

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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2 August 1983
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 2 August 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. J. Morelli Pando

(Peru)

GE.83-63478

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. J. CARASALES
Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIREFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U TIN KYAW HLAING
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. R. SUTHERLAND

China: Mr. LIN CHENG
Ms. ZHOU YUNHUA
Mr. PAN ZHENQIANG

Cuba:

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Ms. M. SLAMOVA
Mr. J. JIRUŠEK

Egypt: Mr. I. ALI HASSAN
Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. H. HOPPE
Mr. M. SCHNEIDER

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. VON DEM HAGEN
Mr. M. GERDTS

Hungary:

Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. S.K. SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. I. DAMANIK
Ms. P. RAMADHAN
Mr. M. JALALUDDIN
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI

Iran:

Mr. F.S. SIRHANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. S.-O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI
Mr. O. HILAIE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

Mr. I.E. AYEWAH

Mr. A.N.C. NWAZOMUDOH

Mr. L.O. AKINDELE

Pakistan:

Mr. T. AITAF

Peru:

Mr. J. MORELLI PANDO

Mr. C. CASTILLO

Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Romania:

Mr. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. LUNDIN

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V. ISSRAELIAN

Mr. L.P. MALEV

Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN

Mr. N. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

Ms. J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS

Mr. M.D. BUSBY

Mr. J. McATEER

Mr. P.S. CORDEN

Mr. B. DURHAM

Mr. J. TIERNEY

Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 230th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee will today begin considering item 6 of its agenda entitled, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". Of course, members who so wish may make statements on any other question relating to the work of the Committee, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure.

As we agreed at our plenary meeting on Tuesday, 26 July, the Committee will also consider today the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts as contained in document CD/399, and the recommendation in paragraph 10 of that report.

On this the first occasion of my speaking to you as Chairman of the Committee, and in my capacity as the representative of Peru, I should like to express my gratitude for the valuable work done by my immediate predecessors, Ambassador Gabriel Ijewere of Nigeria and Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, whose efforts and achievements will be the foundation for my contribution to this concluding part of our session this year. In this joint task and joint responsibility, I am sure that I can count on the co-operation of all delegations represented here in helping to achieve what the international community expects of this Committee.

I should like particularly to express my thanks to Ambassador Ahmad for the very kind remarks he made at the Committee's last plenary meeting. Those warm words of welcome were undoubtedly inspired by the bonds of friendship between our two countries and their common views on matters of disarmament.

The present world situation, which is one of grave danger for peace, prompts me to recall the words of Pope John Paul II when he visited the Monument to Peace at Hiroshima in August 1981: "I want to remind you all of 6 August 1945 so that we can better understand the meaning of the present threat. Since that fateful day, nuclear arsenals have increased in quantity and in destructive power ... It is impossible to foresee the full consequences of a large-scale nuclear war; but even if only some of the weapons available were to be used, we have to ask ourselves if we are truly aware of the repercussions this could have, and if there is not a real possibility of the pure and simple annihilation of mankind".

Today, in August 1983, the warning of Pope John Paul II is still valid, as is the following saying which he repeatedly used in his speech: "To remember the past is to give a pledge for the future".

In this matter of a pledge for the future, I should also like to mention the views of a distinguished United States citizen and a person of world-wide renown, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, who, in a recent statement, pointed out that 20 years after the signature -- at a time when world peace was at great risk -- of the partial test-ban Treaty, the structure existing since then is in danger owing to the development and deployment of new weapons. "If we accept this situation complacently", he said, "then we shall drift toward nuclear war. In an age of 50,000 nuclear weapons, we must actively and urgently seek a safer world".

The present situation is no less critical and is perhaps in certain ways more serious than that of 20 years ago. In this context, the present generation of leaders has a crucial and complex job to do, through all possible means, especially multilateral ones. It is the responsibility of all those who have the power of decision to pay heed without delay, regardless of political systems or social and cultural structures, to the voice of the majority of their own peoples and of the

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peoples of other countries, united as never before in the history of mankind in demanding adequate guarantees for peace.

In this connection I may quote the following sentence from the "New Delhi Message": "The non-aligned countries, speaking for the majority of the world community, want an immediate halt to the drift towards nuclear conflict which threatens the well-being not only of humanity in our times but of future generations as well".

For the same reason and because of its intrinsic validity, attention should be paid to another demand made by the non-aligned countries to the nuclear-weapon powers: not only should the arms race be halted but the resources thus released should be used for the benefit of the developing countries. But what is happening is precisely the opposite, for certain major powers are continuing to ignore the link which, in global terms, exists between security and development, a link that is dramatically reinforced by the present world economic crisis.

