

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETIETH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 3 February 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. D. Erdembileg

(Mongolia)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. B. OULD ROUIS

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia:

Mr. D. SADLEIR

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Mrs. S. FREEMAN

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Mr. H. DE BISSCHOP

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. P. POPCHEV

Mr. C. PRAMOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U TIN KYAW HLAING

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China:

Mr. TIAN JIN

Mr. LI CHANGHE

Mr. PAN ZHENGIANG

Mr. PAN JUSHENG

Cuba:

Mr. L. SOLA VILA  
Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. A. CIMA  
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:

Mr. S.A.R. EL REEDY  
Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Miss W. BASSIM  
Mr. E. EZZ  
Mr. S. SULTAN

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. F. SAYATZ  
Mr. M. NOTZEL

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H.D. GENSCHER  
Mr. F. RUTH  
Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. K.T. PASCHKE  
Mr. J. POHLMANN  
Mr. F. ELBE  
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN  
Mr. W. ISCHINGER  
Mr. W. RÖHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. N.S. SUTRESNA

Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA

Mr. F. QASIM

Iran:

Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. B. CABRAS

Mr. C.M. OLIVA

Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Mr. R. DI CARLO

Japan

Mr. R. IMAI

Mr. M. TAKAHASHI

Mr. K. TAKANA

Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. L. ERDENECHULUUN

Mr. J. CHOINKHOR

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN

Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Mr. A.J.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

Mr. A.N.C. NWAZOMUDOH

Mr. J.O. OBOH

Mr. L.O. AKINDELE

Mr. A.A. ADEDOJU

Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK

Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA

Mr. J. ZAWALONKA

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Mr. L. TOADER

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mrs. M.B. THEORIN

Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS

Mr. B. SKALA

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Mr. P.O. GRANBOM

Mrs. A. LAU-ERIKSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. M.F. TREPIKHALIN  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN  
Mr. G.N. VASHDZE  
Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. B.P. NOBLE  
Mrs. J.I. LINK  
Mr. G.H. COOPER  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M.D. BUSBY  
H.L. CALHOUN  
P.S. CORDEN  
K. CRITTENBERGER  
R.L. HORNE  
W. HECKROTTE  
J.J. HOGAN  
J. MARTIN  
R. MIKULAK

Venezuela:

A. LOPEZ OLIVER  
T. LABRADOR RUBIO

Yugoslavia:

K. VIDAS  
M. MIHAJLOVIC  
D. MINIC

Zaire:

Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA

Under-Secretary-General for  
Disarmament Affairs:

Mr. J. MARTENSON

Director-General of the  
United Nations Office  
at Geneva:

Mr. E. SUY

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 190th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the outset, may I welcome the presence in the Committee of the distinguished Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher. He is a well-known personality, for he has been his country's Vice-Chancellor since May 1974. I am sure that all members of the Committee join me in welcoming him.

May I also welcome Mr. Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General who is in charge of the new Department of Disarmament Affairs, and who is present today in our midst.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Mr. GENSCHER (Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany) (translated from German): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all extend to you my congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of this important Committee for the current month. I should also like to extend to your predecessor, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, my sincere congratulations on his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. We are all aware that this distinction does honour not only to him but also to the noble cause of disarmament for which he has so tirelessly worked.

Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Chairman, it is a special honour for me to address, during my visit to Geneva, this important forum in whose work the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has participated actively and intensively ever since its accession in 1975. My visit occurs at a time when this Committee envisages changing its designation to "Conference on Disarmament". I welcome this intention because I regard the new name not only as due recognition of the practical work this Committee has performed so far but also as recognition of the growing importance of this forum, which is laying important foundations for the long-term process of arms control and disarmament by negotiating new generally acceptable agreements.

I wish you, Mr. Chairman, and all the participants every success in this work that concerns us all.

The city of Geneva is a universal symbol of negotiations aimed at strengthening peace and at banishing the horrors of war. Ever since the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in wartime, this city has been inextricably linked with international arms control and disarmament negotiations. Today it is the site of several highly important arms control negotiations which people throughout the world are watching with growing expectations, this year in particular, and which they expect to yield tangible results as soon as possible.

In this context, there is an inner link between the work of the world-wide forum represented by the Committee on Disarmament and the simultaneous United States-Soviet negotiations on substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. Together with the negotiations in Vienna and Madrid, they combine to form a comprehensive dynamic negotiating process of unprecedented intensity.



Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

The Federal Government therefore has great expectations with regard to further developments during 1983.

It is determined to contribute to ensuring that genuine progress occurs on the way to co-operation, dialogue and disarmament.

