

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 10 March 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. SKALLI

(Morocco)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. C. LAOUAR

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia:

Mr. D. SADLEIR

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. B. GRINBERG

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U TIN KYAW HLAING

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN

China:

Mr. LI LUYE

Mr. TIAN JIN

Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN

Mr. LI CHANGHE

Mrs. GE YUYUN

Cuba:

Mr. P. MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. EL S.A.R. EL REEDY

Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Miss W. BASSIM

Mr. M. ABBAS

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFFE

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. ANDREANI

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

Mr. B. D'ABOVILLE

Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Mr. F. SAYATZ

Mr. M. NOTZEL

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. F. GADJA

Mr. T. TOTTH

India:

Mr. M. KUMAR

Indonesia:

Mrs. P. RAMADHAN

Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO

Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA

Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Mr. F. QASIM

Iran:

Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. B. CABRAS

Mr. C.M. OLIVA

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D.ERDEMBILEG
Mr. O. CHIMIDREGZEN

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
Mr. J. RAMAKER
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. A.N.C. NWAQZOMUDOH
Mr. J.O. OBOH
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland:

Mr. J. ZAWALONKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.M. HYLTEINIUS
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mrs. A. LAU-ERIKSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. G. VORONTZOV
Mr. V.V. LOSHCININE
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. V.A. KROKHA
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
Mr. V.M. TATARNIKOV
Mr. G.N. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. HURD
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Mr. B.P. NOBLE
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Mr. S. LAMPORTE
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M.D. BUSBY
Mr. H.L. CALHOUN
Mr. P. CORDEN
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. W. HECKROTTE
Mr. J.J. HOGAN
Mr. J. MARTIN
Mr. R.L. HORNE
Mr. J. LEONARD

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Under-Secretary-General:

Mr. J. MARTENSON

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERAATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 202nd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

My dear colleagues, allow me first of all to welcome among us His Excellency Ambassador Andreani, the Director of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, and the Right Honourable Douglas Hurd, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, who have come to Geneva today to address the Committee. I thank them very warmly for their interest in our work, and I am sure that all members of the Committee will listen to their statements with very keen attention.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, Brazil, the Soviet Union and Japan.

I now give the floor to the representative of France, His Excellency Ambassador Andreani.

Mr. ANDREANI (France) (translated from French): It is a pleasure and an honour for the representative of France to address the Committee under the chairmanship of the representative of a country which is united with mine by bonds of deep friendship.

I am particularly glad to be able to speak today before the Committee on Disarmament. The Government of France attaches prime importance to the role of your Committee, which is the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament at the world level. Institutionally, the establishment of the Committee was the main achievement of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The provisions of its statute, which are in conformity with the principle of the equality of States, have, among other things, permitted the participation of France in the multilateral disarmament endeavour under the aegis of the United Nations. We have not forgotten the major part played in the drafting of that statute of the Committee on Disarmament by Mr. García Robles, to whom I would like to offer my respects.

The French Government fully recognizes the priority attaching to the problem of disarmament, as well as the responsibilities of the international community in that connection. The questions of disarmament and development today constitute the two main objectives of co-operation between the nations. Mrs. Gandhi has just reaffirmed this at the opening of the summit meeting of the non-aligned countries.

Disarmament is in itself one of the most desirable of objectives: it would contribute greatly to the stability of international relations; it would eliminate formidable destructive capabilities; it would mean the saving of enormous resources. Its principal merit would be the contribution it could make to the two priority needs of our time: security and -- again -- development. The Committee on Disarmament has rightly indicated this dual relationship in its "Decalogue": "Disarmament and international security"; "Disarmament and development".

I should like to stress that the French Government attaches special importance to the second of these two items.

As to the relationship between disarmament and security, it is at the very heart of the entire disarmament endeavour. The Final Document adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its special session in 1978 puts it very clearly: undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments.

(Mr. Andreani, France)

However, security is a complex notion. It depends in the first instance on the state of international relations. Thus disarmament cannot be an autonomous process independent of tensions, threats and crises.

Security also depends on intrinsic conditions: the maintenance of the balances that are necessary to it in certain situations; international verification, which alone can create confidence that agreements are being respected.

If these conditions are not fulfilled, or if the need for them is not recognized, we cannot proceed towards disarmament. This explains the difficulties and obstacles we are encountering -- difficulties further increased by the constant innovations in technology. I do not have to stress these facts to you.

We are all aware today of the disappointment and impatience provoked by the slowness of the negotiations and, in certain matters, their absence. I know that these feelings are echoed even in this Committee. They were noticeable even last year, at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We have seen how the lack of progress in disarmament, and in particular in nuclear disarmament, has caused a kind of displacement of aim among many people: if there was no hope of a rapid reduction in nuclear arsenals until the complete elimination of weapons, then, it was said, nuclear war could be prevented by the prohibition of the use of weapons.

It was thus that a proposal was put before the Committee on Disarmament for the first time for the inclusion in its agenda of an item on the prevention of nuclear war.

In that connection I should like to draw attention to the somewhat exaggerated character of certain widespread fears concerning the alleged imminence of the threat of nuclear war.

I should then like to make two comments. In the first place, the problem of nuclear war cannot be separated from the problem of war in general. The risk of nuclear war derives principally from the escalation that would result from a conventional war. All forms of war, whether nuclear, chemical or conventional, are merely variations, either more or less devastating, either more or less odious, of the evil we ought all to combat.

More important, the stress laid on the theme of the prevention of nuclear war leads to emphasis being placed on undertakings -- undertakings that are theoretically binding but which would have no real effect in reducing the danger that threatens humanity.

In this connection, two measures of a similar nature have formed the subject of proposals: the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of the first use of nuclear weapons. What these two measures have in common is that they cannot be subject to any verification. We know only too well that it is difficult enough to verify reductions in weapons: it is by definition impossible to verify intentions. The prohibitions which have been suggested presuppose a degree of mutual trust which no one, even among the most optimistic, could say exists today. Everyone knows very well what the situation is. Everyone understands also that the States involved are not equally subject to the sanction of a freely expressed public opinion. Any State whose political system is such as to protect it from the censure of public opinion need make no changes whatever in its arrangements in consequence of a

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prohibition, whereas any State which is, very fortunately, we are glad to say, accountable to its public opinion -- a public opinion that is essentially peaceful and sincere-- will be obliged constantly to prove to the public that it is not adopting any military measure incompatible with the prohibition.

The means of preventing wars have been pointed out over and over again, particularly here and by the French delegation: reduced to their essence they are, in the political sphere, respect for the principles of the Charter and especially the renunciation of the use and the threat of use of force, and at the same time, respect for the specific security conditions I referred to earlier.

It is a fact that in the regions of the world where nuclear weapons are located they play an essential part in the prevention of war, and therefore in the prevention of nuclear war itself.

Nuclear weapons constitute one of the two components of a balance necessary to security, the other being conventional weapons. They ensure deterrence, which is the corner-stone of security in the region in question.

The preventive role of deterrence is often denied, or denounced as a source of extreme danger. It is presented either as lacking in credibility because of the risk of mutual destruction which no one will want to run, or as opening the door to nuclear conflict in consequence of alleged theories of limited nuclear war.

In fact -- I will not go into a detailed analysis here -- the idea of deterrence is based on a simple principle: the object of deterrence is to prevent use but it cannot eliminate the possibility of use without eliminating itself. As Mr. Mauroy, the French Prime Minister, said at the Atlantic Council summit meeting on 20 September last: "Deterrence should be desired as ensuring security, and not seen as a risk ... In the matter of deterrence, the object is not to make use of these terrifying weapons. But the way not to use them is precisely to create the conviction that one might do so". One fact is clear: we have succeeded up to now in preventing the risk and no doubt even the temptation of nuclear war.

Security in the region in which deterrence is exercised is based on the certainty that any conflict in Europe is likely, through a process of escalation, to extend to the territories of the two superpowers themselves. At Bonn, on 20 January last, the President of the French Republic said the following: "The 38 years of peace that we have had in Europe have been due -- fortunately or unfortunately, as you will -- to deterrence. Certainly it is very regrettable that they have been due only to that, the balance of terror, and not to a more rational and more satisfactory collective organization of security, which is of course still to be desired. But so long as things remain the way they are, so long as there is no collective organization of security, how could we deprive ourselves of this means of preventing a conflict?".

