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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 69th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. CHAVANAVIRAJ (Thailand)

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A/C.3/38/SR.69
12 December 1983
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The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 12: REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (continued) (A/38/3 (parts I, II), A/38/106, 147 and Add.1 and 2, A/38/166 and Add.1, 2 and 3, A/38/221, 270, 325, 385 and Add.1, A/38/422, 479, 480, 485, 503, 529, 538; A/C.3/38/1, 3, 5, 8, 11 and Corr.1, A/C.3/38/12, A/C.3/38/L.57, L.61, L.62, L.63 and L.64)

1. Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (United States of America) said that the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the one hundred ninety-second anniversary of the United States Bill of Rights would soon be observed. The year 1984 was also drawing near and was a symbolic year associated with George Orwell's book by that name, in which he had described his nightmare vision of totalitarianism.
2. Orwell's great insight was to see and explain the manner in which totalitarianism sought to control history, memory, language and reality itself. The intellectual mode of that modern political régime was a vast system of mental cheating, in which reality was deliberately and knowingly distorted and whose purpose was to possess the inner life of the individual. The totalitarian system was based on total power and terror which presented itself as an agent of liberation and peace. As Solzhenitsyn had written, the violence inherent in totalitarianism was invariably intertwined with the lie. Totalitarianism obscured the truth by engaging in a kind of verbal imperialism. Not content with having appropriated the words "democracy", "peace" and "liberation" for inclusion in its ideological arsenal, it had laid claim to the word "totalitarianism" itself. The Committee had thus seen the spectacle of the representative of Poland condemning the "totalitarianism" of the free world and the Soviet bloc States proclaiming their opposition to nazism, as if their anti-Nazi declarations could obscure the structural equivalence between Nazi and Communist totalitarianism.
3. Lenin had been perfectly clear about the use of violence as the only method for seizing and maintaining power. Totalitarianism spawned Governments based on one-party dictatorship and not on the consent of the governed. It subordinated nations to supranational imperialism and ruled and grew by violence and subjugation. The way in which the Soviets incorporated small helpless peoples into their empire was by now familiar: they chose a weak Government, organized a national liberation front, added a terrorist campaign to disrupt order, provoke repression and weaken an already weak economy, then intensified violence. The brittle institutions of many third world countries would crumble under such strains. The skillful use of "fifth columns" enabled the Soviets to foment coups and rebellions under the guise of indigenous politics. Once a transfer of power had been achieved, they sought to guarantee its irreversibility by providing, in the name of the defence of self-determination, multi-faceted assistance to people whose only desire was to be left alone to solve their own problems.
4. The Soviet Union likewise did not hesitate to manipulate values by using a nation's hopes for peace as a tool for world conquest or by seizing on the human rights issue to reinforce the twin pillars of Marxist-Leninist violence in the modern world, totalitarianism and terrorism.

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5. That claim could be substantiated by looking no further than the draft resolutions which were before the Committee. They focused on only three countries, Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala. Yet, other Latin American countries warranted as much scrutiny by the Committee.

6. Cuba, for example, was a more repressive country than Chile: it held many times more political prisoners in its jails, its State-run press was not independent, its judiciary was subject to State control. The Chilean Government had reinstated freedom of assembly, which would be inconceivable in Cuba. It was true that trade union rights were limited in Chile, but they were non-existent in Cuba. Chile no longer required that the publication of books should be authorized in advance, which was not the case in Cuba. In Chile, there existed 62 movements or parties participating in independent political activity; there were none in Cuba. Thousands of exiles were permitted to return to Chile unconditionally; were Cuban exiles invited to come back to their homeland? In Chile, there was a political dialogue between the Government and the opposition parties, which was not the case in Cuba.

7. It must be asked why that hostile attitude towards Chile persisted. The fact was that Chile was simply a political target. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.3/38/L.63 did not appear to be interested in encouraging the process of reform and transition to democracy which was under way in that country; they no doubt would prefer a violent confrontation which would make more likely the imposition in Chile of a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship based on the Cuban model.

8. The same political motivation underlay the draft resolutions on Guatemala (A/C.3/38/L.57) and on El Salvador (A/C.3/38/L.62), which were just as unbalanced and one-sided.

