

United Nations  
**GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY**

FIFTEENTH SPECIAL SESSION

Official Records



**6th  
PLENARY MEETING**

Friday, 3 June 1988,  
at 10.25 a.m.

**NEW YORK**

*President:* Mr. Peter FLORIN  
(German Democratic Republic).

**AGENDA ITEM 8**

**General debate (*continued*)**

1. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will first hear a statement by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey. I have great pleasure in welcoming Mr. Turgut Özal, and I invite him to address the Assembly.

2. Mr. ÖZAL (Turkey): It is a pleasure for me to address the General Assembly at this third special session devoted to disarmament. I extend to you, Mr. President, our wishes for success. We hope the special session will be fruitful and will contribute to our common thinking on arms control and disarmament issues. I also wish to pay a warm tribute to the Secretary-General, who has always tried to uphold and give effect to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

3. We are meeting at a time of positive developments on disarmament. The international setting is much more favourable than at the previous two special sessions on disarmament. Therefore this is a welcome opportunity to review the distance covered during the past 10 years, since the first special session on disarmament in 1978, and to consider the challenges that lie ahead.

4. Today's optimistic mood is inspired by the dialogue and negotiations in progress between the United States and the Soviet Union, and it underlines the impact of East-West relations on the international atmosphere.

5. After the unprecedented arms race of the four decades following the Second World War, the conclusion and ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty—has been an historic step envisaging the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons. The asymmetrical reductions and the intrusive and effective verification arrangements which it entails will set a good precedent for future arms control agreements. The achievement of an agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms between the United States and the Soviet Union will be another fundamental development and a profoundly encouraging sign for the future of East-West relations and the process of nuclear disarmament.

We welcome the progress achieved towards nuclear disarmament and look forward to the implementation of the agreements that have been and are being finalized.

6. There are other areas to which we should continue to pay attention. In this regard, strict adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], to which Turkey is a party, is of vital significance. We urge universal adherence to the Treaty. Similarly, increasing international co-operation in nuclear safety and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be given firm and universal support.

7. The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty remains one of the most important issues on the nuclear agenda. We note with satisfaction the commitment of the two major nuclear-weapon States to pursue the negotiations on limiting and eventually banning nuclear testing, through a step-by-step process.

8. We continue to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, with the agreement of all States concerned, in regions where nuclear weapons do not exist and where such zones can make a significant contribution to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, in regions saturated with nuclear weapons of all kinds, the establishment of such zones will not enhance security but on the contrary will create security gaps unless region-wide and effective disarmament measures are carried out simultaneously.

9. We also recognize that nuclear disarmament is only one aspect of the general problem. Arms control and disarmament efforts require a comprehensive approach which should encompass conventional arms control and the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is not possible to deal with nuclear weapons in isolation if we are seeking enhanced security. Therefore, important steps to be taken in the field of nuclear disarmament will constitute a first stage in the immense task of establishing a balance of forces at significantly lower levels. For the success of future arms-control efforts, the integrated nature of the endeavours in various fields should be kept in sight.

10. In evaluating disarmament measures, Turkey keeps in mind its unique geostrategic location. As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, Turkey is within the range not only of long-range and intermediate-range nuclear systems in Europe or Asia, but also of the short-range missiles and nuclear weapons.

11. Another cause for concern is the imbalance between the conventional forces of the two alliances. Indeed, Turkey and its Western partners work to

bring on a new era of conventional arms control. It is no secret to anyone that the conventional imbalance is at present one of the most salient destabilizing features of divided Europe. Since the signing of the INF Treaty the need to re-establish the conventional-force relationship in Europe has become even more vital as the imbalance in this field became more pronounced. That is why we look forward to serious and substantive negotiations in Vienna with a view to bringing about conventional balances at the lowest possible level.

12. If there is no progress in the near future in the area of conventional arms control, further reductions in nuclear forces may indeed prove to be very difficult to achieve, since this would tilt the strategic balance dangerously.

13. It would be only self-deception if we were to portray disarmament as the cure for all regional and international problems. It is clear that this is not so. Regional problems have to be peacefully resolved and international understanding has to be improved in order to rely on disarmament measures for enhanced security and stability.

14. We recognize the importance of creating an atmosphere of confidence at the regional level. With this understanding, Turkey has been striving to lessen friction and promote co-operation in the region. The meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Balkan countries, held in February 1988 at Belgrade, was a positive development in bringing together six Balkan countries for the first time in history to consider the possibilities of developing multilateral co-operation. Turkey has constructively contributed to this effort.

15. It has always been an important constant element in the foreign policy of Turkey to have good friendly relations with its neighbours. To this end, Turkey has for the last few years been persistently maintaining the view that various problems that exist with some of the neighbouring countries should be solved through a process of dialogue. We welcome the fact that recently Greece has accepted the same approach, and we, the Prime Ministers of the two countries, were able to set up a mechanism through which all existing bilateral issues would be solved. We hope that certain problems which prevent the normalization of Turco-Bulgarian relations can also be solved within a similar dialogue process that has been initiated after the signing of the Protocol in Belgrade on 23 February 1988.<sup>1</sup> It is our belief that the improvement of bilateral relations and the solution of particular problems will have a positive effect on the promotion of multifaceted co-operation at the bilateral and regional levels.

16. Turkey is exerting every effort to bring about peace and stability to its region, which is afflicted with armed conflicts and historical rivalries. Within this context, Turkey sincerely wishes an early termination of the war between its two neighbours, Iran and Iraq, which is causing considerable loss of human lives and material destruction. Since the outbreak of the war, Turkey has pursued a policy of active neutrality. This policy of Turkey must have been appreciated by the warring parties because, after having broken their diplomatic ties, both Iran

and Iraq requested that their interests be represented by Turkey in Baghdad and Teheran, respectively. I think this is a unique case in the history of diplomacy.

17. Turkey genuinely supports the efforts of the Secretary-General to implement Security Council resolution 598 (1987), which offers a good opportunity for both parties to reach a just and lasting peace. With a view to assisting the endeavours of the Secretary-General, Turkey has also been trying to prevent the ongoing war from escalating and spreading to other countries of the region. In this connection, Turkey has been encouraging the countries of the region to establish a sound dialogue among themselves in order to eliminate misunderstandings and misconceptions.

18. Success in arms control initiatives depends, in the first instance, on the establishment of an environment of confidence among the parties concerned. Greater transparency on defence issues is indispensable in order to avoid uncertainty and insecurity. I should like, in this connection, to underline the significance of the negotiations to be undertaken within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Turkey attaches particular importance to the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures adopted in 1986 at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. We hope that it will be possible to agree on the mandate of future negotiations among the 35 participating States in order to expand the results of the Stockholm Conference. We also expect agreement to be reached on the mandate for conventional stability negotiations to be held between the 23 members of the two military alliances in Europe.

19. Confidence and security in Europe should take into account not just military, but also political, economic and humanitarian factors, and the Helsinki process remains a crucial instrument in this endeavour. Indeed, the Final Act of Helsinki, inspired by this concept, acknowledged the indivisible nature of security and urged all States to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms as essential elements for peace. We believe that all these three dimensions of the Helsinki process are of equal importance. Therefore, a balanced outcome of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe calls for substantial progress in all these areas.

20. Turkey attaches importance to the security of the Mediterranean, which should not be dealt with in isolation and without taking into full account the strategic realities of Europe. While recognizing the fact that there exists a linkage between the security of the Mediterranean and that of Europe, one should not lose sight of the delicate global strategic balance prevailing in that continent and the fact that this balance is so fragile that attempts at regionalized schemes could undermine this delicate relationship.

