

# COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 14 June 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Ijewere

(Nigeria)

GE.83-61741

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia:

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. L. TINDEMANS

Mr. A. ONKELINK

Mr. L. LENARTS

Mr. Ch. RAULIER

Mr. T. DE GRUBEN

Mr. M. GELEYN

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Mr. B. DE CALATAY

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. C. PRAMOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN

China:

Mr. LIN ZHEN

Mr. PAN ZHENQIANG

Mr. YU ZHONGZHOU

Mrs. ZHOU YUNHUA

Mr. CHANG TONG

Mr. HU SHAO DI

Cuba:

Mr. L. SOLA VILA  
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Ms. M. SLAMOVA  
Mr. A. CIMA  
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. A.M. ABBAS  
Ms. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE  
Ms. K. SINEGIORGIS  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. F. SAYATZ  
Mr. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. F. ELBE  
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. N.J. SUTRESNA  
Mr. N. WISNOEMERTI  
Mrs. P. RAMADHAN  
Mr. M. JALALUDDIN

Iran:

Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. B. CABRAS

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI

Mr. M. KONISHI

Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mr. P.M. RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN

Mr. J. RAMAKER

Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

Mr. A.N.C. NWAQZOMUDOH

Mr. J.O. OBOH

Mr. L.O. AKINDELE

Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD

Peru:

Mr. V. ROJAS

Mr. C. CASTILLO

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY

Sweden:

Mrs. M.B. THEORIN  
Mr. R. EKEUS  
Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS  
Mr. G. EKHOLM  
Mr. S. ASK  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. O. DAHLMAN  
Mrs. A. LAU-ERIKSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.M. GANJA  
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV  
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO  
Mr. V.M. TATARNIKOV  
Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M.D. BUSBY  
Mr. R. SCOTT  
Mr. J. TIERNEY  
Mr. J. GUNDERSON  
Mr. J. McATEER  
Mr. R. HORNE

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA

Director-General of the  
United Nations Office at Geneva:

Mr. E. SUY

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 217th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

May I first of all extend a warm welcome to His Excellency Mr. Leo Tindemans, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium. Mr. Tindemans has been a member of the House of Representatives of Belgium since 1961, as well as a member of the European Parliament. He also held several Cabinet posts before becoming Prime Minister of Belgium between 1974 and 1978. He is in addition a Professor at the Catholic University of Louvain. I am sure that the Committee will listen with particular interest to his statement.

I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome in the Committee the new representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Harald Rose, and of Poland, Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski, and also Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of Sweden. I wish them all a very successful tour of duty in Geneva.

I am sure we are all extremely sorry to learn that Ambassador Curt Lidgard will be leaving us shortly. On behalf of the Committee, I should like to acknowledge his distinguished service and his valuable contributions in this Committee. I am glad to say that he will continue to be Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons until the end of this session.

I shall now make my statement, after which I shall call upon the speakers inscribed for today.

I would first of all like to thank my predecessor, His Excellency, Ambassador Franz van Dongen of the Netherlands, for the very able and distinguished manner in which he chaired the Committee's deliberations during the month of April. There is no doubt that, thanks to his rich and varied experience as a seasoned diplomat, he discharged his duties with admirable grace and competence.

So much has been said about the very limited achievements of this Committee that one is getting used to a perpetual state of failure. In addition to the well-known problems associated with disarmament negotiations we also encounter procedural and organizational problems like those we had to contend with at the beginning of the spring part of the session.

We hope that the Committee on Disarmament will urgently take concrete measures to allay the well-founded fears of the vast majority of humankind, as very well expressed by the numerous non-governmental organizations in their support for more concrete results in the field of disarmament negotiations. In this regard, the United States bishops' pastoral letter of 3 May on war and peace is relevant. The American bishops' pastoral letter not only confirms that "people are more frightened about what would happen if irresponsible parties unleash some nuclear war", but it also calls for "more purposeful negotiations under the supervision of a global body realistically fashioned to do its job". Such a body, according to the pastoral letter, "must be given the equipment to keep constant surveillance on the entire earth. Present technology makes this possible. It must have the authority, freely conferred upon it by all the nations, to investigate what seem to be preparations for war by any one of them ... It must be so constituted as to pose no threat to any nation's sovereignty. Obviously, the creation of such a sophisticated instrumentality is a gigantic task, but is it hoping for too much to believe that the genius of humanity ... is able to accomplish it?"; Ladies and gentlemen, the American bishops were probably thinking of an ideal Disarmament Committee with all the political and technological support it needs to function effectively.

(The Chairman)

However, we, as members of the Committee on Disarmament know how hard we have been working. As Chairman for the month of June, I do not intend to dwell on why we have not met the expectations of the world community. It is my privilege to urge us this morning within this idyllic and historic setting to give the best of ourselves. This is because if the Committee on Disarmament is to assert its relevance to the global search for peace and also to get anywhere near satisfying the yearnings of the vast majority of mankind who are calling for concrete progress in disarmament negotiations, the various actors in the arms race must demonstrate the necessary political will and flexibility with a view to undertaking meaningful negotiations in order that "freed from the bondage of war that holds it captive in its threat, the world will at last be able to address its problems and make genuine human progress so that every day there may be more freedom, more food and more opportunity for every human being who walks the face of the earth".

As the Committee is well aware, we are expected to embark on serious and meaningful negotiations aimed at achieving concrete results on a number of priority disarmament issues. These include the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling and deployment of chemical weapons, the submission of a clean draft comprehensive programme of disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session in consonance with the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly and the question of a mandate for and the setting up of a working group on the prevention of nuclear war. We also have the subject of the broadening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, the question of the enhancement of the Committee's effectiveness, its redesignation, and other items on the agenda.

At this juncture, it may be worth while to affirm that the virtual consensus and the momentum achieved during the spring session in favour of a future chemical weapons convention should be maintained and carried to its logical conclusion.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Belgium, Sweden, Indonesia and Morocco. I now call on the distinguished Foreign Minister of Belgium, Mr. Leo Tindemans.

Mr. TINDEMANS (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I deeply appreciate the opportunity I have been given today of addressing the Committee on Disarmament on the first day of its summer session, and I have pleasure in conveying to its members, on behalf of the Government and the people of Belgium, the expression of our interest and our encouragement for the work you have done and the efforts you have made on the important topics on your agenda.

It is, I believe, of profound significance that I should be expressing this message in the city of Geneva, which has for so long been a symbol of the desire for international peace, reconciliation and co-operation.

I should also like to offer you my warm congratulations, Mr. Chairman, on your assumption of the important responsibilities you are to exercise during the month of June. The Federal Republic of Nigeria, which you represent, is not only a country with which Belgium maintains particularly friendly and fruitful relations but also a State of the non-aligned world, whose aspirations for peace and justice among peoples we uphold, and whose contribution to the achievement of collective security we consider essential.



(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

I should also like to extend these congratulations to your predecessor, the representative of the Netherlands, and to thank him for his particularly effective contribution to the Committee's work during the month of April.

