



*President:* Mr. Peter FLORIN  
(German Democratic Republic).

**AGENDA ITEM 8**

**General debate (*continued*)**

1. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will first hear an address by the President of the Republic of the Gambia. On behalf of the Assembly, I have the honour to welcome to the United Nations Alhaji Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara and to invite him to address the Assembly.

2. Sir Dawda Kairaba JAWARA (Gambia): Mr. President, it is indeed gratifying to see you presiding over the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I am sure that with your wide international experience and your diplomatic skills you will guide this important session to a successful conclusion.

3. I felt deeply privileged when I received the invitation of the Secretary-General to address this session. More important, I considered the invitation highly significant, in that requesting the head of State of a small, non-nuclear developing country far removed from the central points of nuclear vulnerability to address this historic session represents the growing awareness that the issue of disarmament is not only truly global but is also an important part of the wider problem of security associated with economic and social development. Indeed, because of my Government's deep commitment to collective security and international co-operation for the promotion of the economic and social development of mankind, we are delighted to have been given the opportunity to participate in this session. I should therefore like to express my thanks and deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his kind invitation and to congratulate him for convening this special session on a very special subject. The timing of this third special session on disarmament could not have been more appropriate, in view of the ongoing negotiations of the super-Powers and of the continuing economic crisis that affects the majority of Member States.

4. We know that long before the emergence of formal international organizations as agents of peace and security, mankind had already been concerned with the need to limit, control and, indeed, eliminate the instruments of war. Thus, Immanuel Kant, the eighteenth-century German political philosopher, included the elimination of standing armies in his treatise containing the "Preliminary Articles of Per-

petual Peace Between States". The declaration of the Canadian-American border as a demilitarized area by the British and American Governments through the Rush-Bagot Convention of 1817 showed that disarmament could be brought into the realm of practical statesmanship. Czar Nicholas II of Russia gave it international prominence when he prescribed it as one of the major objectives of the Hague Conference in his celebrated Rescript of 21 August 1889. Again, the Covenant of the League of Nations made the preoccupation with disarmament the centre-piece of diplomacy. Accordingly, the League organized various negotiations for the formulation of an acceptable disarmament plan. In this connection the Assembly will recall the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 and the London naval conferences of the 1930s, all of which were aimed at reducing the risk of war and preserving the peace. Unfortunately, the First and Second World Wars, and particularly the latter, relegated all those laudable efforts to oblivion. Nonetheless, the search for peace and collective security through disarmament has been bequeathed to the twentieth century by our forebears.

5. The United Nations, therefore, inherited the tradition of the League of Nations and elaborated the strategy of preventive diplomacy by conferring specific functions in the matter of disarmament upon the General Assembly and the Security Council and by assigning to regional organizations responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security under the Charter. I believe that the progress made by the United Nations in the difficult but rewarding task of promoting the disarmament dialogue has not been insignificant. It is not my intention to catalogue the Organization's commendable efforts in this regard. Suffice it to say that the convening of the special sessions on disarmament is a clear demonstration of the United Nations commitment to the promotion of international understanding of the danger of the arms race to peace, security and development.

6. The first special session on disarmament, held in 1978, showed that the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, had assumed its rightful role in the pursuit of disarmament. The Assembly will no doubt recall that the first special session on disarmament aimed to achieve, on a step by step basis, balanced reductions in both nuclear and conventional forces and that one of its main conclusions was that progress towards disarmament would depend on firm agreements on concrete arms-control measures rather than on general declarations of intent. Thus the Programme of Action adopted by that session, as contained in its Final Document [*resolution S-10/2*], called for, among other things, agreement and other concrete measures in the field of disarmament to be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multi-

lateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security.

7. By bringing the issue of mankind's survival in the nuclear age into sharper focus, the second special session on disarmament, held in 1982, reaffirmed the conclusions and recommendations of the first and further stressed the preoccupation of the United Nations over the danger of the arms race. Consistent with that approach, the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which took place in New York from 24 August to 11 September 1987 under the able guidance of the Panel of Eminent Personalities appointed by the Secretary-General, went a step further by seriously addressing the interrelationship of disarmament and development.

8. Those important United Nations initiatives are only the most recent contributions of our world body to the increasing consciousness of the importance of disarmament and a healthy scepticism about the cold-war strategies of deterrence, flexible response and so-called stable strategic balance. We are fully aware of the several arms-control agreements which have been negotiated since 1959 covering various areas of concern over nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. As representatives know, these include agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, reduce the risk of nuclear war, control nuclear testing and limit nuclear weapons. Other important agreements aim at controlling and prohibiting the use of equally deadly chemical and biological weapons.

9. Clearly, by far the greatest landmark in the history of disarmament is the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty—signed by their leaders in December 1987. As representatives are aware, the treaty's objective is to eliminate within three years an entire class of nuclear weapons held by the United States and the Soviet Union. Expert assessment of the significance of this major achievement in disarmament is that it goes beyond calling for a mere freeze or control of existing weapons to their actual removal and destruction. Furthermore, it establishes the most comprehensive and detailed verification régime yet provided under any treaty. This major breakthrough in arms-control negotiations has raised expectations throughout the world and substantially improved the environment for disarmament talks in general, even though the elimination of the intermediate-range missiles will constitute only about a 4 per cent cut in the nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers. President Reagan of the United States and General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union have indeed demonstrated great statesmanship and political will, without which that agreement would not have been possible. They are to be warmly congratulated.

10. Against this background, the third special session on disarmament offers a unique opportunity to broaden international consensus on disarmament and identify concrete steps for further progress towards the reduction of the arms race and the risk of nuclear conflict. Only then can a stable international environment be created for peace, security and

development. I therefore hope that this special session will not only reaffirm the final documents of the two previous sessions but will also chart the direction for exploring substantial new possibilities for comprehensive disarmament. I believe this is possible if we all agree that we share a common future and that we have a common faith in the Charter of the United Nations and a common duty to preserve peace and promote development.

11. As the representative of a third world country, I think one of the key tasks of this session is critically and fully to address the interests of developing countries in the light of recent developments and to define our positions on the critical issue of disarmament, which will no doubt be reflected in a document to be circulated at this session by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

12. While it is true that no country may be safe from a large-scale and uncontrollable nuclear war, the immediate threats to the security of the majority of third world peoples continue to be hunger, ignorance and disease, compounded by debt, deterioration in the terms of trade, desertification, drought and other natural disasters, as well as internal wars which have created millions of refugees in the third world.

13. In a few weeks, in our part of the world, we shall begin to worry about whether it will rain the next day so that the mainstay of our economy—agriculture—can prosper; or, if the crops prosper, whether we shall obtain the right price for our produce on the world market. As I speak now, there is a state of alert in many countries in our region against familiar third world “missiles”—the locust and the grasshopper, which can severely damage and literally devour the basis of a whole economy within a few days.

14. Those and other constraints affecting the basic needs of our people are our daily concerns and are relevant to the subject-matter of this session. Unless the international community mobilizes its resources to support our efforts within the context of Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986–1990 and kindred third world development efforts, it is doubtful whether our ongoing economic reform efforts will have the desired impact and our cherished hope for “peace on Earth and good will to all men” will be realized.

15. We believe that the arms race, nuclear and conventional, is dangerous to both the developed and the developing countries. There can be no doubt that the arms race has been a major factor in the inability or reluctance of the majority of industrialized countries to assist substantially the development efforts of the third world. It is indeed significant that those industrialized countries which have been generous enough to provide the minimum of 0.7 per cent of their gross domestic product in development assistance are those without high-spending military budgets.

16. While it is true that assumptions and generalizations about the link between military expenditure and economic performance are sometimes difficult to establish, available evidence from both the developed and the developing countries indicates that high

levels of expenditure on defence and security often crowd out investment in productive sectors and may militate against satisfaction of the basic needs of the population. In the third world, this particular problem is best illustrated by the sale of conventional arms, which has become a brisk and highly lucrative business for the merchants of death in the industrialized countries. Thanks to the booming arms industries in those countries, civil strife and local wars continue to erupt, with disastrous consequences for the development of those countries.

17. Regrettably, in most cases arms procurements are based not on need but on a perceived sense of insecurity and vulnerability. Therefore, political stability and social and economic development in the third world can best be encouraged if the industrialized countries exercise restraint in the provision of both official military assistance and commercial arms sales to developing countries.

18. Most specialists on disarmament and arms control have observed that military-procurement programmes and the funding of military research and development tend to have adverse effects on a country's long-term economic development. Therefore, so long as the arms race continues, substantial resources that could be used to improve the standard of living of people in both developed and developing countries will continue to be spent on the means of destruction. That lamentable waste of much-needed resources through military expenditure is succinctly described on page 23 of *World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88* in the following words:

“When arms and armies take precedence over needs basic to human development, when economic progress leaves behind hundreds of millions of individuals who are ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished, and desperate, there is no security. More weapons will not produce it.”

19. Fortunately for us, the relationship between disarmament and development is becoming more and more evident. For example, as reported in the publication just cited, the global arms race had consumed over \$15,200 billion of the world's wealth in the 26-year period following 1960. According to estimates, in 1987 world military spending in fact outstripped improvements in global living conditions. As to the arms trade to which I referred earlier, estimates from United States Government sources indicate that about \$36 billion were spent on arms each year over the past eight years. Many of those arms, in fact about 75 per cent, go to the third world and are paid for in scarce foreign exchange.

20. Therefore, over the past 28 years, while the world has become more affluent militarily, about 1 billion people continue to live in abject poverty. Meanwhile, the security we sought or envisaged through officially sanctioned arms purchases by third world countries is at best fragile and uncertain, as the majority of wars since 1945 have been and continue to be fought on third world soil.

21. The allocation of massive resources for armaments is simply a major constraint on the development process, as armaments and development tend to compete for the same limited resources. Given the

general global economic and financial crisis, reduced military spending could contribute significantly not only to an increased flow of development assistance to developing countries, but also to an improved climate for global economic growth. We should therefore work tirelessly to ensure that the progress made in disarmament results in increased attention to economic and social development matters and in particular to increased assistance to developing countries. Remote as the chances for this may seem at the moment, we should continue to strive for this important transition, and I would urge that the General Assembly give this important question particular attention at this special session.

22. Despite the efforts towards disarmament made so far, the predicament we face today is a complex and difficult one. Although the world welcomed the signing last December of the INF Treaty, and other breakthroughs for peace, the dangers of enlarging existing stocks of nuclear weapons and of continuing the arms trade with the third world still remain. Our optimism should therefore be based on caution and our expectations of success should be moderate. None the less, we should reaffirm our commitment to disarmament and realize that the task is a collective one. All nations have a role to play in this great endeavour within the framework of the United Nations system. The universality of the peace we seek and the universality of the mass destruction we abhor should define our guiding principles.

23. The momentum and hope generated by the INF Treaty and by the super-Power Moscow summit that has just ended should be maintained, because agreements in themselves are meaningless if the commitment to implement them is lacking. The success of their implementation will depend to a large extent on the effectiveness of agreed verification methods and the commitment of the parties concerned.

24. Fundamentally, however, the problem of nuclear disarmament is the primary responsibility of the nuclear States themselves. Because of the horrendous prospects of a nuclear war, nuclear-weapon States have been urged for years to make a solemn declaration prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Agreement on no first use of nuclear weapons has become even more urgent today, as it would contribute greatly to reducing the risk of nuclear war and the threat to the survival of mankind.

25. Closely related to the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons is the need for all States to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]. We are convinced that the treaty, which was signed almost two decades ago and which has been reviewed periodically since 1968, is one of the most important and most comprehensive multilateral arms control agreements yet concluded. By reducing the danger of a nuclear war it greatly contributed to the process of détente, international security and disarmament. We therefore urge States that have not yet signed the treaty to do so as a matter of urgency in order to enhance its universality and to improve the climate for the control of the spread of nuclear weapons.

26. It is evident from the foregoing that in order to prevent the spectacular advances in military technology from reaching uncontrollable proportions, the existing agreements on the control of weapons of mass destruction—such as the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963,<sup>1</sup> the Outer Space Treaty of 1967<sup>2</sup> and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972,<sup>3</sup> to name but a few—should be strictly observed by all parties concerned. Far from contributing to the strengthening of international security, the stockpiling of nuclear arms actually endangers it. The untrammelled technological competition for the improvement of weapon systems represents an incalculable setback for peace, since it aggravates international tension and intensifies the feeling of insecurity within all States, including those that do not possess nuclear weapons.

