

**COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT**

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4 February 1983  
ENGLISH

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**FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING**

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Friday, 4 February 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. D. Erdembileg

(Mongolia)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. B. OULD ROUIS

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia:

Mr. D. SADLEIR

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Mrs. S. FREEMAN

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Mr. H. DE BISSCHOP

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. D. KOSTOV

Mr. P. POPCHEV

Mr. C. PRAMOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U TIN KYAW HLAING

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China:

Mr. LI LUYE

Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN

Mr. LI CHANGHE

Mr. PAN ZHENGLIANG

Mrs. GE YUYUN

Mr. PAN JUSHENG

Mrs. ZHOU YUNHUA

Cuba:

Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mrs. M. SLAMOVA

Mr. A. CIMA

Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:

Mr. S.A.R. EL REEDY

Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Miss W. BASSIM

Mr. E. EZZ

Mr. S. SULTAN

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFFE

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

Mr. B. d'ABOVILLE

Miss L. GHAZERIAN

Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Mr. F. SAYATZ

Mr. M. NOTZEL

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN

Mr. W. RÖHR

Mr. J. PFIRSCHKE

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY

Mr. S. SARAN

Mr. N. SETH

Indonesia:

Mr. N.S. SUTRESHA  
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI  
Mrs. P. RAMADHAN  
Mr. B. DARMOSUTANO  
Mr. F. QASIM  
Mr. I.H. WIRAAATMADJA

Iran:

Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI  
Mr. R. DI CARLO

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. KAWAKITA  
Mr. K. TAKANA  
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. L. ERDENCHULJUN  
Mr. J. CHOINKHOR  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMANN  
Mr. A.J.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. A.N.C. NWAQZOMUDOH  
Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. A.A. ADEDOJU  
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK  
Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. J. ZAWALONKA  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. L. TOADER

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mrs. M.B. THEORIN  
Mr. C.M. HYLTEINIUS  
Mr. G. EKHOLM  
Mr. S. ASK  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. P.O. GRANBOM  
Mrs. A. LAU-ERIKSSON  
Mr. N. ELIASSON  
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. V.M. GANJA  
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININE  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO  
Mr. V.A. KROKHA  
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN  
Mr. G.N. VASHDZE  
Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Mr. B.P. NOBLE  
Mrs. J.I. LINK  
Mr. G.H. COOPER  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. G. BUSH  
Mr. J. TOWER  
Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M.D. BUSBY  
Mr. H.L. BROWN  
Mr. H.L. CALHOUN  
Mr. P.S. CORDEN  
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. R.L. HORNE  
Mr. W. HECKROTTE  
Mr. J.J. HOGAN  
Mr. J. MARTIN  
Mr. R. MIKULAK

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER  
Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO  
Mr. H. SUAREZ-MORA  
Mr. O. GARCIA-GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC  
Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Mr. B. ADEITO NZENGEYA  
Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA

Under-Secretary-General for  
Disarmament Affairs:

Mr. J. MARTENSON

Director-General of the  
United Nations Office at Geneva:

Mr. E. SUY

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 191st plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

I wish to welcome today the presence among us of the distinguished Vice-President of the United States of America, the Honourable George Bush, who will address the Committee today. I am sure that all members of the Committee join me in welcoming him. I now give the floor to the Vice-President of the United States of America, the Honourable George Bush.

Mr. BUSH (Vice-President of the United States of America): It is a great pleasure and a personal privilege for me, Sir, to address this Committee. I am mindful that the Committee is meeting in a special plenary in order to afford us this opportunity to convey to you the views of my Government on the very critical issues of arms control, and I am grateful to the Committee for this favour and deeply honoured. As I look around this table I see so many people with whom I have worked in various capacities in the past. I must say that I feel at home. Let me express, Mr. Chairman, my personal satisfaction in seeing a former colleague from New York in the Chair, and in renewing your acquaintance. I am also delighted to see so many other friends and colleagues from New York who represent their governments now in this important work.

No city has done more than Geneva to advance man's oldest, yet seemingly most elusive dream -- to live at peace with his neighbours. This is the city of Rousseau, who taught us that man is born both free and good, a concept that has had the most profound effect upon my country, and on so many others as well. It was near here that Voltaire made his home when his incisive but often irreverent mind brought down upon him the displeasure of his king. After the calamity of the First World War, the League of Nations was established and housed in this very building, in the hope that here in the free city of Geneva this embodiment of man's best intentions might prosper.

