

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 3 August 1976, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G.A. Maciel (Brazil)

SECRET

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:

Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI

Mr. J.M. OTEGUI

Brazil:

Mr. G.A. MACIEL

Mr. I.M.A. MASTROGIOVANNI

Bulgaria:

Mr. B. GRINBERG

Mr. M. SREBREV

Burma:

U THA TUN

Canada:

Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. RŮŽEK

Mr. V. SOJÁK

Egypt:

Mr. F. EL IBRAHIM

Mr. S.A. ABOU-ALI

Miss L. EMARA

Ethiopia:

Mr. W. BERHANU

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER

Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G.J. SCHLAICH

Mr. J. BAUCH

Mr. K. HANNESSCHLÄGER

Hungary:

Mr. I. KÖRMENDY

India:

Mr. B.C. MISHRA

Mr. P.R. SOOD

Mr. P.K. GUPTA

<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. M. FARTASH
	Mr. H. AMERI
	Miss C. TAHMASSEB
	Mr. D. CHILATY
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
	Mr. G. VALDEVIT
	Mr. A. BIZZARINI
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. M. OGISO
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
	Mr. T. SAWAI
	Mr. H. OKA
	Mr. M. OBATA
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. S. CAMPOS-ICARDO
	Mr. M.A. CÁCERES
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. B. JARGALSAIKHAN
	Mr. P. KHALIOUNE
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. C.A. VAN DER KLAUW
	Mr. A.J. MEERBURG
	Mr. A.R. RITSEMA
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. B. AKPORODE CLARK
	Mr. S.T. ADAMU
	Mr. G.S. AKUNWAFOR
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. K. SALEEM
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. L. CHÁVEZ-GODOY

Poland:

Mr. E. WYZNER

Mr. A. OLSZOWKA

Mr. T. FIECKO

Mr. H. PAC

Mr. A. CZERKAWSKI

Romania:

Mr. C. IVASCU

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON

Mr. G. HAMILTON

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.I. LIKHATCHEV

Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN

Mr. N.V. PESTEREV

Mr. L.A. NAUMOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. M.E. ALLEN

Mr. J.G. TAYLOR

Mr. I.R. KENYON

Mr. M. THIRLAWAY

United States of America:

Mr. D.P. BLACK

Mr. P.S. CORDEN

Mr. N. WALDROP

Mr. J.C. BOWDEN

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. RISTO HYVÄRINEN

Alternate Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. A. CORRADINI

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 717th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador George A. Maciel, representative of Brazil.

The representative of Iran (H.E. Ambassador M. Fartash) made a statement on chemical weapons. He termed the recently concluded informal meetings on the subject serious and rewarding and expressed the satisfaction of his delegation at the fact that the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had already discussed the issues involved and that they intended to continue their contacts. He expressed the hope that the CCD would be kept informed of the results of their bilateral contacts and that those bilateral contacts and the CCD negotiations could proceed simultaneously.

The representative of Czechoslovakia (H.E. Ambassador Miloslav Růžek) made a statement in which references were made to the convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, to the ban of new types and new systems of weapons, to the ban of chemical weapons and to the Mid-term Review of the Disarmament Decade.

The representative of Pakistan (Mr. Khalid Saleem) made a statement on the draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.

The representative of the Netherlands (H.E. Ambassador C.A. van der Klaauw) made a statement on the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States on 28 May 1976, and on a comprehensive test ban.

The representative of Nigeria (H.E. Ambassador B. Akporode Clark) summed up his appreciation of the Mid-term Review of the Disarmament Decade which the CCD has undertaken in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3470 (XXX), and submitted a working paper on the subject.

The following document was submitted:

"Letter dated 28 July 1976 from Mr. Leif Blomqvist of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Finland on Finnish capabilities of seismological detection of underground nuclear explosions" (CCD/509).

The delegation of Nigeria submitted a "Working paper on conclusions of the Mid-term Review of the Disarmament Decade" (CCD/510).

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 5 August 1976, at 10.30 a.m.

Mr. FARTASH (Iran): The CCD has recently completed a very fruitful informal meeting on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. There has been, we believe, a serious and rewarding exchange of views between the experts on the subject which has helped to advance the Committee's work towards an eventual treaty. This situation contrasts favourably with that which prevailed last year, when I presented the views of my delegation on the question of chemical disarmament. At that time the CCD seemed to be marking time, waiting to see whether the promised joint United States-Soviet initiative would materialize.

