

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records*



COPY
FOR REFERENCE
ONLY - DO NOT
CIRCULATE

FIRST COMMITTEE
10th meeting
held on
Friday, 21 October 1983
at 3 p.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

CONTENTS

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS (continued)

Statements were made by:

Mr. Vongsay (Lao People's Democratic Republic)
Mr. Murin (Czechoslovakia)
Mr. Said (Tunisia)
Mr. Petrovsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
Mr. Imai (Japan)
Mr. Rossides (Cyprus)

UN LIBRARY

OCT 23 1983

UN/SA COLLECTION

*This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/38/PV.10
25 October 1983

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 to 63, 139, 141, 143 and 144 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. VONGSAY (Lao People's Democratic Republic) (interpretation from French): First of all, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the delegation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, I should like to congratulate you most sincerely on your election to the chairmanship of our Committee. Your experience in First Committee issues will, I am convinced, make it possible for you to guide our work towards concrete results. I should like also to express my congratulations to the other officers of the Committee.

At the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in March this year, the international situation was examined and concern was expressed in the following terms:

"... the renewed escalation in the nuclear arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, ... has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations." (A/38/132, para. 28)

That concern on the part of the international community at the aggravation of the world situation, which can be seen clearly in the deterioration of the process of détente, the intensification of the arms race and the threat of nuclear disaster, has also been mentioned during the general debate in the General Assembly which came to an end just last week.

Instead of a policy of détente, imperialist circles have opted for one of confrontation, by trying to kindle new flashpoints of tension in different parts of the world or by trying to maintain existing ones. In order to regain lost ground or to maintain their spheres of influence they have unhesitatingly intervened directly in regional conflicts. Events in the Middle East, Chad and Central America are all eloquent examples of this. Their desire for hegemony has prompted them to proclaim particular regions of the world - those with vast natural wealth - as areas of vital interest to them.

(Mr. Vongsay, Lao People's
Democratic Republic)

It goes without saying that such a policy could only lead to the arms race, to the excessive acquisition of weapons, because they wanted to gain military superiority over others in order to impose their will and have the upper hand in all circumstances. This led to the production of increasingly improved weapons, increasingly sophisticated weapons, in terms of their destructive capacity, such as the neutron bomb and new chemical weapons, called binary weapons, not to mention their delivery systems, such as the intercontinental MX missiles and strategic B-1 bombers, although the nuclear arsenal that already existed would have been enough to destroy the world many times over. In order to justify this policy to the public and to obtain an increase in their military budgets, myths were spread about the supposed military superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries, the supposed Soviet threat, or the supposed use of chemical weapons by certain Governments in Asia. Even worse, they went as far as to gamble with the lives of the innocent, such as in the case of the South Korean aircraft.

Furthermore, in order to prepare for or persuade the public to accept the possibility of a nuclear war, dangerous theories were put forward, such as those of the nuclear first strike, limited or prolonged nuclear war, or the possibility of winning a nuclear war, and so on.

If such a tendency continues, it is not only international peace and security that will be threatened, but also the very survival of mankind, because at the present stage of progress in science and technology it would be an illusion to believe that a nuclear war could be won. As was rightly stressed by the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries in New Delhi, nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war, they are instruments of mass annihilation. This is why they have rejected the use of such weapons in any circumstances whatsoever.

Hence, given the serious threat to the survival of mankind, it is important that the major Powers, especially the nuclear Powers, adopt urgently practical measures to curb the arms race, particularly that in nuclear weapons, and to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. In this connection, in their New Delhi Message, the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries made the following appeal to the nuclear Powers:

"They should agree on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances and stop further production and deployment of nuclear weapons." (A/38/132, p. 56)

(Mr. Vongsay, Lao People's
Democratic Republic)

In this context the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union on condemnation of nuclear war (A/C.1/38/L.1) and nuclear-weapon freeze (A/C.1/38/L.2) seem very appropriate. They serve to supplement other earlier initiatives by the Soviet Union, such as the Soviet Union's unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and its proposal concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. If these initiatives were accepted and followed up by all the nuclear Powers the nuclear arms race could be curbed and the danger of nuclear war eliminated. These two proposals, therefore, have the firm support of my delegation.

Another subject of concern to the international community at the moment is the question of the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in certain Western European countries. These intermediate-range nuclear missiles whose first strike capability is undeniable, would not only make nuclear hostages of the peoples of the European continent but would also endanger the lives of other peoples in the world, since a nuclear war, whatever those that unleashed it might want, could never be limited. Reprisals would be inevitable.

Therefore, in the interest of world peace, it is important that the Geneva negotiations on this subject achieve positive results, and to that end, that the interlocutors demonstrate good will and realism. In this connection, the most recent Soviet proposal, made by President Yuri Andropov and reaffirmed by the conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty held in Sophia from 12 to 14 October, deserves serious consideration. Similarly, the proposal made by the Socialist countries concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the States of the Warsaw Treaty and those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could contribute to the establishment of mutual trust. Europe, which has been the arena of several major conflicts, including two world wars, must not become the arena of a third world war, this time a nuclear one.

Another equally dangerous enterprise is the militarization of outer space. We are aware of the efforts made by the United Nations to make outer space an area of exclusively peaceful co-operation and exploration. However, for some time now the tendency to extend the arms race into outer space has become increasingly clear. A budget of several hundred million dollars has even been

(Mr. Vongsay, Lao People's
Democratic Republic)

allocated for this in 1985. If this undertaking is not stopped it will become the sword of Damocles for our world. This is why we appreciate the commitment of the Soviet Union not to be the first to install the anti-satellite weapon, just as we support its proposal concerning the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth. We feel that the conclusion of such a treaty together with a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, which was also proposed by the Soviet Union, in 1981, will make it possible to remove this sword of Damocles from the earth and thus to meet the wishes of the international community.

Although the warlike policies of the imperialists give rise to increasing concern among the peoples, it is encouraging to see that everywhere in the world there are movements made up of peoples of all social strata acting in the interest of peace and against the arms race. Last year, during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we witnessed an enormous pacifist demonstration here in New York. There are also widespread demonstrations in certain West European countries against the deployment of Euro-missiles. This is the expression of the will of responsible, intelligent people concerned about their survival and that of coming generations - people for whom my delegation has a great respect, because by their deeds they are demonstrating the views of the majority.

(Mr. Vongsay, Lao People's
Democratic Republic)

These increasing pacifist movements confirm in a sense the success of the campaign for disarmament launched by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to this issue.

True, the process of disarmament is a complex one, but in our view the principles and priorities stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and the measures and objectives defined in it, are still fully valid. It is therefore up to all of us to work toward their realization.

By way of conclusion, may I be permitted to quote this passage from paragraph 4 of the New Delhi Message:

"The non-aligned countries, speaking for the majority of the world community, want an immediate halt to the drift towards nuclear conflict which threatens not only the well-being of humanity in our times but of future generations as well. The nuclear-weapon Powers must heed this voice of the people of the world." (Ibid., p. 56)

Mr. MURIN (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): Today the Czechoslovak delegation would like to continue the statement of its position on some very important items of our agenda. In particular we would like to refer to questions dealt with in the report of the Committee on Disarmament (A/30/27) in Geneva. The first thing that strikes any reader of the report, apart from the general increase in the volume of the work, is the absence of any perceptible progress towards, any real results, in reaching agreement on specific measures to limit the arms race and bring about disarmament, a task which was transferred to the Committee in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

The reasons for this state of affairs in the Committee can best be deduced from the positions taken by a group of States, and by individual States in the Committee, on the items on its agenda.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as an active member of the Committee from the time of its establishment, together with other countries of the socialist community, attaches great significance to its effective functioning as the sole international organ for negotiations on disarmament and the working out of agreements. In the past this Committee has repeatedly demonstrated its potential, serving as a forum for working towards agreement on a number of extremely important measures to curb the arms race. We were all the more perplexed therefore, like many other delegations, to see long drawn-out and fruitless discussions continuing in the Committee at a time when there is such an urgent need to achieve practical progress in resolving those very issues that are being discussed in the Committee.

