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Chairman: Mr. BOYA (Benin)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

TRIBUTE TO THE MEMORY OF HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL MPHEVU DLAMINI, PRIME MINISTER OF SWAZILAND

1. On the proposal of the Chairman, the members of the Committee observed a minute of silence in tribute to the memory of His Excellency General Mphevu Dlamini, Prime Minister of Swaziland.

HEARING OF PETITIONERS

Question of East Timor

2. <u>The CHAIRMAN</u> recalled that the Committee had decided to grant two requests for hearings on East Timor, one from Hr. Bruce P. Cameron (Americans for Democratic Action) (A/C.4/34/3/Add.7), the other from Father Francisco Maria Fernandes (Comissão dos refugiados de Timor Oriental) (A/C.4/34/3/Add.8).

3. <u>At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Cameron (Americans for Democratic Action) and Father Fernandes (Comissão dos refugiados de Timor Oriental) took places at the petitioners' table.</u>

4. <u>Mr. CAMERON</u> (Americans for Democratic Action) recalled that the political organization he represented had supported the candidacy of Mr. Carter in the latest Presidential election. It was proud of the new administration's attitude with respect to Rhodesia and Namibia, but had to disavow its Government's support for the Indonesian authorities whose brutal occupation and recolonization of East Timor were cause for indignation. It was appalling that the United States, which had been among the leading advocates of the adoption of Article 73 of the Charter in 19^{45} , had subsequently so cavalierly ignored the fundamental right of the Timorese people to self-determination.

When Indonesia had invaded East Timor in December 1975, President Gerald Ford 5. and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had just left Djakarta; it could therefore be concluded that they had made no efforts to stop the invasion. Further, at the time of the invasion roughly 90 per cent of Indonesian weaponry had been of United States origin. As a result of that invasion, all military aid should have been terminated, since Indonesia's use of American weapons outside its borders had violated a 1958 agreement with Indonesia as well as United States law. Yet, since December 1975, the United States had continued to deliver military equipment to Indonesia, a fact actually admitted by Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Oakley. Mone of those facts had been revealed to the American people and Congress until March 1977. The State Department claimed that arms deliveries had been suspended between 1975 and 1976. In fact, it had been established that at least four new orders amounting to \$1.2 million had been processed during that period. Those orders had involved primarily spare parts for the "Bronco" aircraft. With those planes, equipped with bombs, napalm, rockets and machine guns, the Indonesians had intentionally massacred the inhabitants and destroyed their crops.

(Mr. Cameron)

6. In March 1977, when the United States Congress had held its first major hearing on the question of East Timor, close to 100,000 people had already been killed. Despite the barbarities carried out by the Indonesian armed forces, the State Department had shown a callous attitude toward the plight of the East Timorese and had sought to deny United States responsibility for it.

7. In support of its position, the State Department had consistently alleged that the information and reports concerning human rights violations by the Indonesians were conflicting, and that consequently the United States was not under any compulsion to investigate the situation in East Timor, nor to revise its military aid policy. David Kenny, a State Department official, had made a statement to that effect barely two months after the assumption of office by President Carter, who had none the less continued to pledge his concern for the cause of human rights.

8. Since 1974, the United States had given Indonesia roughly \$80 million under its Military Assistance Program. One of the conditions of such aid was that the recipient country must agree to permit the United States authorities to observe how the aid was being used. The United States Government could thus have sent a team to East Timor as early as December 1976; if it had not done so, it had been as a result of a deliberate decision.

9. In September 1977, the Indonesians had launched a new offensive, still more brutal, wiping out all villages thought to be sympathetic to FRETILIN. However, with Indonesia making little progress in the war and its military stocks becoming exhausted, the Carter administration had stepped up its military aid to Indonesia. The chart of foreign military sales agreements contained in Congressional documents for the period 1978-1980 contained revealing figures. In December 1976 the amount of estimated sales for 1977 had been \$25 million and the amount proposed for 1978 had also been \$25 million. In December 1977 the Carter administration had revised its estimate for 1978 from \$25 million to \$125 million. By December 1978, sales worth \$112 million had been approved. In addition, 15,000 rifles and ammunition costing \$5 million had been sold to Indonesia, as well as 16 helicopters.

