



FIRST COMMITTEE  
36th meeting  
held on  
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at 10.30 a.m.  
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 36TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GBEHO (Ghana)

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ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 57, 133, 136, 138 AND 139 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will continue its consideration of and action upon draft resolutions related to disarmament items. I should like to inform members of the Committee that it is my intention to put to the vote all those draft resolutions which have financial implications as soon as possible, in order to enable the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly to take action on them before they are considered by the plenary.

I should also like to invite those delegations which submitted draft resolutions kindly to introduce them as soon as possible. I appeal to them to try to do so by the end of the day tomorrow. I know that some members have expressed the wish to do this on Monday, but I should like to change that a little.

We do have a rather busy programme next week, in the sense that we are going to consider an average of 16 to 20 resolutions a day. In light of the number of statements that will be made either on the resolutions or in explanation of vote, this will be a considerable task. I should also like the introduction of draft resolutions - if they are to be introduced at all - to be completed as quickly as possible.

I hope that I receive the co-operation of members in this regard.

(The Chairman)

I am informed that all draft resolutions through A/C.1/37/L.50 are now out, a few of them, however, not in all working languages; even in those cases, they will be issued in all working languages by tomorrow. I hope that those who wish to speak to introduce draft resolutions will do so even though their draft resolutions are not available in all languages.

Since we are running against time, I should like to seek the agreement of the Committee to permit draft resolutions to be issued even if they are available in their original languages only; this would facilitate the work of the Committee, and I would repeat that translations into all working languages will be available tomorrow without fail. If I hear no objections I will take it that the Committee wishes to instruct the Secretariat to issue all available draft resolutions, even where available only in original language, pending translation into the other working languages.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): I should like to speak today about three draft resolutions, submitted to this Committee under agenda items 133 and 139, that would endorse a nuclear arms freeze.

My Government does not doubt that the Member States which at the second special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament advanced proposals for a nuclear freeze were motivated by a desire to advance the objectives of reducing the danger of nuclear war and lowering the level of nuclear destructive capacity on the earth. The United States fully shares these objectives. It does so today as indeed it has since it first advanced the Baruch Plan 36 years ago. The Baruch Plan, it will be recalled, proposed the international control of nuclear energy and involved the creation of an international authority entrusted with all phases of the development and use of nuclear energy. On establishment of that authority, national nuclear forces were to be destroyed. Unfortunately, that proposal was not accepted.

It is essential that the Assembly address directly whether a nuclear freeze, at current levels and without prior reductions, is a worthwhile or feasible objective in its own right. Also, would it advance or hinder achievement of the above objectives, much less other near-term and longer-term security and nuclear disarmament objectives? These are large questions, but they must not be avoided.



(Mr. Lodge, United States)

My Government believes deeply that a general agreement freezing nuclear forces at current levels would not strengthen international security and that, in any case, negotiation of such an agreement would probably not be feasible. It would also undermine ongoing efforts to increase stability and reduce the level of nuclear competition through negotiations already under way in Geneva, and longer-term prospects of nuclear disarmament.

I shall not dwell on the appeal made here on 27 October by Eugene Rostow, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and those made last summer at the second special session on disarmament, for the dedication of every Member State to the fulfilment of its Charter commitment to avoid resort to force or the threat of force against the independence or territorial integrity of any State. Nonetheless, one cannot fail to point out that respect for that binding obligation must precede every arms control and disarmament objective. And every Member State has the right to insist on strict compliance with that commitment from every other Member State. Failure to demand adherence to that standard can only make a mockery of the work of this Committee.

The Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament underlines the urgency of measures to prevent the outbreak of war, including nuclear war. In pursuit of that objective, the United States has, over the years, initiated numerous proposals to avoid the accidental outbreak of war and to increase mutual confidence among nuclear-weapon States in the reliability of their deterrent forces. A number have led to concrete agreements that materially advance these objectives. The United States has also advanced various proposals, alone as well as in combination, intended to cap or reduce nuclear forces. The veil of confidentiality behind which serious negotiations on issues of great sensitivity must proceed has limited and often delayed the availability of information on these proposals, for there is often a trade-off between public disclosure concerning ongoing negotiations and concrete results. However, those representatives who have studied these issues closely know that the United States has directed its most strenuous efforts to devising creative, balanced and verifiable arms control proposals at the negotiating table, not to resolutions, declarations or published treaty drafts that are either self-serving or devoid of the prospect of acceptance by those directly concerned.