In recent years, a sense of insecurity and instability has taken possession of many regions of our planet, and this situation is coming to be seen by the world as a whole as one of the fateful concomitants of our progress towards the year 2000. The disarray brought about by the world economic crisis has led to countless acts of aggression, invasions, tensions and conflicts and a regrettable waning of the ideals of conciliation and arbitration. The spectre of military rivalry and of possible confrontations is part of our daily life in a changing world often marked by violence and upheaval. It is perhaps in societies such as our own, where the freedom of the individual has expanded to an unprecedented degree, that this anxiety at the threatened loss of security develops most easily -- that security which, as de Tocqueville foresaw, is the first among freedoms as it is the necessary precondition for all the others. The spectre of nuclear war is naturally at the forefront of our present concern. We European States are particularly alive to the nuclear danger; and our anxiety has inevitably increased over recent years as we have come to realize more clearly the specific threat that will arise for us from the deployment of a new type of medium-range nuclear weapons, creating the conditions for a limited war in Europe. The existence of these weapons makes us vulnerable to political pressures, possibly accompanied by threats, designed to isolate us from our allies and thus to jeopardize our security.

For the States of Western Europe, which have so often experienced war, there is no other option but peace. This is why, given the new factors of instability and insecurity, we would appeal to the international community and urge that we should together apply ourselves to laying the foundations of a firm structure in whose shelter we may continue to live in peace.

Unfortunately, the discouragement of war is not simply a matter of armament levels. The political behaviour of States plays an essential part in it. Peace cannot be built without moderation and tolerance, without an absence of threats, without the renunciation of the use of political or military force. A peaceful world can be built only if the liberties of States are respected, if there are no political pressures from more powerful entities.

After the promising results of the 1960s and early 1970s, the negotiations on arms control and disarmament virtually came to a halt. This regrettable situation was due essentially to the deterioration in international relations. Although we may deplore it, we have to accept the fact that there is a natural link between the international political climate and the possibilities for negotiation. Fortunately, this is not always a one-way relationship, and sometimes tangible results in talks on arms levels can have an effect on the political relations between the negotiating States. Thus, negotiations such as the SALT talks or the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have made an appreciable contribution to the improvement of political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is therefore to be hoped that the negotiations currently under way in Geneva on medium-range nuclear weapons on the one hand and on strategic arms reductions on the other will bear fruit and help to create a better climate. The interdependence of the climate of political relations and success in disarmament and arms control efforts no longer needs to be demonstrated.

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

It is because they were convinced of this that the countries of the Atlantic alliance took the initiative, in December 1979, of offering the disarmament option as an alternative to the programme for the deployment of nuclear weapons which was considered essential in order to counter the specific new threat that had arisen to the security of western Europe.

The great originality of this approach, the extent to which it represented a new departure in the search for security, has perhaps not been recognized clearly enough. To our knowledge, it was the first time that such an offer had been put forward in so coherent a manner. For what was offered -- an offer which remains valid -- was a choice between disarmament and the pursuit of a hopeless escalation which has already lasted too long. How often in the past have those working for disarmament not deplored the fact that negotiations are envisaged only after the weapons disrupting the balance have been acquired and deployed?

That is what happened in the case of the deployment by the USSR of a whole arsenal of medium-range SS-20 missiles, whose presence quantitatively and qualitatively alters the security conditions of western Europe. It is to this threat that we have responded, since 1979, by offering the choice to which I referred a moment ago, which is, to put it in other terms, a choice between balance at the lowest level and balance at the highest level. Can there be any reasonable doubt as to what the right choice should be?

Progress in the disarmament field takes place only through negotiations, and negotiations are only promising when they seek to establish or restore a balance. This concept of balance is naturally a complex one, for it rests not only on objective facts but also on the perception of the threat, and in assessing this threat, in a continent where the concentration of weapons is as high as it is in Europe, it is impossible not to take into account both conventional weapons and nuclear weapons.

The negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons arose from the concern of the countries of western Europe at the deployment -- added to an imbalance in conventional forces -- of these terrifying nuclear weapons whose target is Europe and Europe alone (and which, it must be stressed, are unable to reach the other nuclear superpower).

To prevent the deployment now of equivalent weapons by the West while leaving that alarming arsenal in place would be an approach that failed to take account of the security needs of western Europe and would, in addition, jeopardize any future disarmament negotiations, should one of the parties perceive that it can attain its goals without making concessions. Belgium therefore continues to favour a solution which would eliminate all longer medium-range nuclear weapons from arsenals. It is to be hoped that the negotiators will succeed in finding a solution for their elimination, in a single stage if possible, but in several stages if necessary. In expressing this hope, I should like to say that while I am fully aware of the right of public opinion to be kept informed about developments in the negotiations, I nevertheless believe that the talks should be held in an atmosphere of greater calm if they are to have the best possible chance of success. The time for polemics is past, and in the difficult phase through which we are now passing the governments concerned should display the greatest possible moderation in the expression of their views and, above all, continuously support the efforts of their negotiators.



(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

With regard to the START talks, it may be recalled that even during the SALT negotiations Belgium and other countries consistently called on the parties to the talks to adopt negotiating positions aimed at substantial reductions in strategic arms. Consequently, we cannot but welcome the approach advocated by the United States in the negotiations as well as the willingness also expressed by the Soviet Union to reach agreement on a substantial reduction in strategic weapon systems.

Time is running out for the achievement of concrete results in the field of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban, one of the priority items on the agenda of your Committee. Good use must be made of this year, 1983, if the next NPT Review Conference, to be held in 1985, is not to be too formidable a task for the international community. For at that conference the non-nuclear-weapon States will take stock, as they did in 1980, of the efforts accomplished to reverse the trend in the nuclear-arms race. If the regime of horizontal non-proliferation, to which Belgium remains firmly attached, is to be maintained, the balance-sheet drawn up at the conference must include positive and encouraging aspects.

As Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, pointed out here in Geneva, on 15 February last, there are aspects of the development of conventional weapons which are in the final analysis at least as worrying as the nuclear arsenals. As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, their design and deployment are based strictly on the deterrent role ascribed to them. They are there to ensure that the threat they represent will discourage a potential aggressor and that, ultimately, it will not be necessary to use them. The same also applies to so-called conventional weapons, inasmuch as nuclear weapons act as a self-deterrent because of their mutual assured destruction capability. As a result of advanced technologies, conventional weapons, too, are destined to become weapons capable of destroying human societies. In economic terms, such weapons represent more than 80 per cent of world military expenditure. There is no question here of horizontal non-proliferation. The hecatombs of the two world conflicts of this century were caused by conventional weapons alone. For reasons both of economic development and of global or regional security, Belgium regrets that, side by side with the work on nuclear disarmament, greater efforts are not being made by the international community to regulate, limit and, tomorrow, reduce conventional arsenals.

It seems to me that this is a duty incumbent upon all our States, a duty which the United Nations, and particularly the Committee on Disarmament, should no longer be able to neglect, once the General Assembly has before it the report currently being prepared by a group of international experts.

Belgium hopes that the Committee on Disarmament will play a substantial part in the efforts which will be made during the rest of this year to give fresh impetus to the disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

The Committee's role as an international forum is unique. The Belgian Government is fully aware of the growing importance of that role, to which it wishes to lend its wholehearted support. It is for this reason that, following the example of several States members of the Committee, I have the pleasure of announcing to you today the appointment of a special ambassador for Belgium to the Committee on Disarmament. A special ambassador for peace questions will also be appointed shortly. In this way, we hope to enhance our contribution to the international community's action aimed at obtaining concrete results in these areas.