It must therefore be recognized that in present circumstances, and no doubt for a fairly long time to come, the means of stable deterrence, at the lowest possible level of armaments, constitute the essential condition for the prevention of war, and thus for the prevention of nuclear war, in the part of the world where my country is situated.

Anything likely to compromise the deterrence effort or the stability of the strategic situation would mean a grave risk for security and therefore for peace.

(Mr. Andreani, France)

Many factors can have a destabilizing effect. In his statement at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament Mr. Claude Cheysson, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave a precise and detailed analysis of these: the destabilizing effects which the nuclear arms race can have, the possible reappearance in the arsenals of the superpowers of first-strike capabilities, anti-satellite weapons, any doubts about the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, and the multiplication of anti-ballistic missile defences.

A further destabilizing element made its appearance with the introduction of the SS-20 missiles aimed at targets in western Europe. Hence the response decided on by our allies: the deployment in Europe of Pershing II and cruise missiles. Such deployment would strengthen the linkage between the European theatre and the fundamental balance; it would at the same time reinforce deterrence. France, as a member of the Atlantic alliance, attaches very great importance to this subject, and consequently to the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range missiles. It hopes that these negotiations will lead to the restoration of the necessary balance. At what level? That is for the two Governments engaged in the negotiations to decide. Like many others, we hope that this point of balance will be as low as possible.

What we consider it essential to avoid, however, is a fictitious balance disguising the actual superiority of one of the parties. In this matter we believe that the criteria to be applied are the following: equality of numbers as between the two participants; the leaving out of account of the forces of third countries; effective verification of the provisions agreed on and the non-circumvention thereof, and the non-transferral of the threat to other regions of the world. These criteria have just been set forth by one of the parties to the negotiations. We hope that the other party will accept them.

These negotiations on intermediate-range weapons and the negotiations on strategic weapons, which are interdependent one with another, open a way that could lead to nuclear disarmament.

Such negotiations, whose object has from the beginning been a search for balances, by definition eliminate the idea of a freeze. This notion of a freeze contains a double risk: on the one hand that of perpetuating possible imbalances, and on the other that of reducing, for the party favoured by the freeze, the incentive to negotiate.

Furthermore, the two sets of negotiations going on in Geneva in our view form an inseparable whole: there is no European strategic nuclear potential; the nuclear forces stationed in Europe cannot be considered apart from the overall nuclear balance the maintenance of which is the essential condition for peace and security on our continent.

As to France's part in negotiations on nuclear disarmament, we consider that France cannot contemplate participating either directly or indirectly in the present negotiations, which ought for the time being to remain bilateral. The French nuclear deterrent forces have been limited to the minimum level strictly necessary to guarantee deterrence, whereas by contrast those of the superpowers are characterized by a superfluity of excess capabilities. In this superfluity, there is room for a reduction: France, on the other hand, cannot reduce its forces below the level of credibility without jeopardizing its security and independence.

(Mr. Andreani, France)

When the arsenals of the superpowers have been reduced to verified levels such that it can be considered that the gap between potentials has changed in kind, and if significant progress has been made in the real reduction of conventional imbalances and towards the elimination of the chemical weapons threat, France will then be ready to join in efforts aimed at the limitation and reduction of nuclear arsenals.

I have endeavoured to describe to you the basic facts and the possibilities with respect to the nuclear problem, as the French Government sees them. Obviously, these facts and possibilities must be seen within the general framework of the effort to achieve disarmament while maintaining security. For this purpose the conventional aspect must be taken into account, because the two fundamental factors in this endeavour cannot be dissociated from each other. In fact, the need for nuclear deterrence and for nuclear forces is very much bound up with the existence of a conventional imbalance in Europe, the effect of which is aggravated by the dissymmetry in geographical conditions. The establishment of the requisite balance will therefore have to be sought through effective and genuine reductions in offensive potentials. That will be the principal task of the conference on disarmament in Europe we have proposed and which is being discussed at Madrid. As you know, this conference would, during its first phase, negotiate significant, binding and verifiable confidence-building measures applicable throughout the territory of Europe.

The subjects I have just mentioned are obviously of more direct concern to the countries situated in the zone covered by deterrence and in which the nuclear arsenals are located. But the French Government recognizes that these subjects are of general interest and that all members of the international community have the unreserved right to take them up and discuss them. It was for this reason that my delegation gave its full support to the idea of these questions being the subject of thorough consideration based on a global and balanced approach, with respect for the demands of security and taking into account the special responsibilities of those who will have to undertake commitments.

The Committee is, of course, required to continue its work on the other items on its agenda. In this connection I should like to emphasize here the great importance which the French Government attaches to the negotiations on chemical disarmament. These negotiations are the most important which the Committee is in a position to conduct in present circumstances. They offer prospects of progress. The conclusion of a treaty on this question would constitute a major success for the Committee and for the cause of disarmament.

We also attach great importance to the resumption and continuation of the discussions which have begun on questions relating to outer space.

In conclusion, I should like to assure delegations here present of the great interest with which the French authorities follow the work of the Committee on Disarmament; despite the vicissitudes encountered in that work, great hopes are placed in it. It is up to us to see that they are realized.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Andreani, the Director of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to myself and my country. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, the Right Honourable Douglas Hurd.

Mr. HURD (United Kingdom): I am very pleased to be here today in the Committee on Disarmament under your chairmanship. I am confident that under your guidance the Committee will find an effective response to the many challenges now being placed before it, and it is a great pleasure to be here in this room surrounded by many people distinguished for their long record of work in the cause of disarmament.

It is also a pleasure to be here in the city of Geneva, where the community of nations has achieved much, ever since the foundation more than a century ago of the International Committee of the Red Cross. As in the 1920s and 1930s, Geneva is a synonym for our longing for peace and mercy in a cruel and dangerous world. This time, we must make sure that these hopes are not suddenly extinguished.

This Committee, the Committee on Disarmament, is a unique negotiating forum. Disarmament by negotiation is the only method by which we can achieve a safer world. I say this because, in their impatience, many people, in my country and elsewhere, suggest simpler and more immediate methods. If speeches, resolutions, visit, communiqués, television programmes or demonstrations could achieve arms control and disarmament, then this morning we could rest content, for we have had abundance of all those things. But they are in fact simply events on the side. They can illuminate or obscure the reality; they can help or can confuse the negotiations, but they cannot be a substitute for them. Agreement, if it is to endure and to enhance peace and security, must be expressed in the firm, careful language of treaties. Agreement must be verifiable, to provide effectively against cheating. It must achieve a reasonable balance, so that those who sign know that they are not risking their security. And these necessary characteristics of agreement can only come about by patient negotiation between governments. To say that the process of multilateral negotiation has achieved nothing would be false. To say that it is disappointingly slow would be true. To say that an alternative exists would be a cruel deception.

In that process, Mr. Chairman, your Committee has a crucial role. Not, of course, a monopoly, because the web of modern weapons is so complicated that disarmament needs to be sought on many fronts. Not a monopoly, because it is sensible that the United States and the Soviet Union should on some matters negotiate direct and alone, and I will come to those negotiations in a minute. But that fact does not diminish the importance of our work here, or of the opportunities which exist for us if we have the skill and self-restraint to select them aright. That requires us to look hard at the most effective use of our time, and to concentrate on areas which offer the greatest chance of success.

My Government shares the deep desire of all States represented here to see a reduction in nuclear arsenals. In the nuclear field, the hopes of the world lie in those direct talks in this city between the United States and the Soviet Union, the countries which have by far the largest arsenals. The United States, with the full support of its allies in NATO, has put forward radical proposals. These go well beyond merely limiting forces at their present levels. They seek drastic cuts. In the START talks, the United States has proposed to cut by a third the numbers of warheads on the two superpowers' strategic ballistic missiles. These are the missiles of most concern. The numbers of missiles themselves would be halved if agreement on the basis of these proposals could be reached.

