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Chairman: Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 AND 121 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Life itself and the whole development of international affairs are pushing the limitation of the arms race and disarmament to the forefront of world political life as mankind's most important problem, solution of which will govern and determine the liberation of world civilization from the devastating effects of nuclear war and ensure genuine security and a peaceful future for all peoples.

As has been emphasized by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, the most urgent and burning task for mankind is the halting of the arms race and elimination of the threat of nuclear world war, and the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, is sparing no effort towards that end. There is no doubt that genuine international security can reliably be guaranteed only under circumstances in which the arms race has been checked and it has been possible to achieve genuine disarmament. It used to be said that if one wanted peace one should prepare for war, but the slogan of all States should in our time be, "If you want peace, conduct a policy of peace and fight for peace."

Disarmament would lead to the release of colossal resources that today are being directed to the arms race. These resources would then be available for co-operation and economic and social progress, in particular that of the developing countries. It would create conditions favourable for the solution of such global human problems as the securing of food-stuffs, the development of genuine new sources of energy, the broad conquest of the oceans and of outer space, the elimination of the most dangerous diseases, and protection of the environment.

Thus cessation of the arms race has become an imperative of our era. In it are consecrated the most pressing tasks facing mankind. And yet the world long ago passed the line at which the arms race became truly insane. If somebody were to use the stockpiles of weapons that have been accumulated, it would be a catastrophe

for mankind. This understanding of the danger of the continuing arms race is clearly reflected in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

For its part, the Soviet Union is resolutely determined systematically to conduct matters in such a way that, together with other countries, it might be possible to stop the arms race, to proceed to dismantling part by part the military machine, and to reduce the armaments of States until there is genuine total and complete disarmament.

Our country threatens no one. It does not intend to, nor will it, attack anybody. The society that believes in its own creative forces and possibilities does not need war, it needs peace. Defending détente, pushing forward the cause of disarmament, expanding and deepening peaceful international co-operation - that is the basis of the foreign policy of our State.

In our struggle on many fronts for disarmament, we put forward the task of supplementing political détente with measures of military détente. Here in the United Nations, in the Committee on Disarmament, and in other negotiations on the limitation of the arms race, there is an abundance of well-considered proposals based upon the principle of equality and equal security. There are proposals that have to do with both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. A large number of initiatives have been put forward aimed at the general improvement of the political climate throughout the world. That is of decisive signifiance for progress in disarmament.

Among these there is the proposal to conclude a world-wide treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are firmly in favour of strict compliance with the principle of the non-use of force and the threat of force in relations between States. They are in favour of resolving all controversial questions exclusively by peaceful means through negotiations. In our opinion, not a single State which is genuinely striving towards peace and towards good relations with other countries could object to such a treaty.

There is also a series of proposals concerning the various regions of the world. Here, by way of example, we may consider the European continent, where relations between States are being developed on the basis of treaties which have been set out in the Final Act of the European conference. That is a code of rules for peaceful coexistence the significance of which goes beyond the framework of Europe. However, the roots which political détente has nourished in European soil cannot be viable if practical measures are not adopted in the sphere of military détente.

Unfortunately, the opponents of détente and of disarmament have not put down their arms, thus undermining the very foundations of European peace, which in their minds they are still planning to build. There is also serious concern about the deployment of new types of nuclear rocket weapons on the territory of Western Europe. The implementation of these plans would substantially alter the strategic situation on the continent. Their purpose is to upset the balance of forces that has been achieved in Europe and to try to provide the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with military superiority. The socialist countries, of course, would not view these efforts with indifference. In that case, they would have to take additional steps in order to strengthen their own security. There would be no alternative. Therefore, the realization of the plans of NATO would inevitably exacerbate the situation in Europe and would to a large extent poison the international atmosphere as a whole.

As for the Soviet Union, it does not strive towards military supremacy. The strategic doctrine of the Soviet Union is essentially defensive in character. Statements which allege that the Soviet Union is building its military might on the European continent on a scale not warranted by its defensive needs have no basis in fact. Such statements are part of a deliberate policy to delude world public opinion.

As was stated by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, in his statement in Berlin on 6 October this year, during the past 10 years, the number of medium-range nuclear-weapon launching devices on the territory of the European part of the Soviet Union has not been increased by a single rocket or by a single aircraft. On the contrary, the number of launching devices for medium-range rockets as well as the power of those weapons has been somewhat decreased. There has also been a decrease in the number of medium-range bombers. On the territory of other States, the Soviet Union simply does not deploy such weapons at all. For a number of years now the Soviet Union has not been increasing the number of its troops stationed in Central Europe. Moreover, the Soviet Union is ready to reduce, as compared to the present level, the number of medium-range nuclear devices which have been deployed in the western regions of the Soviet Union, but, of course, only provided that there will be no further deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

The Soviet Union, moved by a genuine desire to overcome the impasse confronting the efforts of many years to achieve nuclear détente in Europe and to give an example of a transition from words to genuine deeds, after having arrived at agreement with the Government of the German Democratic Republic and in consultation with other States members of the Warsaw Treaty, has adopted the decision unilaterally to reduce the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe. During the next 12 months we shall withdraw up to 20,000 Soviet servicemen from the territory of the German Democratic Republic. We shall also withdraw 1,000 tanks and a specific quantity of other military equipment.

We are sure that this new concrete manifestation of a desire for peace and goodwill on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies will be approved by the peoples of Europe and of the whole world. The Soviet Union calls upon the Governments of the NATO countries duly to appreciate the initiative of the socialist countries and to follow their good example.

