

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY--SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 5 July 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. Ahmad

(Pakistan)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. S. FREEMAN

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. N. MIKHAILOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U TIN KYAW HLAING
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. R.J. ROCHON
Mr. M.C. HAMLIN

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Ms. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. PAN ZHENQIANG
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba: Mr. J.M. PEREZ

Czechoslovakia: Ms. M. SLAMOVA

Egypt: Mr. EL SAYED ABDEL RAOUF EL REEDY
Mr. I. ALI HASSAN
Mr. A. MAHER ABBAS
Mr. WAFAA BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. M. COUTHURES
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. C. GESBERT

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE
Ms. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. W.-E. VON DEM HAGEN
Mr. J.P. FIRSCHKE

Hungary:

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. N.S. SUTRESNA
Ms. P. RAMADHAN
Mr. I. DAMANIK

Iran:

Mr. N. KOZEMI KAMYAB
Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI

Kenya:

Mr. P. NGUGI MWAURA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.-O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN

Mr. J. RAMAKER

Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Mr. A.S.S. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

Mr. A.N.C. NWAZOMUDOH

Mr. J.O. OBOH

Mr. L.O. AKINDELE

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. J. MORELLI PANDO

Mr. C. CASTILLO

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI

Mr. J. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. M. BICHIR

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY

Sweden:

Mr. S. ERICSON

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Dr. O. DAHLMAN

Mr. L.E. DE GEER

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V. ISSRAELIAN

Mr. B. PROKOFIEV

Mr. L.P. MALEV

Mr. G. VASHADZE

Mr. V.M. GANJA

Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN

Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. G.H. COOPER
Ms. J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M.D. BUSHY
Mr. J. McATEER
Mr. P. CORDEN
Mr. B. DURHAM
Mr. J. GUNDERSON
Mr. R. HORNE
Mr. R. MIKULAK
Mr. R. SCOTT
Mr. J. TIERNEY

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. L. MOJSOV
Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Mr. G. OSIL

Under Secretary-General for
Disarmament Affairs:

Mr. J. MARTENSON

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 222nd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

I would like, on behalf of the Committee and myself personally, to extend a warm welcome to the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, His Excellency Mr. Lazar Mojsov, who will address the Committee today. A person as distinguished as the Federal Secretary needs no introduction in this Committee, where he has many personal friends. His outstanding political and legislative career in Yugoslavia is matched by his diplomatic career, which has made him a well-known international figure. Between 1967 and 1969 he served as Ambassador to Austria and Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency. From 1969 to 1974 he was Permanent Representative to the United Nations, having also served as President of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. And most recently, distinguished colleagues, I had the pleasure of working under his very skilful direction at the last Conference on Trade and Development in Belgrade.

Distinguished colleagues, it is a great honour for Pakistan to preside over the Committee for the month of July. As I assume this responsibility I am deeply conscious of the many distinguished contributions made by my predecessors to the Committee's work. For my part I pledge to spare no effort towards carrying forward its mandate.

Throughout history mankind has yearned deeply for peace and security but never before has this need been as overwhelming as it is today. For never before have nations and peoples had to contend with the threat of total annihilation. The responsibility that rests on this Committee as a consequence is great and the opportunity that is available to us to respond rationally to this challenge of life or death may not come our way again.

The threat posed by the existence of large nuclear arsenals, I can assure you, is felt deeply, and the outburst of public opinion against nuclear weapons all over the world is real. In the words of George Kennan, "It is not an expression of some sort of vague and naively neutralist sentiment ...; at the heart of it lie some very fundamental and reasonable and powerful motivations".

The arms race between the two major alliances has created a condition of world-wide military and economic insecurity. The deployment of some 40,000 nuclear warheads, aside from a highly sophisticated array of conventional weapons, raises the spectre of a holocaust taking place not only by design but also unintentionally, by accident. The magnitude of the expenditure on armaments presents chilling contrasts with the situations in most parts of the world where hundreds of millions live shelterless and hungry. This contrast, in the words of Mrs. Inga Thorsson, "focuses our attention on the historical fact that governments have over the past 30 years spent vast resources on armaments, resources which on grounds of morality, on grounds of equal human justice, on grounds of enlightened self-interest ought to have been directed to ending world poverty and building for human and material development". We must never for a moment forget that such a colossal misuse of vast sums of money can only sharpen the already hazardous polarization in our world. We must not forget that continued imbalances are against the laws of nature. They cannot remain extant for too long.

That the vast majority of the people in the third world are gravely concerned with the threat which the huge nuclear arsenals pose to their security must also not be ignored. Their recurrent nightmare of becoming unwilling victims of a

(The Chairman)

nuclear conflagration is equally real. The instability generated by the accumulation of weaponry which knows and respects no geographical or national boundaries has a North-South dimension which is too often and too easily brushed aside. This attitude betrays a lack both of foresight and of understanding. Equal security is the inalienable right of all nations and peoples.

The General Assembly, in the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament, underlined this reality when it said in paragraph 28: "All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security". It was to fulfil this conviction that the Committee on Disarmament came into being.

It is most unfortunate that the Committee has little to show for the five years it has been in existence. The commencement of substantial negotiations on issues of the highest priority, which cannot brook any further delay, has been debarred. This continuing absence of a forward movement in the Committee is for many of us leading to despair. It is not for me to apportion blame. I only wish to express my deeply felt hope that we shall all renew our trust in multilateral disarmament negotiations and overcome the temptation to emphasize our individual security perceptions alone. If the political will to do so is not forthcoming, the hopes and expectations raised at the first special session on disarmament will have suffered an irreversible setback.

The Final Document of the first special session reflects a rare consensus among the international community on a comprehensive and equitable approach to disarmament. It manifests the common will of all nations to end the arms race and follow an international disarmament strategy which, through co-ordinated and persevering efforts in which the United Nations should play a more effective role, aims at general and complete disarmament under effective international control. By mutual agreement we have, all of us, renewed at the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament our commitment to the Final Document in its entirety, including the principles, the priorities and the Programme of Action laid down in it. I can do no better today than to urge, in all humility, members of the Committee to live up to these commitments in letter and spirit.

Before I conclude, it is my pleasant duty to express my warmest appreciation to my distinguished predecessor and friend, Ambassador Ijewere of Nigeria, for the admirable manner in which he guided the work of the Committee as Chairman for the month of June. That he was able to do so when he was involved deeply at the same time in the work of another important international Conference is a tribute to his great ability as well as to his willingness not to spare himself. Our most grateful thanks are therefore due to him.

The Committee starts today its consideration of the question entitled, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", inscribed under item 2 on the agenda of the Committee. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

(The Chairman)

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Yugoslavia, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Democratic Republic. I now give the floor to the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, His Excellency Mr. Lazar Mojsov.

Mr. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, it gives me real particular personal pleasure to address the Committee on Disarmament under your chairmanship. Yugoslavia and Pakistan are linked by the shared goals of the policy of non-alignment among which disarmament occupies a prominent place. Moreover, we are exerting joint efforts to make, within the bounds of our possibilities, a concrete contribution to their attainment. I wish you success in carrying out the tasks facing you and the Committee.