Only if this is achieved can governments and peoples devote themselves to the great tasks facing humanity: world-wide development, the struggle against hunger and poverty and protection of the environment.

The policy pursued by the Federal Republic of Germany has from the very outset been a policy for peace. This precept is enshrined in the Basic Law, our Constitution.

Disarmament and arms control are integral parts of our security policy and that of the alliance. As early as 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany gave its allies a contractual assurance that it would not manufacture nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons. So that its renunciation of the manufacture of chemical weapons can be verified, the Federal Republic has ever since then accepted international on-site inspections, which can be carried out without impairing the legitimate interest in preserving business secrets.

The peace note of 1966 by the then Federal Government proposed, inter alia, the exchange of observers at manoeuvres -- this was nine years before such a confidence-building measure was agreed upon in the Helsinki Final Act.

The Federal Republic of Germany is committed to a consistent policy of the renunciation of force. As early as 1954, 19 years before joining the United Nations, it stated that it would frame its policy in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and committed itself to the obligation to observe the ban on force embodied in Article 2 of the Charter.

This ban on the threat or use of force was the guiding principle of the aforementioned German peace note of 1966. It is also a fundamental element of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and our treaties with Moscow, Warsaw and Prague as well as the Basic Treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

But it is not sufficient to demand a policy forswearing the use of force, embodied in solemn declarations of principle. What matters is whether the ban on the use of force is observed in practical policy. I cannot conceal my deep concern at the fact that, especially in the past few years, this principle has been seriously violated. A major task incumbent upon everyone responsible is to settle existing conflicts by means of political solutions -- here I have in mind Afghanistan in particular.

The ban on the use of force is comprehensive. It must apply between all countries and regions. It must include the use of force of every type, that is to say, it must prevent not only nuclear war but every kind of war. For my densely populated country at the interface of the two alliances in East and West, the policy of preventing war is a matter of life and death.



(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

The principle of a comprehensive ban on the use of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter is the fundament of the security policy pursued by the a Atlantic alliance. This comprehensive ban on force must be applied in relations between all countries and regions.

At its summit meeting held in Bonn on 10 June 1982, the Western alliance solemnly reaffirmed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in response to attack.

We welcome the fact that, in their Prague declaration, the Warsaw Pact countries took up certain points of the solemn statement by the alliance. The North Atlantic defence alliance is ready to examine whether the Warsaw Pact declaration opens possibilities for applying the principle of the ban on force embodied in the United Nations Charter even more consistently in relations among all States. A renewed binding reaffirmation of the ban on force could constitute a contribution to improving the international situation if it is observed by every State with regard to every other State without reservation and if, at the same time, practical steps are taken to put an end to the use of force where it still prevails. A consistent policy for peace requires the renunciation of the threat of force for the attainment of foreign-policy objectives. In addition, the ban on force must be given concrete substance by achieving tangible results at arms control negotiations.

~~Our aim is to~~ obtain stability both in Europe and worldwide at the lowest possible level of armaments: peace with ever fewer weapons. Arms control and disarmament are the means of achieving this aim. Everyone making serious efforts to achieve progress at the current negotiations, be it in Geneva, Vienna, Madrid or New York, knows how difficult it is to eliminate distrust and reconcile conflicting interests. New efforts are needed to create confidence. Concrete measures must be agreed on that make the military conduct of States calculable and thus systematically reduce distrust.

We noted with satisfaction that the idea of confidence-building measures again met with general support at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. The resolution on this subject sponsored by the Federal Republic of Germany together with 36 other countries was unanimously adopted. We regard this as an encouraging sign. The principles and guidelines for confidence-building measures, which already enjoy extensive support by the international community, must now be discussed in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We are supplementing these efforts by an international symposium to be held in the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1983, which will afford scientists from all over the world an opportunity to elaborate the concept of confidence-building measures and in particular to consider their application in individual regions.

Confidence-building is conditional upon maximum mutual openness. The more progress we make in this field, the more we oblige countries to confine themselves to an armament level really needed for self-defence.



(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

We advocate transparency with regard to world-wide expenditure on armaments and to the relationship between arms spending and expenditure on economic and social development. For this reason, I proposed to the General Assembly several years ago that the United Nations establish a twofold register showing how much each industrial country spends per capita, on the one hand, on armaments and, on the other, on development aid. I also suggested setting up a register on world-wide weapons exports and imports so as to be able to make this "grey area" of world-wide armaments activities more transparent. The Federal Republic of Germany has up to now contributed data in three successive years to the register that already exists at the United Nations in the form of a standardized reporting system on defence expenditure. However, this system can only prove a success if the Warsaw Pact countries participate as well in future. At its thirty-seventh session the General Assembly therefore adopted a resolution calling upon all States once more to participate in this first major step towards the reduction of defence spending.