21. The efforts directed at enhancing security and stability in Europe will no doubt have positive ramifications for the security of the Mediterranean. Therefore the primary aim of the Mediterranean countries should be to support those efforts construc-

tively rather than dwelling on schemes that might create security gaps in the global context.

22. Turkey for its part is making every effort to further improve its relations with all the littoral States and is also initiating and encouraging the parties concerned to find solutions to their problems through negotiations. Clearly, the responsibility for delaying settlement of the disputes lies with those who act in an intransigent manner and respond negatively.

23. Although arms control and other security-building endeavours have been largely limited to those in Europe and in the East-West context, there is a growing need to spread those efforts to other regions of the world in order to reduce tensions and enhance stability at a global level.

24. With that consideration in view, the Seventeenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Amman from 21 to 25 March 1988, adopted resolution No. 24/17-P B,<sup>2</sup> on the initiative of Turkey, starting a process that will no doubt contribute to the cause of security, peace and stability in the Islamic world. A group composed of five eminent personalities from the Islamic States, to be appointed by the Secretary-General of the Conference, will study the question of confidence- and security-building measures among the Islamic countries. With modest and practical aims at the initial stage, we hope that further along in the process we may be able to discuss other aspects of security as well and develop a set of measures tailored to the conditions prevailing in the Islamic world.

25. Chemical weapons have been used on an astounding scale, with tragic results. This situation only confirms the growing urgency of concluding without further delay an international convention on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons and on their destruction, with effective and reliable verification systems, including on-site and challenge inspections.

26. We firmly believe that outer space should be reserved for peaceful purposes and for the common interest of all mankind. The extension of the arms race into outer space must be prevented. In this respect, we attach particular importance to the declared objective of the United States and the Soviet Union to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

27. Disarmament efforts can bear the desired results only if they are pursued without diminishing the security of the countries concerned and without upsetting the global strategic balance. The geopolitical characteristics of specific regions should be taken into account in assessing the consequences of any given disarmament measure. Indeed, security is a most vital consideration for all countries. Disarmament will be beneficial to the extent that it does not reduce the security achieved through defence and deterrence but, on the contrary, provides a military and political relationship that improves security.

28. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the General Assembly, I wish to thank the Prime Minister of the

Republic of Turkey for the important statement he has just made.

29. Mr. SALAH (Jordan) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Sir, I am delighted to congratulate you on your election as President of this third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to express my gratitude and appreciation for the efforts you have made to direct the work of the forty-second session and its efficient resumption. In the light of our acquaintance with your personal qualities, diplomatic experience and administrative competence, we are confident that this session will yield the best of results. I also have pleasure in paying a tribute to the continuous efforts of the Secretary-General to strengthen the role of the United Nations and to achieve its objectives. I hereby express my appreciation of the role he has played in making preparations for this session and in ensuring the greatest possible participation of world leaders therein. I am also pleased to express my gratitude and appreciation to the Preparatory Committee for its work in the preparation and arrangement of this important and historic gathering.

30. I have the honour to read to the Assembly, on behalf of His Majesty King Hussein ibn Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the following message, which His Majesty has addressed to the General Assembly at its current session:

“It gives us great pleasure to address you today as you meet to discuss the subject of disarmament. The General Assembly is convened in a special session devoted to that subject, in order to continue the common international effort which began at this level in 1978—and with a similar measure of participation—at the first special session devoted to disarmament and which continued in 1982 with the second special session devoted to that theme.

“This session represents an important historical event which serves more than one purpose. Besides being designed to continue discussion of the ways and means to bring about disarmament in the world, it also constitutes a further indication of the importance of the subject and provides an opportunity for us to reaffirm our commitment to the principles on which the United Nations was founded and to emphasize the need for the Organization properly to fulfil its major role in serving the various causes of mankind, including disarmament.

“The United Nations was founded as a logical result of the Second World War, when the peoples of the world clamoured for the establishment of an international organization which would serve as an instrument with which to address the problems and issues of this world by means of collective international determination, representing the hopes and aspirations of all peoples, on the basis of the series of principles enunciated in the Charter.

“In the course of this century, our world has witnessed development in various fields on a scale which has no precedent in the past. It has also seen events which have no counterpart in history.

“Scientific discoveries and inventions have unlocked many of this life’s closed doors. For the first time in history, man has been able to overcome the grip of gravity, and our globe has thus become, by virtue of modern means of communication, more than anything like a small global village. Man has also managed to split the atom, thus releasing enormous natural energy. These developments, and many others besides, represent splendid human achievements of this century, and they may, if used properly, be of supreme service to mankind.

“Also, during the first half of this century, two world wars were fought in which mankind suffered disasters and destruction of a magnitude never before seen in history. The utilization of nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War was the most important event in the history of war since man was created. The whole world now needs to take a long pause to reconsider the balance of its achievements and to ponder on the extraordinary results that have ensued from its actions. Although it is in man’s nature to learn from his past experience, wars have continued to occur in different parts of the world, causing further misery and suffering. Most such wars are the result of regional disputes for which no appropriate peaceful settlement has been identified. As long as these disputes continue, wars will persist and the arms race will therefore accelerate, resulting in excruciating damage to the real interests of mankind.

“The desire of nations to measure their security in terms of the size of their military arsenals has produced the dangerous situation which our world is experiencing today. Everyone is aware how such a tendency raises barriers of fear, doubt and mistrust which cut peoples off one from another. In truth, the accumulation of weapons does not ensure security but, rather, causes nations to embark on an unending arms race. In the context of the arms race, security based on arsenals of weapons remains temporary and ephemeral. This applies to the situation faced by our world today more than at any time in the past. Although the efforts of scientists and the fruits of technology have been harnessed for the development and production of various weapons, and despite the fact that world military spending now exceeds \$900 billion per year, the world still has no feeling of security. Instead, fear and anxiety increase day by day, particularly in the shadow of nuclear weapons, which have transformed previous concepts of war. It is no longer possible to say that there are limited or other forms of war which can be contained or curtailed, because in the event—God forbid—of the outbreak of a nuclear war, there will be no victorious party. Destruction will be total and annihilation will be the fate of all.

“Disarmament has been one of the principal objectives of the United Nations since the time of its foundation, and the Organization has taken many important decisions and launched various constructive initiatives in this respect. The first decision adopted by the General Assembly related to atomic energy; it called for such energy to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and for precise regulation of its use. In 1959, the United Nations declared that the ultimate objective of

disarmament efforts was to achieve general and complete disarmament.

“The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, saw a high level of international participation. That session’s Final Document [*resolution S-10/2*] included a number of guiding principles adopted by the international community in connection with disarmament, and it therefore remains one of the most important historical documents in this domain to serve as a basis for further action. The session confirmed the significance of the role which could be played by the United Nations in the field of disarmament. One of its most important achievements was to establish a multilateral negotiating mechanism for the consideration of disarmament topics with a view to bringing about global disarmament.

“The General Assembly held its second special session devoted to disarmament in 1982, with the aim of further considering the subject in the light of developments which had occurred since the first special session, and of adopting a comprehensive programme of disarmament. However, the international climate at that time was not favourable to the desired results, and the session was therefore unable to fulfil its objectives.

“The United Nations cannot properly play the important role which has been entrusted to it unless States enable it to do so. Just as collective action through the United Nations cannot, in current international circumstances, substitute for individual efforts and bilateral endeavours on the part of States, so these efforts and endeavours cannot be successful without joint action in the context of the United Nations. We in Jordan believe in the United Nations’ central role as a peacemaker and as a pioneer in ensuring the well-being of mankind.