10. Very recently, Indonesia had permitted international agencies to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of East Timor, and the United States Government had itself contributed about \$3 million. That, of course, was a positive development, since the many tens of thousands of Timorese who had come out of the mountains to the coastal plains over the past year were currently in a critical situation. However, in order not to admit that the mass movement of people had been caused by the Indonesian armed forces, whose tactics had been to starve FRETILIN partisans into submission by burning crops, the United States Government was placing the blame for that situation on the Timorese themselves and on the Portuguese. The argument was that the agricultural practices of the Timorese had led to the exhaustion of arable land in the mountain areas. That had also been the justification for the Indonesian decision not to allow the refugees to return to

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(Mr. Cameron)

their mountain homes. Such arguments could easily be refuted on the basis of a report by the Australian Parliament, which pointed out that there had been no real food problem in the last years of Portuguese rule. It was therefore clear that Indonesian military operations were the cause of the shortage of food.

11. The Carter administration had violated two United States laws dealing with human rights, signed into law by the President himself. Public Law 95-118 of 3 October 1977 stated that the United States representatives in the international financial institutions were to oppose any extension of financial or technical assistance to countries violating human rights, unless such assistance programmes served basic human needs. However, the United States had failed to oppose loans to Indonesia by those institutions totalling almost \$140 million. In the same period, the United States representatives had opposed the provision of aid by those institutions to 14 countries, including Korea, Laos, the Philippines and Viet Nam.

12. Similarly, a law enacted on 26 September 1978 made it a legal requirement for the administration to deny security assistance to any country violating human rights, unless extraordinary circumstances necessitated such assistance and it was in the national interest to provide it. The strategic stakes cited by Congress and the concern over possible communist infiltration could by no stretch of the imagination warrant overriding the consideration of the flagrant human rights violations in Indonesia. However, in 1979 the United States had offered to provide the Indonesians with military equipment and services worth \$27 million.

13. Thus, denying the imprisonment of political dissidents and the summary executions of FRETILIN militants, not to speak of the horrors which had occurred over the past few years, the United States Government had been an active partner in the genocidal practices of Indonesia and in so doing had violated its own laws.

14. <u>Father FERNANDES</u> (Comissão dos refugiados de Timor Oriental) said the international community could no longer remain indifferent to the magnitude of the tragedy in East Timor. As a Catholic priest representing the East Timor Refugee Committee in Portugal, he wished to testify personally on the humanitarian situation in the country.

15. When the civil war had broken out in 1975, 20,000 Timorese had sought refuge near the town of Atambua in the Indonesian part of Timor. There, he and other Catholic priests had been responsible for the welfare of the refugees. Until March 1976, the refugees in Atambua had been well treated by the Indonesian authorities. In March, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mr. Adam Malik, had visited Atambua to ask that all the refugees attend a rally requesting the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. The priests had advised each person to choose for himself; consequently, only 2,000 people out of 20,000 refugees had attended the rally, which had angered the Indonesian authorities. In April, food N/C.4/34/SR.18 Unglish Pape 6

(Father Fernandes)

supplies had been cut off entirely; however, the refugees had not had the right to grow their own food. Many refugees had perished from hunger; others, to survive, had been forced to sell all they owned. Moreover, they had been forced to do hard labour for a paltry wage, sometimes even for just small amounts of food.

16. After Adam Malik's visit, the authorities had announced that the refugees would be sent to Dili, the capital of East Timor. The priests, who had been sent on ahead, had seen that the situation was even worse there. War had been raging all around and the inhabitants had been forced to take refuge in the churches, night and day. They had also had to protect their women from the Indonesian soldiers. Having seen the starving people, the priests had returned to Atambua, convinced that the refugees could not survive in Dili.

17. In the spring of 1976, FRETILIN had launched a major counter-offensive, many executions had been carried out as reprisals and the number of refugees had increased sharply. In day 1976, the priests had sent an appeal to the Metherlands Ambassador in Djakarta, asking for his assistance in evacuating the refugees to Portugal. Two days before the Ambassador's visit to finalize arrangements, 7,000 Timorese had been forced to cross the border and return to East Timor, and so had been unable to go to Portugal. In three years, many of them had perished in the new camp where the living conditions were exectable. Between August and September 1976, nearly 1,600 refugees from Atambua had reached Portugal, despite threats from the Indonesian authorities. Hardly any Timorese had managed to leave that Timor even though Portugal had issued about 700 passports for close relatives of the refugees.

