

CD/PV.4  
25 January 1979  
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOURTH MEETING  
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 25 January 1979, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman:

MR. R. BOUDJAKDJI

(Algeria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. R. BOUDJAKDJI  
Mr. A. FASLA  
Mr. A. BENSMAIL  
Mr. N. KERROUM

Argentina:

Mr. D.C. ORTIZ de ROZAS  
Mr. F. JIMENEZ DÁVILA  
Mr. A.N. MOLTENI

Australia:

Mr. L.D. THOMSON  
Ms. H.S. WICKES

Belgium:

Mr. J.A.R. SCHOUMAKER

Brazil:

Mr. G.A. MACIEL  
Mr. L.P. LINDENBERG SETTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. P. VOUTOV  
Mr. I. PETROV  
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma:

U SAW HLAING  
U AHEIN AUNG  
U THAUNG HTUN

Canada:

Mr. G.A.H. PEARSON  
Mr. R. Harry JAY  
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba:

Mr. P. TORRAS  
Mr. L. SOLA VILA  
Mr. F.O. RODRÍGUEZ  
Mrs. V.B. JACKLEWICH  
Mr. C. PAZOS BECEIRO  
Mr. R. VALIENTE  
Mr. R.L. GARCIA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. TYLNER

Mr. J. JIRŮSEK

Egypt:

Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI

Mr. F. EL-IBRASHI

Mr. M. EL-BARADEI

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE

Mr. G. ALULA

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER

Mr. S. KAHN

Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER

Mr. H. SCHNEPPEN

Mr. J. PÖHLMANN

Mr. H. MÜLLER

Hungary:

Mr. H. DOMOKOS

Mr. A. LAKATOS

France:

Mr. F. de la GORCE

Mr. F. BEAUCHATAUD

Mr. J. FEVRE

Mr. J.C. PARAVY

India:

Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia:

Mr. A. SANI

Mr. A. KAMIL

Iran:

Mr. D. CHILATY

Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. F. FERRETTI  
Mr. N. ALESSI  
Mr. M. MORENO  
Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Japan:

Mr. N. OGISO  
Mr. T. NONOYAMA  
Mr. Y. KIKUCHI  
Mr. T. IWANAMI  
Mr. Y. NAKAMURA

Kenya:

Mr. C.G. MAINA  
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES  
Miss A. CABRERA  
Miss L.M. GARCIA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. LUVSANDORJIIN BAYART

Morocco:Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN  
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria:

Mr. O. ADENIJI  
Mr. K. AHMED

Pakistan:

Mr. J.K.A. MARKER  
Mr. H. AKRAM

Peru:

Mr. J.A. MONTERO

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. H. PAĆ  
Mr. S. KONIK  
Mr. H. KRUCZYK

Romania:

Mr. I. RADULESCU

Mr. C. ENE

Mr. V. TUDOR

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Mr. G. TINCA

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.C.S. HAMEED

Miss M.L. NAGANATHAN

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. L. NORBERG

Mr. J. PRAVITZ

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN

Mr. A.M. VAVILOV

Mr. E.D. ZAITSEV

Mr. V.A. VERTOGRADOV

Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

Mr. H.G. ANTIUKHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

Mr. C.L.G. MALLABY

Mr. C.K. CURWEN

Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A. FISHER

Mr. C. FLOWERREE

Mr. A. AKALOVSKY

Mr. R. HAGENGRUBER

Ms. BLAIR L. MURRAY

Mr. H.L. SANCHES

Mr. A. YARMOLINSKY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. H. PEŠIĆ

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. B. BUKAYI

Mr. M. ESUK

Director-General of the  
United Nations Office at Geneva:

Mr. L. COTTAFANI

Assistant Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT

The CHAIRMAN (Translated from French): Before giving the floor to the first speaker, I should like to inform you that, at the request of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Secretariat is distributing in the conference room, as document CD/3, the text of the message addressed yesterday by Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, the General-Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to the Committee on Disarmament on the occasion of the inauguration of its work.

May I ask Ambassador Victor Issraelyan, the representative of the USSR to the Committee on Disarmament and a member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to convey our sincere thanks for the contents of the message which emphasizes the very special importance that the Soviet Union attaches to the work of our Committee.

Mr. TORRAS (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): In taking the floor for the first time in the discussions of the disarmament negotiating body — the Committee on Disarmament — I should like my first words to convey to you, Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the fraternal greetings of our delegation on your election as Chairman of our meetings and to assure you of our firm decision to make our modest contribution to the achievement of the agreements required of us in our work.

We fully share in the grief felt by a sister republic, the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, at the loss of its beloved leader, President Houari Boumedienne, and should like to convey through you sincerest condolences from the Cuban Revolution and our firm decision to carry on together the consistent and worthy struggle for a better world, the struggle in which he was a distinguished combatant.

We also wish to express our gratitude to all those who have co-operated in some way in choosing our country to take a place in this august tribune and; in turn, congratulate the other countries that have also been selected for the first time to form part of the group of States responsible for negotiations on disarmament in this forum.

Our congratulations also go to the older members and our hope that, with the experience they have already acquired, they will contribute to the successful outcome of our labours; we are grateful to all delegations which have expressed satisfaction that our own country as well as other States have become members of this Committee.

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

The new members and also those which have been engaged so far in the task of arriving at the adoption of international instruments as elements of general and complete disarmament, can, we repeat, unhesitatingly rely on the most determined support and the firm co-operation of the Cuban delegation.

The non-aligned and developing countries bear a special responsibility for the achievement of specific agreements on disarmament, whence their growing interest in taking part in the most important work being done with that aim in mind. This interest has justifiably claimed the attention of all States.

This responsibility is born of the fact that, in representing peoples bravely struggling to overcome underdevelopment and poverty and the vestiges of centuries of colonialist and neo-colonialist exploitation, they wish to contribute as much as they can to the achievement of agreements which will allow the astronomical resources devoted to arms production to be used to combat the backwardness, destitution and hunger that still afflict a large part of mankind. The fact that, according to estimates in the specialist press, the astronomical figure of more than \$300 billion is allocated to military expenditure and that, according to figures given in the North American press, the military budget of a single Power -- the United States -- will amount to \$136 billion by 1980, in itself explains the imperative need for the non-aligned and developing countries to do everything in their power to bring about agreements that will open the way to the desired goal of general and complete disarmament.

We consider that the proliferation of international organs and forums on disarmament, in general and in particular, is not desirable for the achievement of our objectives, since it places a heavy financial burden on our budgets and entails the appropriation of hundreds of thousands of dollars for their servicing, when our peoples expect the investment made in defraying the cost of these activities and their delegations to be translated into concrete and tangible results. In this respect it is important to remember that the tenth special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament decided that there should be a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum: the Committee on Disarmament.



(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

Bearing in mind the general interest and aspirations of the international community, this means that our delegations must work in a constructive spirit and must tackle problems directly, avoiding pointless debate in order to focus attention on what must be our primary objective: the achievement of specific agreements, international instruments and treaties on disarmament which will solve the problems that hamper the attainment of general and complete disarmament.

At the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as well as during the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations and of the First Committee of the General Assembly, we heard a number of opinions to the effect that the main obstacle in the way of agreements on disarmament is the lack of "political will" on the part of some States to set out on the path to achieving them. We consider that those who express such opinions are right in respect of some States that are well known for their deeds, but not in respect of the others.