The Committee has yet to demonstrate its ability to finalize international treaties relating to the limitation or elimination of armaments. During the 1960s and the early 1970s, a start was made on the adoption of international legislation in this sphere. This legislative effort should be resumed as soon as possible. Since joining the Committee in 1979, Belgium has always advocated the identification of specific topics suitable for negotiations. Although important work has been done in recent years, particularly on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Committee has often wasted time on lengthy procedural discussions or academic debates sometimes on abstract subjects hardly lending themselves to negotiation. It is generally agreed that this year once again the most promising topic is that of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Belgium, on whose territory asphyxiating gases were used in an armed conflict for the first time in history, hopes that the Committee will devote all the necessary resources to these negotiations, which have reached a sufficiently advanced stage to permit their conclusion in the fairly near future. A willingness to negotiate was reaffirmed, here in the Committee on Disarmament at the beginning of this year by Mr. Bush, the Vice-President of the United States, and at the second special session of the General Assembly by the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gromyko. In this connection, Belgium was encouraged by the proposals made at that time by the Soviet Union concerning systematic international on-site inspection, even if those proposals have not been sufficiently elaborated since then.

Concerned at the virulent discussions which have developed in recent decades as a result of allegations of the use in combat of chemical warfare agents, I put forward in New York in June 1982 detailed proposals for monitoring compliance with the prohibitions on their use laid down in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Since then, other suggestions have been made for dealing with this problem, both in the General Assembly and here in the Committee on Disarmament itself. Nevertheless, we consider that our proposal remains valid and should be kept in mind when considering the legal aspects of the scope of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Starting from the idea that the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological weapons has, after the passage of more than 50 years, become universally accepted, it seeks solely to improve the range of concrete measures available to the international community to ensure compliance with this prohibition. However, I repeat, the negotiation of a convention on chemical weapons is a priority matter and Belgium expects the Committee to devote the time necessary to it in order to produce the text of a treaty as soon as possible.



(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

Another significant international agreement is within the Committee's grasp and that is an agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons. If such an agreement were to be concluded, it could not only prohibit radiological weapons but also initiate a more comprehensive regulation than at present exists of the prohibition of deliberate attacks upon civilian nuclear installations. In order to facilitate these negotiations, Belgium intends to prepare a proposal for the inclusion in the convention of an undertaking to negotiate on the prohibition of attacks upon civilian nuclear installations. At the same time, we would endeavour to establish the precise modalities for implementing that undertaking without delay.

On these topics of chemical and radiological weapons, as well as on the other items under discussion within the Committee, particularly a nuclear test ban and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, adequate verification measures must be established if we are to be successful. In the history of disarmament efforts since the Second World War, the discussions on verification have no doubt assumed such importance because of a fundamental opposition between the approach of the western countries and that of the socialist countries, an opposition due in large part to the political and military concepts and the types of society prevailing in the two groups of countries. We feel that with the passage of time a better understanding has developed of the absolute necessity of establishing adequate verification systems for international agreements in the field of disarmament. New verification technologies have been developed; efforts have been made to reach a synthesis, and it may be hoped that, in view of the recent position statements of the protagonists on this topic, in future disarmament negotiations the obstacle of verification will no longer be the stumbling block it has often been in the past.

In connection with the question of verification, there is the need to facilitate access to mutual knowledge of our respective defence efforts. Here again, many obstacles remain to be overcome. One possibility for progress is offered us by the reporting instrument for military budgets developed within the United Nations. If we are one day successfully to discuss proposals for the reduction of military budgets, it is first necessary that an instrument of comparability should have been developed which will make it possible to carry on negotiations in a climate of trust.

I therefore invite all States, and particularly those that are militarily the most important, to co-operate in this data collection effort so that the international community may have at its disposal credible bases for comparison. My country, along with others, has unilaterally given this token of trust and we are awaiting a similar step from others, in particular the Soviet Union and its allies, whose contribution to European security, and hence to world security, is essential. I also urge all States to follow up the initiative of my former Austrian colleague, Mr. Willibald Pahr, which was recently the subject of a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, in which States are invited to publish for the international community, in addition to information of a purely budgetary character, supplementary information on their military potential. The international community should be prepared, on a basis of equality, to advance towards greater transparency in military programming and potentials.

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

In this connection, I believe that an area which we could usefully explore is that of mutual information on conditions of military service and other similar civic duties in the various countries. The conditions of military service have a direct effect on the size and state of readiness of armed forces. They are therefore an important element of comparison, in particular on a regional basis. At a later stage, it is conceivable that these States could seek to harmonize the conditions of these military obligations, in particular with a view to reducing the length of service, possibly with the substitution of civic activities, and without necessarily increasing the professional contingent of armed forces. I am not asking the Committee on Disarmament to take up this matter, which at the present stage falls rather within the purview of other appropriate bodies of the United Nations, but have mentioned this suggestion here in the hope that delegations will begin at once to give some preliminary thought to the matter. A regional approach to this question may perhaps initially be more promising than a global effort of harmonization. This is often the case with endeavours relating to security and disarmament. The initiative taken a few years ago by Belgium in the General Assembly with a view to encouraging a regional approach to disarmament is now well known to all.

The fact that at its thirty-seventh session the General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution calling on governments to consult on possible regional disarmament measures provides strong encouragement for our efforts. The regional approach to disarmament has been thoroughly studied by the General Assembly. The chief virtue of this detailed consideration has been to answer the doubts and fears expressed by a number of delegations concerning the concept itself. The regions are now in a position to undertake their own experiments, with the possible assistance of the United Nations. A system has been established which will make it possible to compare the experiments undertaken in full respect for the freedom of States and of the regions themselves.

All this reflection on the regional approach has made it possible to see more clearly how much the regions are interrelated and how much the security of each is the concern of all. I would ask member States of this Committee, and beyond them all States of the world, to make the fullest use of the possibilities offered by General Assembly resolution 37/100 F. Regional disarmament efforts could be undertaken in all parts of the world, and it will no doubt be possible in the near future for regional organizations to play a part in promoting and encouraging them.

The last subject which I should like to touch upon before bringing this necessarily incomplete statement to a close concerns the anxiety so often expressed at the nuclear threat, to which I referred at the beginning of my statement. Belgium shares the concern of the delegations endeavouring to elaborate concrete measures aimed at preventing war, and particularly nuclear war. I think that a new sphere of action is open here to the international community. I do not believe that the role of the Committee on Disarmament in this sphere should be confined to the conduct of theoretical debates. I believe that the most useful contribution which the Committee could make to the international community would be to advocate very specific and easily negotiable measures. At the end of the spring part of the Committee's session, the Belgian delegation put forward a proposal aimed at identifying confidence-building measures in the context of the prevention of nuclear war.



(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

I should like today to appeal to all the nuclear-weapon powers to negotiate both among themselves and with the international community, possibly within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament, on measures designed to build confidence and avert the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. These nuclear-weapon States have already negotiated, on a bilateral basis, a number of limited measures relating to nuclear information, notification of activities, prevention of accidents, behaviour, consultations in the event of crisis and communications. New proposals have been put forward this year by the President of the United States to the USSR, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization States have echoed them. Apart from these bilateral efforts, which we hope will soon reach a successful outcome, there is an enormous potential for supplementing the existing measures and applying them to all nuclear-weapon States.

