


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**GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY**  
THIRTY-SEVENTH SESSION  
*Official Records\**



SECOND COMMITTEE  
27th meeting  
held on  
Tuesday, 2 November 1982  
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 27th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. FAFOWORA (Nigeria)

later: Mr. PAPADATOS (Greece)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 74: SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE (A/37/333, A/37/3 (Parts I and II), 235 and Corr.1, 121-140\*, 508 and Add.1, 209 and Add.1; A/C.2/37/L.9)

- (a) OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISASTER RELIEF CO-ORDINATOR
- (b) SPECIAL PROGRAMMES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
- (c) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEDIUM-TERM AND LONG-TERM RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION PROGRAMME IN THE SUDANO-SAHELIAN REGION

1. Mr. ESSAIFI (United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator) stressed the need to strengthen the role of the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator in order to meet the concerns of those countries that were participating in the international disaster relief effort and to provide more effective aid to disaster stricken countries.

2. Referring to the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (A/37/235), he said that he would discuss the events which had occurred in Lebanon and Chad in some detail because they were examples of the kind of complex disasters and emergencies of exceptional magnitude referred to in General Assembly resolution 36/225. Immediately after the invasion of Lebanon by Israeli forces, the Secretary-General had instructed the Office of the Co-ordinator to mobilize emergency aid for Lebanon. The Office had then sent members of its staff to Lebanon, particularly Beirut, to make, under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, an assessment of damage and of priority needs. Situation reports had subsequently been regularly communicated to Governments and governmental and non-governmental voluntary organizations. He stressed the extent and horror of the destruction in Lebanon, where intensive bombardment by advanced weapons had sown death and destruction, where the refugee camps at Tyre and Sidon had been virtually razed and where not even hospitals and clinics had been spared, not to mention what had taken place at Sabra and Shatila, and said that his Office had recognized, even more clearly than in other emergency situations, the pressing need to prepare a relief programme which met all the priority needs of the people affected. To that end, the Office had assembled the generous contributions made by the international community through United Nations agencies and other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and had prepared, in accordance with its mandate as confirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 36/225, a concerted relief programme in consultation with the competent United Nations agencies and with other organizations operating in Lebanon. The aims of that emergency relief programme had been to clear the rubble from and rehabilitate the refugee camps, to repair water supply and drainage installations, to restore

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\* To be issued.

(Mr. Essaafi)

essential health services, construct temporary shelters and supply other emergency assistance such as baby food and clothing. The emergency programme, which complemented the relief operations of other organizations already on the spot, was currently being executed by United Nations agencies operating in Lebanon in co-operation with the non-governmental organizations concerned. The Office of the Co-ordinator had responsibility, in consultation with the high-level relief committee established by the Lebanese Government, for programme co-ordination and monitoring, its presence in Lebanon having recently been strengthened by the detachment for several months of a senior official to supervise programme execution. In that connection, he paid a tribute to the spirit of co-operation demonstrated by most organizations, both official and voluntary, in meeting the essential needs of the stricken population.

3. The involvement of the Office of the Co-ordinator in Chad had begun in November 1981, when the Secretary-General had designated it the lead entity at the international level for relief operations, pursuant to paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 36/225 and decision 1982/1 of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC). The first appeal to the international community on behalf of that country had been made on 26 November 1981. In that connection, he pointed out that among the major consequences of the internal conflict which had ravaged Chad for almost 15 years, which had been compounded by natural disasters such as persistent drought in the Sahel, had been the almost total destruction of N'Djamena and the existence of a large number of refugees and displaced persons. The country's economy had been severely affected and the administration was completely disorganized. The dispatch of four missions to the country had led to the preparation of an emergency relief programme, after which the Office of the Co-ordinator had convened a meeting at Geneva on 5 and 6 April 1982 of representatives of Governments, the United Nations system and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. As a result of that meeting, the programme, which had been aimed primarily at meeting urgent food, health, educational and transport needs, had been almost completely funded. In July, a representative of the Office of the Co-ordinator had contacted the new Chad authorities in order to review the emergency relief programme and to adapt it to changing priorities, such as taking account of the needs of previously inaccessible regions. To that end, the Office of the Co-ordinator had, on 5 August 1982, issued an appeal for funds, in response to which it was still receiving contributions. It was not until late August that famine had been reported in the north and north-east regions of Chad which had previously been inaccessible. A further special appeal had therefore been made for the organization of an airlift. The response of the international community had been immediate: five aircraft had been chartered, enabling 1,500 tons of foodstuffs supplied by the World Food Programme to be delivered to the affected areas.