For us, political will is expressed in a frank and open presentation of the nature of the problems which prevent or put obstacles in the way of finding the common denominator that will make for agreement on the international instruments under discussion and the decision to eliminate those problems; in this context, the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon Powers for making effective and concrete progress in the sphere of general and complete disarmament is undeniable.

In referring to political will, our delegation considers it a duty to pay tribute to the consistent position in favour of disarmament adopted by the Soviet Union since its very emergence as a State -- one that is a result of its own social system, which means that since it has no economic interests or colonies or investments to defend or safeguard, it has no need of war. As stated by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, the Vice-President of the Council of State and Ministers of Cuba, who headed the Cuban delegation to the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, it is now more than half a century since the Soviet Union spoke of the urgency of bringing about general and complete disarmament. Since then, Soviet initiative has been a part of all international efforts aimed at disarmament.

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

In the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, an important place is occupied by the Programme of Action which is to serve as the basis for future activities. The document itself establishes the priorities on which the attention of States seeking general and complete disarmament must be focused.

The basic element of disarmament priorities is to engage in activities which will prevent the unleashing of a nuclear conflict, the dimensions and the consequences of which are incalculable. It is worth remembering what Fidel Castro, our great leader, said in referring to these weapons in his report to the First Congress of our Communist Party:

"Never has the struggle for peace been more necessary, because neither have weapons ever before been of such destructive power, nor have the risks of human extermination been potentially greater".

For this reason the Committee on Disarmament must tackle, in all its scope and complexity, the need to secure international agreements and instruments which will enable mankind to live without fear of the nuclear holocaust. In this connexion, the negotiations taking place between the nuclear-weapon States on strategic arms limitation and the prohibition of nuclear tests cannot be ignored.

Nuclear disarmament, described by the special session of the Assembly as a measure of the highest priority, must be the central point in the work of this Committee, which has the task of bringing reality to the elimination of the threat posed by nuclear weapons. To this end, we have some significant proposals on which we must work immediately, without delay.

There are also proposals and specific resolutions on the prohibition of other types of weapons of mass destruction. In our opinion, such a prohibition must be made real and effective, without allowing for interpretations that suggest a need to identify such weapons -- for that would in fact imply their very existence.

In this same context, it has to be borne in mind that delays make for the emergence of further obstacles and difficulties, such as the criminal attempt, in the face of world-wide condemnation, to produce the neutron bomb, which is not

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

only a new threat to the survival of mankind but also an obstacle to the negotiations on disarmament. It is worth pointing out that a proposal is already in existence: the draft treaty submitted by the socialist countries at the most recent session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee must take note of these situations so as to identify problems realistically and facilitate progress towards achievement of the increasingly vital agreements for which we are responsible.

There are also General Assembly proposals and suggestions, which must be dealt with as a matter of priority, concerning chemical weapons, on whose prohibition this body has been working for several years.

We firmly believe that conditions are better now for the elimination of existing differences on the conclusion of a treaty banning chemical weapons and, in view of the urgency of the matter, we must strive for its adoption without any delay.

One of the tasks of the Committee on Disarmament is to analyse the so-called comprehensive programme of disarmament. Since the Committee cannot yet begin to deal with all the elements which should be included in this programme, it should not remain inactive or engage in general debates until the United Nations Disarmament Commission meets in May. The progress made by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in this matter must be taken into account, even though it may appear limited.

The Committee on Disarmament, with its more modern structure and with the participation of a greater number of countries, is expected to continue the work started and developed within the CCD over the years, and to begin work on drafts in which the bases have been laid for promoting adoption of appropriate international instruments in the field of disarmament.

It has to be borne in mind in this respect that, if the goal of general and complete disarmament is to be achieved, there must necessarily be partial disarmament agreements of a binding nature.

We also wish to refer to the need for all nuclear-weapon States to participate in our work. Only in this way will it be possible to guarantee the universality of the agreements resulting from our work and their mandatory

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

implementation. And in this context we are gratified by the participation of France in this Committee -- a development which, in our view, is of major importance.

For the analysis of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, moreover, it will be necessary to bear in mind all the points made and set out in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament concerning the existence of a large number of proposals, ideas and suggestions which do not appear in the Final Document because they failed to command the necessary consensus but which have the support of a large part of the international community.

Among these is the proposal for the dismantling of foreign military bases. This is of vital importance to Cuba because, as you know, the United States maintains a naval and air base in our country, against the express will of our Government and people, in gross disregard of our sovereignty. The elimination of military bases in foreign territory would be an effective step towards the strengthening of international security. Our delegation will work for this in the Committee.

In dealing with these questions, we cannot overlook the right of peoples and States to possess the weapons they require in the struggle for their national liberation, and for the defence of their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament established the priorities that exist on this subject, which we must bear in mind when we come to discuss specific proposals.

On the other hand, the General Assembly, at its thirty-third session, adopted various resolutions containing specific suggestions concerning the work of the Committee. These suggestions, coming as they did immediately after the special session, reflect, in the highest degree, the concern produced by the special session and take account of many of the ideas presented at that time.

We have before us various important documents which have already been partly discussed in the CCD, and it is to be hoped that we shall be able to deal with them from a new angle and a new perspective.

It is also to be hoped that we shall soon have before us a text on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests which will greatly facilitate our task and permit the preparation of other related instruments.

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

In recent times, the possibility of the neutron bomb, as a singularly inhumane weapon of mass extermination, has shown that it is increasingly urgent to conclude a treaty on prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

We have before us the priority task of preventing advances in science and technology from contributing to the emergence of weapons of this type. If we are not up to this task, nobody can predict what will happen in the future.

The last point to which my delegation would like to draw attention is also contained in the Final Document of the special session on disarmament. Since the Committee's decisions will be taken by consensus, the instruments resulting from our work will find broad acceptance and be sufficiently effective.

In disarmament questions, the taking of decisions by consensus is of fundamental importance, since if they are not taken in this way any agreement adopted could become a dead letter and be completely ineffective. This fact places a twofold responsibility on us, in that we shall have to reconcile all interests in a realistic and objective manner so that each task undertaken culminates in the success we all desire.

In view of the complex nature of disarmament problems and of their impact on the national sovereignty of each State, there can be no solution to them unless the parties to the negotiations reach firm agreements by means of consensus, possibly including the mandatory element that is required.

My delegation now affirms its commitment to work in this body towards the accomplishment of its mandate, with a view to offering the international community all the international instruments it is possible to produce so as to facilitate achievement of general and complete disarmament, which is our ultimate objective.

This supreme objective of ours in the matter of disarmament is consistent with Cuba's noble concept of peace, which is an essential requisite for creative work, whose glory was extolled by our President, Comrade Fidel Castro, in the speech he made at the solemn session of the National Assembly of Peoples' Power to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the victory of the Revolution. (I quote):

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

"To develop a country and build socialism is much more difficult than to win a revolutionary war. The latter may take years, but the former is a task stretching over decades. Yet victories in work are much nobler than victories in war, which are always won at the price of blood. The glories of war, although just, may be forgotten and, for the revolutionary, they have no meaning except as a bitter instrument of liberty. The glories of work are eternal. Had mankind been just it would have erected more monuments to work than to feats of arms. But work has its own undying monument, namely, progress and human creation and their unknown heroes -- the selfless masses of the people; although to fight, win and die for a just cause is also the form in which expression must sometimes be given to the noble work of revolutionaries with which pages of unsurpassable selflessness and grandeur are written and the everlasting monument of progress constructed".

