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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 33rd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)
later: Mr. ELFAKI (Sudan)

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ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139, 141, 143 AND 144 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will this afternoon continue its consideration of draft resolutions on disarmament items.

Mr. STRUCKA (Czechoslovakia): On behalf of the delegation of Cuba and that of my own country, I wish to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.66, entitled "Institutional Arrangements Relating to the Process of Disarmament".

The overall objective of the draft resolution is the enhancement of the efficient utilization of the existing international disarmament machinery. There is, of course, no substitute for the political will of States if there is to be any substantial or real progress on disarmament, especially the will of States which possess nuclear weapons. Over the past five years the General Assembly has steadily streamlined and revitalized the international machinery for disarmament, both in the deliberative and the negotiating areas. Member States of our Organization have also repeatedly emphasized the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, in the field of disarmament.

It is the considered view of the sponsors of the draft resolution that one way of enhancing the efficient utilization of the international machinery is by ensuring that full use is made of the possibilities offered by specialized agencies and departments, institutions and programmes within the United Nations system in connection with various aspects of disarmament and the related international security issues. In this connection the draft resolution stresses, using the language of paragraph 12 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that the Department for Disarmament Affairs should take full account of the possibilities offered by specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system with regard to studies and information on disarmament.

Each specialized agency and institution has its own area of emphasis and competence with significant relevance to one aspect of disarmament or another. The individual and collective involvement of the agencies and institutions in the sphere of disarmament is, therefore, of the utmost importance for the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations in achieving the major objectives of the Organization, in particular the maintenance of peace and security and the

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

promotion of economic and social development. Furthermore, the sponsors of the draft resolution are convinced that all the efforts within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign can hardly be complete without the full and active participation of the specialized agencies and other institutions of the United Nations system. We are convinced that broadening their contribution to the cause of disarmament would not only not be detrimental to their activity but would enhance their importance and standing within the United Nations system.

These, in brief, are the considerations and convictions behind the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/38/L.66. The text of the draft is self-explanatory, and deliberately simple. It has five operative paragraphs, which constitute a follow-up of the salient points contained in the preambular paragraphs.

The thrust of the draft resolution is thus clearly aimed at a greater contribution by, and a wider involvement of, the specialized agencies, other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system in the various disarmament aspects. Such an invitation to, and urging of, closer co-ordination and co-operation between the various agencies and institutions is fully justified. It is impelled by the exemplary co-ordination and co-operation manifested between the various units of the Secretariat dealing with the relevant vital issues of disarmament and international security. More specifically, I refer here to the close relationship between the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs and the Department for Disarmament Affairs, which are jointly providing the Secretariat team servicing the First Committee. This is an example worthy of emulation, since such co-operation and co-ordination within the Secretariat reflect the unavoidable fact that disarmament and international security are two sides of the same coin.

In this spirit, we hope that all delegations will be able to support the proposed draft, as contained in document A/C.1/38/L.66, and that it will be adopted by consensus.

Mr. ALEXANDROV (Bulgaria): On behalf of the delegations of the German Democratic Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and my own country, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, I introduce draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.45, entitled "Limitation of naval activities: Limitation and reduction of naval armaments, extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans", under agenda item 62, "General and complete disarmament".

(Mr. Alexandrov, Bulgaria)

The sponsors' motives for introducing the draft resolution are reflected in its preambular part. They stem from the fact that the international community can no longer remain indifferent to the serious threat to international peace and security posed by the continuing escalation of the naval arms race. As is well known, navies play an ever greater role in the overall military arsenals of States, and the trend to seek military superiority in, and domination of, the world's oceans, generated by the aggressive imperialist circles' global strategy of negotiating from a position of strength, is ever more conspicuous. The strategic rearmament programmes undertaken by those circles envisage the deployment at sea of qualitatively new nuclear weapons which would increase the dangers to the security of States.

The sophistication of naval armaments and naval warfare have a destabilizing effect on the international situation, and increase the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences for all mankind. The growing military presence and naval activities of certain States far from their own shores are bound to increase this danger.

Today gunboat diplomacy, with the use of powerful naval formations equipped with the most sophisticated weapons, including nuclear arms, is ever more frequently employed as an instrument of the policy of negotiating from a position of strength, of pressure against sovereign States, of direct interference in their internal affairs and of open aggression against them.

The vital interests and security of many States are endangered by the network of over 200 foreign naval bases and facilities encompassing all regions of the world. Historical experience shows that the growing military presence and naval activities in the world's oceans adversely affect the security of international sea lanes, increase their vulnerability and impede the peaceful maritime activities of all States. In the present strained international situation it is even more necessary to adopt urgent measures aimed at substantially limiting naval activities, reducing naval armaments and extending confidence-building measures to seas and oceans. Success in this direction would be an essential contribution to closing yet another channel of the arms race, easing international tension and military confrontation and contributing to the efforts to strengthen international peace and security and prevent war, especially nuclear war.

There are genuine possibilities of achieving those goals in the field of limiting naval activities and armaments. In this respect, there are a number of

(Mr. Alexandrov, Bulgaria)

concrete practical proposals put forward by the socialist and non-aligned States. Here I recall the constructive proposals of the socialist countries dealing with both the global and the regional aspects of the problem, and in particular the proposals on the strengthening of peace and security in the region of the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean region.

We actively support the initiatives to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, and call for the extension of the confidence-building measures envisaged in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to seas and oceans adjacent to Europe.

The sponsors of the draft resolution are aware that reaching agreement on limiting naval activities and reducing naval armaments will be a complex, multilateral process. That is why they believe this process should be launched without further delay. This is the underlying idea embodied in the operative part of the draft resolution. From this starting point, operative paragraph 1

"Appeals to all Member States, in particular the major naval Powers to refrain from enlarging their naval activities in areas of conflict or tension, or far from their own shores".

Operative paragraph 2 contains the sponsors' main proposal. It

"Recognizes the urgent need to start negotiations with the participation of the major naval Powers and other interested States on the limitation of naval activities, the limitation and reduction of naval armaments and the extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans, especially to regions with the busiest sea lanes or regions where the probability of conflict situations is high".

We are ready to co-operate with all interested States in the co-ordination of views concerning modalities for holding such negotiations. Our readiness is reflected in operative paragraphs 3 and 4.

In conclusion, the sponsors express their hope that the draft resolution will be supported by Member States, in view of the importance and urgency of the problem under consideration as well as the fact that their initiative provides an opportunity to consider and adopt various positive ideas aimed at achieving the common goal already mentioned. Solving the problem of the use of the world's oceans exclusively for peaceful purposes is in the best interest of the whole of mankind.

Mr. MRKIC (Yugoslavia): In the past few days the sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.16 and A/C.1/38/L.26 on the implementation of recommendations and decisions of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament have held consultations aimed at elaborating a draft resolution which will be jointly adopted. I am especially pleased to inform the Committee that those efforts have yielded results, and that I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.26/Rev.1.

The revised draft contains the following amendments. After the sixth preambular paragraph the following new paragraph is included:

"Recalling the commitment of States undertaken in various international agreements to negotiate on disarmament measures, in particular on nuclear disarmament".

In the second line of what is now the eighth preambular paragraph the words "in good faith" are added after "negotiations on disarmament". This contributes to a better qualification of "negotiations".

The last preambular paragraph has been changed, and now reads as follows:

"Stressing that the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which was unanimously and categorically reaffirmed by all Member States at the twelfth special session as the comprehensive basis for efforts towards halting and reversing the arms race, retained all its validity and that the objectives and measures contained therein still represent one of the most important and urgent goals to be achieved".

In addition, the operative paragraph 1 has been restructured, and now reads:

"Expresses its grave concern over the acceleration and intensification of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, as well as the new, very serious deterioration of relations in the world, intensification of focal points of aggression and hotbeds of tension in different regions of the world, which threatens international peace and security and increases the danger of outbreak of nuclear war".

Finally, after operative paragraph 3 a new one is included, reading:

"Calls upon all States to refrain from any actions which have or may have negative effects on the outcome of disarmament negotiations".

In conclusion, I express gratitude to the sponsors of both drafts, and particularly to the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Germany, whose

(Mr. Mrkic, Yugoslavia)

understanding and readiness to co-operate have most directly contributed to the successful outcome of our consultations.

I am convinced that our revised text will have the widest support.

Mr. KRUTZSCH (German Democratic Republic): First, on behalf of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, I wholeheartedly endorse the statement we have just heard from the representative of Yugoslavia. We are satisfied that it has been possible to merge the resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/38/L.16 and A/C.1/38/L.26. The revised draft of resolution A/C.1/38/L.26 contains basic ideas from the two original drafts. They have the common aim of directing the attention of States to the urgent need to negotiate and conclude agreements ending and reversing the arms race. My delegation therefore became a co-sponsor of the revised draft, and we ask those delegations supporting the draft in document A/C.1/38/L.16 to give their support to draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.26/Rev.1. If this new draft resolution is adopted, my delegation will ask that we do not vote on draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.16. I express my delegation's high appreciation to the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.26 for the spirit of understanding and co-operation they evinced, and especially to the representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Djokic, for his efforts.

Secondly, I should like to refer again to the problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. My delegation introduced in document A/C.1/38/L.11, on behalf of 10 other sponsors, a draft resolution aimed at the speediest elaboration and conclusion of such a convention. Meanwhile, a draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/38/L.41 has been distributed to members of the Committee. That draft resolution also favours the elaboration of such a convention at the earliest possible date. My delegation supports this draft without reservation, and has joined its sponsors.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/38/L.11, which was proposed by my delegation, is aimed specifically at directing the attention of Member States to the need to avoid action which would complicate or endanger the positive outcome of the negotiations presently under way in the Committee on Disarmament and to find ways and means of facilitating these negotiations. The reaction of many delegations that we consulted has shown that there is a strong need and broad support for such action by the General Assembly, as in previous years. There are more alarming facts than before which may trigger a new escalation in the chemical arms race, an escalation which could render fruitless all efforts to reach a complete prohibition.

(Mr. Krutzsch, German Democratic Republic)

During the consultations some delegations expressed the opinion that it was not necessary for the text to include a freeze. They pointed to the fact that this idea was to some extent, in more general terms, already included in the draft resolution. To meet such opinions, my delegation submitted yesterday a revised draft resolution, contained in document A/C.1/38/L.11/Rev.1, which has meanwhile been distributed by the Secretariat. I should like now to introduce this revised draft.

The only change is that operative paragraph 4, which called for a freeze on chemical weapons for the period of negotiations on a convention, has been deleted. Consequently, former paragraph 5 has now become paragraph 4. In taking this step, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.11 express the hope that this will result in even broader support for this draft. Our conviction that an agreed freeze on chemical weapons would expedite the negotiations on the complete prohibition of all chemical weapons in a most effective way remains unchanged.

Mr. de LA GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): I have the honour to introduce on behalf of my own delegation and on behalf of the delegations of Australia, Belgium, Colombia, Ecuador, Norway, Sweden and Uruguay draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.53, whose purpose is to implement General Assembly resolution 37/98 D, adopted on 13 December last.

The resolution seeks to maintain the authority of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, by giving the international community an appropriate way of examining facts, which if verified, would constitute breaches of the Protocol. To that end, paragraph 5 of resolution 37/98 D requests the Secretary-General, with the co-operation of Member States, to compile lists of qualified experts whose services could be made available at short notice to carry out investigations which may be deemed necessary, and a list of laboratories with the capability of undertaking testing for the presence of agents the use of which is prohibited. So far 17 States have provided the Secretary-General with the names of experts or laboratories. Other States will certainly do likewise in the near future. As a result, if the need arises the Secretary-General will be able to carry out an investigation.

However, the tasks entrusted by paragraph 7 of resolution 37/98 D to the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified consulting experts, were not carried out this year. I remind the Committee of the provisions of that paragraph:

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

"7. Further requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, to devise procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of information concerning activities that may constitute a violation of the Geneva Protocol or of the relevant rules of customary international law and to assemble and organize systematically documentation relating to the identification of signs and symptoms associated with the use of such agents as a means of facilitating such investigations and the medical treatment that may be required". (resolution 37/98 D, para. 7)

As can be seen from the experts' report, they have done a remarkable job. I pay tribute to General Ezz, Chairman of the Group, Dr. Ahlberg, Professor Bretton, Professor Sur, Ambassador Flowerree, Professor Machata and Ms. Segarra.

In their report, published in annex II to document A/38/435, the consultant experts state that they have not been able "to review thoroughly certain aspects" of the procedures to be established, aspects which are mentioned in subsections 5, 9 and 10 of section II C of annex II. Those subsections relate to the following points: procedure to be followed for the transportation of samples, taking into account the legal aspects involved; requirements for logistical support and security arrangements; and materials needed during the course of an investigation.