The key to improving the effectiveness and the fruitfulness of the Committee's work lies wholly and entirely in the hands of its member States. Let us take, for example, what would appear to be a relatively simple question, that of adopting the agenda. If all member States of the Committee had approached this task with the desire to ensure uninterrupted and positive work on the part of the Committee in a spirit of respect for the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the approach adopted by the socialist and non-aligned countries, we are sure that the adoption of the agenda would not have needed more than one or two meetings. Yet this procedural discussion alone dragged on in the Committee for a full seven weeks, thus taking up a considerable portion of the time allocated to the Committee for its substantive work this year.

It would not be surprising if Member States of the United Nations attending this thirty-eighth session were to see such working methods not as a means of ensuring progress but rather as evidence of the reluctance of certain States to begin serious and businesslike negotiations, and of, a desire to block existing disarmament negotiating channels. The same

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

applies also to one of the important central issues of the day: namely, the prevention of nuclear war and the related problem of nuclear disarmament.

The Czechoslovak delegation, in its statement at the beginning of this discussion, set forth its position on the fundamental aspects of this problem, and including the questions of condemning nuclear war, and the freezing of nuclear armaments, items included in the agenda of this session of the United Nations General Assembly on the initiative of the Soviet Union. We wish to state one firm conviction that the question of preventing nuclear war should also be given the highest priority on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament.

In this regard, we cannot fail to be alarmed at the attempts of Western Powers, particularly the United States, to impede the practical consideration of measures to prevent nuclear war, including their refusal to agree to setting up a working group of the Committee on Disarmament on this subject. Generally speaking, the tactics of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members of the Committee on Disarmament, as is clear from their statements and the documents presented, all come down to limiting the question of preventing nuclear war to secondary and insubstantial measures on confidence-building, leaving untouched all existing and potential means of touching off a nuclear conflagration.

If the international community were to agree to such an approach, this would mean opening the door wide to the unhindered intensifying of the nuclear arms race, in combination with the further development of the doctrines and concepts of waging nuclear war, with the specious justification that all of this, so it is alleged, would take place in circumstances of increased confidence.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

We express the hope that the United Nations General Assembly will reject such an approach and appeal urgently to the Geneva Committee to enter into practical negotiations on measures to avert the threat of a nuclear conflict.

It should be recalled in this regard that at the last session the group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament again reaffirmed their well-known proposal of principle for the holding of negotiations on the cessation of the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles up to and including their total elimination. The countries of the socialist community have also repeatedly expressed their views on the practical aspects of holding such negotiations, including participation in the conference and the procedure for bringing about agreed measures on nuclear disarmament that would result from those talks. Those proposals, if approached in a responsible and deliberate way, could be a turning-point in efforts to bring about nuclear disarmament. We hope that next year the Committee on Disarmament will succeed in getting down to businesslike negotiations along these lines.

In this regard, we note with satisfaction the similarity, if not the actual proximity on the essence of the problem, in the approaches of the socialist and non-aligned countries towards solving the complicated problem of nuclear disarmament. That was something which emerged in the statements of delegations of those countries both in the Committee on Disarmament and at this session of the General Assembly. Of course, we also actively support efforts undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament in order to conclude work on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the essence of which should, without any doubt, consist of nuclear disarmament measures. In our view, the real significance of this programme would be determined primarily by the extent to which it would promote the adoption of effective international measures to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. We wish to express our readiness to work constructively and in co-operation with all States for the implementation of such a programme.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

This year will mark the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the historic Treaty on the partial banning of nuclear weapon test in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed in Moscow in 1963. Since that time one of the most important items on the Committee on Disarmament's agenda remains the problem of total and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This problem is most intimately linked with the question of eliminating the threat of nuclear war and, in this regard, has become extremely urgent and of immediate significance.

Nevertheless, debate on the question of working out and concluding a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests which occurred in the Committee on Disarmament this year did not yield any positive results. To all appearances there was an absence of progress on this important and urgent question as a result of the political decision by the Western countries, particularly the United States and Great Britain, to defer indefinitely the conclusion of a treaty on this subject - in that way making it possible for them to put into effect broad programmes of nuclear overarmament, including the creation and introduction of new varieties of nuclear weapon.

Proof of that, along with other factors, is also the negative approach of those countries to the draft fundamental provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests submitted by the USSR delegation at last year's session of the General Assembly. After all, it is well known that the draft was a form of creative codification of agreements and understandings achieved in the past on a number of aspects of this problem in the course of trilateral negotiations among the delegations of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. These understandings included, as representatives know, mutual understanding among the three parties to the talks on such important and substantive items as the question of the régime to govern nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and control measures over the implementation of the treaty. Thus a favourable opportunity did exist to translate the talks in the Committee and the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Testing Ban into the language of an agreed text of a treaty, which would be based on the existing level of

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

understanding. Probably the negotiations could genuinely have developed along those lines if the United States and the United Kingdom delegations had not begun to depart from the understandings already achieved and taken a stand incompatible with the results of the trilateral negotiations and attempting to justify their reluctance to agree to the total prohibition of nuclear tests by what they alleged to be insuperable difficulties of a technological and other nature which were inherent in this problem. But, in spite of these manoeuvres, the essence of the question, we are sure, still remains absolutely clear to the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations - that is to say, the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is a subject for political decision.

We believe that the United Nations General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament will take the necessary steps to make progress towards such a decision.

In the over-all unfavourable results of last year's session of the Committee on Disarmament, the outcome of the Committee's work on chemical weapons is no exception. Although one must appreciate the tremendous amount of work that was done and the active participation of a large number of delegations, agreement on a final draft convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons, the elimination of their stockpiles and the submission of such a draft to the United Nations General Assembly is, nevertheless, a problem which remains unresolved.

In the course of the last session the socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia, evinced a constructive approach and desire to achieve a positive outcome to the negotiations, accommodated the positions of Western and certain other States members of the Committee, made additional proposals and took additional initiatives designed to overcome the remaining difficulties, and that includes work in regard to the question of the non-use of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

Along with the efforts to break the deadlock on the question of chemical weapons in the Disarmament Committee, the members of the Warsaw Treaty came forward with a new major initiative for the elimination of chemical weapons in Europe, as contained in the decisions of the Political Consultative Committee and the Committee of Foreign Ministers which were adopted in Prague early this year. The constructive and flexible position of the socialist countries did not meet, unfortunately, with an equivalent response from the Western side. Instead, the famous decision of the United States on the manufacture of binary nerve-paralysing gases was published and we are witnessing a continuation of the anti-Soviet campaign of falsehoods with regard to the alleged use of chemical weapons. But no matter how much one twists the facts in the question of the prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons as well, what one is actually confronted with is not technical or material hindrances -- even less moral ones -- to the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The one real obstacle in this area is the reluctance of certain States to give up the opportunity to continue to use chemical blackmail against the socialist countries, which has played such an important part in the aggressive plans of militarism. We are convinced that the United Nations General Assembly will throw the weight of its authority behind a positive and final decision on the chemical weapon problem.

