analysis, in particular the analysis of identification parameters. We also appreciate the Swedish plan to organize a workshop in Stockholm to demonstrate the main functions to be performed by such a centre.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has on various occasions in the United Nations and in the CCD, as well as at the opening session of this Committee, declared its readiness to participate actively in the seismic verification of a CTB. The well-equipped Central Observatory at Graefenberg which has a digital broad-band array enables the Institute to support the Group with a working paper on optimum equipment for a global seismic system. This working paper will be submitted as soon as possible.

We think the short report introduced today shows that the seismic Group has indeed achieved further progress. We are looking forward to the eighth session of the experts to be held from 23 July to 3 August 1979, during which the remaining specific questions will be discussed and, as we hope, if necessary, clarified in smaller sub-working groups. My delegation hopes that the seismic experts will be able to conclude their task and that they will be in a position to submit their final report containing the necessary information and the actual procedure for a

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

practical test run. The Federal Government will continue to support the work of the seismic Group by making the necessary arrangements for the continued participation of an expert from the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is our desire to have at hand a reliable and acceptable verification system at the time when the Disarmament Committee starts its deliberations and negotiations on a complete test ban treaty.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic) (translated from Russian): Thank you Mr. Chairman. I wish to invite your attention, Sir, to the following.

Today the Secretariat circulated the text of the rules of procedure dated 1 March 1979 (CD/8), and that document also includes an annex I. The impression is, therefore, that the Committee has discussed and indeed adopted annex I as well but, as is known, the Committee did not have enough time to deal with annex I and that question has remained open. Accordingly, I and my delegation interpret the situation as meaning that after delegations have an opportunity to study this document, at least consultations should be held and the Committee should revert to this matter in order to adopt an appropriate decision in connexion with annex I as well.

The CHAIRMAN: It would be my intention that we resume the discussion of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts on Thursday, when perhaps some further statements will be forthcoming.

We have, I think, this morning had four important statements and, in touching on the explicit subject matter, that is, the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts, delegations have also made a number of observations and indeed some proposals which will be very relevant to the next stage of our work. That is to say, the drafting of the agenda and the programme of work, a stage of our work which I am hopeful we may be able to take up fairly soon. We have one specific proposal before the Committee today, which I would like to refer to, and that is the proposal of the distinguished representative of Sweden, that the Committee should take note of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts and take a decision on the dates of the next meeting of the Ad Hoc Group. It would be my intention, after appropriate consultations with delegations, to prepare a draft decision on the matter and submit it to the Committee at a later meeting. If there are no further observations, I would propose to adjourn the meeting and we would assemble again on Thursday morning, at 10.30 a.m. to resume discussion of the progress report.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.