Even though this has not been the case, the reluctance to engage the CCD in this discussion has fortunately been overcome. We have studied attentively the very informative statement made by Ambassador Martin at our 702nd meeting, and we welcome the views of the Soviet Union on the most pertinent aspects of CW problems presented by Ambassador Likhatchev on 22 July. It was, moreover, a matter of some satisfaction to learn that the issues presented in the United States statement had already been discussed with the Soviet Union and that these two countries intended to continue their contacts. We assume that the CCD will be kept informed of the problems encountered bilaterally, and that the negotiations can proceed simultaneously.

The experts' meeting was therefore particularly encouraging, and hopefully has moved us off dead-centre on this issue. For this we would like to congratulate the Federal Republic of Germany for having proposed these meetings and to thank the experts who shared their knowledge and wisdom with us.

I would like also to convey our appreciation to the esteemed leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, for the draft comprehensive CW convention which the United Kingdom plans to table at our Conference. If it can weave the useful pieces of previous drafts into a workable framework for a treaty, it will make a sizeable contribution to progress in this field.

For the moment I would like to review the problems of chemical disarmament and to present our first reactions to the recent informal meetings. To start with the issue which seems the most promising, we are pleased to note a narrowing of differences over

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the scope of a CW ban. There seems to be considerable agreement on the validity of the phased approach to a comprehensive ban as well as a crystallization of views concerning the CW agents to be included in an initial stage. The United States position regarding the possible scope of the first stage of a CW agreement is of particular interest. An initial ban on "all lethal and other highly toxic CW agents" rather than only on the highly toxic single-purpose agents seems to represent a step towards the views set out in the non-aligned memorandum of 1973. At the same time we hope it is compatible with the Soviet readiness to prohibit as a first step "the most dangerous and lethal chemical means of waging war." We have taken note as well of the statement by the distinguished Japanese representative, that Japan would no longer insist on its previous position of limiting an initial ban to supertoxic CW agents. Although my delegation intends to study further the implications of these adjustments of position, we would like to offer some preliminary thoughts.

A broadening of the initial scope would certainly bring us closer to the ultimate objective of prohibiting all chemical weapons, and it would outlaw many of the chemical weapons which have in fact been used in warfare. It does, however, also create some additional problems. A first-stage ban of all lethal CW agents would thrust our discussion into the category of dual-purpose agents where definition and, particularly, verification become complicated.

On the question of the definition of CW agents, there are some encouraging developments. Both the Soviet and United States delegations have found that broad support and recognition exist for the applicability of a general-purpose criterion and the use of toxicity as an additional criterion. The United States has tentatively upheld the Canadian proposal for two toxicity thresholds, and has expressed interest in the establishment of agreed standards for determining lethality as set forth in CCD/473.

With progress being made in this area, the identification of the agents to be prohibited in the first phase of an agreement might be possible. Yet the inclusion

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of dual-purpose CW agents would seem also to raise the question of the quantities which would have no justification for peaceful purposes and the production of which would have to be curtailed. We have noted in this regard the detail added to the Japanese draft treaty in document CCD/483, which specifies that article I would prohibit certain types or quantities of chemical warfare agents. This prompts us to ask whether it would be necessary to determine the quantities allowed in an initial stage, or whether a unilateral undertaking set forth in the form of a national declaration would suffice.

The recent Japanese contribution, in document CCD/483, appears to tackle the problems posed by a ban on some dual-purpose CW agents. The tables which it introduces seem intended to identify all the chemical agents to be prohibited by a comprehensive agreement and to determine for each agent whether it was to be banned or not from the outset. It would be interesting to hear views on the realistic possibility of making such comprehensive lists, or whether they could be helpful in making the illustrative lists mentioned in the United States document, CCD/499, as supplementary means of defining lethal chemical agents in an initial agreement. The papers submitted by Yugoslavia (CCD/504 and 505) also represent valuable discussions of wider aspects of the definition problem, especially as regards binary weapons.