An important area in the struggle for the elimination of the threat of war in today's world is the prevention of the spread of the arms race to outer space. As we know, the United Nations General Assembly in 1981, on the initiative of the USSR, included the question of the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing in outer space of weapons of any type on its agenda and it instructed the Committee on Disarmament to try to solve this problem. Nevertheless, as emerges from the report submitted this year by the Committee on Disarmament, practical preparations for this draft treaty have not even begun, for certain reasons, while the threat of an arms race in space, with all the concomitant catastrophic consequences for international peace and security, has reached a dangerous brink -- that is to say, the actual possibility of it materializing. The prospect of large-scale militarization of outer space and intensive preparations for carrying out military operations there, on which even now billions of dollars are being spent every year,

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

has rightly aroused the serious concern of Members of the United Nations. After all, the use of force, particularly military force, in outer space would have extremely far-reaching consequences for the whole of our planet. The fact that preparations to this end are continuing and are beginning to assume definite outlines and qualitatively new types and systems of armaments are beginning to take concrete shape, is something which is also leading to a deterioration in the international climate, a decrease in trust in international relations and it is something which could also lead to the destabilization of the international agreements already concluded on the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

In this regard, we believe it necessary to stress the profound concern about the position of members of NATO which, at the last session of the Committee on Disarmament, undermined the creation of a working group with a clearly defined mandate which would have enabled the beginning of practical negotiations on this extremely urgent problem. We express the hope that the United Nations General Assembly will this year adopt an unambiguous appeal to the Committee on Disarmament to get down to concrete work towards reaching an agreement on international measures in this area.

At the same time, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic welcomes the new, important and timely proposal of the Soviet Union with regard to the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth. This proposal has taken fully into account the principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations and is aimed at their further strengthening and concretization, in this particular case, with regard to the activities of States in outer space. We hope that this proposal will meet with the widest possible support from Members of the United Nations and will serve as a basis for the adoption of effective measures to prevent the militarization of space.

A very important positive role will also be played in this regard by the assumption by all space Powers of an obligation not to be the first to place in orbit any anti-satellite system, thus adhering to the moratorium declared unilaterally by the Soviet Union on 19 August this year.

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

Czechoslovakia intends to continue to make every effort to bring about perceptible progress towards the constructive solving of questions of the limitation of the arms race and bringing about disarmament, guided in this by the principles of equal co-operation with all States. In this regard, I should like to refer to the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament, adopted on the initiative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, in 1979. The idea of strengthening mutual co-operation among States in the interests of disarmament, we are firmly convinced, continues to have tremendous potential which, if fully exploited, would do a great deal to help ease the present tense international situation. In this spirit, our delegation, at a subsequent stage of the First Committee's work, will introduce its own concrete proposals. Our delegation would like to limit this statement today to the points we have already made on the most important and most urgent individual items, as we see them, on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. In due course, we shall set forth our position on the other outstanding aspects of the agenda of this Committee.

Mr. SAID (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): The Tunisian delegation is particularly pleased to see you, Mr. Chairman, presiding over the work of our Committee. We are aware of the particular importance you have always attached to disarmament issues and we are convinced that you will endeavour to ensure that the work of the First Committee this year meets the expectations of all. We are also convinced that the well-known competence and dedication of the other officers of the Committee will be of considerable help to you in the accomplishment of your task.

We are beginning our deliberations on questions relating to international security and disarmament this year with a new outlook and a new time-frame.

Bilateral negotiations are now under way on the reduction of strategic weapons and on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The stakes in these negotiations, as everyone knows, are high. These negotiations are now coming up against obstacles, but we also know that a deadline has been set for the negotiations. We are today just a few weeks away from that deadline.

We are told that if by the end of the year agreement is not reached in Geneva, deployed new nuclear devices will be in Europe; and at the same time the other side affirms that in that case appropriate counter-measures would immediately be taken. Of course, following those counter-measures we could expect counter-counter-measures, which in turn would be followed by new, appropriate reactions.

While we are here discussing disarmament, we see before our eyes the classic scenario which characterizes the arms race and illustrates the process of escalation, for which there is no end in sight.

If we study closely the arguments of the two protagonists we are struck by the implacable logic underlying the reasoning of each and the development of that reasoning; and we are even less surprised by the conclusions that each side reaches to defend its position. That implacable logic would no doubt be of considerable intellectual interest if it were not that the fate of the world itself is at stake.

In his report on the work of the United Nations, the Secretary-General tells us in this regard that

"Each side seems determined to respond to any advance achieved by the other side by matching it rather than by making concessions." (A/38/1, p.5)

(Mr. Said, Tunisia)

These are therefore deliberate attitudes from the outset which, if followed through, are irreconcilable. Have negotiations thus been begun with full knowledge that they could not succeed? Have we been from the outset lulled by our illusions?

We are entitled to ask this question because in the era of nuclear weapons we know that our fate, the fate of all, is being played out in Geneva and in some capitals of the world.

It is important that those who are at the negotiating table at Geneva know that we are very concerned by what they are saying and by the results. With the deadline set for these negotiations just a few weeks away and taking into account the turn they seem to have taken, the Tunisian delegation wonders whether the United Nations General Assembly should not consider, since it is in session, making a solemn and urgent appeal to the Geneva negotiators to reach agreement, for such agreement would undoubtedly respond to the interests of all the peoples of the world.

Thirty-eight years after the Second World War it seems to us that the world today is faltering. There has been Yalta, the cold war, détente and once again tension. We are getting lost today in another crisis of identity. The rumblings of war that we hear and the threat of nuclear war inevitably engender fear, and fear gives rise to militant pacificism, which in turn can be exploited to bring about a revival of militarism and even arrogant nationalism. Everything is in a state of flux and the maintenance of the status quo ante becomes problematic. We have observed that the ancient European continent is again today becoming the nerve centre of international relations and it cannot be forgotten that in the twentieth century it was in that same Europe that two world wars originated.

The danger today is much greater. It has taken on a new dimension. Heroic death in action, once exalted, is no longer at issue. Nuclear war is no longer even a combat. The ending of the world is no longer exclusively a divine power since certain Heads of State have, with the nuclear weapon, acquired that same power. The peoples therefore can only serve as a rear guard and bear the brunt of wars that are not theirs.

(Mr. Said, Tunisia)

Those throughout the world who raise their voices proclaiming their aspiration to peace are also proclaiming a right to life for themselves and for their descendants. We hope that their voices will be heard by those that possess such supreme power. The World Disarmament Campaign, which was launched last year and which we hope will this year arouse great interest, should in this respect play a decisive role in both directions: in interesting the world public in the cause of disarmament on the one hand and in making those in power aware of the wisdom, which we hope will be persuasive, of the vox populi on the other.

Just as we stress the urgent need for agreement in the bilateral negotiations, so we recall the central role that the United Nations should play in disarmament issues. As we all know, the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament ended in failure. In fact, no tangible progress has been achieved since our first special session on the subject, in 1978. It has not been possible to prepare and adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

As regards the comprehensive programme of disarmament, we believe that a new opportunity has been given us. The Assembly today has a revised text, less ambitious, it is true, than the 1982 one, but which could constitute an acceptable basis. We appeal for a concerted effort by all concerned with a view to its adoption this year.