Today, the world's hopes for peace are once again focused on Geneva. Two vital bilateral negotiations are under way here, both with a single aim: to make significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union and thereby to strengthen international stability and to increase the security of all States. And, in this Committee, multilateral efforts are in train to deal with other urgent arms control issues: how to eliminate chemical weapons from the world's arsenals; how to effectively verify limitations on nuclear testing; how to approach the question of possible further arms control measures affecting outer space.

My message to you is simple and unequivocal: the United States will do all that it can to create a foundation for enduring world peace through arms control and through agreements that enhance international stability and security. This task is the highest priority of our President, and he has asked me to tell you that: that we will pursue sound and workable arms control initiatives with the utmost determination. But we will not hesitate -- nor should we -- to differ with approaches which are not sound, or do not hold out the prospect of effective, verifiable agreements. What are the prospects for progress here in Geneva? I would like to set forth the views of the United States on the status of our efforts -- both bilateral and multilateral -- to advance the cause of peace by reaching agreement on effective arms control measures.



(Mr. Bush, United States)

President Reagan assumed office at a time of increasing concern among the American people over the behaviour of the Soviet Union and its allies. In its foreign policy, as well as in a relentless build-up of military forces, the Soviet Union has appeared determined to advance its own interests at the expense of everyone else's. This determination was reflected in the invasion of Afghanistan, in the suppression of human rights in Poland, in the use of chemical and toxin weapons in south-east Asia and Afghanistan in violation of customary international law and existing international conventions, and in the steady accumulation of vast amounts of modern weaponry, far beyond any reasonable requirements for defence.

Clearly, this behaviour required a revitalization of our own defences, which in many measures of military power had been outstripped. The United States has undertaken this effort, not with a view toward conquest or intimidation, but rather to maintain our ability to deter aggression and thus to defend our vital interests and those of our friends and allies against the threat of coercion. I know that President Reagan would much prefer to spend our resources on other pursuits. But we will do -- we must do -- what is necessary to defend our interests and preserve the peace.

But providing the means of defence is only one aspect of ensuring one's security. The Reagan Administration believes that arms control measures can be a vital part of our national security, and that equitable and effectively verifiable arms control agreements can increase that security. One of the first actions taken by our President was to launch the most thorough review of arms control policy ever undertaken by a new administration. And a new approach to arms control was necessary to deal with the changed situation in which the United States found itself as a result of Soviet actions over a decade. Arms control had not become less important. Indeed, effective arms control had, if anything, become more important, since the military balance, at all levels, had become more unstable.

President Reagan announced the general principles which guide our arms control efforts in a statement on 18 November 1981. And they are, I think, worth repeating here:

First, the United States seeks to reduce substantially the number and destructive potential of nuclear weapons, not just to freeze them at high levels, as has been the case in previous agreements.

Second, we seek agreements that will lead to mutual reductions to equal levels in both sides' forces. An unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can only encourage aggression.

Third, we seek agreements that will enhance the security of the United States and its allies, and that will reduce the risk of war. Arms control is not an end in itself but a vital means toward ensuring peace and international stability.

Fourth, we will carefully design the provisions of arms control agreements and insist on measures to ensure that all parties comply. In other words, we will insist that agreements must be verifiable. Otherwise, the parties cannot have confidence -- the world cannot have confidence -- that all are abiding by the provisions of an agreement. This is particularly important in the nuclear area, where we have proposed deep cuts in both the United States and the Soviet arsenals. It is also vital to our efforts in this Committee to ban chemical weapons and to develop effective limitations on nuclear testing.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

Based on these objectives, my Government has since then advanced a dynamic programme of arms control initiatives --- in our bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, in the work of this Committee, and --- together with our allies -- in the negotiations at Vienna on MBFR -- Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. Now let me deal with those which are of particular interest to the members of this Committee.

The problem of achieving a reduction in the world's nuclear arsenals is our most important challenge. The United States has met this challenge by developing what President Reagan has called the most comprehensive programme of nuclear arms control ever proposed by my country. These proposals are on the negotiating table here in Geneva --- in the intermediate-range nuclear forces, or INF negotiations, and in the START talks on reducing strategic nuclear forces.

The point I want to stress here is that the United States' proposals in the START negotiations entail deep and significant cuts in the United States and in the Soviet nuclear arsenals --- a 50 per cent cut in our strategic ballistic missiles. In the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations, we have proposed the elimination of an entire class of weapons. We propose doing so in a way which is balanced and which reduces the risk of war. This is, after all, what these negotiations are all about. Stability and security could be greatly enhanced if both sides thus reduced their arsenals, and it is precisely because of this that we are proposing major reductions.