At the same time, the Soviet Union favours a further expansion of measures to achieve trust in Europe. In particular, it is ready to ensure that preliminary notice of major military manoeuvres in Europe should be required earlier than at present and not for manoeuvres involving a force of 25,000, but at a lower level, for instance, a force of 20,000.

That has been provided for in the Final Act of the Helsinki Agreement. The Soviet Union is likewise ready, on a mutual basis, not to hold any military manoeuvees involving a force of more than 40,000 to 50,000. Also in force are the proposals of the socialist countries with respect to notification of military and air manoeuvres as well as naval manoeuvres conducted in the vicinity of the territorial waters of other States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Soviet Union also proposes that in the region which has been defined in the Helsinki Final Act timely warning should be given concerning not only military manoeuvres but also the movement of land forces which number more than 20,000 troops.

Coming forward with these concrete proposals which are aimed at combining political détente with military détente, the Soviet Union is ready to consider other ideas which would contribute to reducing the military confrontation in Europe. The Soviet Union, together with the other members of the Warsaw Treaty, still considers the most appropriate place for the discussion of a large range of measures involved in military détente in Europe to be a European conference at the political level, the preparation and convening of which would be a highly relevant task. Indeed, it is a task that is completely ready for implementation.

We note with satisfaction that the statement of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev in Berlin on 6 October, which contained the aforementioned important proposals, has met with positive response on a very large scale in many countries of the world. It is now for the Western countries to respond. We hope that realism, wisdom and sheer common sense will prevail.

While noting that the portfolio of constructive proposals on various aspects of the problem of disarmament and on the improvement of the political climate throughout the world is substantial, we note with alarm at the same time that a large number of the proposals to reduce the arms race and to achieve disarmament usually encounter resistance on the part of a number of States.

Sometimes, concrete and unequivocal proposals are bogged down in discussion. On a number of substantive aspects of disarmament, negotiations have been under way now for a long time and, so far, have yielded no positive results. Enormous efforts are required to bring constructive initiatives to the stage where decisions are adopted. It is clear that this must be an extensive area of involvement for the United Nations.

The United Nations, at its special session devoted to disarmament, has adopted what is on the whole a good programme for the limitation of the arms race and for disarmament. Unfortunately, no action has been taken on these decisions thus far. It is our firm conviction that the most important task in the present circumstances is to guarantee an early and decisive change in the negotiations on the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. The time has come to move on to genuine disarmament, to concrete steps towards the elimination of the accumulated stockpiles of weapons.

The signing of the Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of strategic weapons (SALT II) has convincingly demonstrated that, given goodwill and a readiness to take into account the legitimate interests of both parties, it is possible to achieve agreement, even on the most difficult questions. The SALT II treaty, signed on 18 June 1979 in Vienna, and other related documents make an important contribution to averting a nuclear war and to the expansion of détente and are thus in keeping not only with the interests of the Soviet and American peoples, but also with the peaceful aspirations of the whole of mankind. Full implementation of the document signed in Vienna would open up new possibilities for preventing the build-up of arsenals of missiles and nuclear weapons and for ensuring their effective qualitative and quantitative limitation.

The Soviet Union believes that, immediately after the SALT II treaty comes into force, talks should begin on a SALT III agreement. Within the framework of such talks we are ready to discuss the possibility of the limitation not only of intercontinental, but also of other types of arms, taking into account, of course, all relevant factors and strict compliance with the principle of equal security for the parties concerned. The completion of this task would be a further move towards holding back the nuclear arms race and an important step towards the achievement of the high aim of the total cessation of production and the elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It is our deep conviction that the results of the Vienna

disarmament along new courses.

meeting could act as a stimulus for encouraging the limitation of the arms race and

It may be noted with satisfaction that the representatives of numerous States have, in the course of the current General Assembly session, reacted positively to the treaty signed in Vienna. This is further evidence that the implementation of the treaty is being awaited by the whole world.

In our opinion, the present session of the General Assembly can - and indeed must - make its authoritative opinion known in favour of a productive series of negotiations and their speedy conclusion as well as of the adoption of decisions on the questions under consideration. As for the Soviet delegation, we are ready to work precisely in this direction and we shall strive towards the mobilization of the efforts of States Members of the United Nations and towards enlisting their co-operation in disarmament negotiations.

Looking at the current negotiations on disarmament, we must see that there are two questions on which decisions are near at hand: a general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and a prohibition of radiological weapons. The prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests is a major question, whose solution the Soviet Union has been urging for a long time. It is the subject of talks between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom which are taking place in Geneva. In the course of these negotiations, the Soviet Union has suggested a number of constructive steps for the purpose of the speedy achievement of an agreement on this question. In contrast to this, the position of the United States and the United Kingdom has, unfortunately, been distinguished by inconsistency and has held up the development of the talks. We venture to hope that our partners will not introduce any complicating features into the negotiations, so that it will be possible to conclude them in the near future. The Soviet Union considers that an early conclusion of a treaty and its entry into force would contribute to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and would create the conditions necessary for a transition to nuclear disarmament.

In the course of bilateral Soviet-American negotiations on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, the elements of a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons were compiled and presented to the Committee on Disarmament. We believe that all necessary factors exist for an agreement on this

question to be made ready for signature at an early date. In this connexion, it would be important for the General Assembly to appeal to the Committee on Disarmament asking it to conclude as early as possible its work on a draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons on the basis of the fundamental elements introduced into the Committee by the Soviet Union and the United States.