Other questions of equal importance are still at the study or negotiations stage in the Committee in Geneva. We hope that the members of that body will demonstrate the necessary good will to hasten progress in their work, especially as regards negotiations on nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the conclusion of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

Similarly, we expect the Geneva Committee to submit without further delay a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

We believe that the revision of its working methods will enable the Committee on Disarmament to carry out its task more effectively. By accepting in this respect the principle of including new members in its work, the Geneva Committee

(Mr. Said, Tunisia)

is opening the way for new contributions, which we hope will be positive, while guaranteeing the effectiveness of its action. As the sole forum for multilateral negotiations it seems to us to be irreplaceable.

My delegation would like to express its pleasure at the inscription on the agenda of this session of the item concerning the implementation of the conclusions of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Tunisia, which is a party to that Treaty, will be making its contribution to the establishment of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference on this Treaty, which we believe to be a fundamental instrument concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Said, Tunisia)

We consider that control in the nuclear sphere is the responsibility of all. Refusal of such a safeguard remains a major obstacle to the realization of several peace objectives, such as the establishment of nuclear-free zones, be it in the Middle East or in Africa. The establishment of such zones is in our view essential to reduce tension and promote the maintenance of peace throughout the world.

But we believe it would be pointless to try to proclaim the Middle East and Africa as nuclear-free zones as long as Israel and South Africa, which are in a position to produce such weapons, refuse any control in this field, as long as they continue to receive from outside massive and highly sophisticated weaponry and continue with impunity their co-operation in the production and testing of nuclear weapons.

Along the same lines, we remain firmly dedicated to the idea of transforming the Mediterranean region into a zone of peace, security and co-operation. We believe that efforts made in that direction at the bilateral, regional and world level can help us to attain that objective.

None the less, conflicts and unresolved disputes in the Mediterranean region remain obstacles to the establishment of the much desired zone of peace. The Palestinian problem is one of the major obstacles. We believe in any event that the transformation of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace will have a fortunate and direct effect on the peace and stability of the world.

I would not like to conclude my statement without mentioning the inseparable link that we see between disarmament and development. In this respect, we should like to recall our support for the recommendations contained in the study on this issue under the chairmanship of Mrs. Inge Thorsson of Sweden, recommendations that we hope will be implemented by the entire international community. In our view, disarmament, development, peace and security all remain closely related.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation has already had occasion to set forth in our Committee its views on questions relating to the prevention of nuclear war, including the new Soviet initiatives on condemning nuclear war and on the freezing of nuclear armaments. Today we should like to draw the Committee's attention to one further important question, the urgent need for preventing an arms race in outer space, thus reducing the threat of nuclear war.

The critical urgency of the task of preventing the militarization of space is increasing every day. The attempts of those who are striving for military supremacy and are working out systems and means of waging war in space and from space are creating a genuine danger that, as in the case of the mastery of atomic energy, one of the other great achievements of the twentieth century, the leap into outer space, will be used not so much in the interests of mankind as for the creation of the threat to its very survival. Whether this danger actually materializes, or whether it will be averted, depends to a decisive extent on the policies of States. The experience accumulated by mankind in the conquest of outer space makes this undeniably clear.

The launching in October 1957 of the first artificial earth satellite by the Soviet Union saw the beginning of the space invasion, a peaceful invasion in the name of scientific progress and for the good of all mankind. Guided by precisely these objectives, the USSR from the very first days of the space age favoured the development of business like international co-operation in space, and on 15 March 1958 put forward a comprehensive programme for the prevention of the use of outer space for military purposes understanding as it did that one was in practice impossible without the other.

Historical experience has confirmed the correctness and reality of this approach to outer space. In circumstances where realism and a sense of responsibility to mankind have prevailed in State policies over other considerations it has proved possible to achieve mutually acceptable understandings designed to prevent the militarization of outer space. The impressive array of agreements of this kind is a precious achievement for mankind which must be cherished and increased.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Of particular importance in the area of limiting the military use of outer space is the 1967 Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which laid down the important international legal obligation not to place in space nuclear weapons or any other types of weapon of mass destruction. The Moscow Treaty of 1963 prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space. A great achievement towards the limitation of the military use of outer space was the conclusion in 1977 of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, including outer space. Important provisions which reduce the possibility of the military use of outer space are contained in a number of other bilateral Soviet-American agreements.

It was those agreements which precisely provided the basis for the possibility of international co-operation in the realm of the conquest of outer space, and this convincingly demonstrated the fact that States belonging to opposite social systems or with any other differences between them in no way excludes the possibility of the peaceful use of outer space by each of them, individually or jointly.

At the present time, however, the continuation of this co-operation, and what is most important, the whole policy of the use of space in the interests of peace and keeping it free from military preparations, is now under threat.

What is extremely significant is that it is precisely those who have been unwilling to enter into broad international co-operation in space who are trying to place weapons there, the deployment of which in outer space has not yet been prohibited by international agreement.

In the belief that this cannot be permitted, the Soviet Union put forward a proposal for the prohibition of the stationing in outer space of weapons of any type, which was submitted to the United Nations in August 1981. As is known, the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, on the initiative of the USSR, adopted a resolution which requested the Committee on Disarmament to embark upon practical negotiations in order to work out urgent measures to prevent the spreading of the arms race to outer space. However, it has not been possible so far to start concrete negotiations on this problem in that Committee.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

I think everyone knows who is sabotaging the possibility of working out measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. In the Committee on Disarmament the United States has had recourse to various kinds of procedural manoeuvring and delaying tactics. This is understandable since the efforts of that country are, in accordance with the special presidential directive for the next decade, aimed at developing weapon strike systems and placing them in orbit.

The scenario for this kind of adventuristic course - that is the only term by which it can be described - is becoming very clear now. First, under the screen of a campaign of falsehoods about the "danger" of lagging behind the Soviet Union in anti-satellite weapons, the United States is busy developing an anti-satellite system, using existing military technology - F-15 fighters and homing missiles - which is now ready for testing and will be operational in 1987. At the same time, the United States side has broken off negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation of anti-satellite systems. Having thus put its foot in the door, the United States is planning next to create more sophisticated anti-satellite systems, including laser beam satellites for the instant destruction of space objects of the other side. The Pentagon is also beginning to take practical steps to organize, control and command combat operations in and from outer space. A special United States Air Force space command is being established for these purposes.

In this regard, great hopes are being placed in manned reusable shuttle spaceships, the testing of which is almost entirely subordinated to the needs of the Pentagon. These spaceships are designed for constructing and placing in earth orbit military satellites and space stations and for testing various guidance and destruction laser systems, as well as for direct use as a means of combating satellites of the other side. In its turn, according to the designs of militaristic circles, the development of this technology should in time open the way to the creation of big orbital combat stations equipped with beam

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

weapons intended for destroying targets in outer and air space; later on this sinister dialectic of military technology development will lead to the emergence of space systems for striking directly at major targets on earth: command and communications centres, armed forces, economic facilities and populated areas.

These unprecedented 'star war' plans of aggression in and from outer space against the earth, which have so captured the imagination of United States strategists, are being formulated in the United States with long-term goals in mind. Meanwhile, efforts are being made to find a military-political rationale for these ideas. There can be no other explanation for the idea of developing a space anti-missile system advanced in the speech on 23 March 1983 by the President of the United States -- a system which, he said, is supposed to provide defence against nuclear missiles.

To believe that the danger to the world posed by thermonuclear arsenals can be removed by means of new kinds and types of weapons is perhaps the greatest illusion -- or, to be more exact, the greatest delusion -- of the nuclear and space age. Promises by the proponents of space anti-missile systems to save the peoples of the world are like the siren calls luring the gullible to certain death.