Since the tasks of the Committee on Disarmament are closely connected with the world situation to which I have referred, it is essential to take account of the important negotiations under way between the Superpowers, although there is no reason why the Committee's work should be dependent on those negotiations or on any other disarmament effort, as the United Nations Secretary-General rightly said in his recent statement before the Committee.

The General Assembly, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, conferred on this Committee the status of the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It is thus obvious that the activities of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies should fall within the prescribed range.

On that understanding, but bearing in mind the difficulties of the task, it is desirable that any agreements reached in this Committee should have a realistic and pragmatic basis; they should be limited in certain cases in the extent of their initial application, but should always be guided by the principles and the Programme of Action laid down in the Final Document. It goes without saying that the procedural problems which so frequently arise in the work of this Committee could easily be overcome if there were consensus on the basic issues to which I have referred.

Although I do not want on this occasion to go into all the matters that are within the competence of the Committee, I should like to mention three of the items on its agenda.

In the first place, the prevention of nuclear war and all related matters, which forms part of item 2 of the agenda, is of outstanding importance because of the imminence of the risk of a nuclear conflict and also because of the great variety of material available on this subject, including earlier agreements, resolutions of the General Assembly and proposals submitted both to this Committee and to the General Assembly (document CD/398). As regards proposals, I should like to recall the one made by my delegation a few weeks ago at a plenary meeting of the Committee, on the subject of the promotion and implementation of confidence-building measures. We believe that, while not constituting measures of disarmament or being substitutes for disarmament, such measures would represent a valuable preliminary stage and could at times be carried out simultaneously with disarmament efforts.

I need hardly mention the esteem in which the Committee would be held if, in its report to the General Assembly at its next session, it were able to record a concrete and continuous advance in the matter of the prevention of nuclear war.

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Secondly, with respect to item 1 of the agenda, concerning a nuclear test ban, I should like to refer again to the partial test-ban Treaty in order to draw attention to the formal undertaking on the part of the nuclear-weapon powers that is implicit in the preamble to that instrument -- an undertaking as yet unfulfilled -- to continue negotiations towards the cessation of all test explosions. As you know, in 20 years it has not proved possible to agree on a prohibition of underground tests, the essential means of putting an end to the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is also important to mention the situation resulting from the failure of the nuclear-weapon powers to fulfil their obligation to provide assistance to the non-nuclear-weapon countries as regards the results of peaceful nuclear explosions.

Thirdly, I should like to refer to the item on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the subject to be discussed at our forthcoming plenary meetings. The draft programme which the Committee is to reconsider from the very beginning reflected the divergencies of views inevitable in a first attempt at a global programme for gradual implementation in this sphere. This fact, far from lessening its merit, should make it a document that is susceptible of many adjustments, although its main structure should be preserved since that is based on the Final Document. However, as you know, in this Committee as in the General Assembly, no such effort at compromise is taking place; on the contrary, points already resolved in the Final Document itself are at times brought into question.

In this connection I should like to recall, as did the Secretary-General in his statement at the spring part of the session, that the priority attaching to nuclear disarmament and the responsibilities flowing therefrom affect but do not exclude conventional disarmament in all its aspects. This is clearly laid down in the Final Document, as is understood by those countries which, like Peru, have formulated and participated in initiatives in favour of disarmament at the subregional and regional levels.

I should like to conclude by recalling, as the representative of the Soviet Union very kindly did at an earlier meeting, that at this summer part of the Committee's session the three successive chairmen have come from countries members of the Group of 21 which are at the same time members of the non-aligned movement. I believe that this and other propitious circumstances will contribute to the achievement of agreements in the sphere of disarmament which it will be possible to record in the Committee's report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the United Kingdom. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, since this is my first statement in the month of August, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship for the last period of the session of the Committee on Disarmament this year. I am convinced that under your guidance, with your diplomatic skill and experience, the Committee will be successful in elaborating its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly at its forthcoming thirty-eighth session.

Allow me to use this opportunity to thank Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan for the excellent manner in which he guided our Committee during the month of July.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Today I would like to dwell on two items of our agenda, i.e. firstly, the prohibition of new types and weapons of mass destruction, and secondly, the prevention of nuclear war, which deserves our permanent attention.