4. He urged all countries to participate in the relief activities for Lebanon and Chad. The experience gained in those two countries in implementing General Assembly resolution 36/225 and ACC decision 1982/1 was extremely encouraging, in that it had been found possible to prepare a concerted relief programme by means of ad hoc consultations with interested United Nations agencies while taking full

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(Mr. Essaafi)

account of the views of voluntary organizations working on the spot. The authorities of the countries concerned had, of course, been closely associated with the preparation of the relief programme, which had had their full approval.

5. With regard to Madagascar, he said that the report of the Secretary-General (A/37/235, annex I, page 7) listed contributions of \$9 million, to which should be added additional contributions, totalling \$12 million, received after the report had been issued. It should be noted, in particular, that the Government of Saudi Arabia had made a contribution of \$500,000 and the Australian Government a contribution of \$40,000, which had been used, with the agreement of the donor countries and WHO, to purchase medical equipment from the list supplied by the Minister of Health of Madagascar. Nevertheless, international aid was still necessary, mainly for the restoration of transport and as to offset losses of agricultural production.

6. Since the report of the Secretary-General had been prepared, unprecedentedly heavy rains in March 1982 had caused serious flooding throughout Democratic Yemen, damaging the irrigation system, bridges, roads, housing and farmland, and decimating livestock. Once the Office of the Co-ordinator had been apprised of the situation in the country it had sounded the alert, on 1 April, and one of his staff had been sent to help the Government with co-ordination. The floods had affected 300,000 people, of whom 482 had been killed, while damage and losses had been estimated at some \$975 million. At the request of the Government, the Office of the Co-ordinator had on 7 April 1982 made an appeal to the international community for foodstuffs, medicine, tents and blankets. In response to that appeal, relief totalling \$11 million had been sent by United Nations agencies, the European Economic Community, 12 Governments and non-governmental organizations. The World Health Assembly at its thirty-fifth session had requested the Director-General to set up an assistance programme for Democratic Yemen, and the Office of the Co-ordinator had urged the United Nations system and governmental and non-governmental organizations to co-operate with WHO in implementing that programme. The Office was continuing to ensure co-ordination between the Government of Democratic Yemen and the Swiss Government, which had sent a team to draw up plans for the reconstruction of roads and bridges. The building of the Zingibar bridge was to begin shortly, with assistance from the People's Republic of China, and reconstruction of the road network would begin at the end of 1982, with financial assistance from UNDP, the World Bank and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. Finally, without wishing to dwell too long on all the other UNDRO relief operations described in the report of the Secretary-General (A/37/235), he stated that a detailed report on the emergency situation of displaced persons in Ethiopia would be submitted to the Third Committee.

7. With regard to the administrative and financial questions raised in the Secretary-General's report, he referred to paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 35/107 and suggested that the General Assembly should decide at the current session, to maintain the trust fund indefinitely. The rigid limitation on the lifetime of the Fund severely restricted UNDRO's planning options, and planning would enable it to make better use of its human and financial resources. With

(Mr. Essaafi)

regard to UNDRO's regular budget contributions, which had been increased by the General Assembly from \$20,000 to \$30,000 by resolution 34/55, he drew attention to paragraph 54 of the report of the Secretary-General, which proposed that the General Assembly should authorize the Co-ordinator, in the event of major disasters, to exceed the normal ceiling of \$30,000 granted under the regular budget, up to a maximum of \$50,000, the difference to be financed from voluntary funds that might be available.

8. During his brief experience as Co-ordinator, he had become deeply convinced that his Office could be an important and effective tool not only for donor countries but especially for disaster-stricken countries when rapid mobilization and rational co-ordination of relief were required in both natural disasters and emergencies caused by man. To date, the role of UNDRO in the latter case had been relatively limited; it was the Secretary-General who appointed a special representative and equipped him with special administrative resources to carry out his functions. If, in the spirit of General Assembly resolution 36/225, the idea was that UNDRO could and should be the lead entity in such emergencies, it must be equipped to carry out that important additional task successfully. That demanded, first and foremost, greater co-operation on the part of all United Nations agencies in order to develop, as the basis for any joint appeal for funds, a concerted relief programme that included a budget for the entire operation, as called for in ACC decision 1982/1. The effectiveness of such an approach had been proved in the case of Chad, and he therefore asked the Committee to reaffirm, indeed strengthen, the mandate of his Office in that respect. Secondly, such a function required the strengthening of the information and logistic capacity of UNDRO since those two elements increased its usefulness to the authorities of the Member States concerned and non-governmental voluntary organizations. In that connection, he pointed out that, as the Office's human and material resources were barely sufficient to handle existing relief activities, it was impossible for him to assign the necessary resources to the development of communications and logistics. He accordingly asked the Committee to give him its support in that regard.