Passing on to forthcoming or incomplete negotiations, we should like to refer specifically to the following general guidelines for the cessation of the further qualitative and quantitative growth in arms and for the implementation of disarmament measures: inasmuch as the principal danger to international peace lies in the intensification of the nuclear arms race, the central place must be given to active efforts towards the adoption of measures to slow and ultimately reverse the arms race in this particular sphere. Among the important questions is the problem of the cessation of production of nuclear weaponry in all its forms and the gradual decrease of stockpiles until they are totally eliminated. We must harbour no illusions here: this problem is extremely complex, from the strictly technical point of view as well. It is important none the less to treat the matter in such a way that it might start proceeding forward. Guided by precisely this idea, the Soviet Union has put forward a proposal concerning the beginning of negotiations on this question.

As is known, the General Assembly, at its last session, called upon all States possessing nuclear weapons to proceed with consultations on an early beginning to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race. In February of this year, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together with other socialist countries, introduced in the Committee on Disarmament a number of concrete proposals concerning the holding of negotiations on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all States possessing nuclear weapons as well as a certain number of States not possessing such weapons. Unfortunately, these negotiations have not yet commenced.

The delegation of the Soviet Union expresses the hope that the General Assembly, at its present session, will declare itself firmly in favour of the earliest possible beginning of preparatory consultations for the negotiations on the subject of nuclear disarmament and of the negotiations themselves.

Naturally the elaboration and implementation of measures in regard to the cessation of production of nuclear weapons must be carried on at the same time as, and in close relationship with, the strengthening of political and international legal guarantees concerning the security of States.

The range of questions connected with nuclear disarmament includes also the securing of guarantees for the safety of non-nuclear States. In the statement he made on 6 October of this year Mr. Brezhnev once again solemnly confirmed that the Soviet Union would never use nuclear weapons against those States which have refrained from the production and acquisition of such weapons and which do not have such weapons on their territories. As is well known, the General Assembly has adopted a decision of principle on this question, and now it is necessary to translate it into binding international agreements. It appears that for this purpose it would be desirable to turn to the Committee on Disarmament and request it to accelerate the elaboration of a draft international convention on the strengtrhening of security guarantees for non-nuclear States.

Equally important is the reaching of an agreement on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in those areas where they do not at present exist. The Soviet Union, as is well known, has indicated that it is ready to take upon itself the obligation not to emplace nuclear weapons on the territories of States where at present they do not exist and it has called on other nuclear Powers to do likewise. At its thirty-third session the General Assembly declared itself to be in favour of concluding an appropriate international agreement, and this is evidence of the desire of the majority of countries to have such an agreement. Taking this into accuont, in our opinion, the General Assembly might adopt a decision which would contain the idea of studying the possibility of concluding an international agreement on this question – a decision which for this purpose would propose that States submit their views on this matter and a decision which would also provide for a proposal to have this matter considered at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

Among the most important tasks to be carried out in regard to the cessation of the nuclear arms race the Soviet Union includes the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Next year 10 years will have elapsed since the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that period the States have acceded to it, and as a result of the treaty an international

régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been developed. However, a whole series of States still refrain from acceding to the treaty. Some even pronounce themselves as being against the desire of the majority of countries to settle this problem once and for all and so far have not abandoned their plans to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Such a state of affairs is bound to sound a warning, because the proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly when they get into the hands of racists and aggressors, would lead to an escalation of tensions in the regions of the world concerned and would greatly increase the nuclear threat to mankind as a whole. In this context, particularly deserving of attention and support is the proposal made by Iraq that at the present session the question of Israeli nuclear armament should be considered.

In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, it will be necessary to secure the accession of all States without exception to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their more active participation in the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. In this connexion, we wish to recall the appeal which has been addressed by the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States in June this year to all States which have so far not done so to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. For its part the Soviet Union intends to co-operate closely with the other countries to ensure the successful conclusion of the forthcoming Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in 1980.

An important aspect of the disarmament negotiations that requires a special impulse from the General Assembly is the elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of the new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. As early as 1975 the Soviet Union introduced an initiative in the United Nations aimed at preventing the realization of such an ominous possibility. The General Assembly supported that proposal and recommended to the Committee on Disarmament that it embark upon the working out of an international agreement on the prohibition of the elaboration and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Since then this question has been considered on a number of occasions both in the Geneva forum and at sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. Some progress has been made. However, so far there is no agreement concerning concrete ways to solve this problem. In our opinion, a positive, definite contribution to progress on this question might be an appeal by the United Nations General Assembly to the Committee

on Disarmament to continue negotiations, with the help of qualified experts, for the purpose of preparing the draft of an all-encompassing treaty on the prohibition of all new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and, where necessary, draft agreements on specific types of such weapons.

The Soviet Union has been consistently and steadfastly in favour of a categorical refusal to make plans to establish neutron weapons. The Committee on Disarmament already has before it a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, emplacement and use of such weapons, which was introduced by the Soviet Union together with other socialist countries. The time has come - indeed it is long overdue - for a specific discussion of this matter.

The Soviet Union is taking an active part in negotiations on the question of the prohibition of the elaboration, stockpiling and production of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. These negotiations, which have been conducted both in the Committee on Disarmament and on a bilateral basis between the United States and the Soviet Union, have made some progress. It is now necessary to strive to achieve real results in that connexion. The Soviet Union continues to believe that the problem of control should not be a stumbling block. The matter can be resolved successfully on the basis of national means of verification, supplemented by properly planned international procedures.