The consultant experts also state that they have not been able to draft section III of their report, the object of which was to have been the assembly and systematic organization of the documentation.

It therefore appears to be necessary for the consultant experts to continue and to complete next year the task entrusted to them by the Secretary-General. That is the purpose, inter alia, of paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, whereby the General Assembly requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to implement resolution 37/98 D, and in particular to complete in 1984, with the help of the group of qualified consultant experts established by him, the task entrusted to him in paragraph 7 of resolution 37/98 D, and to report to it on the work of the group.

I have already referred to the positive replies to the Secretary-General's note verbale of 24 February, in which he requested States to send him, in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 37/98 D, the names of experts and laboratories. A number of other replies are negative and raise legal arguments against the resolution. It is claimed that the resolution seeks to amend the 1925 Protocol

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

without the agreement of the parties, extends their obligation, and would be tantamount to a revision of the Protocol in a manner contrary to the law of treaties.

I emphasize here that resolution 37/98 D - and ipso facto this draft resolution - cannot be interpreted in that way. It was never the intention of the sponsors to complete or amend the Geneva Protocol. The resolution does not, and cannot, create any new legal obligation on the parties to the Geneva Protocol. The Geneva Protocol has the character of a convention and is therefore beyond the reach of a General Assembly resolution. The purpose of resolution 37/98 D is quite different: it is designed to secure respect for the Protocol by means of investigations the results of which are made available to the international community. Action designed to ensure compliance with an obligation under international law cannot be construed as being contrary to international law.

Moreover, I remind the Committee that the procedure provided for by resolution 37/98 D is described, in the resolution's very title, as being provisional.

We very much hope that commitments entered into by convention give binding force to verification procedures on the possible use of chemical weapons. The negotiations now going on in the Committee on Disarmament on chemical weapons seem to be moving in this direction. This new and strong motivation will, we hope, strengthen the will of all the participants to come to a decision on the matter.

Finally, we emphasize, as we did last year when introducing what became resolution 37/98 D, that our initiative this year is in no way linked with the allegations with which representatives are familiar and the polemics to which they have given rise about the possible use of chemical weapons. Our purpose is quite different. We wish to place our proposal outside any controversy and any political context, and we very much hope that it will be considered calmly and in the spirit of constructive co-operation demanded by the subject of our debate: respect for, and strengthening of, international law in one of its most serious provisions, that prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. MARINESCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): We are devoting our statement today to the introduction of a draft resolution on an extremely important and urgent problem - the bilateral negotiations in Geneva on intermediate range missiles. We are proposing the draft resolution for adoption by the General Assembly.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

The importance for peace and security in Europe and the whole world of the problems which are the subject of this draft resolution has been made clear in the General Assembly general debate and throughout the work of our Committee. The prospect of the deployment of new medium-range missiles is a source of great concern, which has grown because of the tendency, in our Organization and elsewhere, to minimize the seriousness of the present situation and its negative impact on the peace and security of all the European countries as well as other countries.

Statements that the deployment of new missiles would serve peace and hasten nuclear disarmament are in fact intended to hide reality, to lessen concern and to divert the attention of peoples from the great danger represented by the new missiles. The peoples must be told the truth frankly and honestly. The new missiles do not, and cannot, serve peace. On the contrary, they only considerably increase the danger of war, of a nuclear catastrophe. At this decisive time, while it is still not too late, we must act with determination to intensify the struggle for disarmament and peace, to prevent the deployment of new missiles and the development of existing missiles.

The hope and desire that the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva will be successful is broadly shared by the Member States. At a time when the negotiations have reached a critical stage, it is the highest duty of every State and of the United Nations to speak out resolutely in favour of the Geneva talks leading as soon as possible to agreements preventing the deployment of new rockets and bringing about the withdrawal and destruction of existing ones.

Many leaders of States and Governments, including the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, have made many proposals to facilitate a suitable agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. At the same time, the Soviet Union and the United States have presented a number of proposals which could lead to an agreement and to the halting of the deployment and development of new missiles. In general, even today, it is recognized that it is still possible for the parties to reach agreement.

Our sense of high moral and political responsibility makes us stress that as long as there is the slightest chance of agreement being reached nothing must be done that endangers Europe and the world and that could pave the way to a new escalation of the arms race, towards nuclear catastrophe. Nothing can justify the deployment of new missiles and the development of existing ones.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

As President Nicolai Ceausescu stated today in the Romanian Parliament, "It must be frankly stated that the renunciation by the United States of the deployment of new missiles would create no imbalance in the balance of power between the two parties. It must also be frankly stated that the withdrawal and destruction by the Soviet Union even of all its intermediate-range missiles would not lead to an imbalance between the two parties. As is well known from statements by both parties, various international conferences and scientists, both countries today have the nuclear capacity to destroy the world many times over. In those circumstances, there is no question of an imbalance in the balance of power between the two countries simply because one country has a few hundred rockets more or less than the other. On the contrary, a major effort must be made to ensure that the halting of the deployment of the new missiles is followed by the reduction of nuclear weapons and armaments in general, to bring about at the lowest possible level a balance of nuclear weapons and weapons in general".

In this context, we stress that, in my country's opinion, to proceed with the deployment of new medium-range missiles in a number of European countries would contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby violating the spirit and even the letter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Whether one likes it or not, this would pave the way for new countries to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. Here at the United Nations we have a lofty responsibility to do everything we can to prevent that. We are strongly convinced that this is a problem that the United Nations cannot and must not ignore if we want our organization to play the role expected of it and entrusted to it by our peoples. It was in this spirit that we drew up our draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.3.

Most members of the Committee are certainly familiar with the hard work that our delegation has done in preparing a text capable of receiving general support. To that end, throughout the various stages of our consultations we have made successive changes in the text of the draft resolution, in both its official and unofficial forms.

In spite of that, to our great regret, the efforts of the Romanian delegation to produce a consensus text have not brought the expected results. At each stage of the consultations increasingly vague language was proposed to us, with the clear intention of making the text meaningless and diminishing the political significance of the General Assembly's appeal to the parties to the Geneva negotiations. Clearly, such a draft would not have responded to the gravity of the present

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

situation and would have obscured the clarity of the message from the United Nations to the parties negotiating in Geneva.

In these circumstances, my delegation believes that the best way to support the continuation of the negotiations and the cause of European and world peace and security is for the General Assembly to state clearly and unequivocally its views on the crucial problem of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and the Geneva negotiations on them.

It is in this spirit that my delegation has presented a revised version of the draft resolution, the basis of which is an appeal to both sides to make every effort to reach agreement in the negotiations or at the very least to agree provisionally not to deploy any new intermediate-range missiles of any kind and to reduce the number of existing missiles. Meanwhile, the negotiations should continue with a view to attaining positive results in keeping with the security interests of all States.

At the same time, the draft resolution calls on all the European countries and all other interested countries to make every effort to promote the negotiating process and its successful outcome. It also calls upon them to do their utmost to put an end to the arms race and to proceed to disarmament, and in particular nuclear disarmament, as well as to contribute to the reduction of international tension and the resumption of the policy of détente, co-operation and respect for the national independence of all peoples.

We are convinced that this appeal is fair and balanced, and that it meets the urgent need to take concrete action to prevent a new escalation of the arms race. The deployment of new missiles, like the development and modernization of existing missiles, despite the repeated demonstrations of the powerful will of the European peoples and world public opinion, will undoubtedly lead to a new spiral in the arms race, perhaps irreversible, with unpredictable consequences not only for Europe but for international peace and security, thus very much increasing the danger of a world conflagration.

We hope that our draft resolution, the profound concern on which it is based and its purposes will command broad support among Member States. We also hope that in the light of the most recent revisions to our draft resolution, which take into account as much as possible various points of view and at the same time strive to maintain the balanced nature of the draft resolution, the sponsors of the two other draft resolutions on the same subject will not insist that their draft resolutions be put to a vote.

Mr. FERM (Sweden): I wish to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.59 on behalf of Austria, Costa Rica, Finland, Mexico, Nigeria, Yugoslavia and my own country. In doing so, I also have the pleasure of announcing that Ecuador has joined us as a sponsor.

With its resolution 37/99 B the General Assembly last year submitted the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (ICDSI) entitled "Common Security - a programme for disarmament" to the Disarmament Commission. The Disarmament Commission welcomed in June this year the ICDSI report as a timely and constructive contribution to international efforts to achieve disarmament and to maintain and strengthen international peace and security. It also recommended that the ICDSI report be duly taken into account in continuing and future disarmament efforts. The draft resolution is the result of that recommendation.

In the draft resolution the Disarmament Commission conclusions have been reflected in operative paragraphs 1 and 2. In accordance with the draft resolution, the General Assembly would further emphasize the need to create concepts enhancing political and economic confidence between nations as well as the need for policies arrived at, not in opposition to, but in co-operation with, other nations. In this context, reference is made to the United Nations Study on Confidence-Building Measures (A/36/474).

The ICDSI recommended that States should not seek security at each other's expense, and stated that security in the nuclear age should be attained through co-operative undertakings. International peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival, rather than a threat of mutual destruction.

During the recent years of tense relations between the major Powers, little effort has been put into the search for measures fostering a sense of common security in international relations. Therefore, it is all the more important now to develop such positive concepts of security. It is the firm conviction of the sponsors of the draft resolution that the United Nations should be the focus for this discussion, thus bringing the attention of all States to the imperative need for new thinking on security concepts. As a starting point for such a process, the Secretary-General is requested to carry out a study of concepts of security, in particular security policies which emphasize co-operative efforts and mutual understanding between States, with a view to developing proposals for policies

(Mr. Ferm, Sweden)

aimed at halting and reversing the arms race and building confidence in relations between States.*

Not the least important in this context are the economic aspects of security. Just as nations cannot achieve security at each other's expense, so they cannot achieve security through military strength alone. Security also requires that people have enough to eat, are able to find work and live in a world without poverty and destitution.

The draft resolution contains an invitation to all States to submit their views on the content of the proposed study. It is the intention of the sponsors that these views should form an important part in defining the precise scope of the study. We therefore appeal to all States to co-operate with the Secretary-General in this respect so that the objectives of the study may be achieved.

I emphasize that my own Government and all the co-sponsors of the draft resolution attach the utmost importance to this matter. In the present situation an exchange of views between Governments on concepts of security would in itself constitute a useful confidence-building exercise. I know that this view is shared by prominent political personalities representing a very wide spectrum of political ideologies and conflicting interests.

It is our hope that the report resulting from the proposed study will contribute to broadening the security concepts and contain a number of suggestions on how to ensure that co-operation rather than that confrontation be the organizing principle for efforts to resolve conflicts of interest in international relations.

A report should be submitted to the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia): On behalf of the group of sponsors - Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire and my own country - I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.58, related to the convening of the third special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

The sponsors of the resolution attach particular importance to the preparations for, and the holding of, the special sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. The special sessions held so far have proved that the United Nations is an irreplaceable forum for the engagement of

* Mr. El Faki (Sudan) took the Chair.

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

all Member States in the field of disarmament. The special sessions are a unique opportunity for the Member States, enabling them actively to participate in and most directly contribute to the efforts aimed at the achievement of the jointly proclaimed goal: general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

We need such international gatherings for, inter alia, an analysis of the implementation of previously adopted recommendations and decisions, and also jointly to determine the guidelines for the further engagement of the whole international community in all disarmament subjects.

Proceeding from the conclusions adopted at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the sponsors propose that a third special session be convened not later than 1988, and that the date of its convening be determined not later than the fortieth session of the General Assembly.

The sponsors have held intensive consultations with numerous delegations, and therefore express the conviction that the draft will meet general support and that the draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

Mr. MORENO-SALCEDO (Philippines): The Philippine delegation is once again pleased to sponsor a draft resolution on confidence-building measures, as embodied in document A/C.1/38/L.5. In sponsoring this resolution, the Philippines reaffirms the view that, in addition to actual disarmament measures, nations must strive to create an environment of harmony and trust which will be conducive to peace.

We offer the experience of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to underline this belief. The ASEAN region is not a stranger to inter-State rivalries and conflicts. The process of decolonization left a residue of distrust and lack of confidence brought about largely by the isolation of the States of the region, one from the other, over a period of centuries and the resulting absence of communication and of the sharing of common experiences.

ASEAN today is generally regarded as one of the more successful regional organizations. By looking beyond the boundaries of nationalism, and by agreeing to co-operate on matters affecting its member States' national and regional economic, social and cultural interests, ASEAN has shown one way - through a series of confidence-building steps - by which a certain measure of regional stability and security can be achieved.