9. In conclusion, he drew attention to the exhibition which would be opened in Conference Room 2 on 3 November illustrating the activities of UNDRO on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of its establishment.

10. Mr. MONDJO (Congo) said that his delegation would in due course explain its position on the problems which the Co-ordinator had just analysed so well. He congratulated Mr. Essaafi on his appointment to that office. The African continent had experienced and continued to experience disasters of all kinds: it had not been spared the devastating effects of colonialist plunder, drought - which it had not yet managed to overcome - floods or famine. Consequently, African countries fully appreciated the support that was given to them in the difficult trials to which nature exposed their highly vulnerable economies and the efforts made by the Co-ordinator since his appointment to increase the effectiveness of his Office. The Co-ordinator could count on the dynamic support of his Government.

11. Mr. Papadatos (Greece) took the Chair.

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12. Mr. KORDS (German Democratic Republic) said that the reports of the Secretary-General on the special economic assistance programmes showed that progress had been made in the area of relief to disaster-stricken developing countries, while illustrating the need to intensify international assistance in that area. His country had provided assistance to disaster-stricken countries on a predominantly bilateral basis. For example, in March 1982 agencies of the German Democratic Republic had provided materials worth roughly 1 million marks to Madagascar to help it to repair the damage caused by violent thunderstorms, and his country's Red Cross had dispatched a comprehensive relief consignment to Chad. Assistance to Mozambique had amounted to roughly 43 million marks in 1981, and his country had also awarded 50 scholarships to nationals of that country. In addition, his country had provided and continued to provide free assistance to the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua in the amount of some 39.6 million marks for the period from July 1979 to the beginning of 1982. The German Democratic Republic had also provided emergency relief assistance to other countries that were victims of natural disasters, such as Ethiopia, Democratic Yemen, Uganda, Zambia, Sao Tome and Principe and Grenada. Those examples showed that his country's solidarity with countries in emergency situations corresponded to a deep sentiment on the part of its population and was an integral part of its policy. Thanks to generous contributions from all sections of the population, the Solidarity Committee of the German Democratic Republic had been able to increase its assistance during the year. Moreover, that policy of solidarity was part of his country's general support for the just demands of developing countries for the establishment of a new international economic order and for the struggle they were waging against colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and apartheid and for economic independence and social progress.

13. With regard to the situation in Lebanon, his delegation emphatically condemned Israel's aggression against Lebanon and its genocidal war against the Palestinian people, which had caused thousands of deaths and had brought misery to the country, and especially to the Palestinian refugees expelled from their homeland. His delegation therefore urged the Israeli aggressor to withdraw immediately from Lebanon and from all Arab territories occupied since 1967. The German Democratic Republic would continue to assist the Palestinian people and its sole legitimate representative, the PLO, in its struggle for self-determination and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian State.

14. It was well known that the economic plight of many developing countries was the result of colonialism and neo-colonial exploitation. It was those very countries that were most severely affected by the effects of the capitalist economic crisis. His delegation therefore condemned all attempts of certain imperialist States to use the disaster situations which they themselves had helped to bring about, as a means of exerting political pressure on developing countries. It should be noted in that connection that the economic difficulties of Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola were largely attributable to the aggressive policy of the South African régime which enjoyed the support of imperialist interests. That policy impeded the efforts being made at the national and international levels to overcome the economic difficulties of those countries. Consequently, the relief given to those countries should also include measures

(Mr. Kords, German Democratic Republic)

against the apartheid régime, such as the cessation of certain Western countries' collaboration with the racist régime in accordance with General Assembly resolution 36/172. It was therefore astonishing to note that the International Monetary Fund had decided on 1 November 1982 to grant the racist régime of South Africa a credit in the amount of \$1,060 million, despite the General Assembly's call in resolution 37/2 for that credit to be denied. There was no doubt that, if relief was to be made more effective, co-ordination would have to be improved between international relief action and the development activities of recipient countries, which would make it possible not only to confront emergencies in the short term but also to eliminate their causes. From that perspective, his Government would pursue its policy of assistance to developing countries.

15. In conclusion, he paid a tribute to the efforts made by the United Nations system to bring natural disasters under control. Certain forces, misusing the justified desire of developing countries to have the effectiveness of the United Nations system in cases of emergencies and disasters enhanced, were challenging the system's authority by establishing instruments which enabled them to interfere in the internal affairs of other States. His delegation was opposed to such actions and hoped that the Office of the Co-ordinator would continue its activities in accordance with its mandate. In that connection, his delegation reaffirmed the position on General Assembly resolution 36/225 which the socialist countries had expressed in their joint statement of 17 September 1981.