I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to extend once again my warmest congratulations to His Excellency Ambassador Garcia Robles on winning the Nobel Peace Prize. I have had the pleasure of co-operating with Mr. Robles for a number of years, in particular during the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, a session on the basis of whose decisions this Committee was established. I recall many consultations that I conducted here in Geneva, in the summer of 1978, and in New York, in September of the same year, which resulted in the successful discharge of my responsibilities with regard to the establishment of the Committee. Ambassador Robles was of invaluable assistance to me in my endeavours. I have always been impressed by his selflessness, dedication and magnanimity as a fighter for disarmament. His work is more eloquent than words can express; but I must underline the great importance of Ambassador Robles' participation in the deliberations of the Committee, and the advantages that we all gained in many discussions on disarmament issues over a number of years from the presence of another Nobel Prize Winner, Mrs. Alva Myrdal. Not only has her far-sighted vision always been thought-provoking but it has also been an impetus to concrete action. The commitment of both Nobel prize winners serves as an encouragement and a source of inspiration for us to make additional efforts in the same direction.

The decision to establish the Committee on Disarmament, which was adopted at the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament offered the most suitable solution for a forum that could provide a basis for, and give a stronger impetus to, negotiations on disarmament, and thus respond, in a more adequate manner, to the requirements of one of the most urgent tasks confronting the world today. For the first time in the history of multilateral negotiations on disarmament, all nuclear-weapon Powers have become members of the Committee, as well as a large group of countries with different social, political and international options. This fact has made it possible for the Committee to begin to carry out its very important mandate on a more democratic, more equitable and more representative basis.

(Mr. Mojsov, Yugoslavia)

The Committee on Disarmament already has more than four years of experience behind it and if somebody is not satisfied with the scope, mandate, membership and the work of the Committee, I gladly accept the personal blame for that. Yes, I am guilty, because I took the responsibility for its establishment and the nomination of its members — of course, on the basis of the authorization given to me in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and after exhaustive consultations with all the groups and all delegations. But after this personal reminiscence, I would like to state, Mr. Chairman, that this Committee during that period, which is too short to use for a historical analysis of its work, has been addressing a considerable number of major disarmament issues, although not all the issues to which the first special session gave the highest priority. At the same time, solid foundations have been laid for negotiations and an appropriate method of negotiation has been devised.

It should be pointed out, however, that the fruits of the work done so far are yet to be seen. Obviously, the Committee will have to assert itself, primarily through tangible results, as a negotiating forum capable of gaining the universal support and confidence of the international community. The results it has achieved thus far are not proportionate to the challenges posed by the arms race and a deteriorating international situation. In the present aggravated international situation, this points even more to the serious character of the tasks that we all face. It is hardly necessary for me to warn of the dangerous and unforeseeable consequences of any delay in the fulfilment of these tasks, let alone of the failure to fulfil them at all.

There can be no doubt that the state of affairs in contemporary international relations, in which adverse trends prevail, gives cause for grave concern.

The essence of such a development is the policy of acting from a position of strength, attempts to achieve and perpetuate domination, and, through the policy of imposing one's predominant influence, to prevent the free development of peoples and countries. We are witnesses to attempts to legalize threats from a position of force or the use of force itself, in all spheres of international life, which are deepening the crisis in the over-all system of international political and economic relations, based on bloc division and the balance of power and terror. The independence, security and development of a growing number of countries are directly threatened; these threats range from various forms of interference and pressure to direct military intervention. The result has been the emergence of new conflicts and hotbeds of crisis, which have brought the world to the brink of war many times.

The crisis in the world economy has dramatically worsened, having especially adverse effects on the position of the developing countries in particular. This situation is constantly undermining the very foundations of international peace and security.

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A particularly negative characteristic of the present state of international relations is the arms race, and especially the nuclear arms race, whose global dimensions and new quality threaten the very survival of civilization, and therefore the survival of the human race. Never before have weapons played such a crucial role in the life of nations, countries and people. Never before has the destiny of the world been so greatly dependent on the solution to be found to this problem, which is heavily burdening international relations in their totality. Unfortunately, the race against death is continuing, and the resources allocated for it are constantly increasing.

The arms race between the leading Powers includes all types of weapons, nuclear and conventional as well as new types of weapons of mass destruction, and is encompassing ever larger areas of land, air and sea and even, now, threatening to use outer space.

The delimitation line between nuclear and conventional weapons is being removed. This virtually eliminates the political, technological and psychological barriers between the use of conventional weapons and the use of nuclear weapons, thus opening the way for nuclear war.

The escalation of the arms race and the attendant use of force have compelled even the non-aligned and other developing countries, because of the pressures to which they are exposed, to earmark ever greater resources for strengthening their over-all defence capabilities, thereby diminishing their already limited resources for financing their economic and social development.

The unbridled arms race calls into question the modest results achieved in the post-war period in the field of disarmament in general. Therefore, the question is whether it will be possible to ensure, in a situation in which commitments with regard to halting and reversing the arms race are not honoured, that all other subjects of international relations continue to maintain the existing level of assumed obligations. This is also true of the treaties imposing certain limitations and bans, and renunciation of the acquisition and possession of certain types of weapons. It is not difficult to perceive the consequences of such a chaotic trend of development leading to a continuing and unrestrained acceleration of the global arms race, in all its forms and in all parts of the world.

If the world continues to tread this path, the moment will dramatically approach when developments may become uncontrollable, and begin to slide down, thus constantly increasing the threat of conflict. This is also manifested by the danger of a qualitatively new round of armament in Europe, where there are already huge arsenals of nuclear and conventional weapons, and by the militarization of entire regions, for instance the Mediterranean. Thus, we may soon be witnessing the same tendencies towards a further continuation of the arms race in other parts of the world as well.

It is well known who is responsible for the arms race. Its cause is the bloc policy of supremacy and domination. Its content, scope and objectives are determined by the proponents of such a policy, in keeping with their strategic interests and needs. The recent New Delhi Conference of Non-aligned Countries and other meetings within the United Nations are very explicit in that respect.

Our purpose at this particular moment is not so much to ascertain responsibilities, but rather to point to the necessity and obligation of taking action aimed at redressing the present situation, unless we want to find ourselves at the point of no return. It is now quite clear that the balance sheet of the

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arms race is negative in all spheres of international relations. It has not brought more security. On the contrary, it constitutes a direct negation of security and international co-operation. It has become obvious that by resorting to force one can only secure temporary and misleading advantages, and that opposition to such a policy is growing stronger and becoming universal.

Consequently, it is high time to take decisive steps to arrest the arms race and to create political conditions that will enable us to move in the direction of disarmament. We therefore rightfully expect the great Powers, as the main protagonists in the arms race, to contribute to the attainment of this goal by taking concrete measures to curb the sustained and irrational growth of their military arsenals. The process of halting the arms race should be initiated in the centre where it began, and spread outwards in concentric circles. This process should undoubtedly be started by the leading Powers; they owe this to the present and future generations:

The arms race is too often justified by the requirements of national security and the need for the over-all system of international security to be adjusted to them. These are legitimate concerns of each country, I must say, but post-war development shows that the existing system has not been able to ensure equal security for all, since it has not taken into account the changed structure of the international community and the needs emanating therefrom.

From bloc division of the world and the relations based on it, a certain concept of the nature of the international community and international politics emerged. Its hallmark was the logic of rivalry between the blocs aimed at expanding their spheres of influence to ever larger areas.