The second major question in regard to the prohibition of chemical warfare agents is that of verification. In this area we fear that it will be more difficult to achieve a meeting of minds. Both the Japanese and the United States delegations had posited previously that the possibility of effective verification should determine which agents to prohibit at the outset. Yet a broadening of the scope of the initial ban would seem to increase verification requirements. The United States statement of 13 April had minimized the differences between the verifiability of single-purpose and dual-purpose CW agents which were considered "not very consequential in the light of the inherent difficulties of verifying any type of CW production or stockpiling". The Japanese statement (CCD/PV.709) cast doubts on the possibilities of verifying dual-purpose agents. Both views reflect the complexities of the issue before us.

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It seems clear that a large part of the verification system will have to centre on the cessation of CW production, but the question of which verification methods to apply remains unsolved. Many of the studies undertaken have focused on the need to follow the production of the phosphorus compounds, and research has also been done in the area of monitoring other less toxic agents. A reporting system for chemical production was sketched by the United States at the 702nd meeting of the Committee, and the recent Soviet statement stresses the analysis of statistical data.

On the next level of verification, which has been termed "technical inspection", considerable effort has been expended in developing effective methods which are as non-intrusive as possible. Several techniques may not require access to the facilities. They include, for example, technical sampling methods which in certain cases might correspond to methods termed "near-site" verification by the Pugwash Workshop. There may be remote monitoring possibilities as well.

We have noted the contributions made to this very complicated and crucial problem by the United Kingdom and the United States. I would like in this context to mention the impressive research project undertaken by Finland on the identification of CW agents.

If some understanding could be reached about the verification methods which are most effective and least intrusive, it might facilitate consideration of the core issue: the search for some verification organ which could reconcile the need for international supervision with the need to protect national industrial interests.

The other aspect of CW verification, the assurance of destruction of stockpiles, is also an obstinate problem. The United States has proposed several alternatives regarding the destruction of CW stockpiles reflecting the view that such reductions are essential in the first stage. On first reading, the destruction of a specified amount by each State would seem one way of avoiding excessive verification demands. The United States statement mentioned the possible unequal burden this would place on

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countries with small stockpiles, but might it not be possible to borrow an idea from the third alternative and establish different amounts for different countries, depending on the estimated size of existing stockpiles?

With regard to the verification of stockpile destruction, we have read with interest the recent Swedish contribution in document CCD/485. We hope it will help to solve the problem of assuring the destruction of CW agents without revealing undue information. We have also taken note of the United States paper, CCD/497, as well as the paper of the German Democratic Republic, CCD/506.

The United States proposal for technical exchanges should certainly receive careful attention. If it can assist in evaluating various verification methods, it could advance our work. We also note the pertinent Yugoslav statement regarding the importance of medical counter-measures against chemical warfare.

It seems to my delegation that, after our examination of all these issues with the help of experts, the CCD might now draw up its balance sheet on chemical disarmament. Here we would certainly join Ambassador Hamilton in questioning whether "anyone of us have a clear picture of where we stand today". We also agree with his suggestion, supported by Ambassador Allen at our meeting of 20 July, that a compilation of facts and views expressed in the CCD is necessary. We would, however, make a plea to keep such a compilation as concise and to the point as possible. It seems to my delegation that it would be useful also to determine the areas of possible agreement -- as the United States has done -- and the major problem areas, perhaps along the lines set forth by Canada at our 709th meeting.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have stated that the CCD should continue its endeavours in this area of CW, parallel to their bilateral initiative. We welcome this approach, but would stress that these bilateral contacts must also be pursued. The renewed interest in chemical disarmament manifested by so many delegations should serve as an impetus for the CCD to press forward in this area where real disarmament is involved, and where a real contribution to lessening the dangers of war could be made.

Mr. RŮŽEK (Czechoslovakia): First of all I should like to welcome the new distinguished representatives: Ambassador Likhatchev of the Soviet Union, Lord Goronwy-Roberts of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Jargalsaikhan of Mongolia. All three have represented their respective countries with great distinction before assuming the leadership of their delegations in the CCD, and we are all looking forward to co-operating with them as closely and in as friendly a manner as with their predecessors.

At the same time I should like to join all other speakers and send our best wishes to the distinguished representatives who have left the CCD: Ambassador Roshchin of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Barton of Canada, Ambassador Kasasa of Zaire and Ambassador Dugersuren of Mongolia. We highly appreciate their contribution to the work of the CCD, which, especially in the case of Ambassador Roshchin, represents efforts spread over many long years.

