

# CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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30 July 1974

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 30 July 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. N.A. Naik

(Pakistan)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. M.T. DA SILVA
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. R. NIKOLOV Mr. B. GRINBERG
<u>Burma:</u>	U WIN PE
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. A.D. ROWE
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. J. STRUCKA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. A. EL-ERIAN Mr. N. ELARABY Mr. S.A. ABOU-ALI
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. G. DEMISSIE
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. I. KÖMIVES Mr. I. KÖRMENDY
<u>India:</u>	Mr. B.C. MISHRA Mr. M.K. MANGALMURTI
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. N. DI BERNARDO Mr. P. BRUNI Mr. A. BIZZARINI
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. M. NISIBORI Mr. A. YATABE Mr. H. OKA Mr. T. AMARI Mr. H. TSUJIMOTO

Mexico:

Mr. M. MARÍN

Mongolia:

Mr. M. DUGERSUREN

Mr. J. CHOINKHOR

Morocco:

Mr. S.M. RAHHALI

Netherlands:

Mr. M.J. ROSENBERG POLAK

Mr. E. BOS

Nigeria:

Mr. B. AKPORODE CLARK

Mr. OLAJIDE ALO

Pakistan:

Mr. N.A. NAIK

Mr. K. SALEEM

Mr. M.J. KHAN

Poland:

Mr. E. WYZNER

Mr. A. CZERKAWSKI

Romania:

Mr. C. ENE

Mr. V. TUDOR

Mr. A. SASU

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON

Mr. L. ECKERBERG

Mr. U. REINIUS

Mr. A. HERNELIUS

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN

Mr. N.V. PESTEREV

Mr. I.P. GLAZKOV

Mr. J.P. KLUKIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. H.C. HAINWORTH

Mr. J.G. TAYLOR

Mr. I.C. SLOANE

United States of America:

Mr. J. MARTIN

Mr. R.W. DREXLER

Mr. R. EINHORN

Mr. D.D. STEDHAM

Yugoslavia:

Mr. V. BLAZ

Mr. M. LALOVIĆ

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. ILKKA PASTINEN

Alternate Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 647th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Niaz A. Naik, representative of Pakistan.

Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and India.

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 1 August 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

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Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): It was not long ago -- it seems to me -- that in my first major statement in the Committee I noted that there were possibilities for real progress in the disarmament work this year. Different aspects of the imperative need for such progress were discussed, including, obviously, the need to curtail nuclear weapons. I said, as has been said many times by many delegations, that the most important immediate step which can be taken to halt the nuclear arms race is a comprehensive test ban. I also referred to the increased proliferation risks emanating from continued tests of nuclear weapons.

Much has happened since then, but not very much which can be welcomed from a disarmament's point of view. Nuclear testing has not been suspended. On the contrary, six countries have exploded nuclear devices during the last two months. That means that more countries have carried out nuclear explosions during this short period than ever before. The two super-Powers have regrettably continued their testing in the traditional manner, thereby violating the spirit of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII)). An agreement between the two to stop their testing completely would obviously improve the prospects considerably for a global cessation of all nuclear tests within not too distant a future. It is our considered opinion that the risks that the super-Powers run by continuing testing are greater than the risks connected with a prohibition of all tests.

It is also disappointing to find that we have again three testing nuclear-weapon Powers in this Committee. As announced by the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons in late June, the United Kingdom Government has carried out a nuclear-weapons test, stating at the same time that it shares the concern of other parties to the NPT about the urgent need to strengthen the Treaty. The weapons testing of the three depositary countries does not strengthen the NPT. I think we can agree on that.

Again this summer two nuclear-weapon States are testing in the atmosphere. The Swedish Government deplores the continuation of these atmospheric tests in defiance of the purpose of the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). We direct a new appeal to these two countries to adhere in effect to the treaty and thereby make it universal. Those who still remain outside take upon themselves a heavy burden of responsibility.

It can be said that from a purely environmental point of view atmospheric tests are more harmful than underground explosions. The fact that most test explosions at present take place underground obviously reduces the health hazards from radioactive fall-out. However, this in no way makes underground tests acceptable. For the development of nuclear weapons there is nowadays little difference between the two kinds of tests.