(Mr. Lodge, United States)

But before others assess the merits or prospects of the nuclear arms control and disarmament proposals put forward by the United States, which have led to the current negotiations in Geneva, referred to as the intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) negotiations, and to the strategic arms reduction talks (START), they should analyse the development of the United States and Soviet nuclear forces over recent years. Mr. Rostow spoke at some length to the Committee regarding the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and its effect on the strategic nuclear balance and the nuclear balance in Europe. He said that the size, scale and structure of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, its steady growth, and, above all, its emphasis on intermediate-range and intercontinental ground-based ballistic missiles have created enormous anxiety. Ground-based ballistic missiles are more accurate and destructive than other nuclear weapons, and far less vulnerable to defences. The Soviet advantage in this category of nuclear weapons creates the potentiality for a disarming first strike.

(Mr. Lodge, United States)

As President Reagan stated on 9 May 1982:

"The main threat to peace posed by nuclear weapons today is the growing instability of the nuclear balance. This is due to the increasingly destructive potential of the massive Soviet build-up in its ballistic missile force."

During the past two decades, at the same time as the Soviet Union was strengthening its already dominant conventional forces in Europe, it devoted unprecedented resources to the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles. More recently, it has also deployed more than 300 mobile SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic launchers with three times that many warheads. Thus, Soviet missile forces have moved to a position in which they are generally recognized as superior in various critical measures, especially megatonnage, to those of the United States.

Just since the signing of the SALT I agreement in 1972, the Soviet strategic offensive threat against the United States, according to various measures, has increased sevenfold. The Soviets have flight-tested or deployed eight new or modified land-based missiles and seven new or modified submarine-launched ballistic missiles. They have developed and deployed their fourth generation of land-based missiles, which are capable of threatening our land-based systems, as well as their backfire bomber and a modernized strategic defence system that includes a major civil defence programme.

Through the 1970s the United States delayed its own land-based missile modernization effort. The United States civil defence programme was funded at a token level, about one-twentieth of the Soviet effort. In 1977, hoping for Soviet restraint, the United States cancelled its manned bomber, the B-1, designed to replace the 30-year-old B-52. The United States has reduced the total megatonnage of its strategic nuclear force by nearly 30 per cent over the past 10 years, and by approximately 60 per cent over the past 20 years.

Unfortunately, American restraint has not been reciprocated by the Soviet Union. Indeed, restraint has been evident nowhere in the Soviet military establishment, which has relentlessly expanded its arsenal beyond a level justified by any rational needs of defence. The response of the United States

(Mr. Lodge, United States)

to this massive Soviet build-up has been on two levels. First, the United States is now beginning to modernize its forces to redress this unacceptable military balance. But the Soviet build-up in nuclear and conventional forces will require a sustained United States effort - or, preferably, agreed reduction to lower and equal force levels - in order to restore balance.

The second element of the United States response has been new arms control initiatives. My Government and our citizenry agree with other Governments and peoples that the horrors of nuclear war must be avoided. President Reagan spoke for all Americans when he said "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". This fundamental proposition is not under debate in the United States; the debate, instead, centres on how best to achieve true nuclear arms control and a stable peace, and how to reduce, with adequate verification and compliance mechanisms, the destructive levels of nuclear arms on both sides to lower and equal levels and thereby increase stability.

Over the last year President Reagan has set down a series of detailed nuclear arms reduction proposals aimed at realizing those objectives. Again, on 9 May, he stated that the United States goal in negotiations is

"... to enhance deterrence and achieve stability through significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear systems - ballistic missiles and especially the giant intercontinental ballistic missiles - while maintaining a nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, to underwrite our national security, and to meet our commitment to allies and friends."

In the intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations the United States has submitted a "zero option" proposal for intermediate-range land-based missiles, and in the strategic arms reduction talks it has proposed substantial reductions in strategic nuclear forces to equal and verifiable levels, beginning with a one-third reduction in ballistic-missile warheads.