The concept of security based on a balance of power was established precisely on such presumptions. In other words, arms were used to set it up. Such approaches make for constant attempts to increase military capability and acquire advantages, even of a temporary nature. Although the balance of power can, in certain circumstances, make the threat of war more remote, it can never become a lasting framework for safeguarding peace, as history has proved. The concept of the balance of power is based essentially on the tendency for such a balance to establish itself at ever high levels of armaments, thus giving rise to new crises which cause still greater uncertainty and mistrust.

An integral part of the concept is the doctrine of the so-called nuclear deterrence which, in order to increase its "credibility", has constantly served as an impetus to the arms race, particularly in its qualitative aspect. Perceived as a means of protection of vital bloc interests, deterrence cannot be conducive to universal peace. Over a hundred bigger or smaller wars have been waged in its shadow, inflicting enormous material destruction and taking millions of human lives. This alone eloquently testifies to the character of the doctrine of deterrence as a means of maintaining security in the world.

New doctrines of limited nuclear warfare have emerged from these or similar assumptions, according to which there could be one winner. Such doctrines are not only illusory, but pave the way to the use of nuclear weapons, thus raising the arms race to ever higher qualitative levels.

The post-war experience has unambiguously demonstrated that the bloc concept of security has been unable to surmount its narrow framework, to place the question of security on a universal basis, and to offer solutions on which equal security

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for all could be built. At best, a so-called "state without a war" would be maintained, constantly verging on the edge of conflict, while the greater part of the world would be held hostage to a nuclear cataclysm and to the continued use of force.

In contrast to this approach to security, the non-aligned countries have developed a concept which was reaffirmed at the Seventh Conference of Non-aligned Countries held recently in New Delhi. This concept proceeds from the stand that a lasting international peace cannot be based on rivalry between the blocs and the leading Powers, on force of arms and recourse to force. It must inevitably be built in the process of changing the existing international relations and establishing a new system in which freedom, independence and equality will be accessible to each State and people. Such an approach necessarily calls for a new perception of the international community as a group of equals, co-operating to accomplish common goals, which will tend to become an essential condition for development -- and also for survival.

Fundamentally, the concept of non-aligned countries proceeds from the belief that peace is the common heritage of mankind, that all countries are responsible for it, but that the great Powers have special obligations in this respect. This implies, inter alia, the elimination of power politics, the need to overcome the present bloc division in the world, the pursuance of the policy of universal détente and the solution of the controversies of the present-day world by peaceful means. It also implies the universal application of the principles of active and peaceful coexistence and strict respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter in all relations among States. These objectives can only be attained if there is a substantial reduction of the armed forces and armaments in the world. This is why disarmament constitutes one of the key elements of the non-aligned countries' concept of security.

In the post-war period, considerable efforts have been made to progress in resolving the question of disarmament. It is not by chance that the United Nations made its first steps precisely in this field. Historically speaking, resolution No. 1 of the General Assembly deals with the problems of disarmament. Since that time there have been many thousands of resolutions of the General Assembly, and disarmament issues have never ceased to be the focus of attention of the international community. This is testified to by the growing interest taken in these problems by millions of people with very different views and beliefs all over the world. This reflects both a protest against the arms race and a desire to find concrete solutions. We, the members of this Committee, who have been entrusted with this task by the international community, should not remain unresponsive to these requests.

There is no need to go into a deeper analysis of the past period to conclude that we have not lived up to expectations and that the results we have achieved are not commensurate with the needs of the international community.

The growth of armaments in the world has not been arrested. International treaties relating to various aspects of disarmament, that were concluded in the post-war period, have not contributed to curbing the arms race and initiating a real disarmament process. Besides, they more often dealt with the marginal questions of disarmament than with those of substance.

(Mr. Mojsov, Yugoslavia)

For years there has been no genuine progress in the negotiations, which are in a state of profound crisis since they are conducted from a position of strength. Some negotiations between the great Powers have been discontinued, or are moving in that direction at an ever quicker pace. The negotiating bodies established long ago are not being used for genuine negotiations.

Unfortunately, even the Committee on Disarmament has been no exception in this respect. Despite the efforts of the great majority of its members, the Committee was prevented more than once from engaging in negotiations precisely on those questions to which the first special session on disarmament gave priority, such as, first and foremost, nuclear disarmament, a comprehensive nuclear test ban and measures aimed at preventing nuclear war. We firmly believe that such an attitude towards the Committee on Disarmament is wrong and harmful.

Obviously, there is no magic formula for ending the stalled state of the disarmament negotiations at present. Disarmament is both the cause and effect of the existing situation in, and the trends and course of development of, international relations. It depends at one and the same time on the nature of the over-all relations in the world and has itself an impact on these relations. Therefore, a solution to the question of disarmament can only be sought in such a context. This makes it incumbent upon us to set ourselves such objectives as, given the reality of the present situation, can be achieved by joint efforts and with the necessary political will.

What we have in mind, inter alia, is an agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, the conclusion of an agreement between the two leading Powers on strategic nuclear arms limitation and, in particular, the conclusion of an agreement on the so-called "Euromissiles", the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons and of a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, confidence-building measures, the establishment of zones of peace and co-operation and nuclear-weapon-free zones in the world, and the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe. In this context, we also have in mind the need for launching substantive negotiations within this Committee on Disarmament concerning nuclear and conventional disarmament, the banning of all types of weapons of mass destruction, the prohibition of the military use of outer space and urgent measures for the prevention of a nuclear war. The elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, on which the Committee has been working for some time, would open the road to and create conditions for more rapid progress towards the launching of the process of disarmament.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has endeavoured, within the limits of its possibilities, to contribute to the efforts of the international community

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towards disarmament. We have done so in the profound conviction that there can be no lasting peace and security for anyone in the shadow of arms, and that disarmament is the road to a life in security for all of us. President Tito was also basically inspired by this idea when he proposed, at the Fifth Conference of Non-aligned Countries in Colombo, in 1976, that the non-aligned countries should launch an initiative for convening a special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Yugoslavia will continue to support all proposals and initiatives contributing, even partially, to the halting of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and to the movement towards disarmament. It will also continue to urge that substantive negotiations on disarmament be held at all levels -- bilateral, regional and multilateral. We are particularly concerned over the present situation in Europe where challenges are faced whose consequences cannot yet be predicted, but which will certainly worsen even more the general climate in international relations, which is already highly unfavourable. Therefore, we consider it to be of paramount importance that the Committee on Disarmament should become the forum for genuine negotiations on disarmament, and will continue to exert efforts along these lines.

The gravity of the situation calls for immediate action. The problems of disarmament can be resolved only by joint efforts on the part of all the members of the international community wherein the great Powers have special obligations and responsibilities. The United Nations must have an important role in this action. The world Organization provides a unique political framework for developing the broadest possible international co-operation for disarmament, enabling all States to contribute fully, through their active participation, to the consideration and resolution of this fundamental question of the present-day world. Therefore, I consider the further strengthening of the United Nations role in this field to be essential, which is not only in accordance with the role of the Committee on Disarmament but could also give it the necessary new stimulus for action.

What we need now is an approach to disarmament problems in which disarmament would not be used for political and propaganda purposes. It is necessary to restore confidence in negotiations and agreement, and in the ability of the human mind to protect and save the human race from the means of destruction which it has invented. Today, more than ever before, we need negotiations that will be pursued with persistence, patience and resolve, truly oriented towards the achievement of tangible results. The Committee on Disarmament, as the most important forum for multilateral negotiations on disarmament, should play the key role in these endeavours.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank His Excellency the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia for his important statement and his kind references to my country. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, may I express to you my pleasure and that of my delegation at seeing you in the Chair for the month of July. Our countries enjoy the warmest of relations and share many common goals and objectives. Moreover, our association together in the work of the Committee has not only embodied the cordial relationship existing between our countries but inspired in me a deep personal respect for your diplomatic skills and balanced approach to the issues before the Committee. I pledge to you the complete co-operation of my delegation during the period of your chairmanship.