Cuba's idea of peace and the importance attached to it by our Revolution have been embodied in its fundamental law, the Constitution of the Republic, which was approved after thorough discussion by our people throughout the length and breadth of the country, and of which article 12 includes the following precise definition. (I quote):

"The Republic of Cuba:

"Shall work for an honourable and lasting peace based on respect for the independence and sovereignty of peoples and their right to self-determination:

"Shall base its international relations on the principles of equality of rights, the sovereignty and independence of States, and mutual interest".

With this provision reaffirmed in the external policy of the Cuban Revolution, we come to this Committee with optimism and in the conviction that it will make progress along the road towards turning the aspirations of peoples for general and complete disarmament into a reality.

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): Seventeen years ago, on 19 March 1962, the head of the Canadian delegation to the new 18-nation Committee on Disarmament addressed it for the first time. He made a special point of welcoming the eight new members and expressed the hope that their presence would "assist materially in the search for early agreement" and in avoiding the stalemates of the past. He went on to note other reasons which gave hope for early progress towards agreement: these included endorsement by the General Assembly of a set of basic principles on disarmament, expectation that the reallocation of some of the resources then devoted to expenditures on armaments to the raising of living standards would greatly improve these standards, awareness from past experience of the grave consequences of the failure of negotiations and, finally, fear of the growing power of modern weapons.

I do not repeat these hopes of 1962 in order to discourage the expectations of the eight new members in 1979. Canada sincerely welcomes these members and believes their presence will indeed be of positive benefit to our work. May I take note in particular, Mr. Chairman, of the distinguished record which your country and you yourself have established at the United Nations. I wish only to remind all of us, old as well as new, that the arguments in favour of disarmament are well known. We might well ask whether anything has happened in these past 17 years to justify a similar optimism today. Part of the answer may be found in the fact that, of eight areas of possible agreement which the Canadian delegation singled out in 1962, negotiations in five areas have actually led to agreement, partial or otherwise. But there has been failure in the most crucial areas of nuclear and conventional disarmament, and we are still waiting for the results of the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and a ban of chemical weapons. Perhaps it is time for this Committee again to resume its efforts to reach agreement on chemical weapons in particular.

Negotiations on disarmament clearly cannot make substantial progress unless all the nuclear-weapon Powers participate. The United States and the USSR have special responsibilities, reflecting the dominance they have achieved in the development of strategic weapons, but there are limits beyond which they are unlikely to reach agreement if other major military Powers stand aside. We express the hope, therefore, that China will soon follow the example of France and take its seat at this table.

Of all the issues that have been examined or referred to this Committee, none has been assigned nor is likely to be given higher priority than those concerned with nuclear weapons. Paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the United Nations special session devoted to disarmament makes this abundantly clear.

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

This priority is not new. The nuclear age is now older than most people alive. But as the years pass the contrast between ever-more sophisticated and efficient weapons and the failure of efforts to control or eliminate them becomes more obvious. Only the Non-Proliferation Treaty stands out as a really significant multilateral arms control measure in the nuclear field. Yet even here, the Final Document of the special session took six full paragraphs on this general subject to achieve the correct balance of views to which all nations could subscribe.

Nuclear issues are not the only ones, as the Final Document also recognizes. But if the nuclear-weapon Powers are able to control these weapons, the incentive for the non-nuclear-weapon States to forego any option to acquire such weapons will be greatly strengthened. To have a lasting and more positive effect upon world security, the concept of non-proliferation must be applied more even-handedly to both its horizontal and vertical dimensions. Unless there is movement in this important field, it will be difficult to breathe new life into the arms control and disarmament process.

In this perspective, Canada believes that negotiations in this Committee on nuclear questions must be directed primarily towards the goal of achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty. We welcomed the start of the discussions in 1977, as it marked the first concerted attempt by nuclear-weapon States to reach such an agreement since the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. We realized that the achievement of a comprehensive test ban would not be rapid, since we agreed that measures of verification must be such that all States could be reasonably certain that others were living up to the terms of the agreement. Yet we are disappointed by the rate of progress of the negotiations. The establishment of a fully-tested world data exchange system to which all of us can contribute could be one of the most effective methods available to the international community for setting up a comprehensive test ban regime. Let us be clear, however, that problems of verification are a matter of judgement, not of technical perfection.

Seen another way, a test ban could be achieved by unilateral declarations to that effect by the nuclear-weapon States themselves. We do not prefer that approach for two reasons. First, we believe that, to have any lasting effect, a test ban should be of such duration that it begins and continues to have a negative impact on development of new weapons. Such an achievement, however, could be called into question if a ban does not go beyond simply moving nuclear testing into an intermittent time frame. Secondly, if future steps, such as the comprehensive test ban, are to be more even-handed in both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of non-proliferation, the non-nuclear-weapon States should have a substantive input into the final treaty, so that it has a good chance of becoming universal, and all contracting parties understand their obligations under it.



(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

A second measure to which we attach importance is a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes or other nuclear explosive devices. The General Assembly of the United Nations, at its thirty-third session, agreed by a large majority that this proposal had at last come of age. Previous formulations of the concept concentrated almost exclusively on the impact such a treaty or convention would have on the nuclear-weapon States. In our view, however, the General Assembly, in requesting this Committee to consider this proposal at an appropriate stage, was right to put it in the context of verifiable and universally binding controls to be implemented on a non-discriminatory basis.

Thus, my delegation views this proposal as another way in which to enhance the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. Indeed, a treaty equally applicable to nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would, in conjunction with a Comprehensive Test Ban, progressively control the dynamics of nuclear competition, and could, if the nuclear-weapon States agreed, prevent the expansion of existing stockpiles for use in developing new nuclear weapons systems based on known technology. We would then have gone a long way toward bringing the nuclear arms race in both its vertical and horizontal dimensions to a halt.

We further believe that, to be realistic and effective, the nuclear-weapon States must first agree on ways in which such a treaty can be verified. To this end, resolution A/33/91 H identifies full-scope safeguards, on a non-discriminatory basis, as the essential mechanism by which adequate verification may be achieved. Canada, for its part, will continue to explore various aspects and methods of verification of such an agreement with a view to tabling, at an appropriate stage, the text of a draft treaty.

Canada looks forward to the conclusion of the second stage of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the beginning of what is now generally recognized as the next stage in a continuing process. The results of the present stage of the negotiations are of particular interest because they involve or look forward to two further measures for reducing nuclear arms: ceilings on strategic weapons systems which may eventually lead to a slowing in the growth of military spending on new strategic nuclear weapon systems and, in time, it is hoped, an agreement to stop flight-testing so as to restrain further development of new strategic delivery vehicles.

Still another way to strengthen the non-proliferation regime is exemplified by negative security guarantees. The Committee now has before it under this heading the unilateral assurances of the various nuclear-weapon States with respect to the conditions which they feel must pertain before they would preclude the use of their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. These assurances are made in the context of rights and responsibilities with respect to self-defence under the Charter of the United Nations. We support such assurances because they constitute, in part,

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

a recognition by the nuclear-weapon States that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is not entirely even-handed in its treatment of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, and that any step towards redressing this balance strengthens the Treaty by providing it with greater equity.