9. The draft resolution on Guatemala, for example, spoke of the guerrilla war there as an armed conflict of a non-international character, thus ignoring the training of insurgents in Cuba and Nicaragua and the weapons provided by the Soviet bloc. It also stated that the Guatemalan security forces and Government institutions had not respected the norms of international humanitarian law. No mention was made of violations of international humanitarian law by the guerrillas who, in 1983, continued to kill civilian non-combatants and to utilize kidnapping as a political weapon. Paragraph 3 urged the Government, but not the guerrillas, to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, which seemed to suggest that there was no insurgency whatsoever in Guatemala. No account was taken of the fact that human rights violations were on a much reduced scale compared to 1981, which had been recognized by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Guatemala. Paragraph 5 called upon the Government of Guatemala to establish a system for the revocation of convictions and sentences passed by the special tribunals, now abolished. Many of the persons convicted by the courts had been charged with murder, kidnapping, robbery and rape. A total revocation of their convictions without remitting them for retrial would not be viewed favourably by the majority of Guatemalans. Paragraph 6 ignored the Government's open-door policy towards responsible human rights groups. Finally, paragraph 8 took no note of the

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prohibition on the covert shipment of arms and other military equipment to the guerrillas. In short, the overall thrust of the draft resolution was that the Guatemalan Government was fully to blame for the situation in the country and did not have the right to use force in opposition to the armed guerrilla insurgency.

10. The draft resolution on El Salvador (A/C.3/38/L.62) failed to make the distinction, in general and specifically in the seventh preambular paragraph, that the guerrillas, against whom the Salvadorian Government was fighting, were responsible for the climate of fear and the acts of economic sabotage in the country. The Government was struggling precisely to attain the institutional authority necessary in a difficult situation to eliminate human rights abuses. The eighth preambular paragraph criticized the 1982 elections as having failed to end the violence or lead to improvement in the situation of human rights. Much of the violence would end with the end of the Marxist-Leninist insurgency. Improvements in the human rights situation had not been dramatic but they had been steady. Paragraph 5 recommended that reforms should be carried out. Those reforms were being carried out, under difficult conditions. The agrarian reform was largely in place and was considered irreversible. Voter registration was proceeding satisfactorily and elections would be held in the near future. Paragraph 8 was willfully inaccurate: there was no proof of regular bombardment of civilian targets. On the contrary, there was evidence that the guerrillas were interfering with military communications so as to direct fire against civilian rather than military targets. Attributing all those human rights problems in El Salvador to the Government served the cause of the insurgent forces, whose only purpose was to use violence to create a revolutionary situation in which the Government will have no alternative but to intensify repression.

11. What could be done to counter the world-wide Soviet-backed campaign of terror and destabilization?

12. In the first instance, it was necessary to call things by their proper names: support for so-called national liberation movements was simply support for armed totalitarian minorities intent on imposing their will on the majority through violence, so destroying human rights. Denying States the right to resist the terrorist movements by force could have only one purpose: to destroy their political will so as to make them more vulnerable to violence and subversion. Secondly, some elementary truths needed to be reasserted: it was a fundamental tenet of international law that sovereign States had the right to defend themselves against externally supported guerrilla movements. That right was enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Yet it was denied by the doctrine of wars of "national liberation" and its corollary, the illegitimacy of the use of force to oppose such wars. It was precisely that pernicious doctrine that was reflected in the draft resolutions before the Committee. Thirdly, if States had certain rights, so did the individuals who composed them: they had the right to choose their own form of Government, based on the will of the majority, and free of external influence or interference.

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13. To say that a State could defend itself against subversion was not to suggest that it could use any means at its disposal. It could use lawful means proportionate to the threat raised. There could not, however, be any derogation from freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, or from freedom from slavery and forced labour. If the opposition was non-violent and claimed only the right to participate in the political process, there could be no justification for any derogation by Government. The parallel that some had drawn between the behaviour of the Government of Poland in suppressing Solidarity, a non-violent, democratic, free trade union, and the efforts by the Government of El Salvador to resist a violent and undemocratic group of guerrillas was insidious and showed a total inability to draw elementary distinctions.

14. The fundamental distinction in the modern world was not between peace and war but between peace and violence. As Solzhenitsyn had written, war was far from being the only manifestation of a never-ceasing world-wide violence. The loudest advocates of "peace" were also the greatest purveyors of violence; they proclaimed the need for peace only in order to disarm the targets of their violence. But no one was duped. People knew when their rights had been violated and knew that even if language could be manipulated, the same did not hold for reality. They also knew that violence was not an effective means of persuasion.