16. Mr. KAABACHI (Tunisia) noted with satisfaction that, in response to the appeal for increasing the resources and improving the operation of the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, the Office had reinforced its role in mobilizing and co-ordinating disaster relief by organizing more inter-agency relief missions and co-ordinating them better, by developing emergency relief programmes in consultation with the Governments and agencies concerned, and by holding regular information meetings to exchange information on current relief operations. The Office was using increasingly efficient methods not only to assess the magnitude of natural disasters and the data on the damage sustained, but also to plan the pre-disaster phase so as to enhance the speed and effectiveness of post-disaster relief. Extremely positive results had been obtained, as the Secretary-General had brought out in his report (A/37/235). The Office was also making commendable efforts to obtain free of charge or at low cost the transport and supplies it needed for its operations.

17. Another basic aspect of the Office's operation was the fact that its responsibility was not only to take action in natural disasters but also to predict them, to collect and disseminate information on them and to provide Governments that requested it with assistance in pre-disaster planning. It would therefore be desirable if national development plans made provision for disaster relief and disaster prevention.

18. As far as Lebanon was concerned, his delegation welcomed the fact that the Office had been able to organize rapidly and implement a relief programme to meet the vital needs of the population affected by that man-made disaster and to ensure

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(Mr. Kaabachi, Tunisia)

that they had essential services. The Office should also be congratulated for what it had done for Chad and for its activities in Madagascar and Democratic Yemen.

19. Given the Office's basic role, his delegation agreed that the Trust Fund should be extended, with no set limit, so as to enable the Co-ordinator to count on definite and predictable financial resources in planning the future activities of the Office.

20. His delegation also supported the proposal in paragraph 54 of the report of the Secretary-General that the Co-ordinator should be authorized, in the event of major disasters, to exceed the normal ceiling of \$30,000 granted under the regular budget, up to a maximum grant of \$50,000, the difference being financed from voluntary funds.

21. The Office must be given the material facilities and personnel it needed to accomplish its task and the Co-ordinator's mandate must be reinforced.

22. Mrs. RODRIGUES (Mozambique) said that she would limit her comments to the report of the Secretary-General on assistance to Mozambique (A/37/129). Mozambique was grateful to the Secretary-General for having sent a mission to Mozambique pursuant to General Assembly resolution 36/275. It would be recalled that in resolution 386 (1976) the Security Council had appealed to all States to co-operate with the United Nations in providing immediate financial, technical and material assistance to Mozambique. Since then the General Assembly had been requested to mobilize the necessary resources for an effective programme of assistance to Mozambique which was currently beset by an extremely difficult economic situation.

23. Since the end of the conflict in Zimbabwe, Mozambique had been facing an undeclared war waged by South Africa. The minority racist régime in Pretoria, in order to foil the efforts of the people of Mozambique to rebuild their country, had redoubled its acts of aggression against Mozambique: there had been armed incursions by its regular troops and by bandits in its pay, crimes against the helpless civilian population, acts of intimidation and various atrocities, a campaign of terror aimed at destabilizing the country, kidnappings and assassinations of foreigners who contributed with their labour to the progress of Mozambique. Such acts of aggression were followed by an international campaign of slander and misinformation designed to give the world the impression that Mozambique was in a permanent state of terror and anarchy.

24. That campaign of political, social and economic destabilization was preventing Mozambique from turning its full attention to economic reconstruction and from pursuing its normal development priorities. Thus, in spite of all the efforts towards economic recovery and the assistance received thus far, the prevailing situation remained very difficult. The balance of payments on current account reflected a constant deficit of nearly \$200 million and the foreign public debt amounted to \$540 million. As a consequence, exchange reserves had fallen to a critical level.



(Mrs. Rodrigues, Mozambique)

25. While the international community had provided assistance in some development projects, substantial needs remained to be met, particularly in the basic areas of food, transport and communications. The food situation continued to be a matter of grave concern for in that area Mozambique was becoming more dependent on foreign aid. Furthermore, because of the 1981 drought, the estimated food deficit for 1982 was 303,000 tons compared to 215,000 tons in 1981. Owing to the adverse balance of payments, Mozambique did not have enough to finance its essential food imports. Despite the food aid pledged by a number of donors, Mozambique still had a food deficit of 118,463 tons; to meet it, it urgently needed donations in kind and in cash.

26. Although substantial progress had been made in transport and communications, large investments were still needed to meet the needs of the country, especially to develop rural and trunk roads and coastal shipping.

27. Funds had been pledged for some of the transport and communications projects included in the special economic assistance programme which now came under the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). Her Government expected that more funds would be pledged by Governments and development agencies invited to attend the Maseru Conference from 27 to 28 January 1983.

28. Her delegation renewed its appeal to the international community to provide the urgent assistance needed by Mozambique, as the Secretary-General had recommended in his report (A/37/129).