We are not entirely convinced that these essentially unenforceable and differing negative promises can be converted into a legally binding form; at the very least the nuclear-weapon States would have to agree on the form of guarantee that they are making. The format of a treaty does not lend itself to the sole purpose of recording unilateral promises, and the obligation not to use nuclear weapons would apply only to those who possess nuclear weapons. The search for a common formula will require on the part of the nuclear-weapon States the careful examination of any common elements of their individual assurances.

They can be assisted in this task by the Committee on Disarmament. Two resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its last session in effect request our Committee to consider the proposals which were submitted during the discussions on this issue and to report. We believe that this Committee could play a useful role in examining the possibility of achieving a common formula which could be acceptable to all nuclear-weapon States and which would satisfy the demands of non-nuclear-weapon States. If preliminary consideration of the question revealed that there were, in fact, elements of possible agreement on such a question, we could then envisage the establishment of a working group to pursue the subject.

Apart from assigning some of the foregoing specific nuclear issues to this negotiating body, the General Assembly at its thirty-third session called for the initiation of a wide-ranging list of disarmament and arms control studies recognizing, inter alia, that global efforts towards disarmament can usefully be supplemented by regional approaches. The results of these studies could prove useful to our own efforts. I wish to endorse the Secretary-General's emphasis on the importance of developing a comprehensive approach to studies on disarmament and the need to relate them to a strategy for disarmament and to negotiations towards the implementation of that strategy. It may well be that studies commissioned for a broader deliberative function will provide valuable background and even suggest directions for negotiations, but we should not hesitate in this body to initiate our own studies of the singular or recurrent problems associated with specific agreements.

One area where this point is already implicitly recognized is in the field of verification; specifically, the application of the science of seismology as it relates to the monitoring of a comprehensive test ban treaty. As the head of the Canadian delegation stated in 1962: "In the opinion of my delegation, the best way to achieve a realistic solution of the problem of verification is to avoid abstract debates on the word 'verification'. Instead, there should be careful examination of each measure of

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

disarmament together with the specific verification procedures ... needed for that measure". The applicability of this suggested negotiating technique is just as valid today, and it is our intention later this year to table a paper summarizing various verification proposals for different disarmament and arms control measures, which we hope will assist this Committee in achieving its goals.

Similarly, any tendency to blur the lines between the negotiating function of this Committee and the deliberative function of the Disarmament Commission will only lead to confusion. Both bodies, while remaining distinctive, must play their part in a comprehensive strategy but the programme for such a strategy, in our view, could most conveniently be discussed in the Commission. It will be for this Committee to focus on the specific elements of any agreed strategy and find ways for bringing them into force.

Finally, it would be logical to assume that one of the first items on our agenda will be the settlement of procedures to aid us in our work. I believe that the timely and very useful suggestions put forward in the letter of 4 January 1979 from the Assistant Secretary-General for the Centre for Disarmament will be of assistance to us in this regard. Our best rule of thumb at this stage is to provide ourselves with a flexible mode of coming to grips with our workload and to avoid rigid structures which constrict our ability to respond to the particular requirements of each negotiation. With larger numbers of participants, a greater degree of informality might prove helpful. Furthermore, some formula whereby more concentrated expertise might be brought to bear on specific problems on an ad hoc basis, without in any way inhibiting the full participation of member States should they so wish, could well prove the most productive way of proceeding.

I have deliberately concentrated these remarks on nuclear weapons. The control and reduction of nuclear weapon systems is the greatest challenge we face, although my Government is strongly of the view that the control of conventional weapons cannot be ignored by this Committee. We would like to see negotiations on all issues of arms control and disarmament proceed as circumstances permit. It is tempting to believe, as the British statesman Lloyd George once remarked, that you cannot cross a chasm in two jumps. That is the all or nothing approach to disarmament. It is correct in the sense that international security cannot be assured by any one category of measures, whether they be arms control, disarmament, defence alliances, declarations of intent, codes of behaviour or international peace-keeping forces. But in a world which is rapidly acquiring the capacity for self-destruction, our immediate goal must be self-preservation, not perfect security. If we cannot cross the chasm in one jump, the alternative is to build a bridge. The Final Document of the special session is not a bad design for such a bridge, but it cannot be built quickly or all at once. Let us do what we can with the materials at hand, remembering what lies below.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): This occasion symbolizes the increasingly active role of the entire community of nations in the processes of arms control and disarmament, the success of which is so critical to the peace and security of all of us. I would like to join in welcoming the representatives of those Governments who were not at this table last year, and to say how much we look forward to working with you, and with all the others present here, in exploring our common interests and our common goals. The presence of so many distinguished statesmen and diplomats is witness to the high hopes the world places in this body.

What I propose to do this afternoon is to tell you why my Government is convinced that this forum is so essential to the pursuit of our common goals, and then to discuss the approach the United States is taking in pursuing those goals.

We all are becoming increasingly aware that the inhabitants of this small planet are more and more dependent on each other for the necessities of life: for our supply of foods and fibres, for our shrinking non-renewable energy resources, for a livable environment. In no other area, however, are we so entirely dependent on each other as in the avoidance of international conflict -- conflict that always holds the terrible danger of escalation into thermonuclear holocaust. Conflict anywhere in the world can threaten all of us, and heighten the potential for conflict among the nuclear-weapon Powers.

The Committee on Disarmament has a major role to play in helping to reduce the tensions that lead to conflict because it can articulate the interests of all Governments concerned, and it can help to incorporate them into the language of workable agreements. I want to stress this point in contrasting the role of the Committee on Disarmament with the role of the other major multilateral disarmament body, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which was designed as a deliberative, rather than a negotiating body. Both bodies provide the opportunity for Governments to share with each other their views and concerns, to test their positions in vigorous multinational debate and to explore mutual values in an effort to narrow differences on divisive issues. But the negotiating body has also to be able to meet the challenge of finding ways to bridge differences so that effective agreements can be achieved.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

Our predecessor bodies have always functioned under the rule of consensus. We are committed to do likewise, and properly so. It may be useful at this time to reflect on the significance of the consensus principle. Clearly, in a multilateral negotiating forum, all participants are free to express their opinions, and any restraint on that freedom of expression can only serve to poison the atmosphere. But, by the same token, all participants must recognize two factors affecting decision making:

First, some participants will have a more vital interest in particular agreements than other participants will. The views and concerns of those specially interested participants must necessarily, in the real world, be given greater consideration.

Second, all participants must bear in mind that the views of the overwhelming majority on a particular question carry special weight, and should lead the minority members to consider their positions carefully.

The rules of ordered liberty are the essence of the principle of consensus on which the work of this body was founded.

Let me turn now to the views of the United States on the substantive issues that are our common concern.

Our objective should be to strengthen the security of all peoples and nations. No nation can be expected to support an agreement that puts its security at risk. I am sure, however, that you share my conviction that through the various mechanisms that are available to us, of which this negotiating forum is in the front rank, we can devise arms control and disarmament measures that contribute to the restraint of armaments and enhance the general security.

In this regard it is natural that the major, but by no means the exclusive, preoccupation of the United States has been with the problem of controlling nuclear armaments. My country shares the view that has often been expressed in international disarmament discussions and was spelled out in the Final Document of the United Nations General Assembly's special session devoted to disarmament, that among genuine measures of disarmament, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. The obligations of the nuclear-weapon Powers in the effort to halt and then reverse the growth of nuclear arsenals are clearly expressed in Article VI of the NPT. The United States is well

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

aware of these obligations and is exerting its best efforts to meet them, as I will outline for you in a moment. I take particular note of the fact that it was a predecessor of this forum -- the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee -- that was responsible for producing the text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including article VI.