In the negotiations on intermediate-range weapons, the North Atlantic alliance seeks to eliminate a whole class of missile: the intermediate-range missiles based on land which can reach western Europe from the Soviet Union and vice versa. NATO's aim

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is no SS-20s, or their predecessors, and no cruise or Pershing II missiles. And we believe that this must be far and away the best solution to the problem of INF missiles. But it is not a "take it or leave it" offer. If the zero option which I have described does not prove acceptable, we must in the negotiations seek a balanced outcome. Her Majesty's Government has had close and continuous contact with the United States Administration on these matters, which I have myself renewed this morning, both direct and through the special machinery established within our alliance. After many conversations, I have no doubt personally in my mind that the Administration is negotiating in the established conviction that success in the negotiations is in the interests of the United States, its allies and of the whole world. So, the good faith of the alliance in these matters cannot be seriously doubted. It is worth recalling, for example, that in 1979 the countries of the NATO alliance announced their intention to withdraw 1,000 United States nuclear warheads from Europe. And this was done. Unfortunately, this contribution to disarmament went unreciprocated. In the same period the Soviet Union steadily continued to install its new SS-20 missiles targeted against western Europe.

We are sometimes asked about the relevance of British nuclear forces to these negotiations which I have been describing. The facts are relatively straightforward and can be briefly stated. The British Polaris force is a strategic, and I underline the word strategic, deterrent of last resort. It is of the minimum size viable for that purpose. It is excluded from the INF negotiations on United States and Soviet sub-strategic land-based missiles by definition, as are the comparable American and Soviet missile firing submarines. In the START talks, the priority must be to reduce the arsenals of the two superpowers, and our British Polaris force is not on the agenda. In terms of strategic nuclear weapon launchers and warheads, it represents only a tiny fraction, a mere 2.3 per cent and 2.2 per cent, respectively, of the 2,700 Soviet launchers and 8,500 Soviet warheads. But we have made it clear — and I am happy to state this again today — that if the present situation were to change significantly, we should be prepared to look again at British systems in relation to strategic arms control. What is merely confusing is the attempt to double-count a strategic force as an element in the intermediate force negotiations.

But we cannot be content with these negotiations alone. The sources of tension in the world are many and the armouries of nations too great to restrict disarmament to nuclear weapons only. That is why the work of this Committee is so important. But in the search for agreements that reduce the number of weapons and the level of forces, and with them the risk and scale of conflict, this Committee should have regard for what has already been achieved and what is under negotiation elsewhere. It needs to agree on a programme of work that is balanced and realistic. Members of this Committee will remember the words of the Secretary-General of the United Nations before this Committee on 15 February: "The past four and a half years have already seen frequent outbreaks of conventional war, with untold loss of life, destruction and human suffering as a result". So we share the view of the Secretary-General that disarmament cannot be restricted to nuclear weapons. And it is the view of the British Government that the Committee would be failing in its responsibilities if it were to seek to discuss the prevention of nuclear war to the exclusion of conventional conflict.

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The British Government's views on the prevention of nuclear war have been made clear many times. We set the prevention of nuclear war firmly in the context of the prevention of war in general because the causes of war, whether conventional or nuclear, are the same, and I share the analysis put forward on this point a few minutes ago by Mr. Andreani. We must not confuse the instruments of war with the root causes of aggression; and to insist on discussing nuclear war in isolation is to forget what is happening in the world today.

So the remarks of the Secretary-General of the United Nations before this Committee echoed this thought. We firmly believe that discussions on the prevention of war which concentrate solely on the nuclear aspects will not be fruitful. We have yet to obtain a clear idea how the Committee could effectively deal with this topic. I repeat that we see the Committee on Disarmament as a negotiating body; and we feel that it should not spend its time repeating discussions which have already taken place elsewhere, e.g. in the First Committee of the General Assembly. The essence of negotiation is that we first agree on our objectives, and we have not done this so far in relation to the prevention of war. We are ready to consider seriously at any time specific suggestions which may be put forward in the Committee for negotiation. But we note that the few measures which have been suggested as being relevant to the prevention of nuclear war are ones which have been consistently and decisively rejected by many members of this Committee in the past. So they do not seem to us at present — and this is our present evaluation — to have any chance of being accepted by consensus, or of forming the basis of real negotiations.

In common with its allies, the United Kingdom believes that the right way to seek to prevent war, including nuclear war, is not only to encourage a greater degree of trust between nations and greater respect for the provisions of the United Nations Charter; but also to negotiate genuine, balanced and verifiable reductions, in both nuclear and conventional arms, which preserve and enhance peace and security. Lofty declarations and grand designs may make praiseworthy reading, but they are not a substitute for the genuine measures of disarmament in which we can all have confidence.

So, then, we look for practical discussion of practical objectives and we want to see real results which advance the practical cause of peace. Now there is much work to do in the conventional field because the subject-matter is vast. And I would now like to spend a little time — a few minutes — on one striking new opportunity which we believe exists. We have agreed in this Committee on a number of objectives as regards chemical weapons. The progress made over the last four years in the Committee on Disarmament seems to us to offer a real hope of concluding a convention to outlaw these chemical weapons of mass destruction completely. Ever since they were first used — ever since the experiences of the First World War — they have evoked a general feeling of revulsion in the civilized world, which found its first expression in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Protocol was an important step forward, and has helped to preserve the world from the horrors of chemical warfare, although we have recently been reminded that it has not always been totally effective. My own country gave up its retaliatory

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capability in this field but this did not lead to similar steps by other countries possessing a formidable capacity for chemical warfare which, in the case of the Soviet Union, has been strengthened since that time. So we must move on now and do our utmost to conclude a comprehensive convention which would ban chemical weapons.

Such a convention would be a solid expression of faith in the purpose and work of this Committee. It would be a real contribution to making the world a more decent and civilized place. Now we have been encouraged in recent months by the major contributions made by the two States represented in this Committee with the largest arsenals of chemical weapons. We welcome the fact that all members of the Committee have shown, by joining in the Working Group, their commitment to making progress. The preparatory work has given us a clearer idea of what is needed to reach agreement on a chemical weapons convention. We strongly support the proposal by Vice-President Bush that the Committee should in this session move into the phase of negotiation.

The specific proposals made by Vice-President Bush and developed by the United States delegation in its working paper, document CD/343, seem to us sensible. The readiness of the United States delegation to explain its proposals in detail has been of great help to other delegations. The acceptance by the Soviet Union of the principle of international, on-site inspection in the verification regime of a chemical weapons convention was also an important step forward. We hope that the Soviet delegation can soon elaborate on its proposals and enter into detailed negotiations.

We were also interested to learn that the Soviet Union is now prepared to include the use of chemical weapons in the scope of a convention. We need to discuss how a convention which covered use would relate to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. A convention would have to provide adequate means for investigating any allegations that chemical weapons were being used. If evidence were found to that effect, it would have to be regarded as evidence of a breach of the convention.

Now some have argued, I know, in this Committee and elsewhere, that the problems of chemical weapons are so complex that we shall never agree. I believe that we need to step back from our detailed discussions to analyse what is really important in this field. The most important and immediate task is to rid the world of the existing arsenals of chemical weapons. We might begin with substances in the supertoxic category, of which by far the most important are the so-called nerve agents. No one can contemplate their use without revulsion. No commercial use is made of these substances. This should make it easier to agree on a convention which effectively proscribes them and which incorporates means of verification to give confidence to other parties.

While concentrating attention on the nerve agents, we should recognize that there are many other less toxic but nevertheless lethal substances which have been, or could be used as chemical weapons, but which also have extensive civil applications. For example, we know that hydrogen cyanide and phosgene are widely used in the chemical industry as synthetic intermediates. We believe that

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a less stringent regime of verification would be acceptable for such substances than that which could be achieved for the nerve agents. We cannot and should not want to police in detail the civil chemical industries of the world, when good progress can be made by focusing on the products of a very narrow and particularly dangerous category.