“As everyone is aware, the Middle East region is experiencing a number of conflicts, the most dangerous being the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is responsible for the state of tension and instability that has prevailed in the region for the past forty years. The truth, of which all the world is now aware, with respect to this conflict is that it is principally due to Israel’s continued occupation of the Arab territories seized in 1967 and its denial of the Palestinian people’s legitimate rights on their own national soil. In the absence of effective international determination, Israel has been able to maintain its occupation without paying any heed to international law. The situation has become more dangerous since it introduced nuclear weapons to the Middle East region. It has been building up its nuclear capabilities since the 1950s and is still continuing to develop and expand them to the extent that it now represents a terrible threat, not only to the Middle East region, but to the world as a whole.

“It has been Israel’s policy in this connection to strive to acquire, to develop and to accumulate nuclear weapons without acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or allowing its nuclear installations to be supervised

by IAEA. In 1981 it attacked and destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which was devoted to peaceful purposes and subject to IAEA supervision. Jordan looks to the United Nations as the appropriate forum through which effective measures must be taken to ensure that the Middle East region is kept free of nuclear weapons, in such a way that Israel's military nuclear programme is halted and its nuclear weapons eliminated, in order to spare the region and the world the terrible dangers inherent in this Israeli policy. Accordingly, Jordan affirms its support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, Africa, the Indian Ocean, South-East Asia, Latin America and other parts of the world, on the basis of its belief that such measures will help to prevent both the quantitative and qualitative proliferation of nuclear weapons and will also contribute to the establishment of a system to prevent nuclear proliferation and its encroachment on fresh horizons and, in particular, to prevent any extension of the arms race into outer space.

"We all have a major responsibility to exert our maximum efforts to achieve disarmament in order to prevent the occurrence of a disaster which might destroy all mankind. The great Powers are invested with a major share of this responsibility, in view of the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security which is entrusted to them by the Charter and also because they possess the most nuclear weapons and are the source of the highest proportion of world military expenditure. We also have a duty to mankind to endeavour to strengthen the role of the United Nations and to apply the principles of its Charter both in letter and in spirit. By so doing we shall be able to identify just and peaceful solutions to the various regional conflicts, so that it will then become unnecessary for each State to try to ensure its security on its own through the accumulation of weapons and so that the tendency to have recourse to the use of force or to the threat of use of force in international relations will be eliminated.

"In this context we consider the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which was signed in Washington last December and the documents of ratification of which were exchanged in Moscow last Wednesday, to be an important step in the right direction which we hope will be followed by other steps in the near future. The agreement on the Afghan question which was signed in Geneva in April also constitutes a good initiative and a significant achievement which will help to reduce tension in the world and allow some optimism. In order for the world to feel a real sense of reassurance, more progress must be made with regard to disarmament and to the settlement of disputes, particularly regional disputes, by peaceful means.

"I wish you all success in your splendid efforts in the service of mankind and express the desire that this session will see the attainment of the objectives for which it was convened. It is my fervent hope that we shall all exert our every effort to ensure the success of this noble endeavour.

"Peace be upon you, and the mercy of God and his blessings."

31. Mr. MARSHALL (New Zealand): I address this gathering not only as Foreign Minister of my country but also in my capacity as Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control. This is a new Cabinet portfolio created last year. It is a symbol of the critical importance which New Zealand attaches to the objectives of disarmament and arms control, objectives which in the Assembly we all share. It is one of the initiatives my Government has taken since its re-election last year to help promote security at all levels—national, regional and global.

32. I represent a country which has taken substantial disarmament initiatives. New Zealand was proud to be part of the regional drive to create the South Pacific nuclear-free zone. The Treaty of Rarotonga is now in force for most South Pacific Forum members. It covers a vast area of the South Pacific. The treaty looks to the co-operation of the major Powers outside the region, including those which see themselves as part of it.

33. The concern which nourished that initiative was born in the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki four decades ago. It developed over the years as nuclear-testing programmes were pursued across the Pacific by several nuclear Powers. It is a regrettable fact that nuclear testing continues still today in French Polynesia. All of these experiences have forged a common bond among the peoples of the South Pacific and have helped to generate the nuclear-free convictions of my Government and of others in the region.

34. That is the regional dimension.

35. At the national level, legislation was passed by Parliament last year establishing a more stringent nuclear-free zone covering New Zealand itself. This effectively bans nuclear weapons from New Zealand. In short, New Zealand has acted and will continue to act on the judgement of the Final Document of the first special session that nuclear weapons constitute more a threat than a protection for the future of humankind.

36. But the South Pacific zone does not stand in isolation. To the east is the Latin American zone, created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco,<sup>3</sup> the treaty which preceded and now stands together with the Treaty of Rarotonga. To the south stands a zone born of a much older agreement, the Antarctic Treaty.<sup>4</sup> We value that treaty not just because of the nuclear-weapon-free and demilitarized zone it establishes for Antarctica, but also because for 25 years it has effectively guaranteed the stability of the region to our south. It is a treaty which works. It provides the basic guarantee that that region will remain free from international rivalry and conflict.

37. I am pleased to be able to announce this morning that the Antarctic Treaty has been effectively strengthened by the adoption yesterday, 2 June, after long negotiations in Wellington, of a new convention on the regulation of Antarctic mineral resource activities.



38. The third special session on disarmament is being held at a time when, to echo the Secretary-General, the horizon is full of promise. The Moscow summit highlighted the profound development that has occurred in relations between the two major Powers over the past three years.

39. We meet in a political climate vastly more positive than that which surrounded the second special session on disarmament only six years ago. Many age-old fears and enmities are at last eroding. They are gradually being replaced by co-operation, candour and dialogue. The need for regular and frequent contact is recognized at the highest levels. These improved relations between the super-Powers are reflected in a variety of ways in the area of security. In Geneva, the super-Powers formally renounced nuclear war as an instrument of national policy and military supremacy as a national objective. Subsequently we have seen negotiated agreed measures of confidence-building and risk reduction. We are witnessing the beginnings of exchanges between defence establishments over strategic doctrine. The first-ever nuclear disarmament agreement—the historic bilateral accord on intermediate-range nuclear forces, which bans land-based intermediate-range nuclear weapons—has been ratified. Momentum has been generated in the strategic-arms negotiations.

40. All of this is greatly to be welcomed. It represents substantial, badly needed progress towards promoting global security and helping ensure international peace and security. We join gladly in the tribute to the achievements of General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan in recent years and in recent days: achievements born of good will and political courage. It is a good beginning.

41. But the whole world seeks a chance to emulate and advance that progress. The multilateral process in disarmament currently stands in pale contrast to the recent developments in bilateral negotiations. Achievements in the decade since the first special session on disarmament have been few, too few. One arms-control measure stands out in the 10 years since 1978: the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty to which I referred earlier. That is a significant measure in itself. But the international community's record overall is lamentable. It is in stark contrast to the record of earlier decades, when major achievements—the Non-Proliferation Treaty [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], the Outer Space Treaty,<sup>5</sup> the Biological Weapons Convention<sup>6</sup>—were recorded. These were spearheaded, appropriately enough, by the super-Powers and duly negotiated through the multilateral machinery. Why cannot this recur in the 1990s? Is there any reason why comparable achievements cannot be recorded in the next decade? Of course there is not, given the will.

42. It is not hard to find areas where work in the bilateral arena demands complementary multilateral action. Nuclear testing is the best example. A comprehensive test-ban treaty is urgently needed. Its purpose is clear. The means of verification are available. We welcome the progress achieved recently in the bilateral nuclear-testing talks. But let there be no mistake: there is no substitute for a comprehensive ban as a catalyst for nuclear disarmament. To

place a comprehensive test ban at the end of that process, to make it consequential upon arms reductions themselves, to defer it into the indefinite future is to render it impotent as a disarmament measure.