Mrs. Thorsson (Sweden)

Recently a sixth nuclear-explosion Power has emerged in the world arena. The Swedish Government has expressed its deep concern about the fact that India has decided to enter upon a nuclear-explosions programme, even though we have taken note of its assurances that this is for peaceful purposes only. Just as the testing of the five nuclear-weapon Powers endangers the NPT, any nuclear explosion by a new country obviously sharply increases the risk of further nuclear-weapons proliferation. The NPT is by nature discriminatory, but its purpose is such that it has been supported by the majority, and needs to be supported by the entirety, of the world community. It is in the interest of every single country in the world that this purpose be fulfilled.

In this context I should like to refer to certain press reports on the potential danger of India's example being followed by other so called threshold States. I feel compelled to state that, as far as Sweden is concerned, there is no such temptation. My country's adherence to the NPT is firm.

One particular aspect of the recent development of nuclear weaponry which has caused concern to my Government is the interest shown in making and deploying nuclear mini-weapons, i.e. nuclear weapons with very small yields, close to or even overlapping the yield range of conventional weapons. Last year my predecessor Mrs. Myrdal posed a number of questions to the nuclear-weapon Powers in the CCD about the situation as regards those weapons (CCD/PV.620, pages 14, 15). I am indeed very pleased to note that two of the delegations concerned have now replied to those questions.

I first wish to thank the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Hainworth, for his statement (CCD/PV.625) last year that the United Kingdom has taken no decision "to develop, test, or deploy a new generation of small yield tactical nuclear weapons", and that

"in the view of the British Government, Security Council resolution 255 refers to nuclear aggression of any type whatsoever, and the statement made by the United Kingdom representative at the 1430th meeting of the Security Council is to be read in that sense".

I also want to thank the representative of the United States, Mr. Martin, for the comprehensive replies he gave on 23 May. We are particularly happy to note his explicit statement

"That the United States Government has no intention whatsoever to treat such tactical systems as interchangeable with conventional arms. We fully appreciate that the distinction, or 'firebreak', between nuclear and non-nuclear arms is a major factor in preventing nuclear warfare, and we will not act to erode this distinction" (CCD/PV.638, page 28).

Mrs. Thorsson (Sweden)

My delegation also attaches the utmost importance to Mr. Martin's unequivocal "Yes" (ibid., page 29) to our questions whether the agreement between the United States and the USSR on the prevention of nuclear war would apply to wars in which only "mini-nukes" were used, and also whether the United States interprets Security Council resolution 255 (1968) concerning security assurances as applying to nuclear aggression in which only "mini-nukes" were used (CCD/PV.620, page 15). We think that the position taken on the issue of nuclear mini-weapons by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States is reassuring. It should remove one of the potential dangers to the NPT regime, something which is badly needed in these days. We hope that a similar statement will soon be forthcoming from the representative of the USSR. This would enable the CCD to close the issue.

For several years now we have all with keen interest been following what we could discern about the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the results achieved there by the two super-Powers. Sometimes the reports have been reassuring, sometimes disappointing, and sometimes outright disquieting. We welcome the agreement at the recent Moscow summit meeting to abstain mutually from a second ABM site, which reinforces the important ADM Treaty of 1972. However, the continuing stalemate and pessimistic undertones regarding the central issue of curbing offensive strategic nuclear weapons give rise to misgiving as to the possibilities of containing the still accelerated arms race in this field.

In order to enable parties -- and non-parties -- to the NPT to take stock of the efforts undertaken by the two main nuclear-weapon Powers in pursuit of article VI of the Treaty, it is desirable for them to have official access to all the texts of agreements and protocols in this field. It should be in the interest of those two Powers to make available any material which could speak in their favour. We therefore fail to understand the decision to keep secret the text of the Protocol regarding offensive weapons signed in Moscow on 3 July. The results of SALT are of great interest and importance to the whole world community. Public opinion can well understand why the negotiations must be kept secret, but reacts with suspicion when information is withheld concerning the agreements reached. Such an attitude does not contribute to the indispensable process of confidence-building between the two super-Powers and the rest of the world.

Now, I should like to examine in some detail the test-ban issue, starting with the threshold test ban signed at the recent summit meeting in Moscow. The first question to consider is obviously the threshold test ban's effect on nuclear test explosions.