Many authoritative specialists in the USSR, the United States and other countries estimate that a space-based anti-missile system capable of protecting against a nuclear first strike is technically impossible. The primary goal of militaristic circles is to use a space anti-missile system to defend against a retaliatory strike -- that is, to secure the impunity of a United States nuclear first strike. The assumption is that in a retaliatory strike it would be more difficult to penetrate an orbital anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. The danger is all the greater since such a use of an ABM system fits in perfectly with today's United States strategic doctrines oriented towards unleashing nuclear aggression. The deployment of orbital ABM systems would most seriously destabilize the strategic and political situation and would immeasurably increase the temptation to be the first to press the nuclear button.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

It is argued that a space ABM system is capable of reducing the destructive effects of nuclear war but this argument too is divorced from all reality, for the development of such a system would first of all stimulate the build-up and improvement of offensive strategic weapons, the development of anti-ABM systems and crash programmes for new kinds and types of space weapons, which would represent a further increase, in absolute terms, of the accumulated potential for global destruction.

As for the economic aspect of this matter, the cost of space-war systems, including orbital ABM systems, would eclipse the total material and intellectual resources wasted by humanity on destruction over the centuries. The proposed appropriation of \$2 billion to \$3 billion to the Pentagon next year for space ABM systems is just the first stone in a future avalanche which, even according to the extremely tentative estimates available at present, will swallow up hundreds of billions, and even trillions, of dollars. These truly astronomical funds will be taken away from the funds for the essential needs of the hungry, the sick and the illiterate and channelled into creating in outer space even more terrible means of destruction of human life and property, thus increasing many times over the risk of nuclear catastrophe.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The creation of anti-missile weapons is contrary to the aims of strategic arms limitation and, in particular, to those of the Agreement on limiting anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems concluded between the USSR and the United States in 1972. Indeed, there is an inseparable link between strategic offensive and defensive weapons that was set forth in the 1972 Soviet-United States Agreement. At that time both sides recognized the importance of mutual restraint in the ABM field for reversing the entire strategic arms race. Now the United States intends to upset this relationship. Realistically minded statesmen, public figures and eminent experts from the USSR, the United States and other countries - all those who cherish peace - refute the claim that security can be achieved through the creation of ever newer kinds of weapons, either on earth or in outer space. Their conclusion is unequivocal. Immediate measures are needed to prevent the arms race from spreading to the infinite expanses of outer space. It is essential to stop before it is too late and before a line is crossed beyond which it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to turn back. Indeed, it would be much simpler not to allow the space jinn out of the bottle than to try to put him back into it later.

Last July over 100 members of the United States Congress and more than 40 eminent scientists and arms-control specialists sent letters to President Reagan calling for an immediate agreement with the Soviet Union on establishing a bilateral moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite weapons in outer space.

For its part the Soviet Union has proposed that Soviet and American scientists hold a meeting to discuss possible consequences of creating large-scale ABM systems. At the All-Union Conference of Scientists to Save Humanity from the Threat of Nuclear War, for Disarmament and Peace held in Moscow last May Soviet scientists made known their authoritative opinion on this issue. The appeal adopted by the Conference emphasizes that we must think about limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons rather than about defence against them. There can be no doubt that an objective scientific analysis will demonstrate the futility and danger of this latest American concept.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

I would like to remind the Committee that in spring this year a group of eminent American scientists and public figures sent a cable to Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, containing an appeal to ban space weapons. The authors of that appeal called attention to the fact that the testing and stationing of any weapons in outer space would considerably increase the likelihood of the outbreak of war on earth, and they stressed the urgent need to take measures to prevent that risk.

In his reply to the authors of that appeal, Yuri Andropov pointed out that the Soviet Union will continue to do its utmost to see that

"outer space remains forever free from any weapons, that it does not become an arena for military confrontation and that no threat comes from outer space against those who live on earth".

Consistently pursuing its policy of principle aimed at preventing the spread of the arms race to outer space and of using outer space for peaceful purposes in the interests and for the benefit of all people, and taking into account the urgent need to erect a reliable barrier against turning outer space into a source of mortal danger for the whole of mankind, the USSR proposed in August of this year to negotiate the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth and submitted a draft treaty on this subject to this session of the General Assembly.

An important characteristic of this draft treaty lies in the combining of political and legal obligations of States to refrain from the use of force against one another in and from outer space with practical steps designed to avert the militarization of outer space. Specifically, it forbids the resort to the use or threat of force in outer and air space or on earth using to that end space objects orbiting the earth, placed on celestial bodies or otherwise deployed in outer space as a means of destruction. The draft treaty also forbids resort to the use or threat of force against space objects.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The Soviet Union is also proposing a comprehensive ban on the testing of and deployment in outer space of space-based weapons designed to destroy targets on earth and in air or outer space. It is also in favour of a radical solution to the problem of anti-satellite weapons and the complete renunciation by States of the development of new anti-satellite weapons, as well as the elimination of such systems already in their possession. The parties to this treaty would also undertake not to destroy, damage or disturb in any other way the normal functioning of space objects of other States or to alter their flight paths. Furthermore, it is proposed to ban the testing and use for military purposes, including anti-satellite purposes, of manned spaceships, which must be used exclusively to solve the manifold scientific, technological and economic problems.

The Soviet draft treaty contains very specific proposals for verifying its observance by States. It is envisaged that along with the use of national technical means of verification States parties would undertake to carry out consultations and co-operation among themselves, including recourse to appropriate international procedures within the United Nations, as well as to the services of the consultative committee of States parties to the treaty. The procedure for convening the consultative committee is set out and the right of any State party to nominate its representative to serve on that body is specifically stipulated. Thus the verification system as proposed in the draft treaty is based on an effective combination of national and international forms of verification.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The most recent Soviet proposal is therefore a major step towards averting the threat of war against humanity in and from outer space. It has been prepared with due regard for the views and suggestions which have been put forward in recent years by many States in the United Nations and in the Committee on Disarmament.

To reach agreement, there must be the political will, expressed in deeds rather than in words, to seek and, more important, to find, ways of preventing a conflict in outer space or the use of space-based weapons in a conflict on earth.

With a view to creating a more favourable atmosphere for working out measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, the Soviet Union has, in addition to its new proposals, taken an extremely important decision: the USSR has undertaken not to be the first to place any kinds of anti-satellite weapon in outer space, that is to say, it has declared a unilateral moratorium on launching such weapons for as long as other States, including the United States, refrain from placing any kind of anti-satellite weapons in outer space.

Such a decision represents yet a further demonstration of the goodwill of the Soviet Union and of its determination effectively to strengthen international peace and security. It is to be hoped that the United States will follow this example.

The implementation of this package of far-reaching measures proposed by the Soviet Union would make a major and truly tangible contribution to the achievement of the goal approved earlier by the United Nations: to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The Soviet proposals indicate the path to follow if the militarization of outer space is to be stopped so that it remains a free zone of businesslike co-operation and peaceful exploration. This task is difficult, yet perfectly feasible. The USSR is proposing that this task be addressed without further delay. The prevention of the militarization of outer space is in keeping with the interests of all countries and peoples. As the discussion of this problem at this session has shown - and this includes the discussion in our own Committee - it is one to which the overwhelming majority of States attach enormous importance. The delegations of the Congo, Nigeria, Peru, Ireland, the Netherlands and other countries have all pressed for an early solution to this problem.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The Soviet Union is ready to consider, in a constructive spirit, all proposals aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

However, we should like to point out to the Committee that difficulties have already emerged which seem likely to impede efforts in that direction.