43. We have listened carefully to the arguments in favour of nuclear testing. We do not accept them.

44. A comprehensive test ban, of course, will not only curb the arms race; it will halt the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. In that light it must be seen as a vital complement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the international safeguards régime. If ever there were an example of a multilateral dimension to arms control, it is this. A bilateral agreement is in itself inadequate. There is no greater purpose for an arms-control measure than to halt the proliferation—both vertical and horizontal—of nuclear weapons. New Zealand will continue, therefore, to call for the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, and we look to the members of the Conference on Disarmament to resolve the procedural stand-off and to commence negotiations for a treaty. The logic of survival demands nothing less.

45. This session is not the place to strive for progress in multilateral negotiations themselves. That is for other bodies created for the purpose. Our primary task here is to chart the course for the future, to agree on a disarmament agenda for the next decade. The year 2000 beckons us.

46. To be equal to the challenge, that agenda must be both imaginative and realistic. It must set guidelines for action that will enhance our common security. To achieve this will require hard work and flexibility. We shall each have to accept formulations that appear in the short term less than ideal from our national perspectives. In the longer term, however, we will all stand to benefit.

47. I believe that a consensus exists that the multilateral process in disarmament is in need of rejuvenation. This session will no doubt debate a variety of ways in which this might occur. Three possible areas for improvement come particularly to mind.

48. First, a more formal link might be introduced between the bilateral negotiations and the multilateral community. The two major Powers might, we hope, see a responsibility to report to the international community on the progress in their negotiations. This could be done regularly, each year, to both the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly. In that way the international community would receive a first-hand account of progress in the nuclear-arms-reduction process.

49. There is both precedent and justification for such a practice. The trilateral reports on the nuclear-test-ban negotiations are the precedent. And the justification, the right to be involved, is inherent in the words of the Secretary-General earlier this week. He said:

“Survival and security are basic to human existence, and Governments have a duty to assure their citizens of both. Nuclear issues, however, go far beyond national security and impinge directly on human survival.” [*See 1st meeting, para. 48.*]

The import of the Secretary-General's words is found in the latest statistics on the latest expert study on the climatic and other global effects of nuclear war,<sup>7</sup> released only a few weeks ago. That study concluded that a major nuclear war would seriously imperil the global environment. It would constitute a severe threat to world food production. The direct effects could kill hundreds of millions, and the indirect effects could kill billions. The group's report concluded that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. It is also a strong argument for sharp reductions in, and the ultimate eradication of, nuclear weapons themselves.

50. Clearly, global security—that is to say, global stability and the avoidance of nuclear war—is the legitimate concern of us all. Last year New Zealand completed its own study on the climatic and other effects on our country of nuclear war. It was a thorough study, and rigorously done. Its message was clear: in the aftermath of a nuclear exchange, New Zealand, assumed to be far away from the conflict, would not be spared. That being so, I say again that global security is the legitimate concern of us all, no matter where we live. We all have a right to follow negotiations, not simply through the media, but from first-hand account of the negotiators.

51. A second matter requires our attention. It is the disarmament machinery itself. There is a need, we believe, to relate the three organs of that machinery more closely, to make the system more streamlined and to make it work more efficiently. In theory, the three organs are linked and interrelated. The Conference on Disarmament is the negotiating body, the Disarmament Commission is the deliberative body and the General Assembly is the decision-making governing body.

52. In practice, however, it does not work like that. The Conference deliberates more than it negotiates. The Commission deliberates, but on subjects that are separate from, and bear no immediate relation to, the subjects that are before the Conference. As a result the two bodies are largely independent of each other. The Commission should focus more sharply on what the Conference is doing. The Conference, in turn, should have the guidance of the Commission. And, finally, the Assembly, which does take decisions on all relevant subjects, is hopelessly overburdened. It deals with a plethora of items, including too often competing resolutions on the same subjects. As a result the First Committee wallows in a mire of words and phrases.

53. The overall system is in need of reform. I believe that the key to reform is to be found in a collective self-discipline, a discipline brought to bear on procedural matters as well as on policy issues. Resolution 42/42N, which sought to rationalize the procedures of the First Committee, was a good start, but more needs to be done. I believe that with good will and common sense the special session can commence that process of reform. It is up to us to get our own house in order. The three bodies—the Conference, the Commission and the Assembly—must be related more constructively and to greater functional effect. They should galvanize the process of multilateral disarmament in the 1990s. Let us begin that process of reform now. It is a matter of

critical urgency. Without such reform, the multilateral process will slide into irrelevance.

54. Verification is a third area where progress could be made in the near future. New Zealand believes that the United Nations has a role in the verification of disarmament and arms-control agreements. The United Nations could act as a verification data library. It could be involved in the verification of specific multilateral agreements when called upon to do so. New Zealand endorses the view of the Secretary-General on the potential of the United Nations in this regard. We look forward to hearing constructive ideas in this area, both at this special session and beyond.

55. In March of this year, when I addressed the Conference on Disarmament at its 445th meeting, I indicated New Zealand's interest in being admitted as a full member, and I reiterate that interest today. The contribution a State can make to the multilateral disarmament process is not a function of size; it is a product of its commitment to a safer world. The Conference can count few small States among its membership. We look forward to the chance, at the invitation of the Conference, to make that contribution, but the whole question of membership of the Conference, including the present impasse, needs to be addressed. So do the procedures for the participation of non-member States. We look for arrangements that will allow them to make a full contribution, and the special session should look to this as well.

56. My country's commitment to disarmament draws from a deep source. It is the strength of conviction of the New Zealand people on the importance of disarmament and their participation in the policy-making process. The Charter of the United Nations had it right with its affirmation of the importance of the people—not States, not Governments, not officials, but the people. As a politician I know how crucial it is to listen to the voices that are raised on every issue when the safety and the survival of the people are at stake.

57. To help the flow of communication between the Government and the people we in New Zealand have established an Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control composed of private citizens with an interest in and experience of the subject. The Committee's brief is to make known to the Government the concerns and views of the New Zealand people on disarmament and arms control. It is to offer new ideas on what might be done to strengthen our common security, and I am pleased that we have two representatives of non-governmental organizations as full members of our delegation, one of them a member of that Advisory Committee.

58. Most New Zealanders focus on nuclear weapons and their elimination as the major task of the international community. There is great concern in my country about the morality of nuclear weaponry. Some would like to see the legality of nuclear weapons tested in international law.

59. They are also worried about ever-increasing expenditures on conventional weapons, both in the developed and in the developing world. In my

Government's view the responsibility for constraining those expenditures falls not only on those who acquire such weapons but also on those who supply them. The Secretary-General appealed earlier this week to arms-exporting countries to consider the objective security needs of their customers. That appeal warrants deep consideration by the Assembly.

60. Excessive expenditure on weaponry suffocates the development of the world economy, perpetuating the misery and poverty afflicting more than two thirds of humankind. As recognized by the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, held in New York from 24 August to 11 September 1987, there is a commonality of interests in finding security at optimally low levels of armaments. Disarmament and development, we declared, are two pillars on which enduring international peace and security can be built.

61. Part of the excessive expenditure on armaments is to be found in the deployment of naval forces around the world. For a country in the South Pacific far from the sharp points of tension and confrontation, an intense interest in naval matters in the Pacific is perhaps understandable. Those matters are, of course, very difficult and complex. I am heartened that progress has been made in the Disarmament Commission on naval issues, including confidence-building measures. My Government supports the consensus reached in that forum. That consensus points out that naval forces are not independent of other military forces and must be considered in the general military context. That is a crucial point.