27. Another major disarmament measure which has been recognized as a deterrent to the spread of nuclear weapons is the establishment and implementation of new nuclear-free zones and zones of peace. I should like to take this opportunity to draw the attention of the international community once again to the 1964 Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted at Cairo by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. In accordance with that 1964 Declaration, African countries undertook to prohibit and prevent any testing or manufacture of nuclear weapons or the explosion of any nuclear device on the African continent. The member States of the Organization of African Unity [OAU] have also unanimously agreed to ban the storage or transportation of nuclear weapons in their territories. The African States have never faltered in their support of that Declaration, which we have continued to uphold in various international conferences on disarmament. Once more, we urge the international community to recognize Africa as a nuclear-free zone, as reaffirmed in resolution AHG/Res. 126(XX), adopted at the twentieth ordinary session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in November 1984.

28. That resolution also took note of the threat posed by South Africa's nuclear programme, as well as the development of South Africa's nuclear capability. The detonation of a nuclear device—the so-called mystery atom test—by South Africa in late 1979 in the Indian Ocean has confirmed the worst fears of many African leaders, who could recall the attempt made earlier by South Africa to detonate a nuclear device in the Kalahari Desert. The possession of a nuclear capability by the *apartheid* régime of South Africa has grave implications for the rest of Africa, and for other parts of the world. Indeed, it will buttress South African aggression and endow that racist régime with the power of nuclear blackmail.

29. Given its aggressive and destabilizing policies against the front-line States and its inability to deal with the inevitable internal revolts and challenges it now faces, it will not be long before the racist South African régime begins openly to blackmail and intimidate the rest of Africa with its nuclear capability. Yet, in spite of the efforts of the General Assembly for steps to be taken to avoid any setbacks to the denuclearization of Africa, a conspiracy of silence and masterly inertia on this issue appears to have descended upon the international community.

How long will this paralysis of the will continue? We urgently appeal to the international community, particularly to those countries that are known to be assisting the Pretoria régime in the acquisition of a nuclear capability, to exert maximum pressure on South Africa to give up its nuclear programme. Our aim is to make the whole of Africa a nuclear-free zone with a view to eliminating all nuclear threats from our continent. We hope this special session will issue a statement urging all States, institutions or companies to refrain from collaborating with South Africa in the nuclear and military fields. Such collaboration will only serve to encourage and entrench the inhuman policies of the South African régime and endanger the security of the African region.

30. In this brief address I have attempted to share with representatives my thoughts on some of the key issues surrounding the disarmament debate; I have tried to stress the important link between disarmament and development. I believe that in spite of the different points of view we may have on this particular issue, it is now clear that disarmament is in the common interest of mankind, regardless of political blocs and regional or national loyalties.

31. Therefore, at this critical moment in the disarmament debate, we must not stop at merely hoping for a better and safer world. We must work together for greater achievements in freeing the world of deadly conflicts and the nightmare of a nuclear holocaust and rededicate ourselves to the survival of our planet, which is threatened by other forces such as over-population, hunger and disease, and environmental degradation in general and deforestation in particular. In this connection, the axiom enunciated by the Panel of Eminent Personalities in the Field of Disarmament and Development that we are borrowing this planet from our children as we inherited it from our forebears is instructive. For our generation, faced with a planet heavily wired with nuclear weapons, the task of securing a better future for the next generation is indeed immense. But if we succeed in reconciling peace and security with disarmament and sustainable development instead of attempting to secure invulnerability through wasteful and unending stockpiling of deadly weapons, we shall have succeeded in saving civilization and our planet itself from extinction.

32. The historic carving in the stone of the cenotaph in Hiroshima reads: "Rest in peace, for the mistake will not be repeated". Four decades after Hiroshima and Nagasaki this inscription, which according to historians was intended as a prayer and a promise, is today not only a warning but a grim reminder that the worst could happen if we fail to fulfil our historic responsibilities as the present guardians of our civilization.

33. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the General Assembly, I wish to thank the President of the Republic of the Gambia for the important statement he has just made.

34. Mr. FERNÁNDEZ ORDOÑEZ (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): May I first of all congratulate you, Sir, on behalf of the Spanish delegation and on my own behalf, on your election as President of

the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament. I am convinced that under your expert guidance we shall be able to continue our advance towards our common goal: a more stable, more peaceful and less heavily armed world. I should also like to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the United Nations Secretariat for their important contribution to the fostering of the multilateral efforts to achieve disarmament.

35. This morning [8th meeting] my colleague the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany addressed this forum on behalf of the 12 States members of the European Community. The ideas set out in his speech summarize clearly the standpoint from which the member countries of the Community, including Spain, approach this special session. For my part, I should now like to highlight a few concepts to which my Government and my delegation devote much attention and to which they attach great importance.

36. The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is being held not only on the tenth anniversary of its first such special session, but also at a time when the ninetieth anniversary of the first Hague Conference, which marked the beginning of multilateral efforts in favour of disarmament, is approaching. Since then many things have changed which make it more urgent, but also more feasible, to achieve those goals. Man's technical capacity for destruction has become immeasurably greater, and this century has also, unfortunately for all concerned, witnessed an unusual willingness to make use of it. But, at the same time, the international community, with its growing membership, has become increasingly aware of the need to seek in solidarity and international co-operation the instruments for dealing with the ever-more-complex global problems with which it is beset.

37. It is from that very standpoint of co-operation that my Government believes that we can tackle the difficult problem of disarmament with the best chances of success. The concept of international co-operation, which is generally recognized in other fields, must become more widespread and be gradually applied in the area of disarmament, because in today's world it is no longer possible for a State to seek its security at the expense of that of other States. It is necessary to replace the quest for security through competition by the quest for security through co-operation, not only with the ally but also with the potential adversary. To co-operate is to work together with others for the same purpose—in our context, disarmament—which requires a dialogue aimed at a meeting of minds, and that in turn calls for confidence.

38. Ten years ago the General Assembly approved the Final Document of its first session devoted to disarmament [resolution S-10/2]. It is full of ideas, initiatives and proposals which deserve today, as they did then, our whole-hearted approval. But among all of them I should like to single out the words with which the document itself opens, because their obvious good sense should guide us today also, as a starting point for our work. In its paragraph 1 the Final Document of 1978 states:

“the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. The time has therefore come to put an end to this situation, to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament”.

39. At the end of the Moscow summit last week, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed a joint statement [A/S-15/28, annex] in which they reaffirmed their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought and added that one of the aims of the disarmament process had as the first priority the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination.

40. In other words, the legitimate aspiration to attain security, to feel secure, has been shown to become illegitimate when the attempt is made to obtain it by simply accumulating weapons. In these circumstances, we can say that a more heavily armed world is not necessarily a more secure world.

41. The course to follow is plain to see. If the accumulation of weapons does not give us security, we must seek it, through agreements, at lower levels of armament. We know that it is perfectly possible to halt and reverse the arms race and at the same time maintain the political, strategic and military balance which enables us to attain an effective level of security.

42. The corner-stone in building such a policy must be confidence. We have lived under the negative logic of an insoluble dilemma—namely, that there can be no confidence without security and yet without confidence disarmament is not possible. But we must formulate the problem in another way, with a different logic: so long as there is no confidence among States, security cannot be attained through disarmament. Therefore, the first step must be to eliminate mistrust.

43. For many years confidence-building measures were looked upon in some quarters with obvious misgivings, owing to the suspicion that they were brought up in the disarmament-negotiating forums solely to distract attention from real disarmament measures and thus further delay their adoption. However, in the past few years the concept of confidence-building measures has begun to be viewed in a different perspective. Since the signing of the Final Act of Helsinki in 1975 and the Document of the Stockholm Conference in 1986, the countries which have participated in the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe have travelled a long way in the theoretical development of the concept and in the practical implementation of a broad range of confidence-building measures. It does not seem to me at all excessive to stress the importance of the measures contained in the Stockholm Document, because although they are particularly suited to a region that has the greatest concentration of arms and troops in the world, they are not lacking in interest and applicability for other regions of the world. The Stockholm Document has also contributed to the practical application of the co-operative approach to which I have already referred



and has confirmed the verification of agreements as one of the cardinal principles of disarmament. Making it possible for each one of the 35 States taking part in the Conference process to carry out inspections, in specified conditions, in the territory of any other—as has in fact begun to happen—entails a decisive departure from the views of sacrosanct sovereignty which in the past blocked the path to the co-operation we need in our times.

44. Predictability and transparency in the military behaviour of States are other necessary steps if mistrust is to be eliminated. We believe that this is a field in which the United Nations can play an important catalysing role. We consider it important that the largest possible number of States should supply the Organization—as, amongst others, my own country has been doing—with standardized and detailed information on their military expenditure.

45. Growing confidence undoubtedly lies at the root of the improvement in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, whose positive influence in the field of disarmament is beyond question. The hopeful expectations raised by this new climate are the reflection of the complementary relationship between the bilateral and multilateral aspects of disarmament. As regards the multilateral aspects, the United Nations has a central role and a primary responsibility. The recent ratification by its signatories of the treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear systems and the progress made at the recent Moscow summit towards a radical reduction in strategic nuclear arsenals are new and significant developments which we welcome unreservedly. The INF Treaty—in particular the concept of asymmetrical reductions and the provisions for the verification of compliance—shows us the road that will have to be taken to conclude future agreements on arms control and disarmament. The dynamic that has been generated suggests that something really significant is changing as compared with the situation in which, 10 years ago, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was held.

46. However, there is still a long way to go. We must strive to replace the risk of war with an effective system for the peaceful settlement of disputes. These efforts should be rewarded with the success of this special session, at a time when there seems to be an increasingly real possibility of making progress. In this context, it would be as well to take into account the lessons of the previous special sessions devoted to disarmament. During the first the constructive attitude of all delegations made it possible to achieve a text adopted by consensus, a document suitable for assessing the complex issues relating to arms control and disarmament. My delegation attaches special importance to that document, in that it is still the most complete and substantial statement in this field and because it made an important contribution to improving the way in which Governments approach the issue.

47. The second special session devoted to disarmament, on the other hand, showed that a climate of confrontation and intransigence hinders any possibility of real progress on the long and difficult road of disarmament.

48. Today, the international situation and circumstances are very different from what they were a few years ago. Therefore, my delegation prefers to concentrate on identifying the specific problems and challenges of today and tomorrow and hopes that this third special session on disarmament will conclude with the adoption of an agreed document that is realistic and balanced and that, leaving the past behind, will enable us to look to the future with optimism and confidence. To this end, it will be necessary for all of us taking part to adopt a flexible position that reconciles the disarmament-security dichotomy, essential if a stable peace is to be achieved, and that enables us to update the Programme of Action approved in 1978.

49. One of the most pressing problems at the present time is the use of chemical weapons, in flagrant breach of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, such weapons have been used recently on a large scale, causing many casualties, in the conflict between Iran and Iraq, as the fact-finding teams sent by the Secretary-General to the zone of operations have confirmed.

50. There is an urgent need to conclude an agreement for the universal eradication of chemical weapons. We are optimistic about the possibility of concluding such an agreement soon. My country, which does not possess such weapons and has no intention of possessing any, must view with concern the possibility that a delay in reaching an agreement to eliminate chemical weapons might lead to their proliferation. Encouraging progress has been achieved in this area in the Conference on Disarmament. Spain is contributing to its work as an active observer, and hopes to become a full member. But efforts must continue, and pragmatic and objective solutions must be sought to outstanding problems, in order to achieve a treaty that guarantees the complete abolition of this kind of weapon. Such an agreement must be based on transparency, verification and undiminished security. In this context, Spain attaches special importance to the goal of basing the scheduling of the destruction of chemical weapons on a gradual and balanced reduction in their lethality.

51. Another priority at present is, in our opinion, the need to reduce the number of conventional weapons. Who can forget that, despite the existence of nuclear weapons, it is conventional weapons that have been used in every conflict since the end of the Second World War, causing the loss of many millions of lives and untold damage and suffering? How can we ignore the astounding magnitude of the expenditures that mankind devotes to such arms, depriving States of a high percentage of resources needed for the development and welfare of their peoples? The extremely high levels of conventional weapons in the world today not only make peace a fragile thing but also obstruct the path to development, for which considerable resources could be released by a generalized process of disarmament, as set out in the action programme of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held last year under the auspices of the United Nations.