This multilateralization of concrete measures would meet a need which is felt more and more widely by very broad sectors of the international community and has been voiced within this Committee. The beginnings of a dialogue among the five nuclear-weapon powers, on the basis of full respect for the positions of each on nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban, would constitute major progress and represent an important political achievement which the international community would be wrong to disregard. Under such an approach, the non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which have chosen the path of non-alignment, could also put forward their own particular concerns with regard to the risk of nuclear war. In this way, and through modalities which would remain to be defined, an international agreement could cover, for example, the areas which Belgium identified in its communication to the Committee on Disarmament.

I venture to hope that this suggestion on the part of my country will help towards the more precise determination of the contribution which the Committee on Disarmament can make in the area of the prevention of nuclear war, to which it has decided now to devote a part of its efforts.

Allow me to express the hope that on the eve of the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Committee on Disarmament, your work may at last lead to tangible results which will demonstrate the Committee's ability to negotiate international agreements and so give our peoples new grounds for optimism.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Britt Theorin.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): Ambassador Ijewere, before I turn to the subject of my intervention today I should like to welcome you as Chairman. I am convinced that under your guidance the Committee will get down to work very rapidly and that it will make great progress. I should also like to express the thanks of the Swedish delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador van Dongen of the Netherlands, for the effective manner in which he conducted the work of the Committee during the last part of the spring session.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

May I also take this opportunity to welcome Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic and Ambassador Turbanski of Poland. I look forward to co-operating with them in the important tasks ahead of us.

My predecessor, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, in her address to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) here in Geneva on 1 August 1962 stressed the necessity of, as she said, "an immediate stop to all testing -- today".

That was more than 20 years ago.

Today, we have every reason to reiterate this demand. No issue is now blocking international disarmament as much as the absence of serious negotiations on the ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. No course would be more sensible than the immediate cessation of all testing of nuclear weapons.

What has, in fact, happened during these more than 20 years?

The arms race has accelerated: sharply rising military expenditures, a constant stream of new records for the international arms trade and a dramatic increase in investment in military research and development are characteristics of the last two decades. The most significant development, however, is the persistent amassing of increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons constitute the most imminent of all threats to the survival of the human race. This threat is drawing nearer and nearer. It is most strongly felt in Europe, where the two power blocs confront one another. But the survival of the whole world is at stake. Nuclear disarmament is, therefore, the life-and-death issue of our time.

The total prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons must be the obvious starting point of every nuclear disarmament process. For more than a quarter of a century it has been regarded as a crucial measure necessary to halt the nuclear arms race. This has year after year been stated by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The importance of a comprehensive test ban has long been deeply rooted in international opinion. A comprehensive test-ban treaty has been given first priority by the unanimous decisions of the member States of this Committee.

I shall devote my statement today entirely to this crucial question.

Every attempt to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty has failed. A partial test-ban treaty was concluded in 1963. This Treaty banned nuclear-weapon test explosions, and any other nuclear explosion, in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It contributed significantly to the reduction of radioactive contamination of the atmosphere. As an arms limitation or disarmament measure, however, it was of very limited importance. It actually permitted testing underground. And since all nuclear-weapon powers did not become parties to the partial test-ban treaty the testing of nuclear weapons continued -- even above ground -- also in the southern hemisphere, where there is no nuclear-weapon power. Everyone knows the alternative to a comprehensive test-ban treaty: it is a continued nuclear arms race.



(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

In the partial test-ban Treaty the nuclear-weapon powers undertook to seek to achieve a stop to any test explosion of nuclear weapons for all time, and stated that they were determined to continue negotiations to this end. This commitment was reaffirmed in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968. But now, 20 years later, no real negotiations are being conducted on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. On the contrary, it is being openly stated by one of the Superpowers that such a treaty is only a long-term goal within the framework of nuclear disarmament.

Since 1945 -- when the first atom bombs shocked the world -- bombs which are many thousand times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb have been exploded. Such tests continue year after year at an unabating rate -- on an average, one test a week. This entitles us to speak of a fatal threat to the whole human race. And we must not be inveigled into believing that the nuclear arms race can go on year after year without increasing the risk that it will one day end in a final catastrophe -- the world will be turned into a "republic of insects", to borrow Jonathan Schell's words.

It is becoming more and more difficult for the nuclear-weapon powers morally to defend their behaviour -- to defend why they let year after year go by without achieving any substantive results, at the same time as the warning signals from the incessant testing of nuclear weapons are ringing in our ears.

The nuclear-weapon powers are responsible for the fact that so far we have not been able to take the final step -- to close up the loopholes and agree on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This does enormous damage to their credibility. They are evidently prepared to make only a gesture of disarmament and arms limitation when some type of weapon has become obsolete or when further weapons development has lost any military usefulness. They are playing a deceitful game against the world's need for peace and common security. It is a great disservice to all serious disarmament efforts.

It is also a great disservice to their own security. The very possession of nuclear weapons is a factor of insecurity. The risk of becoming the target of a nuclear attack is obvious.

And, furthermore, what kind of world will we have in a couple of years' time when the number of nuclear-weapon powers may be even greater? Where is such a horizontal proliferation going to stop? The nuclear-weapon powers should be aware of their responsibility and fulfil their legal and political obligations.

The reinitiation of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty has been an urgent matter for many years. The longer such negotiations are delayed, the more the inherent risks will increase. Time is not working in our favour. Politics and policies change. The pressure from the peace movements, the churches, professional groups and other concerned citizens is mounting. It is bound to yield results, and I am convinced that responsible politicians will have to respond to this growing public concern.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

It is in this spirit that the Swedish delegation today submits a draft comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. It is a revised and considerably extended version of the draft treaty submitted by Sweden in 1977 (CCD/526 and CCD/526/Rev.1).

In making this new draft we have taken into consideration developments since 1977, above all the report from the trilateral talks between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union (CD/130), and the changing attitudes towards, for instance, on-site inspection. We have also considered new working papers and proposals from individual countries, notably the contributions made by Australia (CD/95), the Netherlands (CD/312), and the Soviet Union (CD/346). We have, of course, also taken into account the progress made in the Committee on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. As you will note, we have for the first time endeavoured to elaborate the texts of three draft protocols in order to provide a more concrete basis for the discussions on these matters.

The draft treaty presented today is an honest attempt to find a compromise that should be acceptable to all as a basis for serious negotiations.

The technical achievements in the field of verification are such that a viable international verification system is now within reach.

My delegation fails to see any insurmountable technical obstacles to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The only reason for a country to refuse seriously to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty is its own desire to continue the testing and development of nuclear weapons against the will of an overwhelming majority of the peoples of the world. This is a huge responsibility.

I shall comment on the individual articles in some detail later, but let me first say a few words about the general principles which have guided my delegation in its work on this draft treaty.

In a world where the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is obvious, it is more important than ever that a comprehensive test-ban treaty be designed so as to attract universal adherence. It must, therefore, be non-discriminatory.

The problem of preventing peaceful nuclear explosions from being used as a back door to the further refinement or the acquisition of nuclear weapons must be solved in such a way that it does not discriminate against any party to the treaty. This is not an easy matter, and it is, therefore, important to establish a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions in order not to further delay the long overdue complete ban on nuclear-weapon testing.