This, at any rate, is indicated by the initial reaction of the United States State Department to our proposal - a reaction that cannot by any means be described as constructive. Briefly, this reaction amounts to distorting the purport of our proposal and sowing doubts beforehand as to the feasibility of reaching practical agreements as proposed by the Soviet Union. The United States is also resorting to such frivolous claims as that the Soviet Union's proposal, according to them, contains nothing new compared to the draft treaty the Soviet Union submitted to the United Nations in 1981. What kind of distorting spectacles must be used to prevent anyone from seeing that in actual fact the new Soviet proposal goes much farther than the 1981 version? Thus the new draft provides for a ban not only on the deployment of any space-based weapons designed to destroy targets on earth, in air and outer space but also on the testing of such weapons. The Soviet draft envisages the adoption of verifiable measures to prevent the development of future space-weapons systems. The draft treaty provides for a ban on the development of new anti-satellite systems, and the elimination of existing systems.

As to doubts about the feasibility of achieving practical results, such doubts do not arise in connection with the Soviet proposal, which leaves no room for doubt, but rather in connection with the position of the United States as set forth yesterday in this Committee. The statement made by the United States representative, which was incidentally on the vague side, about exploring ways of reducing the risk of conflict in outer space cannot possibly be reconciled with the programmes of militarization of outer space that have been spelled out in much greater detail by the United States and are actually being implemented. Nor can that statement be reconciled with Washington's hasty negative reaction to the latest Soviet proposals. Finally, I should like to emphasize particularly

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

that the time for study and consideration is long past: the time has come to act to prevent an arms race and conflicts in outer space.

The decisive moment has arrived: either States will immediately sit down at the negotiating table and start work on a treaty on this subject or the arms race will spread to outer space.

The Soviet Union is clearly and plainly proposing a course that would benefit mankind: the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth. If this would help, we would also be prepared to enter into separate talks on anti-satellite systems. We are prepared to take the first steps towards a solution to the general problem of prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth on a bilateral basis, also. We reaffirm the willingness of the Soviet Union - a willingness we already expressed last year at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly - to resume negotiations with the United States on anti-satellite weapons. It is now up to the United States side to respond.

The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that the representatives of all other States in this Committee will take a responsible approach to the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space and prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth, and will make possible the adoption at this session of the General Assembly of an authoritative recommendation that will enable us to begin working on the practical solution of this vital problem.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. Chairman, I should like to begin by extending, on behalf of my delegation, a sincere welcome to you and to express our satisfaction at seeing the Ambassador of the friendly nation of Norway in the Chair of the First Committee. We have no doubt that, under your experienced and skilful guidance, our deliberations on these very important disarmament issues will be led to a successful and fruitful conclusion. Our congratulations are also extended to the Vice-Chairmen and to the other officers of the Committee.

Japan has consistently maintained the fundamental foreign policy of refusing to become a military Power and of devoting its considerable national resources to the cause of world peace and prosperity. As is well known our Constitution is based firmly on the ideal of peace. Moreover, Japan's three non-nuclear principles spell out very clearly and beyond any doubt its posture on the subject of nuclear weapons. I do not think that there is any possible room for misunderstanding of Japan's position of not possessing and not producing nuclear weapons and not permitting their introduction into Japan. The Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Abe, emphasized these points in his statement in plenary meeting at the current session of the General Assembly. Japan is determined to make meaningful contributions to the peace and stability of the world in accordance with its basic foreign policy.

Of greatest concern to Japan is the prevention of nuclear war so that the world may be passed on intact to posterity and that future generations may be free from the fear of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament is the most essential element in the process towards such a goal. We believe that this is an important task which the international community as a whole must vigorously pursue. It is imperative that the nuclear-weapon States, in particular, take full cognizance of the grave responsibilities they bear for international security and make maximum efforts in the direction of effective arms control and disarmament.

In this sense, it is only natural that Japan and for that matter States throughout the world are showing great interest and concern regarding the progress of the two sets of ongoing negotiations on the most crucial issues of the day. I am referring to the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and the strategic arms reduction talks (START). They have high expectations that these negotiations will yield substantive results. The focal point in the

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations is how the SS-20 missiles will be treated, since, because of their extended range, mobility and destructiveness, they greatly affect the East-West military balance. Because of these advanced characteristics and capabilities the SS-20 missiles pose a serious threat to the peace and security of the entire world, a threat which cannot be ignored. Japan has long maintained the position that due consideration must be paid in the intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations to the security of Asia and that a solution should be sought from a global perspective.

I should like to take this opportunity to say that Japan earnestly hopes the recently announced new initiative of the United States will be seriously and positively studied by the Soviet Union.

With regard to the strategic arms reduction talks, we understand that their significance lies in the fact that they aim at maintaining a long-term and stable nuclear balance, at as low a level of armament as possible, between the United States and the Soviet Union through a large-scale reduction of their strategic nuclear arsenals. We welcome the recent United States proposal containing the build-down concept as a way of realizing a steady reduction of existing nuclear weapons. We should like to express our sincere hope that the Soviet Union will demonstrate corresponding flexibility in the negotiations, so that the path to an agreement will be opened up as soon as possible.

In discussing arms control and disarmament today, we must recognize that the present international political situation has become more complex and weapon technology more highly sophisticated. These two factors have made it increasingly difficult correctly to identify and assess the ways and means for achieving disarmament. What is required under these circumstances is efforts to move forward, one step at a time, with concrete and feasible measures. Idealistic slogans alone, unaccompanied by concrete proposals, will not be sufficient for the accomplishment of our task.

In this context, I should like to comment on two elements which in our view are essential for the attainment of disarmament.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

The first is confidence-building, in the original sense of the term. We must redouble our efforts to build and strengthen a sense of mutual trust among nations. We believe that measures for confidence-building between States, if undertaken with sufficient regard for specific regional, political, military and other conditions and requirements, not only will help prevent conflicts but will significantly contribute to the promotion of disarmament.

Secondly, we believe that verification is an important aspect of arms control and disarmament. It is a practical means of consolidating and further strengthening mutual trust and confidence among States which must underlie any disarmament arrangement. Japan has long emphasized the importance of verification. At the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly we expressed the hope that a multilateral verification organization could eventually be established within the framework of the United Nations. Relevant to this approach is, we believe, the important concept of international satellite monitoring. We shall follow with much interest the way in which the Secretary-General's report on this subject is received and how it will develop in the future.

Another important example of an international verification system is an international network to detect seismic events, which is related to a comprehensive test ban. Japan has contributed in the past with regard to this subject by submitting various working papers to the Committee on Disarmament. These include papers with such titles as "Verification and compliance of a nuclear test ban", "Views on a system of international exchange of seismic data" and "Working paper on a contribution to an international monitoring system using a newly installed small seismic array of Japan", to mention just a few of the most recent ones.

It is the view of my Government that verification is important in the following four ways. The verification process can help to preclude the precipitate development of conflicts between States by providing opportunities for consultations; at the same time, this process can deepen mutual trust among nations, which is a prerequisite for disarmament. Verification provisions which are incorporated into agreements and supported by the technical means to detect violations of those agreements will have a deterrent effect against

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

such violations. Finally, the establishment of an international verification system will help further to promote multilateral disarmament efforts, such as those of the United Nations.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Of course, each of those points requires further in-depth examination, which must begin with a clear identification and an orderly arrangement of the issues. The definition of circumstances which would warrant a mandatory on-site inspection is one such issue. Japan will spare no effort in continuing to make effective contributions to this work.