52. In Europe in particular the degree of saturation of such weaponry is especially worrying. The asym-

metries in conventional arms will be aggravated with the coming into force of the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles. It thus becomes urgently necessary to attain conventional stability at the lowest possible level of arms and troops, through appropriate asymmetrical reductions.

53. As a country of the European continent, Spain is taking an active part in the quest for a balanced and satisfactory outcome of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which in our view is the major and most promising forum for dialogue and détente to attain lasting solutions to the problems of the old continent. In this context, we will work for conventional stability at the lowest levels of forces by means of a negotiating process which will start within the Conference framework once the Follow-Up Meeting of the Heisinki process concludes.

54. We will negotiate in parallel the strengthening and expansion of the confidence- and security-building measures agreed upon at the Stockholm Conference. The Spanish Government considers that lowering the asymmetries in conventional forces in Europe today will prevent massive surprise attacks and, together with the progressive elimination of the climate of distrust, contribute to stability, not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world.

55. My delegation believes that a total ban on nuclear testing, which would contribute to curbing the arms race, is another of the objectives which we should try to attain in the not-too-distant future. The considerable progress that has been made recently in seismology furnishes new and fruitful possibilities of verification in this field. In this context, I wish to express my country's satisfaction at the agreements reached in Washington in December 1987 and in Moscow last week. In the view of my delegation, quite apart from the bilateral processes currently under way, this is one of the aspects of disarmament in which the United Nations is called to play a decisive role once it proves possible to open negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

56. Spain, a non-nuclear country, wishes to contribute, through its recent accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to strengthening politically the non-proliferation régime, both horizontal and vertical.

57. For years some countries, including my own, have been insisting that for there to be a possibility of achieving really effective arms control and disarmament agreements it is essential to have a reliable system for the verification of compliance with each such agreement. We were told that this was a pretext designed to conceal a lack of political will to negotiate. Fortunately, the need for verification is now a generally acknowledged truism, and the INF Treaty is a good example of this.

58. Although we believe that verification is a specific requirement for each treaty or agreement and that, therefore, it must be negotiated between the parties concerned, the fact is that there is also a vast field for multilateral action which may greatly facilitate the attainment of verification agreements. The United

Nations in particular has before it a very wide field in which to deploy its stock of human, technical and organizational resources, ranging from the drafting of a set of general principles acceptable to all to professional and technical assistance in concrete negotiations, including the compiling of a catalogue of measures, procedures and techniques for use in verification.

59. The last session of the Disarmament Commission, which ended only a few days ago, adopted by consensus a document which we believe to be an excellent starting-point for defining the part the United Nations is to play in verification. We believe that once the Commission has completed its study of this matter the most practical and realistic thing to do, now that the principle of the need for verification has been established and accepted by all, is to give ourselves an interval for serious thought and professional study, with the participation of governmental experts from the countries concerned, to decide on and plan the next step. We are sure that the Assembly is able to follow a path that seems so clearly to be the right one.

60. In the nuclear age, to which we belong, mankind is living with the fear that an error, or the escalation of any conflict whatsoever, could bring about a catastrophe. The fact that this has not occurred should not provoke an attitude of resigned acceptance. We must continue to seek formulas both to curb the nuclear arms race and to permit the continuing reduction of nuclear arsenals, with a view to their total elimination when circumstances allow.

61. The 50 per cent reduction in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union is an objective that brooks no delay and certainly enjoys the full backing of the international community. My country adds its voice to those of other countries that do not wish to see the pressing need for a reduction in strategic nuclear arsenals thwarted by a lack of understanding between the two Powers because of diverging interpretations of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems—the ABM Treaty.<sup>5</sup> We appeal to both sides to show the necessary flexibility to reach agreement on an issue of such paramount importance and thus avoid endangering the current momentum of disarmament.

62. Indeed, the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament will surely be a test of the ability of the United Nations to intensify its work and its role. Spain is fully aware of the efforts of the Organization in this area and attaches particular value to the important tasks carried out by UNIDIR. In view of the particular importance that my country gives to regional disarmament, we will also contribute to the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America, based in Lima.

63. Another matter of concern in my country is the proliferation of missile technology, a new phenomenon of proliferation to add to those I have already mentioned, whose negative effects are particularly intense in certain areas now affected by armed conflicts. Spain is favourably considering the possibility of adopting a set of guidelines on the transfer of

sensitive elements related to missiles identical to those adopted simultaneously on 16 April 1987 by Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. We wish thus to contribute to the efforts in favour of the non-proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles.

64. I have focused on those issues which my delegation considers to be of primary importance and on which it would, in our opinion, be easier to secure a consensus at this special session. We are of the view that we must approach our work from a standpoint at once realistic and constructive, avoiding recriminations that might obstruct the agreements we are hoping for, or excessively ambitious targets which might exclude from the consensus States which feel their security interests to be threatened.

65. We trust that a final document will be adopted that will be satisfactory to all concerned and consistent with the importance of the problems we are confronting and the expectations this session has raised. My country will spare no effort, nor will a spirit of compromise be lacking, to ensure that these objectives will be met.

66. Mr. VARKONYI (Hungary): The fifteenth special session of the General Assembly is the third in the history of the world Organization to be devoted exclusively to questions of disarmament. The special sessions on disarmament offer unique opportunities for States to take stock of accomplishments, to draw lessons from the past and to map out tasks for the period ahead.

67. The current session derives its topicality from, *inter alia*, the fact that it follows after a lapse of around 10 years the now historic first special session devoted to disarmament. Ten years is a period long enough to allow a wider retrospect. Such a review of events reveals extremes in the history of disarmament efforts during the past decade, when the rising trend as indicated by the Final Document of the first special session and by the SALT II accord was replaced by a setback in disarmament talks and a tearing down of the disarmament infrastructure embodied in the relevant treaties. The low ebb of 1984 was followed by a fresh momentum resulting from gradual and mutual reappraisals as signalled by the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty—and the strategic arms reduction talks accord now taking shape.

68. An important lesson of the past decade is that the recognition of the mutual dependence or interdependence of States and groups of States should deeply penetrate the thinking of man in the present age, and that such a way of thinking should become an integral part of the everyday practice of politics and security policy. The current level of technical development and the quantity and quality of the stockpiles of weapons in the world demand also an awareness of the impossibility of any State guaranteeing its own security solely by military means, by increasing its national military strength in disregard of the security interests of other countries. Under

such circumstances, the arsenal of security guarantees should come to be dominated in the long run by elements of political negotiation, which, in turn, presupposes the strengthening of confidence and the development of broad co-operation among States.

69. The third special session devoted to disarmament is deliberating under a favourable set of conditions. An appropriate atmosphere for the work of this session has been created by an improvement in Soviet-American relations and the concomitant results of bilateral disarmament, the progress made in the resolution of regional crises, and in general the positive tendencies in international relations.

70. Among the disarmament results of the past period outstanding importance is attached to the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which, although affecting but a few per cent of the accumulated nuclear warheads in the world, has definitively banished those two categories of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the two great Powers. But even more important is the fact that the treaty has eliminated a class of first-strike weapons which, by reducing reaction time to a critical level, had created a highly destabilizing sense of insecurity on both sides. The treaty has opened a new chapter in the history of disarmament not only by being the first to provide for actual nuclear disarmament measures; the ratification of the treaty by both sides paves the way for its implementation, opening a new era of nuclear disarmament. In the fact that the Soviet side has already removed from its arsenal and has destroyed missiles covered by the treaty before its entry into force, we see a forward-oriented and confidence-building step.

71. We attach great importance to an early accord between the Soviet Union and the United States on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms in conditions of compliance with the ABM Treaty,<sup>3</sup> as signed in 1972, and non-withdrawal from it for a specified period of time.

72. We welcome the fact that two new disarmament-related agreements were signed at the Moscow summit meeting. Though they are more modest by their character than the INF Treaty, we hope that they will give a further positive impetus to ongoing negotiations, especially to bilateral efforts to bring about the ratification of the "threshold treaties" on nuclear explosions, signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1970s, and to impose further restrictions on nuclear tests. We believe that the success of those efforts may be a milestone on the road to the prohibition of nuclear-test explosions.

73. The favourable trend in Soviet-American disarmament contacts infuses hope into all those who, after years of failure, still believe firmly that, hardly a decade away from the turn of the century, the *raison d'être* of disarmament, as the only modern means of accommodating security and political interests, will be recognized and accepted definitively and irrevocably.

74. We think that for this to become a reality two conditions should be met at present. First, it should be ensured that the unilateral pursuit of security by



military means will not regain momentum and undo what has been achieved in recent years through disarmament efforts. Secondly, it should be seen that tangible results in multilateral disarmament will reinforce the rather delicate infrastructure of disarmament.

75. The first challenge is not a new one, for the race between disarmament and arms buildup, which has so far been taking place under rather unequal conditions, has always been an inseparable concomitant of disarmament efforts, with disarmament the loser all along. Unfortunately, the realization of plans to compensate for the weapons affected by the latest disarmament measures might easily set back the favourable processes which still need strengthening. We feel that such efforts of compensation are not justified by any real security interest whatever but are motivated first and foremost by the self-serving logic of seeking unilateral security. We are convinced that on the basis of proposals and initiatives made by the States involved it will be possible to find, through negotiations, by political means, much more effective and lasting solutions for the problems that are a source of concern for the parties.

76. The second condition is that of breaking the deadlock which multilateral disarmament reached more than 10 years ago. The cause of the failure in multilateral disarmament is primarily political in nature, since the international political environment in the first half of the 1980s, the quality of relations between the two great Powers, tended precisely to narrow the scope of disarmament talks. In addition, one should not overlook the fact that expectations concerning disarmament accords and, in close connection with them, the complexity of the disarmament issues discussed have at the same time increased enormously. Later on, the process of democratization in the field of multilateral disarmament gave rise to the need for the respective postures to grow into a consensus by reliance on the views of a much wider range of countries, rather than on essentially bilateral co-ordination, as had been the case previously. The operation and the negotiating mechanism of the multilateral disarmament forums were and still are unable to meet those challenges in many aspects.

77. We believe that the results already reached within bilateral frameworks and the fresh gains likely to be made in the near future cannot fail to influence the activity of multilateral disarmament forums. If it is true that bilateral and multilateral disarmament efforts mutually influence and complement each other, this should be true in a positive sense now, though it had a negative effect in the past.

78. It is a task of fundamental importance for the third special session on disarmament to give clear evidence, by its successful outcome and its concrete guidance, of the *raison d'être* and viability of multilateral disarmament. While reaffirming the spirit of the Final Document of the first special session, the current session can do so mainly by creating a general awareness that security cannot be an exclusive right of any country, that security is equal, universal and indivisible for all, that it is a right and a duty of every State to contribute to guaranteeing mutual security. Those very ideas are embodied in the concept of

comprehensive international peace and security. The dialogue on this question, which is now under way within the framework of the United Nations, will in all certainty have a fertilizing effect on exchanges of views and concrete negotiations about disarmament issues, while it may lay the conceptual groundwork for a qualitatively new system of international security by extending the concept of mutual security to non-military areas.

79. The Hungarian People's Republic is seeking to make an active contribution, both in its bilateral relations and at international forums, to improving the international atmosphere and preparing agreements on mutual security guarantees. My country came out consistently for the continuation of dialogue among States and for negotiated political solutions to existing problems even in the years of decline in the disarmament process from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, during the period of complete standstill in bilateral disarmament contacts, and we continue to hold this view firmly today. This approach, we feel, has stood the test of particularly hard times, and its correctness has been confirmed by the positive developments of the period which has since elapsed.

80. Among the items on the agenda of the disarmament forums which are also to be addressed by the current session, the question of nuclear disarmament deserves particular attention. The multilateral disarmament forums must not be allowed to be doomed to inactivity by the predominant role and primary tasks of the nuclear-Powers, above all the Soviet Union and the United States. The past period has pointed to the readiness of the two leading great Powers to take the first steps on this road and to the possibility, which may be opened by further bilateral moves, that the other nuclear Powers may become engaged in the process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The multilateral forums, in turn, could also play a useful role, further promoting and broadening that process. If this is to be the case, those concrete partial issues should be identified on which an effective dialogue within multilateral frameworks could also be set in motion on the basis of the principle of mutual interests, namely those of nuclear and non-nuclear States. The common interest in preventing a nuclear war and preventing the escalation of possible conflicts into nuclear ones ought to be translated into practical terms as soon as possible.

81. Prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests is a cardinal issue of halting the nuclear-arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. We stand for a comprehensive prohibition of such tests. The past period has given clearer evidence than ever that the different approaches of States to this question or its final solution call for a co-ordination of bilateral and multilateral efforts. This does not rule out the possibility of attaining the ultimate goal step-by-step, by way of continuous negotiations. In this context, establishment of a system of verification concerning the future comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty appears at present to be the most promising enterprise to be undertaken by the Conference on Disarmament, which could thus make a useful contribution to laying the foundations for a multilateral verification system.

82. Prevention of an arms race in outer space is a question without a past in the 10-year history of special sessions on disarmament. My country considers this problem to be crucial to international security and disarmament. We are convinced that multilateral disarmament diplomacy can do a great deal to prevent an arms race in outer space activities, including safeguards for the immunity of satellites orbiting the Earth, norms of conduct in outer space and a proper system of verification to assure the peaceful character of space research and space activities.

83. At present the elaboration of a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons is perhaps the only field of multilateral disarmament which holds out some promise of success. During the period since the second special session on disarmament, the possibilities as well as the limits of multilateral disarmament in the 1980s have been demonstrated most clearly by this set of problems. In comparison with 1982, a number of questions which formerly seemed insoluble have been resolved or are nearing solution. At the same time, the negotiations have raised problems stemming from increased demands on disarmament accords of a "new generation". Thus, for instance, difficulties hitherto not supposed to exist are experienced in drawing the dividing line between peaceful and military activities, and in such a way that the interests of neither industrial development nor mutual security are prejudiced. The draft convention, which has grown to several times its former size, is clearly indicative of the kinds of problems caused by the increasing complexity of questions and by the need for coordinating the positions of a wide range of States. These difficulties, however, give no satisfactory explanation for the reasons behind the unfavourable trend of the latest rounds of talks or the events outside the scope of negotiations.

84. During the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament the Hungarian People's Republic made an important confidence-building announcement, declaring its chemical-weapon-free status. With a view to further strengthening confidence, we even published data on the production of specific "key precursors" for peaceful purposes and also released figures on the volume of production. In making those announcements we were guided by the conviction that this kind of openness, particularly if displayed by a wide range of States, serves to contribute significantly to the strengthening of confidence and thereby to promoting the early elaboration of the convention.

85. Similarly, at the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons, held at Geneva in September 1986, openness was not treated by our representatives as an end in itself when they stated their case for increasing openness. The non-mandatory information envisaged by the Conference has been provided, and on a broader scale than required, and will also in the future be provided by the Hungarian People's Republic. We feel that the confidence-building measures taken in connection with the Convention will serve to increase certainty about full compliance with the relevant obligations.

86. The prohibition of radiological weapons and of attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities would likewise serve the interest of all mankind. In respect to the former, we attach importance to prevention, as an agreement could block the way to the development of a new type of weapon not yet in existence, while a provision for the inviolability of nuclear facilities would meet not only the demand of States which already operate a total of more than 900 nuclear facilities but also serve the interests of States not yet possessing such facilities. We think it deplorable and untenable that, while the Chernobyl disaster has awakened world public opinion to the weight of this problem, this question is still on the list of items hopelessly awaiting solution at multilateral disarmament talks. Though it is not easy, one should pose the question: what else should happen to cause the negotiations to become substantive and produce results at last?

87. Along with the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, it is ever more urgent to achieve progress in questions of conventional disarmament and confidence- and security-building. A process which we expect to produce tangible results has got under way in Europe, where the armed forces of the two largest military alliances confront each other directly and the stockpiles of weapons defy description. This makes it understandable that more and more people are becoming increasingly aware of the imperative need to reduce armed forces and conventional armaments and to eliminate the offensive capabilities and structures in Europe.

88. The efforts to create military stability in Europe at a lower level of armaments should naturally include the elimination, by way of reductions, of asymmetries which at present imperil that stability. If success is to be achieved at negotiations on conventional disarmament, it is indispensable to eliminate those asymmetries, and we are convinced that they do exist on both sides. We know that all this requires time, political will and up-to-date forms of co-operation. We feel that the political will now exists on the part of all countries concerned, and up-to-date forms of co-operation are for us alone to create. But we do not have much time, as technical advances and the development of weaponry may easily cause what is realistically possible today to melt into thin air tomorrow. That is why we deem it indispensable that talks be started as early as possible with no pre-conditions attached and with all participants making maximum efforts to secure success.

89. The question of military détente is a key element of all European co-operation and accordingly receives appropriate attention at the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting and the parallel consultations of the 23 taking place in close association with the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. It is the first time that representatives of the States concerned are meeting in this composition, and it is no wonder that the elaboration of mutually acceptable compromises, in keeping with the security interests of all participants, calls for patience, contributions by all partners and, in certain cases, political courage.

90. Judging by the favourable experience gained in the implementation of the Stockholm agreement, and keeping in view my country's practice of surpassing the minimum requirements, we see encouraging prospects for progress and seek to ensure that after the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting additional effective confidence- and security-building measures will be elaborated by the 35 participating States on the basis of the Stockholm agreement.

91. Following the Budapest Appeal for reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, Hungarian diplomacy has been working actively to promote, within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organization as well as the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the co-ordination of ideas about military détente and to encourage their translation into practical terms, lending support to efforts to ensure that substantive talks are started as early as possible, perhaps before the end of 1988.

92. In our view, it would be important to take steps—similar to those in Europe—also in other regions of the world to reduce the level of armed forces and conventional armaments, taking due account of the characteristics of the particular region.

93. The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will have the important task of reviewing the disarmament machinery, finding more efficient forms of negotiation and effecting such changes as it may deem necessary. We think that in dealing with this question we should be guided by the principle of increasing the result-orientation of the disarmament forums, promoting the continuation of substantive talks and contributing to the elaboration of concrete agreements. Any proposal of a change for the better should be considered in terms of meeting those expectations. We would find it desirable to reinforce the infrastructure of disarmament, which is relatively deficient in comparison with other areas, such as economic co-operation, and to enhance the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, in particular the relevant sections of the Secretariat.

94. During the 1980s, verification has come to represent an independent and indispensable aspect of disarmament. The reason for this is not only because expectations about disarmament accords have increased mostly in the field of verification, but also because the confidence- and security-building effect of verification and other related measures has made itself felt with increasing certainty, primarily in the course of implementation of the Stockholm Document. There is growing recognition that the question of verification, including its machinery, requires an integrated approach, which, in our view, could be aimed ultimately at setting up an agency within the framework of the United Nations for the verification of disarmament. We would welcome concrete recommendations by the Assembly at this session, perhaps in the form of an expert study, to consider the possibility of establishing such an agency.

95. Like verification, the question of openness has also assumed greater significance. Openness is urgently needed not only in military aspects but also in respect of disarmament, where small and medium-

sized countries lag far behind the great Powers in terms of possibilities. Access to information about disarmament could, in our view, be greatly facilitated if, as a first step, the States concerned would, on a voluntary basis and according to appropriately co-ordinated criteria, study their own literature on disarmament, feed relevant information into a disarmament data bank and make it available to all countries ready to co-operate in that respect.

96. It is advisable and necessary for the present session to review and assess the period since the first special session on disarmament, but it is important that this should be done in an objective manner, avoiding confrontations. The analysis of the reasons may of course take some time, but the successful outcome of this session requires that we concentrate more on the tasks ahead. We believe that the tasks should be defined by displaying an appropriate sense of realism, adopting a creative approach and seeking joint solutions based on a balance of interests of the participants. We should refrain from taking the "all or nothing" approach, but a kind of empathy during the exchanges of views is likely to contribute to a positive outcome.

97. In view of the foregoing, it appears to us that the current session should adopt a phased approach to disarmament questions, by defining concrete, short-term tasks, keeping in mind the priorities as formulated in the Final Document of the first special session. With one month of work, we shall be able to produce results only if we focus on questions which hold out some prospect of agreement, even if on the basis of compromise. With this end in view, we should find it desirable for the final document to contain, in addition to statements of a general nature, concrete tasks for the next five to seven years.

98. The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic invariably deems it necessary to contribute, by promoting efforts to reach concrete multilateral disarmament accords and to devise up-to-date mechanisms for the accommodation of security policy interests, to attaining the goals set forth in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. Now as before, my delegation will try to contribute its share to the success of the deliberations. In the present international situation, and proceeding from the objective fact of the mutual dependence or interdependence of States, we consider it our main duty to work actively and constructively for extending and deepening the process of disarmament.

99. Mr. JACKSON (Guyana): I have come to this special session as a citizen and representative of a country of the third world. In that world live the vast majority of this planet's poor, who cling to the hope of surviving and of living in decent material conditions. The greatest threat to the survival of us all is the existence of nuclear weapons and the potential for their use. With those weapons, we can, in the words of the famous Jamaican reggae artist, Bob Marley, be "totally destroyed". I am here—and I believe so are we all—to work to avoid that eventual-ity.

100. The primary focus of this session should, therefore, be on the attitudes of those who manufac-

ture and stockpile nuclear weapons. We all shudder at the thought of the horrific consequences of the use of such weapons. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are grim reminders. In a real sense, therefore, man for the first time in history has created a weapons system the effectiveness of which lies in its non-use. Those weapons have clearly altered perceptions about human relations. Instead of emphasizing the promotion of life in larger freedoms, we have adjusted our thinking to mutually assured destruction, and terror, even as a balance, has been assigned strategic significance. Nuclear weapons have become a currency of power, and those weapons have encouraged the retention of a hegemonic model for the conduct of international relations. This does not correspond with the wishes of the majority of the world's States and peoples. Speaking of those of us who pursue a policy of non-alignment, an astute commentator has observed, "The non-aligned nations maintain that the approach to international relations should be a co-operative competition among States with emphasis on co-operation". For these and other reasons, the debate that has been engaged in at this special session takes on added meaning.

101. The convening of this special session propitiously coincides with a move on the part of the two major Powers, if not to normalize their relations, then at least to place them on a more predictable level. One good outcome of the recent Moscow summit meeting is the demonstration given that dialogue and negotiation between the leaders of two different social systems can build confidence and bring about an alteration of perceptions held in a past era. Therefore Guyana welcomes the signing and ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. Fundamental differences persist, but the prospects for further agreements are not discouraging. What is of value is that a beginning has been made. Encouragement must accordingly be given to those two Powers to pursue their dialogue and to reach the early conclusion of an agreement to effect a 50 per cent reduction in strategic weapons.

102. The momentum should not be allowed to slacken. The movement forward to other nuclear disarmament measures between the United States and the Soviet Union is both logical and necessary. Of course, the ultimate goal is the abandonment of nuclear weapons as a construct of peace. It is clear, therefore, that other nuclear Powers should also be involved. They cannot be ignored on the assumption that they are marginal and that the destructive power at their disposal is of a lower order. Indeed, all States should be involved, for if the dialogue on disarmament is to be successful it must be a dialogue of all mankind.

103. Even as the process towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons is being advanced, no Member of the Organization should allow an attribution to itself of selectivity, in the sense either that it gives encouragement to, or is silent on, the acquisition by preferred States of nuclear weapons. It would, therefore, be disappointing if this session remained silent on the possession of such weapons by Israel and South Africa.

104. While nuclear disarmament is the most urgent requirement, it will not by itself secure and guarantee peace. There are other fearsome weapons of mass destruction. The world has had recent experience of chemical weapons and the untold suffering that their use entails. The prohibition of these and other such weapons is as necessary as it is urgent.

105. Science and technology rightfully excite our imaginations and summon our energies, and we are naturally attracted to their possibilities for enhancing social progress and the quality of life. But I ask the question: is it necessary to orient those possibilities offered by advances in science and technology to human suffering, human degradation and human extinction? I believe not. The clear lesson, in Guyana's view, is that we should build new bases for a structure of peace that irrevocably places at the centre the concerns of people, of our human race.

106. Disarmament must therefore remain a priority issue on the global agenda. Its urgency is dictated by the formidable threat posed to human survival by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. It is dramatized by a growing realization that concerted and far-reaching measures must be adopted to resolve the problems of overarmament and underdevelopment. One must never lose sight of those issues and of the links that exist between them.

107. The imperative of disarmament compels us to reassess the political philosophy that governs inter-State relations and to re-think the basic concept of security. A different concept, I suggest, must be found, for the one that has prevailed since the outbreak of the cold war is now not only anachronistic but positively dangerous. Instead of being based on negative fear, our approach must be founded on confidence and mutual trust. It must embrace the principles of peaceful coexistence and co-operation.