My Government believes that the verification regime for the convention should combine routine international on-site inspections with the possibility of fact-finding procedures to investigate any doubt which may arise about compliance with the convention. Agreement must be reached on a procedure for handling complaints. Without such a procedure, confidence would be weak, because there would be no established machinery for resolving questions on which doubt remains. We believe that the need for its invocation could be lessened, though not eliminated, by the system of routine inspections which we have in mind. Such inspections would carry no implication that the convention was being violated by the country inspected. We have a model for a world wide system of international inspections in the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Many features of this system might not suit chemical weapons, but I believe that there are valuable lessons to be learned from the Agency's long and respected experience.

Routine international on-site inspection would be required for four activities set out in the provisions envisaged for a chemical weapons convention. These are:

First, destruction of stockpiles;

Secondly, destruction of production facilities;

Thirdly, production of supertoxic agents for permitted activities; and

Fourthly, monitoring to make sure that chemical weapons are not being produced after the destruction of existing stockpiles.

We are encouraged that agreement in principle already exists on the need for the first and third categories, i.e. destruction of stockpiles and monitoring of permitted production. But we are puzzled at the seeming reluctance of some States to contemplate international inspection to verify the second activity, namely, the destruction of production facilities. It is clear that once stockpiles have been destroyed, parties to the convention must be confident that the means to build them up again have also been removed. This is particularly true for the supertoxic nerve agents. As in the case of destruction of actual stocks, Governments should have nothing to fear from letting the world see that they are destroying permanently their production facilities in fulfilment of their obligations under a convention; indeed, they should be happy to do so.

I should like to recall that in 1979 the United Kingdom invited representatives of Member States to visit the pilot nerve agent production facility at Nancecuke in Cornwall which was then being dismantled. This was not, of course, intended as a detailed model for the procedure for inspection of destruction of production facilities, which will need to be worked out here in this Committee. It was designed rather as a confidence-building measure. We showed that we were willing to accept visitors at such a facility. I hope that there will soon be agreement in principle on this aspect of verification.

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The fourth type of on-site inspection which I mentioned is particularly important. This is designed to verify that States are not starting to produce chemical weapons again once their stockpiles have been destroyed. As a contribution to the consideration of this subject, my delegation has circulated a working paper entitled, "Verification of non-production of chemical weapons", which I introduce today. This is the latest in a series of initiatives which successive British Governments have taken in seeking a ban on chemical weapons. We gratefully acknowledge the important contributions in this field already made by other delegations, particularly that of the Federal Republic of Germany. The proposals we make have as their objective the development of a system of non-discriminatory routine inspections, to provide confidence that those substances which pose the greatest threat are not being produced in violation of the convention. Although this type of inspection would, in our judgement, have to continue indefinitely, we aim to show that the regime required for this purpose would not be anything like as onerous to the chemical industry as has sometimes been suggested. We know that that has been a cause of comment and concern in some countries. We are examining the problems that might arise with the help of the British chemical industry and hope to be able to report to the Committee in due course on the results of these discussions.

We look forward to hearing detailed comments from other delegations on our working paper, and, indeed, on all the other substantive contributions that have already been made. Because we really believe that an opportunity now exists for serious, detailed negotiation, we have tabled this paper. The commitment of other governments to these negotiations will be judged by their disposition to grapple with difficult but necessary detail.

I have spoken earlier of the need for a practical and realistic approach. One of the important tasks of this Committee, if I may turn to it briefly, is the study of verification of and compliance with a nuclear test ban. Verification is of course a crucial element in any arms control agreement. The question of nuclear test ban verification has been debated now for 25 years. It is not, therefore, surprising that the first session of the Working Group here should have exposed a wide difference in views among delegations. There is broad agreement on the capabilities of a possible world-wide system of stations for the detection of seismic events. But there has been some confusion between the limits of detection and the limits of identification, which are rather different. There is, moreover, less agreement on the relationship between the magnitude of a seismic event and the size of a nuclear explosion.

Those who argue that a world-wide network of seismic stations would be enough to monitor a nuclear test ban appear to base their belief on the assumption that nuclear test explosions would always take place in hard rock. This is not necessarily the case; and we need to consider the limits of detection and identification for explosions in other conditions and also the possibilities of conducting explosions so as to minimize the risk of detection. Our own calculations suggest that it would be possible to conduct tests with yields of some tens of kilotons in such a manner as to avoid detection. And obviously explosions of this magnitude cannot be disregarded.

We note that some governments continue to claim exemption from a test ban for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. These claims create further difficulties, because they would oblige us to find a way of distinguishing in practice between nuclear-weapon tests and explosions for peaceful purposes, and of ensuring that the

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latter do not bring military advantages to the country which performs them. We came to the conclusion some years ago, after careful study, that there was in fact no practical way of making such a distinction. My Government would be prepared to renounce permanently the right to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as part of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban on all nuclear explosions in all environments. In our view, those who seek an exemption for peaceful nuclear explosions, which Britain does not seek, should tell us in detail what practical system of verification they propose, to give us confidence that the nuclear explosions they might carry out were exclusively peaceful and brought them no military advantage of any kind.

I should now like to consider for a minute one other aspect of the Committee's work. My delegation shared the regret that it was not possible to reach agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament; but we did not share entirely the conclusions drawn by some delegations from our failure to reach agreement. Negotiations on disarmament, like politics in general, consist of the art of the possible. The limits of the possible are set in this instance by the security policies of the governments which are represented in this Committee and indeed of all States Members of the United Nations. The comprehensive programme of disarmament has to be adapted to those policies, not the other way round. It will not help to insist on the inclusion of certain elements on which consensus is not possible. My delegation is very willing to consider once more each of the elements of the programme in accordance with the programme of work proposed by the Chairman of the Working Group. We should be equally willing to look at alternative ways of proceeding and alternative forms of a comprehensive programme if that were the general wish.

Fifty years ago almost to this day, the United Kingdom presented to the League of Nations a draft disarmament convention. That effort and others like it bore no fruit. Now, after the suffering and destruction of the last World War, we have another chance. It would be silly to deny or underestimate the difficulties. In 1945 we set up a new system of international order whose rules as defined in the United Nations Charter should have made unnecessary the accumulation of armaments on any large scale by any country. But we know that the rules are broken, that the Charter is ignored. Some countries arm to protect their freedom and some, I fear, arm to menace the freedom of others. Fears and suspicions abound. Nevertheless, it must be right to make another effort. It must be good news that there are now four meeting places between East and West where specific agreements are being sought — and today I have suggested a fifth, here in Geneva, on chemical weapons. At these negotiations, we should be patient but persistent. This Committee can act as a pilot in our ventures, watching for the tide and navigating to take full advantage of it. The task is supremely important, and the difficulties great. The peoples of the world want peace; they want freedom, and they want confidence in the future. Because the means to endanger these ideals are today more fearful than ever before, the demands on governments — at least in those countries where people are free to express their fears — are loud. We all share a responsibility to preserve and improve the peace between us which all right-thinking men and women know must not be thrown away. This is the solemn background to our discussions in the Committee on Disarmament. The British Government will live up to these hopes and these responsibilities.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Mr. Douglas Hurd, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Souza e Silva.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, the Brazilian delegation would like to address today some of the issues relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction. Both in this Committee and in its predecessor, the delegations of the Group of 21 have long advocated the speedy conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons and have urged serious multilateral negotiations to that end. Concrete action now appears feasible, since the nations which possess the largest arsenals of such weapons at last seem willing to join the other members of this Committee in an effort to achieve agreement. Both the Soviet Union and the United States recently submitted documents containing their ideas and stating their views; the Committee also has before it a considerable number of papers on the various aspects of the convention, and in this connection I should like to acknowledge and welcome the contribution just made by the United Kingdom through its Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and in document CD/353.

The Working Group established in 1980, first to "examine issues to be dealt with" in connection with the prohibition of chemical weapons, and since 1982 to "elaborate" the relevant convention, produced significant results during its three years of activity. The elements identified in the earlier stages of its work were subsequently studied in greater detail, and a substantial measure of convergence was achieved with regard to several issues. There are still differences to be resolved on other relevant parts of the convention, but the current trend toward greater flexibility on substantive questions should be pursued in order to overcome the remaining problems.