May I also thank all the distinguished representatives for the kind words with which they have earlier welcomed me to the CCD.

An intensive activity in the field of disarmament always was and remains an integral part of our country's efforts, especially in the field of foreign policy. It found a new expression in the report of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Gustáv Husák, at the XVth Party Congress: "We regard it necessary to strengthen the trend towards the reduction of political tension by extending it to the military sphere and reduce military activities as well, to stop the feverish arms race and to safeguard the transition towards the limitation of accumulated weaponry and to disarmament".

In the same spirit, our country supports the document of the recent conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties in Berlin, especially its strong emphasis on questions of disarmament, as well as the recent declaration of the World Peace Council adopted in Stockholm.

When we look at this year's session of the CCD, we cannot fail to note the good, businesslike atmosphere in which the discussion has been going. But time and tide wait for no man. It is necessary to report concrete progress, and concrete progress means agreed texts and all that follows.

(Mr. Růžek, Czechoslovakia)

Undoubtedly the work on the text of the Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques is advanced to a sufficient degree that it may prove possible to finish it during the present summer session. The setting up of the working group has been useful. It has undoubtedly helped to clarify the issues under consideration. We all know that there are in the Convention three key articles: I, II and V. Our delegation would like to express its opinion that the first sentence in article I, containing the definition of the scope of the ban, is, with the given clarifications of both co-sponsors, acceptable to us. While we understand the concern some delegations feel about the potential use of new, so far unknown techniques in the field under negotiation, we cannot help feeling that the best possible method of defense against this possibility is precisely the method used in defining the scope of the ban. There might be, however, one logical addition made, namely to ban not only the use of military or any other hostile environmental modification techniques, but the threat to use them as well. We hope that consensus on this key article can be reached.

As far as article V is concerned, we are of the opinion that the proposal to add to the tasks connected with the functioning of the Convention further and different tasks is not feasible, not to speak about practical problems connected with its realization in practice. In our view we should concentrate on the main thing, which is to make it possible for the Convention to become a viable instrument of international life. That means to look on article V from the point of view of fact-finding, helping the Governments concerned to clarify the phenomena which might arise. We welcome the progress in achieving consensus on this article.

One can see a certain link between some of the problems we are grappling with in connexion with the Enmod Convention and the problems dealt with in the proposal to ban new types and new systems of weapons as proposed by the Soviet Union and accepted by last year's General Assembly, namely the problems connected with the consequences of an ever-accelerating rate of scientific and technical progress. If we wait in every

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individual case of a scientific and technical discovery until that discovery is made use of for military purposes, for purposes of mass killing, we shall most probably never be able to catch the bus. This is the reason why, in our view, the idea of stopping the use of scientific discovery for military use — or misuse, if you wish — is a historic contribution towards intensifying the effort towards disarmament. For these reasons we welcome the decision to hold a new series of discussions with the participation of experts, beginning on 9 August 1976. In order to help this important part of our work in the CCD, we intend to send an expert as well. On this occasion I should like to welcome the intention of some member countries to send their experts.

The Committee has devoted due attention to another important task, namely to the task of banning chemical weapons. A complete ban must remain the goal here. Again, the rate of scientific discovery makes it more and more urgent to take this measure as soon as possible. That is why our delegation continues to regard the proposal of the socialist countries from the year 1972 (CCD/361) as a starting point. As in other fields, it may be necessary to approach this goal by partial steps. If that is so, some step should be taken soon, the sooner the better. The discussions with the participation of experts have shown that there exists an increased interest in this urgent problem, and moreover that — as far as some aspects of it are concerned — there is a certain narrowing of the differences in points of view of the participants. A significant number of interesting contributions clarifying numerous aspects of this complicated subject matter were made. In spite of that, the problem of verification and control remains one of the problems to be solved. We think that it is possible to organize an effective system of control making good and ingenious use of the scientific disciplines concerned and of national means of control. It seems to us useful to pay attention in this connexion to the working paper submitted by Finland (CCD/501) and to the ideas advanced by Ambassador Likhatchev on 22 July 1976 (CCD/PV.714). We heard with interest the declaration of Lord Goronwy-Roberts on 1 July 1976 and are looking forward to the draft of the comprehensive CW convention mentioned there.