15. Mr. NGUYEN LUONG (Viet Nam) said that he shared the concern of other delegations at the deterioration of the situation in Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala, where cases of flagrant and systematic violations of human rights were corroborated by United Nations documents, the reports of Special Rapporteurs and non-governmental organizations, and by opposition movements and the Western press. In El Salvador, following the fraudulent elections of 1982, the new Government had intensified repression with increased brutality, as was evidenced by the latitude accorded to "death squads", the massacres of civilians for purposes of intimidation, as at San Nicolas, the use of artillery and aircraft in attacks on the civilian population in rural areas, the prohibition of meetings of more than six people and the secret killings, in particular the assassination of the Chairman of the Salvadorian Commission on Human Rights). His delegation recalled resolution 37/185 which the General Assembly had adopted on the matter.

16. In Guatemala, according to the report of the Guatemalan Human Rights Committee (1983), despite promises and alleged "reforms", there had been no improvement in the military régime's policy based on systematic and continuous violations of human rights which had become even worse recently and were often perpetrated by high-ranking army officers. The Guatemalan Government had contrived to cover up its acts of internal repression when it had received the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, but the many other sources of information available enabled the facts to be established.

17. The report of the Special Rapporteur responsible for studying the human rights situation in Chile (A/38/385 and Add.1) had fully exposed the seriousness of the situation in that country: the army was exercising exceptional powers covering executive, administrative, legislative, judicial and enforcement functions. The

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repression to which the "national days of protest" in July and August 1983 had given rise amounted to a virtual attempt to destroy the right to life and the right to physical and psychological integrity.

18. Those three situations in which human rights were being violated had common features; the policy of State terror and repression pursued by military régimes which were isolated from their respective peoples and had been able to remain in power only with the assistance, especially in the military and police fields, of the greatest imperialist Power; and the resolute struggle of the peoples concerned for the right to life and democratic freedoms and for the right to choose the political system and the path of economic development which suited them. The struggle being waged by the peoples of those three countries against flagrant and systematic violations of human rights was closely linked with their struggle to put an end to imperialist interference in their internal affairs, a struggle which his own country resolutely supported.

19. The existence of Nazi, Fascist and neo-Fascist forces, which the General Assembly had condemned at its thirty-seventh session, and the recrudescence of their activities - in the former Axis countries and in the United States, where the American Nazi Party and the National Socialist Party of America had been established - constituted a real danger to international peace and security and called for joint action by the international community.

20. Other forms of totalitarian ideologies and practices, such as apartheid and zionism, which were based on institutionalized racial discrimination, internal repression, aggression, expansion and terrorism elevated to the rank of State policy, denied the peoples subjected to their domination and occupation the right to self-determination and independence. Encouraged by the direct or indirect assistance and protection of international imperialism, they represented a persistent threat to international peace and security and to the independence and sovereignty of States in the regions concerned.

21. The greatest imperialist Power in the world, while posing as the champion of human rights and arrogating to itself the right to dictate to other States what their conduct shall be, did not hesitate to resort to aggression - as in his own country or in Grenada - or to intimidation - as in the case of Nicaragua; moreover, it meant to defend its vital interests without regard for those of other States, as was shown by the deployment of its intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

22. With regard to mass exoduses, his Government attached great importance to studying the causes of refugee flows and to the efforts made to find a means of preventing or limiting those flows. He noted that population movements and exoduses in developing countries were often explained by wars of aggression, tensions, interference in the internal affairs of States, the threat or use of force in international relations, racist policies, the exploitation and pauperization of countries, economic blockade, political pressures, incitement to flee for political purposes and natural catastrophes.

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23. The problem of African refugees would persist so long as the apartheid régime in South Africa and all its attendant harmful effects remained, as would the problem of Palestinian refugees so long as the Zionist régime pursued its policy and the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine were not recognized. In developing countries which were victims of the underdevelopment inherited from the colonial past, only the establishment of a new international economic order would remove the cause of refugee flows. In his own country, departures were attributable to the wars of aggression waged against the country, to their consequences for its economy, environment and society, and to the war being waged to undermine the country on all fronts.