29. Mr. BARMA (Chad), on behalf of his Government and people, warmly thanked the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, the United Nations system as a whole and the voluntary governmental organizations for their assistance to the people of Chad who, like the people of Lebanon, were undergoing a crisis. He also welcomed the appeal which the Secretary-General had just made to the international community to take part in the International Conference on Chad, to be held on 29 and 30 November 1982, and to make generous pledges for the reconstruction of that war-devastated country. His delegation also thanked all friendly countries, particularly those neighbouring on Chad, which had accepted the burden of the refugees and those driven from their homes by the war.

30. The situation in Chad, with due regard to differences of scale, was similar to that of Lebanon. In both cases, a civil war had been imposed from outside. In both cases, there had been interference in internal affairs, the effect of which had been to accentuate the antagonisms existing among the various population groups. In both cases again, foreign troops had intervened at a high cost in terms of human lives and massive physical destruction.

31. Turning to the situation in Lebanon, his delegation condemned Israeli expansionism and the massacre of the civilian Palestinian population in Sabra and Shatila and fully endorsed the view expressed by President Gemayel that foreign troops should withdraw from Lebanon so that the country could start the process of reconstruction in conditions of complete independence and respect for its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

(Mr. Barma, Chad)

32. Chad had experienced 17 years of civil war fomented and sustained from abroad. That war had reached its height in February 1979 and, in the three years that followed, the country and particularly its capital N'Djamena had been put to fire and the sword. That situation had resulted in considerable loss of life, massive destruction of its economic, social and administrative infrastructures, which had been shaky anyway, the flight of many civilians to neighbouring countries and the closing-down of schools and all the country's social and economic activities. That man-made disaster had been compounded by the drought which had been raging in the countries of the Sahel, including Chad, since 1972-1973 and which had only aggravated the situation of a country which was geographically disadvantaged by nature and rightly classified as one of the least developed among the developing countries.

33. Today, the fratricidal battles had ended throughout the country, and the new authorities had continuously repeated their appeals for unconditional national reconciliation. A first Government, headed by Mr. Hussein Habré, had just been formed at N'Djamena, and its task would be to complete the work of national reconciliation, reconstruct the economy with the help of assistance from the international community, and guide the country towards free and democratic elections. However, for the time being, the Government's most important task was to respond to urgent problems: feeding women, children and old people suffering from famine and giving them the medical care they required, resettling the refugees and displaced persons who were returning in the thousands to their homes which had been destroyed by the war, providing school buildings and facilities for children, rehabilitating the administrative structure and paying employees in the public and private services and, finally, clearing wells to obtain water for the population and livestock. Therefore, his delegation warmly supported the appeal which the Co-ordinator had made to the international community to strengthen the means at his disposal to respond to the crisis currently affecting Lebanon and Chad. In that connection, the Committee should recommend that the General Assembly should adopt a specific resolution for each of the two countries, authorizing the Co-ordinator to mobilize the required resources.

34. Mr. RAKOTONAIVO (Madagascar) said that his delegation would make a formal statement on item 74 at the next meeting but wished to take the current opportunity to express on behalf of the people and Government of Madagascar its gratitude to the Co-ordinator for the assistance which his Office had given to the Malagasy victims of the cyclones and floods which had devastated Madagascar in early 1982. He reiterated that Madagascar would give the office complete support to assist it in its difficult task.

35. Mr. BA-ISSA (Democratic Yemen) said that he wished to take the floor, before the general debate on item 74, in order to thank the Co-ordinator for the excellent report he had presented on the activities of his Office, and for the action which it had taken to help the people of Democratic Yemen severely affected by the floods which had inundated his country, leaving thousands homeless and seriously damaging the national economy. He expressed the gratitude of the people and Government of his country to the United Nations bodies, the Governments and the national and

(Mr. Ba-Issa, Democratic Yemen)

international organizations which had come to the aid of Democratic Yemen. The assistance received was, however, short-term and the problem of reconstructing the national infrastructure remained. Therefore Democratic Yemen also needed international assistance for that purpose. His delegation was grateful to the Office of the Co-ordinator for the emergency assistance that it provided to developing countries, particularly the least developed among them.

36. Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya) said that his delegation would make a formal statement on item 74 at a later date, but, for the moment, it wished to congratulate the Co-ordinator on the excellent report he had presented, which, without doubt, would be extremely useful when it came to preparing a draft resolution as a follow-up to resolution 36/225, adopted by the General Assembly in 1981.

37. The achievements of the Office of the Co-ordinator were very encouraging, particularly since the adoption by the General Assembly in 1981 of resolution 36/225 concerning the strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations system to respond to natural disasters and other disaster situations.