It has been widely recognized, inter alia, in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, that the nuclear-weapon powers possessing the most important nuclear arsenals bear a special responsibility for achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament. For this reason it is required in the

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

present draft that those nuclear-weapon powers should have ratified the treaty before it enters into force. However, as regards the remaining nuclear-weapon powers, it goes without saying that there is a limit to the time one can tolerate their continued testing. This limit has been set at five years in the draft treaty.

Let me, in this context, renew the appeal made by many other countries to China and France to reconsider their decision not to participate in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

An adequate verification system is a most important element in a comprehensive test-ban treaty as it is in all arms control and disarmament agreements. The legitimate right and duty of all countries to participate in the verification of international treaties to which they are parties must be recognized. This political recognition must be supported by international technical arrangements that will make it possible for all countries to possess essentially the same verification possibilities. International co-operative measures are also the corner-stone of the verification arrangements of this draft treaty.

These seismological measures, supplemented by surveillance of airborne radioactivity should, in combination with the proposed procedures for consultation and on-site-inspection, in our view provide an adequate verification system acceptable to all.

The Swedish Government is deeply committed to the work of establishing such international verification arrangements. I take this opportunity to reaffirm the offer of the Swedish Government to establish, operate and finance an international data centre in Sweden and also to contribute data from our Hagfors Observatory to such an international data exchange.

I will now present our draft treaty in more detail.

The purpose is to obtain a comprehensive treaty prohibiting any nuclear-weapon test explosion in any environment, by all countries and for all time.

As to explosions for peaceful purposes, a moratorium should be established until appropriate international arrangements for conducting such explosions have been worked out. It is suggested in the draft treaty that the parties keep under consideration the question of arrangements for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis, including the aspect of precluding military benefits.

The treaty should be open to all States for signature and it is our hope that all countries will find it possible to adhere to the treaty. The treaty will enter into force when at least 20 governments, including the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, have become parties to it. If this treaty has not been adhered to by all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within five years after its entry into force, each party will have the right to withdraw from the treaty.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

In our view, the verification arrangements must be part of the treaty and thus be worked out and ready for implementation when the treaty enters into force. We are therefore presenting three draft protocols containing provisions for an international data exchange, for on-site inspections and for a consultative committee.

The suggested arrangements for the international exchange of seismological and other data are based on the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. The international system has three basic elements, national recording stations, the data exchange system to be carried out through the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization and, finally, international data centres. Each party should have the right to participate in the international data exchange by providing data from stations in its territory and by receiving all data made available through the exchange. To ensure that from the very beginning the station network has the necessary global coverage, agreements to contribute data should be made in advance with a number of countries. The stations designated to participate in the international exchange should have the same basic equipment and be operated, calibrated and maintained according to agreed specifications to be given in an operational manual for seismic stations.

Seismic data from designated stations should routinely be reported through the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization or through other agreed communication channels. In addition to data thus submitted, each country should provide any additional data from its designated stations requested by any party to the treaty. The data to be reported, the reporting format and time schedule, as well as the procedures for the international exchange of these data, are to be laid down in an operational manual for data exchange.

International data centres should be established at agreed locations. Each centre should be under the jurisdiction of and financed by the party on whose territory it is located. Each international data centre should receive all contributed data, process these data without assessing the nature of observed events and make the processed data available to all parties. An operational manual for international data centres should also be worked out containing a specification of procedures to be followed at such centres.

In addition to an exchange of seismological data, the exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity should be established. This exchange could be organized in a way similar to seismological data exchange and utilizing the same international data centres. The possibility of including additional measures such as hydro-acoustic signals in oceans and infrasound and micro-barographic signals in the atmosphere could also be considered. An operational manual must be worked out for such additional measures.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

All parties to the treaty should, through the data provided by the international data exchange or through their national means of verification, obtain the technical data needed to verify the treaty. The parties should, further, through bilateral or multilateral consultations, co-operate in good faith to clarify any event relevant to the subject matter of this treaty. Each should, in that respect, be entitled to request and receive information from any other party.

Each party should further be entitled to request an on-site inspection for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not a specified event was a nuclear explosion. A party may also invite on-site inspection in its own territory of large non-nuclear explosions or of any other events where it finds that such inspections might allay unfounded suspicion. The procedures for international inspections, including the rights and functions of the inspecting personnel, are laid down in a separate protocol.

The purpose of an international on-site inspection is purely fact-finding, and the inspection team should not make any assessment as to the nature of the inspected event, but only present a factual report of the observations made during the inspection. We have found that the technical material which is available and compiled today on the various inspection techniques and their potential usefulness is insufficient to propose a treaty text in this respect. The task of compiling such necessary additional technical material should be given to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

A consultative committee should be established to oversee the implementation of the treaty and of the international verification arrangements. The consultative committee should also serve as a forum to discuss and resolve disputes concerning the treaty and its verification arrangements that might arise between parties to the treaty. Any party would be entitled to make inquiries in the committee and receive answers. They could also request an international on-site inspection and receive the factual results of such an inspection.

A technical expert group and a permanent secretariat should assist the consultative committee. The technical expert group, which should be open to all parties, should evaluate the technical performance of the international verification measures and propose changes in equipment and technical procedures. It should also be a forum for technical discussions of events of which a party seeks clarification through international measures.

The permanent secretariat should assist the consultative committee and the technical expert group. It should, inter alia, supervise that the technical components of the international data exchange are operated as specified in the



(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

treaty. The secretariat should compile and present operational statistics to the technical expert group. The secretariat should also serve as the point of contact for co-operation with international organizations such as WMO.

It is our hope that this draft treaty presented today will facilitate serious political negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. As I have mentioned, additional technical material is, however, needed. In our view the task of providing this technical material should be given to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

My Government is presenting this draft comprehensive test-ban treaty in order to give a new impetus to the disarmament negotiations in the nuclear field.

The draft treaty with its protocol demonstrates that a combination of verification measures, such as seismic means, surveillance of airborne radioactivity and on-site inspection, creates the opportunity to establish a sound and reliable verification system.

This is now a definite possibility to lay the necessary foundation for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Certainly, considerable political and technical problems remain to be solved.

The technical obstacles are manageable. The present draft clearly shows that.

The political obstacles may be more difficult. However, the opportunity of creating a viable international verification system may help in shaping a political will, so sadly lacking up to this time.

The world's leaders should by now start to become aware of what has so long been obvious to all non-nuclear-weapon nations.

The nuclear-arms race is futile. Instead of creating security, it breeds insecurity for all. The first step towards nuclear disarmament -- and thus towards enhanced security -- should be the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

We have a responsibility. We are getting the means. This is a chance. Let us together take this step now.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Sweden for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Sutresna.

Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, it is indeed a great pleasure for my delegation to welcome you, the representative of a non-aligned and friendly country, as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the first month of the second part of the Committee's session this year. Relations between our two countries, Nigeria and Indonesia, have always been and will continue to be warm and cordial, despite the great geographical distance separating us. I would like to assure you of my delegation's support and co-operation in the discharge of your difficult task.

May I also take this opportunity to convey my delegation's thanks and appreciation to Ambassador van Dongen of the Netherlands for his effective leadership and wisdom in leading the Committee during its work last April.

My delegation would also like to welcome Ambassador Kamyab of Iran, Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland and Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden as new members of the family of the Committee on Disarmament. I wish to offer them the co-operation of my delegation. In this connection, my delegation is gratified to see that Ambassador Lidgard will continue to be with us to chair the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. His contributions to the Committee and to the Group of 21 in the past are greatly appreciated by my delegation, and I am sure, by all of us here. My delegation wishes him success in his future assignment.