24. Those problems could be solved only through collective action by the international community, in absolute conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular those of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and by constructive consultations among the countries concerned. That was why Viet Nam considered it unnecessary to create new organs for that purpose; a Group of Governmental Experts on International Co-operation to Avert New Flows of Refugees already existed in the United Nations. In his delegation's view, the Group had shown a very praiseworthy spirit of co-operation, and care must be taken not to prejudge the results of its work or to introduce controversial elements.

25. In reply to the Netherlands delegation, which had criticized Viet Nam with surprising acrimony, he said that his delegation rejected those baseless allegations. The representative of the Netherlands had in fact claimed that political freedom was non-existent in Viet Nam, whereas the Vietnamese Government had made enormous efforts to create the conditions likely to promote them. For countries which had freed themselves from the colonial yoke, freedom could be guaranteed only by national independence.

26. The Netherlands representative had expressed his concern for the freedom of individuals; that freedom was guaranteed by the Vietnamese Constitution, but in Viet Nam it meant the freedom of the citizen in the context of his people and for the good of his people. The Government had shown tolerance and humanity by allowing criminals, after the liberation of Viet Nam, to become reinstated in society by leading a decent life through their work; the aim of the re-education camps was to help them to do so. Ninety per cent of the people who had been in the camps had returned home; those still there were persons guilty of very serious crimes, whose freedom would endanger public order and their personal safety. Moreover, the Vietnamese Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated that Viet Nam would allow all those persons to leave the country if the United States was willing to accept all of them.

27. Mr. BYKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) drew the Committee's attention to the danger of fascism and nazism, which had already plunged the world once into the abyss of world war, and to the importance of adopting effective measures against the threat of a resurgence of nazism, fascism and all forms of totalitarian ideologies and practices based on racial intolerance, hatred and terror. The arms

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race and the war psychosis fostered by some created an atmosphere favourable to the development of Fascist and neo-Fascists ideologies and practices, which existed everywhere in an embryonic state. Some, such as apartheid, had even been raised to the level of State policy. Was it necessary to remind the Committee that the Ad Hoc Working Group to inquire into the situation of human rights in Chile had described the régime instituted by the military putsch of 1973 as a Fascist-type dictatorship? Fascism was gaining ground in various parts of the world. In South Africa, the number of members of the secret Fascist organization "Broederbond" (League of Brothers) who were in the higher echelons of the State establishment had greatly increased in recent years; Prime Minister Botha himself had been a member. In Israel, there was the Tehiya (Revival) Party, whose programme was based on principles of an obviously pro-Nazi character, namely, the idea of the superiority of the people of Israel over other peoples and the need to conquer "living space". The massacre perpetrated in the Sabra and Shatila camps, which had been directed by Israel, should be put on the same plane as the war crimes committed by Hitler's Fascists during the Second World War.

28. Some openly existing Fascist, neo-Fascist and racist organizations and groups had also intensified their activities in a number of Western countries. That was true in particular of the Union of German Soldiers, the Mutual Aid Association of Former SS Soldiers and the German National Democratic Party. In the United States the Ku Klux Klan, the American Nazi Party, the National Socialist Party of America and others were terrorizing the non-white sectors of the population and Americans with progressive ideas; the number of members of the Ku Klux Klan had quadrupled since the current Government had come to power. International links among Fascist and neo-Fascist organizations were being strengthened: the "Black International" had assembled 800 delegates and observers from several countries at Washington in May 1978 to work out a strategy to combat the world's progressive and democratic forces.

29. It was worth recalling that even before the end of the Second World War, the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition had undertaken to pursue and punish Nazi criminals, as well as to extradite them to the countries where they had committed crimes, so that they could be judged in accordance with the laws of those countries. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal and many United Nations resolutions confirmed the principle of the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes, and the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, adopted by the General Assembly on 26 November 1968, covered all aspects of the question.