The urgency of the need to take steps against the creation of new weapons of mass destruction has often been emphasized, and time and again, the socialist and many other countries have, over the last eight years, advocated in this Committee the elaboration of an agreement on such measures. Many meetings with experts were held and substantive working papers tabled. The United Nations General Assembly has stressed the significance of the matter in quite a number of resolutions. However, nothing has been achieved up to now. Obviously, it is not the complexity of the issue which has to be blamed. It is the unwillingness of some countries to participate in negotiations aimed at the exclusion of qualitatively new developments in the field of weapons of mass destruction from the very outset.

Meanwhile, military-technological development is going ahead at a fast pace. If we fail to take preventive action now, we will be soon faced with weapons which will then be an integral part of arsenals and, as experience shows, cannot easily be negotiated away.

For example, some years ago, we drew attention to laser and particle beam weapons as a possible dangerous development. Nowadays, this issue is by no means a hypothetical one any more. Thus, no time must be lost. We renew our proposal that this Committee should set up an expert group to clarify questions related to the scope of a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

Recent events show how fast the development, production and deployment of new weapons of mass destruction will go ahead, if not stopped by preventive agreements. Here we have particularly in mind nuclear neutron weapons. Only a few days ago, alarming news spread all over the world that the United States is about to start the full-scale production of this weapon. The decision was taken in spite of all the urgent appeals made by the public, especially in Europe, as well as by the United Nations General Assembly. Proposals to negotiate on the preventive prohibition of this weapon, as for example made by the socialist countries in 1978 (document CCD/559), were flatly ignored by certain countries. The taking up of the production of this weapon leads to an escalation of the nuclear arms race and is closely connected with doctrines aimed at making a limited nuclear war wageable and winnable. In document CD/344, submitted by my delegation on behalf of a group of socialist States on 10 February 1983, attention was drawn to the severe consequences the introduction of nuclear neutron weapons into military arsenals would entail. This weapon is conceived by its proponents to be deployed in the vicinity of what they call the "future battlefield". Thereby they have in mind western Europe and other regions far from their own territory. According to their plans, the deployment of neutron weapons should follow the stationing of new United States medium-range nuclear missiles in western Europe. A further step could well be the deployment of binary chemical weapons in the same area.

All these developments are bound to diminish universal stability and security. The danger of nuclear war would be increased by the deployment of United States medium-range and neutron weapons in western Europe. It is not by chance, therefore, that the prevention of nuclear war has occupied our main attention in the course of this year's session. From the very beginning my delegation, like many others, has advocated the inclusion of a corresponding item in our agenda and our dealing with this problem on a priority basis.

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My delegation has already presented its opinion on several aspects of this item. Today I would like to make some observations concerning Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, since time and again some countries have made reference to those provisions in the context of measures to prevent a nuclear war. Without any doubt, the principles contained in Article 2 of the Charter constitute the basis for the development of international relations in our time. They are indeed the fundamental rules and guidelines for peaceful coexistence. Their strict observance is an indispensable precondition for strengthening international security. However, professions of observance of Article 2, and especially of its paragraph 4, are highly incredible when, at the same time, governments refuse to commit themselves to the non-first-use of nuclear weapons and make nuclear deterrence a main principle of their military policy, when they declare whole regions of the world to be their own spheres of interest, install so-called rapid-deployment forces in order to compel other States to accept such a policy and constantly extend their systems of military bases. In brief, the policy of confrontation and superarmament implies the persistent threat of the use of force which is prohibited by Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. It is indeed highly important to give up such a policy.

We are alarmed about the threat of the use of military force by a neighbouring nuclear-weapon State against sovereign States in Central America in order to impose its will on these countries, thereby increasing the danger of war in this region. So we might ask how all these actions could be reconciled with Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.

Our position on these and other questions in connection with Article 2, paragraph 4, is well known. We are always prepared to consider them in the forum where they belong -- the United Nations. On the basis of the resolutions already adopted, such as the Declaration on principles of international law, the United Nations should contribute, in exercising its responsibility, towards the establishment of specific and legally binding criteria for the conduct of States in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter.

As far as this Committee is concerned, it should concentrate, in conformity with paragraph 20 of the Final Document, on urgent measures directly aimed at preventing a nuclear war. Pertinent proposals to this end have been made by the socialist countries in document CD/355.