As regards proposals for a freeze, my Government believes that it would preserve and legitimize the military advantages the USSR now enjoys because of its military build-up. Our land-based missiles are already vulnerable to a Soviet first strike, and a nuclear freeze would do nothing to stop improvements in Soviet conventional air defence or anti-submarine warfare capabilities that



(Mr. Lodge, United States)

could threaten our bombers and submarines. A freeze would also prevent the United States from modernizing or replacing those forces already vulnerable with new and more secure forces. As a consequence, the Soviet Union would have little or no incentive to pursue seriously negotiations intended to achieve equal but lower strategic or intermediate-range force levels.

From the perspective of international stability, it is hard to see how a freeze could advance the cause of disarmament or reduce the chances of nuclear war. United States unilateral restraint alone cannot produce a safer world. There must be joint and co-operative action. Moreover, important elements of a general nuclear freeze at current levels would be extremely difficult to verify; some would not be verifiable at all. My Government believes that its arms control proposals are the most prudent basis for negotiations - for all concerned. They contain fundamental advantages over a freeze. First, they would not simply leave the level of nuclear weapons where it is now but would substantially reduce them. Secondly, the United States proposals do not contain unverifiable prohibitions, which is exactly what the sweeping freeze concept does. Thirdly, while a freeze would attempt to stop changes in nuclear-weapon technology, an unrealizable ambition at this time, the United States proposals, which focus on specific weapons and specific levels of destructive power, are concrete and attainable.

A deep yearning for peace and stability is an emotion all here can share. However, it cannot free us from the responsibility to address and comprehend the complexities of nuclear deterrence or the existing array of military forces.

(Mr. Lodge, United States)

How, then, does the United States view the specific freeze draft resolutions before the Committee?

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.1, preambular paragraph 1, we must observe that "lasting world peace" can only be based, in the first instance, on observance of the Charter's demand for respect for the sovereignty of every Member State, and not on disarmament measures. Respect for the Charter is a precondition for any major progress toward general and complete disarmament.

We fully share the view expressed in preambular paragraph 4 of the draft resolution that there is an "urgent need for a negotiated reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles leading to their complete elimination". However, we cannot agree that a sweeping "freeze on nuclear weapons" - even if it were subject to clear definition and verifiable - would, under present circumstances, lead either to nuclear arms reductions or to a safer world.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3, we share many sentiments and objectives contained in its preambular part. At the same time, other, disturbing words are to be found there. "... illusory doctrines of 'limited' or 'winnable' nuclear war" are said to be promoted by unnamed persons or States. It is true that Soviet spokesmen - and even some draft resolutions before this Committee - have asserted, however falsely, that the United States promulgates such doctrines. One must ask whether the authors of that draft resolution have accepted those totally unfounded claims. Or, perhaps, to the contrary, they are drawing conclusions implicit in the Soviet deployment of strategic and intermediate nuclear forces far beyond the requirements of nuclear deterrence.

Also, we find it odd as well as disturbing that the draft resolution ignores the intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) negotiations and the START negotiations and instead calls for an immediate across-the-board nuclear freeze. The judgement is implied that "unilateral" or "joint declarations" require no negotiation. Issues of definition and scope are ignored.

(Mr. Lodge, United States)

Verification is dealt with in a single sentence and in disregard of the unprecedented intended scope of the restrictions. In light of the excruciatingly complex discussions of verification in the Committee on Disarmament in connexion with a ban on chemical weapons production, we ask: How could verification measures contained in SALT I and SALT II satisfy the requirement of verifying non-production of fissionable material for weapons purposes?

I should now like to turn to the Soviet proposal, draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.7. It calls on "all" - repeat all - "nuclear-weapon States ... to agree on a simultaneous suspension (freezing) of the production and development of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and also of the production of fissionable materials for the purposes of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons".

In advancing - or perhaps it is more apt to say - borrowing this proposal, the USSR would seem to be disparaging or dismissing the START and INF negotiations it has insisted it entered in good faith. The USSR, in this way, seems to be opting for putting off reductions - the objective of both START and INF - to a later date.

Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.7 contains another element, one entirely extraneous to the issue of a nuclear freeze, namely, a statement that any deliberate destruction of peaceful nuclear installations is equivalent to an attack using nuclear weapons. The subject of attacks on such facilities has been before the Committee on Disarmament for some time and the United States has participated actively in those discussions.

Members of the Committee will surely want to analyse carefully the merits of endorsing a freeze which would be impossible to define or verify, and in any event be unfair and unbalanced. What are urgently needed are negotiated agreements for reductions and increased stability, not a hopeless effort to lock in a dangerous and unacceptable status quo.