AGENDA ITEM 12: REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Draft resolution A/C.2/37/L.17 entitled "Identification of the least developed among the developing countries"

38. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to adopt the draft resolution.

39. Draft resolution A/C.2/37/L.17 was adopted.

40. Mr. KARIM (Bangladesh) felt that, in the title of the draft resolution, it would be preferable to replace the word "identification" by the word "inclusion" in order to bring it into line with the wording used in the title of Economic and Social Council resolution 1981/34 ("Inclusion of Guinea-Bissau in the list of the least developed countries").

41. Mr. SEVAN (Secretary of the Committee) said that the word "identification" had also been used in the title of Economic and Social Council resolution 1982/41.

42. Mr. KARIM (Bangladesh) felt that, in the case in point, the word "inclusion" was preferable to the word "identification" and that it would be better to use the title of resolution 1981/34 as a model.

43. The CHAIRMAN said that the Secretariat would follow that practice.

44. Mr. BOYD (United Kingdom), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of Malta, in his statement on the problem of the remnants of war, had rehearsed a number of familiar allegations about the policy of the British Government. In particular, he had stated that the reason why his delegation had been obliged to raise the problem in the Second Committee and

(Mr. Boyd, United Kingdom)

elsewhere was that direct contacts with the British Government had proved fruitless owing to the latter's absence of goodwill, its lack of interest in the problem, and the preconditions that it had set.

45. Those allegations were incorrect, and the United Kingdom had made it clear, in the United Nations and elsewhere, that it was not indifferent to the problems certain countries had to face concerning the removal of the remnants of war. His Government had always been and continued to be ready to engage in bilateral discussions on the subject. That position had been made clear to the Maltese Government on many occasions. The Prime Minister of Malta had been informed in 1981 that the representative of the British Government at Valetta was at his Government's disposal to discuss the question with him and, since then, there had been a number of bilateral exchanges.

46. The United Kingdom Government had repeatedly indicated that, while it was under no legal obligation to clear from Maltese waters unexploded ordnance or wrecks, a large part of which were the direct result of attacks by the Axis Powers during the Second World War, it was prepared to examine what assistance it might be possible to offer in the context of specific harbour development plans, if it could be shown that wrecks or unexploded ordnance would be a hindrance to such plans. That offer was clear and remained open.

47. He reminded the representative of Malta that, while it was true that the island of Filfla had continued, after Maltese independence, to be used as an air weapon and gunnery range, that had been done with the full agreement of the Maltese Government.

48. On three occasions (5 March, 16 April and 27 October 1982), his Government had sent communications to the Maltese Government in which it had expressed its willingness to engage in informal talks at the expert level on the problem of remnants of war, and had requested specific information on the harbour development plans which, according to the Maltese Government, were being hampered by the presence of bombs and wrecks in Maltese waters. Those offers had led to naught.

49. Consequently, it was obvious that the United Kingdom Government did not lack good will and had not been ignoring the problem at all. It was certainly not the United Kingdom Government that had been holding things up. It was well known that the United Kingdom refused to accept any legal or moral responsibility in the matter, but it had never demanded that the Maltese Government should accept that position as a precondition for the opening of negotiations. There was reason to wonder whether it was the Maltese Government that wished to impose preconditions. The United Kingdom Government hoped that that was not the case and that it would soon receive a positive reply.

50. Mr. HILLEL (Israel), exercising his right of reply, said that it was most ironic that, of all nations, it was Syria that criticized Israel for its administration of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Those concerns for civil and national liberties had not been evident at the time of the horrendous massacres perpetrated at Hama by Syrian armed forces. Over the years, Syria had exploited

(Mr. Hillel, Israel)

Lebanon mercilessly to promote its own regional aims and had put down any resistance to its occupation. The role it had played in the Palestinian context was nothing less than disastrous, whereas - as attested to in document A/37/347 and, recently, in the Second Committee - Israel could be proud of the rapid rise in the standard of living of the residents of areas under its administration. The Israeli delegation had therefore been astonished to hear, on 29 October in the Second Committee, the words of the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic on the living conditions of the Palestinians. It was tragic but also paradoxical that the Byelorussian SSR had cast the first stone at Israel and had spoken of genocide. It could hardly have forgotten that the USSR had collaborated with the Nazi régime in 1939, at a time when it had been clearly established that one of its major aims was the destruction of the Jewish people. The genocide perpetrated by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, demonstrated the respect of the Soviet Union for international law and human rights.

51. Mr. ASTAFIEF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that it was astonishing, to say the very least, at a time when so many delegations had noted the severity of the economic crisis in capitalist countries and had criticized the selfish policy of the United States and its major Western allies, to hear the representative of that country state that such a crisis practically did not exist.