(Mr. Ružek, Czechoslovakia)

There is no doubt about the fact that the complicated nature of the efforts towards disarmament is reflected in the situation in the field of nuclear disarmament, especially as far as the universalization of the system of non-proliferation and the CTB are concerned. During the remaining period of the Disarmament Decade, we shall have to maintain, extend and intensify the effort in this field. We welcome in this connexion the ratification of the NPT by Japan as well as the accession of the Yemen Arab Republic and the progress towards accession in the case of our host country, Switzerland. It is to be hoped that the remaining period of the Disarmament Decade will see still more progress of this kind, especially in the case of States which already possess nuclear weapons or have significant capabilities in nuclear technology.

For the same reasons we welcome the treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States on 28 May 1976. It again shows the possibilities of co-operation between the two most developed nuclear States, and is a further contribution towards relaxation of tension. We regret to note, however, that General Assembly resolution 3478 (XXX) has so far not been followed by corresponding action on the part of all nuclear States. Not only have the negotiations not been set into motion by the agreed date, namely 31 March 1976, but there is no sign of them being set into motion even now. From this point of view, it is clear that until positive measures are taken regarding this basic solution by all nuclear States, technical steps, however useful and well-intentioned in themselves, will not be sufficient. This concerns, for instance, the proposal to set up a working group of seismic experts.

Once I have touched upon the question of the mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade, let me say how much we appreciate the initiative taken by the distinguished representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Clark, who proposed that a series of plenary meetings should be held at which the results and the problems connected with the Decade would be reviewed. Looking at the Disarmament Decade, we see two elements: on the one hand, significant progress has undoubtedly been made; on the other hand,

(Mr. Ružek, Czechoslovakia)

one cannot be satisfied with what has been done. But the growth of armaments has been a process adding newer and newer weapons. If we stop adding qualitatively new elements, we shall have a better chance of making progress in dealing with what there is. This is the reason which leads us to conclude that the proposal to ban new types and systems of weapons is one of the best contributions for the Disarmament Decade and at the same time a qualitatively new contribution.

There is undoubtedly one further important aspect of our work which we should not overlook in reviewing, as we do, what has been and what has not been done. That is the ever-closer relationship between the solution of pressing economic and social problems on the planet and all kinds of waste or -- better said -- all kinds of activities which do not help to solve these huge problems or complicate their solution. It is not a mere coincidence that, as many economists calculate, the extent of resources spent on armaments at present roughly equals the developing world's need of new resources to sustain a sufficiently upward-pointing development curve, which would gradually close the gap.

To transfer these vast resources spent on armaments back to development, where they belong, would certainly be not only feasible but beneficial for everybody concerned. In our view, this should be kept in mind, especially in connexion with the proposal to organize a World Disarmament Conference.

Mr. SALEEM (Pakistan): taking the floor for the first time during the session, may I begin by welcoming two new colleagues, Ambassador Likhatchev of the Soviet Union and Ambassador Jargalsaikhan of Mongolia, who have taken over as leaders of their respective delegations. I am confident that they will distinguish themselves as much as their predecessors had done. I would also like to join those who preceded me in requesting the delegations of the Soviet Union, Canada, Mongolia and Zaire to convey our best wishes to Ambassadors Roshchin, Barton, Dugersuren and Kasasa. At the risk of being dubbed unrealistic, I would venture to say that I wish we had presented a treaty to each of these departing colleagues as a souvenir of their distinguished association with this Committee.

(Mr. Saleem, Pakistan)

I find myself in sympathy with those who maintain that, in view of what this Committee has before it by way of issues vital and urgent for world security, it seems to challenge one's sense of proportion to address oneself to prospective dangers so ardently as to find little or no time for existing dangers. These latter are in no way inferior either in their magnitude or in the degree of devastation that they can cause as compared to the prospective dangers that now monopolize the time of this Committee.

This is not to say that my delegation has not willingly addressed itself to the draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. But we must remind ourselves of the importance of moving forward on vital questions such as CTB, security of non-nuclear-weapon States and the ban on chemical weapons.

In the 658th meeting of the CCD last year, I had occasion to state that the initiative regarding "environmental modification techniques" was timely, and that this was a problem which had the potentialities of becoming both dangerous as well as intractable if not tackled in good time. We continue to hold that view.