Since I did not take the floor in the month of June, I did not have the opportunity to indicate the pleasure of my delegation to see the distinguished representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Ijewere, at the helm of the Committee as we reconvened for our summer session. His enormous skill enabled us to chart a favourable course which, with good following winds, can move us constructively forward in our work.

May I also pay the respects of my delegation to the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Dongen, for his leadership of the Committee in the difficult final days of our spring session. He has our gratitude for the position in which he left the Committee after a frustrating time for us all. His skill set the scene for Ambassador Ijewere to get us going again in the right direction -- the direction of progress.

May I also take the opportunity of welcoming our new colleagues and pledge to them the friendship and co-operation of the United States delegation in our work together toward common objectives.

This morning I intend to speak about the prohibition of chemical weapons. I will present my delegation's views on the topic scheduled for this week -- the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters -- at our next plenary meeting.

Let me begin with some general remarks. The over-all results of the spring part of the 1983 session were very disappointing to my delegation. Our disappointment was particularly sharp in the area of chemical weapons, since we had undertaken major steps at the beginning of the session to facilitate progress toward an agreement in this critical area. The failure of the Committee to resolve procedural issues promptly led to an unconscionable delay in resuming work on the important chemical weapons ban. None the less, by the end of April we were modestly encouraged by the activities of the chemical weapons Working Group. We believed that prospects were good for more intensive and productive work once the Committee reconvened in mid-June.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

We continue to be optimistic about what realistically might be achieved this summer. It is now clear that an agreement cannot be completed this year, given the complex and difficult issues that remain to be resolved. On many issues the necessary foundation for a convention is still far from complete. However, by systematically tackling and resolving each of these remaining key issues, an effective ban can be constructed. We would hope that by the end of the summer some of these issues will be resolved, and that positions on others will be closer.

Under the able leadership of Ambassador McPhail, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has established contact groups on four important problem areas -- stockpiles, the compliance mechanism, a ban on use, and recently, definitions, lists and related verification measures. We applaud the decision to deal comprehensively with each area, to pull together work on related issues of scope, declaration and verification. In each of these four groups there are a number of issues yet to be resolved. While these contact groups have been under way for only a short time, there already seems to be encouraging forward movement. Still, much remains to be done. In particular, it must not be forgotten that there is not yet active discussion of one of the most important problem areas -- the declaration, monitoring and elimination of chemical weapons production and filling facilities. Positions are far apart here, and much needs to be done. The chemical weapons Working Group needs to find a way to intensify its consideration of this key area.

Of the existing contact groups, the one on stockpiles has the most complex task. The group's mandate encompasses declaration and destruction, the monitoring of the stocks until they are destroyed and the verification of their destruction. We expect each of these issues to be dealt with seriously in the group this summer. Special attention should be given to issues which have not already been discussed extensively, such as inspection and monitoring of declared stocks. Issues whose resolution appears within reach, such as verification of stockpile destruction, should also be focal points for the group's work and, in that regard, I would like to make some specific comments.

In his statement of 4 February, Vice-President Bush stressed the need to intensify work on a chemical weapons ban and committed the United States to help accelerate the Committee's efforts. Toward this end the United States delegation immediately presented a major initiative, which is contained in document CD/343. We have been encouraged by the constructive response from most delegations.

In order to facilitate progress toward an agreement, today the United States delegation is tabling another major document. The document deals with the critical issue of verification of stockpile destruction.

Verification of stockpile destruction has, of course, been discussed at length in the Committee. These discussions, which have thus far been largely conceptual in nature, have none the less resulted in a significant narrowing of differences. The most important remaining issue -- whether or not international inspection needs to be continuous while stockpile destruction is under way -- has a major technical component. Conclusions about the need for continuous inspection necessarily rest on information about the characteristics of the destruction process, the capabilities of sensors and the functions of inspectors.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

In our view, further progress on verification of stockpile destructions can only be achieved if the discussions move now from concepts to real-life situations. The paper we are tabling today is intended to facilitate a realistic consideration of the level of verification needed in a concrete existing situation. It is the product of intensive work during the recess period by members of my delegation in conjunction with United States army experts. Although the paper certainly reflects our own approach, in preparing it we have been mindful of the views and concerns expressed by other delegations. Delegations should be mindful as they study the paper that we have modified our approach at several points to take into account the views of others.

Our paper shows in detail, and in layman's language, how our approach to verification of stockpile destruction would actually work, using an existing destruction facility for the purpose of illustration. The first part of the paper describes the operation of the facility, the chemical agent munition disposal system (CAMDS) at Tooele army depot in Utah. This discussion is followed by an outline of the principles which form the basis for the verification plan. The concluding part describes in very specific terms how the destruction process would be monitored at the Utah facility through a combination of sensors and human inspectors. The type and location of sensors is spelled out and the specific tasks for inspectors described. Specific measures are provided to ensure the validity of data used for verification. The exact procedures to be used at another facility could, of course, be somewhat different, but the general scheme would be quite similar.

In our view, a careful analysis of this real-life example demonstrates clearly that effective verification of stockpile destruction can only be achieved through the continuous presence of inspectors while destruction operations are under way. Current sensors are inadequate to permit inspection visits to be put on a periodic basis. But it should be noted that effective verification does not require a throng of inspectors. For the Utah facility, for example, only a handful would be needed, and these only during the destruction process.

We trust that those who take a different position will also explain their approach in specific terms, as we have done. Specifically, it would be helpful for the group working on this issue to know: how would another approach work in practice at a real-life facility? How would it provide effective verification?

On this issue the time is past for vague, hypothetical arguments. The Committee's efforts must be directed to working out sound provisions which would lead to a truly effective ban on these odious weapons. It is our intention to make a more detailed presentation of this paper later this week in the contact group on stockpiles, and also to hold a question-and-answer session later for interested members of delegations and experts. Our experts will, of course, be prepared to respond to questions in the contact group meeting and in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons as well.

I believe it is clear that the United States delegation is ready to work hard on this issue with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution this summer. We hope that others are prepared to do the same. In our view, whether or not a solution can be found soon on this issue is a good way to judge the prospects for an agreement. Success here will augur well, even though more difficult problems are still ahead. Failure will cause many to question the seriousness of some within the Committee. For our part, we are ready -- and eagerly looking forward to -- a constructive dialogue which will inevitably lead to success.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Allow me first of all to welcome you to the difficult and responsible office of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of July. The Soviet Union wishes, through you, to salute the growing role being played in international affairs by the States of the non-aligned movement, which is striving for the maintenance of peace and international security, the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, as was made clear in particular by the results of the meeting of those countries held recently in New Delhi. My delegation would like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to a noteworthy fact: the summer of 1983 in the Committee on Disarmament is the summer of the non-aligned countries, for all the chairmen of the Committee during these summer months will be representatives from those countries.

We note with satisfaction, Mr. Chairman, the proximity of the positions of the Soviet Union and Pakistan on the most important issues on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, and we look forward to the further development of co-operation between our two countries in the Committee's subsidiary bodies. I should also like to assure you that you will at all times find in the Soviet delegation understanding and support in the performance of your difficult duties in that office.