30. The Soviet State was strictly and resolutely fulfilling the international obligations it had assumed with respect to the extradition and punishment of Nazi war criminals and their accomplices. He referred the members of the Committee to document A/C.3/38/12. If many war criminals were still at large, it was solely because the forces in power in certain Western countries had given them asylum and were not living up to their international commitments. According to The Washington Post and even the FBI, several thousand ex-Nazis who had personally participated in the extermination of the population of countries occupied by Hitler's Germany had

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found refuge in the United States. Seven war criminals held important posts in the CIA - one was working in the State Department and another in the Pentagon. Many of Hitler's former torturers were employed by radio stations such as "Radio Liberty" and "Radio Free Europe", where they specialized in anti-Soviet and anti-socialist propaganda and slander. According to C. Allen, a United States specialist, the presence and use of Nazi criminals in the United States were directly linked with that country's foreign policy, a policy of cold war, and had made it possible to transmit the experience acquired by the SS in the organization of terrorist operations to the United States military forces, so that there was a direct link between the murders committed by the Nazis in the Soviet Union and the Song My massacre in Viet Nam. Between 1976 and 1982, conclusive proof concerning over 140 persons had been communicated to the United States judicial organs, showing that those persons had committed serious crimes in the territory of the USSR; only seven of those people had been stripped of their United States citizenship, and not one had been extradited to the Soviet Union. Even when a Nazi criminal or an accomplice of the SS was brought to court, there was always a judge who enabled him to avoid punishment on various pretexts. He cited the Sprogis case, which had been heard in the United States.

31. The inescapable punishment of war criminals and the strict suppression of Fascist and neo-Fascist ideologies and practices should not be considered solely from the legal point of view. For the international community, they were a duty to the victims of fascism and militarism and a warning to all aggressors and revanchists who had not learned the lessons of history. They were also the expression of the unshakeable will of peoples to do everything possible to ensure that war crimes and crimes against humanity would never be repeated and that the scourge of war should be removed from the face of the earth for ever, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

32. Like fascism, totalitarianism was the political framework of the imperialist States, in which the most reactionary capitalist circles imposed a terrorist dictatorship. All their totalitarian beliefs and practices were imbued with a frenzied anti-communism, racism and a pathological hatred of anything progressive and revolutionary, and they manifested themselves in racism, racial discrimination, colonialism, a desire to dominate the world, the declaration of certain parts of the world as "areas of vital interest" for a given country, and the proclamation of "holy wars" against socialism. Internationally, totalitarianism took the form of "gunboat diplomacy", which involved diktat and interference, even armed interference, in the internal affairs of States, and of protecting "gunboat democracies". The invasion of Grenada by the United States army in order to establish an American-style "democracy" there and the deployment of United States nuclear missiles in Europe against the wishes of the European peoples could scarcely be viewed otherwise than as manifestations of totalitarianism.

33. The representative of the United States had just expatiated on violence and totalitarianism. But one should face the facts squarely, as she herself had said. He read out excerpts from a secret document intended for United States diplomats and CIA agents which had been approved by the White House at the end of 1981 and which

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contained action guidelines stating in essence that the United States must seek political dominance in regions such as the Mediterranean and the Caribbean Seas, southern Africa, and the Pacific and Indian Oceans, including the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, as well as regions that provided essential raw materials, that the United States must re-establish its influence over the Governments in the regions in question which followed an anti-United States policy, and that it must seek to neutralize that action of certain Asian and African countries seeking demilitarization of the Indian Ocean region, the effect of which would be to limit the United States military presence not only in the Indian Ocean but also in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and some African countries. That document was a veritable quintessence of United States totalitarianism. The statement of the representative of the United States to the Committee had been replete with slander of socialist States and the non-aligned countries which rejected United States diktat even while reproaching others for lying and slandering the United States.

34. Mr. TRUCO (Chile) recalled that in his statement on agenda item 100 he had already underscored the increasingly obvious discrepancy between the principle of universal respect for human rights as established in the Charter and the political conception of those rights which a majority group had been imposing for several years upon the international community in such a way that the extremely serious violations of human rights occurring in certain regions of the world were systematically passed over in silence.

35. During the entire bloody reign of Idi Amin the representative of his régime had been seated in the Commission on Human Rights, and it had been impossible to study the situation in Uganda because of the opposition of the Soviet Union and other delegations; that fact showed the extent to which the United Nations had lost its credibility and hypocrisy had become the rule there.

36. Moreover, all but five of the sponsors of the draft resolutions accusing the three Latin American countries of human rights violations were included in the list of 117 countries that Amnesty International cited in its 1983 report as having committed such violations. In the particular case of Chile, only 3 of the 12 countries sponsoring draft resolution A/C.3/38/L.63 were not named in that report.

37. He pointed out that the Amnesty International report would lead one to believe that 1,492 persons had been arrested in Chile "following simple administrative decisions without any review by the courts". The fact was that all but 22 of the 1,492 persons in question had been freed and that in the overwhelming majority of cases those arrested had disturbed public order.