Mrs. Thorsson (Sweden)

After 31 March 1976 nuclear-weapons testing by the two Powers will be limited to yields below 150 kilotons and confined to a number of designated military test sites. From an analysis which our scientists have made on available observations and publications, I have learned that in recent years the nuclear explosions tests above 150 kilotons have constituted not even ten per cent of the United States and not even twenty per cent of the Soviet testing. We therefore foresee, at most, a moderate decrease of the frequency of United States and Soviet tests after the coming into force of the threshold test ban. Before that cut-off date we unfortunately must count on an increase in the number of tests above the 150 kiloton threshold. This has already been foreshadowed by reports from the United States about requests for new funds for this purpose.

The only advantage I can find in this particular aspect of the threshold test ban is that the eventual disappearance of the most powerful tests will perhaps allay some of the fears always felt by the general public. I can only hope that this will not develop into a false feeling of security and thereby lessen the vigilance of the general public against all nuclear testing. The administrations directly responsible for the testing under the bilateral threshold test ban will, I fear, be led into the mistaken feeling that testing below the 150 kiloton threshold has now been legitimized. They may well become even less inclined than before to strive for a comprehensive test ban. It is perhaps significant -- though I hope not -- that on the very day that we could read in the joint communiqué from Moscow that both sides were in favour of a comprehensive test ban and that the threshold test ban was an important step in this direction -- on that very day Secretary of Defense Schlesinger said in Washington that those who wait for a comprehensive test-ban agreement might "wait eternally". A bilateral agreement cannot legitimize activities to which the United Nations General Assembly has called for an end for so many years.

As we assess the capabilities of seismology, the threshold could from the identification point of view have been put considerably lower than 150, indeed below ten kilotons. That would have been a very different -- quite significant -- threshold treaty. As it is, there must be some other explanation than the verification issue of the selection of the very high threshold of 150 kilotons. What influence will in fact the bilateral threshold test ban have on the future of nuclear weaponry?

Mrs. Thorsson (Sweden)

We can expect that eventually the United States and the Soviet Union will not deploy any new nuclear-weapons systems with warhead yields in the awesome megaton range. With the long lead-times needed for the development of weapons systems we cannot, however, expect this effect for five or ten years from now. During the next few years, we may, on the contrary, expect deployment of some new high-yield nuclear weapons systems.

In other words, nuclear disarmament has not begun. Recent developments in the technique of finding and hitting targets, such as using satellites and what has been called "smart" bombs which look for and run towards the target, will increase the precision of missiles to the extent that the demand for the most powerful nuclear weapons will be diminishing. Instead of near misses with powerful nuclear explosions, it will be possible to achieve direct hits with weaker nuclear explosions. This appears to be the simple technical reason behind the threshold test ban.

The disappearance of the strongest nuclear weapons would reduce the horrible damage to be expected in the event of strategic nuclear weapons ever being used. This gain, however, would be partly offset by the acquisition by both super-Powers of the much-debated MIRV missiles, which would permit them to shower each other and any part of our planet with a several times increased number of weaker nuclear explosions, where "weaker" still means several times stronger than the Hiroshima bomb. Must this be our perspective of the future?

Furthermore, the appearance of a large number of less powerful but more accurate missiles in the strange world of deterrence has been considered by some to increase the likelihood of an outbreak of nuclear war. That is another case of the classical dialectic problem in matters of war and peace, where often a decrease of the consequences of war is compensated by an increase of its likelihood, and vice versa.

The threshold test ban is a bilateral treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Its bilateral nature, in combination with the international concern about the tools of deterrence and nuclear war, must generate a feeling of being ruled over by the Big Two. The rest of the world cannot accept to be left outside the course of events. We in the CCD, to which the United Nations General Assembly has delegated the task of negotiating world-wide disarmament, must continuously study how this bilateral Treaty affects all other States.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The comprehensive test ban remains the priority item on the agenda of our Committee. Will, then, the threshold test ban make the comprehensive test ban easier to attain? We hope so, but we can see arguments both for and against. It can be feared that the parties will regard this as a convenient closure of the test-ban issue, despite the undertaking to treat the threshold test ban as a first step towards a comprehensive test ban. On the other hand, the detailed control co-operation foreseen in the threshold test ban could well generate so much understanding and trust that at least the control issue in connexion with a comprehensive test ban could be set aside by the super-Powers. Sweden will continue to contribute political, scientific and technical efforts to this end.