15. A number of speakers had already described the suffering endured by the people of East Timor, where Indonesia was engaged in actual genocide. In addition to the killing, an ever-increasing number of victims was being claimed by disease and starvation. The hundreds of thousands of refugees who had come down from the mountains during the previous year were those who were suffering the most. According to some reports, 300 people perished every month in the Ermera camp. The horrifying conditions in which the refugees and the whole population were living had been confirmed by the reports of delegations from the International Red Cross and of representatives from other relief agencies.

19. Emergency aid had now been designated for East Timor but it would not be sufficient to meet either the short-term or long-term needs. Host of the refugees were not receiving any aid due to the inaccessibility of their camps and also because of the corruption of Indonesian officials. The humanitarian aid being rendered by, for example, the International Red Cross, though welcome, was still extremely limited and was only for the short term. What would become of the people of East Timor when those relief programmes came to an end?

(Father Fernandes)

20. The Indonesian Government claimed that peace now reigned throughout the territory, but it continued to bomb and kill the people and, in some areas, was acting like the Mazis in occupied Europe during the Second World Mar. Disappearances and executions were commonplace. There were about 40 prisons in East Timor and 4 in Dili. The reports on prison conditions in Indonesia published by organizations such as Amnesty International left little doubt as to the situation in the country. The Indonesian authorities even refused exit permits to Timorese who wished to emigrate to Australia or Portugal.

21. He appealed to all representatives to urge the Indonesian authorities to allow international relief agencies such as the Red Cross to operate directly in Bast Timor with a view to eliminating the corruption that was contributing to a worsening of the situation, and to allow those who wished to do so to join their families abroad. Be likewise appealed to the Indonesian Government to put a stop to the genocide of the Timorese people. It was incumbent upon all Members of the United Hations to respond to that appeal for, as His Holiness Pope John Paul II had reminded the General Assembly, the principles laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Human Rights must remain the basic value by which Hember States were guided in realizing the noble purposes of the Organization.

22. Hr. Cameron and Father Fernandes withdrew.

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23. <u>Mr. AMPAT</u> (Congo) said that, if there was one area in which the United Nations could legitimately be proud of its activities, it was the area of decolonization. Through its efforts, many peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America had been able to break out of their isolation and contribute at last to the development of international relations. Mevertheless, that encouraging record of putting an end to a heinous system of exploitation was weakened by the continuation of traditional colonialism and the emergence of an unexpected form of new colonialism which did no honour to the third world. The old colonialists and the new refused to acknowledge that the right of peoples to self-determination, as defined in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), was the very essence of contemporary international society.

24. The obstacles being put in the way of the decolonization of Western Sahara and East Timor provided some of the clearest evidence of how certain Member States were deliberately refusing to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The history of the question of Western Sahara from 1964 to 1974 showed the indifference of the international community towards the Saharan people and the serious short-comings of the United Nations. On 13 December 1974, the General Assembly had decided to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice and had requested the postponement of the referendum which the administering Power, Spain, had contemplated holding during the first half of 1975 and which would have made it

(Mr. Ampat, Congo)

possible to prevent dangerous tensions in north-west Africa. On that occasion, the enemies of the third world had been able rightly to denounce what they called "the immunity of the third world". On 10 May 1973, against that background of conspiracy against the Saharan people, the Frente POLISARIO had been established and had taken up arms to fight the military occupation of the Territory by Morocco and Mauritania. Under the tripartite Madrid Agreement, Spain had allowed Morocco and Mauritania to divide the Territory in exchange for one third of the revenues from the sale of the Bu Craa phosphates.

Fortunately, the Mauritanian Government had finally understood that the only 25. alternative for that country, formerly so highly regarded in Africa, was to pull out of a hopeless situation. In signing the peace agreement with the Frente POLISARIO, the sole authentic representative of the Saharan people, the Mauritanian Government had given the world proof of its adherence to the principles of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the movement of non-aligned countries. On the other hand, Morocco, a country formerly devoted to friendship and respect for all, should be denounced in the interest of fraternal co-operation among all the peoples of the Maghreb. In defiance of international opinion, once the Mauritanian troops had withdrawn from Sahara, Morocco had brutally taken over the part of the Territory that had been restored by Mauritania, thus extending its military occupation of the Saharan Territory. But nothing could break the unyielding will of a people determined to achieve their independence at whatever cost. The Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting at Monrovia, had reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence and had advocated a peaceful solution to the problem which must necessarily include negotiation between the parties to the conflict. All of Morocco's friends, including the Congo, had the duty to urge the Moroccan Government to respect the fundamental rights of the Saharan people to freedom and independence so as to contribute to the promotion of an era of true reconciliation, peace and brotherly collaboration between all the peoples of the Maghreb. That was why his delegation invited all others to support draft resolution A/C.4/34/L.2, which was aimed at achieving that noble goal and was in conformity with the spirit and the letter of the Charter of the United Nations and the decision on that matter adopted by the non-aligned countries at Havana.