In the INF negotiations, there is now on the table a far-reaching United States proposal which would at a stroke ban this entire class of United States and Soviet longer-range INF missiles, the systems of greatest concern to both sides. The Soviet Union now has over 600 such missiles, with some 1,200 warheads, while the United States has none -- zero. Under our proposal, the Soviet Union would be required to eliminate all of its ground-launched missiles of this type. These missiles -- of the type referred to in the lexicon of the West as SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s -- are in place now. The United States would be required to forgo agreed-upon deployment of its roughly comparable missiles. As you know, they are scheduled to be deployed in Europe beginning this year under the decision -- the unanimous, jointly-taken decision -- of the NATO Alliance.

The United States believes that any such agreement on nuclear forces must be effective and balanced; it must genuinely reduce the nuclear threat to both sides; it must enhance stability; and it must lessen the risk of conflict. Our proposal meets these criteria. Indeed, it strikes to the very heart of the problem.

Thus far, the proposals advanced in the negotiations by the Soviet Union have been designed to leave one side, in this case their side, with significant advantages, indeed with a monopoly over the United States and its allies in the longer-range INF missiles. Indeed, the ideas recently advanced by General Secretary Andropov continue to have this as their aim. We will of course continue to give the most serious consideration to any constructive Soviet proposal. Ours is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. However, we think the Soviet Union must recognize the legitimate security concerns in these talks.

We think ours is a moral position. What is wrong with eliminating from the face of the earth an entire class of new, deadly missiles? The only argument that I have heard as to why we cannot eliminate this generation of INF missiles is that the Soviet Union opposes it, is simply against it. Well, I do not believe that



(Mr. Bush, United States)

in this awesome nuclear age this argument is good enough. Our challenge to the Soviet leadership is: come up with a plan to banish these INF missiles and let us consider, openly, in frank dialogue, initiatives that will achieve that moral goal.

As in the case of intermediate-range missiles, we are emphasizing in the START negotiations real and significant reductions on both sides in the levels of strategic armaments, down to equal ceilings. As President Reagan has pointed out, our proposals in these negotiations would eliminate some 4,700 warheads and 2,250 missiles from the combined nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.

We have been encouraged by the fact that the Soviet Union is negotiating seriously -- we have said that publicly and I am pleased to repeat it today -- and has accepted the concept of reduction, although we do not find its proposals sufficient. Its proposal fails to focus on the more destabilizing elements of strategic forces, ballistic missiles and particularly ICBMs, and it does not go far enough, in our view, in making the kind of deep reductions in ballistic missile forces that we believe to be necessary. However, we believe that the approaches do provide a basis for negotiation, and we intend to explore avenues for achieving such reductions and to pursue the negotiations seriously and constructively. Indeed, our President, upon hearing of the proposal of Mr. Andropov, recognized this seriousness of purpose and I think that is appropriate. People here should understand that.

I will be meeting during my visit here in Geneva with the United States and Soviet delegations to both these critical negotiations. My purpose in doing so is to emphasize the importance which we and our President attach to a successful outcome in both of them. I will convey to the negotiators the President's hope that they will press forward with speed and energy, and his wishes that their efforts will meet with success. I know that all of you deeply share this hope.

I will also, as I have in other stops on this trip, make it clear that I am not the negotiator. The negotiators are here in Geneva, seriously talking with their Soviet counterparts now.

Let me now turn, Mr. Chairman, to the work directly before this Committee, to which we also attach the highest importance.

The Committee is confronted with numerous important issues. None has a higher priority for the United States than the efforts to ban for ever an entire and different class of weapons from the world's arsenals. As the President has stated, the goal of United States policy is to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare by achieving a complete and verifiable ban of chemical weapons.

The nations of the world have already prohibited the first use of chemical and biological weapons in the Geneva Protocol, and have outlawed the possession of biological and toxin weapons in the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Like most other nations at the table, the United States is a party to these treaties, and, like most others, we are in full compliance with these provisions. Beyond the provisions of these treaties, there is an even broader moral prohibition against the use of these weapons. President Franklin Roosevelt perhaps expressed it best when he said that their use "has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind".