(Mr. Moreno-Salcedo, Philippines)

How, it may be asked, was it possible for countries with enough differences to ignite distrust and rivalry among them to plan and work together as friends and partners? A first step was recognizing and giving emphasis to the things they shared, rather than to the things that could divide them. A cultural heritage sprung from the same wellsprings and a shared experience in the struggle to achieve independence and to maintain free and open societies provided the foundation for the emergence of a viable regional organization. Over the years, through cultural exchanges and visits, the ASEAN peoples have increasingly become aware of the many similarities - in language, customs and traditions - which lie at the basis of their culture. The youth of ASEAN, in particular, are growing to maturity with a world-view that has a special focus on the region where they live - in many, shaped by personal experience derived from study in, employment in, or visits to, other ASEAN countries.

Shared economic interests have provided a potent impetus to the process of drawing the ASEAN peoples closer together. Over the years, a whole new structure of economic agreements has emerged which provides for intra-regional preferential trade, joint ownership of industrial projects, and complementation of production in designated industries. The ASEAN countries have learned to act in common in dealing with their third-country economic problems and on international economic issues.

The facility of constant, even instant communication among the leaders in the ASEAN region is a major element in raising the levels of trust and confidence. The frequent talks and exchanges of visits between ASEAN Heads of State and high ASEAN officials contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of regional understanding.

Underlying all ASEAN co-operative endeavours are two basic ASEAN agreements: the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord lays the basis for ASEAN economic co-operation. The Treaty of Amity and Co-operation contains a code of conduct for inter-State relations, including provisions for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

As regional consolidation progresses, ASEAN has reached out to establish relations with other regional organizations. It is in this area of inter-regional co-operation that we hope ASEAN in the future will be able to make a major contribution to the attainment of global understanding and world peace.

We well realize that we live in an imperfect world, and that it will take a long time to achieve that degree of trust and confidence which, as expressed in the

(Mr. Moreno-Salcedo, Philippines)

Bible, would make the lamb lie down with the lion. We welcome, therefore, such developments as the convening in Stockholm of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. With past history in mind, we are aware that confidence-building in this region is vital towards achieving a universal peace. Difficult decisions will have to be made. As the draft resolution states in its preamble,

"confidence reflects a set of interrelated factors of a military as well as of a non-military character and ... a plurality of approaches is needed to overcome fear, apprehension and mistrust between States and to replace them by confidence."

The Philippines, we would like to believe, has made a modest contribution towards this end through its active participation in the elaboration of the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. The principles of the Declaration could well be taken into account in the elaboration of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures on a global or regional level - guidelines which must recognize differences and the peculiar problems that may be inherent in certain areas of the world.

We are realists enough not to expect that confidence will spring forth fullblown overnight. We could, however, take a cue from the Latin writer Terence, who said, "I am human; nothing human is alien to me". With this in mind, we could perhaps take a first step towards building and achieving confidence in one another.

Mr. SINGH (India): On behalf of the delegations of Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Romania and Yugoslavia, I should like to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/38/L.55, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons".

This draft resolution is on the lines of resolution 37/100 C of 13 December 1982, adopted by the General Assembly by 117 votes in favour to 17 against, with 8 abstentions. It is important to underline here that the countries voting in favour of that resolution included two nuclear-weapon States, namely, China and the Soviet Union. When we submitted the draft resolution last year, we were hopeful that its adoption would open up practical opportunities for concrete negotiations on an international agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The main operative paragraph of the resolution was addressed to the sole

(Mr. Singh, India)

multilateral negotiating forum, that is, the Committee on Disarmament, which was requested

"... to undertake, on a priority basis, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as basis the text of the annexed draft Convention" (resolution 37/100 C).

It is indeed a matter of deep concern for the entire international community that the Committee on Disarmament, during its sessions in 1983, could not make any progress on this issue. The last preambular paragraph of the draft resolution we have submitted expresses that concern. The main operative paragraph of the draft resolution

"... reiterates [the request of the General Assembly] to the Committee on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to achieve agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances" (A/C.1/38/L.55, para. 1).

While submitting this draft resolution the sponsors are aware of the repetitious nature of this exercise. But then who can say with certainty how many times a point has to be made in order for it to be driven home and acted upon? The objective behind this draft resolution is shared by the vast majority of the nations of this world. The draft resolution reflects the concerns of millions of people who have raised their voices against the imminent danger of a nuclear holocaust. The use of nuclear weapons therefore must be forsworn by those who are responsible for creating and sustaining this menace. This point therefore has to be driven home repeatedly until it is accepted and implemented. In seeking the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, we are reaffirming our choice of life over omnicide. Resistance to forswearing the use of nuclear weapons symbolizes a collective death wish by mankind. The international community must unequivocally and firmly resist it. This draft resolution is an attempt in that direction.

The preambular part of this draft resolution seeks to reflect the present dangerous situation in the field of nuclear armament. Far from abjuring the use of nuclear weapons and halting the nuclear-arms race, the nuclear-weapon States have been relentlessly stockpiling nuclear weapons in larger quantities and of an increasingly destructive character. This has brought the world precariously close to nuclear war. Moreover, there is no doubt that only the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth would remove the danger of nuclear war, because as long as these weapons remain in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon

(Mr. Singh, India)

States the possibility of their use cannot be ruled out. Adherence to an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States would be the first step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and would constitute concrete evidence of their willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament measures. These ideas are duly reflected in the preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution submitted by us. Before I conclude my introduction of this draft resolution, I should like to emphasize that our initiative to seek the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is one of the few significant, viable and concrete measures for preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. The catalytic effect of this measure on the adoption of further measures for the prevention of nuclear war and for moving towards total nuclear disarmament cannot be overemphasized.

The second draft resolution that I should like to introduce this afternoon is contained in document A/C.1/38/L.34, entitled "Freeze on Nuclear Weapons". It will be recalled that at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly India, along with the German Democratic Republic, Liberia and Mali, submitted a draft resolution on the same item which was adopted by the General Assembly by 120 votes in favour to 16 against, with 6 abstentions. Our freeze proposal called for, among other things, a simultaneous total stoppage of the production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes. The sixth preambular paragraph of the present draft resolution expresses the deep concern of the General Assembly that so far no action has been taken to comply with the provision of last year's resolution. The operative paragraph of that resolution reiterates our proposal on a freeze of nuclear weapons.

The principal motivation behind this draft resolution is to put a stop to the escalation of the nuclear-arms race and the attending growth of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. As the preamble of this draft resolution states,

"... the highest priority objectives in the field of disarmament have to be nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction ... and the urgent need for a negotiated reduction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles leading to their complete elimination". (A/C.1/38/L.34)

With this purpose in mind, the immediate objective of this draft resolution is to focus attention on two crucial elements, namely, the production of nuclear weapons and that of fissionable material for weapons purposes. In confining our peace proposal to these two elements, we have been guided by the consideration that the freeze measures should be practical and of a kind on which there could be quick

(Mr. Singh, India)

agreement. The emphasis on these key elements does not mean that a freeze on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons is any less important or that it can be ignored. We are aware that the most frequently trumpeted objection to the call for a freeze on nuclear weapons has been in regard to the problem of verification. If a freeze is applied on the production of nuclear weapons and on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, then all nuclear-weapon laboratories, reprocessing plants, enrichment facilities, etc., will become peaceful, which will enable non-discriminatory safeguards to be applied on a universal basis.

We should also like to make it clear that the question of a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons has been left out of the scope of this draft resolution because the same objective is being sought to be achieved by other draft resolutions which are before this Committee.

Our delegation would also like to state that we have no difficulty with other proposals for a freeze on nuclear arms which have been put forward in draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.2 and L.31. Nevertheless, we are strongly of the view that it is extremely important that the appeal for a freeze on nuclear weapons should be made to all nuclear-weapon States and not merely to the States with the largest arsenals, and that all nuclear-weapon States should act simultaneously without losing any time. The presence and increase of nuclear weapons anywhere imperils our existence and no discrimination can be made in our attempts to reduce and eliminate these weapons.

It is our hope that an agreement by all nuclear-weapon States to apply a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons and of weapon-grade nuclear materials would pave the way for negotiations on the reduction and subsequent elimination of all nuclear-weapon stockpiles. It is at that stage of negotiations that the relative qualitative and quantitative aspects of existing nuclear arsenals could be taken into account.

The freeze proposal, as I have explained, is a direct measure for halting the nuclear arms race. There can be no justification whatsoever for the continuation of the present insane nuclear arms race and for the further quantitative and qualitative escalation of nuclear armament. If the nuclear-weapon States are indeed concerned about dangers of the nuclear war, they should immediately pay heed to a simple, universally applicable, practical and quickly negotiable measure like the freeze on nuclear weapons. We sincerely hope that the draft resolution submitted by us will be adopted this year with an even greater measure of support in this Committee and subsequently in the Assembly.

Mr. KOROMA (Sierra Leone): The purpose of my statement this afternoon is to introduce, on behalf of the group of African Member States, draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.67 and L.68, under agenda item 46 entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa". Before proceeding, may I be permitted to amend the draft resolutions to which I have just referred. I have in mind particularly the penultimate preambular paragraph on page 2 of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.68, which begins with the words:

"Strongly condemning the military occupation by the South African troops of parts of the territory of the People's Republic of Angola in violation of its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity".

At that point the following words would be added:

"and urging the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the South African troops from Angolan soil".

It is worth recalling that the denuclearization of Africa has always been a major preoccupation of our Heads of State and Government; in fact, no sooner was the Organization of African Unity (OAU) itself founded, back in 1964, than our Heads of State and Government, recognizing that the denuclearization of Africa would be a practical step towards the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons in the world and towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the objectives of the United Nations, reaffirmed their call upon all States to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone.

It is for me here to affirm today that African States have continued to be faithful to that Declaration.

As at a recent session, one of the two draft resolutions, A/C.1/38/L.67, is the traditional resolution on the item covering the question of the implementation of the Declaration as a whole. On the other hand, draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.68 deals with the more specific problem of South Africa's nuclear capability. There are, however, certain unavoidable cases of overlapping and similarity in both drafts, demonstrating the close link that exists between the problem of South Africa's nuclear capability and the question of the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

In submitting these two draft resolutions, the group of African Member States wishes, in the first place, to reaffirm its long-standing commitment to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war in general, and to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, specifically the prevention of the introduction of such weapons into Africa in particular. At the same time, we wish

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to point out the grave implications, not only for peace and security in the African region but for international peace and security as a whole, of South Africa's growing military and nuclear activities.

The threat posed directly to our region by the racist minority régime in South Africa is real and serious. With its repressive and odious internal policies and its aggressive militaristic adventures beyond its borders, the racist minority régime in Pretoria not only violates the norms of civilized behaviour but, also, and more importantly, heightens tension, uncertainty and the risk of conflict. How can we, therefore, be anything but concerned about the intentions of such a régime which by its own words and deeds is committed to the attainment of a nuclear-weapon capability?

Since the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in Cairo, some 19 years ago, the group of African Member States has continued to abide by and to support fully the objectives of that Declaration. Although the General Assembly of the United Nations has endorsed that Declaration and called repeatedly for its implementation, and although most members of the international community, including the nuclear-weapon States, have stressed the importance of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we are alarmed, as the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session had established, that South Africa has attained the ominous capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. This development attempts to frustrate the objectives of the Organization of African Unity, the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, and constitutes the most serious obstacle which must be overcome if it is to be possible to implement that Declaration.

It is highly regrettable and a source of much anxiety that, despite the Security Council's arms embargo and despite several appeals from the international community, including the General Assembly and most recently the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, some States, in particular certain Western States, some of which are nuclear-weapon countries, as well as Israel, have continued to collaborate with the racist and aggressive South African régime in the military and nuclear fields. We are not persuaded that a régime with an internal and external record such as that of racist South Africa, particularly when it has achieved nuclear-weapon capability and continues the operation of its nuclear

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installations outside recognized international safeguards, can be treated as a State interested in the exclusively peaceful use of atomic energy. Rather we proceed from the demonstrated fact that South Africa's nuclear activities are aimed ultimately at achieving its repressive and aggressive purposes and serving as an instrument of blackmail.

The credibility of any non-proliferation régime depends largely on the actions of nuclear-weapon States. They should not expect progress in this field by preaching non-proliferation while continuing to increase their own nuclear arsenals or assisting their friends either directly or indirectly to acquire nuclear-weapon capability. Therefore we continue to call upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to refrain from any form of collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa which enables it to frustrate the objectives of the Organization of African Unity Declaration which seeks to keep Africa free from nuclear weapons. At the same time, we demand once again that the racist minority régime should submit all its nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency forthwith.

Draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.67 and A/C.1/38/L.68 constitute in general a reaffirmation of the General Assembly's basic position on the question of the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and South Africa's nuclear capability. The texts are factual and self-explanatory, with few new elements.

In draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.67 the most substantive new element is contained in paragraph 7, by which the General Assembly would request the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to undertake, in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to provide data on the continued development of South Africa's nuclear capability with a view to identifying and examining practical measures for the speedy implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and the promotion of the overall objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This request represents a modest and indispensable minimum effort to move the consideration of this question forward.

The report requested is not a full-fledged study with analyses, conclusions and recommendations. What we are asking for is a report containing data and other relevant information relating to South Africa's continued nuclear activities and

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the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. The Secretary-General's expert report of 1980 established South Africa's capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. It would be of vital importance in the future consideration of the question of the implementation of the Declaration to have additional comprehensive data on the continued development of South Africa's nuclear capability, since it constitutes the most serious threat to the implementation of the Declaration. Such information would also be of great assistance in any review of the Declaration itself, as it will be 20 years old next July.

In making that request we took into account also General Assembly resolution 37/100 F, of 13 December 1982, by which the Assembly, inter alia, requested the Secretariat, in particular the Department for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, to lend assistance to States and regional institutions which may request it in the context of regional disarmament measures taken at the initiative of the States concerned.

General Assembly resolution 37/99 K, also adopted last year, states that the role of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research is, inter alia, to provide the international community

"with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armaments race and disarmament so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, towards greater security for all States".

Therefore we believe that the Assembly should make maximum use of the independence and technical status of the Institute, whose projects and activities, as reflected in the report of its Director, contained in document A/38/475, have been welcomed by many delegations.

At the same time we wish to call upon the nuclear-weapon States and all the nuclear-exporting countries to co-operate fully with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research towards the successful fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to it. We hope that the Department for Disarmament Affairs, whose experience and role in the disarmament field within the United Nations system are well established and highly appreciated, will also co-operate with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on this project.

A few new elements are reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.68, dealing with the nuclear capability of South Africa. In particular, in paragraph 2 the

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Assembly would express its full support for the Governments of the independent States of southern Africa in their efforts to guarantee and safeguard the territorial integrity and national sovereignty against South African aggression and subversion.

Finally, in paragraph 8 the Assembly would condemn the recent decision of a major nuclear-weapon State to permit certain corporations in its territory to transfer nuclear assistance to South Africa.

Mr. PITFIELD (Canada): I have the honour today to introduce to the First Committee three draft resolutions. They are draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.41, which relates to agenda item 61 (a), entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"; A/C.1/38/L.63, which relates to agenda item 50 (c), entitled "Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations"; and A/C.1/38/L.37, which relates to agenda item 62 (h), entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes".

As regards chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, I would say that this draft resolution, which urges the Committee on Disarmament as a matter of high priority to intensify the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, has become known as the "traditional" chemical weapons resolution. I have the honour to present the draft resolution this year on behalf of the following sponsors: Argentina, the German Democratic Republic, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Canada.

We would invite other sponsors to join us in endorsing this draft resolution and its purposes. Good progress was made during this year's negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. On behalf of the sponsors of this draft resolution, we would ask that it be adopted by consensus so that the full weight of the international community stands behind it. Such a consensus would in our view contribute to further forward momentum in the conduct of these negotiations.

As regards bilateral nuclear arms negotiations, this draft resolution has the following cosponsors: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Canada.

The sponsors are deeply concerned that a breakdown of bilateral nuclear arms negotiations could impede efforts to strengthen peace and security and to achieve progress towards disarmament. In this regard the sponsors of this draft resolution

(Mr. Pitfield, Canada)

would have preferred that this matter, which is of vital concern to all of us, be the subject of a single consensus resolution. In the event, this did not prove possible, despite the efforts of many. In its stead, therefore, the sponsors of this draft resolution are confident that the text and intent of draft solution A/C.1/38/L.63 reflects the shared concerns of all in this chamber.

We therefore commend to the First Committee a draft resolution giving expression to the firmest possible encouragement and support to the negotiating parties to bring them to a successful conclusion.

Concerning the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, I wish to introduce this draft resolution on behalf of the following sponsors: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Finland, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Romania, Sweden and Canada.

Members of the First Committee will recall that similar procedural resolutions have been passed by the General Assembly since 1978. We believe that it is important that the Committee on Disarmament pursue its consideration of the question of the "cut-off" of fissionable materials at an appropriate stage of its work. The purpose of this draft resolution is to maintain the cut-off concept on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. This would ensure that once conditions are right negotiations leading to the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes can be fully engaged.

Mr. de SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): On behalf of the delegations of Argentina, Ecuador, Indonesia, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Brazil, I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.60 on the review and supplement to the comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects.

Last year at its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly decided to undertake the updating of the 1975 comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the light of a number of important developments of both a conceptual and an objective nature that have taken place since the completion of its consideration by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly in 1975 and 1976. We include among these developments the events in the South Atlantic during the Malvinas crisis which have contributed to heightening the doubts of non-nuclear-weapon countries as to the credibility and efficacy of the

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commitments made by the nuclear-weapon Powers to ensure respect for the status of a denuclearized zone such as the one recognized by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Experience has shown that commitments on the extension of negative assurances contained in article 3 of Protocol II of that Treaty, which allows no conditions or qualifications, have been virtually eroded by unilateral interpretations on the part of nuclear-weapon Powers. Such interpretations, although varying in nature and degree, amount to de facto reservations which run counter to a clear-cut provision of the Treaty and literally ignore the commitment undertaken by the non-nuclear parties to that instrument to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories the testing, use, manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or any form of possession of such weapons.

In addition to the self-conferred exemptions arising from unilateral declarations, the nuclear-weapon Powers are not subject to any form of system of verification of compliance with the obligations they undertake as parties to the Protocols of the Treaty. Serious questions concerning compliance with the obligations contained in Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco were raised at the last meeting of Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), which reached the conclusions that have recently been brought to the attention of this Committee in document A/38/496.

The need for adequate and effective procedures of verification of compliance with obligations undertaken through legally binding instruments cannot be confined to areas where nuclear weapons exist. If the nuclear-weapon Powers undertake to respect their obligation to respect compliance in areas which are not free from nuclear weapons, they should be prepared to act in the same way in relation to nuclear-weapon-free zones. The establishment of machinery for verification of compliance of the Treaty of Tlatelolco would contribute to the achievement of an effective balance of rights and obligations between non-nuclear and nuclear Powers under that Treaty. This is true also of any other similar instrument to be created for the denuclearization of any specific zone.

Last but not least, it is our considered opinion that the whole question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the extension of negative security assurances has to be reassessed in the light of the commitment by the nuclear-weapon Powers to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament. We think that the group of experts established by resolution 37/99 F will benefit immensely

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

from the consideration it is requested to undertake of the document submitted at this session of the General Assembly as well as of the views expressed on the subject during the general debate. Once that has been accomplished, the experts should be better prepared to shed new light on the overall question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.60 formulates this procedural request.

I also want to introduce, on behalf of the delegations of Argentina, Pakistan, Brazil - and, may I add, Indonesia - draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.38. This draft resolution deals with the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon Powers for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. Draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.38 recalls in its preambular part the provisions of the Final Document, where such responsibilities are spelled out, and goes on to regret that the nuclear-arms race has not been halted and that the danger of nuclear war has been increasing and, finally, expresses the concern of the Assembly over the risk of a nuclear war inherent in the present world situation. The language comes directly from the Final Document and reflects the main trends of the general debate during this session of the First Committee.

In the operative part the draft reaffirms the three main points of the issue, namely, the special responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States, the vital interests of all mankind in disarmament negotiations, and the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament. Again, the language used is that of the Final Document itself, which was adopted by consensus in 1978 and solemnly reaffirmed at the second special session devoted to disarmament. Furthermore, the nuclear Powers themselves have repeatedly told us that they fully recognize and accept their responsibilities in this field.

If the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon Powers for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war is thus universally recognized, including by themselves; if the whole community of nations has a vital interest in such matters; and, finally, if this Organization is a forum before which such responsibilities were formally undertaken five years ago, it follows that the United Nations has a right to call on the nuclear-weapon Powers to account for the way in which their responsibilities are being fulfilled. This is the gist of operative paragraph 4, in which they are requested to report annually to the General Assembly on the measures and steps they are taking to discharge their responsibilities.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

They are accountable before the United Nations by virtue of their acceptance of the responsibilities devolving upon them. It is only natural that the international community request that they report on the ways in which their actions do or do not conform with such responsibilities. These include, of course, not only the concepts, doctrines and policies formulated and carried out by them in the field of disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war but also their compliance with the obligations that they, together with other nations, have undertaken in binding international agreements which they ought to respect faithfully.

We hope therefore that the First Committee will adopt it and that the nuclear-weapon Powers will abide by the wish of the General Assembly.

Mr. MIDDLETON (United Kingdom): It is my privilege today to introduce formally the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/38/L.50 on agenda item 139, entitled "Implementation of the conclusions of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the Third Review Conference".

There is a most impressive list of sponsors for this draft resolution - 35 so far - but I hope they will forgive me if, in order to speed our proceedings, I do not name them all. But, as representatives will have observed, they form a widely representative group.

The draft resolution sets out the agreement reached amongst the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at a meeting held in the course of this session to hold the Third Review Conference in 1985 and to set up a preparatory committee for that purpose. It is the hope of the parties to the Treaty that this draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

Mr. HYLTEINIUS (Sweden): I have the honour today of introducing in the First Committee two draft resolutions. The first is draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.49 on the reduction of military budgets. I do this on behalf of the sponsors: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Norway, Romania, Sudan and my own country.

The item entitled "Reduction of military budgets" has been on the agenda of the First Committee for several years now. Some progress has been made: one example is the adoption in 1980 by the General Assembly of a carefully elaborated system for international reporting of military expenditures.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

It is true that not very many States have yet complied with the recommendations of the Assembly to participate in the reporting. However, the system is still at an early stage of implementation and we hope that the number of participating States will grow in the years to come. It is of course highly desirable to achieve active and growing participation by States of all geographical regions and with different economic and budgetary systems. Apart from the important confidence-building impact that such a development would have, it would also serve the purpose of enabling a further refinement of the reporting system.

It should be noted that the main objective of this whole reporting exercise is not to provide better statistics on military expenditures but to promote international agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain such expenditures. If and when Member States - and, in particular, the most heavily armed States - decide to try seriously to negotiate such agreements, they would need to know what the military expenditures are and how they can be defined and reported in the framework of an agreement. The existing reporting instrument as adopted by the General Assembly in this context would provide a necessary basis for the negotiations. It is therefore important to preserve the reporting system and to improve it further by a continuous and possibly growing participation.

In operative paragraph 1 of the present draft resolution the Assembly would take note with appreciation of the reports of the Secretary-General containing the replies received in 1983 from Member States in the framework of the reporting system and of the views and suggestions of States on practical means of promoting wider participation in the standardized reporting system.

In operative paragraph 2 the need to increase the number of reporting States with a view to the broadest possible participation from different geographical regions and representing different budgeting systems is stressed.

In operative paragraph 3 it is recommended that all Member States should report annually by 30 April to the Secretary-General, by using the reporting instrument.

No doubt, future negotiations will also have to deal with the problems of comparing and verifying military expenditures. Any agreement lasting more than one year will have to take into account that national rates of inflation may be very different, and each negotiating party will of course require sufficient assurance that the other parties do comply with the provisions of the agreement. The

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

purchasing power of national currencies also vary considerably among different countries.

For comparison purposes there is thus a need to construct military price deflators and military purchasing-power parities. The General Assembly last year in its resolution 37/95 B requested the Secretary-General to conduct a study on these problems and to submit a progress report to this session. In operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution the Assembly takes note with appreciation of the progress report contained in document A/38/354. I wish, by the way, to draw attention to a misprint in operative paragraph 4. The number of the document referred to should be A/38/354, as I have stated. I take it that this misprint will be corrected. Operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution invites all Member States to participate in this exercise.

The current study has shown that direct contact between the Group of Experts and the voluntarily participating Member States is vital for the work of the Group. For this reason the Secretary-General is requested in operative paragraph 6 to provide the Group of Experts with sufficient resources for carrying out this complex task.

In the seventh and last operative paragraph it is decided to include an item entitled "Reduction of military budgets" in the provisional agenda of the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

The second draft resolution which I have the honour to introduce is A/C.1/38/L.23 - and which, for technical reasons, has been reissued as A/C.1/38/L.23/Rev.1 - concerns the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. I introduce it on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Japan and Sweden.

In recognition of the potential dangers of the use of radiological weapons and of the need to reach agreement on the comprehensive prohibition of such weapons the question of radiological weapons has been on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for several years. At this year's session an ad hoc working group was established by the Committee to deal with the problems relating to radiological weapons. During the year some progress was achieved in the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. Nevertheless, divergent views continue to exist.