The control arrangements foreseen in the threshold test ban itself and the Protocol to it are, in other words, an important aspect of the agreement. The first task for the parties will be to identify explosions, the next to monitor the location and strength of the explosions, in order to verify that they are inside the test sites and below the 150-kiloton threshold. The two Powers have agreed to assist each other in solving the special problems in regard to the threshold by exchanging information on the location and geophysical characteristics of the military test sites and the explosions, including explosions for calibration.

Other States would also be interested in monitoring the explosions and the adherence to the yield threshold. They would probably wish to contribute their measurements to the observations made by the two parties. Contributions from many widespread observatories would indeed assist this task materially. On the other hand, access to the particulars about the test sites and the shot data will be essential for their proper interpretation of the events. It would therefore be both politically and technically appropriate to make data on test sites and explosion data available to other governments and to pool all observations on the events. It is not clear from the threshold test ban and its Protocol whether this is intended or not. The Swedish delegation would welcome a statement by the co-Chairmen on this point.

The two Powers will also have to distinguish between earthquakes and explosions on each other's territory. Under the threshold test ban the identification problems are somewhat modified by the confinement of military tests to designated test sites, whereas explosions for peaceful purposes are to be conducted outside these sites. If the test sites are placed in non-seismic areas the identification problem there will be quite small; but outside these areas it will remain necessary to distinguish between earthquakes and explosions. In particular the parties will have to deal with the many earthquakes in seismic areas.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

All this should be another good reason for them to take advantage of an international pooling of seismometric observations. This is indeed the occasion to institute the international data exchange advocated for many years by the Swedish delegation, for the first time in 1965 (ENDC/154). The idea has been supported by a number of States; we have also noted that the representative of the Soviet Union has repeatedly declared that his Government would be ready to join in and contribute to such a data exchange in the event of an underground test ban.

The parties will also have to find out whether explosions outside the test sites are non-nuclear or nuclear and, in the latter case, whether they are for peaceful purposes or not. The solution of these problems will depend on an agreement about peaceful nuclear explosions which remains to be concluded between the two Powers. We have understood that there is an agreement in principle that observers will be present at such explosions. I hope indeed that this will mean not merely bilateral but international observation. The International Atomic Energy Agency has, in co-operation with the two Powers and other States, already formulated and agreed on procedures for the international observation of peaceful nuclear explosions under the NPT. These procedures could be considered a suitable starting-point for the working-out of procedures for the international observation of such explosions also in the territories of the two super-Powers.

Apart from the technicalities of identification under the threshold test ban of military nuclear explosions and peaceful nuclear explosions, particular political importance must be attached to the achievement of international observation of peaceful nuclear explosions. By this I mean not only such explosions under the NPT -- that is when the NPT nuclear Powers perform peaceful nuclear explosions by way of assistance under article V -- but also when the nuclear-weapons Powers carry out peaceful nuclear explosions for their own purposes anywhere. Such an undertaking would constitute a good example and would considerably ease the task of arranging international observations of peaceful nuclear explosions made by countries still outside the NPT.

The threshold test ban gives peaceful nuclear explosions a new and rather distinct place. Together with the attention already given to them under the NPT, and the recent carrying-out of a peaceful nuclear explosion by India -- an event which has adversely affected the efforts to stop the spread of nuclear-explosion capability -- peaceful nuclear explosions have obtained a political importance which compels me to take up some more general aspects.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Peaceful nuclear explosions give rise to a number of international problems. Under the NPT they were offered as a compensation for the undertaking by the non-nuclear weapon States not to develop nuclear devices. This provision of the NPT has so far not been implemented. The United States development of peaceful nuclear explosions has slowed down, perhaps for purely domestic reasons but enough to generate doubts about the general usefulness of such explosions. The Soviet programme appears more vigorous and contains a few applications which could be quite successful.

In order to implement the NPT fully in regard to peaceful nuclear explosions, an international agreement on such explosions must be concluded. The stipulation in article V of the Treaty on this matter provides us with a base for negotiation. This would of course be a political matter and therefore a proper task for the CCD to undertake. The special international agreement must state explicitly that the potential benefits of peaceful explosions shall be made available on a non-discriminatory basis to those countries that forego production of nuclear devices. The technical feasibility of a particular project, its economic, health and safety aspects, should be evaluated by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The overall advisability of the project should in our view be determined by a political international body. This body should also have the authority to license such a project. When it comes to the execution of the project, the International Atomic Energy Agency again would have an important role to play in arranging for and controlling the actual explosion.