The Soviet Union has been and remains a steadfast champion of the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. It regards the establishment of such zones as one of the measures for the strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a means of diminishing the threat of nuclear war and a means of achieving regional military détente. It is necessary that such zones be truly free from nuclear weapons, and the relevant agreements should not contain any loop-holes for the violation of the non-nuclear status of the zones.

Proceeding from this position of principle the Soviet Union, in 1978, became a party to the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, known also as the Tlatelolco Treaty, which consolidates the establishment of the first nuclear-free zone in the world, encompassing the majority of the countries of Latin America.

An important step also would be the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. A key question in the solution of this problem is the matter of bases. The Soviet Union is in favour of the liquidation of all existing foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean, and of the prohibition of the establishment of additional bases. It has never taken part, does not take part and does not intend to take part in any military competition in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union has not established and is not establishing in the Indian Ocean any of its own military bases. As for the Soviet-American talks on this question that have been interrupted through no fault of ours, the Soviet Union has systematically been in favour of their renewal.

The Soviet Union has been consistently in favour of the convening of a world-wide conference on disarmament. We immediately associate the holding of such a conference with the universal character of the participation of the States and the binding nature of the decisions concerned. Of course, we share the view that a conference of that kind would require very careful and comprehensive preparation. At the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament, a decision was adopted concerning the convening of a world conference at the earliest possible date. The Soviet delegation considers that it is necessary to proceed with the implementation of this recommendation of the special session in order to determine specific dates for the convening of the conference and for the setting up of an organ which would be responsible for conducting the preparatory work. In our opinion, such a conference might well take place after the second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament.

The full range of disarmament questions is today becoming more and more complex and multifaceted, and that is why we consider as extremely timely and deserving of considerable attention the proposal of the delegation of Czechoslovakia, which contains a draft declaration on international co-operation

for disarmament (A/34/141 and Add.1). The adoption of such a declaration and compliance therewith by all States might well serve to establish conditions in international relations in which it would be far easier to conduct negotiations on the most diversified ramifications of disarmament and also might make it possible to accelerate the process of achieving concrete results at such negotiations. The adoption of the declaration would also be a further step towards the application of the Final Document of the tenth session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It might result in translation of the decisions contained therein into concrete agreements in this sphere, and this, we believe, is the purpose and indeed the desire of all delegations. That is why we support this proposal and intend to speak specifically on the item at a later stage.

In the view of the Soviet delegation, at a moment when the arms race is being intensified and the world is sliding down a slope in this connexion, it is high time to proceed from general appeals concerning disarmament to concrete actions and to a solution of questions related to the cessation of the arms race in practical terms. The United Nations can and should play its proper role in such a turn in the course of events. Concerning our work in the sphere of disarmament, opinions will be formulated not on the basis of the numbers of resolutions adopted or groups of experts created but on the basis of qualitative indicators of the extent to which our Organization has been able to influence the achievement of palpable, concrete results on measures to achieve real disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: As I look around I see here quite a number of representatives from the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, and before calling on the next speaker I should like to take this opportunity to welcome them all here. I am sure that their presence and their contributions will help immeasurably to ensure an effective outcome of our deliberations at this session.

Mr. SEIGNIOUS (United States of America): I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. This is my first visit to the United Nations as Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and I am indeed honoured to be here.

The fact that some \$450 billion is spent the world over every year for arms, the fact that 1,000 missile warheads could kill more than 100 million people, the fact that conflict anywhere could result in destruction everywhere - these facts make the pursuit of peace a necessity for all humanity.

The fact that this Committee now deals only with disarmament and security, the fact that more nations than ever before are actively participating in the consideration of disarmament issues, the fact that there are some nine international arms-control conventions in effect which have been adhered to by most of the nations of the world - these facts testify to a simple conclusion: arms control and disarmament are the province of all nations.

We have an immense task before us, however. It is difficult enough psychologically for any nation or people to share responsibility for its security with other nations. How much more of a revolution in thinking is required for nations to see security as a function of reducing the very arms that often have been the only means that they have had to ensure their security? Arms control, in short, does not come naturally, and any progress - though it may fall short of our hopes - should be welcomed as a step towards security through restraint of arms and as a step away from the tradition of security only through arms.

Because so many challenges remain, progress should not mean complacency. We cannot be satisfied with the security of the world as it is. The weapons we have within our collective hands are too numerous and too awesome for us to entrust our common destiny to good fortune and chance. We must therefore actively seek a safer world and never falter in that search.

I want to begin by stating that my Government has negotiated and supported two SALT treaties because we believe that strategic arms limitations that are equitable can enhance the security of all nations. No agreement constructed on unilateral gain or fiat can long endure, even if it were possible to achieve in the first place. Consensus, on SALT between two nations, or on other arms control issues among many nations, is a difficult but unyielding prerequisite for success, for we are dealing with fundamental issues of security and survival.

The process of SALT confirms that serious negotiations, conducted seriously, can move forward towards a future that does not necessarily bear impossible burdens. The Soviet Ambassador made the same point in his opening remarks. No arms control talks will succeed if they must right every age-old wrong; and no arms control talks can make progress if political advantage rather than enhancement of mutual security is the principal purpose. My Government is firmly committed to arms control agreements based on principles of equity and improved security for all.

Today I want to discuss briefly five arms control subjects that I know are of interest to this Committee. All of them demonstrate that our task ahead is not without challenge, as it is also not without hope.