62. Although we have an interest in the deployment of military power in and around the North Pacific and in the way security there is managed, we also recognize the primacy of the views of those countries within that region when questions of regional security are being considered.

63. Let me conclude by restating the commitment of my country to the goal of a safer world for our children and our children's children. My Government will also remain committed to the goals it has held for many years now: a comprehensive test-ban treaty at an early date, a nuclear-free South Pacific and a reformed international security system, a system in which nuclear weapons have no place, a system in which no weapons are to be found in space, a system in which the collective security enshrined in the Charter and relevant to the nuclear age is the buttress, a system in which the forces of conflict are diminished over time through humanitarian measures and economic co-operation, and a system in which disarmament and development go hand in hand with international security. That is the security system to which my Government proclaims a commitment, and that commitment is deep and abiding.

64. I believe that we shall succeed in attaining that goal. It is, as the Secretary-General said last year, as if the sails of a small boat in which all the people of the earth are gathered had caught again, in the midst of a perilous sea, a light but favourable wind. We shall succeed. We must succeed. The people of my country reaffirm that belief, and my Government acts accordingly.

65. Mr. AL-DALI (Democratic Yemen) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The convening of the third special session devoted to disarmament quite clearly reflects the international community's deep sense of responsibility for the urgent need to prevent nuclear disaster and eliminate the arms race which threaten humanity as a whole. This international event takes on particular political importance; it represents a turning-point in promoting the disarmament process so that humanity can achieve its aspirations in a world which is free of nuclear weapons and where peace and security prevail. We have come to participate in this session because we are advocates of peace and because we are fully aware of the growing dangers posed by the arms race to the noble goals we are endeavouring to reach.

66. It is with increased confidence and pride that we see you, Sir, presiding over this session. Because of your outstanding ability and talents, you are best qualified to shoulder this responsibility. Furthermore, the common pursuit of peace by our two friendly peoples and countries make us doubly confident that we will achieve the positive results we have set ourselves. Allow me to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the confidence placed in you and to wish you the utmost success in carrying out your mission.

67. While the first special session devoted to disarmament succeeded in laying down firm bases and general outlines of an international strategy for disarmament, the 10-year period that has elapsed since the adoption by consensus of the historic Final Document has seen many important developments in the field of disarmament and international security. Foremost among them has been the harnessing of the astonishingly advancing technology that led to the escalation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race. On the other hand, only modest achievements were made in bringing about genuine disarmament; efforts were concentrated on regulating or limiting armaments rather than on ending the arms race.

68. Hence, this session provides the international community with the opportunity to rededicate itself to achieving security for all at a minimum level of armaments as a prelude to our ultimate goal—general and complete disarmament.

69. It is natural that at the start priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. We appreciate the significance of the agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the United States to eliminate their intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles and the impetus that that gives for the realization of further progress in what remains our only choice: nuclear disarmament. It goes without saying that the agreement is a historic event which underscores the increased awareness of the realities of the nuclear age in which we live and constitutes a further step along the road to realizing the international community's desire for disarmament.

70. As we welcome the outcome of the Moscow summit meeting between the Soviet Union and the United States, we hope that this result will quickly lead to negotiations on the reduction of the strategic offensive weapons of both countries, thus consti-



tuting a further step in the disarmament field. That meeting demonstrated realism in dealing with bilateral problems; it gives us hope for the possibility of positive co-operation in the search for just, political solutions to international and regional problems leading to the elimination of hotbeds of tension, improvement in international relations and promoting opportunities for further fruitful and constructive international co-operation. Undoubtedly this new thinking required by our interdependent world, in which the Soviet Union has taken the initiative, deserves our gratitude and support of the efforts being made to translate it into positive results.

71. Our welcoming the results achieved on the bilateral level between the Soviet Union and the United States does not minimize in any way the fact that disarmament is an international responsibility in which the international community must participate, because the consequences—be they negative or positive—will be felt by humanity as a whole. On this premise, we attach great importance to seeing this session expand on the positive results and active measures undertaken at the first and second special sessions devoted to disarmament. It gives us an opportunity to discuss seriously the items on the session's agenda that constitute a practical and general framework of what we can discuss and on what we can reach common understanding.

72. It is important that we concentrate on making our assessment with a view towards the future. We should also like to confirm that such an assessment must reject any tendencies to undermine the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, which is the framework that provides the basis and starting-point for all our future efforts. The priorities and principles set out in its Programme of Action are as valid today as they were 10 years ago. However, that must not prevent us from dealing with any shortcomings in our work or from displaying the political will necessary to take the steps necessary to achieve positive, tangible results. This also underscores the importance of multilateral disarmament forums in overcoming the stalemate that has so far plagued our work to end the risks of nuclear war and realize nuclear disarmament, starting with the total banning of nuclear tests; an end to the militarization of outer space in keeping with the comprehensive programme of disarmament; agreement on a treaty on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and a treaty on the prohibition of all chemical weapons.

73. At the same time, we feel that special importance must be given to technological progress, including stockpiling weapons or impeding progress in the field of disarmament. Qualitative superiority has become the driving force in spreading the arms race to new arenas and to new environments, such as outer space and the oceans. It has already contributed to undermining prospects for negotiation and to obstructing progress. It is therefore not surprising to hear of new plans to develop and deploy new systems of medium-range missiles with advanced technology intended to fill the vacuum or correct imbalances, or talk of substitute strategies for the European theatre after the INF Treaty.

74. We believe that this session must not overlook an important element, namely, the naval arms race and naval disarmament, especially since imperialist armadas threaten the stability and security of our small States and impose on us exceptional circumstances. Naval nuclear armaments constitute about one third of the world's nuclear arsenals.

75. We understand the special relationship between the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace [resolution 2382 (XXVI)] and complete disarmament. Because we belong to this part of the world and want to avoid the dangers to which our region is exposed, we look forward to results that would give impetus to the efforts to accelerate the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean, more especially since there are positive and important developments in the region, the most prominent of which is the Geneva agreements on the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan.

76. First and foremost, we realize that achieving any progress in the field of disarmament is closely related to facing the social and political challenges in the field of development. We see in the relationship between disarmament and development a confirmation of the fact underscored by the international community, which is that the question of disarmament has become vital. It represents the line between survival or annihilation, between progress or backwardness. We hope that a spirit of co-operation will prevail in order to translate the action programme adopted by the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development<sup>8</sup> into tangible results, by taking practical measures to be put to the service of all of mankind and to promote development in all States, especially in developing countries. We hope that practical measures will be taken to establish a fund to channel the resources freed by disarmament measures to be used for development in developing countries.

77. We appreciate any real and sincere efforts aimed at the realization of conventional disarmament. However, we do not agree with the trend towards using this goal to divert attention from the priorities, agreed on by consensus, to eliminate nuclear weapons, and which are the greater danger to mankind and civilization. We also believe that conventional disarmament at the regional level must take into consideration the characteristics of each region. The Middle East region is marked by being the setting for a raging conflict caused by Israeli policies and practices based on aggression, occupation and expansion in the region. We must put an end to these policies and practices and work to regain the national rights of the Palestinian people, the foremost of which are their right to return to their homeland, to self-determination, and to the establishment of an independent State on their national soil.

78. Southern Africa has its own characteristics. It is essential to eliminate the *apartheid* régime in South Africa and end the illegal occupation of Namibia, so that the African people can enjoy—especially in South Africa and Namibia—their freedom and independence.