26, The difficulty of the struggle for liberation being waged by other colonial peoples in Latin America and Asia must be borne in mind. The people of East Timor, particularly, were experiencing a terrible tragedy, being the victims of the expansionist ambitions of Indonesia, a founding country of the non-aligned movement, which had assisted in the liberation of other third world countries. The international community must make the Indonesian Government aware of the situation in which it had placed itself by preventing the people of East Timor from exercising their right to self-determination. Old and new colonialism were outdated, for what counted in the modern world was the inextinguishable aspiration of all peoples to enjoy freedom, independence and peace with dignity.

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27. Mr. BADI (Libyan Arch Janabisigs) said that accordy 20 years had elepsed since the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 1514 (XV). Despite the efforts of the Committee of 20, many peoples were still struggling to achieve their independence and were counting on the aid of the independence eccemity in order to find a just and lesting colution to their creblers.

28. The question of Matern Schera was a read in article issue reach the Organization had not yet been able to resolve the therma months who had been strugling for so long should be alless to strugger their dishes freely and exercise their right to self determination in accordance with the Churler of the United Mations. The inalignable right of the Coheren peorle to self-determination and independence had been reactioned some times by the General Assembly particularly in paragraph 2 of resolution 33/31 A of 13 Recember 1973, as yell as by the sixteenth Assorbly of Verd of Visto and Coversiont of CAU in Correction and examination of the report of the Consister of O(1/2b/22/2bd.3) should that despite positive developments and as the purposent between Constants and Costern Sahara and the resolution electric at the situate survive contine of OAU the tensions remained threatenin moves in the ration and the Debaran agonle had still not been able to exercise their sign to self to been institute precomized by the Charter of the United attime machanic sector and Ceneral (parable and OM) Peace imposed by force was not neared. An end of the covery paners an in Harden peace which could not be recented by a scale who ever straysling for their freedom. The sence to which the Concern a who continue was a peace based on gustice and equality and that was what the United Ations should belo be actuallish in the retion.

29. His country wished to declare its succent for the product who were struggling to exercise their right to self distribution and independence; faithful to that principle it offered sound and establish enders the flatarent people, whose wishes should be respected. The following people bet has sufficient for simple and energy and it was time that they finally endered freedees. The mitral fations must find a just and lasting solution to their residence of each countries are appeare in which they could succeive their risks and exact a unitable atmosphere in which they could succeive their risks and exact a unitable atmosphere in

30. Ur. LIFA (Cape Verde) shid that his eccency attached prior incortance to the work of the Fourth Compitton, which was speed at eccenciant facilitating or accelerating decolonization is consistential shift under the ecterial sets. This even country had experienced the intolerable situation of destination, or latation and humiliation and had had to encape in a difficult other to believe its independence.

31. Once again the Condition and refers it the measure of Best Timor. The resolutions adopted by the denoral framebly class 1975 reason that the calerity of Members of the United fations considered that the process of decolonization, which had been well advanced in that Memitory, had been brutally interruped. The people of East Timor, who had been menuning to join the ranks of sovereign nations had been abruptly faced with an aread on received by formign forces and had found their territory occuried their sovereign between the their hopes dashed and their legitimate aspirations to enser and process incommably frustrated.

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(Ir. Lina Cape Verde)

32. Because it was guilty of that deliberate aggression and shameful integration. Indonesia, long the leader of countries suffering domination, had lost prestige and influence vis-à-vis peace-loving nations. The pseudo-integration that had been carried out without consulting the people concerned and which therefore had no legal basis whatsoever, had been used as a legal and political justification for the presence of troops of aggression and for relegating the struggle of the people of the Territory to the level of criminal activities. That dubious legalism could also be used to logitizate the pseudo-elections that had raised Huzorewa to power in Thodesia or the strengts at an "internal settlement" made by the South African racist régime in Familia.