52. According to that representative, the 1 per cent drop in interest rates in the United States was a boon for everyone. It meant a \$1 billion drop in the balance-of-payments deficit of developing countries. According to that reasoning, whenever interest rates in the United States increased by 1 per cent, the concomitant deficit in developing countries was \$1 billion. Considering that, over the last 10 years, those rates had increased from 5 to 20 per cent, it was not difficult to draw the appropriate conclusions. Moreover the figure put forward by the United States representative was unconfirmed. Actually, according to estimates of the Group of 77 and the UNCTAD secretariat, that deficit amounted not to \$1 billion but to twice that amount. The flow of financial resources from developing countries to the United States, on the basis of official statistics published in June 1982 in the Survey of Current Business, totalled \$30 billion for the period 1979-1981, or \$10 billion per year or \$40 per capita. That was an indication of the extent to which developing countries were exploited by the United States.

53. It was therefore inappropriate for the representative of the United States to discredit the Soviet Union's policy of assistance to developing countries and, in so doing, to humiliate the sovereign Governments which maintained economic relations with it. The United States representative had spoken of customers. Actually 65 per cent of its assistance went to the two parties to the Camp David agreements, the cost of which had to be borne by thousands of human beings.

54. Moreover, the United States representative had said that the assistance of his country was disinterested. He had no doubt not had time to mention how the United States took advantage of the multilateral assistance facilities, in particular

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(Mr. Astafief, USSR)

those of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which enabled it to exert pressure so as to keep in power reactionary and even racist régimes, like that of Pretoria. Nor had he had time to say how, under pressure from the United States and its allies, the pro-Western administration of UNDP had opposed the granting of aid to Argentina and Viet Nam, or how well-known forces within the Programme had illegally obstructed the use of Soviet voluntary contributions. As a result, considerable resources which might well have served the interests of developing countries, had remained frozen. The United States had nevertheless recognized in its own legislative bodies - and he particularly recalled a 1980 meeting of the House budget committee - that every United States dollar disbursed for development assistance, was returned to the United States many times over in both political and financial profits. United States contributions to UNDP had totalled \$115 million in 1977, of which the programme had spent \$100 million in the United States. United States UNICEF contributions had totalled \$30 million in 1978 and the United States had got back \$48.4 million.

55. With regard to the United States attitude concerning the opening of global negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations, the United States had set the following major condition for the holding of those talks: the rigid maintenance of the principles underlying the activities of IMF and the World Bank, in other words, the maintenance of inequalities, exploitation and the policy of diktat which now characterized international economic and financial relations.

56. History had shown that the benefits of the socialist system increased as it spread throughout the world. The Soviet people looked to the future with hope since their society was the society of the future.

57. Mr. FARRUGIA (Malta) said that his delegation reserved its right to reply at the next meeting to the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom. For the time being he merely noted that the United Kingdom was continuing to refuse to accept any moral or legal responsibility. Malta, unlike the United Kingdom, had not been guilty of any reprehensible act and was therefore unable to bear any responsibility whatsoever.

58. Mr. MARDOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he was surprised at what had been said the day before by the representative of Singapore, according to whom the need to provide aid to the developing countries did not derive from a historic responsibility but from the fact that the world was divided between rich and poor countries. The history of development showed that that view of things was false. While the wealth of the capitalist countries, both at home and abroad, was the result of their exploitation of poor countries, the increased well-being of the socialist world was the product of people's labour and their fraternal collaboration. The nature of the relations of the capitalist countries with their former colonies remained unchanged; there had been only a change of method. The internationalist approach of the socialist countries contrasted with that dualistic view of the imperialists. The United Nations was not a table from which the satiated would throw to the famished some crumbs from their feast. The effort made by the

(Mr. Mardovich, Byelorussian SSR)

socialist countries was intended to effect a far-reaching change in existing relations and to establish a new international economic order on a just and democratic basis. As a first step, the imperialists should be made to yield what they had taken by plunder and to establish conditions in which neo-colonialist pillage was made impossible. It was thanks to the joint efforts of the socialist countries and the developing countries that it had been possible to adopt important documents such as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States or the Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. But the struggle for such a transformation of economic relations dated back to the founding of the first socialist State in the world, and the history of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was replete with it. It was an integral part of the policy of peace and co-operation of the socialist countries. There was a close relationship between the just demands of the developing countries and those of the socialist countries.

59. Document A/C.2/37/4, which spoke volumes about the economic relations with developing countries, and the statement made in the Second Committee by the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gromyko, showed that Soviet aid to those countries was greater than that of any developed capitalist country. That aid, without conditions or diktats, responded directly to the interests of its recipients. As could be seen, the accusations levelled against the socialist countries were baseless. They were part of an arsenal of measures which the socialist countries disavowed because they were entirely foreign to them.