As the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities with respect to nuclear weapons, so all States have responsibilities with respect to limits on non-nuclear weapons. Although these responsibilities bear more heavily, perhaps, on those States that are the principal suppliers of the non-nuclear weapons that make up 90 per cent of the world's arsenals, effective limitation is not possible without co-operation between suppliers and recipients. In this area, too, my country is fully aware of its obligations and is taking action to meet them.

Returning to the question of bringing nuclear arsenals under control, I am happy to be able to report that the United States and the Soviet Union are close to resolving the remaining issues that stand in the way of a SALT II agreement. This agreement will establish ceilings on all major categories of strategic nuclear delivery systems of the two sides. It will also initiate the process of reducing the over-all number of such systems. In addition, important qualitative constraints will be imposed on the further development of the nuclear arsenals of the two participants.

Let me stress that this agreement not only builds -- and builds very considerably -- upon the first 1972 Agreements, but also commits both sides to a process which we firmly expect will yield further and more extensive agreements in the future. Indeed, in conjunction with this agreement, the two sides have stated their intention to pursue further negotiations aimed at securing significant additional reductions of their strategic arsenals and at imposing further qualitative constraints on these arsenals. Moreover, we are aware of the military significance of current and potential modernized long-range theatre nuclear systems, and are examining their potential relevance and susceptibility to arms control.

Some may regret that the SALT II agreement is not even more far-reaching in its impact. Let me emphasize the importance of viewing SALT II as just one step, although a considerable one, in the process of bringing nuclear weapons under

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

control; it is not, admittedly, the end of the story. However, we are convinced that the agreement we envisage represents not only a major step toward the effective control of nuclear arms but also a landmark achievement for arms control and disarmament in general. We trust it will serve as a catalyst for progress in other areas as well.

In parallel with the SALT effort, we and our Soviet and British negotiating partners are pushing ahead toward resolution of issues standing in the way of trilateral agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

As the United Kingdom representative has noted, substantial progress has been made in the CTB negotiations during the past year. The three delegations have agreed that the treaty will prohibit all nuclear weapons tests in all environments and will be of fixed duration. An integrally related protocol will impose a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions.

A fundamental issue in the negotiations has been verification of compliance. Although agreement in principle has been reached on a number of verification measures, many critical technical details remain to be resolved.

The next round of CTB negotiations will be starting shortly. We will be doing our utmost to find ways to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible date, recognizing that success means laying the basis for an international convention which commands the widest possible international support and which is both comprehensive in its application and verifiable in its execution.

The international community has also displayed special interest in our negotiations aimed at achieving a prohibition on chemical weapons and munitions and the means of their production. Achievement of an international convention banning chemical weapons would be a signal accomplishment since it would be a true disarmament measure eliminating completely a whole class of weapons capable of destroying human beings on a massive scale.

It would also be a disarmament measure that would have direct consequences for many countries, whether or not they possess chemical weapons, since an effective world-wide agreement implies a certain measure of control over chemical production capabilities wherever they may be located. This element makes a CW convention a particularly appropriate arms control measure for multilateral consideration.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

The unique characteristics of a ban on CW, however, also make the negotiation of an agreement extraordinarily complicated. The negotiations we have had with the Soviet Union aimed at producing a joint initiative on CW have made progress and we will be resuming them shortly. But I would be less than candid if I were to minimize the difficulties that still remain. In this area, too, we are very conscious of the impatience with which you await our long hoped-for initiative.

In our efforts to achieve bilateral agreement on the elements of a treaty banning radiological weapons we appear to be closer to success. While the threat of radiological weapons is more potential than actual, such an agreement would close a gap in the application of arms control measures to identified weapons of mass destruction, and would shut off any future development of weapons in this field. Bilateral United States-USSR negotiations on RW, which are also of special interest to this body, will resume on 6 February.

The arms control agenda of the United States is heavy with negotiations on many other subjects which are at least of general interest to all who are gathered here today. On Tuesday of this week, in fact, in the capital city of our host country the United States and the Soviet Union resumed discussions of the question of anti-satellite systems. In deference to other speakers I will not prolong my remarks by treating these other activities in detail. The relatively glancing attention I must perforce pay them does not, however, in any way suggest that we relegate them to a lesser order of importance. Indeed such measures as regional arms control and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons are at the forefront of our national concerns.

Our regional efforts include:

Pursuit of agreement on mutually acceptable and verifiable force reductions in the MBFR talks in Vienna;

Exploration of ways to strengthen the system of confidence-building measures which was an important aspect of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and which we would like to see applied elsewhere; and

Bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union on mutual restraints on forces in the Indian Ocean.



(Mr. Fisher, United States)

We have also supported regional initiatives by others aimed at reducing force levels in specific regions and have engaged in talks and consultations with both supplier and recipient countries aimed at finding ways to limit conventional arms transfers.

We are greatly encouraged by recent progress toward full implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We believe this far-sighted effort by the Latin American States significantly contributes to the security of countries in the region and to international non-proliferation objectives.

The subject of non-proliferation is particularly pertinent at this time as the more than 100 States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty begin preparations for the 1980 Review Conference. The addition of several more nuclear-weapon States by the end of the century would simply not be compatible with the evolution of a political and military environment guaranteeing the survival of human society as we know it. A vigorous international effort is necessary to meet this challenge and all States, regardless of size, can contribute to this endeavour.

The NPT remains the cornerstone of international non-proliferation efforts and the United States continues to encourage universal adherence. We welcomed the statements by Indonesia and Turkey during the special session that the NPT had been submitted to their Parliaments for approval. The Indonesian Parliament has since taken such action, and we are hopeful for similar action by Turkey in the near future. The steps taken by these two countries towards accession to the NPT represent a development of considerable importance in the life of the Treaty.

With respect to article IV of the NPT, the United States remains committed to maintaining and strengthening its programmes for assisting in the peaceful nuclear development of other nations, with particular attention to the needs of the developing countries.

Beyond the problems relating to weapons and forces, there are other disarmament issues on which the United States has been active.

The United States is pleased that one matter left unresolved by the special session was given renewed impetus by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session when it authorized a practical test of a proposed standardized reporting format for nations voluntarily to report their military expenditures. The United States has expressed its willingness to participate actively in this project, and we hope many other countries will take the same view. The development of reliable, standardized international reporting of military expenditures could have a double

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

value: by lifting the veil of secrecy which shrouds much of the world's military spending, it could dampen the action-reaction cycle, based on worst case estimates, which helps drive expenditures ever higher; it would also satisfy one of the preconditions for negotiated agreements to limit or reduce military spending.

The United States is also conscious that aspirations for economic development are among the most fundamental concerns of the non-industrialized nations. The contribution that disarmament might make to the availability of resources for development, both domestically and through foreign assistance, is a question in which many countries have a stake. The United States, therefore, supports and is actively participating in the expert study of the relationship between disarmament and development that was instituted by the special session devoted to disarmament.

A recital of the number and variety of arms control and disarmament activities in which the United States and other member States of this body are engaged sounds superficially impressive. Let us not for a moment, however, lose sight of the fact that activity does not equate with progress; that the issues with which we are dealing are complicated, sometimes imperfectly understood and usually bear importantly on the most sensitive aspects of national and world security.