I now turn to nuclear disarmament measures themselves - in particular, a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, which has been Japan's primary concern over the years. A comprehensive nuclear-test ban would of course be an effective means for halting the further sophistication and diversification of nuclear weapons, as well as for preventing a possible increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States. In view of the current level of technological sophistication, we regard the questions of verification and compliance as central to a comprehensive test ban in the 1980s. Japan thus appreciates the fact that the Committee on Disarmament has established an ad hoc working group on these matters and has sought to clarify the different views and positions of Member States. Japan strongly hopes that at its session next year the Conference on Disarmament will strengthen these efforts in order to narrow the differences between Member States, and that it will continue seriously to consider these issues. It is hoped that the Conference will re-establish without delay the ad hoc working group with an appropriate mandate so as to reach an early agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

In this connection, my delegation welcomes the recommendation of the ad hoc group of scientific experts concerning the new experimental exchange of seismic data to be conducted next spring, utilizing the internationally available data network. Japan intends to participate actively in this exchange, as it has in the past, and hopes very much that as many States as possible will do so as well. It is our view that efforts of this nature, although they may not seem very dramatic, constitute valuable, concrete steps towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

Today, the advancement and spread of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes has reached a level where 3 to 4 per cent of the world energy demand is met through nuclear power generation. While the knowledge and capability for such purposes are being disseminated widely, it is regrettable to observe that the possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation is also growing. In order to accommodate the world's energy needs on a stable basis, further emphasis on the maintenance and strengthening of the world's non-proliferation régime, as embodied in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is a matter of the highest priority. We therefore reiterate our appeal to those countries which have not yet done so to take appropriate measures and accede to the Treaty at an early date. This appeal, in our view, is particularly timely since the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is on the agenda of the current session of the General Assembly.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty stipulates that efforts towards genuine and effective nuclear disarmament measures should be constantly pursued in good faith in response to the trust of those non-nuclear-weapon States which are voluntarily relinquishing the nuclear option. If the impression should develop that nuclear-weapon States have not made sufficient efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, I am deeply concerned that this might affect the credibility of the NPT régime itself. It is appropriate in the context of the NPT also to reiterate Japan's strong hope for substantive progress in the ongoing United States-Soviet negotiations. At the same time, let me reaffirm the importance we attach to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This area should be further encouraged and promoted, with adequate protection provided against military attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities.

I mentioned earlier that the prevention of nuclear war was a matter of the greatest concern to Japan. I also stressed the importance of nuclear disarmament. But it may be noted that the present military balance in reality is maintained by the totality of both nuclear and conventional weapons. Within the domain of conventional weapons, the world's attention is at present focused on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Because Japan's keen interest in this issue is already well known, I need not go into it now. We wish to note, however, that during its session this year the Committee on Disarmament, with the participation of experts, conducted in-depth discussions on such important issues as the destruction of existing chemical weapons and verification thereof, the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, and a definition of chemical agents to be prohibited. These efforts by the Committee, and particularly its ad hoc working group, are to be highly commended. At the same time, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the negotiations themselves have become more complex as detailed substantive issues have entered the discussions. Nevertheless, I am confident that the Conference on Disarmament will be able to streamline these issues and make progress towards the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. I hasten to add that Japan will continue to make contributions by providing detailed proposals and factual analyses to the Conference on Disarmament, as it has in the past.

It is hardly necessary to refer to the fact that, in addition to chemical weapons, many other important disarmament subjects are now under consideration in the various multilateral negotiating and deliberative forums. I should like to limit myself today to simply expressing Japan's concern that the rapid development of space technology which we have been witnessing recently could lead to an intensified arms race in outer space. I am pleased to note that the Committee on Disarmament has discussed this issue as one of its agenda items. It is the hope of my delegation that during its session next year the Conference on Disarmament will establish an ad hoc working group and begin a substantive examination of this very complicated and sensitive subject.

On the occasion of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, Japan proposed that some of the materials concerning its atomic bomb experiences be turned over to the United Nations. We did so in the hope of promoting public understanding of the destruction that even a relatively small nuclear weapon, as it might be called today, can cause. I am pleased to note that this proposal has now been implemented in the form of the United Nations Permanent Exhibit on Disarmament. Also at the special session we extended an invitation to the participation in the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament.

(Mr. Imai Japan)

The 25 fellows recently visited Japan, with trips to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and I hope they found the programme in Japan useful. These two steps, of course, do not constitute substantive disarmament measures. However, since the actual experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are no longer the sole possession of Japan, but should be regarded as the common property of humanity, we hope that these modest steps will be useful in spreading throughout the world our genuine concerns about nuclear weapons.

The call for disarmament has never been as fervent as it is today, but the stark realities of an increasingly tense international political situation and the extraordinary development of weapons-related technology are delaying genuine achievements in the disarmament field. In these circumstances, courage and patience are particularly necessary as we continue our efforts to explore and accumulate step by step, concrete and effective disarmament measures. I would like to conclude my statement by reaffirming Japan's commitment to continue working for disarmament with such courage and patience in order that future generations may be free of the fear of nuclear destruction and that they may live in a world of peace.

Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): We have reached a time in history when the need for an effectively functioning United Nations emerges, as never before, as compelling and urgent. The significance of the deliberations of this Committee at the present juncture should not be overlooked. It is fortunate that a person of your high calibre and experience, Mr. Chairman, should be presiding over our meetings. I wish to convey my delegation's congratulations to you and the other officers of the Committee.

A closely interdependent world composed of many sovereign nations cannot possibly function towards peace, security and survival in a nuclear and space age without an effectively functioning organization. We have the United Nations, therefore we should see that it is restored to its effectiveness as required by the Charter, so that it can answer its primary purpose of ensuring international peace and security. The deliberations in this Committee have thus to be centred on the effective functioning of the security system provided for in the Charter concurrently with disarmament efforts. The two have to be dealt with in a parallel way so that those efforts may be productive.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

The Charter, in its Preamble, expresses the determination of the peoples of the United Nations

"to unite /their/ strength to maintain international peace and security, and

to ensure ... that armed force shall not be used save in the common interest".

That means that the basis of the function of the United Nations is international security, as distinct from that of the League of Nations, the basis of whose Covenant was disarmament.

There is nothing in the Charter which obligates Members of the United Nations to throw away their armaments, but it makes it compulsory for them to comply with the provisions concerning international security through the United Nations so that the shedding of arms will follow naturally in sequence, and this is affirmed by Article 1 of the Charter, which states that the primary purpose of the United Nations is

"to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression ...".

The way was thus opened through international security to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Without such an effective prohibition of the use of force, disputes cannot be settled peacefully, because the stronger side will rely on the use of its forces to have its own way if it is unhindered by any provisions existing in the world Organization.

In dealing with disarmament, within the context of international security, I wish to refer to the burning question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which appears now so remote from conclusion that the Committee should be reminded that this year is the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty, the achievement of which was a landmark at the time. However, the undiminished underground nuclear testing which has since increased and is continuing, is a matter of very serious concern.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

The partial test-ban Treaty incorporated in its preamble an undertaking concerning the continuance of relevant negotiations with the aim of achieving a ban on all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The partial test-ban Treaty was thus treated as only a part of a comprehensive test-ban treaty to be completed soon afterwards.

The General Assembly already in 1963 called upon the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to prepare, as a matter of high priority, a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The absence of results necessitated a repetition of that call by the General Assembly the following year -- 1964 -- and the same appeal went forth from subsequent sessions of the General Assembly, without effect.

The last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was requested to conclude, by the tenth anniversary of the partial test-ban Treaty, a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Now we have reached the twentieth anniversary, and nothing has happened.