108. That was in fact the conclusion in September 1986 of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the stated aim of which was:

"to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in . . . international relations". The unwavering pursuit of that determination will contribute enormously to the creation of an international environment in which the prospects for meaningful disarmament can be enhanced. It will succeed because it accepts the fact that individual concerns and needs are best satisfied when they are made collective and treated as such.

109. Essentially, this is the doctrine of the Palme study on "Common Security"<sup>6</sup> and the Brundtland report, "Our Common Future".<sup>7</sup> Both of those reports illustrate the virtues of global action in the cause of peace and development. They rightly conclude that the definition of security cannot be narrowly confined to matters of strategic importance to only some Powers; it must of necessity embrace those issues that are critical to the rest of the world.

and go beyond strategic interests to include social, humanitarian, environmental and developmental matters.

110. As with other forms of armaments, a reduction in conventional weapons, which is desirable, can best be achieved by removing the causes for their acquisition and by changing the perceptions of threat that inform the security needs of States. In this respect it is good to see that in the relations between the two military blocs there is shared interest in the serious pursuit of the question of conventional weapons. This session should therefore support the ongoing discussions in that matter. The present up-beat climate has advantages that should be utilized.

111. Earlier in this century, at the conclusion of the two so-called world wars—and even before—the quantities of weapons then current were reduced, industry was retooled and science and research were redirected to serve the purposes of development. The advent of nuclear weapons and the emergence of the cold war dramatically altered that situation. What they induced was a mode of organization in some societies in which the preparation for war became a full-time occupation. In dealing with the issue of conventional weapons, therefore, an important aspect that must be taken into consideration is the extent to which the production and export of arms have become a significant part of the national economic activity of several States. Today, arms form no small proportion of international trade and, like so many other commodities, are marketed aggressively.

112. Several steps suggest themselves to curb this practice. The first is universal adherence to international law. Foremost among its principles are those relating to the threat or use of force and the Charter injunction to settle conflicts peacefully. Clearly, there is also a crying need for national action to restrain, and to deal condignly with, the arms pushers who profit from trafficking in the deaths of others. In that respect action is urgently required to deal with arms for South Africa, where the mandatory arms embargo authorized by the Security Council is being so egregiously breached.

113. The need for conventional weapons can also be reduced if positive action is taken in other areas. Take, for example, the case of regional conflicts. I believe that when such conflicts arise, if all members of the international community condition themselves to give pre-eminence to their real origins we will, as a community, be in a better position to attenuate them and to respond by and large in a helpful way in support of the efforts of the States of the region and their prescriptive solutions. I wish to mention in this respect that the Foreign Ministers of the Caribbean Community at the Fourteenth Meeting of their Standing Committee held at Port of Spain on 20 and 21 May 1988, in animadverting to the Central American crisis, observed that the developments there “indicated a growing demonstration by regional States of their capacity and determination to find solutions to their problems”.<sup>8</sup>

114. Naturally, the situation will vary from region to region on account of special peculiarities. What is important is that regional conflicts should be un-

linked from strategic considerations. The interests of the people of the region should be paramount. Such changes are not going to be easily come by. We should, however, be relentless in our efforts to bring them about.

115. We can also help in removing the causes of the emergence of regional conflicts. While the necessary conceptual adjustments in security thinking are being made, additional steps should be taken. States within some regions have seen fit to designate their areas as zones of peace and as nuclear-weapon-free zones. Several such declarations are yet to be fully respected and implemented, and some States have generally resisted such proposals because of their outmoded security concepts. This special session should give impetus to those initiatives.

116. In all those matters the United Nations can play a beneficial role, one which should neither be ignored nor sabotaged. The Organization's sterling performance in peace-keeping is universally acknowledged. Its capacity has not yet, however, been amply utilized in peace-making. Yet the role of the United Nations, in so far as the situation in relation to Afghanistan is concerned, should give us hope and courage. In this connection Guyana welcomes the Geneva accords and calls for their strict implementation. Can we not enlarge the Organization's role in other conflicts—in Cyprus and Namibia, in Korea and in South Africa?

117. As I have indicated, the concept of collective responsibility allocates a central role to the United Nations in all matters relating to disarmament. As a nearly universal forum it is uniquely suited to the co-ordination of activities in this field and to the engagement of global negotiations. Bilateral agreements are of course indispensable, but they need to be related to a multilateral framework, which would then translate their provisions to a wider scheme of international peace and security. It is imperative, therefore, that this world Organization be sufficiently strengthened to allow it fully to discharge the manifold obligations that fall to it under the Charter.

118. The area of verification is one in which the Organization can be particularly helpful. We are all aware of the problems surrounding this question, especially when agreements are bilateral in nature. The problems are many—problems of ascertaining the exact level of weaponry the other side owns, the problems of mutual distrust when there is no objective third party to pronounce judgement in a situation of non-compliance, the absence of sanctions for such actions, nuances in interpretation of agreements and many more.

119. In recognition of the problems of verification, Guyana is firmly of the view that a greater role could be played by the United Nations in dealing with this issue. Let us therefore support all progressive initiatives aimed at ensuring that a set of verification principles and procedures are put in place covering the relevant treaties that are concluded in the process of disarmament. Let us support on the basis of its merits the proposal of the Six-Nation Initiative concerning the establishment of an integrated verification system within the United Nations system [see *A/S-15/AC.1/1*].



120. Fortunately, we not only have the current favourable climate in which to promote disarmament; we are also now armed with the knowledge that the nuclear-weapon culture has created a monster of insatiable appetite and unruly temperament and that it will not hesitate to devour those who feed it. Indeed, all of us are potential victims. And, finally, we already have as an indispensable framework the conclusions and Programme of Action of the first special session on disarmament, held in 1978, which are still valid and whose full implementation is now propitious.

121. War, it has been observed, begins in the minds of men. Given the necessary imagination and courage, we may yet hope to curb the present proclivity to violence and to replace it with the determination to follow the path to peace and stability. Time, in this case, is not the best of allies. We should therefore move swiftly before it is too late. The Second Disarmament Decade will soon draw to a close. Let us ensure by the measures we adopt that we will be around to declare a third which will be more fruitful than its predecessors.

122. Mr. NGUYEN CŨ THACH (Viet Nam) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you warmly on your successful conduct of the proceedings of the General Assembly. I should also like to extend my warm congratulations to the Secretary-General for his contribution to the settlement of a number of crises throughout the world.

123. The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament unfolds against a backdrop that is a source of both great hope and of major concern. In the wake of the recent Soviet-American summit in Moscow, a new chapter is opening up in the history of international relations in general and disarmament in particular. But at the same time we are threatened by plans for a new stage in the arms race.

124. The summit may constitute a landmark heralding the end of the prolonged cold-war era between East and West and ushering in a new era of negotiated settlement of differences between East and West. Should the non-use of force in relations between the two major Powers and the peaceful solution of their disputes grow into a new type of international relations, that would provide powerful impetus towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament. Looking back on the history of the East-West cold war over the past 40 years, we are very much encouraged by the initial achievements, while at the same time we are also aware that the shaping of a new type of international relations based on the non-use of force is a long and arduous struggle.

125. The ratification of the INF Treaty and progress towards a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear arms are a significant first step towards general and complete disarmament, if those agreements can put an end to plans to extend the arms race from Earth into outer space and the search for new and much more sophisticated weapons. But if the reduction in existing nuclear arsenals, regardless of its magnitude, serves only to intensify senselessly

the arms race, it would spell disaster for the whole of mankind.

126. At present the most pressing problem facing us is not only to reduce the existing nuclear arsenal but also to prevent the arms race from assuming a new, more dangerous dimension and from spreading into outer space, and to impose a complete prohibition on nuclear tests and chemical weapons, as well as a ban on the testing and production of new generations of weapons. Such is the wish of the peoples of the world and of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. In his statement [*2nd meeting*], Robert Mugabe, Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, has given voice to the deep and full expression of the position of non-aligned countries. The special ministerial meeting devoted to disarmament of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held at Havana from 26 to 30 May produced comprehensive proposals on disarmament for consideration at this special session of the General Assembly [*see A/S-15/27 and Corr. 1*]. It is our hope that the current special session will live up to the expectations of the peoples of the world, who want to live in peace, independence and freedom.

127. The current arms race confronts humanity with a major contradiction that calls for a solution. This contradiction lies in the fact that decisions on vital interests and the happiness of the whole of mankind are in the hands of restricted circles which have huge vested interests in maintaining the arms race. The whole human race is being held hostage to a nuclear holocaust by a small minority, namely, the various military-industrial complexes. It is unacceptable for the leaders of just a few nuclear-weapon countries to decide on the survival of all humanity. It is known that some nuclear Powers have an interest in stepping up the arms race and particularly in extending it into outer space, while one or two of them earnestly desire general and complete disarmament.

128. The past 40 years have seen no wars among the five nuclear Powers, which are the largest arms producers and possess the biggest arsenals in the world. However, over that same period more than 100 local wars have been waged by several nuclear Powers on the territory of Asian, African and Latin American countries which do not possess nuclear weapons and neither produce nor possess large arsenals of weapons. These imperialist and colonialist wars have been directed against the aspiration for independence and freedom of the peoples of those continents.

129. South-East Asia has witnessed 40 years of war, waged by four of the five nuclear Powers against the aspiration for independence and freedom of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea, one nuclear Power alone having respected and supported the independence of those countries. Imperialist and colonialist circles are making colossal profits out of the arms race and are using weapons as an instrument for maintaining their exploitation and domination in the world, the peoples of the world and particularly of those countries, the main victims of the arms race.

130. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the five permanent members of the Security Council

should be true guarantors of the peace and security of nations. Regrettably, however, some of them are actually a source of insecurity in the world and the biggest threat to the survival of mankind. The peoples of the world are entitled to demand that the permanent members of the Security Council assume the major responsibility for international peace and security. We welcome any agreement among those countries to put an end gradually to the arms race and proceed towards general and complete disarmament.

131. At the same time, nearly all countries which possess no nuclear weapons have a vital interest in ending the arms race and eliminating nuclear weapons throughout the world, and they have the right to contribute to that goal. Over the past 40 years, many countries, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which do not possess nuclear weapons, produce weapons or hold large arsenals have played a decisive role in the collapse of colonialism and the disintegration of several military blocs including the Baghdad Pact, the South-East Asia Treaty Organization and others, and have helped stymie many wars of aggression.

132. In many parts of various continents, we have seen the establishment or proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as those for Antarctica, Central Europe, the Nordic countries, the Balkans, Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, South-East Asia and the Korean peninsula. The same is true of zones of peace: I am thinking of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Mongolian proposal for a convention on the non-use of force to be signed among the countries of Asia and the Pacific, the proposed establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia, a zone of cooperation in South Asia, and a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

133. A growing number of countries are demanding an end to the presence of foreign troops and military bases on their territories.

134. If all the world's non-nuclear-weapon States were to establish denuclearized zones where the use of force would be banned from international relations and where there would be no foreign troops or military bases, that would be a significant contribution by non-nuclear-weapon countries to the cause of general and complete disarmament. Such an undertaking would respond fully to the vital interests of countries without nuclear weapons and would lie entirely within their hands.

135. The time has come for us to make the legitimate demand that the five nuclear Powers sign a joint treaty or bilateral treaties with all non-nuclear-weapon States on the non-use of force in their relations, and on the peaceful settlement of all disputes. The five nuclear Powers should undertake in those treaties not to use nuclear weapons against countries that do not possess such weapons.

136. For the past 40 years the peoples of the world have been able to avoid another world war and to maintain the longest period of peace our century has known. In South-East Asia, however, the peoples of

Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea alone have been the victims of a number of protracted wars of aggression, which involved the use of the largest volume of bombs and other explosives in history. More than anyone else, we long for peace so we can rehabilitate our ravaged economy. We support the initiative of the States of the Association of South-East Asian Nations [ASEAN] to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia and to make it a denuclearized zone. We welcome the formulation by the ASEAN States of an instrument on a nuclear-free South-East Asia.

137. We want a speedy political solution to the Kampuchean question on the basis of respect for the right of the Kampuchean people to self-determination, the end to all foreign interference, and the final prevention of any possible return of the genocidal, war-mongering Pol Pot régime. Annual withdrawals of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea have been carried out. Half of those forces were withdrawn between 1982 and the end of 1987. This year, Viet Nam will withdraw half its remaining forces and by 1990 will have withdrawn them all. If a political solution on Kampuchea can be achieved, Vietnamese forces will totally withdraw from Kampuchea in accordance with the provisions of the agreement that will be reached.