60. With respect to the statement made by the representative of Israel in exercise of the right of reply, all progressive peoples knew very well that Israel was guilty of genocide of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples and, as a result, Israel's attempts to justify its action convinced no one.

61. Mr. SALLIUM (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the representative of the Menachem Begin gang was attempting to mislead the Committee by inventing lies concerning Syria and by avoiding the point at issue, namely, the living conditions of the Palestinian people.

62. The events of Hama had been greatly exaggerated by Zionist and imperialist propaganda. It had been a very short-lived political and non-sectarian conflict between the members of a backward group attempting to sow destruction and terror in the country and a nation which had pursued and punished them. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic represented a people who were proud of their leaders and rallied around them in the struggle against zionism and its plans. The neo-Nazis of the so-called State of Israel were always attempting to introduce a sectarian dimension whenever they spoke of any Arab country, because their plans consisted of dividing the region into weak sectarian mini-States which would be dominated by the aggressor Zionist State, as their thinkers advocated in the conviction that such a division was the sole guarantee of secure borders.

63. As pointed out by Professor Chomsky, a linguistics expert at the University of Massachusetts who maintained relations with the leaders of the Israeli Movement for

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Peace, in an article published in the British newspaper The Guardian, Israel would try to sow disorder in Syria until that country and Lebanon reverted to a régime similar to that which had existed under the Ottoman occupation, thus permitting Israel to dominate the sectarian or ethnic groups. The little nazi present in the Committee was not unaware of those plans or of the reason why the Syrian forces were in Lebanon. It had been at the request of the legitimate Government of Lebanon and on a decision of the League of Arab States that the Syrian army had intervened to stop the fratricidal war in Lebanon and to participate in the reconstruction of that country. The Syrian forces had always been under the control of the legitimate President of Lebanon, while the invaders and occupiers of the country had destroyed all life there, dropping 250,000 bombs on the city of Beirut in a single day, under the pretext of preserving the security of Galilee. The crimes committed in the camps of Sabra and Shatila and, previously, in the Ein-el-Hilweh camp in southern Lebanon, were without precedent. The invaders had learnt a lot from nazism and now dared to speak before the international community and attempt to justify their crimes. In 1950, only two years after the Zionist occupation of Palestine, Ben Gurion had declared that the Palestinian problem could be resolved only by war and that it was only war that would decide the fate of Israel, adding that Israel would have to crush the Arab States with its military superiority.

64. It was obvious that Israel's main objective, the annihilation of the Palestinian people, would not be easy to achieve. That was why the acts of aggression against the Arab States had been stepped up. But the international community had been able to verify, since the first days of the invasion of Lebanon by Israel, that the purpose of that operation had not been the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Beirut, but genocide and destruction. That reality had been recognized by the American press: The New York Times of Sunday, 8 August 1982, had referred in a headline to the destruction of a city. In addition, The Washington Post of 28 June 1982 had observed that it should be acknowledged that the arms supplied to Israel had been used to massacre innocent people who had never threatened its security.

65. While the terrorist Sharon had stated that the objective of the Israeli army at the start of the invasion had been to clear a 40-kilometre-wide strip in Lebanese territory, there had been a siege of Beirut and a bombardment that had caused thousands of casualties among innocent people and had damaged or destroyed United Nations offices, embassies or diplomatic missions, hospitals, the Central Bank, the premises of the International Red Cross, Lebanese and foreign news offices and public buildings.

66. After their invasion of Lebanon, the Zionist authorities had hardened their position on the West Bank. They had taken many measures to put down demonstrations by carrying out campaigns of terror which had led to the arrest of hundreds of persons and the killing of demonstrators. Furthermore, the Israeli authorities had tightened up their control of the press in the occupied territories by prohibiting the distribution of newspapers that had published articles condemning the invasion of Lebanon and by arresting journalists. Finally, they had proceeded to dissolve



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four municipal councils and, alleging participation by their Presidents or members in the campaign of denunciation of the invasion of Lebanon and their refusal to co-operate with the civil administration, had proceeded to replace them with persons in their pay.

67. Mr. CHAN (Singapore) said that his delegation was surprised at the remarks by the representative of the Byelorussian SSR and reserved the right to reply at the next meeting. In requesting the socialist countries to play a part commensurate with their economic weight and political influence, his delegation had simply been paying a tribute to the socialist system. Its statement had been aimed only at stimulating the spirit of compassion and the sense of responsibility of the fortunate towards those who had less and who, after all, were not asking for charity. Were not assistance to developing countries and international economic co-operation, as all had come to recognize, the only true way of facing the current economic crisis?

68. Mr. SMITH (United States of America) said he wished to reserve the right to reply at a later date to the representative of the Soviet Union.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.