Confidence-building measures are not an end in themselves; they considerably facilitate progress towards the attainment of tangible and balanced results in the field of disarmament and arms control.

In particular, this also applies to verification of the observance of treaties. If countries that sign a treaty do not possess the national means of monitoring its observance, the treaty must provide for an impartial body of experts to examine any doubts or unclarified incidents. If necessary, the countries must also be willing to grant this independent body of experts access to their territory for the purpose of its examinations.

The Federal Republic of Germany has urged reliable verification simply for the purpose of placing arms control agreements on a firm basis and hence contributing to the success of the respective treaty and of the subsequent disarmament and arms control efforts in general. I therefore welcome the remark in last month's Prague declaration to the effect that the Warsaw Pact countries proceed on the understanding that all arms control agreements must, where necessary, provide for international verification of their implementation.

I cherish the hope that this remark will soon be reflected in concrete steps in the ongoing negotiations.

The efforts undertaken by the Federal Republic of Germany serve in particular the cause of arms control and disarmament between East and West. In the past few years the Warsaw Pact has made enormous efforts to increase its conventional and nuclear forces. This deeply disturbs us because the balance has been greatly shifted, to the disadvantage of the West. Imbalance creates distrust and has an adverse impact on the endeavours for co-operation and détente.

We are especially concerned at the Soviet Union's continuous build-up of modern land-based intermediate-range missiles, the SS 20s. The West does not yet have an equivalent capability. The Atlantic alliance, including the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, has in past years repeatedly drawn attention to this development. In the end it was forced to react by means of its dual-track decision of December 1979. With this decision the Western alliance embarked on a completely new course: it was ready from the outset to make the necessary modernization of its weapons the subject of negotiations. The alliance proposed negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union aimed at their mutual, world-wide renunciation of land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

We regard this zero solution for both sides as the best and most desirable outcome of these negotiations. It would mean that, in an important area of nuclear arms, agreement would be reached not merely on limiting but on eliminating an entire category of weapons, in other words, genuine disarmament.

The United States, supported by its allies, will continue to make every effort to achieve as soon as possible in these negotiations concrete, balanced and verifiable results. Let there be no doubt that the West cannot accept the Soviet Union acquiring a monopoly in land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. I emphasize: we are firmly determined to achieve concrete negotiated results. Every suggestion made by the Soviet Union at the negotiating table indicating readiness substantially to reduce, that is to say eliminate, modern Soviet land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles would be a step in the right direction. Such a reduction in Soviet potential would make possible a reduction in Western modernization, based on the principles of equality and parity. This means that the West is prepared, as envisaged in NATO's double-track decision, to review its modernization requirement in the light of concrete negotiating results.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany also attaches great importance to the United States-Soviet negotiations on the reduction of strategic weapons. The United States has proposed making deep cuts in the arsenals of both sides with a view to establishing a stable balance at a lower level. We welcome the remark made by General Secretary Andropov in his speech on 21 December 1982 to the effect that the Soviet Union, too, is ready to agree on reductions going beyond SALT II.

At the United States-Soviet START and INF negotiations, confidence-building measures in the nuclear field are also being discussed. We hope that the aim of creating more trust and transparency and thus preventing misunderstandings and wrong assessments can soon be translated into binding and verifiable agreements.

Concern at the ever-increasing growth of nuclear arsenals should not blind us to the dangers posed by conventional arms.

It is imperative that -- parallel to the envisaged increasing control over and reduction of nuclear potentials -- all ways and means should be exploited for intensifying the dialogue on arms control in the conventional field and checking and reversing the world-wide build-up of conventional armaments: every year they deprive peoples of immense resources which are urgently needed for tackling vital development tasks.

The only forum existing at present on arms control in the conventional sphere are the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions.

Now it is essential to concentrate in Vienna on the key questions that are still unsettled: finding a solution to the problem of starting data on forces and reaching agreement on associated measures doing justice to the requirement of adequate verification and to the goal of confidence-building and stabilization.