79. We do not need to reiterate our country's support for the United Nations efforts towards the establishment of nuclear-free zones as a step on the road to achieving complete and general disarmament under effective international control. We have supported efforts aimed at the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the call to make Africa a nuclear-free zone. We are also alarmed that the South African and Israeli racist régimes have nuclear arms, which constitutes a grave danger to the Arab and African peoples and States and to international peace and security. Tangible action must be taken to face this danger and put an end to all forms of co-operation with the two régimes in this field.

80. Naturally, many important questions require study at this session with regard to the disarmament process, the most important of which is the follow-up machinery for the implementation process, in which the United Nations can play a major role. The United Nations is the international forum entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security. We must work to strengthen the existing machinery so that, through the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the regular and special sessions of the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and other specialized bodies, the United Nations can play its role. We believe that the problem is not with the absence of the machinery but with the lack of political will and resolve on the part of some States to make use of the appropriate machinery and allow it to play the desired role in the field of disarmament.

81. There is also an important role to be played by the masses through non-governmental organizations, peace movements and the World Disarmament Campaign, which deserve our full support and appreciation for their positive contribution to the process of disarmament. We believe that coming out of this session with decisions that would lead to further participation would enhance the effective role of the Organization and act as a safety valve for the continuation and development of the process of disarmament.

82. Our task in this session is an historic one, and it is not easy. At the same time, it does not require panaceas or magic solutions. The solutions are in our hands. Many proposals have been made at this and previous sessions, some of which are feasible and constructive. We have to work in a way which will bring about the success of the session and to meet the aspirations of our people for peace, security and stability by taking the first step on the road to disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. We must be equal to the obligation we all undertook in the Charter, to save future generations from the scourge of war. We can undoubtedly do this by taking positive and definite steps to push the process of disarmament forward.

83. Mr. ABERKANE (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, it is with great satisfaction that the Algerian delegation finds you presiding over this session of the General Assembly. Your skill and great experience were constantly called upon during the forty-second session of the Assembly, which was marked by a particularly busy agenda and by work

which you conducted with the kind of skill which naturally qualified you for your post. These same professional and personal qualities today suggest that the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will be crowned with success.

84. By holding for the third time in a decade a special session devoted only to disarmament issues, the General Assembly has testified to the importance that it attributes to this process and to the essential role that it intends to play. In so doing it has solemnly acknowledged the work of the non-aligned countries to extend international co-operation and understanding. In this area, and in many other areas, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has shown that it is capable of acting as a decisive force in mobilizing the international community to promote discussions and negotiations in the United Nations on problems of common interest to its Members.

85. Furthermore, it is certainly more than coincidental that our meeting is taking place today when these past few years, and this year in particular, have been marked by favourable events that had been long awaited, marking a significant stage in the common effort of disarmament, which had already been one of the goals of the founding fathers of the Organization but which today is more than ever an obligation to be pursued and fulfilled. That this meeting is being held on the threshold of the final decade of the millenium is another sign that the international community intends to devote itself to a task essential to the survival of mankind as the third millenium approaches.

86. After many years of suspicion and dangerous tension, which at times threatened to turn the prevailing confrontation into a suicidal clash, the two major Powers have once again adopted the course of dialogue and negotiation, so ardently desired and promoted by the international community. This dialogue and these negotiations have produced beneficial results, whereas formerly there had only been many dangerous deadlocks caused by distrust and confrontation. In fact, a treaty signed last year on the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles has now been ratified. This event alone is of considerable importance inasmuch as, when implemented, it will be the first real measure of nuclear disarmament, involving as it does the complete destruction of a whole category of nuclear weapons.

87. Thus it has been welcomed, because of its potentially historic value, by all those who had encouraged the return of the two super-Powers to negotiation and who wished to see them develop a dialogue that would foster mutual security and turn away from the search for unilateral security advantages symptomatic of a dangerous escalation. I have said that this is potentially of historic value because, before we can say that with certainty, it must herald a resolute process, a systematic and definite approach to disarmament, especially to nuclear disarmament, which is a steadfast goal to be achieved by gradual and significant measures in keeping with the priorities established here and laid down in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

88. Furthermore, while it is certainly the special responsibility of the two super-Powers, because of their formidable arsenals, to initiate this process through the exercise of their political will, it is up to the international community to support the process with its collective will and its multilateral efforts. From this point of view, as the General Assembly is meeting today just after the fourth summit meeting between the two super-Powers, it is up to it to take advantage of the new and favourable international situation which has thus been created and to reaffirm its role in the field of disarmament, while at the same time encouraging the bilateral effort.

89. The current bilateral negotiations, however decisive they may be—and undeniably they are decisive—in the promotion of an internationally favourable climate for achieving increased security for all, can neither set aside nor replace multilateral negotiations. If the principal nuclear-weapon States have a recognized primary responsibility in the disarmament effort, the other States, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States, must not be expected to abdicate their own right to security, particularly in view of nuclear weapons, which could destroy the entire planet. Nor can we expect the multilateral system to renounce its role, laid down in the Charter, as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. Nuclear weapons have the frightening equalizing effect of placing all peoples, without distinction, under one threat, that of the annihilation of the human species. Hence, every State has the legitimate right, indeed the duty, to claim and make its contribution to the collective effort to carry out the disarmament process. The United Nations, of course, is at once the ideal place and irreplaceable framework for such efforts. The responsibility of the United Nations cannot be reduced to a passive role of recognizing agreements signed without its participation, or making occasional limited statements with respect to the violation of some agreement, to meet the crisis of the moment. The United Nations has a central role to play, but its full potential has not yet been explored. Thus, the United Nations provides the suitable, impartial machinery for verification, as has already been proposed, within the framework of an agreement on a total ban on nuclear tests. Unless it is to be used only as a pretext for procrastination, the problem of verification, like so many others, is also an area that can be assumed by the United Nations.

90. More fundamentally, the United Nations must remain the irreplaceable forum in which negotiations can take place on agreements involving nothing less than the survival of mankind. Consequently, the Conference on Disarmament must play its role, fully and effectively, as the highest negotiating body on the various items of its agenda. We can only regret that the Conference has not been able to conclude an agreement on any of its many agenda items, nor has it been able seriously to take up its work on the nuclear question. A disturbing tendency has even emerged to try to deprive the Conference of its role with regard to negotiations, which might mean a step backwards with respect to a few aspects of certain questions that are being negotiated on which consensus appeared to be clear. It is therefore indispensable for the Conference on Disarmament to reaffirm its full mandate and effectively to assume responsibility

for the negotiation of specific agreements on the items on its agenda.

91. Generally speaking, we can agree with those who really wish to enhance the effectiveness of the multilateral framework that at times greater rationalization is possible, but we must not allow anyone to question the legitimacy or the integrity of the central role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. We cannot dissociate the role of the United Nations in this field from its ability to take action wherever peace or security is threatened.

92. It is indeed a sign of considerable progress that a nuclear confrontation is no longer considered inevitable, or even conceivable, when those who possess the largest nuclear arsenals agree that a nuclear war cannot be won and should therefore never be fought. Nuclear weapons have been neutralized, and now the next step, a considerable one, is their total elimination. Thus, above and beyond the unilateral commitments entered into by two Powers not to be first to use nuclear weapons, a total ban on the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons must now be agreed upon by the five nuclear-weapon Powers, as an initial measure, to be set forth in a binding instrument.