Agreement on the important question of the scope of the future convention seems now within reach. The statement by Ambassador Issraelyan on 22 February brought positions closer on that account. My own delegation would have been satisfied with the solution proposed by the co-ordinator of the contact group on the scope, which had the merit of upholding the 1925 Protocol while at the same time equating an incident of use of chemical weapons with a violation of the prohibitions contained in the convention. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the possibility of use of a weapon whose production, possession, stockpiling and transfer are prohibited, particularly if adequate verification provisions are included in the convention. We are ready, however, to examine the existing proposal aimed at making the prohibition of use explicit in the text, with a view to drafting the article which will set forth the scope of the agreement. If a generally acceptable draft is achieved, negotiations on the verification clauses would be greatly facilitated, since the area of application of the convention would be clearly defined.

There seems to be general agreement that the main article on the scope of the convention should spell out a set of prohibitions and a set of obligations, namely, the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and possibly

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also use of chemical weapons, plus the obligation to destroy existing stocks and production facilities. It is obvious that some exceptions must be contemplated under non-hostile, or permitted purposes, such as industrial, medical and scientific research as well as law enforcement needs. The question of permission to retain certain quantities of supertoxic lethal chemical agents for so-called "protective purposes" must be more closely scrutinized to avoid any loopholes that might defeat the aim of the convention. If existing stocks of chemical weapons and the facilities for their production are to be destroyed, there seems to be no sensible argument in favour of maintaining a protective capability, for there would be nothing left to protect oneself against.

"Permitted", or "non-hostile" purposes to be allowed as exceptions under the convention should, in our view, be understood in the narrow sense described above. It would not be practical or feasible to consider the entire peaceful civilian chemical industry as an exception to the prohibitions contained in the Convention, since the regulation of the chemical industry as a whole clearly falls well beyond the scope of the instrument that we are negotiating here.

Beside the prohibitions contemplated, special attention should be given to the obligations which are an integral part of the scope of the future instrument. Such commitments would require those who now possess chemical weapons in their arsenals to destroy their stocks and their facilities for the production of chemical weapons. Verification procedures should ensure that destruction is carried out in accordance with the obligations entered into. My delegation considers it important to bear in mind that verification does not constitute an end in itself, but rather a means to ascertain that both the prohibitions and the obligations are respected by each of the parties to the convention. International procedures, including on-site inspection, should aim at the minimum degree of intrusiveness necessary to satisfy all parties that the provisions of the convention are being adequately observed. Special care must be taken to devise a set of procedures that allows ample opportunity for consultation and co-operation between parties to clear any doubts about the implementation of the convention, before the mechanism for international verification is set in motion. In carrying out agreed verification procedures, the appropriate international body to be instituted by the convention must take into account the preservation of the sovereign rights of States parties, in order to avoid the utilization of allegations as a tool for the exacerbation of tensions or for increasing confrontation between States. National institutions and internal legislation should function in co-operation with the international body and in accordance with the provisions of the convention.

Provisions dealing with the procedures of verification should aim, in our view, at establishing a multilateral, non-discriminatory regime in which all parties have equal rights and obligations. Nothing can prevent any State from utilizing its

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technological advancement to gain private knowledge about facts and events taking place in another State, provided that the use of such methods does not violate existing principles and practices of international law. The convention should not, however, become a means of condoning or legitimizing such practices, nor should parties be required to give their consent in advance for the use of so-called "national technical means", the nature and scope of which is necessarily covert. Whenever information obtained by a party is introduced to substantiate claims of a possible violation, all parties should have equal access to the available data through the international body charged with the verification of the convention. By the same token, the composition of the international body should not be based upon any form of discrimination, by granting to some parties special rights and responsibilities which are denied to others. Nor should the convention refer the solution of such claims to any existing international organ whose rules permit a few privileged parties effectively to block action. Under the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States are already entitled to bring to the attention of the Security Council any situation which might endanger international peace and security. Action by the Security Council should not be confused with or become a substitute for action by the mechanism provided for in the convention.

As I said at the beginning of this statement, there seems to exist now an opportunity for the achievement of an effective convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The few nations which currently possess such weapons in their arsenals have apparently come to the conclusion that the possible advantages of the military use of supertoxic agents would be offset by the hindrance to the regular operation of troops, caused by the need for cumbersome protective equipment. Quite apart from moral considerations, the purely military value of chemical weapons appears to be doubtful. But because huge arsenals exist, some powers have continued to produce and stockpile large quantities of chemical agents that have no application in peaceful industry. Their cost, and the tactical drawbacks of their actual use in military operations may have been the main factors in the political decision to seek an agreement to ban chemical weapons taken by those who possess them. Their main interest, accordingly, is the achievement of an international instrument which will ensure that the potential adversary also eliminates its own arsenals and its capability for chemical weapons production, and which at the same time provides reciprocal confidence that no such weapons are ever used in combat. The international community, represented in this Committee, should seize this opportunity to negotiate and conclude a convention through which chemical warfare will no longer remain an indiscriminate threat in the hands of those who are capable of waging it. Thus it is imperative that the arsenals in the hands of a few be completely destroyed, so as to win the confidence of those who do not possess any chemical weapons at all.

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For the vast majority of nations, the convention can also have another useful purpose: the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of chemical agents.

The Brazilian delegation, together with other delegations of the Group of 21, has long argued that the convention should contain meaningful provisions on international co-operation for peaceful purposes. We are convinced that such provisions would be instrumental in promoting confidence among parties, by ensuring that technological progress in the field of chemistry is made available to all parties, particularly the developing countries. A number of proposals to this effect have already been advanced, and we hope they will receive the serious attention they deserve. The "detailed views" submitted by the United States do not elaborate on this subject, while the "basic provisions" of the Soviet Union only contain a general statement which needs further clarification and expansion.

Finally, let me dwell for a moment on the procedural difficulties with which this Committee has been confronted since the start of the 1983 session and which have so far **prevented** it from building upon the results of the fruitful activity of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. My delegation deeply regrets the absence of a report by the previous Chairman of the Working Group on the result of his consultations with experts. The obstacles raised by a group of delegations deprived the Committee, for instance, of the possibility of consolidating the progress made by the contact group led by the distinguished Egyptian expert, General Ezz. The inability of the Committee to agree on an agenda and programme of work for its 1983 session also adversely affects the continuation of work on the elaboration of a convention on chemical weapons, since the intransigent attitude of some delegations has so far prevented the re-establishment of working groups and agreement on their chairmanships. The consequence of the procedural obstacles raised is the unjustifiable and counterproductive delay in the resumption of the activities of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which might otherwise have already started its work on the basis of existing proposals, thus taking advantage of the political will to achieve a convention. My delegation fails to understand the motivations of this attitude, especially since the delegations concerned profess their active interest in the speedy conclusion of a convention. We are confident that under your guidance Mr. Chairman, the procedural deadlock can be quickly broken so that work on a draft convention may start very soon.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador de Souza e Silva for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, allow me, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to congratulate you, the representative of the non-aligned State of Morocco, with which the Soviet Union maintains good-neighbourly relations, upon your assumption of the Chairmanship of the Committee for the month of March. I should at the same time like to express our profound gratitude to Ambassador Erdembileg, the distinguished representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, for his successful accomplishment of the duties of Chairman of the Committee during the initial phase of its work in 1983.

The Soviet delegation would today like to draw the attention of the Committee to the question of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy. As you know, the group of socialist countries has submitted a proposal for the Committee on Disarmament to conduct negotiations on this issue with a view to elaborating an appropriate international agreement.

At the present time, the problem of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy is particularly important and urgent; it is raised by life itself. The extreme importance of this question is also due to the fact that it is one aspect of the problem of the prevention of nuclear war.

The practical necessity of raising the question of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy is linked with the irreversible process of its rapid development. The number of nuclear installations for non-military purposes is growing in the world. The interest of many States in the development of nuclear energy shows that this vitally important industry will continue to develop speedily in the future. The rapid development of civilian nuclear energy in the world is an indisputable fact of modern life, which has a great future. According to IAEA data, by the end of 1981, in 23 States of the world, there were 272 nuclear energy reactors with a capacity of more than 150,000 MW (electric), which produced 9 per cent of all electric energy output in the world. In addition to that, 239 nuclear energy reactors were under construction, the commissioning of which will bring the total capacity of nuclear power stations up to 376,000 MW. By 1985 nuclear energy reactors should produce 17 per cent of world electric energy output, and by the end of the current century, 25-30 per cent.