The United States trusts the good sense of this Committee not to dismiss and undermine the START and INF negotiations by supporting draft resolutions calling for a nuclear freeze.



Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): It is a pleasure for my delegation to introduce the draft resolution on the prevention of nuclear war, contained in document A/C.1/37/L.45. This draft resolution is sponsored by the delegations of Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and, of course, Argentina.

There is no need on this occasion for me to dwell on the importance and urgency of preventing a nuclear war. As a matter of principle all war should of course be prevented. But there is no doubt that in the case of nuclear war, because of its vast potential for widespread destruction that would threaten the very survival of mankind, special priority measures are called for to prevent its outbreak.

The final document states in this respect that "effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority".

(A/S-10/4, para. 20) Later in the same document we read that:

"All States, in particular nuclear weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war." (Ibid., para. 32)

I could mention many other paragraphs of the Final Document which are related to this subject, such as paragraphs 47 to 50 or 56 to 58, but I shall not do so because these matters are already very familiar to members. In any case, nobody disputes the need to make every possible effort, as a matter of urgency, to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. All countries have at least stated that they share that objective, and it is indeed the purpose of the draft resolution that I have the honour of introducing to seek practical and appropriate measures, on an agreed basis, to that end.

This question is part of the broader question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The various difficulties that attach to the discussion of this item should not impede the first step, analysing and negotiating on ways and means that are sufficiently straightforward to make their adoption comparatively easy, and would constitute a significant contribution to the continuing effort to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

The Committee may recall at the thirty-sixth session the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 36/81 B, whereby all nuclear-weapon States and those other States wishing to do so were urged to submit to the Secretary-General their views, proposals and practical suggestions for consideration at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Many States abided by the request set forth in that resolution and their replies have been compiled by the Secretary-General in document A/S-12/11 with various addenda. There can be found the various replies of States containing assertions, views and suggestions regarding the prevention of nuclear war. Of course, my delegation does not agree with a number of the views contained in these proposals and we wish to state this for the record, but unquestionably these replies are relevant and should be examined during the consideration of this matter.

As representatives will recall, the prevention of nuclear war was the subject of a very interesting debate at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, specifically, in Working Group III and in the ad hoc working group set up for that purpose. References to the work done on this subject appear in the Concluding Document in paragraphs 44 and those which follow and in Annex III.

This matter of paramount importance was once again considered at the recent session of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. The report of this body says in its paragraph 49 that:

"The question of prevention of nuclear war has been the subject of earnest and intensive discussion and its importance and urgency are readily acknowledged." (CD/335)

Subsequent paragraphs of the report of the Committee discuss in summary form the treatment given to the matter in the Committee. I would merely recall that, as paragraph 58 says, the Group of 21:

"...has also strongly supported the proposal (CD/309) for a working group to undertake negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, since its consideration would enable the Committee to reach agreement on concrete and urgent measures in the context of nuclear disarmament." (Ibid.)

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

The draft resolution which I have the honour to introduce is very much a part of this process. It is fundamentally procedural in nature and its purpose is to call on the Committee on Disarmament to give preferential treatment to negotiations with a view to an agreement on practical and appropriate measures to prevent nuclear war, bearing in mind all the documents to which I have referred and all existing proposals and others that may be submitted in the future.

In view of the importance and urgency of the problem, and the competence of the multilateral negotiating body in the area of disarmament, it is only logical and reasonable, in the opinion of my delegation, and in the opinion of the sponsors of the draft resolution, to ask that top priority be given to the search for concrete positive agreements aimed at preventing nuclear war.

Before concluding this introduction, I wish to announce that the delegation of Brazil has joined the sponsors of this draft resolution.

Finally, I shall conclude by submitting draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.45 to the members of this Committee for their consideration while expressing the hope that it will command consensus, or at least widespread approval.

Mr. MARTYNOV (Byelorussian SSR) (interpretation from Russian): In this statement the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR is presenting for the consideration of the First Committee draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.43 and also A/C.1/37/L.46.

The first of these is headed "Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons". Here we have the honour to submit the text in question on behalf of 27 delegations. They are as follows: Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Bulgaria, Burundi, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Hungary, Jordan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Poland, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam, Yemen and also the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.