(Mr. Bush, United States)

All forms of warfare are terrible. But these weapons are particularly to be feared because of the human suffering that they inflict. That is why the civilized world has condemned their use. Sadly, mankind has, nonetheless, had repeated demonstrations of the cruelty and horror wrought by the use of these weapons. And now, chemical and toxin weapons are being used in Afghanistan and south-east Asia in violation of international law and international arms control agreements. These violations are made all the worse by the fact that the victims do not have the means either to deter the attacks against them or to defend or protect themselves against these weapons.

The United States presented conclusive evidence to the world community of the facts surrounding the use of chemical and toxin weapons. Others have presented evidence as well. We did not come to these conclusions seeking confrontation or rashly, but only after the most exhaustive study. The implications that flow from the use of these weapons are so serious that many would prefer to disbelieve them, simply to ignore them. In our view we just have to face the facts.

The world's progress toward more civilized relations among States has been doggedly slow, and beset at every turn by fears, ambitions, rivalry among nations. We cannot, therefore, allow the progress which we have made in civilization to be destroyed. To do so would be to begin a relentless slide back to a new dark age of mindless barbarism. This is what is at stake here, and this is what we must prevent.

What must now be done? We have called upon the Soviet Union and its allies to stop immediately the illegal use of these weapons. I strongly repeat that call here today. And I urge the Soviet Union, and all other members of the Committee, to join the United States in negotiating a complete and effective and verifiable ban on the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons, a ban that will ensure that these horrors can never occur again.

A complete, effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons is really long overdue. My Government, therefore, would like to see the work of this Committee accelerated, and negotiations undertaken on a treaty to eliminate the threat that is posed by chemical weapons.

A number of key issues, of course, must be resolved if we are to be successful in negotiating such a treaty. In the coming days, our delegation will present to this Committee a new document that contains our detailed views on the content of a convention that we believe could effectively — more specifically, verifiably — eliminate the chemical weapons threat. We undertake this initiative with the aim of further advancing the work of the Committee, and to encourage contributions and co-operation from others as well.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

The key to an effective convention — one that could eliminate the possibility of chemical warfare for ever — is the firm assurance of compliance through effective verification. I think we would all agree that this principle is absolutely fundamental. Effective verification, as the world's recent experience with the use of chemical and toxin weapons shows, is an absolute necessity for any future agreement that could be entered into. This is why we seek a level of verification that will protect civilization, our allies, and indeed humanity itself from this terrible threat. For today, the threat of chemical warfare has increased. And until an effective agreement can be achieved, the United States, just as others, must continue to ensure that it can deter the use of chemical weapons against its citizens and friends. If we are to expect nations ever to forgo the ability to deter chemical warfare, those nations must have confidence that others who accept the prohibition cannot circumvent their obligations and later threaten the peace with chemical weapons. They must be certain that they will not be attacked with such weapons by any State which has likewise forsworn chemical warfare. In short, for us, the verification and compliance provisions of a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty have got to be truly effective.

We know that most of the members of this Committee, like ourselves, are dedicated to accomplishing this important task. To do so will require more than our dedication. It will require greater willingness and flexibility on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies to work seriously and constructively on resolving these key outstanding issues — especially those pertaining to the verification and compliance side. And such issues must be resolved if we expect to make progress. For although some may argue that progress could be made by concentrating on the "easier" issues, or even by drafting treaty texts on them, this would be a fruitless exercise if the verification issues cannot be addressed, cannot be resolved. We will not support a diversion of effort here.

I urge all members of this Committee to begin negotiation in this session to resolve the key issues that face us in this area, and to join with us in achieving a complete and **verifiable ban on chemical weapons**.

The Committee is faced with a number of nuclear arms control issues. The elimination of the threat of nuclear war is clearly of paramount importance to all of us, and the United States fully accepts its special responsibilities in this area. We are recognizing this responsibility in the most effective way that we know — here in Geneva, in good faith, across the negotiating table from the Soviet Union.

At the same time, this Committee has its role to play in the area of nuclear arms control. One of the major issues before it is that of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. Such a ban remains a long-term goal of United States policy, and we will continue to work toward its achievement. The work already done in the Committee by the Group of Scientific Experts on developing a world-wide system for monitoring of nuclear explosions has been very valuable. Moreover,

(Mr. Bush, United States)

at the suggestion of the United States, this Committee formed a working group last year to study issues of verification and compliance surrounding a nuclear test ban. Verification is one area, in particular, in which we believe greater progress must be made if we are to make progress towards a ban on nuclear tests. Therefore, we would hope that the Committee will continue its work in this area this year.