I should also like to express our gratitude to the distinguished Ambassador of Nigeria, Mr. Ijewere, for his skilful guidance of our work during the month of June. It is largely due to him that we were able, within a very short space of time, to begin work on the substance of the issues before the Committee.

Allow me also to welcome to the Committee the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Comrade Lazar Mojsov, an outstanding State and political leader of socialist Yugoslavia, a country with which the Soviet Union maintains very close and friendly relations. I should like particularly to recall the major contribution made by Mr. Mojsov as President of the United Nations General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, when he personally played a large part in the shaping of the Committee on Disarmament as it is at present constituted. The Soviet delegation regrets that the Committee has little to show for its five years of activity in its present form.

On 28 June 1983, a meeting was held in Moscow of leading party and State leaders of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR. The participants in the meeting exchanged views on recent international developments and adopted a joint statement which, at the request of the USSR delegation, has been distributed as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament (CD/386).

This document points out that the current situation is characterized by a continued increase in tension, the further destabilization of international relations and the growth of the threat of nuclear war with its catastrophic consequences. The arms race is assuming unprecedented proportions. The United States and some of its allies make no secret of the fact that their actions are aimed at the achievement of military superiority. Work is proceeding on the construction of bases for the deployment in some West European countries members of NATO of the new United States intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Programmes

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

are being implemented for the production and deployment of new ground-, sea- and air-based strategic nuclear weapons. Combat space systems are being developed, designed to deliver strikes on targets in outer space and on earth. Completely new systems of conventional weapons are being created which, in their combat characteristics, are close to weapons of mass destruction. Military budgets are being drastically increased, representing a heavy burden for the peoples.

In these circumstances, particular concern is aroused by the lack of progress in the arms limitation and reduction talks. This applies to the bilateral Soviet-United States talks being held here in Geneva on nuclear arms limitation in Europe and on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. It applies also to the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. A similar situation exists also in the Committee on Disarmament.

The reason for the lack of any progress at all in these talks is that the United States is apparently aiming, not at the achievement of agreement but at the implementation of its plans for a strategic arms build-up, at the deployment in western Europe of new intermediate-range missiles and at the carrying out of its military programme.

The participants in the Moscow meeting declared that the situation that is taking shape confronts all States and all peoples with the question of how to prevent its further dangerous development and how to prevent the world from sliding into catastrophe. "In the present situation", the statement says "urgent measures are needed to avert the danger of war and redirect the course of world events towards détente and the improvement of inter-State relations". The participants in the Moscow meeting viewed the speediest possible ending of the arms race and transition to disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, as the key issue of our time and held it necessary to do everything for the attainment of these urgent objectives and for the preservation of peace, civilization and life on earth. They confirmed their readiness to exert every effort to solve these problems through negotiations.

The joint statement contains a number of concrete proposals on the part of the States participating in the meeting which will, we hope, as indeed the whole of this extremely important document, be carefully studied by the members of the Committee.

The Soviet delegation wishes in its statement today to focus on the central issue of the present time -- the question of the prevention of nuclear war. As is justly emphasized in the Appeal of the World Assembly for Peace and Life and against Nuclear War held last month in Prague, "Mankind has arrived at a crucial crossroads in its history. One step in the wrong direction and the world can be plunged into the abyss of nuclear war".

We would like to stress once again the particular significance of the adoption by the Committee of practical measures on the question of the prevention of nuclear war. We are deeply convinced that concrete talks on this item should be initiated without delay with a view to achieving at them tangible results as soon as possible. As we have already pointed out, there is no lack of concrete proposals designed to lessen the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war in practice. They have been put forward both by the socialist and by the non-aligned countries, as well as by some Western countries.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Last spring the USSR, together with other socialist countries, submitted document CD/355 in which they expressed their views concerning the measures which should be taken as a priority matter with a view to the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe.

Among those measures the USSR raised the question of the freezing by all States possessing nuclear weapons, as a first step towards the reduction and ultimately the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, of the production and deployment of nuclear charges and their delivery vehicles, as well as of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons. This proposal was put forward by the socialist countries with one purpose -- to stop the process of the building up of stocks of weapons of mass destruction, to place a freeze on them, qualitatively and quantitatively.

Consistently supporting a nuclear arsenals freeze, the Soviet Government on 21 June 1983, on the instructions of the highest organ of State power in the Soviet Union -- the Supreme Soviet of the USSR -- addressed a formal proposal to the governments of the other nuclear-weapon States -- the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China -- for the nuclear-weapon States to freeze all the nuclear weapons at their disposal, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

In its proposal, the Soviet Government pointed out that such a freeze would envisage the cessation of the quantitative build-up of all the components of the nuclear arsenals of the sides and their commitment not to deploy new types of nuclear weapons.

In addition to that, each side would declare a moratorium on all nuclear-weapon tests, as well as on tests of new types of nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles.

The proposal also noted that compliance with the freeze obligations could be effectively verified by national technical means. If necessary, some additional measures could be worked out and agreed on, on the basis of co-operation.

Of course, a nuclear freeze would be most efficient if undertaken by all the nuclear-weapon Powers simultaneously. However, the Soviet Government believes it possible -- and this is made clear in the proposal -- that this could be done initially by the Soviet Union and the United States, on the understanding that the other nuclear-weapon Powers would subsequently follow suit. The proposal emphasizes that while putting forward this important initiative, the Soviet Union in no way considers the freeze as a goal in itself, but regards this measure as an effective first step towards the reduction and, ultimately, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and thus towards the total elimination of the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

In addressing the freeze proposal to the other nuclear-weapon Powers, the Soviet Union believes that it should help to initiate the practical elaboration of a programme of stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament, mentioned in the well-known proposals of the socialist countries submitted for the consideration of the Committee on Disarmament. I would like to recall that in our view such a programme, in addition to the cessation of the development and production of nuclear weapons, could include also the gradual reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including their delivery vehicles, as well as the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The idea of a nuclear arms freeze has in fact been the subject of broad discussion all over the world for a number of years now. Many public and political figures of various countries address this idea, regarding it as a key link in the chain of efforts designed to stop the arms race and prevent the growth of the threat of nuclear war. The freeze was also supported at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly which, on the initiative of India, Mexico and Sweden adopted resolutions calling upon the nuclear-weapon States, and in the first instance the USSR and the United States, to freeze their nuclear weapons. The General Assembly resolutions qualify this measure as "an extremely urgent one", as "the first step towards the cessation of the nuclear weapons build-up and their improvement". The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to adopt "urgent practical measures to prevent nuclear war" (including the suspension of the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons) in the decision adopted by the non-aligned countries at the summit conference held recently in New Delhi.

The idea of a freeze has been widely supported by public opinion in the NATO countries, and particularly in the United States. It is enough to recall that during a kind of referendum on this issue held last autumn in a number of States of the United States of America, more than 70 per cent of electors were in favour of the freeze. This attitude of millions of Americans is reflected also in the United States Congress. As you know, the House of Representatives of the United States Congress recently adopted a resolution calling for a "mutually verifiable freeze and reduction of nuclear weapons" by the USSR and the United States.