Let us being with the new treaty, SALT II, to limit strategic offensive nuclear arms. I have said over and over again to my fellow citizens in America that SALT II is not the millenium, nor will it stop competition, nor will it quarantee permanent stability. But yet it is a remarkable accomplishment.

The United States and the Soviet Union have established, for the first time, equal ceilings on strategic nuclear forces.

We have negotiated equal sub-ceilings on strategic systems carrying multiple independently targetable warheads.

We have begun the much desired progress of reductions.

We have taken major steps to control the technological arms race, such as limiting the numbers of warheads allowed on each missile.

We have broken new ground in verification procedures.

And we have renewed our commitment to the long-term process of strategic arms limitation.

In crafting a framework of equality between two different strategic forces, SALT II has become an essential bridge to deeper reductions and further qualitative restraints that we look forward to in SALT III.

I want to reaffirm before this Committee the commitment of the United States and President Carter - as expressed in the SALT II agreement itself - to begin negotiations to achieve further limitations and deeper reductions in nuclear arms promptly upon entry into force of SALT II. We take this obligation with the utmost seriousness; it is an obligation between two nations and it is an obligation of two nations to all nations.

In this regard, let me state in this forum what President Carter makes clear every day in Washington. This Administration is making strenuous efforts to ensure early ratification and entry into force of SALT II.

I would like now to turn to the subject of the comprehensive nuclear test-ban, for no arms control measure has been consistently assigned a higher priority in this chamber over the years. Indeed, the very fact that negotiations are under way on such a treaty can be attributed in part to the dedicated efforts by many nations and individuals to build strong international support for such a ban.

That support is well founded. A comprehensive test ban will place an important qualitative constraint on the nuclear arms competition, and it will be an important contribution to the international community's efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The trilateral negotiations are proceeding actively in Geneva. Agreement has already been reached on many of the features of the treaty, including some issues that just a few years ago seemed insurmountable obstacles. Verification of a comprehensive test ban is extremely important. Innovative co-operative measures will be required, as both sides have recognized. Work is now continuing on these and other aspects. A number of these problems have been less susceptible to prompt solutions than we had hoped. But my Government continues to place great importance

on the conclusion of these negotiations. Success however will require hard work; but success, I believe, would be a statement of hope no nation could ignore.

As with the negotiations for a comprehensive test ban, progress in the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on chemical weapons has not been characterized as rapid, but it has been substantial. Two and a half months ago our two nations provided a detailed report on these negotiations to the Committee on Disarmament.

A treaty providing for the elimination of chemical weapons would be a unique and far-reaching accomplishment: for the first time, an entire class of weapons that has been used in a major conflict would be banned and eliminated; the international community would be establishing and participating in co-operative measures of verification of great breadth and complexity; and a technology capable of inflicting widespread and horrible destruction of human life would be safeguarded for peaceful uses.

Those are some of the reasons why my Government attaches high importance to the chemical weapons negotiations. We fully recognize that many other countries have a direct interest in a chemical weapons prohibition. Many nations could produce them at short notice, and all nations that adhere would be affected by the verification procedures that are a necessity if such an agreement is to promote stability and confidence. In this connexion I would like to note that my Government is grateful for the important work on verification which is being pursued by a large number of countries.

The Committee on Disarmament has a vital role to play in the process of achieving a chemical weapons convention. The United States fully appreciates the importance of that Committee's role, and we are giving serious thought to how we can contribute to making the Committee's work in this area most effective in advancing the objective that we all seek.

The complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons has been an important goal of the international community for many decades, ever since, in the first great World War of this century, these weapons were used on a massive scale.

Even as a boy, the vision of men returned home but gasping for breath torever. That is a vision we should evadicate entirely from the memory of man.

We could be haunted by another class of weapons never used but with a similarly dreadful potential - radiological weapons. The number of facilities producing radioactive byproducts has multiplied many times in recent years and the accumulation of materials is accelerating.

I am pleased to note that significant progress was achieved this year in dealing with such weapons. My nation and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have presented a joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament to ban all radiological weapons. The United States hopes that the General Assembly will encourage the Committee on Disarmament to build on this achievement and to draft an international convention.

August 1980 will mark the date of the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The SALT II agreement, with its commitment to continuing the process in SALT III, reflects the determination of the United States and the Soviet Union to fulfil their obligation under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. My Government is deeply conscious of its obligations to the nations parties to this Treaty which have forsworn nuclear weapons. Their continued restraint, and that of other non-nuclear-weapon States, is essential to preventing a dangerous multiplication of the risk that conflict or miscalculation could lead to nuclear war. In this regard, the United States welcomes the recent accession of Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Bangladesh.

We can further buttress non-proliferation and nuclear stability by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The full realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America is drawing closer. We continue to hope that the necessary steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force for all concerned States within the region will be taken in the near future. Additionally, the United States strongly supports efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world - in accordance with the criteria which we believe can permit the successful establishment of zones that promote the security of the participants.

The development of effective international arrangements for assuring that nations which forswear nuclear weapons will not be threatened by nuclear attack is an effort which deserves our serious consideration. Such arrangements would help create a climate of confidence and would reduce incentives for additional countries to develop nuclear weapons. The United States would like to reiterate its proposal

made last July in the Committee on Disarmament that there be a General Assembly resolution setting forth the various undertakings made by the five nuclear Powers to give assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons.