38. Furthermore, the assertion made in the Committee to the effect that the Chilean junta had established the state of emergency when it had taken power was absolutely untrue. The state of emergency - which, incidentally, the Government had lifted on 28 August 1983 - had been established in Chilean legislation for a very long time. It was therefore, to say the least, ill-considered to denounce in paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.3/38/L.63 "the institutionalization of various states of emergency". The intention of the sponsors of the text was clear: they

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were trying to show a difference between the current régime and the "traditional democratic legal order" which, according to them, had prevailed under Allende. How the sponsors of the draft, let alone the Special Rapporteur, could be unaware of the fact that the United Popular (Popular Unity) Government presided over by Allende had imposed the state of emergency on the country was something he could not understand, since he had himself transmitted to the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights photocopies of the pertinent decrees bearing the signature of President Allende. To ask the Chilean authorities in paragraph 5 of the draft resolution to lift the state of emergency was pointless.

39. In addition, the sponsors of the draft resolution, forced to recognize that the Chilean authorities had permitted Chilean nationals to return to the country, had seen fit, guided by their political prejudices, to state in the seventh preambular paragraph that "the measures taken to that effect had been arbitrary and restrictive", without concerning themselves with the different conclusions reached by the Special Rapporteur, who had in fact noted in his report that the Government had authorized the return of a large number of exiles.

40. Indeed, 3,421 persons in all had been authorized to return to the country, and on 29 October 1983 a special bureau had been set up to deal with their situation. The great majority of requests to return addressed to the Government had been granted. None the less, the Chilean authorities were once again urged in the draft resolution in question to respect "the right of Chileans to live in and freely enter and leave their country". One of the sponsors of the draft resolution was the Cuban Government, which had made a practice of the mass expulsion of its nationals.

41. The request to the Chilean authorities in paragraph 6 of the draft resolution to investigate the fate of persons who had disappeared in Chile was clear proof that the United Nations had lost the character of "a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of ... common goals" which the San Francisco Charter had originally conferred upon it. It had, in fact, been six years since any case of disappearance in Chile had been reported. Why had that fact not been noted in any United Nations document? As for the persons who had disappeared before that period, he wondered why there was an obstinate refusal to recognize that the Chilean Government itself had solicited the co-operation of prestigious international bodies to shed light on their fate. Those investigations were not yet concluded, and one could rest assured that if the missing persons had been kidnapped, the perpetrators of such a crime would not go unpunished.

42. When the United Nations had been established, no one would have thought that the representatives of Member States were going to adopt resolutions that would constitute gross interference in the internal affairs of a country. Yet that was the case when the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.3/38/L.63 dared to claim that the Constitution adopted in 1980 following a plebiscite observed by hundreds of foreign journalists did not reflect a freely expressed popular will. No foreign Government was authorized to meddle in what were exclusively the affairs of Chileans.

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43. Chile was at a turning point in its history. Ten years had elapsed since the fall of the so-called Unidad Popular régime, and the Government and opposition were both eager to consolidate democratic institutions. As Lord Colville had told the Committee, some situations could not be fully understood without knowing the history of the country in which they occurred. Unfortunately, the author of the report on Chile was utterly wanting in such knowledge, and that was clearly reflected in the draft resolutions submitted for the Committee's consideration.

44. In the preface to a book entitled "De la vía chilena a la vía insurreccional" (From the Chilean path to the path of insurrection) by the Chilean sociologist and writer Genaro Arriagada, Eduardo Frei, the former President of Chile, had put events in Chile between 1970 and 1973 in their true light. He wished to quote that preface to help those involved in the discussion to understand that period of Chilean history.

45. After describing the situation in Chile in 1970, when the country seemed to the outside world to be a particularly stable democratic régime, Eduardo Frei pointed out that to Unidad Popular, the political grouping that had supported Salvador Allende's nomination in 1970, the only thing that counted was to win political power. Under Allende, Eduardo Frei affirmed, the country had had galloping inflation, the currency had been devalued, produce of all kinds, including bread, had become scarce, production had fallen and anarchy had begun to reign in all areas. In brief, Eduardo Frei said, there was "economic and social chaos". Eduardo Frei also pointed out that opposition to the Allende régime had come not only, as some tried to make out, from the middle classes but from the entire populace. In the last months of the régime the copper workers, with the backing of the main trade unions, had held the longest strike in the country's history. Additionally, Unidad Popular had suffered almost total defeat in the municipal elections in 1973. In fact, as Eduardo Frei pointed out, Unidad Popular had never been anything other than a minority.