The inclusion of the item, Prevention of nuclear war, in the agenda for the year 1983 is a manifestation of the Committee's growing concern over the survival of humankind that has been relentlessly voiced by the world community. It is based on the conviction that our Committee could and should contribute to the efforts toward the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war which is recognized by all as an immediate goal in the final objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Such an inclusion, specifically, is a response to the request directed to our Committee in United Nations General Assembly resolution 37/78 I, which reads, "to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of a nuclear war."

Our endeavour is both relevant and timely. The Committee on Disarmament can no longer adopt an evasive stance on this serious issue, particularly in view of the strained relations between the Superpowers, the impasse in bilateral/trilateral negotiations and the alarming pace of the nuclear arms race, as well as the conflict and tension that tend to engulf various regions of the world. It was precisely because of this gloomy situation that the non-aligned countries issued a message, during their Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government in New Delhi in March this year which, inter alia, expresses their demand for "an immediate halt to the drift towards nuclear conflict which threatens the well-being not only of humanity in our times but of future generations as well".

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

The great importance that my delegation attaches to the question of the prevention of nuclear war hardly needs repeating. The Government of Indonesia has always viewed with the utmost concern the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war and has consistently supported efforts to eliminate the danger of the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, as early as the sixteenth session of the General Assembly in 1961, Indonesia co-sponsored resolution 1653 (XVI) which unequivocally asserted that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the aims of the United Nations and a violation of its Charter as well as of the laws of humanity. The resolution further declared that any State using these deadly weapons is to be considered as committing a crime against humanity.

Since then, a number of technological developments, quantitative increases and qualitative improvements of nuclear weaponry have made even clearer the catastrophic results of a nuclear war. The situation is further compounded by an alarming trend toward a new strategy for the use of nuclear weapons based on the theory of a limited nuclear war which could be won by one of the parties to the conflict. This theory is unquestionably illusory as well as dangerous. There is no guarantee that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a geographically limited war would not lead to counter-strikes by one nuclear-weapon State against another, thus making a full-scale nuclear war inevitable. Such an escalation may seem to be a natural sequence. Moreover, that theory involves the very real danger of making the possibility of nuclear war, which will result in the destruction of all forms of life on earth, "thinkable" and more immediate.

The growing awareness of the potentially devastating consequences which a nuclear war would have on mankind should make us realize the enormity of our responsibilities. Therefore, an issue of such critical importance to all mankind as the prevention of nuclear war, which in fact constitutes the preservation of our civilization, must be the legitimate concern of all States -- big, medium and small. Regrettably, the decision of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to accord priority consideration to effective measures toward the prevention of nuclear war remains, if anything, a statement of intent. Nuclear-weapon States have not lived up to what continues legitimately to be expected of them as being primarily responsible for nuclear disarmament.

My delegation remains to be convinced by the argument that such a situation was unavoidable in view of the pattern of behaviour among the Superpowers prevailing in a particular period. There is no denying that nuclear-disarmament negotiations cannot be pursued in isolation. However, it has become an axiom that the attainment of disarmament agreements will further the cause of peace and international security. Moreover, past experience of disarmament negotiations, including those of the early years after the Second World War, has shown us that the so-called "theory of linkage" proved to be not only senseless but also counter-productive. Attempts to link the disarmament negotiations with the solution of non-disarmament problems will be of no avail. Conversely, the sincerity of the parties to disarmament negotiations will also be put to the test by the restraint of their behaviour in other areas of activity. We cannot have a situation in which those countries attempt to contribute to the establishment of peace and international security through disarmament, while at the same time, the same countries are carrying out policies in different regions of the world contrary to the very objective of disarmament.



(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

Paragraph 13 of the Final Document states that "Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority". In spite of this, nuclear-weapon States, in protecting and promoting their respective security interests, continue to rely on the doctrines predicated upon the use of nuclear weapons. Their search for greater security on the basis of the possession of, and the willingness to use, nuclear weapons, has instead brought us further insecurity.

Nuclear-weapon States apparently continue to cherish the hope that the balance of deterrence can be maintained stable. This is an oversimplification. How can such a balance be maintained when each of the parties concerned adopts a strategy which seeks to achieve nuclear superiority, in terms both of quality and of quantity? In the nuclear age, moreover, these doctrines involve unacceptable uncertainty and, given the nature of these weapons, the risks inherent in the failure of deterrence are only too obvious. The use by some States of the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization for promoting their security is inadmissible and is certainly not consistent with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Neither is it acceptable to use perceived inferiority in conventional forces as a pretext for pursuing a nuclear deterrence strategy.

I hope it is clear from the foregoing that the assumption that the question of the prevention of nuclear war is exclusively the concern of nuclear-weapon States is fallacious. Furthermore, numerous studies relating to nuclear weapons that have been conducted within or outside the United Nations system have indicated to us in no uncertain terms that massive annihilating effects from the outbreak of a nuclear war could not be confined to belligerent States alone. Hence, the voice of non-nuclear-weapon countries -- which will also be potential victims in any nuclear conflict -- must be heard and their concerns be heeded. It is within this context too, that the position of the Group of 21 on the prevention of nuclear war, as contained in document CD/341, has to be appreciated. That working paper has rightly pointed out first, that, it is the shared responsibility of all States to prevent a nuclear war, and secondly, that elaboration of practical measures of such prevention is within the realm of competence of the Committee on Disarmament.

My delegation therefore submits that all delegations, with no exception, will have to pursue the subject with greater vigour and sense of urgency, lest we fail in our inherent responsibilities as members of this sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament. Appropriate and practical measures that the Committee will have to seek, in the view of my delegation, will inevitably, therefore, be all-encompassing in character. The form in which we carry out that task will determine the degree of seriousness we all accord to this subject. Like the other members of the Group of 21, my delegation believes that the urgency and vital importance of the prevention of nuclear war requires nothing less than an *ad hoc* working group established for that purpose and with an appropriate mandate. As far as the modalities of work are concerned, my delegation is open-minded.

While recognizing that the subject-matter is practically not new to us, my delegation believes that further intensive discussions would be useful for the purpose of reaching a common understanding on basic premises and a framework on the basis of which our task, i.e. to draw up appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, could be pursued.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

Such basic premises and framework should include, first and foremost, as has been spelled out in document CD/341, the reaffirmation of our strict adherence to and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter, and in particular respect for sovereignty, the non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States and peaceful coexistence and trust between all States.

Secondly, they should also include the recognition that nuclear weapons are not instruments of war: they are weapons of mass destruction. Pending nuclear disarmament, whose ultimate objective is the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited under all circumstances. In this context, it must be mentioned that our search for practical measures to prevent nuclear war in no way implies that we underrate the consequences of war in which conventional weapons, especially the most sophisticated ones, are used. If my delegation does not deem it relevant to deal with this question under the item, Prevention of nuclear war, it is simply because the problem of conventional weapons is not as pressing as that of nuclear weapons with their immense destructive capability. However, in so far as conventional wars could escalate to a nuclear threshold, this probability underlines the need for nuclear-weapon States to steer clear of conflicts among non-nuclear-weapon States.