(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

We realize that, since they are confined in scope to Central Europe and in substance to force strengths, the MBFR negotiations can render only a limited contribution towards stabilizing the relationship of conventional forces in Europe. The need to complement MBFR by means of an arms control forum covering the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, is met by the project of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe within the CSCE framework. This opportunity should be taken advantage of. In an initial phase the Conference should negotiate confidence-building measures that are militarily significant, binding, verifiable and applicable to the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

We are convinced that these measures could make an important contribution to greater transparency and calculability in the military sphere and reduce the danger of surprise attacks.

At the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid we are therefore striving -- within the framework of a balanced and substantive final document -- for a precise mandate for convening the Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

The year 1983 holds out great opportunities for the Committee on Disarmament as well. The impulses provided by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament last year need to be translated into practice.

New opportunities exist for the Committee, I feel, particularly in a field to which my country attaches no less importance than to the nuclear disarmament talks between the two Superpowers and to the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. My country wishes a treaty on the complete and verifiable elimination of all chemical weapons to be concluded soon. It is high time that mankind be freed from the threat posed by chemical weapons. A comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons ban is all the more imperative now because there have recently been increasing signs of chemical and toxic weapons being used in various crisis areas on the Asian continent. I therefore appeal to the Committee to expedite its work in this field and draw up a treaty banning these weapons as quickly as possible.

I note with satisfaction that the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban have been greatly intensified during the past year. This affords a good basis for the Committee's work this year.

The indispensable prerequisites for such a ban are reliable verification procedures. As we all know, national technical means are absolutely insufficient for verifying a weapons ban. Consequently, decisive importance attaches to an international committee of experts with autonomous competence, including the right to carry out on-site inspections.

My country is the only one to have directly experienced international inspections in connection with the renunciation of the production of chemical weapons. Proceeding from this experience, we presented specific, practical suggestions in 1982 both at the second special session devoted to disarmament and in the Committee on Disarmament. I appeal to the Committee to examine these proposals carefully and to use them as a basis for its subsequent deliberations so that the negotiations can be brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

As regards a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomes the fact that a working group is now dealing with questions of verification and observance of such a treaty. Great importance attaches to a comprehensive nuclear test ban in connection with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty dealing with the obligation of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

Precisely because a test ban is particularly sensitive in both military and security terms, its strict observance by all contracting parties must be ensured by means of reliable verification. We advocate an exchange of data from existing seismological stations; the seismological institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany are fully available for this purpose.

There is another area in which the Committee's work is well advanced and in which speed is advisable. I am referring to the prohibition of radiological weapons. We still have the opportunity to ban, for the first time ever, a category of weapons of mass destruction even before they are ready for deployment. My country's delegation, which chaired the working group on radiological weapons in 1982, will continue to strive for the early conclusion of such an agreement.

We sympathize with the proposal by a number of non-aligned countries to incorporate in an agreement banning radiological weapons a provision that prohibits attacks on civilian nuclear facilities and thus enhances the protection afforded to the facilities above and beyond the provisions of the Geneva Protocol. However, this proposal creates so many technical and legal problems that it is questionable, in my view, whether this subject should be combined with the subject-matter of an agreement on radiological weapons.

Finally, great importance also attaches, in my Government's view, to arms control measures designed to prevent an arms build-up in outer space. The Committee on Disarmament will have to pay particular attention to this field as well in the future.

I wish the Committee on Disarmament and all its participants every success at this session. Here where nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, where industrial and developing countries, where members of the world's two large military alliances and non-aligned countries sit at the same table, the joint responsibility that we bear becomes apparent: we must avert the dangers posed by the arms build-up, eliminate confrontation and reconcile opposing interests by a mutual readiness for compromise. In short, we must undertake every effort to make this world safer and more peaceful. We must endeavour to create peace with ever fewer weapons.

May 1983 bring us nearer to this great goal.

The work of the Committee on Disarmament can make a major contribution.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chairman and this multilateral negotiating forum. I welcome the presence of the leader of the Swedish delegation and I give her the floor.



Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, It is a great pleasure for me on behalf of the Swedish delegation to extend a warm welcome to you, Ambassador Erdembileg of Mongolia, as Chairman of this Committee for the month of February. I am confident that during your chairmanship this Committee will achieve substantive progress in its endeavours.

I should also like to express our deep appreciation to your predecessor in the chair, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico.

Allow me on this occasion, Mr. Chairman, also to thank you for the kind words of welcome you addressed to me personally at our opening session last Tuesday.

The last few years have been an extraordinary period of popular and political awakening to the dangers of war. The strong call for peace and disarmament reflects the deeply rooted concern of many millions of people. It is a genuine expression of the anxiety they feel about the danger of a war of a magnitude never experienced before. Statesmen and political leaders must listen carefully to the voices raised with increasing strength in support of disarmament. I am convinced that the peace movement is emerging as an important political factor in many countries. And it will in the long run prove to be bad politics to underestimate the knowledge and the wisdom of enlightened citizens and voters.