(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

The question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons has been on the agenda of various international bodies for a number of years. Many resolutions of the General Assembly have been adopted on this subject. There is a growing understanding on the part of world public opinion of the fact that the scientific and technological revolution and the accelerating tempo of progress in various fields of science are creating not only favourable opportunities for the solution of the basic problems of mankind, but also, to the significant extent to which they are being diverted for military needs, they constitute a serious danger of new rounds of the arms race. The awareness of this situation and the urgent need to avoid such a development are directly reflected in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

Today mankind has approached the very threshold of a new danger. The fact is that in the development of military technology there are rapid and profound changes taking place. Qualitatively new types of weapons are being developed, primarily weapons of mass destruction. They are of a type which can make their control and, accordingly, any agreed limitation, reduction and prohibition an extremely difficult matter, if not an impossible one. A new stage of the arms race will undermine international stability and will greatly increase the danger of the outbreak of war. The task of placing an effective barrier in the path of such a development has these days acquired particular significance and urgency. In essence, not a single delegation questions the genuine need to prevent the production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

At the same time, there are some divergences of views as to effective ways for bringing this about. Taking into account the existing basic and diversified approaches to the solution of the present problem, operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.43 requests the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to intensify negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons.

It is also important to take the first step towards the solution of this problem, and such a step could be declarations identical in substance by States permanent members of the Security Council as well as other militarily significant States concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Those statements could then be approved by a decision of the Security Council. An appeal for this step is to be found in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution.

Finally, in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.43, there is an appeal to all States to refrain from any action which could adversely affect the talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

A highly dangerous and potentially destabilizing character of the new qualitative advance in the arms race requires that we tackle the solution of large-scale problems and that we renounce the use of new discoveries and scientific and technological achievements for military purposes. As is known, the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in paragraph 39, mentions the need to intensify efforts so that scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

In this connection, our delegation has the honour to submit on behalf of the delegations of Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, Viet Nam and the Byelorussian SSR the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.46, headed "Renunciation of the use of new discoveries and scientific and technical achievements for military purposes".

In that draft resolution, the sponsors state that the General Assembly, recalling its Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind of 1975, and noting that scientific and technological progress has become one of the most important factors in the development of mankind, notes with concern the fact that new discoveries and scientific and technical achievements can be used to intensify dangerously the arms race and, recognizing the necessity to ensure that scientific and technological progress is used exclusively to serve the peaceful aspirations of humanity, calls upon all States to renounce the use of new discoveries and scientific and technological achievements for military purposes.

There is no doubt that this is a major and extensive problem and to find a solution to the problem is not an easy matter. Nevertheless, this problem has been raised by life itself and it is necessary that we work together to find a solution.

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that the draft resolutions introduced in this statement, A/C.1/37/L.43 and A/C.1/37/L.46, will meet with the support of delegations and, having been adopted by the General Assembly, will make a useful contribution to the cause of the limitation of the arms race in new directions, as well as of disarmament.



Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia): On behalf of a group of sponsors, namely Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zaire and Yugoslavia, I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/37/L/26 on the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session.

There is no doubt that this year the main event in the field of disarmament was the holding of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in which great hopes were placed by the majority of the international community. Our expectations were based on the real and urgent need to halt the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and to undertake concrete measures of disarmament. Then, as now, the unabated spiral of the arms race called for immediate action.

This year's debate in our Committee was marked by grave concern and disquiet over the failure to implement and to fulfil the obligations assumed at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, as well as over the lack of success of the second special session. It is an established fact that the second special session ended without achieving its major goals: a comprehensive programme of disarmament was not adopted, and neither a joint assessment of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted at the first special session nor an agreement on immediate measures to be undertaken in the sphere of disarmament in the near future was reached.

On the other hand, the accelerated accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, is a constant source of particular concern. We are witnessing an extraordinary deterioration of international relations, the revival of the cold war atmosphere and the deep crisis of détente, all of which directly threaten peace and security in the world. Numerous negotiations on certain issues of disarmament were interrupted or suspended. Negotiations on some major issues of disarmament, which were given the highest priority by the first special session on disarmament, have not yet been launched.