As regards the identical drafts submitted to the Committee by the two co-Chairmen, we feel that the scope of the prohibition in the draft convention is too limited. Restricting the prohibition to only those environmental modification techniques that have "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects" will not only limit its scope but render it difficult of interpretation. It has been argued that the existing draft prohibits hostile uses of the techniques in question only above and beyond a certain level. Is it that the intention is only to curtail rather than prohibit the option to use these awesome techniques? In our view the "threshold approach" is not suitable for this convention.

Since the draft already makes an exception in respect of the use of environmental modification techniques for "peaceful purposes", why should "hostile use" of these techniques be sanctioned at the same time, albeit on a small scale? We suggest that the phrase "widespread, long-lasting or severe" be reviewed in this light.

In respect to article II, we feel that only the definition of the term "environmental modification techniques" should be contained in this article, and the illustrative list of examples should be made as extensive as possible and form an annex to the convention. Those "environmental modification techniques" which are ostensibly peaceful but which could possibly be diverted to hostile use should also

(Mr. Saleem, Pakistan)

be included. Since the list of examples will be only illustrative and not exhaustive or limitative, we do not see how any exception can be taken to the inclusion of such examples.

Coming to article III, on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes, our first concern regarding this article is that it appears to give the so-called "peaceful" uses a status higher than the Convention itself. We have no quarrel with the fact that use of these techniques for peaceful purposes should be allowed. But we feel that such uses should be allowed under the Convention and subject to its provisions rather than independently of it. We also feel that there should be safeguards of some sort so as to ensure that such uses for ostensibly peaceful purposes should not be such as can be easily diverted to hostile use, and in particular such use as can have an adverse effect on another State, for example a neighbouring one.

Under article V, with the draft as it stands, action against any State in breach of its obligations will be taken only if all the permanent members of the Security Council are in agreement. Article V also does not appear to take into account a situation in which one or more permanent members of the Security Council do not agree to recognize the Convention. This can hardly be seriously considered as a practical solution to meet the situation created by a breach of obligations under the Convention. Taking a theoretical case, what would happen, for instance, if the offending party happens to be a permanent member of the Security Council or happens to have a defence agreement with a permanent member? If the dangers and prospective devastation are as great as explained here, the ban should be complete. Conceptually it is inadmissible to provide statutory powers to some States to hold up international action while devastation on the scale envisaged in the Convention is taking place. It can be argued that such are the facts of the contemporary system of security. Very well, then; but why enshrine them in a Convention and bar the opportunity to evoke a more effective system of ensuring the implementation of the Convention? We shall look forward with considerable interest to the results of the consultations that are taking place with a view to making the article more effective.

Finally, the "threat of use" of these techniques should be effectively prohibited in the proposed Convention. I need hardly point out that such a threat can do incalculable harm to the interests of the threatened State. The use of such threats may, in fact, already be regarded as a most effective weapon.

Mr. van der KLAUW (Netherlands): In resolution 3484 A (XXX) the General Assembly of the United Nations requested the CCD to keep under review, in its consideration of an elaboration of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including the possibility that such explosions could be misused to circumvent any ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. I will briefly address myself to this question.

On 28 May 1976, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America signed a Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes or, as I will call it, the PNE-agreement. This treaty was concluded in accordance with article III of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, the so-called Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The purpose of the PNE-agreement is apparently to make arrangements for the explosion of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in such a way that the threshold test ban will not be circumvented. Since this problem is clearly related to the earlier-mentioned request made by the General Assembly, it seems worthwhile to study the PNE-agreement, and in particular to consider whether this agreement can give us some clues for the problem, how to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under a comprehensive test ban treaty. To this end, my delegation suggested at the end of the spring session to spend a few meetings, either formal or informal, to discuss the PNE-agreement during the summer session of the CCD. Our suggestion did not find many responses, and since the CCD is already overloaded in this session, we did not insist on our suggestion. However, I would like to make a number of preliminary remarks in the absence of a more extensive explanation by the United States and the USSR of their PNE-agreement until now.