Mankind may finally become united in its fear of a nuclear war, and united in a common effort to avert such a war. A new dialogue is starting over political and ideological boundaries, as shown by religious movements and professional groups, such as physicians and medical students.

Governments will have to respond to the demands of ordinary people, who protest against the continuing arms race, with its inherent and growing dangers for our survival and the colossal waste of limited resources so badly needed for economic and social development. It is, however, not only a moral dilemma; it is a political necessity to move from words to deeds in the field of disarmament.

The arms race is no law of nature; it is possible to stop and reverse it. It is a question of political will. The arms race is the result of tensions, suspicion, injustice and the quest for power. At the same time the arms race is also the cause of its own causes, which creates a vicious circle. It is a cause of the world economic crisis, of the widening gap between rich and poor countries and of the morally upsetting abuse of vast economic and intellectual resources, desperately needed for human development. Common sense tells us that armaments are an economic burden for the peoples.

Disarmament and peace must be seen not only in an East-West perspective but also in a North-South dimension. It is not an exclusive affair for the two military blocs or for the Superpowers. The growing capability for military power projection over long distances poses a real threat to all countries. The arms race is a concern for mankind as a whole. It is literally a matter of survival for millions -- not only in a threatening future.

As a European I share the concerns and the fears of the peoples of our continent. We have suddenly begun to realize what a war in Europe would mean and also that another devastating war may be fought here. Not that there are any current conflicts between European States which are likely to escalate into full-scale war overnight. But Europe is a potential battlefield. It is prepared for war and is constantly becoming more so, primarily through the nuclear build-up on

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

both sides. The latest phase is the deployment of SS 20 missiles and the planned deployment of Pershing II and land-based cruise missiles. It is the most thoroughly prepared battlefield in history, with thousands of nuclear weapons on each side aimed at densely populated areas. No wonder that people are frightened.

It is my conviction that political and national leaders who are not responsive to public concern over the arms race will soon lose the confidence of their own peoples. I am furthermore convinced that this will prove to be true for all States, irrespective of their political and social systems.

At the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the nations of the world agreed to seek security in disarmament. They further agreed that balanced reductions of armaments should be carried out on the basis of the principle of undiminished security.

The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues concluded, in full harmony with these principles, that common security rather than mutual deterrence based on armaments should be the prime basis for security in the world. Common security is based on the conviction that in this modern nuclear age, peace cannot be achieved through military means. Peace is basically a political concept and must be sought by political means. It must be sought in a tireless process of negotiation and rapprochement, with the aim of removing mutual suspicion and fear. We face common dangers and must also promote our security in common.

The United Nations has an important role to play in the efforts to promote, to develop and to implement the concept of common security. My Government finds it gratifying that the General Assembly has requested the United Nations Disarmament Commission to consider those recommendations and proposals in the report of The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues which relate to disarmament and arms limitation. We are confident that the Disarmament Commission will reach agreement on how to ensure an effective follow-up to those parts of the report.

A central conclusion contained in that report is that the two major power blocs can only survive together. Security cannot be achieved against the adversary but together with him. There is no other option for long-term survival. This insight has not sufficiently characterized the relations between the Superpowers in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

It is true, of course, that disarmament negotiations by their very nature are influenced by different international events. It is obvious that a certain measure of trust and confidence among States is necessary for successful disarmament negotiations. Such a climate can be created in particular when the major powers demonstrate both in word and deed that they are prepared to agree on real disarmament measures. But even if my Government fully recognizes that a favourable international climate is important for progress in disarmament efforts, linkages between arms negotiations and political events should be avoided.

This year -- 1983 -- will be crucial in the history of disarmament. It is, therefore, essential not to allow the current climate of confrontation to prevail and to lead to a continued unbridled escalation of the arms race, in particular as regards nuclear weapons. But this year also offers an historic opportunity to prevent the final establishment of a new generation of Eurostrategic nuclear weapons.



(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The two Superpowers hold the fate of the earth in their hands. They have incomparably the largest weapon arsenals. They bear the primary responsibility for assuring that a change of direction takes place.

It is no longer possible for them to come to a well-informed public opinion with empty rhetoric asking people to accept a further increase in nuclear arms. People demand constructive proposals and concrete results from ongoing negotiations. Proposals of a propagandistic nature will be unmasked by an enlightened public opinion, which will hold their governments responsible for the future developments in this field.