The purpose of the present draft resolution is mainly procedural. It requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue its work on the subject so that a

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons can be promptly concluded and so that a prompt solution can be found to the question of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. To facilitate this task the Secretary-General is also asked to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all relevant documents emanating from the discussions of these subjects at this session of the General Assembly.

Mr. MAJOOD (Iraq): On behalf of the delegations of Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Jordan, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, Yemen and my own, I should like to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.51 under agenda item 54, "Israeli nuclear armament".

We are fully aware how sensitive the Middle East region is. However, every day we find evidence accumulating about the frenzied policy of militarization Israel is following, especially in the nuclear field. This policy is accompanied by total disregard of international law, of security and of United Nations resolutions, in particular General Assembly resolutions 35/157 of 12 December 1980 and 36/98 of 9 December 1981, among others.

Another aspect is Israel's close co-operation with the racist régime of South Africa, which has been increasing in flagrant violation of United Nations resolutions. The collaboration between those two régimes poses a grave danger to peace and security in the whole world. This danger was greatly exacerbated by the fact that both régimes are known to have nuclear-weapon capability and are co-operating closely on developing delivery systems. The special report of the Special Committee against Apartheid, in document A/38/22/Add.1, has noted clearly the common racist tactics and designs both régimes implement and exchange against humanity.

Turning to the draft resolution, I should like to begin with operative paragraph 1, which condemns Israel's refusal to renounce officially the acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons. This continued refusal constitutes a blatant challenge to the United Nations resolutions and the calls of the international community.

Operative paragraph 2 requests the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to implement its resolution 487 (1981), which the Zionist entity has flagrantly disregarded. The operative paragraph also demands that Israel place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and that it abide by the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. Majood, Iraq)

Owing to the Zionists' total disregard of these appeals, operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution requests that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel so that it cannot upgrade its nuclear capabilities. That request takes into account the region's concern and is also a legitimate action to reinforce the IAEA's peaceful global role. The deliberate Israeli refusal to place all its nuclear facilities under international safeguards and the safeguards of the Non-Proliferation Treaty undermines the efforts to implement United Nations resolutions aimed at establishing a nuclear-free-zone in the Middle East.

The Zionist entity, following its wanton aggression against our safeguarded nuclear installation, not only has not withdrawn its threat to repeat its aggression, it has officially reaffirmed, as recently as July of this year, its infamous threat. The IAEA, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the United Nations have suffered irreparable damage from the Zionist aggression. Operative paragraph 4 reiterates the condemnation of the Zionist entity for its persistent violation of the United Nations Charter.

Operative paragraph 5 requests the Secretary-General to follow closely Israel's nuclear activities and its collaboration with the racist régime in South Africa. In this connection, I should like to refer to the report of the International Conference on the Alliance between South Africa and Israel held in Vienna from 11 to 13 July 1983, which is contained in document A/AC.115/L.595. Paragraph 25 of the Declaration issued by that Conference states:

"The Conference strongly condemns the Government of Israel for its collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa, especially in the military and the nuclear field, in flagrant defiance of United Nations resolutions."

Given the danger to regional peace and security posed by Israel's policy of nuclear armament, and the continued Zionist challenge to the international organizations, we believe that what is now needed is action rather than a number of condemnations. We also believe that action would be a deterrent to Israel's aggressive intentions and policies.

Miss ABOUL NAGA (Egypt): It is my privilege to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.36, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. I do so on behalf of the delegations of Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden and Egypt.

(Miss Aboul Naga, Egypt)

Some 26 years ago, man's adventure in space started with all the great prospects opening up before mankind. During these 26 years we have witnessed startling developments in space and space technology that have given rise to general concern as to our future and to the future of the generations to come. It is certainly in the interest of us all to explore outer space and use it for the benefit of humanity and for the promotion of international co-operation and understanding. We do believe, however, that in order to realize such an objective, outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The international community has shown and indeed expressed its concern over the extension of the arms race into outer space. Indeed, the mere fact that this Committee has before it for its consideration three draft resolutions on outer space is a clear demonstration of this genuine concern.

A year ago, during the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, resolution 37/83 was adopted. It requested the Committee on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its session in 1983, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.

Twelve months have now elapsed and, most regrettably, the Committee on Disarmament, at its 1983 session, has not been able to establish a working group, owing to the lack of consensus on a specific mandate as proposed by the Group of 21 that would allow the working group to undertake complete negotiations on the subject. Meanwhile, space weapons programmes and plans have been intensified and space technology has indeed reached a frightening point, making it imperative for the international community to act urgently and take further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

I feel it appropriate at this juncture to refer to the following assessment, analysis and evaluation by a group of top scientists fighting the space weapons plan. It appeared in The New York Times of Wednesday, 16 November.

"Almost any time now, most arms-control experts say the arms race may well expand from land and sea and air into near-earth space, the frontier of the rest of the universe."

The same group of scientists described space weaponry as extremely destabilizing and likely to trigger the nuclear war which both sides are supposed to prevent. I need not elaborate on this, except to say that our determination is

(Miss Aboul Naga, Egypt)

greater than ever to make every effort to ensure that effective measures be taken, appropriate international negotiations held and an acceptable agreement, or agreements, reached.

Draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.36, which is before the Committee for consideration, is basically similar to last year's resolution 37/83 and therefore I shall address myself only to the new paragraphs in L.36.

The anti-penultimate preambular paragraph expresses deep concern and disappointment at the fact that the Committee on Disarmament has not been able to reach an agreement on an acceptable mandate for the ad hoc working group while the penultimate preambular paragraph notes with alarm the intensification of certain reported space programmes.

As to the operative paragraphs, new paragraph 5 reiterates the primary role of the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in the negotiation of an agreement, or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.

Paragraph 7 of L.36 repeats the request made of the Committee on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc working group on the subject with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement, or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.

In doing so, this paragraph conveys to the Committee on Disarmament the wish of the General Assembly that the Committee on Disarmament take the first meaningful and concrete step in handling this question, leaving enough room for the Committee itself to develop its own approach on a comprehensive basis.

The sponsors of draft resolution L.36 have done their utmost to secure the widest possible support for it in the Committee. The door is still open to every effort to avoid dividing the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Finally, I express the hope that draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.36, which is being submitted to the Committee with good will, and in full awareness of the difficulties of negotiating disarmament agreements, can offer the Committee an opportunity to arrive at a unified decision on specific action to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): I wish to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.57, concerning a study on naval forces and naval armaments. It is sponsored by Austria, Finland, Indonesia, Mexico, Yugoslavia and Sweden. I am pleased to announce that Iceland has joined us as a co-sponsor.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

The naval build-up and the development of naval arms systems, especially during recent years, have added new dimensions to international security. The modernization and expansion of the fleets of the major maritime Powers and the increased sophistication of naval-based arms systems have created new and extended operational capabilities, causing great concern among a great number of nations. They are concerned about possible effects on the freedom of the high seas, the principle of non-interference with international sea communications for trade and shipping and with the economic exploitation of maritime resources.

Another serious concern is that the greater part of naval armaments and naval forces is unaccounted for in the arms control and disarmament context.

Considering the rapid deployment of naval forces and armaments, as well as the difficulties in evaluating the consequences for international peace and security, including the consequences for international shipping and sea communications, it would be valuable if a study could be carried out by the United Nations on these questions. Such a study would enhance international understanding of the issues involved and could help clarify matters of concern to many States.

The present draft resolution requests the Secretary-General to carry out a study on naval forces and naval arms systems, as well as on the development, deployment and mode of operation of such naval forces and systems, with a view to analysing its possible implications for international security and for the freedom of the high seas and international shipping routes.

Another important aim of the study is to facilitate the identification of possible areas of disarmament and confidence-building measures in this field. Governments should be invited to submit their views on the study. Their views are of crucial importance to the definition of its scope. The study should be carried out by a small number of experts in order to limit the costs and the report should be submitted to the fortieth session of the General Assembly.

Mr. TIMERBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation wishes to introduce two draft resolutions: one on the condemnation of nuclear war (A/C.1/38/L.1), the other on a nuclear-weapon freeze (A/C.1/38/L.2). These two new Soviet proposals are designed to resolve the principal task now confronting mankind, the prevention of nuclear war.

The substance of the approach which has guided the Soviet Union was recently clearly and precisely set forth by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, Mr. Andropov, as follows:

(Mr. Timerbaev, USSR)

"Rather than irresponsible attempts to accustom the world to the admissibility of nuclear war, or a striving for nuclear supremacy, it is a focussing of political will on the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe and a guaranteeing of people's right to life that, in our opinion, should now primarily determine the policy of the leaders of all States, particularly the nuclear ones."

Guided by these objectives, the Soviet Union proposes drawing attention to scientists' conclusion that once a nuclear war starts there is no way of limiting its deadly consequences.

We propose that the General Assembly should decisively, unconditionally and for all time condemn nuclear war as being contrary to human conscience and reason, as the most monstrous crime against peoples and as a violation of the foremost human right - the right to life. We note with satisfaction that these ideas are being sympathetically received at the United Nations and beyond its confines. Striving to find the most suitable expression for them, we have been listening carefully to the views of other delegations that are anxious to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. As a result, we intend to make certain changes in the wording of our draft resolution, which will be issued as document A/C.1/38/L.1/Rev.1. The notion that any thoughts of unleashing a nuclear war are criminal will be expressed in the revised draft resolution in the form of a comprehensive condemnation of the formulation, propounding, dissemination and propagation of political and military doctrines and concepts intended to provide "legitimacy" for the first use of nuclear weapons and, in general, to justify the "admissibility" of unleashing nuclear war.

By adopting the draft resolution the United Nations would be making a major contribution to the creation of an international moral and political climate likely to reduce substantially the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and open up more favourable prospects for the solution of far-reaching tasks in this sphere. One such task is the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons with the participation of all the nuclear States, as is called for by many non-aligned countries. A provision to this effect will be incorporated in document A/C.1/38/L.1/Rev.1, to be introduced on behalf of a group of States.

As for draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.2, its basic feature is its pressing appeal for a freeze on nuclear armaments.

(Mr. Timerbaev, USSR)

The measures being proposed would include the cessation of the build-up of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of nuclear-weapon delivery systems and all kinds of nuclear weapons; the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons of new kinds and types; the establishment of a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and on tests of new kinds and types of their delivery systems; and the stopping of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of creating nuclear weapons.

Of course, a nuclear freeze would be most effective if it were carried out simultaneously by all nuclear Powers. However, the Soviet Union considers that, as a start, it could be done, to begin with, by the Soviet Union and the United States on a bilateral basis, by way of setting an example for the other nuclear Powers.

We note with satisfaction that the idea of a freeze, as was pointed out in the discussions in the First Committee, enjoys the broadest support among States Members of the United Nations and world public opinion as a whole. In this respect we are proposing that the General Assembly should remind States of its resolution 37/100 B, adopted one year ago, which expressed the firm conviction that then-existing conditions were most propitious for a nuclear-weapon freeze.

Such are the basic provisions of draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.1/Rev.1 and A/C.1/38/L.2. In our opinion, they meet the interests of all States, nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, and are likely to promote the establishment of favourable conditions for the solution of a broad range of questions concerning the limitation of the arms race. We hope that they will be supported by the members of the First Committee.

Mr. de La GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): I have the honour to introduce, on behalf of the French delegation, draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.54, concerning the relationship between disarmament and development.

Disarmament and development are the major objectives in international co-operation. The idea of a link between the two and the assistance that the former could provide for the latter has been accepted by everyone. That idea is clearly set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. There is a reflection of it this year in the New Delhi appeal.

The President of the French Republic mentioned this matter in September when addressing the General Assembly, as follows:

"Are we to concede that the overarming of the planet should prevail over its development? ...

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

"Our Governments, in spite of their differences on the approaches to disarmament and security, would surely subscribe to the disarmament-development link and the establishment of an international fund which would make it possible to give effect to this." (A/38/PV.9, p. 42)

Mr. Mitterrand then described a global political plan that would make it easier to understand the main aspects of the problem - increased armaments, the economic effects of the growth of military expenditures, the relationship between the growth of military expenditures and the main factors responsible for the disruption of the international economy - and he dealt with the essential point of the ways and means of reallocating the funds made available by the reduction of military expenditures. The President of the French Republic stated that he was in favour of a United Nations conference. A preparatory meeting would define a primary series of objectives to be achieved as regards the transfer of funds to development purposes. Because of their special responsibilities, the major military Powers would be called upon to participate.

The draft resolution submitted today by the French delegation has the aim of paving the way for such a conference. States would first of all be invited to make known their views and offer proposals, particularly on the five points set forth in paragraph 2.