138. The current dispute over the South-East Asian archipelagos poses a threat to peace and security in the region. On several occasions, Viet Nam has proposed to the countries concerned that they settle their differences over the archipelagos through negotiation and that, pending such a settlement, they refrain from the use of force and from any action that could aggravate the tension.

139. Since late 1987 there have been several developments in line with the dialogue on the settlement of problems among South-East Asian countries: the July 1987 Ho Chi Minh City agreement between Indonesia and Viet Nam; and the Paris talks between Prime Minister Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk. Viet Nam has repeatedly proposed talks with China with a view to resolving any differences between them and to normalizing their relations in the interests of both countries and of peace in South-East Asia.

140. Nuclear weapons threaten the human race with extermination. Mankind's will to survive has made possible the elimination of intermediate-range missiles and will succeed in eliminating the entire nuclear arsenal. Mankind will be able firmly to safeguard peace.

141. Mr. AL-KAWARI (Qatar) (*interpretation from Arabic*): It is a pleasure for me, Sir, to congratulate you on your election to the presidency of the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament. The wisdom, experience and competence you have shown make me confident that you will guide our work in the best possible manner. It is my pleasure too to express my country's deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his outstanding role in promoting the authority of the United Nations and his efforts in making preparations for this special session.

142. This special session devoted to disarmament signals a new stage in the international Organization's continuing efforts to find a way to end the arms race, to maintain world peace and security, to devote the available material and scientific skills to the well-being of the world's peoples and to tackle the economic and social problems from which peoples suffer.

*Mr. Adodo (Togo), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

143. Disarmament is one of the primary objectives of the United Nations and has been so since its inception. United Nations resolutions have continually stressed that the ultimate objective of the Organization is disarmament. At the two previous special sessions on disarmament, in 1978 and 1982, the General Assembly adopted resolutions and guidelines. However, the fundamental objective of disarmament is still far from being within reach despite the progress achieved in this field. This must not discourage us from continuing our efforts within the international Organization, sustained collective efforts, until our hopes for a weapon-free world are realized. Let this special session be the opportunity to reaffirm the sincere political will to achieve this objective—conventional and nuclear disarmament—and to take effective measures to allow us to come nearer to it.

144. My country welcomes the agreement signed between the two super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. We hope that that agreement will constitute a new stimulus towards further steps of the same kind which will ultimately realize the hopes of the world for nuclear disarmament.

145. Such hopes will never be translated into reality unless we fully take into account the reasons which lead to armament. Armament is one of the phenomena which the whole world is trying to eliminate or at least to slow down in the interim. However, it has inherent causes which, if untreated, will lead to a continuing arms race. The security of the world will then be subject to more danger than it is today. With continuing war in many parts of our world, with the concept of war as the means to settle disputes instead of their being settled by well-known peaceful means, with the intervention by States in the affairs of others, with lack of respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, with the non-recognition of the right of some peoples to self-determination, with the policies of expansion of some States, with non-respect for international law and the Charter of the United Nations—with all those factors, how can we hope to see a world free of armaments in the near future?

146. The regions of the Middle East and southern Africa are prime examples of "might makes right", of the arms race, of policies of expansion and denial of the right of peoples to self-determination.

147. Israel does not bother to hide its nuclear armament, which is now known to all. It refuses to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and refuses any control on its nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it has a policy of

expansion which it practises at the expense of Arab States in the region. In addition to Palestinian lands, Israel occupies Syrian and Lebanese territory. The concept of security for Israel is always at the expense of the security and stability of others. Israel does not hesitate to undertake raids against independent States, under the pretext of its own security. It has struck the nuclear reactor used in Iraq for peaceful purposes. It constantly undertakes raids against Lebanon. It raided the Tunisian capital once to hit the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] and a second time to assassinate the militant Abu Jihad, an outstanding Palestinian leader. Furthermore, its Nazi oppressive policy in dealing with Palestinians has become clear to all. Israel daily kills women and children, it detains innocent people and even buries some alive, in addition to other practices known to all and sundry. Such practices are aimed at forcing the Palestinian people to bend to its will and to stop demanding self-determination and the establishment of their own independent State on their national soil under the leadership of its sole legitimate representative, the PLO.

148. In southern Africa the racist régime continues to occupy Namibia and to reject the right of the black majority to self-determination. It is building up its nuclear capability and co-operates with Israel in that field.

149. My country fully supports a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East and Africa. However, we believe that such aspirations are not realistic within current conditions, conditions of continuing Israeli nuclear armament and Israeli-South African co-operation in this field.

150. Furthermore, my country fully supports a nuclear-weapon-free Indian Ocean. We look forward to concrete results that would facilitate further progress towards speedily implementing that objective.

151. We are aware that the achievement of any progress in the field of disarmament will have positive repercussions on the task of overcoming the economic and social challenges in the field of development, which we in the third world so greatly need. We also believe in the close link between disarmament, security and development. The matter of disarmament is indeed one of the fundamental issues in our contemporary world. My country hopes that a positive spirit at this special session will enable the action programme adopted by the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development<sup>9</sup> to be translated into concrete results and practical measures in the interest of the entire world. Further, my country supports practical measures to establish a fund for the resources liberated by disarmament measures to be devoted to development in the third world.

152. Let the great challenges facing the world today in achieving disarmament lead us to intensify our efforts and let it be the impetus for ongoing work to achieve that objective in the service of mankind.

153. Mr. BARRIOS TASSANO (Uruguay) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Like the preceding speaker, I wish to convey to Mr. Peter Florin sincere congratu-

lations on his assumption of the presidency of the General Assembly at this third special session devoted to disarmament. His skills and his experience will no doubt contribute to the success of this special session.

154. History will judge our era and its leaders very harshly. Future generations will find it difficult to understand this world in which over \$900 billion are spent each year on armaments while millions of human beings are dying because of a lack of the elementary means of subsistence, a world in which \$1.5 million are spent each minute on military expenditures while during that same minute thousands of children are dying from a lack of adequate medical attention.

155. From 1980 through 1985, there was an average yearly increase of 3.2 per cent in military spending, while the world production of foodstuffs, goods and services increased by only 2.4 per cent. Those differences dramatically and eloquently reflect the diversion of the greater part of world resources to purposes of armament. That fact in itself is the reason why all nations are present here today to try to defeat this suicidal irrationality.

156. In differing degrees we are all responsible for this paradoxical situation in which, against the most basic human instincts, vast resources desperately required to ensure the survival and welfare of mankind are used instead to produce death and fear. That contradiction constitutes the greatest tragedy of our times.

157. We are all responsible because, in fact, the arms race is not a consequence of an inexorable law beyond the control of Governments. On the contrary, Governments prepare, determine, negotiate and carry out their arms policies. Both the volume of resources and the direction of technological research to military purposes are the results of deliberate options, programmes and political decisions.

158. The greater the power of Governments effectively to influence international events, the greater their moral and political responsibility. In that sense, it should be recalled that the great Powers continue to accumulate overwhelming arsenals of nuclear and conventional weapons capable of erasing every vestige of life from the face of the earth.

159. The developing countries, for their part, invest in weapons sums in excess of \$130 billion a year, several times the amount of the resources they receive from the World Bank in development loans. This amounts to an incomprehensible deflection of resources from economic and social priorities—a deflection which cannot always be justified by invoking errors, ambitions or pressures outside the developing world.

160. In an unfolding drama in which almost all the players have a certain degree of responsibility, this Organization is certainly the most appropriate forum for reawakening the conscience of mankind in order to erect barriers that will put an end to this suicidal competition. That is why we have come here to reiterate the disarmament principles, criteria and objectives agreed upon in the Final Document of the

first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament [*resolution S-10/2*]. And, in that spirit, we are here before the Assembly ready to participate in the adoption of new resolutions in keeping with those guidelines, ready to support efforts to consolidate them and to make concrete progress in the same direction.

161. For a small country like Uruguay, this is the forum and occasion to reiterate its commitment to peace for itself and for all the nations of the world and to contribute to the adoption of collective decisions and concrete measures aimed at the effective establishment of an international community which is organized on the basis of principles of solidarity and whose freedom, survival and security will not necessarily depend on the possibility of resorting to the use of weapons.

162. For that reason, we continue to support all efforts by the Organization to that end. Nevertheless, we understand that, owing to the complexity of disarmament problems, a more feasible strategy would be to forgo the desire to deal simultaneously with all aspects of disarmament and, instead, to consider progressively those problems that offer better possibilities for reaching a general agreement.

163. Furthermore, this is also the appropriate forum in which to identify another great enemy of mankind, an enemy which constitutes a real threat to its freedom, its security and its peace. That enemy is not a rival Power or a military alliance but, rather, the growing economic and technological gap that divides the world more than political or ideological differences do. In fact, the great enemy of developing countries in the twenty-first century will be their status as forced consumers of imported technology. That condition will constitute a new and more threatening challenge to their political sovereignty and their internal peace and freedom.

164. For the great majority of mankind, the freedom of peoples is threatened also by the lack of resources to develop equitable conditions of life and by their lack of access to the benefits which present technology generates only for the minority living in the developed areas of the world. It is therefore against that common enemy that we should struggle—all peoples and countries together, regardless of the degree of development, organization or ideology. That is true because the dynamics of technological and economic change continue to link industrialized countries and developing countries in an ever-more-complicated and enveloping relationship, creating new and greater interdependencies which make untenable the survival of enclaves of happiness in a world climate of generalized underdevelopment and insecurity.

165. Today the international community should be prepared to engage in this fight for survival. To wage this war and win it, however, it is not weapons that are needed but just the opposite: to give up the possession of weapons or substantially reduce their number in order to make available human, financial and technological resources for the great task of promoting development. That will make it possible not only to allocate to peaceful purposes non-renewable natural and energy resources that are at present

used to produce weapons, but also to foster a climate of political détente that is the necessary pre-condition for the development of international economic and technological co-operation.

166. There are also reasons based on the self-interest of the most powerful nations themselves to encourage arms reductions and the reorganization of international co-operation. Internal requirements which are increasingly apparent seem to call for a revision of priorities in the allocation of resources. Attention to internal economic shortcomings and imbalances makes it more and more necessary to reduce the exorbitant military burden in both of the major political-military blocs. Decisions taken by these nations to reduce their military budgets would undoubtedly lead to strengthening the general climate of international confidence and stability.

167. In a situation still full of bleak prospects and tensions, certain positive signs have nevertheless emerged which allow us to regard the future with greater hope.

168. The signing of the intermediate-range arms reduction agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union is a big step in the right direction. For the first time the principle of verification to control nuclear weapons has been embodied in an international instrument, taking specific shape through the on-site inspections provided for. Uruguay shares both the satisfaction and the hope generated in the international community by the bilateral INF Treaty. This is unquestionably an auspicious beginning, whose momentum does not appear to have been reinforced during the recent negotiations at the Moscow summit. That leads us to urge the super-Powers to redouble their efforts to agree upon future political decisions designed to achieve the universally desired strategic nuclear weapons reductions, renewing the momentum of a process which must necessarily continue through general and comprehensive disarmament measures.

169. Progress on the road to détente is also taking place in regard to certain regional conflicts which appear to have moved away from the boiling point which they were dangerously approaching. They are beginning to emerge from the tragic impasse, as a result of tenacious negotiating efforts.

170. The restoration of constitutional order and the strengthening of democratic institutions in several countries of our region are positive and auspicious factors, because they generate the climate in which disputes between States may be settled by peaceful means, thus making the use of force unnecessary.

171. Multilateral efforts channeled through United Nations agencies are demonstrating their value in the preparation of a multilateral treaty aimed at curbing another alarming contemporary phenomenon: the resurgence of chemical weapons, today manifest in the presence of massive stockpiles of such instruments of annihilation and terror, in the confirmation of their actual use in regional wars and in the growing evidence of their proliferation in developing countries. We urge those States most directly involved in the negotiations to make the utmost effort and to make a reality of their commitment to complete the

convention currently under negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and stipulating the destruction of existing stocks.

172. War is waged today with conventional weapons. More than 2 million people have fallen victim to their use year after year on our planet. Regional conflicts are the driving force behind the concentration of these instruments of destruction. That is why my country, together with other Latin American States, encourages the promotion of multilateral, bilateral and unilateral measures aimed at regional disarmament, taking into account the specific characteristics of the problems of the region, and at the same time fosters the adoption of confidence-building measures on our continent. To that end, we support the establishment and activities of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America, with its headquarters in Lima, which was created in 1986 by General Assembly resolution 41/60 J.