I seize this opportunity to repeat emphatically the call on the two Superpowers to initiate a disarmament process now.

The outcome of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear arms will be of decisive importance for the prospects in general for arms limitation and disarmament. A breakthrough in these negotiations would be of utmost importance also to the work in other negotiation forums.

Many people find it hard not to despair when speaking about the arms race. The attempts to stop it have had no breakthroughs in the last few years. Many signs point to a continued escalation of the arms race, despite some brief moments of hopeful rhetoric. Yet we must not choose to despair. The conditions for hope, however, must be clearly set forth.

Unless some real progress is made within the next few months, the nuclear arms race will enter into a new and dangerous phase. My Government, therefore, anxiously awaits a first decisive step to be taken in the field of nuclear disarmament.

As a European country, Sweden is particularly concerned about nuclear weapons which are deployed and intended for use in Europe and its adjacent sea areas. The Swedish Government does not believe that the deployment of SS 20 missiles on the one side and the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles on the other has been, is or will be necessary to maintain an equilibrium of nuclear forces in Europe. Instead, my Government considers that these deployments constitute another series of tragic mistakes which will leave both sides even more insecure and vulnerable than before.

The Superpowers are now negotiating bilaterally on a wide range of nuclear weapons. The ongoing negotiations to limit the Eurostrategic nuclear forces are of crucial importance. The nuclear arms spiral is most likely to have serious negative effects on mutual confidence and might increase the risk of nuclear war breaking out.

We welcome the far-reaching proposals made by the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce the number of such weapons in or aimed at Europe. Although many points in their respective offers remain to be clarified, my Government hopes that they will constitute a substantive opening which could pave the way for agreement. This opportunity should not be lost.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

It is the basic view of the Swedish Government that all categories of Eurostrategic weapons should be completely eliminated. For practical and political reasons, first agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union -- which we would welcome -- might fall short of this goal and thus permit the continued or future deployment of some of these weapons. If such partial agreement is reached, it should, in our view, be seen as an interim agreement, which should later lead to a comprehensive agreement banning all relevant categories of nuclear weapons systems for Europe.

The SALT II Treaty, which never entered into force, offers a good basis for negotiations on the reduction of strategic weapons. According to the limited information available about the START negotiations, it seems that the positions of the parties are still far apart. It goes without saying that every effort must be made to avoid the emergence of new generations of strategic weapons, which will merely increase the dangers and contribute to a further destabilizing of the present situation.

The Swedish Government has on numerous occasions stressed the need for disarmament and arms limitation measures regarding the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and its adjacent sea areas. My Government has inter alia in this Committee suggested that a particular effort should be made in order to lower the number of these weapons, with the aim of their ultimate abolition.

Negotiations must now be initiated also concerning these weapons. In the course of such negotiations it would be necessary to ensure that nuclear disarmament is accompanied by appropriately balanced reductions also in conventional military forces.

The Swedish Government has approached the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as European neutral and non-aligned States in order to solicit their views on the idea of withdrawing in a first phase tactical nuclear weapons from an area 150 km wide on each side of the East-West border, running through Central Europe. The idea of such a withdrawal has been developed in the report of The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. The purpose of this sounding is primarily to find out how the governments most directly concerned view the idea of such a nuclear withdrawal in Central Europe.

It is too early to make any general assessment of the responses received so far. The Swedish Government expects in the near future to be in a position to evaluate how this matter can best be pursued. It is our hope that the proposal made by the Commission will initiate a process of debate on the role and importance of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe which will gradually lead to their withdrawal and elimination.

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is conditioned by the situation in general as regards East-West relations. Although many difficulties remain, my Government has the impression that a possible solution is within reach. This would, however, require that a certain degree of rapprochement takes place between the Superpowers and the military alliances. Together with the other neutral and non-aligned countries in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Sweden intends to exert every effort in order to bring a positive outcome of the Madrid meeting, in particular as regards the convening of a European disarmament conference. Sweden has declared itself prepared to host such a conference.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The Swedish Government considers that in the present situation the highest priority must be given to concrete measures to reduce and finally eliminate the nuclear arsenals. As a complement to such measures, efforts should be made to establish security-promoting arrangements susceptible of lowering tension and of reducing the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. In this context, my Government takes keen interest in the current debate on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. We believe that as part of a realistic disarmament policy it should be possible to achieve mutual obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The Swedish Government is furthermore convinced that determined efforts should be made to improve the possibilities of achieving agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones. As a Nordic country Sweden is actively pursuing a policy in support of efforts to create a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. In our view such a zone and the process leading to it would reduce the nuclear threat confronting the Nordic region. It would also constitute a substantial confidence-building measure in Europe.