As appears from the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) that there is no technical obstacle to the conclusion of such a treaty. It is only the lack of political will of the countries concerned that prevents it; and that lack of political will is a result of a momentum for the continuance and further escalation of the arms race, in preparation for more destructive weapons of self-annihilation.

We believe that the suspension of all nuclear testing is of vital significance to the problem of halting the arms race, with the enormous dangers it involves, for a number of obvious reasons. The momentum of the nuclear arms race is ever increasing through the technological development of nuclear weapons. The proposals of the peoples of the world for a freeze on the development, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons is of particular significance and importance. We therefore whole-heartedly support them, not as a solution to the problems but as a constructive step towards solution taken by the peoples of the world to influence those responsible in the right direction.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

All the main disarmament problems in the United Nations are in the last analysis but the consequence of the ineffectiveness of Security Council decisions resulting in the manifest lack of order and security in a world of increasing anarchy and terrorism. We are now in the midst of an escalating and immediately threatening arms race, while conflicts in a polarized world multiply and intensify. We, therefore, feel the time has come to seek an improvement in this situation through an effective United Nations and to insist on it by all means in the firm belief that ultimately co-operation for peace and survival is possible when there is a United Nations functioning effectively in accordance with the terms of the Charter. In these critical times, all our efforts must turn in that direction.

Our delegation fully supports and endorses all collateral measures aimed at averting a threatened conflagration.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

I should now like to refer to what was very rightly said by the representative of the Soviet Union in his statement when he asked:

"whether the slide towards the nuclear abyss can be halted and whether we can move on to another road in world politics". (A/C.1/38/PV.3, p. 47)

We welcome this question because it shows concern about matters which are very important in making the United Nations effective. For our part, our reply is, yes, by restoring the proper function of the United Nations in fulfilling its primary purpose of insuring international peace and security through compliance with the provisions of the Charter, whereby the decisions of the Security Council will be effective, thus making the security system provided for in the Charter operative.

This procedure, of course, is under consideration by the Security Council in closed meetings regarding compliance with Articles 43 and 47 of the Charter, to restore to the decisions of the Security Council their effect and validity. It is encouraging that this is happening. There have been 18 closed meetings of the Security Council in which the subject has been discussed and, as we all know, the President of the Security Council has indicated that this matter is under serious consideration. We hope that results will soon be achieved, because this is not a matter which allows of the exercise of political will; it is a matter of an existing obligation and commitment under the Charter for the Security Council to function and for its decisions to be effective. Therefore, lengthy consideration of compliance with already existing obligations under the Charter is not required. I repeat, it is not a matter of political will, of a Member State of the United Nations being able to exercise its political will one way or the other. It has to comply with its commitment under the Charter. It was pointed out in The New York Times on 13 April 1983 by James Reston that the major Powers do not respect the Charter, so how can they try to enter into other treaties when this most solemn treaty is being violated by them. Therefore, the article concluded, before they try to enter into other treaties they must comply with the provisions of the Charter. This shows that public opinion is alerted to the lack of any serious effect on international security through the United Nations.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

Another hopeful sign is the establishment of the Palme Commission, composed of eminent statesmen and presided over by the Prime Minister of Sweden, which has pronounced itself against the negativeness of security based on a doctrine of mutual deterrence or parity in weapons and for the positiveness of common security. This is the line that we should consistently follow so that we may get results. This is our position, and I believe that the United Nations can become effective in these critical times if it asserts itself in the way it should.

We have to consider certain realities that cannot be ignored and must be faced by the international community. The Powers that conduct the arms race, by their position, are also those that dominate the disarmament effort. As a result, the arms race is a galloping reality, the disarmament negotiations a stagnant pretence.

We do not complain against anyone, for this situation is the result of a momentum. It is a momentum that was created at the very start of the United Nations by bypassing provisions of the Charter that would make available to the Security Council the means of giving effect to its decisions, thereby depriving the international community of the system of security through the United Nations required by the Charter.

Hence, we were taken back to the era before the United Nations when there was no security other than through armaments. Now that we have the Charter, with provisions concerning the non-use of force, we have violated the Charter by creating a situation in which the main organ of the United Nations, the Security Council, whose decisions have to be enforceable, remains ineffective.

Recent events in the international field have brought into sharp focus the inability of the Security Council to give effect to its decisions and the grave dangers this entails. In past years, a series of decisions adopted unanimously by the Security Council have been ignored and bypassed with impunity by the States concerned.

The characteristic importance of the Security Council derives from the fact that it is the only organ of the United Nations whose decisions must be implemented by enforcement action where necessary. When, however, the Security Council is deprived of the means of enforcement and its decisions remain unimplemented, they lose their effect and validity and become a pretence; they are, in reality, mere recommendations, as are the resolutions of the General Assembly. The importance of

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

the resolutions of the General Assembly, however, lies in the fact that by representing the totality of the United Nations membership they are an official expression of world public opinion. The same cannot be said of the Security Council and its 15 members. This state of affairs runs counter to the Charter in the most vital function of the United Nations.

It is a well-known adage that law without enforcement is not law, and similarly, a Security Council without enforcement is no "security" council but a pretence. Yet the entire system of security provided for by the Charter and the whole function of the United Nations concerning its primary purpose of international peace and security rests on the effectiveness of the Security Council.

In the final documents of the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament emphasis was laid on the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in disarmament. Where is that central role and primary responsibility if the decisions of the Security Council are repeatedly and deliberately ignored?

It is time the United Nations asserted itself. In this direction the Secretary-General has made a significant move.

The Secretary-General, in his report of last year (A/37/1), came out very emphatically in favour of increasing the effectiveness of Security Council decisions. He very courageously placed the matter before the Security Council, and it has been considered, as I have said, at 18 closed meetings of the Security Council. But the meetings have not produced any concrete results, so the matter remains open. If the Security Council keeps postponing it as a matter for consideration and does not give the Council the validity and effect which it deserves, as required by the Charter, the Secretary-General must act in his own right under Article 99 of the Charter. If he does so, as I am sure he will consider doing, his role will be historic, because he is the only person who has the means of challenging the attitude of the Security Council. This raises a matter of serious concern and I think that the whole of the United Nations and every Member must support the Secretary-General in his efforts to establish peace and security in the world through respect for the Charter. The present crisis in human affairs is caused not by the incapacity to deal with it, but by the failure to recognize its root cause and, indeed, by an inclination to ignore it. There is in our time a widespread tendency to avoid all reference to the main cause of the ineffectiveness of the Security Council's decisions and to treat the matter as though of little consequence. The cause can be traced back to the original default or failure of those responsible for ensuring compliance with the specific provisions of the Charter to make available to the Security Council the means to give effect to its decisions.

I should now like to say a few words with regard to the influence of the spirit of man in world affairs and, indeed, in the United Nations. In the last analysis, our problem is one of adjustment to the demands of a radically changed world. The change was very sudden. The advent of the nuclear weapon necessarily brought a radical change, and a need for adjustment to the change, for which man was not ready. Therefore, he finds himself in great difficulty in adjusting. In whatever stratum he may be, man is the same; he cannot adjust so quickly to such an enormous change. Therefore, in order to be

effective we have to invoke the spirit in man, because the spirit is man's communion with the universal mind and partakes of its moral flow. When awakened, it leads man to the right decision. If the spirit is awakened, he cannot go wrong; he will take the right decision.

Therefore, what we most need now in the United Nations is the spirit of man. Let us hope that being already a part of the Preamble to the Charter, it may find its way into the United Nations and bring about the change that we need for positive action towards peace and security.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.