These facts show that the further development of nuclear energy is in the interests of the progress of human civilization. Modern science confirms that this process is inevitable. In the future it will acquire a still greater scope, in particular because, as the non-renewable resources of organic fuels are exhausted on earth, peaceful nuclear power will make it possible to meet the ever-growing requirements of mankind in the spheres of energy, supply industry, agriculture and scientific research. There is no doubt that nuclear energy will be developed in a growing number of countries and on virtually all continents. Accordingly, the technical equipment will become more sophisticated and there will be an increasing number of such nuclear installations as nuclear power stations, research reactors, nuclear fuel production and processing plants and depots for radioactive materials.

Nuclear power stations and other nuclear installations are located quite irregularly over the globe. The majority of such installations are situated in western Europe. Peaceful nuclear energy is being developed rapidly in the Soviet Union and other CMEA member countries.

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In the 1980s, the growth of electric energy production in the Soviet Union will be basically assured by nuclear energy. More than 70 per cent of the increase in electric energy production will be obtained from nuclear and hydro-electric power stations. In 1985, nuclear power stations will produce up to 220-225 billion kWh of electric energy. New facilities will be commissioned with a capacity of 24-25 million kW. Work is being continued to develop fast neutron reactors and to use nuclear fuel for the production of thermo-energy. To this end capacities will be commissioned at the Smolensk, Kalinin and Kursk nuclear power stations. In the Ukraine, new capacities are being commissioned at the South Ukrainian, Khmelnytsky, Zaporozhye, Chernobylska, Crimea and Rovno nuclear power stations and at the Odessa nuclear thermal power station. In Lithuania, the first stage of the Ignalinsk nuclear power station is being put into operation.

New energy units are being developed in the USSR with fast neutron reactors with a capacity of 800-1,600 thousand kW. We have initiated the construction of several powerful nuclear stations for the supply of heat, each of which will be able to supply heat to a city with a population of many thousands.

The Soviet Union has participated and will participate in the construction in the fraternal socialist countries of nuclear power stations and other installations. On the territory of the USSR major enterprises will be constructed on an integrated basis, in the same way as the Khmelnytskaya nuclear power station.

That is why we are interested in ensuring the safe development of peaceful nuclear facilities and call upon the Committee on Disarmament to consider this important question.

The premeditated destruction of nuclear power stations, research reactors and other similar facilities is capable of causing the release and dissemination of a tremendous quantity of radioactive substances, with disastrous consequences for the population; in other words, it may lead to consequences similar to those resulting from the use of nuclear weapons. According to the estimates of the experts, the radioactive contamination occurring after the destruction of only one nuclear power station with a capacity of 1 million kW would in the short term be comparable with the radioactive contamination after the explosion of a 1 mt nuclear bomb and it would be dozens of times higher after a period of one year or more. The estimates of Swedish experts show, for example, that after a major accident at a power station with such a capacity, the fatality rate in a 16 km zone of radioactive contamination would be 58 per cent. The total surface of contamination could be up to tens of thousands of square kilometres. Over this area, the prolonged effect of radiation would cause cancerous diseases and manifestations of adverse genetic consequences. It should be added, that owing to the fact that the set of radioactive isotopes occurring after the destruction of such facilities is different from those occurring after a nuclear explosion, the consequences of radioactive contamination after the destruction of such facilities would last longer than after the explosion of a nuclear charge and would continue for 50-100 years or more.

It is important to note that an attack on nuclear installations could have serious consequences not only for the States exposed to such an attack but also for neighbouring countries, since the radioactive substances released as a result of such actions might spread far beyond the State's boundaries. It is not difficult to understand what a danger an attack on peaceful nuclear facilities might constitute for countries which have a large number of civilian nuclear installations.

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These facts convincingly show that it is in the interests of the international community to ensure the safety of peaceful nuclear facilities and that the prohibition of attacks on such facilities on the basis of an international agreement would be an extremely important measure.

As has already been noted, the destruction of peaceful nuclear installations even with the use of conventional weapons would in fact have the same kinds of consequences as an attack with the use of nuclear weapons. The destruction of such facilities as a result of the use of nuclear weapons would have disastrous consequences of a global nature. Therefore, the need to ensure the safe development of nuclear energy is organically linked with the task of the prevention of nuclear war. That is why the problems of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy and the prevention of nuclear war represent two components of the general task of eliminating the nuclear threat. All this supports the idea that the question of the prevention of attacks on peaceful nuclear installations should become the subject of serious negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, with a view to elaborating international legal measures to prevent such actions. It is absolutely clear that the elaboration and adoption of such measures would make a significant contribution to the prevention of nuclear war in another important way.

It should be noted that the question of the safe development of nuclear energy is not a new one. For a number of years it has been raised and actively discussed in the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums.

The Soviet Union has taken an active part in the discussion of the question of the protection of peaceful nuclear facilities in the Committee, and declared its readiness to make a contribution to the elaboration of appropriate international legal measures in addition to the already existing legal instruments. We have stated, in particular, that we are ready to conduct negotiations both within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament and at a conference convened especially for this purpose. We have also proposed the establishment of a certain time-limit for the elaboration of the necessary international legal measures to protect peaceful nuclear facilities. The only thing to which the Soviet delegation has always objected, and these objections remain, is the confusion of two different questions: the prohibition of radiological weapons and the protection of peaceful nuclear facilities from attacks. We have always been in favour of independent negotiations on these two different issues and against their linkage. We believe that it would be correct to try to complete the talks on a radiological weapons ban while at the same time elaborating international legal measures aimed at preventing attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities. In our view, the speedy completion of the elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons would open the way to progress in the negotiations on the protection of civilian nuclear facilities, the safe development of which is of profound interest for all countries of the world.

The prevention of attacks on civilian nuclear facilities is an important and independent question requiring serious consideration, and we would like to emphasize once again that it should not be artificially linked with the problem of radiological weapons.

I should now like to dwell on some aspects of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons. We shall, of course, study the proposals put forward today by Mr. Hurd, the representative of the United Kingdom, in connection with the

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prohibition of chemical weapons. I should, however, like to make one observation immediately. We note the fact that the United Kingdom is ready to proceed to negotiations on the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The United Kingdom delegation linked this readiness on its part with the statement of Vice-President Bush of the United States. In that connection, I should like to draw attention to the fact that the socialist countries, and in particular the Soviet Union, together with many non-aligned States, have long been urging the Committee on Disarmament to move on from general discussions on the question of chemical weapons to real and serious negotiations on the drafting of the text of a convention.

At a recent meeting of the Committee, the Soviet delegation informed members of the decision of the Soviet Government to agree to the proposal of a number of non-aligned and neutral States for the inclusion in the future convention of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. The Soviet Government was guided by the desire to speed up the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of such weapons, and therefore to make progress on a question which has for a long time caused the greatest divergence of views in the sphere of the definition of the scope of the prohibition in the future convention. We have listened to the comments on our proposal, which have on the whole been positive; we have also taken note of the statement made by the French delegation at our last plenary meeting, and we shall be ready to revert to this question at a later meeting of the Committee.

The Soviet delegation today intends also to touch upon a number of other questions, with a view to facilitating the search for mutually acceptable solutions on a number of important provisions of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

One of these questions has already been raised recently in a statement by Ambassador Herder, the representative of the German Democratic Republic. He spoke about the "serious additional problems" which arise in connection with the technological breakthrough in the field of chemical weapons -- the appearance of binary types of such weapons. These problems are of different kinds. We shall touch upon one of them, which consists in the following. The introduction of binary weapons could significantly undermine the basic principle of the future convention in the course of its implementation -- the principle of the undiminished security of all sides. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic proposed the following solution to the problem: the inclusion in the convention of a provision whereby the States parties, during the first year of its implementation, shall declare the location of plants producing binary chemical weapons, and shall, during the first two years of the implementation of the convention eliminate these plants.

While supporting this proposal, we would like to express our point of view on it.