In these days we are discussing how the item on the prevention of a nuclear war should be tackled in our future work. My delegation shares the demand for the establishment of a working group to this end. There is no magic in such a group. Its existence alone would not mean that the problem is solved. The working group can only be the form which has to be filled by a real content, i.e. the political will of all members of this body to come to an agreement on measures to prevent a nuclear war. Thus a working group could provide the necessary framework to negotiate in a comprehensive and at the same time concrete manner with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, as called for in resolution 37/78 I of the United Nations General Assembly.

This cannot be achieved by means of discussions during informal meetings of this Committee. However, to overcome the deadlock in our debate and to reach a consensus, my delegation could go along with the idea of holding in the coming days informal meetings to prepare future negotiations, with the clear understanding and indeed an appropriate decision that a working group should be established at the Committee's session next year. Thus, a clear objective would be set for those informal meetings. In order to facilitate further consideration we intend to submit, with other socialist countries, a document concerning relevant issues.

The proposed procedure would enable us to start on the concrete achievement of the goal shared by all of us -- the elaboration of measures to prevent a nuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, His Excellency Ambassador Cromartie.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I should like first of all to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chair for the first time today. The month of your chairmanship promises to be an important one, and I assure you of the full support of my delegation in the weeks ahead. I should also like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan for his admirable conduct of the chairmanship during the month of July.

My statement this morning is once again devoted to the subject of a nuclear-test ban. The United Kingdom considers that a comprehensive test ban which met all the necessary requirements would be an important measure of disarmament. But such a ban cannot be considered as an isolated measure divorced from other disarmament negotiations. It must take its place "within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process", as recommended in the Final Document. Furthermore, as the same authority recognized, a comprehensive test ban cannot be negotiated regardless of the need for States to protect their security.

One of the necessary requirements of an acceptable test-ban agreement would be to ensure that the ban would be entirely respected. There would be an unacceptable risk in agreeing to a test ban which did not provide for a verification system that would give adequate assurance against non-compliance with the treaty. The United Kingdom has, therefore, always given high priority to the establishment of an effective system of verification with respect to a comprehensive test ban. Given the very difficult problems inherent in this complex subject, it is not surprising that agreement on verification has proved a major obstacle to successful negotiation in the past.

On 21 June I introduced a working paper (CD/383) which discussed the way in which nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be treated in a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The paper emphasized the importance of a satisfactory solution to this problem if a fully acceptable treaty was to be negotiated. The distinguished representative of Brazil made a number of interesting comments on this paper in his statement of 7 July which deserve a reply. But I hope that he will forgive me if this morning I concentrate on another aspect of a comprehensive test ban, namely, verification by seismic means, on which I am introducing a further working paper (CD/402) today.

In the discussions in the working group during the 1982 session, references were made to an earlier statement on this subject which is contained in document CCD/492. My predecessor, Mr. Summerhayes, said on 14 September 1982 (CD/PV.186) that we considered that the assessments made in that paper remained generally valid. We have since carefully reviewed all the existing information and we have incorporated the results of our study in the new working paper.

I cannot do justice to the paper by summarizing its contents in this statement. I will therefore leave delegations to read the full version as distributed. But I should like to draw attention to two important points. Firstly, the paper stresses the importance of being able to identify, not merely detect, seismic events. Failure to make this distinction has led to over-optimistic assessments of the ability of the proposed world-wide seismic network. Secondly, we conclude that the means of seismic detection and identification of underground events which are at present available to us leave gaps exploitable by a State party to a comprehensive

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test-ban treaty, which might make it possible to conduct underground nuclear-weapon test explosions at yields up to at least some tens of kilotons without detection. Such explosions could have very considerable military significance. These possibilities could be more easily exploited by some States than by others because of differences in geographical situation, and particularly in size.

These conclusions should not be surprising to other delegations, since they are in line with earlier statements by the United Kingdom delegation on this important issue. They are also in line with the technical information currently available to us, which fully justifies them. In our view other, non-official published assessments have failed to attach due weight to certain technical factors and have made assumptions about the realizability of an effective global seismic network which are not justified.