This is, of course, only one aspect of the general desideratum, or rather imperative, that the use of nuclear energy in general should be under the control of an international regime. This is a matter which I should like to elaborate in some general terms.

The initial success achieved in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons may turn into a frightening failure. We must request all parties to the NPT to take further action to implement articles IV, V and VI, and appeal to States not yet parties to adhere to the treaty. But new vigorous efforts are also necessary to guide the course of events into a positive direction. We must ask ourselves whether a new approach might not be necessary to tackle the problem of control, a more powerful and effective approach than the one now prescribed in article III. In view of all the recent events, it is necessary to strengthen the barrier which must be kept between the peaceful uses of the atom and its use in nuclear weapons. The present safeguards system can detect but not prevent the diversion of nuclear materials. It is, in other words, only an inspection and accounting system. Most important, it lacks, so far, application to all facilities in all countries.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

A country which exports nuclear material and equipment for exclusively peaceful use cannot feel safe that its exported material or equipment will not in some future be used for bombs or other explosive devices. In addition to this danger of proliferation, the accelerating world production of plutonium as a by-product of peaceful nuclear energy constitutes a formidable problem in the handling of large quantities of this highly radioactive and supertoxic material. It is obvious that the free utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as foreseen in article IV of the NPT, will not be possible if the barrier is not secure.

Facing these grave prospects, I wish to recall that, when the International Atomic Energy Agency was established, the aim was to provide such a barrier. I wish to suggest for the consideration of the Committee that these aims now be realized. In considering this I have been inspired by certain elements in the proposals discussed during the 1940s in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and also by elements of the Euratom Treaty and the IAEA Statute itself. It might be necessary to extend the present safeguards system, which can detect but not prevent any misuse of nuclear material, to include a system for physical protection of all stockpiles of nuclear material, for stockpiling by the Agency of all excess nuclear material. One could also consider International Atomic Energy Agency ownership of all nuclear material in the same way as the Euratom Supply Agency is supposed to "own" all nuclear material within the Community. However, what I primarily have in mind is an internationalization of the management of nuclear material, the key task being not only to watch but also to protect all the material in order to prevent nuclear-weapons proliferation and guarantee the safest possible management of nuclear-energy production. The matter is indeed complex, but it is our conviction that the Committee cannot avoid facing it one way or another.

We believe that establishing sufficiently strong international measures for the effective control of the use of nuclear energy must be part of an indispensable process of creating internationally-designed and accepted policies in areas of crucial importance to the future of mankind. The Swedish delegation will continue to give serious thought and consideration to the ideas which we have presented in a very preliminary form today. We know that many other delegations share the fears which underlie these ideas. We hope that an exchange of views will take place in the forum of this Committee.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

The prohibition of chemical weapons is a major problem to which the Committee on Disarmament has been giving much attention for several years. This problem has also been considered for decades in various international forums with the aim of removing the danger of chemical warfare. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 was a major international act concluded for that purpose. Although this important international instrument prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, it does not prohibit their development, production or stockpiling or provide for their destruction. But so long as chemical means of warfare are being developed, produced and stockpiled, the danger of their use in war will never be fully eliminated. The task, therefore, is to go further than the Geneva Protocol in removing the danger of chemical warfare.

The discussion in the Committee on Disarmament of the problem of banning chemical weapons has not so far produced any solution to the problem. The Western States are not yet ready to proceed to practical consideration of the proposal for the complete prohibition of such weapons. The state of the negotiations on banning chemical weapons was reviewed at the third Soviet-United States summit meeting held recently. With a view to making progress towards the solution of this problem and reaching an effective international agreement which would exclude such dangerous instruments of mass destruction from the arsenals of States, the USSR and the United States agreed to consider a joint initiative in the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare. This agreement was embodied in the joint Soviet-United States communiqué signed in Moscow on 3 July.

The intention of the USSR and the United States to achieve progress in the solution of the problem of banning chemical weapons is a significant development in this field, which in our opinion is bound to give an impetus to the Committee's work on all aspects of this problem.