It is no wonder then that arms control negotiations are among the most difficult and contentious aspects of the conduct of relations between States. The difficulties, however, are not so great or the prospects so bleak as to merit the wry comment attributed to William of Orange in another circumstance, "It is not necessary to hope in order to attempt, nor to succeed in order to persevere." More relevant to our efforts is the reminder of Arthur Clough, "If hopes are dupes, fears may be liars."

Of the qualities needed for success in arms control and disarmament negotiations, perseverance certainly ranks near the top of the list. I am sure that this body will persevere in the pursuit of greater security through arms control measures. I can assure you that my Government will do the same.

Mr. OGISO (Japan): Today, on the occasion of the opening of the Committee on Disarmament, I should like to limit my statement to general remarks, and at a later date I expect to be able to explain at greater length the official position of Japan on matters of substance. The fact that this Committee on Disarmament, as a result of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, has resumed its negotiations with a fresh outlook may certainly be described as opening a new chapter in the history of disarmament negotiations. On behalf of my delegation, I would like to express our heartfelt gratification at the participation of France and the eight non-nuclear-weapon States in this Committee, and at the same time I should like to convey the ardent hope of the Government of Japan that China will participate at the earliest possible date in this Committee which is open to all the nuclear-weapon States.

My delegation believes it urgent and important that, making the best use of the achievements which the CCD has made so far, the Committee on Disarmament will start negotiations as soon as possible on such priority items as a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) and a ban on chemical weapons and, taking into consideration the future prospects of other important questions, the Committee on Disarmament will take, step by step, such measures as are feasible in the current international situation. That is the way in which this Committee can meet the interests of all Member States of the United Nations, and that is the very purpose of this Committee. To this end, the Committee on Disarmament should reopen promptly the expert studies on the issues which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has conducted so far.

My country, Japan, with a Peace Constitution, earnestly desires the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons. We have become a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have, as a matter of policy, consistently upheld the three non-nuclear principles, that is, not to possess, not to manufacture and not to permit the entry into Japan of nuclear weapons, and we have always upheld the position that nuclear energy must be used only for peaceful purposes. On this occasion, my delegation wishes to reiterate Japan's policy on nuclear disarmament as I have just mentioned, and to emphasize that further efforts should be made to promote disarmament, the central issue of which is nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

Taking into consideration the fact that a regional framework for the maintenance of security is based on the principle of mutual deterrence which is derived from a balance between the sums of the nuclear and conventional weapons held by the parties concerned, and that such a framework contributes to the maintenance of the peace and security of the present world, my delegation believes that the most realistic way to achieve the ultimate goal of the abolition of nuclear weapons is that the world should take various measures to arrest the nuclear arms race, while strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and take steps to reduce nuclear armaments gradually. On the basis of such views, my delegation would like to urge all the nuclear-weapon States, which bear a special responsibility in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, to work out concrete measures, in particular, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, through negotiations at this Committee at an early date.

My delegation wishes to take this opportunity to express its appreciation for the efforts made in the SALT II negotiations by the United States and the Soviet Union which are reported to have come to a basic agreement on the major issues to be solved, at the Foreign Ministers' talks between the two countries in December last year, and to express its hope that final agreements on SALT II will soon be reached.

Finally, my delegation hopes that fruitful results will also be achieved in the Committee on Disarmament in the field of non-nuclear disarmament, in particular, a ban on chemical weapons.

On the basis of the positions I have mentioned, my delegation will continue to make positive contributions to the negotiating body on disarmament.

Mr. RADULESCU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the Romanian delegation is taking part in the work of this new Committee on Disarmament in the conviction that one of the specific tasks which must now be considered as a priority item on the agenda of international affairs is to combine the determined efforts of Member States, and of all countries, in order to agree on concrete measures which will contribute to the achievement of disarmament, this vital desideratum of the contemporary world.

(Mr. Radulescu, Romania)

In the policy of détente, security and progress promoted by Romania, in the thinking and activities of President Nicolae Ceaușescu, a central place is consistently assigned to the need to launch a set of effective measures designed to halt the arms race in order to build a world without arms and without war. "The Romanian people, and indeed all peoples of the world", President Nicolae Ceaușescu recently stressed, "have a vital need for security and peace. This is why the main goal of our foreign policy is represented by the unrelenting struggle against all preparations for war, against the arms race, and in support of the solution of the complex problems of the contemporary world by peaceful means and by negotiation, in order to speed up the course of détente and the establishment of genuine international security and lasting world peace".

Romania believes that it is now necessary to act energetically to implement a concrete and effective programme of negotiation and implementation of disarmament, in accordance with the recommendations adopted at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In this context, the Romanian Government appreciates the particularly important role to be played in present circumstances by the new Committee on Disarmament which, with its expanded membership and more democratic framework, has the task of launching an effective process leading to the negotiation of and agreement on specific steps on the road to disarmament.

Public opinion and peoples rightly expect the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament to lead to the analysis of the armaments situation and, in particular, to pave the way for concrete measures designed to halt the arms race and initiate an effective process of disarmament.

In outlining the objectives assigned to the Committee, whose work has just begun, Romania believes that the first step should be to consider the proposals made by a number of States to the United Nations -- proposals which have been accepted and adopted as working papers for our Committee.

The identification of viable and effective disarmament measures likely to meet the concern created by the gravity of the dangers which the arms race and the unprecedented stockpiling of arms, and particularly of nuclear weapons, present

(Mr. Radulescu, Romania)

for the future of all mankind, is in our opinion, the highly responsible task which States and the peoples of the world are entrusting to this new negotiating body in the disarmament field.

Romania regards the implementation of concrete disarmament measures as an inseparable part of the process of improving the international political climate and strengthening détente, confidence and peaceful co-operation among States, on the basis of equal rights, respect for the principles of independence and national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, territorial integrity, mutual advantage, and the non-use of force or the threat of force in reciprocal relations.

The realities of the contemporary world clearly demonstrate not only the need to settle all conflicts and disputes between States by political means and by negotiation, but also the great dangers inherent in the use of force and in attempts to solve problems arising between States through military action. The vital interests of peoples call for a combination of all efforts with a view to finding procedures for the political settlement, through negotiation, of any dispute or conflict between States, and the rejection and elimination of the use of force in international relations. We are firmly convinced that this is the only way to promote continuously efforts aimed at détente, peace and security of peoples, while at the same time directly influencing the solution of disarmament problems.

Romania believes that a measure of special importance would be to embody in binding international agreements the undertaking by all States not to resort in any case or in any circumstances to the use or threat of force in order to interfere in the internal affairs of other States, and not to use their armed forces, on any pretext, to support the actions of various groups against the legal Governments of sovereign and independent States.

Romania is determined to work in the future also, for the negotiated settlement and elimination of all conflicts and hotbeds of war, for the complete eradication of the use or threat of force in international relations, in the conviction that these are basic requirements for peace and security, and for the creation of conditions favourable to the achievement of disarmament.

A study of international affairs and of the major changes taking place in the world proves that, despite the conflicts and complications existing in international

(Mr. Radulescu, Romania)

relations, the world is not facing an imminent world war. On the contrary, the profound changes taking place in favour of the forces of peace, national independence and progress show that, through united action, these forces, these peoples, can prevent the unleashing of a new world war and ensure lasting world peace.

This calls for the intensification of action designed to prevent the deterioration of the world political climate and to bring about an immediate halt to the arms race, and for the adoption of effective disarmament measures, which are the only true way to strengthen peace and security.