There is every reason to describe the existing situation with chemical weapons as such that some States possess only unitary types of such weapons and the capacities for their production, while others possess both unitary types of chemical weapons and samples of munitions of binary chemical weapons and designs for facilities for their production or, in any case, have elaborated the technology of their production and consequently are capable of creating in the future stockpiles of such weapons. This puts future parties to the convention in an unequal situation, allowing some of them to maintain the material basis for circumventing their

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commitments under the convention if appropriate measures are not taken. Everybody knows that it is much easier to create illegally, in violation of the convention, new stockpiles of binary chemical weapons than of the traditional types of such weapons. Binary weapons need not necessarily be produced at specialized military facilities; they can, besides, be manufactured unnoticed since the production process for binary weapon components does not include several particularly dangerous stages which are difficult to conceal, in contrast to the production of unitary chemical weapons.

As we understand it, this is the essence of the German Democratic Republic proposal aimed at a certain equalization of the positions of the future parties to the convention through the introduction of a special, very strict regime for the prohibition of binary weapons. As we see it, such a proposal does not create any significant difficulties for future parties to the convention. It assumes, of course, that if by the time of the conclusion of the convention, one or another State has created specialized facilities, belonging to military agencies, for the production of the components of binary or multicomponent weapons, or concludes contracts for the production of such components with commercial firms, then, after the convention has entered into force it should, as a matter of priority, declare the location of these facilities, and their capacity and then eliminate these facilities. Naturally, this proposal also means that we should already now be thinking about and envisaging for the convention a provision determining how the elimination of such facilities should be carried out, particularly those belonging to commercial firms -- whether they should necessarily be physically eliminated "down to the foundation", as is proposed by the United States delegation, or whether their dismantling or reorientation for commercial production could be allowed.

In the light of the proposal of the German Democratic Republic, the appeal of the United Nations General Assembly contained in resolution 37/98 A to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons is particularly relevant.

Of course, the proposal of the German Democratic Republic does not solve the entire problem. There still exists the possibility of circumventing the convention through the covert production of the most dangerous types of prohibited chemicals for the manufacture of chemical weapons at commercial enterprises, and not only to create stockpiles of binary weapons but also to increase the stocks of traditional chemical weapons. In order also to eliminate this possibility of upsetting the balance, we would like to propose another solution. We suggest that the parties to the convention should not only close and then eliminate the facilities specially designed to produce chemicals for the manufacture of chemical weapons, but in addition should refrain from the production, at their commercial enterprises also, of products the molecules of which contain the linking of the methyl group with the phosphorus atom. We believe that this proposal would eliminate the material basis for the covert production of chemical weapons on the basis of organophosphorus compounds. As is known, these compounds serve as the basis for obtaining the most dangerous supertoxic lethal chemical nerve agents such as, for example, GB, GD, GF, VX, both in industrial conditions and in binary systems. Since they are not widely used in the commercial chemical industry, the economic damage resulting from the cessation of their production would not be significant.

No less important is the fact that our proposal would facilitate verification of the non-production of prohibited chemicals, especially for binary weapons, at commercial enterprises. In particular, it would eliminate the need "to make an inventory" of the entire organophosphorus industry and to identify those enterprises

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capable of producing chemical weapons. Detection of the fact of the production of organophosphorus compounds containing the methylphosphorus link in the commercial industry would constitute proof of the violation of the relevant provision of the convention.

The question of the undiminished security of all sides has other aspects. The military capability of States possessing chemical weapons of course comprises not only chemical weapons but also other types of weapons. It is improbable that even two States could possess completely identical components of their capabilities, including also the chemical components, from the point of view of their qualitative and quantitative parameters. Finally, it is difficult to imagine that the States which will have to eliminate stockpiles of chemical weapons would elaborate, if there is no previously agreed order, even approximately similar plans for the destruction or reorientation of these stockpiles according to such indicators as, for example, uniformity, dates, rates of destruction of various categories of chemicals, etc. And that being so, the question arises what to do in order not to diminish the security of States but on the other hand to give them confidence that the convention is effective and that they should not postpone the destruction of stockpiles to the last moment.

Taking all these factors into account, the Soviet delegation proposes the working out of an order for the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons which would not give unilateral military advantages to any participant at any stage of the elimination of stockpiles and would ensure the evenness of the process.

This order should be carefully thought out and embodied in appropriate provisions of the future convention. Naturally, after the convention enters into force, taking into account the specific quantities and parameters of the stockpiles of chemical weapons declared by the States parties, these provisions should be spelled out in greater detail.

In conclusion, I should like to say a few words about organizational matters. The Soviet delegation, like the delegation of Brazil, is concerned at the stagnation which has overtaken the work of the Committee, and it appeals to those delegations which have prevented the resumption of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons during the past several weeks to agree to the proposals that have been made, offering a way out of the present situation. Twice last week Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic, speaking on behalf of the socialist countries at plenary meetings of the Committee -- not to mention our actions through informal channels -- put forward proposals and alternatives designed to permit the immediate resumption of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We hope and we are even convinced that the efforts of the group of socialist States will have positive results and that all the formal obstacles that existed earlier, and which of course were not created by the group of socialist countries, will be removed, and that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will be able to resume its activities.

At the same time, we would like to note with satisfaction that many delegations in the Committee have responded to our proposal concerning the conduct of bilateral consultations on various specific aspects of the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Soviet delegation has already had a number of bilateral meetings and others are envisaged in the very near future. We confirm our readiness to display any form of co-operation with delegations in the Committee which will allow the speediest possible progress in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Issraelyan for his statement and for his kind words with respect to myself and my country. I now give

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my delegation, I wish to express our heartfelt congratulations for your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee for this month of March. It is our pleasure to work under your experienced leadership and let me assure you of our fullest co-operation.

I would also like to take this occasion to express our appreciation to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Erdembileg of the Mongolian People's Republic, for his efforts during the very difficult period of this session.

It is not with such a light heart that I have asked for the floor this morning to restate and clarify the positions of a group of Western delegations. We would much have preferred that the matters of a procedural nature be dealt with in informal consultations through you, Mr. Chairman, with the well-appreciated assistance of our able Secretary of the Committee. We would like to take this opportunity to express our joint appreciations to you for your present efforts. However, the matter has already been taken up by certain delegations in the plenary, which compels us also to state our positions at this plenary meeting.

A group of delegations for which I am speaking this morning has been devoting many hours of serious deliberations since the beginning of the session to what essentially are the requests by other groups to put new items on the agenda or to restructure the basic understanding regarding the working group chairmanships. I am not revealing any secret when I say that we have undertaken numerous consultations since the beginning of February, in our joint attempts to accommodate as much as possible the concern and wishes of other delegations, thereby stretching to the maximum extent possible what we consider to be our principles, and indeed those of the Committee on Disarmament. We have taken a number of occasions to sound out with the other colleagues of the Committee various possible solutions to what we have been unilaterally asked to do. It is our intention that this process of consultations be continued in the future, mainly through you, Mr. Chairman, so that satisfactory solutions can be worked out very shortly.

At the same time, we have become increasingly concerned that in spite of our oft-repeated desire and request, and those of many other delegations, that the Committee on Disarmament get into working gear and deal with substantive matters through the resumption of the working groups under the existing mandates, we are already in the sixth week of this session without being able to do so. I would not want to think that the situation is the result of the preoccupation of certain delegations that some issues be dealt with first, before the Committee starts substantive work. I would like to recall that Ambassador Alessi, our distinguished colleague from Italy, while being last month's co-ordinator, repeatedly emphasized that we go along with the established practice of the Committee, namely, that those working groups for which there is a consensus should immediately resume work, while at the same time we work hard to resolve the proposal for new agenda items. I hope that the extent of the flexibility and accommodating approach thus displayed by us has not been lost on the rest of our colleagues.

With this much preface, I would like to get into the clarification of our positions first on the matter of the working groups. We fail to understand why there should be any problem regarding the chairmanship of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. It has been an established practice, to which we have never raised any objection and which we quietly followed in the previous years, that this chairmanship be on a rotation basis. We cannot think of it in any other way, and thus we fail to understand the alternatives proposed by the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic last week.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Everyone in the Committee agrees that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons is doing very important work and that we might be able to accomplish something very meaningful if we do not waste time on non-existent problems. Our proposal is, therefore: let us have the chemical weapons working group with Ambassador McPhail as Chairman and with the existing mandate and get to work.