The first three points have been studied either within the United Nations - in particular in the group presided over by Mrs. Thorsson - or by Governments or research institutes. Thus the information is available.

The fourth point, concerning machinery to give effect to the contributions, might give rise to various proposals, including the possibility of an international fund.

The fifth point, the consideration of proposals concerning the convening of a conference, is self-explanatory.

Assigning to the Disarmament Commission the task of considering the replies from States is justified, in our opinion, for the following reasons.

The Commission is the only United Nations body specializing in disarmament questions and open to the participation of all Member States. The French Government attaches great importance to the Commission and hopes that it will express its views on the question of the relationship between disarmament and development, a matter of major importance. Finally, the Commission generally meets in May for four weeks, and thus its session offers a particularly welcome

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

opportunity for a debate among States on the question at a relatively early date.

Of course, we are familiar with the circumstances in which the Commission works. It has a heavy agenda, a consensus rule and limited time. Therefore, it should probably not be asked to prepare too complex a document concerning the relationship between disarmament and development. In our opinion, it might wish to adopt rather basic conclusions, which might deal with the matter of machinery and the presentation of a number of options. The recommendations of the Commission would be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, which should discuss the matter and adopt a resolution which, we hope, would establish the principle of a Conference and would represent a milestone on the way to its convening. We hope that this will make it possible between now and next September to define the various elements set forth in this draft resolution, which we hope will command broad support.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): I wish, on behalf of the delegations of Austria, Belgium, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia, to introduce the draft resolution on certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, contained in document A/C.1/38/L.21/Rev.1.

The decision to undertake efforts at the international level to prohibit or restrict certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects was taken in full view of advances in weapon technology and out of basic humanitarian considerations to reduce the suffering of civilian populations and of combatants in war time.

The first general agreement, reached on 10 October 1980, after almost three years of intensive negotiations, was a Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, together with three Protocols on non-detectable fragments, mines, booby-traps and other devices and on incendiary weapons.

The sponsors are pleased to note that, consequent upon the fulfilment of the conditions set out in article 5 of the Convention, the Convention and the three Protocols will enter into force on 2 December 1983. It is desirable that this Convention achieve universality of adherence. In this connection, the draft resolution urges those States which have not yet done so to exert the best of their endeavours to become parties as early as possible.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

It is also the hope of the sponsors that the possibility of further restrictions and prohibitions of use of other specific types of conventional weapons be kept open for future negotiations and agreements; for, if we cannot stop wars in inter-State relations, we can at least minimize human suffering in those wars.

Since I have the floor, I hope I may be able to make a few comments on draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.67 and A/C.1/38/L.68, introduced a few moments ago by the representative of Sierra Leone on behalf of the African States.

For yet another year the countries of Africa find themselves constrained to debate, at the current session of the General Assembly, the vexed question of the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, which was solemnly adopted by the first summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Cairo in 1964. It is simply not fortuitous.

As we see it, the achievement of the objective of an Africa free from nuclear weapons is constantly being undermined, firstly, by the military posture and nuclear capability of the recalcitrant racist minority régime in the continent; secondly, by the duplicity and attitude of certain States Members of the United Nations which have covertly or overtly reneged on their international obligations as Members of the world body and have willingly extended co-operation to South Africa to enable it to remain defiant and intransigent; and, thirdly, by the failure of the United Nations itself to act decisively on the matter.

In contributing to the debate on draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.67 and L.68, introduced on behalf of the African States by the representative of Sierra Leone, the delegation of Nigeria expresses its full support for the statement that representative has just made, and especially for his insistence that the General Assembly have a continuing obligation to assist in the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. My delegation accepts the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone not only as a collateral measure of disarmament, but essentially, as an objective enabling countries which are within the zone and which subscribe to the concept to pursue their national development efforts and their international obligations in peace.

As a developing country, Nigeria naturally places a premium on social and economic development as an integral part of the quest for peace and security. As a result, it finds the reckless pursuit of a military option incompatible with development. This is certainly the case with all African States except South

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

Africa, which, on the basis of its racist policy of apartheid, has refused in its inter-State relations to conduct itself responsibly and according to accepted norms of international law. Furthermore, it has refused to pursue development objectives for the benefit of all its peoples.

It is clear that the sole impediment to the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa is the known capability of South Africa to produce nuclear weapons. This situation presents Africa and the rest of the international community with a fait accompli which casts doubt on the prospects for the eventual implementation of the Declaration and poses a challenge to the international community, which is faced with the urgent need to disarm.

The development of South Africa's nuclear programme presents the rest of Africa with a dangerous choice, which will clearly be out of tune with the objectives of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We might wish to recall here that African countries have largely subscribed to the non-proliferation régime. We also hope that the General Assembly will prevail on the Security Council, as the sole authority responsible for maintaining international peace and security, to take enforcement measures to ensure that South Africa conducts itself responsibly and that all other States abide by their obligations under the Charter and implement the relevant recommendations and decisions of the General Assembly bearing on military and nuclear collaboration with the régime in South Africa.

We accept that nuclear technology is a tool which must be put at the service of development and human happiness. It ought not to be a means of destabilization or destruction. South Africa's ready disposition to nuclear blackmail as an instrument of policy in perpetuating its obnoxious policy of apartheid must in all conscience remain condemned by us all.

The General Assembly has rightly condemned the racist policy of apartheid as a crime against humanity, while the Security Council has qualified it as a challenge to international conscience. My delegation believes that a clear responsibility devolves in turn on the General Assembly, the Security Council and the international community alike to take concrete steps to ensure that apartheid and its inhumanities be eradicated for all time, and that South Africa be brought to reason and rationality.

Africa's commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free zone is unmistakable. It therefore rejects the prospect of South Africa's becoming a nuclear-weapon State. In this regard, and given the nature of the South African régime, we categorically

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

reject any form of military or nuclear collaboration which any State, corporation or individual might wish to extend to South Africa. We call once again on those Western countries and Israel which have extended or are extending military and nuclear collaboration to South Africa to consider in all objectivity and in good conscience whether such collaboration helps the cause of international peace and security or the stability of the African continent. By the same token we believe that a special responsibility devolves upon those countries which have exercised or can exercise any leverage upon South Africa to prevail on it to change course in the interests of world peace and security, rather than encouraging it to remain defiant and intransigent in the face of international concern, oppressive to its citizens and aggressive towards other African States.

If there must be "constructive engagement" by any Member State with South Africa, let it be aimed at promoting just and honourable peace and stability in the region; let it be aimed at promoting human happiness and the orderly development of all the peoples of South Africa; let it be aimed at the enjoyment of basic human rights and freedoms; but let it not be in the military and nuclear field, which implies death and destruction and the destabilization of society.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (interpretation from Russian): The Mongolian delegation is honoured today to introduce to the First Committee draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.24, under agenda item 141, entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against earth". This question, included on the agenda of this session at the request of the Soviet Union as a matter of great importance and urgency, has very great significance.

It is the will of mankind that its conquest of space shall be exclusively for peaceful purposes. Thus, the scientifically and technologically advanced States, first and foremost the Soviet Union, have made outstanding progress in the peaceful conquest of space, progress which is of immense significance for the economic progress of all countries. Other socialist and peace-loving countries, including Mongolia, are joining with the Soviet Union in taking an active part in making peaceful use of outer space.

In the face of the danger of an arms race in outer space, measures to put a speedy end to military escalation take on paramount significance. As is well known, actions such as the stationing on celestial bodies or in space of types of weapons not defined as weapons of mass destruction are still not covered under the prohibitions set forth in existing international treaties.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The Soviet Union, which in 1981 proposed the idea of the non-stationing in outer space of weapons of any sort, went even further and made a proposal on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against Earth, for which purpose it proposed the conclusion of an appropriate international treaty. Members of the Committee are aware that the Committee on Disarmament, as the sole multinational negotiating forum, has been considering the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. However, negotiations on this question have not yet started.

The Mongolian delegation has repeatedly drawn attention to the reason for the absence of such negotiations; therefore I need hardly repeat them here. None the less, we feel that it would be helpful if the proposed draft resolution were to reflect certain considerations related to this matter. In the operative part of the draft resolution there is a request to the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, including the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the subject and in this context to work out specific measures of practical nature aimed at preventing the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth, with a view to concluding, as soon as possible, a relevant international agreement.

The Mongolian delegation, like other delegations, regards as highly useful the active participation of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in the elaboration of specific international agreements in this sphere. That body has been making a substantial contribution to the elaboration of international instruments designed to ensure the use of outer space solely for peaceful purposes. On that basis we found it necessary to include a separate operative paragraph wherein the General Assembly requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to proceed, as a matter of priority, to the elaboration of a text of a binding international instrument that would establish legal norms prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth, and to set up an ad hoc working group on the subject.

In the concluding paragraph, we have included a proposal that the General Assembly should decide to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session an item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth".

These are the main ideas contained in draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.24, which is now being introduced to the First Committee. The Mongolian delegation is prepared

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

to work together with other delegations in considering this draft resolution. It is our hope that this draft resolution will meet with a constructive response in the First Committee and will be adopted by it.

Mr. STRUCKA (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): The Czechoslovak delegation would like, on behalf of the co-sponsors, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland and Viet Nam, to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/38/L.65/Rev.1, on item 50 (c) of the Committee's agenda.

The first paragraph explains the main thrust of the draft resolution, its great concern that no progress has yet been achieved in the bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. It then takes note of the profound alarm expressed in this context by the general public all over the world concerned over the possibility of a new and dangerous intensification of the nuclear-arms race, in particular, in Europe.

Convinced that mutually acceptable agreement in the Geneva negotiations is possible on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security, the General Assembly, in operative paragraph 1, reiterates the conviction that all peoples of the world are vitally interested in the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and, accordingly, in the progress and the successful conclusion of these negotiations.

Paragraph 2 calls upon the States parties to the bilateral talks to achieve as soon as possible equitable agreement which would provide for the non-deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and for a drastic reduction in the existing nuclear systems of such range without prejudice to anybody's security.

In paragraphs 3 and 4 the draft resolution requests both States parties to keep the United Nations appropriately informed of the progress achieved in the negotiations and requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to transmit the present draft resolution to the Governments of all States concerned.

The negotiations to which we refer are at the present time one of the most decisive ways of curbing a new spiral of the arms race. If they fail we are faced with the danger of a new lowering of the threshold of nuclear catastrophe. The Czechoslovak delegation is convinced that the only way out of the present situation is the conclusion of a treaty on the radical reduction of existing intermediate-range nuclear forces on the basis of equality and equal security and that all States concerned should do their utmost to promote this aim.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): It is an honour and a pleasure for my delegation to introduce a draft resolution on peace and disarmament movements, on behalf of the delegations of Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Norway, Sweden, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay.

Our delegations are convinced that a well-informed discussion of all points of view relating to disarmament issues is one of the best ways to build trust and confidence among the peoples and nations of this world. We are further convinced that such a free and unfettered dialogue could contribute real and effective paths to arms-limitation accords. It is with those vital goals in mind that our delegation has decided to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.61.

Throughout this troubled century, wars have all too often resulted from the lack of communication. Excessive secrecy and censorship can create only mistrust and misunderstanding among the peoples of the world; they are the true enemies of peaceful relations among nations. An educated public is the best guarantee against such mistrust and misunderstanding. This draft resolution, then, seeks to ensure that citizens of all nations have the freedom to make well-informed choices on the vital questions surrounding disarmament.

We view our draft resolution as a natural complement and follow-up to last year's consensus resolution 37/100 I and J. In other words, all Member States of this body have accepted a moral commitment to abide by norms of behaviour that are by now generally accepted. Sadly, this commitment has often been honoured in the breach and not in the observance. However, now is not the time to lament the past: it is a time to translate the lofty goals of these resolutions into concrete measures; it is a time for all nations to put the clear principles of the World Disarmament Campaign into practice.

The second special session devoted to disarmament produced a framework for a truly universal and effective World Disarmament Campaign. The language of the Concluding Document is clear and unequivocal. It stipulates that the Campaign should be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner; that its universality should be guaranteed by the co-operation and participation of all States and by the widest possible dissemination of information on questions of arms limitation and disarmament; that all sectors of the public should have unimpeded access to a broad range of information and opinions on the subject. Those admirable goals are contained in the fifth preambular paragraph of our draft resolution.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

The operative portion of the text calls upon all Member States to permit their citizens freely and publicly to express their own views on disarmament questions and to organize and meet publicly for that purpose. It is now time to make this dialogue truly universal. The Secretary-General, for example, recommended to the second special session on disarmament that individual and independent organizations become increasingly involved in the discussion of disarmament issues. With that in mind, our draft resolution encourages non-governmental organizations and individuals, as well as Member States, to furnish to the Secretary-General information pertinent to the implementation of the resolution.