93. The political and philosophical neutralization of nuclear weapons by the ruling out of any possibility of their being used is the first step towards a genuine process of nuclear disarmament. Similarly, while we should welcome with great satisfaction the bilateral negotiations currently under way for the reduction by 50 per cent of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States, which we hope will be concluded at an early date, at the same time we must admit that the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, is continuing at a rate more headlong than ever. Weapons are being modernized, the nuclear militarization of maritime space is being extended and outer space has now been designated a new frontier for the arms race. The freezing of the arms race, particularly in nuclear arms, is now indispensable if we do not wish to see the gains in greater common security achieved as a result of agreements which have limited goals jeopardized by an arms race which is pursued elsewhere without let-up.

94. From that viewpoint, we must stress the crucial importance for the validation of a process of nuclear disarmament of a complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests, applying to all States and all environments. This is an objective that has been pursued for more than three decades now by the international community but has unfortunately not been brought nearer, in spite of the agreements that have been entered into, or the partial test-ban treaty and the so-called threshold treaties limiting the magnitude of nuclear tests. Only a complete test ban can curb the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons and thus of both vertical and horizontal proliferation of such weapons. The step-by-step approach adopted by the two principal nuclear-weapon States can be meaningful only if it has the near-term goal of a complete ban on nuclear tests and if at the same time it is aimed at preventing the qualitative development of such weapons. Therefore active negotiations must still be

initiated, with a suitable mandate, particularly within the Conference on Disarmament, with a view to attaining the objective of a complete nuclear test ban at an early date.

95. Since the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, six years ago, the international community has witnessed with heightened concern the opening of outer space to military competition—not that outer space had escaped militarization up to that point, but the use of satellites for information, surveillance and reconnaissance constituted merely a support point for the arms race, which was essentially taking place on Earth. With current research and the long-term plans for the deployment of new weapon systems in outer space, a new and unprecedented dimension is being given to the arms race, one that is perilous both for the disarmament process and for international peace and security. In order to comprehend the gravity of this new threat, one need only recall that, while theories of nuclear deterrence followed the emergence of nuclear weapons in the arms race—and this is not to justify such theories—in the case of the arms race in outer space, military investments were planned even before the technology was developed, or, indeed, the feasibility of such weapon systems was established.

96. The challenge to the real problems of security is a political challenge to conclude agreements guaranteeing mutual security, and not a technological challenge which would prompt States to involve themselves in the arms race at a higher level, that of qualitative improvements which would themselves be the harbingers of further escalation.

97. An equally essential concern of the international community is to achieve a complete ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of such weapons, over and above the ban placed on their use. The negotiating process for a convention dealing with weapons of this type seems to be at a very advanced stage in the Conference on Disarmament, and it suggests that it may be the only agreement that can be reached in the foreseeable future. Such progress should not be compromised by the production of new types of chemical weapons, by the surprising stiffening of certain attitudes and by the subordination of multilateral negotiations, the only ones that have been effective so far, to bilateral negotiations. It would be incomprehensible if progress towards a convention that would completely and effectively ban chemical weapons were not to follow the remarkable progress that has been made on adequate verification.

98. Considerable progress with regard to reliable verification procedures has been achieved in the areas of nuclear tests and chemical weapons and has been supported by the confidence-building measures adopted at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. If verification, an objective difficulty, is less an excuse than a true concern, it is to be hoped that these further new measures will lead even more surely to progress in the disarmament process.

99. International security is indivisible. It cannot be limited to one region of the world—no matter how important or crucial that region may be for global

security—to the exclusion of the rest of the world. If the security of Europe is consequently essential to the security of the world—and indeed it is in many respects—it cannot be viewed only in terms of its European dimensions. It would be contradictory to confine the quest for security to Europe and leave out the rest of the world, essentially the non-aligned world, and to proclaim, after agreements had been concluded, that they were universally applicable.

100. History and geography have made us attentive to everything that concerns European security. Algeria, which is a non-aligned Mediterranean country affected by the developments in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, can testify to the limitations of an approach leaving intact, in their threatening complexity, the problems of security and disarmament in the Mediterranean region. What merit can there be in inviting the non-aligned countries to develop a regional approach to security and disarmament when the countries which form the southern shore of the Mediterranean are not allowed to take part in discussion of the security of the Mediterranean region?

101. That is a concern the legitimacy of which was made clear directly after the conclusion of the Stockholm Conference and the agreement on short-range and medium-range missiles. The problem of the presence of sizeable military forces, including nuclear forces, is crucial, and consideration of it must take into account the security concerns of the non-aligned countries of the southern Mediterranean. These countries have repeatedly expressed their willingness to initiate a dialogue with the countries of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe with a view to extend co-operation, and they are more determined than ever before to pursue such dialogue.

102. In order to be valid and give promise of success the regional approach must not be limited arbitrarily by geographical considerations. At the same time, such an approach must take into account the specific situations in each region. If dialogue and negotiations in Europe are marked by given political, military and historical conditions, especially by two military blocs confronting each other which have long prepared for a clash viewed as inevitable, such a pattern does not necessarily exist in the rest of the world, where the East-West confrontation, when it exists, has only been artificially introduced in the context of power politics not concerning those other areas of the world. For this reason the results of the Stockholm Conference, for example, significant though they may appear to be for Europe, do not really apply to other parts of the world.

103. The dialogue in Europe was born of a need to ensure survival in the face of the presence, here and there, of considerable military forces, comparable overall and perceived as equally threatening. But a similar process, in satisfactory conditions of equality and justice, is unimaginable in southern Africa or in the Middle East, where aggressive claims to regional domination have been expressed by South Africa and Israel. Those claims also compromised the efforts that have been made in Africa and in the Middle East to make those two regions nuclear-free zones.

104. Similarly, the preservation of the status of the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean as zones of peace and respect for the denuclearized status of South America and the South Pacific demand much from the nuclear-weapons States, which have special responsibilities in that respect.

105. Turning now to the need for a just and lasting settlement of regional conflicts in order to promote increased international peace and security, the right to self-determination and independence, which is involved in most so-called localized conflicts, must be recognized and enshrined without being made the subject of manipulations within the East-West framework.

106. The present special session of the General Assembly—which is timely because it is necessary from time to time to evaluate the process of disarmament and recent events in this area—above and beyond reaffirming, as it must, the validity of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, must take significant decisions which will clarify the role of the United Nations in future years and how it can make positive progress along agreed lines. Timetables must be established which, without being rigid, must be more than indicative, in order to provide guidelines for multilateral efforts towards the precise objective of specific agreements in various areas. This is a realistic task and one which can be accomplished when we consider that the two principal nuclear-weapon countries have made progress in their negotiations in accordance with agreed timetables. These timetables were flexibly applied but nevertheless demonstrated their value as a stimulus.

107. These timetables, which would be outlined here and further elaborated in the Conference on Disarmament in particular, would be useful for sustained progress in negotiations towards agreements and the implementation of agreed measures. The completion of the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the implementation of the plans of action of the 1978 session and the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development would benefit greatly from such action.

108. The prodigious technological changes that are currently underway seem to have further reduced the dimensions of our planet, causing increased interdependence among nations, which are now more aware than ever before of the fact that they are living in one world. It is in this awareness by the peoples of the world of a new global community that the greatest hope exists, as we approach the third millennium, for a greater solidarity based on a genuine and lasting peace shared by all States and a just economic co-operation which benefits everyone. At the end of this century the nuclear threat is a constant, ongoing threat. The right, indeed the only course of action for reconciliation of peoples with their planet and its resources and with their mutual civilizing mission, the course of disarmament and development, must therefore be further strengthened. This is a challenge whose magnitude is surely clear to this gathering. It is our hope that the Assembly will meet that challenge decisively.