As far as we can see, the two countries could have taken a number of different approaches to solve the problem how to conduct PNEs under the threshold test ban. They could have prohibited PNEs. They could have tried to develop a system of verification and control, presumably complicated, to make sure that PNEs above the threshold of 150 kton would not be used for weapons tests or in any case to minimize this chance to an acceptable level. If that last approach had been taken, it could have given us valuable indications on how to develop a system for PNEs under a comprehensive test ban, for it is clear that in such a system there is no real difference between a threshold of 150 kton, 20 kton or zero kiloton.

(Mr. van der Klaauw, Netherlands)

However, the countries involved took another approach. They designed a system to make sure that the yield of the peaceful nuclear explosions remains under the threshold set by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Since the yield of the individual PNEs must stay under the weapons threshold in this system, a lower weapons threshold would mean that the yield of the individual PNEs has to go down. The system cannot be used under a comprehensive test ban, since the weapons threshold in that case is zero kiloton.

In our opinion, this assessment is different from that made by several delegations in this Committee, inter alia, by the representative of the German Democratic Republic on 6 July. As we see it, the PNE-agreement has not given us a clue how to solve the problem of conducting PNEs under a comprehensive test ban.

Perhaps the agreement has taught us something. I do not know how much time and effort the two countries involved have spent to find a system to conduct PNEs above the threshold. In view of the fact that a great part of the agreement and the protocol refers to explosions with an aggregate yield above the threshold, it means that there is at least one country which has a potential interest in conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes above the threshold of 150 kton. Therefore one could imagine that the two countries have really tried to design a system to conduct such explosions without circumventing the nuclear weapons threshold, but apparently they did not succeed. My delegation would be interested to know how much they tried, since such information could be very important for our future deliberations on a comprehensive test ban. At the moment at least, we get the impression that a system to conduct PNEs under a CTB without circumventing the purposes of a CTB is very difficult if not impossible to achieve, which leads us to the logical conclusion that as long as this problem is not satisfactorily solved, we are faced with the choice of either not having a foolproof CTB or abandoning PNEs.

Having said this, I would like to congratulate the United States and the USSR on having been able to agree on a rather complicated question, that is, how to measure the yield of nuclear explosions, including the yield of individual explosions with explosion times which are only milliseconds apart. The negotiations have at great length spelled out complicated procedures, using a number of innovative and elegant solutions for

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difficult technical and political problems. I may refer, for example, to the ingenious solution found for the problem how to avoid the use by the observing State of instruments other than what it states them to be, while on the other hand making sure that the observed State cannot tamper with the observing equipment and the data so obtained. Such solutions for difficult problems may well be used in other arms control and disarmament agreements in the future.

An interesting aspect of the agreement is the provision that the verification system will also be used on the territory of other countries. This is, of course, a logical provision, but it means that when a non-nuclear-weapon State asks PNE-services from one of the two nuclear-weapon States involved, it has to invite the other party, too, at least if the aggregate yield of the PNE is above 150 kton.

The agreement also shows, and this is in our view highly important, that when countries lay down precise procedures for verifying the implementation of an agreement, they are now willing to allow the exercise of inspection activities on their territory. The observing State is even allowed to lower equipment into the borehole of the nuclear explosive device. It is encouraging to note how far States are prepared to go if the political will is present.

We saw the same happen in the nuclear safeguards field, in particular during the negotiations on the NPT-safeguards. Many countries were for various reasons reluctant to accept international inspection activities within their territories. Nevertheless, with the political will which was present during these negotiations, and by painstakingly laying down the rights and duties of inspectors and the detailed procedures to follow, it was possible to design an effective safeguards system which could be accepted by the countries involved. In this connexion I would like to recall that the final declaration of the NPT-Review Conference asked the parties to the NPT, without making a distinction between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States, to accept safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities. Perhaps it now becomes possible to implement this request fully. Anyway, the PNE-agreement has very interesting verification provisions which could be of importance for future arms control and disarmament agreements. I therefore hope that the agreement will soon come into force.

(Mr. van der Klaauw, Netherlands)

Let me now turn to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty itself. Members of the Committee are well aware of our disappointment over the very restricted scope of that treaty. As far as I know, even the parties to it did not dare to claim that the threshold was set so high because of verification problems. A long time ago we already expressed our concern that a Threshold Test Ban might hinder rather than facilitate the conclusion of a Comprehensive Ban. In the spring session, during informal meetings, we expressed our views on some of the more interesting technical provisions of the TTBT. For example, we showed our interest in the exchange of technical data on the weapons test sites and on the calibration data.