173. Uruguay sponsored the draft resolution, approved by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority at the forty-first session, on the zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic. The resolution, 41/11, embodies a goal that Uruguay shares with other Latin American countries, that of keeping large regions of the planet free of military activities, the arms race and nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

174. The Government of Uruguay believes that its commitment to international peace and disarmament should be translated into active, permanent participation in the initiatives for rebuilding multilateral co-operation. Within the framework of co-operation and co-ordination of our efforts with other countries of Latin America, Uruguay undertakes this commitment in the hope that the region will become a factor in reversing the trends undermining the peace and security of the international community.

175. In November 1987 the Presidents of the eight states comprising the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political Action met at Acapulco and urged a halt to the arms race and called on the heads of State of the industrialized nations to establish a dialogue to make disarmament a reality, overcome the obstacles to development and promote a restructuring of the world economy. The Acapulco Commitment to Peace, Development and Democracy, drawn up by the eight Presidents,<sup>10</sup> is based on what Uruguay considers to be the foundation stone of collective security on its continent: the indivisible nature of peace, democracy and development. That is the principle that guides Uruguay's foreign policy and inspires its participation in this special session of the General Assembly.

176. We are all aware that if our efforts are successful and general and universal disarmament is achieved, we shall have taken a gigantic step towards the ultimate goal of world peace. However, such an achievement would only be partial, for peace is not merely the absence of physical violence; it also means freedom and economic development. Peace cannot be genuine and lasting in the absence of those universal values. We must therefore recognize the



very complex task that faces us. But we must also bear in mind that if we do not measure up to the challenge we shall not achieve our common goal of building a peaceful and truly free world.

177. Mr. JOHNSON (Liberia): It is with renewed pleasure that I extend to the President the sincere congratulations of the Liberian delegation on his unanimous election to preside over the General Assembly at this third special session devoted to disarmament. Over the course of the year we have grown accustomed to the high standard of leadership which he has been providing in the Organization. We also thank the Secretary-General for his various activities in preparation for this session and for his continuing efforts towards the attainment of international peace and security. The Preparatory Committee likewise deserves our high commendation for its effective background work, which will no doubt facilitate our deliberations during the next few weeks.

178. The fact that the current session is, by coincidence, taking place against the background of the recent disarmament talks in Moscow should only serve to reinforce our resolve to intensify efforts to save mankind from total self-annihilation and to alleviate the social ills besetting humanity.

179. Taking up the primary challenge of disarmament should therefore mean not only delivering mankind from an unprecedented catastrophe, but also procuring the means successfully to combat poverty, disease and ignorance, thereby removing the non-military threats to security and contributing to a more stable and sustainable international order.

180. It is in this context that the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, adopted by consensus 10 years ago, was hailed as a workable formula for halting and reversing the arms race and promoting security in all its dimensions. And that is why the Document still retains all of its great significance, particularly since no substantial results have yet been achieved. We believe that a logical point of departure for this special session should therefore be to reconfirm the validity of that Final Document and to seek ways and means of implementing its Programme of Action and achieving its objectives.

181. The fact is that an unbridled arms race continues, with military arsenals increasing and being improved upon. Indeed, breakthroughs in science and technology are being diverted away from development to the production of new generations of weapons of destruction. This trend has led to the exacerbation of the arms race in both the nuclear and the conventional fields and has had negative implications for international peace and security. Never before has man's capacity to eliminate all traces of life and civilization from the face of the Earth been so great, and never have the resources devoted to that destructive capacity reached such staggering dimensions.

182. The General Assembly at this special session should be in no doubt that the alternative to disarmament is an escalation of the arms race, with all its concomitant inevitable consequences of self-destruction. We must therefore remain firm and unequivocal

in our message that if the arms race is not halted the world will soon be saturated with lethal weapons looming within the easy reach of those nations that may be disposed to put an end to human civilization only to satisfy their unadulterated greed for power.

183. In disarmament, as in other human endeavours, there are no insurmountable obstacles provided we can but summon the right amount of political will and determination to overcome them, particularly when the very survival of the human race and of civilization is at stake.

184. But the issue here is how to make disarmament compatible with security. In a world in which the power of force dominates the power of law, can any nation, large or small, be expected to disarm without sufficient guarantees for its security? The answer, obviously, is no. Thus, to achieve a significant level of disarmament we will first need to address the root causes of the arms race.

185. In this connection, my delegation holds the view that if a just order existed there would be no need for weapons to safeguard it. The prevalence of greed and exploitation, of oppression and suppression of peoples, of social and economic injustice, of the imposition of alien ideologies on others, of military and other forms of intervention and interference in the internal affairs of other States—all that only serves to increase distrust and tension in the world and, in turn, to spur the arms race. We must endeavour to break that vicious circle, in which mutual distrust leads to increases in armaments, and increases in armaments, in turn, breed mutual distrust.

186. A practical agenda for disarmament is therefore a recommitment and rededication to the principles and ideals of the Charter of the United Nations. A major theme of this special session should be that armament is not a substitute for security, and that security can best be ensured through respect for the Charter.

187. My delegation believes that disarmament should be a collective responsibility, with bilateral, multilateral and regional efforts complementing one another for the achievement of the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. We support the view, however, that the universality of the United Nations places the Organization in a unique and ideal position to play the leading role in the field of disarmament.

188. Moreover, for negotiations as complex and sometimes as controversial as those on disarmament to achieve concrete results, it is important for all countries, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, effectively to express their views on all the problems pertaining to the arms race. The multilateral disarmament process provided for in the Final Document of the first special session should therefore be the basis for a continuing dialogue aimed at furthering world peace and security through disarmament.

189. In this connection, the first task facing the international community today, the task to which the highest priority should be given, consists of securing the elimination of all nuclear weapons. To achieve

that goal, it will be necessary to adopt feasible measures, initially to halt the nuclear arms race and thereafter to reduce existing arsenals.

190. For, indeed, one wonders what progress would be achieved if strategic offensive weapons were to be reduced in one area while at the same time the arms race was launched or continued in another. It should be a priority goal of this special session to halt and reverse the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, here on Earth, to prevent its extension into outer space and to strengthen the conditions of peace and security among the nations of the world.

191. The nuclear Powers must accept primary responsibility for ensuring the destruction of their nuclear arsenals, ending further production of nuclear weapons, and not taking the arms race into outer space.

192. We appreciate the complexity and sensitivity of the task at hand in the face of the ideological differences between the nuclear States. We know that complete disarmament will not be achieved overnight. But we are convinced that progress would be made if we could strengthen mutual understanding and trust among ourselves. In this connection it is far better to hold the world by a balance of trust than to maintain it in a state of fear.

193. That is why my Government fully endorses the objective of preventing the further increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States and accordingly calls for the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be made truly universal. The spread of nuclear weapons to an increasing number of countries and regions could only bring closer the probability of their use, or at least tend to heighten global and regional tension, making disarmament even more difficult to achieve.

194. Conventional weapons account for about 80 per cent of the world's military budget. Even the poorest countries are sacrificing their high economic and social priorities in favour of armaments. While the security interests of these countries are no doubt legitimate, the accumulation of such weapons, particularly in those regions where conflicts exist among States, constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security.

195. An important milestone on the path towards general and complete disarmament has been the declaration of peace zones and nuclear-free zones in certain parts of the world. In order for such zones to be protected from nuclear proliferation, it is important for all States, particularly the nuclear States, to recognize their status as nuclear-free zones and solemnly to pledge to respect them as such.

196. In this connection, it is regrettable that the goal of denuclearizing Africa has continued to be frustrated and undermined by the racist régime of South Africa, which has achieved nuclear capability thanks to the assistance and collaboration of its allies and friends. Considering racist Pretoria's *apartheid* system and destabilization policy, the racist régime's acquisition of nuclear capability poses a grave danger to the region and constitutes a major threat to international peace and security. We therefore urge the international community to rid Africa of this

menace, and we renew our call for the subjection of South Africa's nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards and inspection.

197. Similarly, an issue of considerable concern to my Government is the dumping of industrial toxic waste in Africa, which amounts to a crime against the peoples of that continent. There is also talk of plans to dispose of nuclear waste in Africa. As such a move would be tantamount to dropping a nuclear time-bomb on our people, we implore the United Nations to take urgent and appropriate steps to halt such dangerous acts in the context of keeping the continent of Africa nuclear free.

198. Another area requiring urgent action is that of chemical weapons. The conclusion of an appropriate convention in this field would constitute a significant step towards disarmament—and the sooner the better.

199. On testing, my Government believes that the highest priority should be accorded to concluding a comprehensive and fully verifiable nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such a treaty would discourage non-nuclear States from developing nuclear weapons and encourage nuclear-weapon Powers to discontinue further development of such weapons.

200. The arms race is not only a definite cause of political instability throughout the world, it is also a direct source of economic and social underdevelopment, especially in third world countries. In spite of the growing danger to the international community of the accumulation of increasingly sophisticated military arsenals, and despite the total impoverishment of two thirds of the world's population, a very large proportion of the world's resources is still being devoted to armaments rather than to development.

201. As we know, the global cost of arms has risen from \$400 billion in 1978 to \$1,000 billion today and is still increasing. We also know that current military expenditures are about 5 per cent of total world output, which is more than 25 times as large as all official development assistance to developing countries. These facts become all the more significant against a claim reported in a 1986 UNEP publication entitled, *Disarmament, Environment and Sustainable Development: A Time for Action*:

"Less than 0.5 per cent of global military spending would have been sufficient to develop agriculture in a sustainable way to approach self-sufficiency in food-deficit, low-income countries by 1990. An allocation of about US \$200 million annually—three hours of military expenditure each year—would free the world of illiteracy in less than a decade."

202. My Government must reiterate its conviction that a definite relationship exists between disarmament and development and that, as both compete for the same resources, it follows that excessive expenditures on arms would greatly limit the resources available for development.

203. Be that as it may, the mere elimination of weapons or the reduction of expenditures on armaments, although a giant step towards peace and

security, would not be enough. People must be educated. Their hearts must be reached and changed. It is in this role that the World Disarmament Campaign and the United Nations information and educational activities in the field of disarmament, as well as the role of civic and religious movements, becomes more meaningful and relevant.

204. In the nuclear age, the maxim that war is an extension of politics by other means has lost its validity and should give way to a new realism which makes it impossible to assume that anyone can survive at the expense of others. If disarmament is really the common aspiration of mankind, we can start to strengthen peace, security and confidence among nations by our deeds, and not by mere words alone. At this session, let us recommit ourselves fully to the Final Document of the first special session, the provisions of which are as valid today as they were 10 years ago.

205. Mr. SEDOC (Suriname): I should like to begin by congratulating the President on his unanimous election to preside over this third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. His experience and the skill he has already demonstrated in guiding the work of the Assembly make us confident that we can look forward to a successful outcome of this important session. I also wish to add the praise of my Government to the many words of appreciation that have already been expressed to the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts in having the United Nations fulfil its tasks and play the role it was meant to play in the maintenance of international peace.

206. Maintaining global peace in an overarmed world like the one we live in today is indeed a most difficult task. Guarding international peace in our era is no longer a matter of preventing disturbance of the peace but has become a matter of saving the human race from extinction. The presence on our planet of an ever-growing number of nuclear weapons and their continued qualitative improvements have brought us to the brink of eradicating in a short period of time a civilization brought about over thousands of years.

207. Many of the speakers preceding me in this general debate, and the many others who are still to address the Assembly, have spoken or will speak on behalf of States like mine, whose share in the arms buildup and arms race is close to none, if any at all. Still, we have felt obliged to respond positively to the appeal of the Secretary-General to attend and participate in this third special session on disarmament, as the dangers and the consequences of this life-threatening adventure are no less to our countries than to those States most responsible for them. As for my Government, we have done so to underline our concern for the ever-looming danger of a nuclear war and to acknowledge our shared responsibility, however small, for a peaceful world that is primarily concerned with the betterment of the unacceptable living conditions of two thirds of its population.

208. Decades have elapsed during which the world Organization has been endeavouring to halt and reverse the arms race in both its aspects, conventional and nuclear. The results we have achieved over the

past four decades may be far from encouraging, but the goal of this endeavour lies at the Organization's very foundation and *raison d'être* and therefore cannot be relinquished.