In concluding this brief review of the important questions with which this Committee is concerned, I am also happy to refer to the progress which has been made on a number of significant and potentially useful studies currently under way, such as the pilot test of a standard format for reporting military budgets, the study on the relationship between disarmament and development, and the study of regional arms control. The United States for its part will continue to give those studies whole-hearted support; they are investments in the future.

My life has been dedicated to the security of the United States. Yet, I see no greater security for my nation than peace among all nations. We share a common goal - peace with security - for we share, in this nuclear age, a common bond for survival and a common search for the ability of all to live in a secure world.

We are all involved in an undertaking to shape our destiny and, as President Carter said in Vienna: "If we cannot control the power to destroy, we can neither guide our fate nor preserve our own future."

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): For the first time the General Assembly - in particular the First Committee under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Hepburn - is now called upon to review and appraise the work performed by the new machinery set up during the tenth special session on disarmament.

New procedures and methods were devised for the Committee on Disarmament in order to correct some deficiencies of its predecessors, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. New guidelines were adopted in the Final Document of that special session.

In fact the meagre record after almost two decades of existence of both preceding organs is well known. Some measures of non-armament or, at best, of arms control have found their way into formal agreements. On many different issues related to their purposes both organs engaged in deliberations, and programmes and plans received careful consideration by their member States, some of them proposed by the major nuclear Powers themselves.

Unfortunately, in nearly 20 years not a single effective measure of disarmament was achieved. Much to the contrary, during that period of time a most massive build-up in the nuclear arms race seems to have run practically unchecked.

That is why by the time it was called the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was already overdue; and, despite its failure to arrive at an unequivocal commitment for effective measures of disarmament, let alone the ambiguities of the Final Document, especially of its paragraph 120, it did represent the best consensus possible in the circumstances.

The most important consequence of the consensus embodied in the Final Document, however, was the reorganization of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the reshaping of its rather peculiar structure. That development was hailed as a significant step forward.

The main ambiguity contained in paragraph 120 relates to the mandate and jurisdiction of the Committee on Disarmament. For us, the mandate of the Committee comes from the General Assembly, to which it reports and from which it receives the guidelines for its work. The Committee should reflect the membership of the General Assembly of which it is a cross-section.

Brazil fully supports the right of every nation to express itself on matters of vital concern to it. Speaking in the General Assembly debate on 24 September last, the Minister of External Relations of Brazil, Ambassador Saraiva Guerreiro, said:

"It can no longer be ignored that all States, without discrimination, have the right to participate equitably and effectively in the decisions affecting their national destinies." (A/34/PV.5, p. 17)

For pragmatic reasons, it would be difficult for a negotiating body composed of all Member States of the United Nations to discharge the functions ascribed to it by the parent body - that is, the General Assembly. In the pursuit of its responsibilities, however, it is imperative that the Committee on Disarmament never lose sight of the simple fact that disarmament is a matter of paramount concern for all Members of the international community, regardless of their size or of the destructive power of their arsenals. But since a handful of nations command arsenals and destructive power so far beyond the military capabilities of the rest of the world, it is obvious that the main responsibility for the task of disarmament, and especially of nuclear disarmament, should devolve upon nuclear-weapon Powers.

The foregoing consideration bear close relevance to the mandate and jurisdiction of the Committee on Disarmament. We believe that all aspects of disarmament fall within the purview of the Committee, according to the guidelines established by the General Assembly.

Just a few months ago the international community and the Committee on Disarmament watched from the outside as important developments in bilateral arms control agreements were taking place. The results of the latest round in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have been commended in some quarters as a major breakthrough in the field of nuclear disarmament, while in other quarters the Vienna Agreements have been viewed as little more than a limited step towards what might be called the rational management of the arms race. From news accounts and commentaries made by observers of the international scene we learn also that the fulfilment of the obligations contained in the agreements is being perceived as entailing the need for the development of new and more sophisticated weapons and weapon systems. Defence reports, according to the same views, should be increased to ensure each side of its full capabilities so that the relative strength of the two super-Powers remains matched at a higher level.

Such developments are indeed thought-provoking, as the questions raised by SALT II concern not only the two Powers involved but all nations of the world.

Nevertheless, further negotiations seem likely to be conducted outside the scope

of the Committee on Disarmament, the sole negotiating body established by the international community to deal with all aspects of disarmament. While we view the outcome of the SALT II negotiations primarily as an intermediate stage which should lead to the early start and, we hope, the successful conclusion of SALT III negotiations, with its promise of substantive reductions in nuclear armament, it is our considered opinion that an urgent and concerted effort should be made to integrate those negotiations in a broader context, in which all nations should be entitled to participate, with a view to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

National security is of primary concern to every State, and this applies, of course, to nuclear-weapon States as well. It would be naive to assume that any State would willingly entrust an international body with responsibilities related to its vital security interests. The theory and practice of national sovereignty still represents a most cherished feature of the contemporary State. But here we are dealing with the survival of mankind and world public opinion may wonder from the sidelines whether we are witnessing a new, self-propelling trend in the ever-widening spiral of the arms race.

A potentially similar situation obtains with regard to other important issues in the disarmament and arms control fields. So far, attempts by the Committee on Disarmament to engage in meaningful multilateral negotiations on the banning and destruction of chemical weapons have failed, while technical and political aspects are being discussed in a forum where only two nations have reserved seats. The long overdue conclusion of a comprehensive test ban is similarly restricted to a very small number of partners in the negotiations. Last, but not least, an agreement finalized by the two major military Powers on the prohibition of radiological weapons was recently submitted to the Committee on disarmament, with a cogent recommendation that it be swiftly examined and sent forthwith to the General Assembly for approval.