46. Eduardo Frei also drew attention to the fact that the Unidad Popular Government had tried to impose its political preferences on the armed forces, which were known for their unswerving respect for the Constitution. According to Eduardo Frei, the attempt had brought about the beginnings of a rebellion within the armed forces and there was allegedly no doubt that arms imports and the presence of foreigners belonging to extremist movements that were interfering in the life of the country lay behind the September 1973 coup d'état. The armed forces had intervened when they realized that the Constitution had been violated and they themselves were threatened.

47. On 10 August 1983, as he announced some decisions aimed at reviving economic activity, President Pinochet had referred to the need to prevent the country from "slipping back into the situation it had been in under the former régime". The Minister of the Interior had called on all sectors of the democratic opposition to engage in constructive dialogue with the Government. The dialogue had begun on 25 August 1983 in the presence and under the auspices of the Archbishop of Santiago, between the Minister of the Interior and the leaders of the group known

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as the "Democratic Alliance". The dialogue was Chile's business exclusively, and any attempt to exert pressure from the outside, besides having the opposite effect to that intended, would infringe the provisions which Member States had solemnly undertaken to respect upon ratifying the Charter of the United Nations.

48. The information supplied to the Secretary-General by the Chilean Government was simply what had been published in the Chilean press, and one had only to read the Chilean papers to appreciate the extent of the freedom of expression and information that existed in the country. On 2 November 1983 the press had published a list of 62 movements, groups and parties involved in the political life of the country. How many of the countries now preparing to support the loathsome draft resolution put before the members of the Committee could supply such irrefutable evidence of what was happening at home?

49. As for the "violent repression of the ever larger and more widespread public protest" which was supposed to arouse the "concern" of the General Assembly (draft resolution A/C.3/38/L.63, para. 8), he pointed out that the demonstrations were not spontaneous protests but public meetings, announced ahead of time and authorized by municipal authorities. Of course it was unfortunate that some of them had given rise to incidents which had resulted in the loss of human lives. Insofar as the necessary steps had been taken to prevent those who had provoked the incidents from doing so again, such incidents were unlikely to recur.

50. It was at least strange that the sponsors of the draft resolution, who were accusing Chile of violent repression, included Mexico, whose history included the sad episode of the "night of Tlatelolco" during which, on the Plaza de las Tres Culturas, some 200 students had died under fire from members of the security forces. As no special rapporteur had been sent to Mexico to cast light on the incident, it would never be known just what had happened that night. All that was known was that the person then in command of the security forces had later been elected President of Mexico.

51. In view of all that he had said, his Government's position was clear. Chile would refuse to become involved with any procedure stemming from the Commission on Human Rights or the General Assembly as long as it continued to be the victim of discriminatory treatment. In his Government's view, only a high commissioner for human rights with the necessary authority to play a universal, apolitical role free from pressure - in other words, completely impartially - could afford States the guarantee that they would not be subjected to "selective" treatment.

52. He wished to correct a misunderstanding in the statement made by the representative of Spain the previous night. His delegation had never said that special rapporteurs' mandates derived from the procedure established in Economic and Social Council resolution 1503 (XLVIII). What his country constantly did stress was that the only generally applicable and universally accepted procedure was that set forth in Economic and Social Council resolution 1503, since it applied to all States without exception. Special rapporteurs were "selective" by nature, as their very title indicated.

/...

(Mr. Trucco, Chile)

53. On the other hand, the misunderstanding was of no great importance. Much more important were political decisions. Some months previously, the head of the Spanish Government had sent a letter to his European colleagues calling for joint action in support of the Chilean opposition. All Chileans knew about the letter, which had been published in both Spain and Chile.

54. He wished to emphasize that it was not the "political transnationals" that would determine Chile's future. A similar attempt in the period 1970-1973 had provoked a strong reaction from the vast majority of the Chilean people and armed forces.

55. What the Third Committee was witnessing had nothing to do with the protection of human rights in Chile: it was an attempt to execute political schemes devised outside the country.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.