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

The Programme of Action adopted at the first special session thus continues to be of great significance, as was reconfirmed at the second special session. At the first special session, we unanimously agreed that the continuation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, jeopardizes the very foundations of our fragile international security. We agreed that stable and indivisible international peace can be achieved only by implementing a goal adopted long ago: general and complete disarmament under effective and strict international control. We determined certain principles of international co-operation in the field of disarmament, as well as the lines along which we should act in implementing programmes that were adopted. We agreed that nuclear-weapon States, particularly those countries which possess the most significant military potential, bear special responsibility for the launching and implementing of the process of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament.

The sponsors of this draft resolution are firmly convinced that it is high time that all countries, especially those which possess the most significant nuclear arsenals, undertake decisive measures aimed at implementing the recommendations and decisions that were unanimously adopted at the first special session on disarmament.

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

Proceeding from the assessment that legitimate expectations have not been fulfilled, the sponsors would like this draft resolution to give a new impetus to the efforts for the halting of the arms race and for the launching of the process of disarmament. In elaborating this draft resolution, we are motivated by the firm belief that the undertaking of urgent measures aimed at implementing the recommendations and decisions of the first special session is the best way to halt the arms race and to launch the process of genuine disarmament.

Bearing in mind the main goals of the draft resolution, as well as our common interest in the full implementation of recommendations and decisions of the first special session, I should like to express the conviction of the sponsors that the draft resolution will meet general approval and that it will be adopted by consensus.

Mr. AKHTAR (Bangladesh): I just wish to say that we are grateful to our colleague from Yugoslavia for the introduction of this draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.26. If the other sponsors have no objection, Bangladesh would also like to become a sponsor of this draft resolution.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure the other sponsors will have no objection to your joining them. The Secretariat will take note of this.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy): The issue of arms control and disarmament in outer space has attracted wide attention and special interest this year in the First Committee among all delegations. This testifies to the importance and the urgency of the issue. Building upon resolution 36/97 C adopted last year by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority, we have deemed it advisable to present this year, together with other interested delegations, a new draft resolution that could help effectively in promoting efforts devoted to preserving outer space as a peaceful environment.

I should like to introduce today draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.41 on prevention of an arms race in outer space, presented under agenda item 55 (b).



(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

I do so on behalf of the delegations of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Uruguay and my own.

The structure of this draft resolution is the following: the first five preambular paragraphs recall the basic principles which ought to inspire any efforts in this field. They are the principles which govern human activities in relation to the exploration and use of outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies and which are to be found in fundamental texts like resolution 1962 (XVIII) adopted by consensus in 1963 or the 1967 outer space Treaty.

The sixth preambular paragraph recalls the specific objective that we have chosen to pursue: that of preventing an arms race in outer space; it singles out, in this context, the most immediately threatening feature we ought to tackle - the development of space weapons intended to damage, destroy or interfere with satellites.

The remaining preambular paragraphs recall or note certain contributions made with regard to this issue: the two resolutions adopted last year on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the results of UNISPACE 82 and the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

The operative part embodies, in paragraph 3, the substantive approach to the subject matter that also characterized last year's resolution 36/97 C. It is our conviction that if we wish effectively to prevent an arms race in outer space we have to negotiate and adopt a number of diversified measures tailored to the present situation. This approach is perfectly in keeping with the Final Document of the first special session which exhorts the international community to adopt further effective measures to that end. Subparagraph (b) of operative paragraph 3 specifies that, as a first step, an effective and verifiable agreement should be negotiated to prohibit anti-satellite systems. It is our view that such negotiations would be perfectly suited to multilateral treatment in the appropriate forum, which is the Committee on Disarmament. In fact they would affect the interests of all States, well beyond the bilateral framework of the two major space Powers.

For this reason, operative paragraph 4 expresses the hope that the Committee on Disarmament will take the appropriate steps, such as the possible

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

establishment of an ad hoc working group, in order to promote the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space. It seemed to us that such a paragraph was needed to convey to the Committee on Disarmament the sense of urgency which has clearly emerged from our deliberations so far; it would indeed be desirable that the substantive consideration of the issue be continued next year, within the Committee on Disarmament, in the most effective and expeditious way. To this end, the establishment of the appropriate operational framework, such as an ad hoc working group, is called for.

Operative paragraph 4 is drafted, however, in such a way as to safeguard the autonomy of the Committee on Disarmament in matters regarding the organization of its work. It seems to us that it would not be appropriate for the General Assembly, a deliberative body, to address specific requests to the Committee on Disarmament concerning merely procedural questions, such as the establishment of a subsidiary body.

On behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.41, I should like to express our confidence that this initiative will receive the same wide support that last year accompanied resolution 36/97 C. We are aware that other draft resolutions have been or will be submitted concerning the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Indeed, we have been engaged with some of the proponents of those draft resolutions in an effort to harmonize texts and, if possible, to arrive at a common text. I would like to stress that this remains our aim and that we shall pursue our consultations to this end.

The consultations that we have had so far have convinced us that, besides well-known differences mainly related to the negotiating priorities, there exists a very large area of consensus upon which it appears possible and indeed desirable to elaborate a text which would attract consensus.

Mr. HASSAN (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): Item 56, "Israeli nuclear armament" has been on the agenda of the General Assembly since the thirty-fourth session. Since then the General Assembly has adopted resolution 34/89, on 11 September 1979, which includes the following words:

"Convinced that the development of nuclear capability by Israel would further aggravate the already dangerous situation in the region and further threaten international peace and security,

...

"Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to prepare a study on Israeli nuclear armament ...".

At the thirty-sixth session the General Assembly was to take note of the report of the Secretary-General on Israeli nuclear armament, in document A/36/431, and to express its deep alarm on reading in the report that Israel had the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and possessed the means of delivery of such weapons. Consequently the General Assembly called on all States and institutions to terminate all nuclear co-operation with Israel, at the same time requesting the Security Council to prohibit all forms of co-operation with Israel in the nuclear field and to institute effective enforcement action against Israel. The General Assembly also demanded that Israel should renounce, without delay, any possession of nuclear weapons and place all its nuclear activities under international safeguards.

Israel's nuclear activities are a growing cause of concern for the United Nations, for other international bodies and for the countries of the Middle East. That concern is reflected in many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Israel's possession of nuclear weapons could bring catastrophe both to the Middle East region and to the whole world. This can only be prevented if the necessary measures are taken at once. Those measures must include requiring Israel to renounce immediately any possession of nuclear weapons and to place all its nuclear activities under international safeguards, as well as to comply with all the resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency that concern Israel's nuclear activities.



(Mr. Hassan, Iraq)

The sponsors of the draft resolution are convinced of the importance of this question and wish to support the efforts of the United Nations to prevent a catastrophe with unimaginable consequences. I therefore wish, on behalf of Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait, Mali, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Iraq to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.31, relating to agenda item 56 "Israeli nuclear armament".

The sponsors consider that this draft resolution would make an important contribution to reducing tension in one of the most volatile regions in the world and to preventing the catastrophe that could result from Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that sincere attachment to the promotion of international peace and security is a prerequisite before we can come to this international forum and undertake such collective action. I believe that the vast majority of Members of this Assembly are convinced that Israel is trying to establish its superiority through nuclear blackmail in the Middle East, in addition to its policies of aggression, annexation and occupation. The responsibility to respond lies with the international community and with all peace-loving countries, whose goodwill is blocked by Israeli policies, which are a danger not only to the people of the region but to the whole world. Despite the decisions of the General Assembly and the appeals of the international community calling on Israel to abandon its nuclear weapon plans, Israel persists in its refusal to submit its nuclear facilities to international safeguards.

The draft resolution that I have the honour to introduce today deals with all those questions in the various operative paragraphs. At the same time it outlines the measures that the General Assembly should take to eliminate the threats that Israel constitutes to international peace and security.

Israel has made the most serious possible challenge to the international community, the Security Council and the General Assembly by declaring

(Mr. Hassan, Iraq)

officially its intention of repeating its armed attack against peaceful nuclear facilities in the region.

Paragraph 6 of the draft resolution condemns that arrogant policy, while paragraph 4:

"Calls upon all States to submit to the Secretary-General all information in their possession concerning the Israeli nuclear programme or any public or private assistance thereto".

This is designed to mobilize international solidarity in order to prevent a nuclear catastrophe in one of the regions of the world where tension is greatest.

In paragraph 3 the General Assembly

"Requests again the Security Council to investigate Israel's nuclear activities and the collaboration of other States, parties and institutions in these activities".

In paragraph 5 the General Assembly

"Requests the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action against Israel so as to prevent it from endangering international peace and security by its nuclear capability and by pursuing its policy of aggression, expansion and annexation of territories".