The first year of work of the Committee on Disarmament must be assessed against this background, and it is only fair to recognize that some progress has been made despite the aforementioned distortions.

The Committee has been able to agree on rules of procedure that represent a major achievement as compared to the lopsided way in which its predecessors have functioned. Important issues such as the negotiation of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have been examined in some detail by a working group within the Committee. The Brazilian delegation shares the belief that negative assurances must be considered in the broader context of effective measures regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons and looks forward to contributing to the adoption by the General Assembly of significant measures which may be conducive to effective international arrangements against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Committee has also devoted several meetings to consideration of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Brazil believes that nuclear disarmament rightly deserves the topmost priority in multilateral efforts directed towards achieving concrete steps on the path of disarmament. A working paper submitted by the Group of 21 and a working document submitted by the Group of Socialist Countries on this question have been discussed during the 1979 session of the Committee. In connexion with both initiatives, the Brazilian delegation deems it worth while to recall that the fundamental issues concerning nuclear disarmament negotiations must be brought within the purview of the world community. Accordingly, a demarcation line should be drawn so that multilateral and bilateral negotiations complement each other and work to mutual advantage.

It might thus be possible to envisage some concrete examples or areas in which the Committee could concentrate its efforts with regard to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In this connexion, some specific nuclear disarmament issues could be brought under the scrutiny of the Committee,

such as offensive nuclear systems, be they land-based, submarine-launched or airborne. Related questions might also be usefully discussed, and, it is to be hoped, a trend towards concrete, multilateral negotiations started in the Committee. By the same token, issues deriving from the militarization of outer space come to mind, such as "passive" data-collecting systems, or sub-orbital weapon systems, or the development of offensive missiles to hunt and destroy observation satellites in outer space.

As a direct result of the special session, the United Nations Disarmament Commission met last spring, for the first time in several years, to deliberate on a comprehensive programme of disarmament. A document that reflects the precarious consensus arrived at is now before the First Committee. Brazil participated actively in the discussion that led to the drafting of that document, which still contains several areas of disagreement and, to our mind, some serious short-comings as well.

At this stage of our work, let me just point out some of the concrete concepts which are lacking and which should be an integral part of a comprehensive disarmament programme.

In its present form the document fails to identify adequately the responsibilities for disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. It also reflects the absence of agreement on the question of the non-use of nuclear weapons. Both concepts are, in our opinion, of paramount importance for the necessary balance of any comprehensive disarmament programme. Serious imbalances also appear in the items related to further steps to develop an international consensus on ways and means of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, where no explicit mention is made of the ever-increasing vertical nuclear proliferation. Finally, the document does not take into account, as regards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones, the important qualifications adopted in the Final Document of the special session.

Since it is composed of all the Members States of the United Nations, the United Nations Disarmament Commission can play an extremely important role in furthering the goal of general and complete disarmament. Without prejudice to its present functions and priorities, the United Nations Disarmament Commission might usefully perform related tasks. The Brazilian delegation believes that a suggestion put forward at the recent Conference of the United Nations on Specific Conventional Weapons, which has just adjourned in Geneva, is well worth looking into. There was considerable debate on the review mechanism of the protocols discussed at that Conference, and particularly on their follow-up through the eventual addition of new protocols to restrict or ban the use of other types of conventional weapons. It was rightly pointed out that such a mechanism should be

open to all Member States in view of the military and humanitarian aspects of the problems involved. At the same time, some States hesitate to establish permanent, independent machinery under an umbrella treaty to perform the review and follow-up functions for fear of a new type of proliferation - namely, that of international bodies. In the opinion of the Brazilian delegation, a possible solution might be to make fuller use of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, where the entire membership of this Organization is represented, and to set up within it appropriate arrangements to deal with such questions.

The momentum gained from the establishment of the new multilateral machinery to deal with disarmament ought not to be lost. Despite the lack of concrete progress in the most substantive areas, my delegation looks forward to the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament with renewed hope that real negotiations may be started without delay. To this end we deem it imperative that the Committee concentrate upon the issues which make up its agenda, particularly those to which the General Assembly has ascribed the highest priority.

The Brazilian delegation would not support any attempt to distract the Committee from the mandate and jurisdiction given to it by the General Assembly. Let our endeavours be directed towards ensuring our increasing commitment to achieve concrete disarmament measures through the established multilateral machinery already available. Let us provide clear, unequivocal guidelines to further those objectives. Most of all, let us engage in a concerted effort, with the broadest possible participation of all nations, conducive to effective nuclear disarmament. Only by approaching our task with a spirit of commitment to the priorities established by the General Assembly and by making full use of the existing multilateral machinery will we be able to fulfil the hopes and aspirations of the community of nations as a whole.

Mr. MOHAMED (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, even though it is customary for delegations to offer congratulations to the Chairman and the other members of the Bureau, you have specifically requested us not to do so. I shall therefore desist from that pleasurable task.

(Mr. Mohamed, Sri Lanka)

My delegation has asked to be allowed to speak so early in the deliberations of this Committee advisedly in the light of the very keen interest that Sri Lanka, among others, has taken in disarmament. In the past three years Sri Lanka's task in this and other forums has been not only to outline Sri Lanka's own attitude and policies in these matters but also to speak on behalf of the non-aligned countries as Chairman of the Movement. Now that Sri Lanka has, after its period of stewardship, handed over that responsibility to the current Chairman of the non-aligned countries, it is my responsibility to set out, at this very early stage in the work of this Committee, the deep and abiding interest of Sri Lanka in the subject of disarmament.