My delegation profoundly believes that if this draft resolution were now applied universally, it would have truly beneficial results for mankind. It could provide an impulse for promoting real peace movements whenever people wished and in whatever form they chose. It could help clarify the real issues and the deepest concerns of all sides. It could help promote the kind of genuine dialogue among peoples that is so vital if we are to rebuild the foundation of mutual trust and confidence which has been so lacking in recent years. And, finally, it could help create a world in which enduring arms-control accords were not just a dreamer's dream but a political reality.

I should now like to turn to draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.64, submitted by the delegations of Liberia, Somalia, Swaziland, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay. It deals with an issue of grave concern to the sponsoring Governments and, I am confident, to the world at large. Yet we are cognizant of the heavy workload the Committee has to carry in dealing with almost 70 draft resolutions placed before it, and the strong desire of the Chairman to minimize the number of draft resolutions this year. We are also fully aware of the importance of a particular draft resolution - the one in document A/C.1/38/L.53 - to which this Committee will want to give its full attention.

With those considerations in mind, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.64 have decided not to pursue the draft resolution at this time. Speaking for my own Government, I wish to emphasize that this is in no way an indication of any lessening of our profound concern about the subject which the draft resolution addresses and which we shall have the opportunity of raising on subsequent occasions.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Today I shall be introducing four draft resolutions that the delegation of Mexico is co-sponsoring.

The first is contained in document A/C.1/38/L.32 and relates to the item on the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The draft resolution is sponsored by the 20 States parties to that Treaty, for which the Government of Mexico is the depositary. Those sponsors are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay, as well as Mexico.

The text of the draft resolution is very similar to that of resolution 37/71, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December last year by a vote of 136 to none.

The only difference in the first preambular paragraph is that 10 resolutions, instead of nine, are recalled; we now include resolution 37/71, to which I just referred.

A similar change has been made in the second preambular paragraph, reflecting the increase in the number of States Parties to the Treaty from 22 to 23. The only substantive differences between this draft resolution and the one adopted last session are that in paragraph 2 of the present text the words "once more" have been added, indicating that this is not the first time that the Assembly will have directed an appeal to France not to delay its ratification of Additional Protocol I, which, as the draft resolution put it, "has been requested so many times", and that in paragraph 1 the General Assembly no longer "regrets" but rather "deplores" that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France has not yet been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the five-year period that will soon have elapsed and the "pressing invitations which the General Assembly has addressed to it".

When on 22 November 1982 I introduced the draft resolution which became resolution 37/71 I concluded that brief introduction by saying that:

"In view of the fact that the State in question" - that is, the State to which the appeals had been made - "is France, one of the three main exponents of the Romance tradition in Europe and that the Treaty of Tlatelolco is considered - and rightly so - to be one of the most important contributions of

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Latin America at the international level, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.51 wish to believe that this will be the last time that the Assembly will have to urge that country to act in conformity with the excellent political, economic and cultural relations that exist between it and the States parties to the Treaty. We therefore hope that inclusion of this item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly will be solely for the purpose of celebrating next year the fact that Additional Protocol I will be fully in force, as envisaged when it was prepared in 1967." (A/C.1/37/PV.39, p. 11)

Thus, we were deeply disappointed that what we had hoped for did not happen. We truly regret that. We should like to believe that it was due to the fact that those who are in charge of French foreign policy - for lack of time or because of the pressure of other high-priority issues - have placed the matter into the hands of a bureaucracy which cannot take the initiative and which is ruled by inertia.

As General Assembly resolutions have so often said, and as the present draft resolution also says, Additional Protocol I is designed to make it possible for the peoples which inhabit certain territories falling within the ambit of the Treaty of Tlatelolco to gain the benefits of the Treaty by the accession to that Protocol by "those States that de jure or de facto are internationally responsible for those territories".

In addition to their obligation to take seriously the interests of the populations of those territories, those States must, in cases such as the one I have just described, bear fully in mind the unequivocal position of the sovereign States of the Latin America sub-continent - which, it must not be forgotten, make up a geographical part of those territories - a position which, in light of the provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, especially its preamble and its article I, may be defined as unshakeably supporting the need for a Latin America which is protected by a régime dictating the total absence of nuclear weapons.

Let us hope that when next year the Assembly considers this item once again, in accordance with paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.32, developments in this regard will have shown the State to which the draft resolution - which, I am certain, will become a resolution - is addressed to have heeded it.

I wish now to introduce a second draft resolution: A/C.1/38/L.30/Rev.1, which deals with one of the items in the report of the Disarmament Commission. It is sponsored by the delegations of Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

In the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament, adopted by consensus in 1978 and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982 at its second special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly defined a series of objectives, principles, priorities, measures and machinery which together constitute what might be called an excellent philosophy of disarmament.

But despite the fact that the Assembly stressed the need to "translate into practical terms" (resolution S-10/2, para. 17) the provisions of the Final Document and to

"proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament", (ibid.)

it is undeniable that nearly all its provisions have remained dead letters and that in the five years since the special session it has not been possible to agree on a single new treaty or convention on nuclear disarmament.

It is therefore necessary to turn to procedures which could expedite those which are traditionally used in international negotiations, particularly those relating to nuclear disarmament. One of those procedures which might, in the light of certain positive experiences, be carefully explored could be the taking of unilateral measures. The best example of such measures in this field is what is known as the voluntary suspension of nuclear weapon tests which was observed for nearly three years, from autumn 1958 to autumn 1961.

There is no doubt that if such measures are to go forward, the States concerned must have full confidence that they will not jeopardize their security. That confidence would not seem difficult to achieve if there is reciprocal good will. Thus, for example, if one State or group of States could begin the process by announcing unilateral adoption of some very modest disarmament measure, it could specify that if there is no reciprocity within a reasonable period - six months for example - by their partner State or States, it would cancel that measure. At the same time they could state that if there were to be reciprocity they would be prepared to expand the scope of the measures gradually and very considerably.

What I have just stated is only a hint of the unexpected positive elements that could be found in this question. That is why the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.30 believe that the General Assembly should ask the Secretary-General

"to prepare, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts and applying the methods customary in these cases, a report, to be submitted to

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

the Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, on ways and means that seem advisable for stimulating the adoption of unilateral nuclear disarmament measures which, without prejudice to the security of States, would come to promote and complement bilateral and multilateral negotiations in this sphere."

The sponsors trust that this draft resolution, the purposes of which are eminently constructive and which is totally uncontroversial, will command a consensus in the First Committee and the General Assembly.

The third draft resolution that I should like to introduce in this statement is A/C.1/38/L.42, sponsored by Ecuador, Sweden, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and my own country, which deals with the subject of bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations.

The draft resolution begins by recalling a fundamental fact - that the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament approved by consensus a declaration, contained in the Final Document of that session, in which, inter alia, it proclaimed that in order effectively to discharge the central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament which belong to the United Nations in accordance with its Charter, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

The second preambular paragraph also recalls that at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1982, Member States reiterated "their solemn commitment" to implement what had been agreed upon four years earlier.

The draft resolution refers to resolution 37/78 A, adopted on 9 December 1982 with 114 votes in favour and only 1 against it, which called on the United States and the Soviet Union to transmit to the Secretary-General "a joint report or two separate reports" on progress in their bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons, which had been taking place in Geneva, "for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session" (General Assembly resolution 37/78 A, para. 1).

The draft resolution notes "with satisfaction" that the Soviet Union has already submitted the report referred to in that resolution, a report which appears in document A/38/562, and expresses the hope that "the other major nuclear-weapon State", the United States,

"will find it possible to comply also with the request of the General Assembly before the closure of its thirty-eighth session".

That would make it possible for the General Assembly to consider both reports this year.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The operative part of the draft resolution makes an appeal to both negotiating States to examine, as a way out of the present impasse in their negotiations,

"the possibility of combining into a single forum the two series of negotiations which they have been carrying out and of broadening their scope so as to embrace also the 'tactical' or 'battlefield' nuclear weapons".

It requests both parties

"to keep the United Nations appropriately informed of the progress achieved in their negotiations";

reiterates the need for the two negotiating parties

"to bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question";

and decides to include in the General Assembly's agenda next year an item with the same title: "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations".

Given the content and purpose of the draft resolution, the sponsors do not wish to rule out the possibility that it may be adopted by consensus.

The fourth and last draft resolution that I wish to introduce now is draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.52, sponsored by Algeria, Argentina, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, India, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and my own country. It concerns the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies.

The draft resolution recalls the Board's origins, in paragraph 124 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, held in 1978, calling on the Secretary-General to set up

"an advisory board of eminent persons, selected on the basis of their personal expertise and taking into account the principle of equitable geographical representation, to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, including a programme of such studies". (General Assembly resolution S-10/1, para. 124)

The Board which was established on the basis of that request from the Assembly functioned until the year before last. Subsequently, in resolution 37/99 K of 13 December 1982, the General Assembly called on the Secretary-General to revive the Advisory Board. The resolution indicated that the Board's functions should be, first, to advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies on disarmament questions carried out under the auspices of the United Nations; secondly, to serve

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

as the Advisory Council of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research; thirdly, to advise the Secretary-General on the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign; and, fourthly, to provide the Secretary-General with advice, at his specific invitation, on other matters within the area of disarmament and arms limitation.

The revived Board has held its first session. Added to those which the Board held during its first life, that makes its eighth session. If the draft resolution is carried, the General Assembly will express its satisfaction that the Board has been revived and will take note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on the Board's activities in 1983, which appears in document A/38/467 of 20 October this year. Finally, the Assembly will call on the Secretary-General to report to it annually on the work of the Advisory Board.

I am quite sure that the Assembly will be able to approve this draft resolution by consensus.

Mr. KOROMA (Sierra Leone): I crave your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, if in speaking for the first time this session on behalf of my country I address a few words to you. You are aware of the high esteem in which you are held by the Sierra Leone delegation. Given your personal commitment and that of your country to this Organization, and to its purposes and principles, it is only fitting that you should have been unanimously elected to steer the affairs of this all-important Committee, which is charged with the consideration of some of the most important issues on the international calendar, namely, the question of disarmament and international security. We extend our felicitations to you and to the other officers of the Committee on your election and on the way in which you have been conducting the affairs of this Committee.

The Sierra Leone delegation would like to comment on the draft resolution on the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament contained in document A/C.1/38/L.39. My delegation can attest to the fact that since its inception the Programme has contributed in no small measure to our greater understanding of this all-important and sensitive issue of disarmament. The Programme has been attracting the manifest interest of an increasing number of Member States, either through their direct participation or by inviting the fellowship recipients to visit their respective countries to study disarmament-oriented activities, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the Programme, as well as providing additional information sources and practical knowledge for them.

(Mr. Koroma, Sierra Leone)

The imperative necessity of the Programme was succinctly recorded by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament held here in New York last year. At that session, it was recognized that

"The result of the implementation of the programme thus far, including the continuing contribution to disarmament negotiations by former fellows, confirms the view that the programme has justified the hopes which inspired its establishment." (A/S-12/32, Annex IV, p. 1)

The Assembly further concluded that

"In view of the growing interest which continues to be manifested in the programme by an ever-increasing number of States, an expansion of the programme in terms of its content ... has become desirable." (Ibid.)

As a recipient of one of the Disarmament Fellowships, Sierra Leone can attest to the Programme's importance as a tangible investment in our sustained efforts to bring about a disarmament régime. We therefore wish to attest to the efficient manner in which the Programme has been organized so far. For this we congratulate the Secretary-General and commend the Department for Disarmament Affairs, especially the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, for their commitment to the Programme and for conducting it remarkably well thus far.

In interpreting operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.39, we are glad to see that in actual terms the Disarmament Fellowship Programme has been expanded quantitatively, qualitatively and in scope. In terms of scope, the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States have joined the growing number of States which have already invited the Programme. Qualitatively, the Programme has been very much intensified this year and the disarmament materials covered this year are not comparable to any previous year. Quantitatively, the number of fellows has been increased from 20 to 25 based on the principle of equitable geographical distribution. In this connection, the representative of Nigeria, speaking on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution, proposed a new expansion, which was enumerated in his speech last Tuesday.

In view of the upgraded functions of the Programme the Assembly should take appropriate measures in upgrading the level of co-ordination in order to meet the requirements of the high level of activities.

Mr. ELBE (Federal Republic of Germany): Since this week is devoted to the consideration of and action on the draft resolutions on disarmament agenda items, my delegation should like to address the subject of chemical weapons in the

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context of the draft resolutions that are now before us in this Committee. My comments will, at the same time, explain my delegation's vote on these draft resolutions when the Committee takes action upon them next week, obviating the need for separate statements then.

