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**General Assembly
Seventy-eighth session
Agenda item 62****The situation in the temporarily occupied territories
of Ukraine****Security Council
Seventy-ninth year****Letter dated 25 April 2024 from the Permanent Representative of
Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit herewith information on the situation at and around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant of Ukraine, temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation, for the period from 19 March to 23 April 2024 (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Sergiy Kyslytsya**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 25 April 2024 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Situation at and around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation, for the period from 19 March to 23 April 2024

On 13 April 2024, power unit No. 4 of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) was put into a “cold shutdown” state. Thus, currently all power units of the ZNPP are in a state of “cold shutdown”.

Despite this, the situation at and around the ZNPP remains unstable. The occupiers continue to militarize the station and adjacent occupied territories, using them as a cover for artillery strikes on territories and settlements controlled by Ukraine.

Due to the intensification of military activity in the region, constant explosions and fire from small arms are recorded near the site of the station, as evidenced by the statements of experts of the permanent mission of the IAEA at the ZNPP.

During the reporting period, the IAEA recorded a number of attempted attacks on the ZNPP site using UAVs:

1. 5 April 2024 – near the nitrogen-oxygen station.
2. 7 April 2024 – next to the reactor building of power unit No. 6. During the day, explosions, shooting and artillery shells were heard near the station.
3. 9 April 2024 – at the training centre.

In all cases, the IAEA team attempted to access the incident sites to assess the damage, but was not granted permission from the Russian occupation administration of the ZNPP.

The mentioned attacks by Russia are a significant escalation of the situation of nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP and considerably increase the risk of a nuclear accident. The occupiers, including Rosatom representatives, continue to violate all Seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security. Moreover, Russia violates all five principles of protection of nuclear power plants announced by the IAEA:

1. There should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant, in particular targeting the reactors, spent fuel storage, other critical infrastructure, or personnel.
2. ZNPP should not be used as storage or a base for heavy weapons (i.e. multiple rocket launchers, artillery systems and munitions, and tanks) or military personnel that could be used for an attack from the plant.
3. Off-site power to the plant should not be put at risk. To that effect, all efforts should be made to ensure that off-site power remains available and secure at all times.
4. All structures, systems and components essential to the safe and secure operation of ZNPP should be protected from attacks or acts of sabotage.
5. No action should be taken that undermines these principles.

The Russian occupation administration of the ZNPP, led by Rosatom, continues to hide the real state of the plant, and in fact dictates how and where to work to the

experts of the permanent mission of the IAEA. Thus, experts have not yet been granted the access to the western parts of the turbine halls of units No. 5 and 6, part of the turbine hall of Unit No. 2, and some parts of the storage of spent nuclear fuel. Since November 2023, the Russians have not given IAEA experts access to the isolation valve of the ZNPP cooling pond.

The occupiers continue to block the access of Ukrainian personnel to the site of the station. The total number of personnel who are in the city of Energodar and are not allowed to work exceeds 2,500 people. A significant reduction in the licensed and qualified staff of the ZNPP, as well as attempts to replace them with Russian specialists who do not have the proper training and licenses, poses a direct threat to the safe operation of the ZNPP, can lead to human errors and, accordingly, to a nuclear incident or accident.

Currently, the ZNPP continues to receive power from the Ukrainian power system through the main 750 kV Dniprovska high-voltage line or the only available 330 kV Ferosplavna-1 backup line.