Mankind has reached a stage where the pursuit of the arms race represents a grave danger to human civilization itself. The arms race weighs like an increasingly heavy burden on the shoulders of peoples and carries with it the seeds of the exacerbation of international conflicts. Gigantic military expenditures lead to the maintenance and deepening of the economic disparities between States; they impede the implementation of programmes for improving the well-being of the population; they also draw into their vortex the developing countries, which are thus deprived of important material and human resources needed in the efforts to eliminate under-development.

This is why Romania is of the view that one of the basic tasks of the modern world is to halt the arms race without any further delay, and to adopt effective measures for military disengagement and disarmament, and above all nuclear disarmament.

Romania considers that the interests of peace and progress of all peoples demand, as a goal of the utmost importance, that the equilibrium necessary for the security of all States should no longer be maintained by escalation of the arms race, increased military expenditures and the build-up of further stockpiles of weapons, but, on the contrary, by reducing military personnel and arms, and by embarking on disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, under adequate and effective international control.

The set of measures proposed by my country at the special session of the General Assembly have recently been reaffirmed in the Appeal addressed to the parliaments and Governments of all States throughout the world by the Grand National Assembly, on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the unified

(Mr. Radulescu, Romania)

Romanian national State. This Appeal gives expression to the Romanian people's unshakeable desire for peace; it contains an invitation to strengthen co-operation among peoples with a view to speeding up the process of détente and strengthening international security, putting an end to the arms race and implementing genuine disarmament measures and ensuring lasting world peace.

Romania believes that, in defining the role to be played by the Committee on Disarmament, it is necessary to have in view above all the negotiation, as a matter of priority, of measures designed to halt the arms race, to put an end to the allocation, by all States, of any additional financial resources for the purpose of increasing military potential particularly the heavily armed States.

In this regard, we wish to recall that Romania, in line with the ideas also expressed by other States, has proposed the freezing of military budgets, as well as of military forces and arms, with a view to their subsequent gradual reduction, by 10 to 15 per cent in the first stage. Countries reducing their military budgets could channel the funds thus made available into the implementation of programmes for their own development, and into support for the efforts of developing countries, with a view to their more rapid economic and social progress, and the elimination of under-development and the disparities between them and the industrialized countries.

It is the conviction of the Romanian Government that the adoption of such measures as a matter of urgency would produce a powerful positive response, open the way to a more profound approach to the problems of disarmament, create conditions for the subsequent implementation of a long-term disarmament programme designed to lead to the achievement of general disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security.

Romania's comments on general disarmament problems are prompted by the fact that the present military situation in Europe represents the gravest threat to world security, and international peace and co-operation. It is precisely in Europe that vast quantities of arms are stockpiled and the greatest number of troops equipped with the most sophisticated means of mass destruction are concentrated; it is also here that more than two-thirds of the world's total outlay on armaments takes place. It is on this continent that the two most heavily armed military blocs face each other.



(Mr. Radulescu, Romania)

Determined to make an effective contribution to the creation of a climate of peace, co-operation and understanding on the continent of Europe, Romania places particular emphasis on the implementation of military disengagement and disarmament measures, without which no real security is conceivable on this continent or anywhere else in the world.

Accordingly, Romania considers it particularly important for the peace and security of the continent to bring about the adoption of an undertaking not to deploy any more troops or weapons in the territory of other States and to proceed to the gradual reduction of those already there and the subsequent withdrawal of all foreign troops and weapons within national frontiers, the dismantling of military bases in the territory of other States, and the curtailment and eventual cessation of military manoeuvres and all demonstrations of force in general near the frontiers of other States.

Strengthening peace and the security of States means continually limiting the military activity of the blocs and intensifying action in order to create the necessary conditions for the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. As a means of strengthening mutual trust to attain that end, Romania attaches particular political importance to the establishment between the military blocs of a zone in which no armies or weapons would be stationed and no manoeuvres or military demonstrations would take place.

Romania considers that a prominent place in the Committee's work should be assigned to stopping the nuclear arms race and creating favourable conditions for nuclear disarmament.

To strengthen international peace and security, it is imperative to take effective measures leading to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their manufacture and development, the gradual reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery systems until they have been entirely eliminated, and the negotiation of an agreement completely banning nuclear weapons. We consider it equally important to agree, in the Committee, on a treaty whereby States possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to use, in any form, in any circumstances or under any pretext, nuclear weapons or any other weapons or the

(Mr. Radulescu, Romania)

threat of force against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, have renounced the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear arms and the deployment of such weapons in their territory.

Nuclear disarmament measures should in no way hinder the free access of all States to the use of atomic energy and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Romania is also in favour of the adoption, in the Committee on Disarmament, of measures designed to halt production, to remove from military arsenals and to ban the use of chemical, biological, radiation and any other weapons of mass extermination, including neutron weapons.

Measures taken to achieve military disengagement and disarmament must, of course, ensure a reasonable balance of military power that does not confer a military advantage on any one country; they must, on the other hand, guarantee full respect, throughout the disarmament process, for the principle of the equal security of the parties and constantly foster détente and mutual trust between States.

The Romanian delegation attaches particular importance to the Committee's organizational arrangements and procedures, which have a decisive influence on its work. The Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament merely outlined those arrangements. Now, in the light of the new spirit which the special session decided to infuse into the disarmament negotiations, those procedures should be worked out in detail.

It is in that spirit that we consider it necessary to agree, at this session, that all the work of the Committee will be based on the right of all member States to participate in all the work of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies as sovereign independent States, in conditions of complete equality, independently of any military blocs or closed groupings.

What is of decisive importance for the Committee's work is not membership of a particular bloc, but the manner in which States, as subjects of international law, intend to make their contribution to the joint efforts to negotiate effective measures leading to disarmament, strengthening trust between States and international peace and security. That presupposes examining and solving all the problems before the Committee with the participation of all the Member States in accordance with its own organizational arrangements. The Committee should be open and receptive to the proposals and initiatives of all States, including non-members.

(Mr. Radulescu, Romania)

Accordingly, we believe that the Committee's rules of procedure should expressly recognize the right of non-member States to participate in the work, express their views and submit proposals for the purposes of negotiation.

Far from being a matter of form, the organizational arrangements and procedures should be an expression of the relations between independent sovereign States and have a direct impact on substantive negotiation, which can open up or restrict prospects for the work of the Committee.

We therefore consider that, as the next step, it would be appropriate for the Committee to draw up a specific programme of work and its rules of procedure, taking into account proposals and suggestions by all States, whether or not they are members of the Committee.

All the Committee's decisions should be adopted by consensus of the participants, based on the freely expressed consent of each member as a sovereign State with equal rights and taking into account the security interests of all States.

The procedural arrangements should also clearly reflect the relations between the Committee and the United Nations, in view of the primordial responsibility borne by the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

The interest of the entire international community in disarmament makes it essential that the Committee's work should be conducted openly and that the Committee should fully inform the public about the course and actual status of negotiations.

Those are the main points of substance which Romania wishes to make at this opening stage of the Committee's work.

The imperatives of international peace and security require us to act with a proper sense of responsibility, before it is too late, to stop the arms race and bring about disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament, under an adequate and effective system of control.