Thirdly, as amply shown by the UNIDIR study on "Risks of unintentional nuclear war", it should be acknowledged that an acute international crisis may act as a catalyst to trigger a nuclear war.

Fourthly, the negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which would constitute the litmus test of the sincerity of the desire of nuclear-weapon States to remove the danger of the vertical as well as of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, should urgently be pursued.

May I at this juncture, sincerely welcome the draft treaty that has just been presented by the distinguished head of the delegation of Sweden; my delegation looks forward to studying it more carefully.

Fifthly, the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons should also be pursued through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world by the States of the region or subregion concerned. In order for such zones to be effective, nuclear-weapon States are obliged to support and respect the status of such zones.

Finally, another element of no less importance is the difference in conditions pertaining to specific regions. It seems obvious that measures that may be applicable for a region where there is a high concentration of nuclear weapons, such as Europe, would not necessarily be the same as those that are required for another region where, for instance, although no nuclear weapons are being deployed, the threat to the security of the region is inherent in the transit of nuclear weapons through that region. The latter example, has a greater relevance in the case of a region or a country having geographic peculiarities, such as Indonesia, which constitutes an archipelagic State, situated at the crossroads of sea-routes connecting two oceans and two continents.

Those aspects are definitely not exhaustive. Other delegations may perhaps wish to add other elements to the list, if the approach that we are suggesting is deemed appropriate.



(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

In conclusion, I wish to state that my delegation, in sharing its thoughts on the question of the prevention of nuclear war, does not at all underestimate the complexity of the subject. On the contrary, we are aware that the problems that will arise may be manifold. They include not only problems relating to the formulation of and agreement on appropriate and practical measures, but also those relating to the ways and means to ensure the effective implementation of such measures. We believe, however, that they would not be insurmountable if we are all committed to contributing to this gigantic task of securing the survival of the present as well as future generations.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, Ambassador Skalli.

Mr. ALI SKALLI (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the members of my delegation and I are especially happy to offer you our sincere congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of our Committee in this first month of its summer session. We wish to express our satisfaction that the guidance of our discussions has been entrusted to the eminent and worthy representative of Nigeria, a friendly and fraternal country with which Morocco has so many ties.

Your great diplomatic talents, your skilfulness and your human and professional qualities constitute for us so many guarantees of the success of our work.

You may rest assured of the full and unstinted co-operation of my delegation and myself.

It is with great pleasure that I wish to express our profound and sincere gratitude to our excellent friend, Ambassador Franz van Dongen of the Netherlands, for his valuable contribution to our work during the month when he was Chairman. The devotion he showed to the cause of disarmament, his courtesy and exemplary patience, as well as his skill and great wisdom, enabled him to accomplish brilliantly and successfully the mission entrusted to him during his term of office.

My delegation would like to welcome the presence among us this morning of his Excellency Mr. Leo Tindemans, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium. It was with keen attention that the Moroccan delegation listened to the important speech he made before our Committee. I should also like to welcome the new representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Sweden. We are most happy to have this opportunity of establishing links of co-operation and friendship with them. We are also pleased to note the return among us of Mrs. Britt Theorin, Ambassador, Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Swedish Disarmament Commission. Sweden has always played an important and constructive part in disarmament matters and our eminent colleague and warm friend, Ambassador Curt Lidgard, has left his mark in this field. We wish him well in the new stage he is embarking on in his life and career.

Nearly four decades have now passed since man turned one of the darkest pages in his history. Since then mankind has endeavoured to establish a new type of international relations, based on confidence, co-operation and solidarity.

It must, however, be admitted that in spite of all the efforts made to achieve that aim, the world continues to live in a state of armed peace, with all that that means in terms of mistrust and insecurity.

(Mr. Ali Skalli, Morocco)

International relations are constantly deteriorating; centres of tension are smouldering in the four corners of the earth, and the arms race goes on without respite. Far from giving one side or the other a greater sense of security, the arms race merely heightens suspicion and increases tension and consequently creates a climate where the fear of a new world war and especially of a nuclear war, prevails.

There is no denying that the arms race has today assumed a magnitude out of all proportion to the security needs of the States engaged in it. The accumulation of more and more sophisticated and destructive weapons can only lead to a conflict situation in which a conflagration of incalculable consequences may break out at any moment.

Our awareness of the dangers inherent in this situation should encourage us to strive harder than ever to focus all our efforts on a common objective, that of putting an end to the arms race and advancing towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

In a statement to the Committee on 3 February 1983, the head of the Swedish delegation said that according to figures from the Hagfors Seismic Observatory in Sweden, no less than 55 nuclear explosions had taken place in the world in 1982 as compared with 49 in 1981. In other words, there was an explosion every six days.

These figures in themselves sound an alarm, since the number of nuclear tests is increasing year after year at a staggering rate, testifying to a greater proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We consider that the threshold of security has already been crossed and that we must react before it is really too late.

The failure of the various United Nations bodies, including our Committee, after more than two decades of fruitless debate, to agree on a treaty banning all nuclear tests, is for us a source of grave concern which is only equalled by our ardent desire to see common sense and reason finally prevail.

Since the question of banning nuclear tests was placed on the agenda of our Committee in 1979, a dozen resolutions have been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly requesting the Committee to submit to it the text of an agreement providing for a complete ban on nuclear tests.

Last year, the Committee on Disarmament took the excellent initiative of setting up an ad hoc working group to consider all specific issues which could facilitate progress towards the negotiation of a nuclear test ban and to define through substantive examination, the issues relating to verification and compliance.

We were pleased, at that time, to see a working group finally taking up this priority issue. As you know, it had been very difficult to secure the establishment of such a group and much patience and imagination had been necessary in order to overcome the difficulties which had prevented its being set up.

We should, however, realize that this achievement, although positive, was nevertheless not an end in itself, but a practical and suitable means for going beyond the stage of purely academic statements and engaging in concrete negotiations on a draft treaty.

(Mr. Ali Skalli, Morocco)

Most members of the Committee rightly consider that the Ad Hoc Working Group's mandate is limited and restrictive and does not permit the negotiation of a draft treaty. To justify this mandate, some delegations have emphasized the fundamental importance of the problem of verification.

Of course, verification and compliance are key elements in any instrument imposing a ban on nuclear testing, but they could not possibly be the only ones. Other elements, especially the scope of the treaty, are important also, and should receive our attention.

This seems all the more obvious to us as the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament states in paragraph 31: "The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement."

Consequently, one can but regret the rejection of the request for a broadening of the mandate of the Working Group set up under item 1 of the agenda.

However, our disappointment has been somewhat mitigated by the fact that all the delegations present here have expressed a desire to discuss, in an open-minded and constructive spirit, all the issues connected with the draft treaty which, we hope, will be concluded in the near future. We cannot lose sight of the importance and the urgency of concluding a treaty completely banning all nuclear tests. There is no doubt that the signing of such an instrument would be a fundamental step likely to put an end to the present continuous vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, prevent horizontal proliferation and open the way to nuclear disarmament.

The question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is of equal importance, and one to which the General Assembly has given high priority.

Our interest in this matter is justified by the fact that nuclear weapons constitute the gravest threat to mankind and to the survival of our civilization.

The existence of such weapons, the constant increase in their numbers and their constant improvement are, in our view, a challenge to all mankind. Far from guaranteeing international peace and security, these weapons only serve to maintain a climate of mistrust and anxiety which accentuates the deterioration in international relations.