But one cannot ignore the fact that the freeze idea has not only its partisans on the other side of the ocean but also very influential opponents, who spare no efforts in order to describe "the harm and danger" if the tremendous nuclear arms arsenals cease to increase and at the same time to sow doubts about the practical possibility of implementing a freeze and about its usefulness from the point of view of the prevention of nuclear war. The main "argument" which they use is to frighten people with the idea of "Soviet military superiority". They claim that the freeze would mean the preservation of an "unequal and unstable" level of nuclear forces "condemning" the United States to a "military and moral lagging behind".

Another method of the adversaries of a freeze is to claim that it would hinder the large-scale reduction of nuclear weapons because, they say, it would deprive the USSR of the incentive to make such reductions. It is also alleged that a freeze cannot be verified.

The artificial character of such arguments is clear. Concerning the notion of "Soviet superiority", I believe there is no need to dwell upon it. We have repeatedly explained that there is no Soviet nuclear superiority and moreover the USSR believes that in the current situation it is pointless for anyone to count on achieving military superiority.

Setting off the freeze against nuclear arms reduction is no less absurd. From our point of view the freeze is a necessary prerequisite, the first step towards reduction. It is difficult, in fact, to imagine a genuine reduction without a freeze. The reduction of some types of nuclear weapons with the simultaneous building up of others, obviously still more dangerous, would transfer the arms race into the qualitative field.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As for the allegation that the freeze would deprive the USSR of the incentive to reduce nuclear weapons, we regard it as a repetition of the old story about the need to have "bargaining chips" at the talks with the USSR in the form of ever newer and more dangerous types of weapons. History has shown more than once that such an approach to the talks with the USSR and attempts to talk with it from a position of strength do not produce positive results. For example, it is enough to recall the attempts of the United States at the beginning of the 1970s to use as "bargaining chips" the last word in United States military technology of that time — the MIRV systems. As is known, all the attempts of the United States to gain additional advantages for itself at the talks with the Soviet Union using the pressure put with the help of this "chip" gave no results. The only result of this policy was the spiralling upwards of the arms race to a higher and more dangerous level.

Verification

As regards the allegation about the "unverifiable" nature of a freeze, we believe that there is no reason to overestimate the difficulties connected with the verification of a freeze. The experience of verification of the SALT agreements can be successfully used for the freeze verification too. Besides, the proposal of the USSR makes it clear that, if necessary, some additional measures could be worked out on the basis of co-operation. In connection with the verification problem Mr. Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, pointed out: "Verification is no less important for us than for others. Our approach to verification problems is a practical one, and not a matter of general declarations. Such an approach was adopted in the SALT agreements. Our verification policy is far-reaching — up to the establishment of general and complete verification when we are dealing with general and complete disarmament. We are against the conversion of the verification problem into a stumbling block at the talks".

It should be emphasized that the freezing of all the components of nuclear arsenals would sharply increase the level of confidence in the relations between nuclear-weapon States and considerably improve the political situation in the world. Proceeding from this notion, the participants in the summit meeting of the socialist countries held in Moscow on 28 June expressed their conviction that in the interests of peace and security it is necessary "to freeze without delay the nuclear weapons of all the nuclear-weapon powers, and first of all those of the USSR and the United States".

In view of the increasing danger of nuclear war, the cessation of the process of the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction and the freezing of them quantitatively and qualitatively offer a reasonable alternative to the growing threat of nuclear catastrophe. However, this does not mean that the proposals of the USSR and other socialist countries on the prevention of nuclear war consist solely of the freeze proposal. Another important proposal made by the socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament is the proposal for an undertaking by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

By its unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the USSR once again reaffirmed that the main concern in its policy is the elimination of the threat of war. This step on the part of the Soviet Union has met with a wide response both among States and among broad strata of the international community.

We expect the other nuclear-weapon Powers, which have not yet undertaken such a commitment, to take a similar step. No pretexts and excuses can outweigh the need to prevent nuclear war.

It is argued in the West that the USSR, while undertaking not to use nuclear weapons first, remains free to use conventional weapons, in which it allegedly has superiority. This argument is designed to mislead the peoples.

The Soviet Union and its allies categorically reject such allegations. In the Political Declaration which the Warsaw Treaty countries adopted in Prague, they proposed the conclusion of an agreement between the States parties to that Treaty and the NATO countries, which would contain a mutual commitment not to use any weapons, either nuclear or conventional, in other words, not to use force in their relations at all.

Quite some time has now passed since this proposal was put before our Western partners. However, their response, contained in the communiqué of the June session of the NATO Council, frankly speaking, is not clear. It shows that apparently not all are able or wish to realize how drastically the situation in Europe and in the world could be improved if an agreement was reached on the non-use of force between the two groups of countries.

Another measure which could considerably reduce the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war is, in our view, the declaration by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on the conduct of any nuclear test explosions up to the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This proposal has been widely supported by the States Members of the United Nations, as is shown by the fact that at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly 115 States voted in favour of the resolution calling for the declaration of such a moratorium.

However, this idea also has opponents. One of the most widely used arguments against the moratorium is that on the one hand such a moratorium cannot be appropriately verified and on the other that it could hamper the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests by reducing the incentive for States to strive for its conclusion.

The Soviet Union holds a different point of view on these issues. Concerning the verification of a moratorium on nuclear explosions, we believe that this question is out of place, since what is involved here is not the assumption by States of commitments under the relevant treaty but a step based on the good will of States. Besides, it is absolutely clear that the resumption by anyone of nuclear tests could not remain unnoticed. We believe that the declaration of a moratorium on the conduct of nuclear explosions would create very favourable conditions for the elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of nuclear-weapon tests because all States, and in the first instance the nuclear-weapon States which have declared a moratorium, will strive for the speediest possible solution of all the questions arising in connection with the cessation of nuclear tests, including questions of verification and compliance with the relevant obligations.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to call on all the delegations participating in the Committee's deliberations to start without delay practical work on the question of the prevention of nuclear war. We confirm once again our support for the establishment of an ad hoc working group in the Committee on Disarmament to conduct negotiations on this problem, and we hope that other delegations will take a similar position. If some States continue to hamper the establishment of a working group, we would propose the convening of informal meetings of the Committee with a view to holding a detailed and comprehensive discussion of the existing proposals on measures aimed at preventing nuclear war, in order to identify those practical measures on which general agreement can be reached for the conduct of concrete negotiations for the elaboration of an appropriate agreement or agreements.

The Soviet delegation therefore makes a formal proposal for the holding of an informal meeting in the very near future, devoted to consideration of the organizational framework for the discussion of the question of the prevention of nuclear war, including the documents submitted to the Committee on this item.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair, and his references to Pakistan. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, since this is my first statement in the Committee on Disarmament, allow me to join the congratulations you have received on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee for the month of July. We are confident that your diplomatic skill and experience will be of great help to us in performing the difficult tasks that are before us. My delegation assures you of its determination to continue its work in this Committee in a constructive and flexible spirit in order to achieve tangible results. May I also, through you, Mr. Chairman, express our thanks and appreciation to Ambassador Ijewere for the dedicated manner in which he guided our Committee through the first month of this summer session.

My delegation is also very pleased to see in its midst the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, His Excellency Mr. Mojsov, whose dedication and record in the disarmament field are well known to all of us.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude for the cordial welcome extended to me by the representatives of the States members of this Committee on the occasion of my assumption of my new functions here. I would like to assure you of my willingness to co-operate closely with all of you in fulfilling the tasks of our body. On behalf of my delegation I warmly welcome the new representatives of the People's Republic of Poland, Sweden, Peru, Iran and Zaire.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

In recent months it has become increasingly clear to the peoples of the world that the international situation has dangerously deteriorated. Never before in history has the sense of responsibility of politicians and statesmen been so important to mankind as it is nowadays.