209. The holding of the third special session to deal with the arms race constitutes another important and welcome initiative of the Organization to give the necessary impetus to the process of disarmament, after the disappointing results of the preceding such session in 1982. On the other hand, the work of this session can and should be significantly facilitated by the successful outcome of the first special session devoted to disarmament, of 1978, which still stands as a landmark in the history of our efforts to rid the world of threat of a nuclear war. Widely acclaimed as the corner-stone of a realistic approach to arms control and disarmament, the Final Document of that session is to serve as an important guideline for our present deliberations on the basis of today's realities.

210. The prospects for a successful outcome of our work at this session are the most hopeful in view of the apparent re-emergence of the era of *détente* between the two super-Powers, which undeniably is a prerequisite for the success of the multilateral disarmament process. The far-reaching agreements on nuclear disarmament concluded between these two States and the atmosphere that obviously prevailed at the recent summit meeting between the leaders of the two States have filled mankind with renewed hope that we are heading for better times. This process deserves our maximum support and encouragement for the common good and enhanced security of all the people of the world.

211. The convening of this special session on disarmament at a time when far-reaching agreements are being concluded between the two States possessing by far the largest destructive power in their arsenals is indeed a unique coincidence, one which must be seized by the international community in order to sustain the momentum and to strengthen this promising new course to disarmament. The strict observance of these agreements, in particular the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty—by both parties and its implementation in good faith hold the key to further progress and success with respect to additional measures which can lead to the further and genuine reduction of the nuclear arms of the two super-Powers.

212. The INF Treaty and other bilateral agreements between the two super-Powers to curb the arms race, however important they may be, are still merely small steps to reduce the tremendous overkill capacity that those States have amassed. They should, therefore, be followed soon by further substantial cuts in the total nuclear forces of those countries, if we are to achieve the noble goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons by the turn of the century. The obligation to do so remains a moral duty to future generations of the human species that it is incumbent on us to fulfil.

213. In addition, further substantial cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the two super-Powers will not fail to have a bearing on the attitude of other nuclear

Powers towards nuclear disarmament. Demands by the international community to these States for a rethinking of their position towards nuclear disarmament can be made with greater moral authority if they can be made against the background of substantial and progressive cuts in the nuclear forces of the two States accounting for more than 90 per cent of all nuclear weapons in the world.

214. The goal we have set for ourselves of enhancing global security through disarmament has never been an easy one. There can be no room for the illusion that it will be otherwise even in a vastly improving international atmosphere.

215. The arms buildup and the arms race are not phenomena standing in isolation by themselves; rather they are the consequences of political controversies between States or groups of States and a deeply rooted mistrust of each other's intentions. The behaviour of States in the post-war era has certainly not contributed to alleviating the distrust and fear of nations that still characterize the international community. This reality of our world has served to fuel the desire of nations to acquire an ever-growing amount of weapons in a search for security. Total disregard, particularly, of the right of all peoples to determine freely their way of life, and sometimes irrational territorial ambitions are prevailing realities in our world of today, seriously impeding the cause of disarmament.

216. Strict adherence to the principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, which have lost none of their validity, and scrupulous respect for the right of self-determination of all peoples are simple but highly important steps to create the necessary confidence among nations. In addition, specific confidence-building measures to be agreed upon among States, particularly among the militarily significant States, such as greater transparency in military matters, are indeed inevitable if we are to reduce the fear on the part of nations of seriously committing themselves to arms reductions.

217. Events of the past few days have rekindled hope for mankind that we have finally entered the era of nuclear-arms reduction. To increase the credibility of this promising development it is necessary for the international community to agree now on certain nuclear disarmament steps that should be considered basic requirements for genuine nuclear disarmament. Among these measures is, first and foremost, the conclusion of an internationally binding treaty to ban all further tests of nuclear weapons. Failure to do so would turn any agreement on the quantitative reduction of nuclear arms into yet another hollow phrase of a propagandistic nature.

218. The importance of the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty to strengthen the process of nuclear disarmament can be illustrated, for example, by the impact of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entering its third decade, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has, in spite of its shortcomings, rendered the world invaluable service in containing the spread of nuclear arms which could easily have caused the catastrophe we all fear most. It remains, therefore, a matter of concern to my Government that some States have still not

ratified the treaty. Moreover, the satisfaction we can derive from the treaty is tempered by the fact that its influence has not prevented some States from acquiring nuclear capability. Furthermore, nuclear weapons in the possession of a racist régime notorious for its habit of intimidating and destabilizing neighbouring States with all the means at its disposal could prove to be a great risk for international peace.

219. When addressing the problems of the arms race and disarmament, we understandably concentrate our discussions on nuclear arms, as these weapons pose the greatest immediate threat to the survival of the human race. It is, however, generally accepted that the massive amount of conventional arms spread over the globe is the greatest contributor to the insecurity of States prevailing in the world. Their frequent and continued use, which has become a tragic fact of life in our time, makes them as serious a threat to international peace as nuclear weapons themselves, taking into account the fact that all regional armed conflicts bear the potential of escalating to a wider scale.

220. The number of fatalities and the amount of suffering that these weapons, because of their level of sophistication, inflict upon millions of our fellow world citizens and their environment make them no less a threat to peaceful life on Earth. Measures to curb the spread of conventional arms, therefore, deserve an equal sense of urgency.

221. In this regard, we have the duty to act speedily upon measures to ban the use and further production of chemical weapons, which, tragically enough, are still being used in armed conflicts. The horrendous effects of these inhumane weapons on fellow world citizens call for an immediate appeal from this forum for an unconditional ending of the use of such weapons.

222. Moreover, the uncontrolled production and stockpiling of conventional arms have not served the cause of nuclear disarmament. In the not-too-distant past the installation of certain types of nuclear arms was justified as a legitimate means of self-defence to offset a perceived overwhelming imbalance in conventional forces. This illustrates the inherent interrelationship between the nuclear and the conventional arms race and the importance of paying equal attention to both these aspects of the arms race.

223. For a country like mine, the sense of urgency with regard to halting the arms race is twofold. First, it is our conviction that an uncontrolled continuation of the arms buildup will ultimately lead to a catastrophe that will render our planet uninhabitable. Secondly, to the peoples of the developing world it remains beyond comprehension that, while they have to allow for a continued decrease in their already minimal standard of living because of an alleged lack of resources, an increasing amount of the global gross domestic product is squandered on the arms race. The figures in this respect are well known to all of us.

224. The conclusions of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held from 24 August to 11 September 1987, leave little, if any, room for doubt that in fact it is the developing world that is paying a substantial

part of the cost of the arms race. This is one of the greatest contradictions of our time, one that cannot and should not be carried into the next century.

225. I venture to state that this third special session on disarmament has gained significance in the eyes of the world as a result of the positive results of the recent summit meeting of the leaders of the two militarily most powerful States. We have a right to expect from those States that, as Members of the Organization bearing special responsibilities for world peace, they will display the same spirit during this session in order to enhance its success.

226. A great deal of what has to be done to halt and reverse the arms race has already been worked out over many years. There is not much new that we can add to what we already know. We have come here, however, to plan action, that is, to join in the efforts to free the world from the peril of the arms race and the economic burden it so severely places on us.

227. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Democratic Kampuchea has asked to make a statement in exercise of the right of reply.

228. Mr. TEP (Democratic Kampuchea): A serious distortion has been made of the nature of the Kampuchean problem and the nature of the Hanoi authorities by the Vietnamese representative, who tried hard to turn black into white. As representatives of the Kampuchean people, who are currently the victims of the most barbarous war of aggression and occupation perpetrated by Viet Nam, my delegation cannot let this propaganda pass unchallenged.

229. The Vietnamese representative has shamelessly referred to the so-called withdrawal of 50,000 members of the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, from this month until the end of the year. In this connection I wish to draw the attention of the Assembly to the following.

230. First, this announcement by Viet Nam is the seventh of its kind since 1982. However, facts have proved that the six earlier so-called troop withdrawals have only been troop rotations and troop movements within Kampuchea. It is no wonder, therefore, that countries around the world, particularly neighbouring countries in Asia and the Pacific, either paid no attention or responded with great scepticism to this deceitful ploy.

231. Facts on the battlefield in Kampuchea reveal that during the past few months the Vietnamese aggressor has made strenuous efforts to move its troops from one place to another, from the battlefield along Kampuchea's western border to the interior, in a desperate attempt to resist attacks by the Kampuchean National Resistance Forces, who are now carrying out the heroic struggle deep inside and throughout the country. Viet Nam makes use of those troop movements to claim that it has pulled out or will withdraw some of its troops from Kampuchea. Only the Hanoi authorities, who blatantly violated the Charter of the United Nations by invading Kampuchea 10 years ago, have the audacity to stage such a manoeuvre. In fact, the fighting between the Kampuchean National Resistance Forces and the

Vietnamese occupying forces, both along the border and in the interior of Kampuchea, continue unabated and remain intense. Not a single Vietnamese soldier has been withdrawn from Kampuchea.

232. Secondly, the demands from the world community for the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea have never been stronger, especially since Moscow began to pull its troops out of Afghanistan. The Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea has become more prominent, and international pressure is mounting. In the face of that increasing pressure Viet Nam has felt compelled to make such an announcement in order to have a breathing spell, at least temporarily. This has been Hanoi's traditional policy.

233. Thirdly, the announcement to which the Vietnamese representative has referred was made on 26 May, a few days after Hanoi's appeal for food emergency aid to cope with famine and economic difficulties. Therefore, this claim of Hanoi can safely be considered as nothing but a charade aimed at persuading the world community to believe that it is now flexible and prepared to settle the problem of Kampuchea in the hope that pressure will be lessened and aid will be given.

234. Fourthly, the announcement was made shortly before the recent United States-Soviet summit in Moscow with a view to giving publicity to Hanoi for its sincerity and readiness to settle the Kampuchean problem and so as to offset any pressure that might be exerted concerning the Kampuchean conflict during the talks. As a matter of fact, according to sources in Hanoi, Viet Nam's decision on this troop withdrawal was made during a Party Politburo meeting early last month. At that time Viet Nam dispatched its Foreign Minister to Moscow to talk about the issue.

235. Those are some of the motives behind Hanoi's announcement of the withdrawal of some of its troops from Kampuchea. It is clear that that announcement is part and parcel of Viet Nam's diplomatic manoeuvres designed to circumvent the relevant United Nations resolutions on Kampuchea. We call for the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and the right of the Kampuchean people to self-determination.

236. Furthermore, the Vietnamese representative has claimed that the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops would be complete by 1990. In this connection permit me to refer to the editorial in the Vietnamese Communist Party daily newspaper, *Nhan Dan*, of 20 May last, which stated: "The facts have proved that Viet Nam-Kampuchea united fighting and all-around co-operation is a vital law." This confirms what was said four years ago by the then commander-in-chief of the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, General Le Duc Han, who said:

"Indochina is a single battlefield. This is a scientific viewpoint, the law governing the existence and development of the three countries, Viet Nam, Kampuchea and Laos."

237. The foregoing shows that since 1930 Viet Nam has never wavered in its strategic goal of forming the



Indochina federation under its domination. Talk by Hanoi of troop withdrawal in 1990 is only a diplomatic ruse. To have the world community tone down the condemnation of its occupation is Viet Nam's main objective. To legitimize its military presence in Kampuchea is always Hanoi's goal.

238. It would be a tragedy for Kampuchea, for South-East Asia and for all peace-loving and justice-loving peoples around the world if we allow ourselves to be deceived by this cynical trick of Viet Nam. Viet Nam has no right whatsoever to put a timetable on the restoration of Kampuchea's independence.

239. My delegation is firmly convinced that the world community will keep its eyes on Viet Nam's policies and deeds. Only when Viet Nam agrees to talk with the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea can it be considered as sincere and prepared to respect the right of the Kampuchean people to self-determination.

*The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.*

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#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964).

<sup>2</sup>Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

<sup>3</sup>Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972 (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex).

<sup>4</sup>Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

<sup>5</sup>United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 944, No. 13446.

<sup>6</sup>"Common Security—a programme for disarmament." Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, submitted to the General Assembly in 1982 at its twelfth special session (A/CN.10/38; see also A/CN.10/51).

<sup>7</sup>Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (A/42/427, annex).

<sup>8</sup>See A/43/399, annex, p. 6.

<sup>9</sup>United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.8, para. 35.

<sup>10</sup>A/42/844, annex.