In paragraph 7 the Secretary-General is asked

"to keep Israeli nuclear activities under constant review and to report thereon as appropriate"

and in paragraph 8 he is requested

"in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States to follow closely the nuclear and military collaboration between Israel and South Africa and its dangers to peace and security, and to efforts aimed at establishing of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the Middle East".

(Mr. Hassan, Iraq)

We are convinced that draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.31 is a serious contribution to the defence of peace and security in a tense part of the world where united and effective international efforts are needed to ward off danger and prevent a nuclear catastrophe. We hope to see that the international community, as represented in this Committee, will support this draft resolution, and thus demonstrate its desire to end the terrible threat of nuclear war and eliminate the nuclear weapons that constitute a threat to international peace and security.



Mr. de la FUENTE (Peru)(interpretation from Spanish): Since its re-establishment by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, the Disarmament Commission has carried out its functions in accordance with the mandate set out in paragraph 113 of the Final Document. In doing so, it has considered and made recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament. More specifically, the Commission has been engaged in the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly. While it has completed consideration of a number of items on its agenda and has made concrete recommendations on them to the General Assembly, it has not been able, with regard to other items, to complete its work or to make recommendations to the General Assembly on those other items.

In the past year or so there has been a growing concern that the Disarmament Commission has been mired in inconclusive deliberations, and it has been accused of giving too much attention to items that did not lend themselves to concrete solution.

Many have said too that there is a need for change in the work of the Commission in order to allow it to carry out its functions in a more effective manner. In that regard, there seemed to be wide agreement that the Commission should consider specific aspects of disarmament questions and conclude such consideration with the appropriate recommendations. Notwithstanding this, it is also clear that this new approach should not prejudice the work that the Commission has done so far. Against this background, my delegation, together with the other sponsors of the draft resolution - Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, Liberia, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden and Yugoslavia - submits the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.42, on the item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session", dealing specifically with the report of the Disarmament Commission.

This draft resolution reaffirms the important role the Disarmament Commission has played and the significant contribution it has made in the field of disarmament. The draft resolution also expresses the need to strengthen the effectiveness of the Disarmament Commission. It reflects the concern regarding a new approach to the work of the Commission, and requests the Commission to continue its work, in accordance with its mandate, and, to that end, to direct its attention

(Ur. de la Fuente, Peru)

at each substantive session to specific subjects from among those which have been and will be under its consideration, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and to make concrete recommendations on such subjects to the subsequent sessions of the General Assembly. As to the duration of the Commission's period of work, we believe that, as set out in paragraph 118 (c) of the Final Document, it should not exceed four weeks.

The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.42 addresses itself to all the aspects of the work of the Commission. As for other issues, such as the date for its 1983 substantive session and the items to be considered at that session, we hope that they will be the subject of consultations and discussion at the organizational meeting which will be held in December this year.

It is the hope of Peru and the other sponsors that the draft resolution I am submitting will be adopted by consensus.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. RATHORE (Secretary of the Committee): I wish first to apologize to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic for a typographical error in the Arabic version of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.41: the agenda item should be 55 (b), rather than 55 (a).

The following delegations have announced their sponsorship of the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/37/L.4/Rev.1, Congo; L.10, Bangladesh and Tunisia; L.11, Ecuador; L.12, Yugoslavia; L.17, Spain; L.19 and L.20, Mali; L.22/Rev.1, Malta; L.23, Mali, Malta, Qatar, Sudan and Turkey; L.24, Congo and Mali; L.26 and L.27, Bangladesh and Congo; L.28, Mali and Qatar; L.30, Mali; L.31, Mali and Mauritania; L.44, Norway; L.45, Sri Lanka and Brazil; and L.46, Mali.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to repeat, for the benefit of those who were not here at the beginning of this meeting, that all delegations intending to introduce draft resolutions should endeavour to do so tomorrow. I am in the process of finding out whether we can have a meeting tomorrow evening or Saturday morning in order to conclude this work, if there are enough requests for the introduction of draft resolutions. I hope we can conclude the introduction of draft resolutions by this weekend so that from Monday on we can devote total attention to the voting on draft resolutions. Therefore I ask members to be ready to introduce their draft resolutions tomorrow. I take it that any draft resolutions not introduced by this weekend will not be introduced next week.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.