33. Mevertheless, the extent of the ver of resistance of the people of East Timor, under the leadership of FRUTTURE which had cost and continued to cost so many human lives and material resources, was proof of the national character of the struggle in the Territery and of the fact that the integration, supposedly irreversible and a domestic matter of a Tember State had only been a superficial manoeuvre sided at conferring a semblance of legitimacy on an undertaking that was condemned by international porality and by the laws governing international relations. The idea that such a situation could be perpetuated use unacceptable. According to all indications, nearly one third of the conduction of East Timor had been wiped out by var, famine and disease under the current régime of integration. Furthermore, during 1979, the Year of the Child, the international community could not help but feel indignant at the critics represented against thousands of children in East Timor and could not belo conducting those who, refusing to accent the evidence, justified the unjustifiable and took refuge in the illusory incantations of an outdated policy. To reasure taken in the context of a war purportedly aimed at encouraging the cultural and economic development of a people could hide the fact that the situation bad deteriorated at all levels as a result of the presence of foreign troops which profited from the misery, submission and humiliation of en utterly destitute scenle.

 3^h . Moreover, the fact that elements which had belonded to political groups that favoured Indonesia's ennemation of last Ti or were currently denouncing the crimes perpetrated by their former allies and protectors, and the immorinious state of affairs excated in the country by the occurring troops, proved that Indonesia was doing nothing to improve the lot of the people when it sought to subjugate. A clear affirmation of an ever-increasing national awareness, enchancing the unity and structure of that people, was likewise to be seen, as was a manifest demonstration of the rejection of the presence of the foreign occupier and a stinging rejoinder to all those who in the name of an alleged cultural identity - which 500 years of Portuguese presence would in any case have seriously underwined - endeavoured to defend the merits of the Indonesian policy. In any event, an alleged cultural identity was no justification for the forced integration of a people, and the occupation of their territor emainst their will and still less for the systematic wassacre of their sons.

35. Although it had not been thought necessary to consult them, the people of East Timor had proclaimed and were continuing to proclaim through their struggle

(Mr. Lima, Cape Verde)

for freedom, their will to be free, their fierce desire for justice and their resolute determination to experience freedom and peace in independence.

36. The United Nations should make every effort to persuade Indonesia to abandon its blind and cruel policy and to withdraw its troops from East Timor so that the people of that Territory could exercise their undeniable right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Organization should likewise do everything to provide that courageous people with emergency aid in the form of supplies and equipment.

37. The situation in Western Sahara was another subject of deep concern to the whole international community. Despite the peace moves initiated by the Frente POLISARIO, which had declared a unilateral cease-fire in July 1978, the stubbornness and bad faith of one of the parties to the conflict had brought to naught all the peace efforts of States Members of the United Nations and of international organizations. For over 10 years, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the movement of non-aligned countries had redoubled their efforts to reach a just and lasting solution to the problem. More recently, during the sixteenth Assembly of Heads of State and Government, OAU had adopted an important decision in which it had reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence. The Sixth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned (ountries, meeting in Havana in September 1979, had in turn expressed its solidarity with the Saharan people and declared its concern at the stubbornness of the Moroccan Government in seeking to pursue an unjust war that helped to create a dangerous climate of tension and constituted a threat to peace and stability in the area.

38. The peace agreement concluded between Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO on 5 August 1979 should have served as an example to Morocco, which would thus have had the opportunity of demonstrating to the international community its will for peace and its sense of justice towards the people of Western Sahara. Despite unanimous disapproval, Morocco had seen fit to act in total disregard of the OAU recommendations and had lost no time in occupying a part of the territory evacuated by Mauritania, thereby perpetuating the dangerous practice of annexation which could only make the search for a solution more complicated.

39. His delegation sorely regretted that attitude and trusted that all the parties concerned would agree to co-operate in the implementation of the OAU recommendations, for it was essential to put an end to the intolerable situation of thousands of Saharans who were forced to live as refugees or exiles in their own land. Morocco must understand that its action could only be detrimental to its own interests and those of the Maghreb peoples and of Africa as a whole; Africa had hard battles ahead of it if it were to put an end to the countless ills from which it suffered and which stood in the way of its development: and for that it needed all its forces, in their diversity and their unity.

(Mr. Lima, Cape Verde)

40. In the face of the danger which Morocco's uncompromising attitude represented for the security and peace of the peoples of the area, the United Nations could not but renew its call for the exercise of the right to self-determination and independence by the Saharan people, who were fighting under the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO, their sole and unique representative, as well as for the withdrawal of foreign troops from their territory. The Organization should likewise do everything to avoid any internationalization of the conflict.