A total ban on chemical weapons aimed at preserving humanity from the threat of these terrible weapons of mass destruction has always had a high priority on my Government's agenda. The exposed situation of my densely populated country on the dividing line between contrasting political, social and military systems, explains the apprehension which the possible use of chemical weapons evokes. As early as 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany renounced the production of chemical weapons in an international treaty and admitted international controls verifying the non-production of such weapons on its territory. It is therefore a matter of logic and continuity that we should strive with singular fervour for a universal, comprehensive and adequately verifiable prohibition of all chemical weapons as a matter of extreme urgency.

As expressed in the statement by the representative of Greece, Ambassador Stephanou, who spoke on behalf of the 10 member States of the European Community on 18 October, we hope that from the beginning of its next session the Conference on Disarmament will negotiate resolutely so as to arrive rapidly at the adoption of a draft convention on chemical weapons. Looking back at the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament we welcome the fact that negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons have reached an advanced stage. Under the able guidance of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador McPhail of Canada, all the essential elements of an agreement on chemical weapons have been processed. The spheres of fundamental accord and approximation in specific areas have been defined, as have the areas in which different views still prevail.

These results allow us to assess this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament as encouraging, although not entirely satisfactory. The hopes for a genuine breakthrough in these negotiations have not yet materialized. In statements made in this Committee some delegations representing the group of socialist States have tried to shift the responsibility for the lack of progress onto others. This is a misrepresentation of facts by the socialist group, and particularly the Soviet Union. Many delegations in the Committee on Disarmament have been struck by the fact that this group of States has chosen to remain silent in the face of essential issues of a future chemical weapons ban and have deemed it

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necessary to address an urgent appeal to the socialist group to show a greater measure of political flexibility and to document such a flexibility by practical contributions. My delegation regrets that no tangible results could be achieved in the field of verification.

We welcomed the Soviet proposal contained in last year's working paper CD/294 to allow for international on-site inspections of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons according to an agreed quota as an important step in the right direction. However, the negotiations in Geneva have demonstrated that the Soviet Union is not yet willing to accept an international control that should, at least for the actual technical phase of destruction, be of continuous nature. In addition, there has been no noteworthy sign of readiness to apply an adequate régime of verification to the elimination of facilities for the production of chemical weapons and to submit the non-production of chemicals for use in chemical weapons to systematic international verification.

Unfortunately, the position of the Soviet Union has also stiffened on the question of on-challenge verification. The representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Petrovsky, stated in this Committee on 25 October that on-challenge verification could be possible only on a voluntary basis. It is our view, as well as one generally accepted by the overwhelming majority of the Committee on Disarmament members, that a refusal by a State party to accept on-site inspections requested by the competent organ of the Convention should be exceptional and accompanied by a full explanation of the reasons for such a refusal. A verification régime that does not establish the stringent obligation to permit such inspections does not fulfil the requirements of adequate verification in the framework of a future convention on chemical weapons, but rather deepens the mistrust in international relations.

Instead of participating in the complicated process of elaborating the necessary mechanisms for international verification, the difficulties of which are surmountable provided that the necessary political will exists, some delegations view the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations as forums to propagate political projects that make the conclusion of a universal convention on chemical weapons even more difficult. One of these projects to which I am referring asks for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe. Another promulgates the freeze of the production and deployment of chemical weapons. Both are reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.11/Rev.1, in favour of which my delegation my delegation cannot vote.

(Mr. Elbe, Federal Republic of Germany)

My delegation has repeatedly spoken of the subject of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe, both in New York and in Geneva. We have critically discussed the arguments pro and contra the creation of such a zone. We regret that the advocates of this zonal concept have so far evaded an argumentative discussion. The mere reiteration of proposals is no substitute for substantive debate. It demonstrates a disregard for the justified interests of all delegations to be fully informed of the implications of such proposals.

Our hesitation about the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe persists. My Government has repeatedly expressed its opinion that such a zone will be truly weapon free, in the meaning of such a concept, only if it can no longer be reached by such weapons. The usefulness of a chemical-weapon-free zone is therefore highly doubtful. This holds true especially for the option to reintroduce chemical weapons quickly and without detection, if indeed they have not remained hidden there in the first place. A chemical-weapon-free zone would have to be verifiable. Questions of verification are just as difficult as in negotiations on a world-wide convention on chemical weapons. This is so in particular with regard to the verification of non-production and in the case of unchallenged verification. In both cases the Soviet Union has hitherto shown little flexibility in the Geneva negotiations. Additional problems would emerge concerning the verification of a possible reintroduction of chemical weapons in such a zone.

My delegation has difficulty understanding the logic of the argument that the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone would offer advantages, since our concentrated efforts have hitherto been directed at a world-wide chemical weapons convention which would render such a zone superfluous. In statements in this Committee some delegations have pronounced themselves in favour of a freeze on the production and deployment of chemical weapons. In draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.11/Rev.1 submitted by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic this initiative is reflected in the form of several restraints directed unilaterally and quite visibly only against States members of the Atlantic Alliance. We are asking ourselves whether a freeze, in whatever form, would really raise the prospects for the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention or whether it would not, rather, complicate negotiations.

Our reservations with regard to proposals of this kind have been conditioned, on the one hand, by the history of disarmament negotiations in which freeze

(Mr. Elbe, Federal Republic of Germany)

proposals used to by submitted by the side which, in turn, had created a military imbalance through its own prior build-up and which was hoping to have its preponderance sanctioned and enshrined by the freeze of the arms balance potential. More recent telling examples in this context are the manifold Soviet proposals for a moratorium on nuclear intermediate-range missiles. They were forthcoming only at a time when the Soviet Union had already created the fait accompli of a qualitative and quantitative supremacy by means of the deployment of an excessively large number of modern SS-20s. In the realm of chemical weapons the situation is familiar and similar: the Soviet Union has a considerable chemical-weapon warfare capability; Soviet military doctrine includes the use of chemical warfare agents as a means of conducting war. The use of chemical weapons forms an essential part of the Soviet offensive concept. It accords with this concept that the Soviet Union has at its disposal a large potential of chemical warfare agents in Europe. Whereas the United States of America has exercised reserve in the field of chemical weapons for more than 14 years now, the Soviet Union has systematically developed its capacity for waging chemical warfare during the last decade. Whoever submits proposals for the freezing of chemical weapons potential from such a position of supremacy exposes himself to the justified suspicion that he is aiming less at the conclusion of a world-wide chemical weapons convention than at consolidating his existing superiority. This is particularly true if the freeze is so formulated that it would constrain only the other side.

The problems connected with the creation of chemical-weapon-free zones equally exist in the context of any freeze of the production and deployment of chemical weapons. It is self evident that such a freeze would have to be fully verifiable. The questions of verification of the freeze agreement, independent of the variety of chemical weapons to be so constrained, are as complex and difficult as in the case of a world-wide chemical weapons convention. It would therefore be an illusion to believe that a freeze could be an immediate measure, as some delegations here present have contended. Negotiations on freeze measures could only delay the process of meaningful negotiations on a world-wide chemical weapons convention.

Canada, along with other delegations, has submitted the traditional draft resolution designed to instill an additional momentum in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. It has been distributed as document A/C.1/38/L.41. As a sponsor we fully support that draft resolution and expect that it will enjoy a consensus as did last year's draft resolution, which we also sponsored.

(Mr. Elbe, Federal Republic of Germany)

My delegation also supports draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.53 submitted by the French delegation and stresses the importance of the rapid establishment of a reliable monitoring instrument for the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the period during which the institutional setup for the future chemical weapons ban does not yet function. The Federal Republic of Germany has quickly responded to the appeals contained in last year's draft resolution in this area, draft resolution 37/98 D. We regret that draft resolution 37/98 C has not been followed-up by a corresponding draft resolution this year. Undoubtedly it was, above all, the scarcity of time and the early deadline for the submission of draft resolutions that has prevented action in this important field.

In any event, it is important to stress that the validity of draft resolution 37/98 C is unaffected and that the appeal by the overwhelming majority of States that a special conference be convened as soon as possible to establish a flexible, objective and non-discriminating procedure to deal with issues concerning compliance with the biological weapons Convention still holds true.

My delegation insists that efforts be undertaken to hold that conference and to fill a grave void in the bacteriological warfare Convention. We are gratified that the American side has recently organized an international workshop in Tooele, Utah in order to illustrate in a concrete manner possibilities of verifying the destruction of chemical weapons by the example of the chemical weapons destruction facility that operates there. Many delegations, including mine, have just returned from that workshop. Their participation will be for the benefit of the negotiations in Geneva.

The visit to the United States destruction facility and the discussions at the workshop have, in our view, convincingly demonstrated that modern censoring and communications equipment go a long way towards providing necessary verification data and that they can be usefully combined with a very small number of international inspectors to form an adequate and relatively simple international verification arrangement at a low level of cost and intrusiveness. One of the great merits of the workshop was that it allowed a pragmatic technical assessment of verification needs outside of ideological and theoretical considerations.

We wish that those delegations that have so far played down the importance of this workshop and ostentatiously withheld their participation would familiarize themselves with the results of the international workshop.

(Mr. Elbe, Federal Republic of Germany)

As announced by former Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt at the second special session on disarmament, the Federal Republic of Germany will in 1984 organize a workshop similar to the one just organized by the United States.

At such a crucial stage in negotiations, it is important not to lose sight of the essential objective of our work, namely, the conclusion of a world-wide convention on the banning of chemical weapons in order to liberate mankind from a dreadful scourge.

In this context we appeal to the group of socialist countries - and, in particular, to the Soviet Union - to continue work in the Conference on Disarmament in a spirit of compromise and flexibility in order to find constructive solutions to the intricate problems with which we are dealing. Despite dragging negotiations we remain confident that this aim may be achieved, because we believe that all parties to the negotiations will be guided by a sense of responsibility.

Mr. ERDENECHULUUN (Mongolia): The Mongolian delegation has asked to make a statement in order to introduce a draft resolution on Disarmament Week contained in document A/C.1/38/L.33/Rev.1. I do so on behalf of the delegations of Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Viet Nam and my own delegation.

The draft resolution we are presenting today represents a follow-up measure to the decision taken by the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Today, Disarmament Week has become a world-wide action aimed at the mobilization of world public opinion in support of halting and reversing the arms race - especially the nuclear arms race - in all its aspects. Disarmament Week, in the view of its sponsors, represents an effort to increase public awareness of the growing danger of nuclear war. This can be seen from the reports of the Secretary-General containing information about the activities undertaken by Governments and international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, as well as from the message of the President of the United Nations General Assembly and the Secretary-General and statements made at the annual ceremonial meetings of the First Committee. In this connection my delegation wishes to express its appreciation to the Department for Disarmament Affairs for preparing a broad report on the activities of Governments, international governmental and non-governmental organizations in holding Disarmament Week. The draft resolution was formulated along the lines of last

(Mr. Erdenechuluun, Mongolia)

year's resolution and those previously adopted. It requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session a report containing the information referred to in paragraph 7 of draft resolution 37/78 D, as well as paragraphs 4 to 6 of the present draft resolution.

Those, in short, are the comments that my delegation on behalf of the sponsors wished to make in introducing the draft resolution on Disarmament Week. Here, I should like to note that, following consultations with interested delegations, we have submitted to the Secretariat an amendment to the said draft resolution concerning the third preambular paragraph. The amendment relates to the replacement of the word "anti-missile" by the word "anti-nuclear".

In conclusion, may I express the hope that this draft resolution will receive broad support from the members of this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the Secretary of the Committee, who has a few announcements to make.

Mr. RATHORE (Secretary of the Committee): I should like to inform members of the Committee that the following countries have become co-sponsors of the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/38/L.5, Japan, Mali, Peru and the United Republic of Cameroon; L.8/Rev.1, Djibouti and Mali; L.9, Singapore; L.15, Ecuador, Greece, Indonesia and Mali; L.17, Congo and Mali; L.19, German Democratic Republic; L.32, El Salvador; L.33, Afghanistan, the German Democratic Republic and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; L.35, Singapore and Spain; L.36, India; L.37, Denmark, Singapore and New Zealand; L.38, Ecuador and Indonesia; L.39, Cuba and Indonesia; L.40, Venezuela - which was omitted in the original - and Indonesia; L.49, New Zealand; A/C.1/38/L.51, Democratic Yemen and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; L.54, Mali; L.58, Singapore; L.61, Singapore and the Netherlands; L.62, Guatemala and Singapore; L.63, Norway and Turkey; L.64, Somalia; L.1, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; L.2, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; L.41, Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and Spain; L.21/Rev.1, Ecuador; L.26/Rev.1, German Democratic Republic; L.57, Iceland; L.59, the Bahamas and Ecuador.

The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m.