As far as the other working groups are concerned, as we all know, the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is already in action under the able leadership of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico. Our position regarding other working groups has been very flexible and we have stated so.

At the same time, I have said on the occasion of informal consultations that there may be some merit in the proposal floating around this room for some time that the chairmanships of all the working groups should be on the principle of rotation. I have stated that if it is the wish of the other delegations we shall certainly be more than prepared to entertain and give serious consideration to the principle of rotation and to the proposed allocation of chairmanships accordingly. Of course, it is even mathematically difficult to observe complete rotation together with the maintenance of fair representation, but I am quite sure that the Committee on Disarmament, in its wisdom, can solve these details from year to year.

Nevertheless, it is essential to emphasize that the working groups should start their work with the existing mandates. The existing mandates reflect the results of the work of previous years, and if only for the sake of maintaining continuity of the work it is essential that we start with them and follow through until such mandates are exhausted. Of course, one may argue that no mandate represents holy and supreme wisdom and it is the right of every delegation to advance various ideas, but I would hope that such procedures would by no means prevent the working group from proceeding with its important and substantive work.

While I have the floor, let me touch upon a subject that has been with us for quite some time, namely, the proposed agenda item on the prevention of nuclear war. There is no question that the prevention of nuclear war is one of the most important and serious subjects today. Various views have been expressed as to the form and the context in which this question should be addressed. The positions of the various delegations for which I am speaking now have been made clear on a number of occasions, including the plenary meeting of 28 February, and I have no intention of repeating them here today.

I would merely like to remind our colleagues that through our serious efforts in good faith to accommodate and make concessions as much as possible, a formula was proposed by our distinguished colleague from Italy at the informal meeting on 22 February. I would like to inform the Committee that at the informal consultation held last Friday, 4 March, I presented yet another formulation, namely:

- "Item 2 (a) Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
- (b) International security and disarmament;
prevention of war, in particular nuclear war."

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Sensing that this formulation might still pose difficulties to some delegations, I again presented, on the afternoon of Monday, 7 March, to our Chairman, Ambassador Skalli, still another alternative. This one reads as follows:

"Item 2 Prevention of nuclear war:

- (a) Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
- (b) International security and disarmament."

When presenting these formulations we have repeatedly emphasized our flexibility in achieving a formulation that would meet not only our own but all others' requirements. It has even been suggested that we would entertain constructive suggestions for changes or that we might consider it feasible that a formulation such as the one I have just mentioned, on which the Chairman of the Committee would invite interpretative statements from interested delegations, may be agreed on. I sincerely hope that all these serious efforts of ours will not meet out-of-hand rejections, but that the door is kept open for continued efforts to arrive at a consensus.

I have only one more item on which I would like to state our position. We have noted, and indeed we share, the concern expressed by several delegations that the starting period of the Committee on Disarmament sessions should be taken up so much by procedural discussions. There have been a number of interesting concepts presented on ways to avoid such possible impasses in the future, and we would be interested in participating in the consideration of this problem at an appropriate time and in an appropriate formulation.

Before concluding my statement, which I am making on behalf of my own delegation and of a number of other delegations, I would like to repeat what I said at the outset. It would be much better, and in keeping with practice, if procedural issues were handled through informal consultations with you Mr. Chairman, and I would like to repeat again, that we appreciate the sincere efforts you have been undertaking in this direction, and would like to reconfirm our full support for your admirable and untiring efforts.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Imai for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first time that I am taking the floor in the month of March, allow me to begin by saying how happy my delegation is to see you presiding over our work at this time, when so many unexpected difficulties and obstacles have arisen. I believe that your great knowledge of the subject and your diplomatic skill, with which we are all familiar, will be of help to us in the solution of our problems. I should also like once again to express my gratitude to Ambassador Erdembileg, the distinguished representative of Mongolia, who guided our work last month in an exemplary manner.

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

Although, as I have already said here, there are many aspects of the present situation that are rather discouraging for the Committee, there are at the same time other elements which should give us encouragement. I am referring to the number of distinguished persons who have visited us so far during our 1983 session, the latest today, when we have heard the eloquent statements by Ambassador Andreani, the Director-General of Political Affairs of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Douglas Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom. It is precisely because of the content of those two statements and of the one we have just heard from the distinguished representative of Japan that, even at the risk of the imperfections inevitable in any improvisation, I have felt compelled to take the floor. I do not intend to speak at any great length. I have already, at the Committee's 197th and 198th meetings, fully explained the position of my delegation with regard to such questions as the item on the prevention of nuclear war. Today, in the light of the statements we have just heard, I should simply like to quote one passage of the working paper circulated by the Group of 21 in document CD/341, because it seems to me that this passage contains the essence of the position of that Group on the subject of the prevention of nuclear war. The passage in question is the following:

"Doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being the cause of the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation in the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines, which are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of nuclear war."

Since a reference has been made -- a far too generous reference -- to the modest contribution I was able to make to the drafting of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, I should like to quote certain paragraphs which in my view serve as a basis for the position of the Group of 21. Speakers here have talked about international security. What does the Final Document say with respect to security? With regard to security the Final Document says: "The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it". There has also been talk of deterrence. What does the Final Document say about deterrence? The Final Document says: "Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliance nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority". The Final Document dates from 1978. Two years later, on 12 September 1980, a study entitled "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" was circulated in the United Nations as a report of the Secretary-General, in document A/35/392. In this study there are two paragraphs in particular which are of special relevance to the matter of deterrence. The first is paragraph 497 which reads as follows:

"Even if the balance of deterrence was an entirely stable phenomenon, there are strong moral and political arguments against a continued reliance on this balance. It is inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization is used by some States to promote their security. The future of mankind is then made hostage to the perceived security of a few nuclear-weapon States ...".

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

Secondly, paragraph 519 of this same study, a study which, I should like to remind you, was drafted by 12 experts from 12 different countries and was unanimously approved by all of them, says the following:

"Even if the road to nuclear disarmament is a long and difficult one, there is no alternative. Peace requires the prevention of the danger of a nuclear war. If nuclear disarmament is to become a reality, the commitment to mutual deterrence through a balance of terror must be discarded. The concept of the maintenance of world peace, stability and balance through the process of deterrence is perhaps the most dangerous collective fallacy that exists."

Lastly, as regards the prevention of nuclear war, there are two paragraphs of the Final Document which seem to me particularly relevant: paragraph 19, which emphasizes the need to adopt genuine measures of disarmament in order to "ensure the survival of mankind", and paragraph 20, which says the following:

"Among such measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

I think that if you compare the passage I quoted from the working paper of the Group of 21 and the above-mentioned paragraphs with some of the statements we have heard today, you will be bound to come to the conclusion that there are discrepancies of substance. It was for that reason that the Group of 21 preferred to submit its proposal in a wholly neutral formulation under which all positions of substance could be expressed. In addition, the Group of 21 was and is in agreement with the suggestion you made, Mr. Chairman, that upon the adoption of the agenda you should give the floor to all representatives who wished to place on record their interpretation of this neutral and general expression. My delegation thus finds it very difficult to understand why such a neutral form of wording should provoke such a violent reaction on the part of certain delegations. Apart from the fact of its general and neutral character, which would allow each delegation to interpret it in the manner most appropriate to its position of substance, the Group of 21 proposed the item in this form of wording because resolution 37/78 I, which the General Assembly adopted on 9 December 1982 by 130 votes in favour and none against, is entitled "Prevention of nuclear war", and in that resolution the General Assembly, in addition to requesting the Committee on Disarmament to undertake negotiations on that subject as a matter of the highest priority, decided to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session an item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war: report of the Committee on Disarmament".

In view of all that I have said, Mr. Chairman, my delegation ventures to hope that under your skilful guidance we may be able to find a solution to this matter as well as to the question of the working groups.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador García Robles for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to myself.

I have no further speakers on my list. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

In that case, the next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 15 March 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.