The Committee has before it two documents containing concrete proposals on the problem: the draft convention on the complete prohibition of chemical means of warfare submitted by the Socialist countries (CCD/361), and the draft convention on the phasing-out of these means submitted by Japan (CCD/420). The socialist countries, as the sponsors of the draft convention providing for the complete prohibition of chemical means of warfare, have for years been pressing for the prohibition of all types of chemical weapons and for the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons. Accordingly the draft convention of the socialist countries, as regards the scope of the prohibition, is based on the "purpose criterion"; in other words, it provides

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

for prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling, and for the destruction, of all types of chemical agents intended to be used as means of warfare and not for peaceful purposes.

The Japanese draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CCD/420), as regards its scope, contains a provision similar to that of the socialist countries. The Japanese draft provides for the parties to the convention to undertake never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain chemical weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents for hostile purposes. On the key question of the scope of the ban, the draft conventions of the socialist countries and of Japan thus coincide.

Unlike the draft convention of the socialist countries, however, the Japanese draft states in its article IV that the Parties to the convention may take provisional measures providing for exceptions to the prohibitions concerning chemical weapons. What are those exceptions going to be? The Japanese draft convention gives no answer to this question. The States whose views have been taken into account in article IV of the Japanese draft, allowing limitations and exceptions to the prohibition of chemical weapons, have not yet disclosed their attitude towards the essence of the scope of the prohibition of such weapons. That is why it is not clear to what extent and in what direction these States intend to make use of the provision contained in article IV.

As we see it, article IV of the Japanese text has been drafted to clear the way to an agreement and to the participation in this agreement of Japan's Western partners, who, as is well known, are not ready to agree to the complete prohibition of chemical means of warfare but are supposed to be willing to consider the question of such prohibition with certain exceptions.

No agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons can be reached unless the Western countries take the necessary political decision concerning the scope of the prohibition -- a decision which would have to be acceptable to other States. Needless to say, a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons must contain equal provisions for all its parties. There cannot be different obligations for States parties concerning the scope of the prohibition; in other words, complete prohibition for some parties and a prohibition with exceptions for others. Such an unequal approach to solution of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons would not be justified, since it would contradict the principle of equal security for all sides.

Until the position of the militarily significant Western States on the scope of the ban on chemical weapons has been clearly determined, it will hardly be possible in practice to make progress in the negotiations on the problem of the prohibition of such weapons within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Verification of the fulfilment by the States parties to the convention of their obligations is another important problem pertaining to a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The draft conventions submitted to the Committee by the socialist countries and by Japan offer different approaches to the problem of control. The draft of the socialist countries is based on national means of observation and control by the use of certain international procedures. The Japanese draft provides for the establishment of an international verification agency entitled to conduct international on-site inspections. However important the problem of organizing control over the prohibition of chemical weapons may be, it is a secondary one. The way it is handled in all its concrete aspects might be made to depend on the measure of agreement reached regarding the scope of the prohibition and regarding the problem of banning chemical weapons altogether.

We note with satisfaction the work accomplished at informal meetings of the Committee with the participation of experts from 17 to 22 July on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Twenty-two experts from thirteen States members of the Committee took part in those meetings. The meetings gave evidence of the great interest of States in the solution of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as of their concern at the present regrettable stagnation of the negotiations on this problem in the Committee. The active participation of experts from many countries of the world in the discussion of technical aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons has attracted much attention to these issues and has stimulated their discussion both in the Committee and in other international forums.

The question of the scope of the prohibition of chemical weapons loomed large in the statements made by the experts. In the choice of a criterion for defining the scope of the prohibition, it is necessary to bear in mind that the ban must cover all types of chemical weapons. In this connexion we should like to note that the "purpose criterion" for defining the scope of the prohibition has been widely recognized as the most appropriate and realistic approach. The main advantage of this criterion is its universality, which ensures the comprehensive prohibition of chemical means of warfare. The acceptance of this criterion makes it possible to prohibit not only known substances but also any other toxic substances whose properties may be studied in the future. Another argument in favour of the "purpose criterion" is that it also covers binaries, which turn into chemical weapons at the moment of application, and substances used for destroying useful plants. Consequently the "purpose criterion" would guarantee the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, which is the eventual goal of any solution to this problem. However, in view of the possibility of solving the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons by stages, it becomes necessary to supplement the "purpose criterion" by some other criteria.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