My Government believes that the negotiations in this body on a convention to ban radiological weapons offer the prospect of a modest, but real, genuine step forward, a step that could eliminate a potentially very dangerous type of weapon. Mr. Chairman, we should take it as a cardinal rule of this Committee that when there is the prospect for real progress toward an agreement, we should pursue it to its conclusion. While there are a number of issues yet to be resolved, we believe that an agreement is within the grasp of this Committee and that we should move ahead with all due speed to conclude the negotiations on this treaty.

I should also like to say a brief word about further arms control measures affecting outer space. The United States has been the leader in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. We intend to continue this leadership role. Some of these activities in outer space are important to our national security and that of our allies. They help to monitor the peace, to warn of the threat of war, to ensure proper command and control of our armed forces world-wide, to preserve our deterrent capability, and to assist in the verification of arms control agreements. The limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the Environmental Modification Convention, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which is one of the SALT I agreements, all have important arms control provisions affecting outer space. Some are now asking of us all whether additional measures might be called for and if so of what kind? The United States does not have a simple answer to that question, and we are continuing to study this issue. Clearly, the conditions do not exist which would make negotiations appropriate. We are, however, prepared to exchange views with other members of this Committee, and believe the Committee should address the matter in a very systematic way, a more systematic way than it has done in the past.

Finally, I would like to use this occasion to pay tribute to one among us here today whose tireless efforts over a **lifetime** of service were recently recognized when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. I am **proud that** Ambassador Garcia Robles and I were colleagues in the United Nations in New York. His accomplishments are far too numerous for me to mention, but let me just say that I assure you, Sir, of the full co-operation of the United States delegation in efforts to finish work on a realistic comprehensive programme of disarmament.

There is one more **thought** which I would like to leave with this Committee, a thought which underlies our approach to arms control, and to the issues before this Committee, and that is that the achievement of effective arms control agreements is difficult work. We all know that. **It requires dedication, persistence,**



(Mr. Bush, United States)

tolerance, a respect for the views of others, and above all, a faith that conflict can be prevented, and that no matter how difficult it is, solutions can be found. The most dangerous view, the most dangerous view for mankind, particularly in this nuclear age, is that war is inevitable. I reject this view entirely, because such a belief merely increases the inclination to make a self-fulfilling prophecy. And so let us then rededicate ourselves in this Committee, in every other available forum to the hard and serious work which is absolutely essential to prevent war.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Vice-President of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the members of the Committee.

The representative of the Soviet Union has asked for the floor. I give the floor to Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade Chairman, in connection with the statement of the Vice-President of the United States, the Soviet delegation would like to say the following.

The Soviet Union's position on questions concerning the bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, based on the principle of equality and equal security, has been repeatedly stated by the Soviet Union's leaders. I should like, in this connection, to refer once again to the statement made by Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on 21 December 1982 and to his recent replies to a Pravda correspondent, which have today been circulated as a document of the Committee. I should like to quote the following extract from this document:

[speaking in English] "The best thing of all, and this we suggest, is not to have in the European zone any nuclear weapons at all, either medium-range or tactical weapons. Since the United States will not agree to this, we are also prepared to accept a solution whereby the Soviet Union would have no more missiles than there already are in Europe on the side of NATO. At the same time, an agreement should be reached on the cutting by both parties to equal levels of the numbers of aircraft capable of delivering medium-range nuclear weapons. In that way there would be complete parity both in missiles and in aircraft, and parity on an incomparably lower level than at present."

[resuming in Russian] As regards the questions that are being discussed here in the Committee on Disarmament, our position on those, too, has been repeatedly stated, and not only in a general way but also in the form of concrete proposals and in particular in the form of a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

With respect to the Vice-President's assertions about violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, I should like to remind him, and others as well, that the Geneva Protocol has indeed been violated. The facts are well known: in 1935-1936, poison gases were used by Fascist Italy against Ethiopia; they were used by Hitlerite Germany against my country, especially in the Crimea, in 1942; both before the Second World War and during it, as President Roosevelt said, chemical substances were used by Japan against China. Lastly, poisonous chemical substances were widely used for a long time during the period of the American aggression against Viet Nam, and this, too, is well known. As to the lies about the Soviet Union's use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and south-east Asia, well, a lie will never be anything but a lie, however many times it is repeated.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement.

I have no other member inscribed on my list of speakers for today. This being the case, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 8 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.