109. Mr. ASAMOAH (Ghana): On behalf of the delegation of Ghana, I should like to congratulate you most warmly, Sir, on your election to preside over this special session of the General Assembly. We wish to assure you of our co-operation in the discharge of your onerous responsibilities.

110. Ghana welcomes the convening of the third special session devoted to disarmament because it offers yet another opportunity for the international community to reassess the goals it set itself in the programme of action of the 1978 and 1982 special sessions as well as to consider the practical multilateral efforts that could be exerted to provide the impetus for the attainment of these goals. Therefore, the third special session is, in a sense, a recognition of the vital role that multilateralism should play in addressing the awesome phenomenon of the arms race in our contemporary world.

111. Ever since the holding of the first special session on disarmament in 1978, Member States, including Ghana, have observed with regret the widening gap between the aspirations of nations, as expressed in the 1978 Final Document, and actual achievements in the area of arms control and disarmament. The arms race has continued to grow steadily and ominously at a cost running into hundreds of billions of dollars. These heavy financial outlays are being incurred while the vast majority of mankind lives in abject poverty. Nuclear weapons continue to be manufactured and often tested far beyond the shores of their manufacturers and over the protestations of the people of the region where the testing is carried out. The only moratorium on nuclear testing, announced in August 1985 by one of the super-Powers, turned out to be short-lived because it was not reciprocated.

112. While the major nuclear Powers, by reason of the magnitude of their nuclear and military stockpiles, share an obvious responsibility greater than that of others, a number of medium Powers equally carry blame for heavy military expenditures and the stockpiling of nuclear and conventional weapons.

113. But the third world countries should not be excused. Since the end of the Second World War not only have most regional conflicts been fought in third world countries, but also some of those countries have become greedy customers for conventional arms in order to prosecute protracted wars and have thus unwittingly turned themselves into laboratories for testing weapons produced by developed countries.

114. The recent turn of events resulting in the signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty—in Washington in December 1987, and the encounter in Moscow of the leaders of the two countries, do, however, mark positive developments, but the conclusion of the INF Treaty will remain an isolated incident with little impact unless it is followed by a reduction in strategic weapons. It is important to note that the INF Treaty merely covers a fraction of a large nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the treaty does not mean that the world is now denuclearized. New nuclear weapons are being manufactured and tested.



As the Six-Nation Initiative has observed in its Stockholm Declaration of 21 January 1988,

“Even after the implementation of the INF Treaty, thousands of tactical nuclear weapons will still remain in Europe and elsewhere. In fact, these weapons could actually be the ones to trigger a nuclear holocaust.”<sup>9</sup>

115. It follows that the nuclear threat continues to be a reality. The capacity of the nuclear Powers to destroy civilization remains intact. The banning of all nuclear weapons should therefore remain high on the international agenda. It is our hope that the spirit of compromise demonstrated in the negotiations between the super-Powers will set the pace for positive developments in the future.

116. This third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is meeting at an opportune time. Its challenge is to exert greater efforts at ensuring that the disarmament process proceeds in the right direction. The issues that we face at this session are many, but I should like at this stage to share the thoughts of the Ghana delegation on some of them.

117. The Final Document of the first special session on disarmament represents the most comprehensive document on disarmament ever to be adopted by consensus by the international community. The goals and priorities of the Programme of Action set out a decade ago have not been fulfilled, not even as we approach the end of the Second Disarmament Decade. The General Assembly at this special session should therefore reaffirm their validity.

118. My delegation would like to reiterate that an effective way to check the arms race and the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons would be to end nuclear-weapon tests by all States. Such a step would check the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which have so far refrained from acquiring them. We call upon those who have ignored international appeals for a nuclear-test ban to reverse their position. One cannot talk of nuclear disarmament while remaining attached to nuclear testing.

119. Ghana is equally concerned about the widespread buildup in conventional weapons and the growing transfer of such weapons. Major regional conflicts have been fought and are being fought with conventional weapons. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook for 1987, a total of 36 armed conflicts were being fought around the world by the year 1986, involving about 5.5 million soldiers from 41 countries—one quarter of the world's 165 nations. The ongoing Iran-Iraq war is a classic case of an unnecessary war involving the use of conventional weapons. In terms of its duration, intensity and the magnitude of the material and human losses involved, the Iran-Iraq conflict is by far the most bloody and costly local war. It is the view of the Ghana delegation that this special session of the General Assembly should accord deserved attention to the problems of conventional weapons and their transfer.

120. Chemical weapons and the frequency of their use, particularly in ongoing regional conflicts, in

flagrant breach of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,<sup>10</sup> should also be addressed. We appreciate the constructive efforts by the Conference on Disarmament aimed at concluding an international treaty that would effectively strengthen that Protocol. Although we are aware of the pending delicate technical and administrative issues remaining to be resolved, this special session could, in our view, provide the impetus for the early conclusion of an agreement.

121. Outer space belongs to us all. It should therefore be kept free of military competition so as to ensure its continued peaceful use for the benefit of mankind. The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should thus focus on the prevention of the arms race in outer space. In particular it should work out a consensus that would prevail upon the parties to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty<sup>11</sup> to abide strictly by their treaty obligations. In this connection not only would the so-called Star Wars programme undermine the ABM Treaty, but also it could jeopardize further progress in disarmament. The third special session should appeal for an end to the testing of anti-satellite weapons.

122. Verification of compliance with disarmament agreements is an issue of concern to all nations. Everybody would like to be sure that agreements to destroy weapons and to refrain from their production are complied with. The last-minute delay by the United States Senate to ratify the INF Treaty over certain clarifications concerning the on-site verification of that Treaty shows the sensitivity that attends the subject. This session should therefore consider the issue of verification in depth and provide some guidance. In this regard the reports of the Disarmament Commission on the issue provide a useful guide. The Stockholm Declaration of the Six-Nation Initiative has also proposed the establishment of an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations. This and other proposals on the question of verification deserve serious consideration at this special session.

123. The arms race is a consequence of insecurity caused by competition for hegemony and by greed and exploitation. There is a direct relationship between the arms race and the absence of justice and equity in international relations. Political differences between States need to be resolved if international peace and security are to be secured. The problem of southern Africa, for example, is a threat to peace as long as the international community, particularly important Western nations, continues to ignore the call for collective action to bring *apartheid* to an end. Furthermore, the solution of the problem of the continued exploitation and underdevelopment of the third world is of vital importance. We must recognize the great danger to peace that exists if the gap between the haves and have-nots is not narrowed quickly. If it were possible to apply the vast resources saved through disarmament to that objective, the world would be safer for mankind.

124. Ghana believes in the global disarmament effort partly because of its potential for a beneficial impact on the developmental process in developing countries. While we cannot force any nation to accept the principle of a direct and consequential relationship between disarmament and development,

we hope and expect that the financial, physical and human resources to be released through disarmament will benefit developing countries in one way or another.

125. In conclusion, let me say that our proposals are by no means exhaustive. Discussions at this special session will cover many more substantive issues. The important point for the Ghana delegation is to approach discussions in the spirit of give and take and to avoid inflexibility. In that way, the session will be able to make significant progress and be a milestone in the search for a world without war and rancour.

*The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.*

---

NOTES

<sup>1</sup>A/43/320, annex.

<sup>2</sup>A/43/393, annex II, p. 136.

<sup>3</sup>Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068).

<sup>4</sup>United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778.

<sup>5</sup>Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

<sup>6</sup>Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex).

<sup>7</sup>A/43/351.

<sup>8</sup>United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.8, para. 35.

<sup>9</sup>See A/43/125, p. 5.

<sup>10</sup>Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

<sup>11</sup>Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 944, No. 13446).