The continuity and reliability of the peace policy of the socialist countries are among the most decisive elements for building confidence and a source of hope for a peaceful future.

This was testified to anew by the joint statement adopted at the Moscow meeting of party and State leaders of socialist countries on 28 June 1983, which has been referred to several times in this Committee.

Starting from a sober judgement of the international situation, that does not varnish anything, an urgent appeal was addressed to the NATO States to join in undertaking all efforts aimed at directing international development into the channels of stable peace.

On that account, it is necessary that the concrete proposals on arms limitation and disarmament contained in the Political Declaration adopted on 5 January 1983 by the Prague meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Treaty member States, will, after all, be met with a positive answer. The proposals are well-known to the members of this Committee.

On the occasion of the United Nations Secretary-General's visit to our country last week, the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Erich Honecker, and the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, agreed that preventing a nuclear catastrophe and securing peace are the most urgent tasks of the present. Negotiations aimed at achieving immediate measures to this end are imperative. The consideration of this subject should be taken up in this Committee without further delay. Appropriate initiatives are already at hand.

After the USSR had unilaterally pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, its Supreme Soviet recently turned to all nuclear-weapon States with the demand to freeze nuclear arsenals.

It must be assumed that this initiative will be met with a positive response within this Committee, since most of the States represented here have already shown their particular interest in such a step by consenting to the corresponding resolutions of the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The German Democratic Republic endorses the Soviet initiative since it is firmly convinced that a new situation would be brought about if the other nuclear-weapon States responded positively. The disastrous arms race in the field of nuclear weapons would be halted and a sound basis would be laid for agreements on the reduction of arsenals. This proposal is simple and reasonable and would not discriminate against any side. Peoples throughout the world would welcome its adoption.

My delegation would once again like to draw attention to the proposal to conclude a treaty on the mutual renunciation of military force and on the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Warsaw Treaty member States and

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

the member countries of NATO. This treaty would prohibit the use both of nuclear and of conventional weapons. The NATO States have not yet given a constructive answer, although they have made solemn declarations on the renunciation of force which — if they were meant seriously — should facilitate their consent to such a treaty.

With a view to warding off the danger of a world-wide nuclear war, it is imperative to take appropriate measures in Europe. The German Democratic Republic advocates freeing the whole European continent from medium-range nuclear weapons as well as tactical nuclear weapons. It is important that new United States nuclear missiles should not be deployed in Europe. The stationing of these first-strike weapons would bring our continent and the world nearer to war than to peace. The arms race would escalate and entail extremely negative consequences for the entire process of arms limitation and disarmament.

Increased efforts have to be undertaken to reach an agreement in the course of negotiations this year that would rule out the deployment of new American nuclear missiles in West European countries and provide for a corresponding reduction of the existing medium-range weapon systems in Europe with the aim of ensuring a balance at the lowest possible level. The proposal submitted by the Soviet Union lays a solid basis for a treaty. The USSR would agree not to have a single medium-range missile or warhead more than the United Kingdom or France. This corresponds with the real situation and takes into account the security interests of all sides. According to the same proposal, the Soviet Union is prepared not to retain a single aircraft capable of delivering medium-range nuclear weapons more than the members of NATO.

Regrettably, the other side is not yet willing to respond to this constructive approach in the same way. On the contrary, it is creating bases for new United States missiles. The nature of the so-called double decision of NATO is becoming more and more obvious.

We remember the following. Negotiations were delayed under various pretexts for a long time. After that they were led into an impasse by the suggestion of the so-called "zero option" and "interim solution" which amount to unilateral disarmament of the other side. Now the target date for deployment has been hung over the negotiations like a sword of Damocles.

The use of threats is absolutely alien to socialist foreign policy. But we have the right and even the duty to draw attention to the inevitable consequences. The Moscow meeting of socialist countries already mentioned reiterated the firm intention of those countries under no circumstances to allow the military superiority of the other side.

Should the plans for the deployment of new United States missiles in western Europe be carried into effect, the German Democratic Republic, for its part, according to its obligations in the socialist military alliance, will take the necessary measures to guarantee its security and to preserve peace.

The NATO States should actually know that, in the event of deployment they would gain neither a military nor a political advantage. But security, confidence and good-neighbourly relations in Europe would suffer damage.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Steps are also called for to eliminate battlefield nuclear weapons from European territory. I should like to remind you that the German Democratic Republic, in the interest of scaling down military confrontation, has agreed to the establishment of a corresponding zone and declared its readiness to make available its entire territory for such a zone, provided the principle of equality and equal security is observed.

All those proposals put forward by the socialist countries have so far been ignored or disapproved by the other side. Recent top-level meetings of the NATO States have rather confirmed the concepts for the accelerated arms build-up and increased confrontation.

On the other side of the ocean, resources have been made available under high speed which should enforce the doctrines aimed at making a nuclear war wageable, limitable and winnable. The MX, Pershing-II and Trident-II missiles are called a sword which cannot be parried. A so-called "reliable shield" in the shape of a qualitatively new missile defence system is to serve for protection. Outer space is planned to become part of a future nuclear battlefield. The authorization of financial means and the application of new scientific-technological findings in arms production are spread as a kind of news of victory throughout the world.

This development is the more perilous since it is also linked with the open rejection of the policy of peaceful coexistence. It is again the talk of the "crusade" against socialism. The change of political and economic systems in other countries is being announced as an official goal of foreign policy. The fact speaks for itself and, at the same time, provides information on the real motives regarding the striving for military superiority. The aim is to achieve world hegemony, sometimes also called "strong leadership". This has, of course, nothing to do with legitimate national security interests.

We, for our part, will do our utmost so that simple truth will gain general acceptance according to which one's own security cannot be guaranteed by the attempt to undermine the security of others. It is the more necessary honestly to seek international conciliation as well as just agreements, which certainly cannot be reached by means of the policy of strength, but only by observing the principle of equality and equal security.

The German Democratic Republic fully lives up to its obligations, which it assumed by consenting to the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to relevant United Nations resolutions or by acceding to international treaties. This is also true for our participation in the work of this Committee.

My delegation agrees with all those members of the Committee who demand political willingness towards elaborating effective agreements in the field of disarmament. In the current complicated international situation, it should be our common concern to exhaust all the possibilities this body provides for the holding of business-like negotiations which are inspired by a constructive spirit.

With a view to reaching fruitful results we consider the following as the most urgent practical tasks before us:

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

1. The establishment of a working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, with a view to elaborating a programme of nuclear disarmament. In one of the first documents of this Committee (working paper CD/4) the socialist States expressed their views on this question. Proposals have been submitted by the Group of 21. The Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as further resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, contain a clear guideline for the Committee's work.

2. Besides the negotiations on far-reaching measures of nuclear disarmament, immediate steps are imperative to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. Such steps would, of course, not eliminate nuclear weapons. But, apart from reducing the danger of their use, they could improve the conditions for nuclear disarmament. Naturally, the nuclear-weapon States bear a high responsibility in this context. We have paid considerable attention to the conclusion of the Belgian working paper, document CD/380, that the nuclear-weapon States could "undertake to make the prevention of nuclear war a basic objective of their policies". The commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to freeze nuclear weapon stockpiles would be in keeping with this concern. There is no reason further to delay the establishment of a working group on the prevention of nuclear war.