We regret that progress in research and technology, instead of being made in order to ensure and promote the welfare of mankind, is most often achieved for military purposes.

The figures supplied by the United Nations in its "Report on the world social situation", published this spring, leave us somewhat perplexed. On page 196, this report states: "Total warheads in the United States and Soviet nuclear arsenals nearly tripled between 1970 and 1980 with a parallel growing sophistication of this weaponry in terms of killing power." It also states that the global total spent annually for nuclear weapons amounts to \$100 billion, or one fifth of all military expenditure, and further that "Around 50,000 nuclear weapons are now available to destroy the world. Their explosive power is equivalent to one million Hiroshima bombs."

These figures are sufficiently eloquent in themselves; they confirm our anxiety and reinforce our conviction that if the process of the building up of nuclear arsenals is not reversed, nuclear disarmament will in a few years time become an increasingly idle dream.



(Mr. Ali Skalli, Morocco)

Of course, nobody wishes to reach that stage. However, the determination of the nuclear-weapon Powers to ensure that they are ahead is, to say the least, a source of anxiety. The frantic pursuit of superiority in this field serves only to increase the risks of the annihilation of man by man. The General Assembly itself, in the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament highlighted this dilemma when it said: "We must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation".

It seems to my delegation that the time has come to react and to take the necessary measures to remove the threats of extermination with which our planet is faced.

We believe that the cessation of the nuclear arms race, followed by general and complete nuclear disarmament under international control, is the only way in which the world can avert a nuclear war. To attain this goal, however, it is imperative that our Committee should go beyond the stage of debates and discussions of a general character and initiate without delay negotiations on substantive matters, especially with regard to halting the manufacture of nuclear weapons and reducing stockpiles until they are totally destroyed.

A request for concrete negotiations on this fundamental issue has been repeated at every session of our Committee, especially by the Group of 21. Appeals have constantly been made for such negotiations to be started so that the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document can be translated into practical terms.

The neutral and non-aligned countries, supported on this point by many other delegations, have repeatedly stressed the usefulness and desirability of establishing an ad hoc working group to conduct negotiations towards that end. Unfortunately, owing to the absence of a consensus, it has not as yet been possible to adopt the proposal of the Group of 21 contained in document CD/180. The Moroccan delegation supports this proposal and considers it to be still valid and topical.

Similarly, the numerous resolutions of the United Nations, urging us to initiate negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and to establish a working group for that purpose, have not so far received any favourable response.

Quite clearly, here too, we find ourselves in a situation of deadlock resulting from a complete lack of political will.

We ought to realize that the impasse the Committee has reached as regards a number of important items on its agenda must necessarily impair its efficiency and, by way consequence, harm the image of our Committee, the only multilateral negotiating organ with regard to disarmament.

The Moroccan delegation would like the working group on the improvement of the functioning of the Committee on Disarmament to undertake a close study of the question of the establishment of ad hoc working groups and the determination of

(Mr. Ali Skalli, Morocco)

their mandates as well as of the formulation of a rational and practical approach which would in the future spare the Committee on Disarmament sterile discussions and a loss of time which has effectively prevented it from performing its task in optimum conditions.

I would now like to deal with item 6 of our agenda concerning the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

As you know, the General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, was unable to adopt the draft programme which the Committee had submitted to it.

The text of this draft was referred back to the Committee for reconsideration.

The Working Group dealing with this item resumed its work during the spring part of our session without, however, achieving any results which might inspire or justify optimism on our part. It is true that it lacked time, but a first reading of the paragraphs or sentences still in brackets does not suggest that there has been any positive development.

And yet this programme was the fruit of several years' sustained and meticulous effort within the Ad Hoc Working Group and 13 years of negotiations starting from the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of resolution 2602 E in 1969.

The programme seemed sufficiently well-structured and well-balanced to meet the hopes and aspirations of everyone. It was, however, referred back to our Committee by the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament owing, once again, to the lack of political will, which had prevented its adoption.

Of course, we should not overlook the fact that there are in the world different concepts based on differences between political and social systems, but we should recognize that these systems now form part of our daily environment. They cannot and should not be a stumbling block on the road to an agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which is in everybody's interests. It would be regrettable if these differences were to compromise the important work accomplished so far in this field or were to be used as an excuse for an implicit repudiation of commitments undertaken when the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament was adopted.

We hope that all obstacles of every kind will be removed so that this comprehensive programme of disarmament can be adopted, for we are convinced that its adoption would provide an impetus to other aspects of our negotiations and would have a beneficial effect on matters still outstanding.

(Mr. Ali Skalli, Morocco)

Ambassador García Robles, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, to whom we should like to pay tribute for the outstanding work done under his guidance, spoke in his statement on 1 February 1983 of his optimism regarding the adoption of the programme this year. We should like to say that we share his optimism and that we hope that all persons of goodwill will unite their efforts to secure the adoption of the programme, which will be a landmark in the history of our Committee's work and a considerable step forward on the road to general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

I wish now to give the floor to the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal, who would like to make a brief statement.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): I should like to inform the members of the Committee that the Government of Norway has kindly donated \$5,000 as a grant to be used for supplementing the library of the Committee on Disarmament. This library is located on the sixth floor and is known by the modest name of Research and Reference Collection. The Norwegian grant of \$5,000 to the Committee's library is part of Norway's over-all contribution to the World Disarmament Campaign. Members may not be aware that the library of the Committee is financed at present entirely by donations, which are placed in a Trust Fund. The cheque sent to me by the Government of Norway will also be credited to the Research and Reference Collection Trust Fund. I am sure that this generous gesture of the Government of Norway is much appreciated by the members of the Committee. I should like to express the hope that others, too, will find it possible to emulate the example of the Government of Norway, and I may add that the donation, if not in cash, could also be in the form of books, periodicals and other published material.

The United Nations Disarmament Fellowships Programme under the guidance of Mr. Ogunbanwo has been transferred from New York to Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee for his statement. I am sure that members have taken note of the hidden appeal in his statement for assistance to our library.

Members will recall that consultations have been going on in connection with the draft programme of work circulated by the secretariat for the second part of the Committee's session. It seems to me that it will be advisable to suspend the plenary meeting now and convene an informal meeting, as in the past, to consider our programme. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee agrees to hold an informal meeting now. It is so decided. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.45 p.m. and resumed at 1 p.m.



The CHAIRMAN: The 217th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed.

The Committee has before it Working Paper No. 98 of 14 June 1983, containing the draft programme of work for the second part of the 1983 session.

If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee adopts its programme of work with the minor alteration to be effected by the secretariat.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Members will recall that on 28 April the Committee adopted its time-table for meetings to be held during this week. The Chairman indicated that this time-table was merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. I have requested the secretariat to circulate a slightly revised time-table, which takes into account a readjustment in the meetings to be held today in the afternoon and on Thursday afternoon. The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet today at 3 p.m. instead of Thursday at 3 p.m., while the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances will be moved to Thursday afternoon. This change has been agreed upon by the chairmen of the two working groups, and I trust that the Committee has no objection.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 16 June 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

26 August 1983

ERRATUM TO CD/PV.218-CD/PV.231

On page 3 of each of the above-mentioned documents amend "Iran" to read "Islamic Republic of Iran".

GE.83-63946