It has often been said that in the long run war can be prevented only if the underlying causes of tension and conflict are eliminated. But it is also true that the arms race is in itself a factor in increasing tensions and conflicts. One of the most important expressions of this phenomenon is the present trend in military research and technology. These are currently moving in directions which may, unless checked, render disarmament virtually impossible. The quest for technological superiority in the military field, as well as military superiority in general, is a dead-end. Individual nations and the international community must make a determined effort to come to grips with military research and development. Ways must be sought in international co-operation to curtail the utilization of military research and development for offensive military purposes. That is why my delegation took the initiative of proposing a resolution on military research and development requesting the Secretary-General to carry out an expert study on the subject.

I shall now discuss some of the items on our agenda and I will indicate what my delegation sees as the main tasks of this Committee in the course of the session it has just begun.

Efforts for at least a quarter of a century to achieve a comprehensive test ban have so far not yielded the results hoped for. The obstacles of both a technical and a political nature have been tremendous. I believe it is fair to say that to a very large degree the technical problems have been solved as regards the methods for monitoring a test ban, although further progress is still possible. It is now mainly the lack of sufficient political will which is preventing the Committee on Disarmament from elaborating the complete text of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

It has been Sweden's persistent view that a comprehensive test ban is of vital importance as a means to slow or stop the further development of nuclear weapons systems. It would constitute a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to initiate an era of mutual nuclear restraint. Such a ban should also constitute an element in a general freeze on nuclear armaments. We strongly urge all the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate at this session of the Committee that they are prepared to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a starting point for nuclear disarmament.



(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

This is a matter of the utmost importance. In the view of my delegation the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban should be formally empowered to negotiate on all relevant substantive aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Sweden intends this year to present a revised version of its draft CTB treaty submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1977.

My Government deeply regrets that the nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated. According to figures from the Hagfors Seismic Observatory in Sweden, no less than 55 nuclear explosions took place in 1982, compared to 49 during the preceding year. The Soviet Union increased the number of explosions from 21 to 31, whereas the United States carried out 16 explosions in 1981 and 18 in 1982. The number of explosions carried out by France diminished from 11 in 1981 to 5 in 1982. No Chinese explosion was observed either in 1981 or in 1982. The United Kingdom carried out one explosion per year in the last two years. These figures further stress the importance of a complete test ban in order to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by the present nuclear powers and to prevent a proliferation of such weapons to additional countries.

This Committee should continue the negotiations on a treaty on radiological weapons. Sweden has proposed that such a treaty should include a ban on attacks against nuclear facilities containing radioactive substances.

Next to a nuclear explosion this would be the most effective method of dispersing radioactivity. This possibility must obviously be foreclosed, if such a treaty is to be meaningful. The protection of nuclear facilities is important -- not least for the civilian population -- but the main purpose of the Swedish proposal is to prevent any release of radioactivity, including military exploitation of this possibility, as an act of radiological warfare. When attacked, such a nuclear facility could be turned into a radiological weapon. Such a prohibition should consequently be included in a treaty on radiological weapons.

My delegation notes with satisfaction the growing support for our proposal both here in the Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations. The number of negative or sceptical voices is diminishing as the importance of the issue becomes clearer. The question of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities is generally acknowledged as a legitimate matter for negotiations. A growing number of delegations share our view that the matter should be dealt with in the context of a treaty on radiological weapons.

Recent events have drawn our attention to a special space problem. We are informed that nuclear power reactors are used on board certain satellites. We are concerned that the malfunction of such satellites can pose hazards to the population and the environment. The use of nuclear power sources in orbit should therefore be subject to the same kind of regulations as those adopted for the use of nuclear power on earth. Such regulations must be internationally accepted since the malfunction of a space craft with a nuclear power source may affect almost any country. It is, therefore, important that the work on international safety regulations which has been going on for some years in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space be completed expeditiously.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The military utilization of outer space has assumed increasing importance. In fact the majority of the satellites launched in the last two decades have had a military mission. It is known that considerable efforts are being made to develop anti-satellite systems and such systems have already been tested in outer space. Important resources have also been committed to studying and developing technologies for space-based ABM systems. The extension of an arms race into outer space is a matter of grave concern to the international community. This concern was clearly reflected at the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 82).