In the discussion of the technical aspects by the experts, considerable attention was devoted to the problems of supervising the prohibition of chemical weapons. Many aspects of these problems were broached, in particular that of the basis of supervision—national or international means of observation and supervision. At the meetings of experts data were produced on the difficulties that would arise from international supervision of the production of chemical agents—especially of dual-purpose agents—and, of course, from supervision of research. In such supervision the questions arise of protecting the rights of industrial and intellectual property, in view of the need for patenting new chemical substances, processes and production technology. Many chemical firms, especially those producing dual-purpose agents, and research institutes and laboratories will not agree to acquaint foreign specialists with their activities. Visits by such specialists to industrial enterprises and research institutes could reveal industrial secrets and nullify the protection of industrial property. The conclusion, therefore, is that international supervision of cessation of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons is impracticable.

Moreover, the very presence of foreign observers during the conversion to peaceful purposes or the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons could in certain circumstances lead to the revelation of industrial secrets. In this connexion we should like to point out that their presence might also lead to the revelation of secrets regarding the nature and character of the chemical agents to be destroyed. This could, in the event of abuse by an observer of his rights, lead to proliferation of lethal chemical means of warfare. In addition, methods can be developed for chemical conversion of war-oriented chemical agents to peaceful purposes. Here, too, the question arises of protecting industrial property. This idea was confirmed in the discussions of the experts at the informal meetings.

In view of the difficulties involved in the organization of international supervision of prohibition of chemical weapons and, indeed, of its impracticability, we believe that a solution to the problem of supervising such prohibition should be sought in the use of national means of supervision, supplemented by certain international procedures. In this connexion the Soviet expert expressed the view that international supervisory bodies could act in accordance with an international

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

programme containing the necessary rules and standards. This programme could be elaborated and adopted at an international conference of experts. A standardized programme would make it possible to eliminate any shortcomings in the day-to-day work of national supervision committees.

In a system of national supervision of prohibition of chemical weapons, the representatives of national supervisory committees could acquaint themselves with the work of the chemical undertakings of the country, and visit plants and research institutes. The national supervisory committees could be empowered by law to visit any undertaking whose work they thought they should see. Divulgence of industrial secrets by national inspectors would be prevented by State legislation. The national supervisory system could also be supplemented by international co-operation, such as an exchange of information between States on the production of chemicals and so on.

In building up a system for national supervision of prohibition of chemical weapons, use could be made of the experience of organizations engaged in the protection of the environment, in the campaign against illicit traffic in drugs, and in supervision of the production of goods subject to special State regulations concerning their sale and consumption.

The exchange of expert opinion at the informal meetings should contribute to the elaboration of an agreed approach to these problems, as well as to progress in the talks on prohibition of chemical weapons.

In order to stop the production of chemical means of warfare, it would be effective to introduce changes in the patent law of countries signing an agreement on prohibition of chemical weapons, with a view to banning the patenting of chemical agents designed for military purposes, and to cancelling all existing chemical-weapon patents and destroying all means of using them for military purposes.

In conclusion, we should like to stress the positive contribution which the experts taking part in the discussions on the question of prohibiting chemical weapons made to the consideration of this problem. The exchange of views with their participation will throw a clearer light on the situation and on the difficulties arising in the talks on prohibiting chemical means of warfare. At the same time we would also point out that, for real progress in prohibiting chemical weapons, States should above all be prepared to ban chemical weapons and to make appropriate political decisions. Without political decisions by States in the matter of chemical weapons, the ideas and conclusions of the experts will not advance the talks on this problem, whatever the intentions or aspirations of the scientists who have tried here, at the informal meetings of the Committee, to enrich our knowledge of the highly complex field of chemical weapons.

Mr. MISHRA (India): We have listened with great attention to the statement made this morning by the Under-Secretary of State, Mrs. Thorsson, leader of the Swedish delegation. We have no doubt that many of the points mentioned therein would contribute to our work in this Committee. I would like to express my gratitude to Mrs. Thorsson for her statement that she has taken note of our assurances that our nuclear explosion is for peaceful purposes only. While we agree with many points made in her general statement this morning, obviously my delegation does not accept her perspective of our peaceful nuclear explosion and her estimate of the consequences which might flow from it. At a future meeting I may state our appreciation of the situation and also reply to a few points made at earlier meetings of the Committee by other representatives.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.