3. It seems imperative to us to expand the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban in order to allow negotiations. The Chairman of this Committee should therefore continue appropriate consultations. Working documents for negotiations are on the table. The "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" (CD/346) submitted by the USSR, the trilateral report (CD/130), the draft treaty banning any nuclear-weapon test explosion in any environment (CD/381) tabled by Sweden, as well as further documents put forward by other States and groups of States emphasize the need and possibility to elaborate a treaty text.

4. We deem it necessary to commence negotiations on the prohibition of the deployment of all types of weapons in outer space in order to prevent the expansion of the arms race to outer space. A working group has to be established for this purpose. Its mandate should permit the elaboration of a treaty.

5. With regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons we expect the Working Group to take up the drafting work at this session, so that concrete results can be achieved soon. The same applies to radiological weapons.

6. In the course of the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, all delegations should, through a constructive approach, contribute to accomplishing the task set by the United Nations General Assembly. Thus, the Committee will be in a position to submit a draft of the comprehensive programme of disarmament to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

This concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 7 July, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

Erratum to CD/PV.223

Replace paras. 1, 2 and 6 on page 18 by the following:

May I also, Mr. Chairman, convey through you our appreciation of Ambassador Ijewere's wise and even-handed conduct of affairs in the preceding month.

Agreement in the Committee on the inclusion in our agenda of an item focusing on the "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" appears to my delegation as one of the main achievements of our troubled spring session. We have thus amplified our work schedule by a subject-matter of vital significance which calls for collective international action and which responds to genuine preoccupations in many sectors of the public opinion of our respective countries.

My delegation, together with other Western delegations, in the final stages of the spring session expounded the view that given its high degree of complexity the topic of the prevention of nuclear war necessitates, in the first instance, a comprehensive analytical exploration with broad participation by a large number of delegations. At that time, I brought to bear that a suitable format at the present juncture would consist of a set number of clustered informal plenary meetings devoted to a structured in-depth exploration of the entire issue with the view to facilitating, inter alia, the identification of appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war in all its aspects. My delegation continues to hold this view and, in the informal consultations which the Chairman will hold, intends to press for the early convocation of a substantial number of such meetings in close temporal succession. We envisage a structured debate designed to cover a prearranged list of relevant subitems, the sum of which will afford delegations a full view of the subject and a suitable basis for further, more concrete action. The sequence of meetings which my delegation anticipates, would in fact constitute a kind of "workshop" on the subject matter, and a transcript of the proceedings should be made available to delegations on request.

Replace paras. 2 and 3 on page 21 by the following:

I have taken the particularly preoccupying scene of Western Europe as an example, but the fears felt and expressed in other parts of the world, particularly in the developing countries, are no less real. These fears are nourished by the feeling of individual and often collective helplessness vis-à-vis an armed conflagration that may be imported from other quarters. Again it is the phenomenon of degeneration of a local conventional conflict which may escalate both geographically, or quantitatively into a nuclear conflict. Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar rightly stated during his recent stay in East Berlin: "At this time of general tension and distrust, and the existence of almost limitless arsenals of conventional weapons, regional conflicts harbour serious dangers. In the first place, they can claim an enormous toll of human life and human suffering, as well as of national resources, secondly, they include the risk of intervention from extra-regional powers and the possibility of a dramatic expansion of the conflict."

In this connection, it is elucidating to look at the Soviet military doctrine and its implied advocacy of the surprise concept. There is ample authority in recent official Soviet military writings that the Soviet leadership still envisages preserving every possibility of waging a preventive surprise attack with all military forces, including their integrated nuclear potentials. In the Soviet

Military Encyclopedia, 1981 Edition, we read: "With the development of means of armed combat the significance of surprise has steadily grown. Especially after the introduction of nuclear missile weapons and other powerful means of destruction its role has increased. Nuclear missile weapons and air forces in combination with high mobility and manoeuverability of troops make possible the application of a wide array of methods of surprise actions ... Principal conditions for the successful accomplishment of surprise attacks continue to be the preservation of the secret of the operational plans of the commander-in-chief, the preparation of the combat on short notice, the concealed storage of the means of destruction, among them in the first place of nuclear missile weapons". This preoccupying citation does not stand alone. The Soviet chief of staff, General Ogarkov, also wrote in 1981: "The element of surprise has already played a certain role in the Second World War. Today it has become a factor of overriding strategic (!) significance" and in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, 1979 Edition, we find the following: "From the moment of the establishment of Soviet armed forces, particular attention was focused on the methods of the attainment of surprise. That has been reflected in internal directives and guidelines ... In the directives of the post-war era a high degree of emphasis was placed upon the attainment of surprise, especially surprise strikes with means of mass destruction, and the methods of exploiting their results."

Replace para. 4 on page 22 by the following:

Yet, I credit Ambassador Issraelyan with a clear and argumentative exposition of his ideas. By taking note of counter-arguments that have for a long time been stated by a number of Western countries he has offered us a more rational basis for discussing the concept and ultimately, for assessing its merits. Ambassador Issraelyan has attempted to refute the three main Western counter-arguments to the freeze -- consolidation of Soviet superiority, eliminating incentives for a deep reduction of nuclear arms, problems of verification -- and, while unconvinced, we will certainly not take his arguments lightly. The most important intellectual step which he has accomplished is, however, the following: he has argued in the same thinking categories as many Western delegations have done. By implication he has now admitted -- as my delegation expressed it before the General Assembly on 23 November 1982 -- that "a freeze could only be justified if the participants to a freeze decision would at that time fully enjoy and preserve their right to security, in other words if there was a genuine balance, both in a global context and at significant regional levels. If not, the freeze decision would be in direct contradiction of paragraph 29 of the Final Document. If that paragraph is taken seriously a freeze decision should never be taken totally separated from a profound analysis of the underlying security situation and force relationships".

Replace para. 3 on page 23 by the following:

If a nuclear freeze is so important to the Soviet Union, why are the appeals for it so recent in date, and so pressing only now? Why was the freeze not accepted when the United States proposed it in the framework of the Baruch Plan, coupled with a total renunciation of national possession of nuclear weapons? Why was a freeze for all nuclear weapons, including intermediate-range and short-range, not proposed in the era of SALT I, when a negotiated strategic parity was in view? Why was it not proposed in 1978, when President Brezhnev claimed, on the occasion of his visit in Bonn, that there was approximate parity in nuclear weapons between the two great powers, both on the strategic and the regional European level? Why did the Soviet Union have to wait to the present moment where roughly 300 SS-20 launching vehicles later with approximately 900 additional warheads threatening Europe and the Far East, a position of one-sided dominance

over these surrounding territories has been reached? Is the freeze, in their eyes, only an instrument to sanction and eternalize weapons predominance and a one-sided potential for political blackmail? Why, in spite of the strong push towards a freeze is the construction of SS-20 basing sites still continued and goes on unabated, raising the level of threat as each week goes by? And what, with all the insistence on the merits of a freeze, is the function of this increased nuclear armament, if we are to believe that a freeze would not diminish but rather heighten Soviet incentives to reduce levels of armaments? If such reductions do not come about even in the period where the freeze concept is advocated in such a persuasive manner, how can we believe that reductions are to take place once a freeze is accomplished?