If unchecked, developments in this field will accelerate into another ruinous and destabilizing arms race. The international community and the space Powers themselves should -- before it is too late -- make a determined effort to further limit the military use of outer space and to prohibit anti-satellite and ABM warfare.

The General Assembly has, in two resolutions (37/99 D and 37/83), requested the Committee on Disarmament to consider taking up the question of the military utilization of outer space for substantive consideration. The Committee should, therefore, as a matter of urgency establish a working group on this subject at the very beginning of this session.

Last year the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament again confirmed that there exists a broad political consensus on the need to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The Ad Hoc Working Group was able to make substantial progress on a number of technical and scientific issues relating to a possible convention on a complete ban on chemical weapons. On issues of a more political nature there was some progress with regard to the question of on-site inspection. This matter should be explored further, as the question of verification is one of the greatest problems in the negotiations. It is imperative that all delegations demonstrate the political will that is required in order to ensure such concrete progress that brings us closer to a generally acceptable agreement.

Considerable efforts were made in the Committee to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament before the convening of the second special session devoted to disarmament. As the General Assembly was not able at that session to reach consensus on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the matter has been referred back to this Committee for further consideration. We must not forget that the main reason why we failed to reach agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament was that the United States could not again agree on the priority which had been given to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban in the Final Document of the first special session. My delegation is particularly interested in knowing whether there has been any progress in the position which blocked our previous efforts.

At our last session, extensive discussions were held concerning the membership of the Committee. No objection in principle was raised to a limited expansion of the membership, but no consensus was detected on how such an expansion could be carried out. Sweden favours a limited expansion without prejudice to the existing balance in representation. Preference should be given to those countries which have demonstrated an active interest in the work of the Committee on Disarmament and to those which are in a position to make a valuable contribution through their competence in the field.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

You may recall that at the very end of last year's session the Swedish delegation proposed that the Committee, in preparing its agenda for 1983, should make provisions for consideration of the major technological developments which affect the operation of the Sea-Bed Treaty. This proposal was made with a view to fulfilling the recommendations adopted in 1977 by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty. The need for discussing this with the assistance of experts within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament is obvious. An enormous civilian exploitation of the sea and the sea-bed is continuously taking place on a global scale. These developments may lead to an increased military use of the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof, be it within the present or an enlarged scope of the Treaty.

There is an urgent need to discuss what can be done to compile the necessary information about recent developments in this field. The Swedish delegation believes that the expertise gathered within this Committee is well fitted to further this process. I therefore wish to express the hope that members of the Committee will give their support to the proposal to include this item in the programme of work for the spring session of the Committee.

This is my first experience of the Committee on Disarmament. I have come here with the firm intention of giving voice to Sweden's strong commitment to real disarmament, both nuclear and conventional. I wish to believe that this is a negotiating body where tangible progress can be made. A continued absence of results would on the other hand cause great frustration and would confirm the increasing impression that this and other disarmament forums are more talk-shops than efficient negotiating bodies.

In concluding my speech I want to stress a few points. This year, 1983, will be crucial for disarmament. The increasing public commitment to disarmament and peace gives us hope for the future. It emphasizes the demands on negotiating bodies to take substantial steps forward. It underlines the impatience many peoples and governments -- including my own -- feel with the stalemate in the negotiations between the two Superpowers.

Public opinion is in harmony with common sense, basic values and sound politics. Time is more than ripe for concrete actions in the field of disarmament. The leading politicians in every country must realize that the world cannot afford another year of lost opportunities.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Sweden for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair.

[Speaking in Russian] The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics wishes to make a statement. I give the floor to Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade Chairman, in view of the great interest which, as has been shown by the discussion taking place in the Committee on Disarmament, is being attached to questions connected with the bilateral Soviet-United States talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, and bearing in mind also the fact that the subjects of these talks affect the vitally important interests of all peoples of the world, the Soviet delegation



(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

has transmitted to the secretariat for distribution as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament the replies of Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to questions from a Pravda correspondent. In these replies, Y.V. Andropov explains in detail the USSR's position of principle on the questions that are being considered at the Soviet-United States talks, and also on certain other important international issues and in particular the role of summit meetings. The Soviet delegation hopes that the delegations of States members of the Committee will study this document carefully.

The CHAIRMAN: (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement.

[Speaking in English] That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor?

Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, may I recall that the Committee will hold today at 3.30 p.m. an informal meeting to consider the draft agenda and programme of work, and any other organizational matter.

There will be an additional plenary meeting of the Committee tomorrow, Friday, 4 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.