There is also a certain tendency to speak as if the world-wide network of seismic stations contemplated for the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty was already in existence. This is not the case. The capabilities of such a network are, therefore, not yet proven, and the estimate that we make of its capabilities is based on assumptions with respect to the distribution of stations, which cannot at present be determined, since it will depend in part on adherence to the treaty. We can be sure neither of the reliability of the data they would produce, nor of the efficiency of the exchange, although experimental exchanges have been encouraging. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has been doing important work in this field; but, while there is broad agreement in the Group on certain principles, there are many points of detail on which agreement has not yet been reached. There is the question of the standards of technical specification of the stations participating in the global network. There is also the important question of the use of Level II data. The United Kingdom delegation believes that the analysis of Level II data in favourable circumstances could provide a way of ascertaining whether there had been a probable breach of the treaty. Given the high number of seismic events recorded each year which could cause confusion in the identification of low-yield underground explosions, it is important that the proposed international data centres should have access to Level II data. We believe that the feasibility of transmitting such data requires further consideration in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

My delegation welcomes the recommendation of the Group of Scientific Experts in its report, document CD/399, which is before us this morning, that its next meeting should be held at the end of February 1984. As will be clear from what I have said already, we believe that there is a great deal of valuable work for the Group to do. We are pleased that the recent session of the Group took place, under the able chairmanship of Dr. Dahlman, in a more constructive and scientific atmosphere, which augurs well for the future. We welcome the plans for a further experiment on the international co-operative exchange of seismic data in 1984. We hope that countries which have not previously participated in these experiments, especially in the southern hemisphere, will do so on this occasion, in order to achieve the widest possible geographical coverage. We look forward to hearing the results of this important experiment in due course.

The conclusions which we have drawn about the use of seismic methods as the sole means of verification point to the need for the consideration of supplementary measures, such as on-site inspection, in order to attempt to fill in those gaps which remain in the verification system; and which could be exploited to the advantage of an individual State. It was with this in mind that we agreed to a mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban which required the Group

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"to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress towards a nuclear test ban". As the submission of two working papers in this summer period of the session shows, the United Kingdom delegation is ready to enter into that substantive examination. We regret that a number of other delegations take a different view. Since the Committee agreed on the mandate for the Working Group, these delegations have made no secret of their dissatisfaction with it, and at each stage of the discussion in the Committee have tried to rush through the work, and to gloss over difficulties, with the transparent objective of claiming that the mandate has been carried out and that a revised mandate is necessary. My delegation does not believe that the substantive examination called for in the mandate has been made, nor that such an examination is not possible because the Group is not "negotiating". The United Kingdom delegation calls upon all delegations to take part in a genuine discussion of the problems facing us in achieving a satisfactory system of verification for a comprehensive test ban. As a first step, my delegation would welcome comments on the two papers that it has put forward.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I have no other speakers on my list for today, Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I shall have the pleasure of offering you formally the congratulations of my delegation at some other time, when I make a statement on an item of substance. For the moment, I want simply to refer to a very specific and prosaic procedural matter. As you will remember, each week when the secretariat circulates a tentative time-table for our work, we are told that this is purely indicative and subject to any amendments that may be necessary. I was unfortunately absent during the latter part of last week and was therefore unable to make any comment on the time-table for this week. Consequently, I have this morning consulted the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, informing him that one of the contact groups of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, namely, the contact group concerned with chapter D, on measures and stages of implementation, needs to hold a meeting this week. As you know, Mr. Chairman, it has been the custom in the past for Thursday afternoon to be reserved for meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and its contact groups. I therefore asked the Chairman of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons if he would have any objection to the holding of the meeting of the contact group on measures and stages of implementation, here in this room on Thursday at 3 p.m., instead of the scheduled meeting of group A of the radiological weapons Working Group. He felt that for the moment it would be preferable for the radiological weapons group to meet, but told me that he would have no objection to the contact group on disarmament measures meeting in this room on that afternoon. There would thus be three meetings on Thursday afternoon instead of the two planned. That was the agreement we reached this morning. I should therefore be grateful, Mr. Chairman, if you would kindly announce that there will be this change in the time-table as circulated.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): In reply to the representative of Mexico, I should like to say that I have been informed by the secretariat that it is endeavouring to make the necessary arrangements for three meetings to be held on Thursday afternoon, as he requested. I can therefore assure him that all possible efforts will be made towards that end.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I only asked that the agreement I reached with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons should be observed, namely, that the contact group of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should meet in this Council Chamber on Thursday, 4 August, at 3 p.m. The other questions, concerning the arrangements the secretariat will make for the servicing of the various groups, are secondary matters which do not fall within my competence.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I should like to tell the representative of Mexico that, as I have been informed by the secretariat, his request for the meeting of the contact group on Thursday in this room will be met; the other meetings can also be held with the services available.

Allow me now to submit to the Committee for its decision the recommendation contained in paragraph 10 of document CD/399, namely, that the next session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should be held in Geneva from 27 February to 9 March 1984. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Committee agrees to the dates proposed by the Ad Hoc Group for its next session.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on 4 August at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.