⁴1. It was along those lines that the international community should direct its action and his delegation trusted that the draft resolution on Western Sahara (A/C.4/34/L.2) would be adopted by a large majority as a mark of the Committee's will to find a just and lasting solution to the problem in keeping with its mandate.

42. <u>Mr. TUAN</u> (Viet Nam) said that, even though national liberation movements had had some remarkable successes, it was regrettable that, almost 20 years after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), whole peoples in southern Africa, the Middle East and other areas were still deprived of their right to self-determination and independence as well as of the basic human rights and were forced to live under the yoke of oppression and exploitation by colonial and racist régimes. That was why the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, meeting in Havana, had denounced the political strategems and manoeuvres of the imperialist, colonialist and racist forces that were endeavouring to resist the irreversible process of decolonization and thereby to perpetuate foreign oppression, aggression and occupation. In order to achieve their ends, they were encouraging collusion between the reactionary and expansionist forces with a view to dividing the non-aligned countries and to isolating and wiping out the national liberation movements in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Palestine, South Africa and other parts of the world.

43. In the face of that situation, the international community should consider the matter with all the care that it deserved and should take decisions that would make an active contribution to the struggle being waged by peoples to assert their inalienable rights. In that regard, the people and Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam supported without reservation the inalienable right of peoples still under colonial domination to self-determination and independence and the legitimacy of the struggle they were waging with all the means at their disposal to realize that sacred right; they were also opposed to recourse to the threat or use of force against the exercise of that right.

44. In the specific case of Western Sahara, the Saharan people, under the leadership of their sole legitimate representative, the Frente POLISARIO, had won major victories in the political, military and diplomatic spheres and had received increased support at the international level. In that connexion, the people and Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam warmly welcomed the peace agreement concluded between the Frente POLISARIO and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania as well as the latter's decision to withdraw its military forces from Western Sahara. The situation in that Territory, however, far from improving, had deteriorated, owing to the continuing occupation of Western Sahara

(<u>Mr. Tuan, Viet Nam</u>)

by Moroccan forces, which had lost no time in annexing the part of the Territory evacuated by Mauritania and were currently seeking to internationalize the conflict.

45. His delegation joined the international community in calling for the withdrawal of the occupying forces and for respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Western Sahara in accordance with the decisions taken by the non-aligned countries and the relevant resolutions of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, particularly General Assembly resolution 33/31. Accordingly, draft resolution A/0.4/34/L.2, of which Viet Nam was a sponsor, deserved the Committee's wide support.

46. In regard to Puerto Rico, the Special Committee of 24 had adopted a resolution on 15 August 1979 in which it had <u>inter alia</u> reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Puerto Rican people to self-determination and independence. His delegation supported that resolution and wished to reiterate that the Vietnamese people and Government were strongly in favour of the right to self-determination of the Puerto Rican people, as well as of trat of the peoples of East Timor, Belize and of other peoples still under colonial domination, including those who lived in small Territories where the presence of imperialist military bases, whether in the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean or the Caribbean, was not only a serious obstacle to the exercise of the right to self-determination but also a threat to the peace and security of those areas. Accordingly, it was the duty of the Committee to recommend to the General Assembly that it request the administering Powers to respect those of its resolutions concerned, in particular resolution 31/143.

47. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the United Nations should assume the responsibility incumbent upon it to help to expedite the decolonization process so that the colonial peoples could rid themselves of the yoke of colonialist oppression and exploitation and could regain genuine independence and true freedom; and it was the duty of the Fourth Committee to assist it in the fulfilment of that task.

48. <u>Mr. CARTER</u> (Barbados) was gratified that a number of Territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific - Saint Lucia, Kiribati, St. Vincent and the New Hebrides - had recently attained independence or were about to do so. Nevertheless, the majority of Non-Self-Governing Territories still in existence were in the Caribbean area. Some of them were reluctant to throw off the yoke of colonialism and preferred to remain subservient to administering Powers, simply because they were fearful of achieving on independence for which they were ill-prepared. The administering Powers of those Territories had apparently failed to develop an economy and infrastructure which were viable enough to enable them to pursue their own development once they were independent, as was shown by the number of General Assembly resolutions calling for assistance to newly independent countries.