Convinced of the importance of this session for the proper conduct of the Committee's work and for all its future activities, the Romanian delegation wishes to assure you, Mr. Chairman, as well as the distinguished representatives of other States, that it is determined to contribute actively and constructively, together with the delegations of other States, at this crossroads in the disarmament negotiations, to their positive outcome and to the attainment of man's most cherished ideal: the right to international peace and security.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): It is a happy augury for this Committee that its inaugural session is being held under your chairmanship. For your country played an active role in the series of initiatives which resulted in the reactivation of multilateral consideration of disarmament issues. The inclusion of Algeria in the Committee is a fitting recognition of the great contribution which your country had made and can continue to make to the search for a solution of the crucial question of disarmament.

On behalf of the Nigerian delegation, I wish to express, through you, my hearty welcome to other new members of the Committee, namely, Australia, Belgium, Cuba, Indonesia, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Venezuela, whose representatives are taking their seats for the first time this session.

The agreement reached during the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the multilateral negotiating body represents one of the most concrete achievements of the session. In reaching that agreement, the special session was conscious "of the considerable and urgent work that remains to be accomplished in the field of disarmament". Details of the considerable and urgent work are reflected in the Programme of Action adopted by the special session by consensus. Thus, we should not see as an end in itself the democratization and enlargement of the multilateral negotiating body, as a result of which the Committee on Disarmament is now assembled. A suitable negotiating body is indeed important to the achievement of results. Considering, however, the working method prescribed for the Committee on Disarmament by the General Assembly -- to take decisions on the basis of consensus -- it is absolutely essential that a willingness to reach concrete results should be demonstrated by all members. In this connexion, it is hardly necessary for us to recall that the results achieved in the past 17 years since the multilateral disarmament negotiating body first met have been rather disappointing.

Let us not forget, in our satisfaction at reaching agreement on convening the Committee on Disarmament, that this is not the first time that the multilateral negotiating body has been reviewed and enlarged. The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee which first met in 1962 ended as the 31-nation Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Successive increases in the membership of the Committee did not, in the past, lead to greater productivity. We should therefore have no illusions in this regard. What we like to hope for, is that the democratization of the multilateral negotiating body resulting in the participation, as equal partners, of nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States, combined with the urgency indicated in the Programme of Action of the special session, will give the process of disarmament negotiations a new direction and purpose.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

In this connexion, my delegation is encouraged that France which had hitherto not participated in the multilateral negotiating body has now found it possible to do so. This development gives us the hope that, before long, all nuclear-weapon States will take their rightful places in this body. If nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, then it is obvious that realistic negotiations for effective measures should involve all nuclear-weapon States. The automatic opening of the Committee on Disarmament to participation by nuclear-weapon States was the special session's way of recognizing these realities.

I said earlier on that the convening of this Committee represents one of the concrete achievements of the special session. So also was the consensus reached on the Programme of Action. I am, and this is all I can do at this stage, taking a short-term view of the special session. For how long, however, can we base our assessment of the special session on its historic nature, on the adoption of a Final Document? I say not for long. In the first place, the very awakening of international consciousness to the danger posed by the arms race puts on this organ as well as the United Nations itself the onus of adopting concrete measures to stem the danger. World opinion will not for long be satisfied with a finely composed document of four parts, if the arms race continues to escalate, if no effective measure is taken to reduce the danger of nuclear holocaust, and if much-needed resources are increasingly wasted on armaments when much of the world's population lives below starvation level.

A second reason why we cannot for long rely only on the historic special session is the decision of the General Assembly at its thirty-third session scheduling a second special session devoted to disarmament for 1982. It will be a great disappointment if we go to the second special session without concrete measures of disarmament arising from the Programme of Action adopted in 1978. We are bound to arouse bitter skepticism if we again embark on the elaboration of a final document when the first such document remains largely unfulfilled.

The stakes in the armaments race are so high that we cannot afford to allow the consensus document arising from the first special session to suffer the fate of many other United Nations documents which are forgotten as soon as they are adopted.

In its decision on machinery, the special session devoted to disarmament rightly concluded -- and I quote from paragraph 113 of the Final Document -- that:

"For maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies are required in the field of disarmament -- deliberative and negotiating. All Member States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership".

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

If we are to sustain the hopes raised by the special session then we should ensure that each of the two bodies -- deliberative and negotiating -- faithfully keeps to its assigned area. The danger is very real that the Committee on Disarmament, if it fails to chart out for itself a real programme of negotiations on concrete measures, will soon lapse into the area of deliberation. If anyone wonders how this can happen, he or she only needs to pick up some reports of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The CCD spent the last few years without any real negotiations, as distinct from discussions on any of the disarmament issues which many, inside and outside of the body, believed to be ripe for the elaboration of legal instruments.

With the convening of the Committee on Disarmament, let us learn from the mistakes of the CCD. Let us eschew general debates for which there are adequate forums in the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee. Let us bear in mind that the objective of general and complete disarmament can best be achieved, in present circumstances, by the conclusion and implementation of concrete agreements. If this negotiating forum loses sight of this fact, if it decides to talk about negotiating agreements rather than negotiating these agreements, then it runs the danger of defeating the purpose for which the General Assembly in its wisdom drew the line between the deliberative organ and the negotiating organ.

If this body should decide, as I think it should, to strike while the iron is hot, it will not lack the wherewithal to do so.

There are measures on which deliberations by the former negotiating body have gone far enough. These same measures have been singled out for urgent conclusion of legal instruments by the special session. In paragraphs 21 and 75 of its Final Document, the special session emphasized that an agreement on the elimination of all chemical weapons should be concluded as a matter of high priority. Needless to say that earlier regular sessions of the General Assembly had adopted similar resolutions on chemical weapons.

Moreover, in paragraph 51, the special session considered that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The special session therefore urged that the tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty should be urgently concluded and the result submitted for full consideration by the negotiating body with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

earliest possible date. Nigeria, as party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty believes that a positive measure like the CTBT is more likely to persuade those outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty that the nuclear-weapon States are willing to remove the inherent discrimination in the Treaty.

Speaking in the CCD on 17 August 1978, I said that since it was too late to expect the submission of a draft CTBT to the summer session of the CCD then in progress, my delegation would like to suggest that the Committee on Disarmament should be given a birthday present of a draft comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, or that part of it on which work by the tripartite negotiators had advanced.

My delegation is still looking forward eagerly to the presentation of a draft CTBT to this session of the Committee on Disarmament. However, even if that submission is not made, this should not prevent the Committee, at the appropriate stage during the session, from commencing work on elaborating a text. The restructuring of the Committee gives us a chance to place initiatives by a member or group of members in proper perspective. These initiatives, particularly if they come from nuclear-weapon States, can be vital in advancing the course of negotiations in the Committee. They should not, however, be considered as substitutes for action by the Committee as a whole; nor should they indefinitely prevent the Committee from fulfilling its task in specific areas.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and chemical weapons treaty are two examples of measures which should occupy the immediate attention of this Committee. There are other tasks, particularly in the field of nuclear armaments, which the General Assembly at its thirty-third session again called upon the Committee to undertake: prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Following the consideration by the Disarmament Commission of elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, this Committee will have to undertake the elaboration of such a programme. For the meantime, therefore, we should seek to concentrate on specific issues rather than crowd our immediate work programme with all the issues.

In conclusion, my delegation pledges its co-operation with other members and we are optimistic that its transformation will provide the Committee with the dynamism necessary to tackle the substantive issues before it with purposefulness.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.