I speak as the representative of a country small in size, which has no military muscle. Yet, it is not without significance that countries like Sri Lanka and the part they could play in the disarmament process have been well recognized, as is evident from the fact that Sri Lanka has become a member of the enlarged Committee on Disarmament. Our representative on that Committee, my Minister of Foreign Affairs, when it met for the first time in January this year, referred to the manner in which we seek to play a role in disarmament matters. We are not so naive as to expect instant results in nuclear disarmament but we are indeed disappointed that the pace is so slow. If we, the smaller countries, can make our own little contribution to hasten this process, which I may call "making haste slowly", and thus help bring about some progress in this slow and tortuous process, we shall be well satisfied. We can, indeed, say that the democratization process of enlarging the field and scope of the search for disarmament has enabled us to make our own contribution.

It is in this light that we welcome the new impetus which the tenth special session began, and which has been proceeded with in seeking to implement the decisions of that session. It is indeed a matter for gratification that the resuscitated Disarmament Commission and the enlarged Committee on Disarmament have already got down to business and have established priorities in their work. The Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies has just concluded another of its sessions and we look forward to practical and worth-while results from it.

At previous meetings of this Committee as well as in other forums, the Sri Lanka delegation has pointed to the need for political will on the part of those directly involved to move away actively and meaningfully from the belief in seeking security in mutual deterrence. More than once we have urged a rethinking of priorities and goals so that the goal of disarmament need not continue to be a dim and distant one. The Sri Lanka representative in this Committee last year referred to this political will and had occasion to quote from the Secretary-General's report on the work of the Organization. We know that this year, too, the Secretary-General in his report has had occasion to point out that, "It cannot be said that the past year has witnessed any striking progress on our main problems". (A/34/1, p.3)

(Mr. Mohamed, Sri Lanka)

One cannot help but notice his harking back to the need for this political will. True, he was referring to lack of progress mainly in the economic field, but we note his assertion that "Political determination and a sense of pragmatism are necessary to reverse this debilitating situation." (<u>ibid</u>.) It is our fervent hope that, as far as the work relating to this Committee is concerned, it will be possible for the Secretary-General to report next year that at least some significant steps have been taken to demonstrate that political will or determination.

We are gratified that both the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament have got down to the work entrusted to them by the special session and the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly. The reports they have issued for our consideration give room for hope that they have set about their tasks gainfully. The procedure adopted in the Disarmament Commission in conducting its work through a Working Group of the Whole was able to achieve consensus and the report submitted to the General Assembly contains the framework for the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and we look forward to the work of the Committee on Disarmament on the elaboration of that comprehensive programme. It is our hope that we shall have this programme well in time for the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament scheduled for 1982.

The Committee on Disarmament has issued its report after meeting in two sessions during the year. Here, too, the strategy of establishing ad hoc working groups enabled the rules of procedure for the Committee to be adopted by consensus. We welcome this as most salutary. But I should like to refer to the basic function of the Committee on Disarmament. As my colleague pointed out during the sessions of the Committee, it was conceived of as a negotiating body, but what took place in Geneva was more discussion than negotiations on the subjects that were taken up there. Consequently, the report of the Committee on Disarmament which is before us, regrettably, in our view, has not moved the negotiating process any further, despite the contents of the Final Document of the tenth special

session on disarmament. It is our earnest hope that, when the Committee on Disarmament resumes its sessions in 1980, it will be able to move into meaningful negotiations instead of continuing with discussions which could go on without an end and thus lose its importance as a negotiating body. I trust the purpose in reconstituting the Committee on Disarmament and its fresh mandate should not be forgotten. Our position was made clear by our Foreign Minister, His Excellency Shahul Hameed, at the inauguration of the Committee on Disarmament when he said:

"While not discounting the advances made in the negotiating body in the past, we regard this Committee as a significant new beginning aimed at giving the disarmament process a new and decisive impetus. The increase in its membership, the adoption of its own rules of procedure, the appointment of its Secretary, the rotation of its Chairmanship, the adoption of its own agenda, the provision for the participation of States not members of the Committee - these we regard not as mere tokens but as tangible evidence of the Committee's new role and the expectations of the international community from its members." (CD/PV.2, p. 30)

I wish to recall my earlier remarks about the interest of countries like mine which have no military muscle. Yet, for all that, our interest in disarmament is genuine and deep-rooted for the simple reason that the arms race and its escalation divert those very resources that can be employed most usefully for the development of the developing world. Hence the work now being done by the Group of Governmental Experts on the relationship between disarmament and development is of crucial concern to us. We are not unmindful of how progress in the field of disarmament can vitally contribute to the establishment of a New International Economic Order. Sri Lanka has urged in that Group that in studying the redeployment of the resources the resource requirements arising out of the aims related to the New International Economic Order should be examined.

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(Mr. Mohamed, Sri Lanka)

Finally, I wish to refer to an initiative that was taken by President Jayewardene at the tenth special session devoted to disarmament with his proposal for a world disarmament authority, which was listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document along with other proposals made by individual countries. Resolution 33/71 L adopted last year by the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to transmit them "to the deliberative and negotiating as well as the studying organs dealing with the question of disarmament". We are gratified that this has been done and, even though these bodies have so far been preoccupied with other items of priority, it is our hope that, as the resolution requested, they will be in a position to report on the state of the consideration of these proposals to the General Assembly next year at the thirty-fifth session.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.