49. In order to avoid jeopardizing international peace and security by creating a climate of instability in those countries, the administering Powers should not

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(Mr. Carter, Barbados)

only prepare them for economic independence, but should guarantee economic and social assistance for at least the first five years of independence. Otherwise, the United Nations and its uneclatized agencies would be responsible for ensuring that Non-Self-Governing Territories which achieved self-determination and independence following the normal pattern attained the necessary level of development.

30. With regard to those Torritories which were denied the exercise of their right to celf-determination and independence, his delegation supported the aspirations for independence of devibia, Zimbabye and Belize, which would be considered later. Its position was the same on East Timor and Western Sahara. Fortugal was still the administering Power in Last Timor, the people of which had not been able to exercise their right to self-determination and independence because of the Indonesian intuition. If, as Indonesia claimed, the people of East Timor had freely decided on integration with Indonesia, why were they still resisting and being slaughtered? It was muite simply an act of annexation which Indonesia was attempting to legitimize by grushing every semblance of resistance before inviting the international companity to verify that integration had taken place. Why else would Indonesia have rejected a referendum supervised by the United Nations? His delegation used Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor and to allow the people of that Territory Freely to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

51. On the question of Sestern Cahara, he commended Mauritania on having withdrawn from the arrangement contrived between Spain and Morocco for the disposal of Vestern Sahara and its people, an arrangement which had been doomed to failure from the outset. He regretted that, in disregard of world public opinion, Norocco persisted in its illegal occupation of the Territory and continued to deny the Saharan moople their inclinable right to self-determination and independence. In the satirit of General Asserbly resolution 1514 (XV), he called upon the Horoccan Government to relinquish its claims to Western Sahara and to allow the Saharan moople to achieve incediate independence with guarantees of territorial interrity, it accordance with the Charter of the United Mations and the Declaration on the fraction of independence to Colonial Countries and icoples.

52. Barbados vished to become a spondor of draft resolution A/C.4/34/L.2.

53. <u>Fr. ABUEL FAITAU</u> (Separative encouraging that a growing number of former colonial Territories were accelled to independence and joining the United Mations Family. The situation had greatly altered since the adoption of General Assembly resolution ISLE (VV), VC years earlier, largely thanks to the decisive efforts of the Special Countries of 2h to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Feoties.

55. Devertheless, some 50 colonial Corritories still remained. The administering Povers should assume their representations and provide the necessary conditions for those countries to some an inducerdance of that the United Nations could

(Mr. Abdel Fattah, Egypt)

attain one of its principal aims. The majority of States had already condemned the activities of foreign interests which impeded the exercise of the right to self-determination by peoples under colonial domination. While it was logical for the United Nations to encourage activities which promoted the development of those peoples, pernicious activities should, on the other hand be categorically condemned. The two categories of activities were easily distinguishable from each other, largely thanks to investigations carried out in the field by the Special Committee.

55. While the situation in the small Territories in the Pacific and the Atlantic was relatively encouraging, that obtaining in southern Africa was very different. The peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe were still subjected to the policies of racist régimes which continued to exploit the resources of the Territories for their own benefit. If the South African régime had indeed recently detonated a nuclear device, thus posing a serious threat to peace throughout the region. those countries which collaborated with South Africa in the nuclear field should be condemned. The international community should face up to its responsibilities towards the peoples of southern Africa and help them to achieve independence. The assistance provided to Namibia and Zimbabwe by the specialized agencies and other organizations was manifestly inadequate. His delegation thus supported the recommendation of the Special Committee of 24 that the specialized agencies and other organizations should increase their aid to those countries and relate it more closely to their real needs. To that end, Member States should increase their own contributions to those organizations.

56. Despite its economic difficulties, Egypt would continue to assist the liberation movements in southern Africa and would contribute to special funds established for their benefit. Finally, he pointed out that Egypt offered a large number of fellowships to students, particularly from southern Africa and that it would continue to provide a considerable amount of assistance to them.

57. Mr. CORREA DA COSTA (Brazil) said that his country had on many occasions declared its support for the principle of self-determination for colonial peoples. In particular, it had supported the resolution recognizing the right of East Timor to self-determination, because it saw in it a humanitarian obligation which accorded with its foreign policy and because the two countries shared a common language and culture. His delegation therefore hoped that appropriate measures would be taken to solve the problems of that Territory, particularly in the social and humanitarian fields by appealing to the United Nations Children's Fund and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It would be prepared to support any General Assembly resolution designed to contribute to such a solution.

58. <u>The CHAIRMAN</u> announced that Haiti, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Togo had become sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/34/L.2.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.