This week the Ad Hoc Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events started its work. My Government is grateful for the initiative taken by Sweden to set up this group. I noted also with interest that several countries which are not members of the CCD have sent experts, including countries in the southern hemisphere. This promises seismic expertise from all over the world, which is important in the context of a world-wide detection and identification system.

Frankly, I was somewhat puzzled by the attitude taken by some members of the Committee with respect to the Ad Hoc Group. During the spring session the representatives of Poland, Mongolia, Hungary and Bulgaria, while supporting the proposal by the Soviet Union to strive for a CTB signed by all nuclear-weapon States, all said that the CCD could play a useful role in further discussions on a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban. The Soviet Union stated that "an important supplementary means of control must be the development between the States parties to the treaty of international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data (CCD/PV.688, p.17). The representative of Czechoslovakia said that "Czechoslovakia with its advanced seismographic system has expressed its readiness to participate in the international system of exchange of seismographic information, in the so-called international detection club, which could achieve a satisfactory level of verification of the CTB" (CCD/PV.695, p.16).

These statements gave the impression that, although disagreement still exists on some points, we could try to move ahead on other points, in harmony with the spirit in which the CCD always works. I was therefore somewhat surprised that on 1 July the representative of Bulgaria said he thought that the Ad Hoc Committee could better be set up in the context of the committee proposed under

(Mr. van der Klaauw, Netherlands)

resolution 3478 (XXX), while we all know that that committee has, at least for the time being, not been established. I think this is somewhat contradictory to his statement in the spring session. The German Democratic Republic also thought that the Ad Hoc Group would distract from the work of the not-yet established committee under resolution 3478 (XXX).

If we cannot talk about one of the important elements of a CTB in the CCD, how can we usefully keep CTB on our agenda? I would therefore urgently appeal to all CCD-members to participate where possible in the work of the Ad Hoc Group, the results of which could form a basis for all our future work on the test ban issue.

Referring to remarks made by the representatives of Nigeria and Mexico, I think there is some misunderstanding about the purpose of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts. Even if one is of the opinion that a CTB can in principle be concluded on the basis of national verification means, a position held by my Government, this does not mean that all conditions for such a verification system have already been met. For example, as was pointed out several times during our technical meetings on the test ban issue, there is still a lack of international exchange of certain data important for the identification of seismic events. We, for our part, see the Swedish proposal for an Ad Hoc Group mainly in the light of determining in practice how an international seismic verification system could work as efficiently as possible and what measures are necessary to achieve this purpose. Participation in such a group does not distract at all from the position taken, inter alia, by my Government that sufficient verification can, in principle, be achieved by national means, at least when we compare the risks of ongoing nuclear weapon tests with the chance of violating a CTB with very small tests.

My delegation listened with interest to the statement made by Mrs. Thorsson last week on this subject and will study her proposals carefully.

I will finish my remarks with a few comments on the importance of a CTB. A CTB is long overdue. I am certain that the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban in the end of the fifties or the early sixties would have been more important than now, at least from an arms control point of view. Perhaps we would have been spared the development of more and more sophisticated nuclear weaponry, weaponry which makes arms control measures in the nuclear field increasingly difficult to achieve and to verify, and which could blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional war.

(Mr. van der Klaauw, Netherlands)

A CTB would not accomplish nuclear disarmament, either, since the nuclear weapons would still be present. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons tests are apparently still important if we have to believe the nuclear weapon States themselves, and to judge from the ongoing weapons tests. So, from a direct arms-control point of view it is still a worth-while goal.

It could well be, however, that from a political point of view a CTB is even more important. The conclusion of a CTB has become a kind of symbol of the question: are the great Powers really serious in their proclaimed will to stop the arms race and work towards nuclear disarmament? This is a strictly political argument which could be dismissed as irrational. Political arguments play, however, an important role in decisions taken by Governments.

In the same line one could argue that it is not necessary for the two big Powers to have comparable strategic nuclear forces. Numerical differences in strategic nuclear forces need not be of direct military significance, at least with anything like present force levels. Nevertheless, both of the Powers referred to consider it apparently highly important, for political reasons, to possess strategic forces on levels sometimes described as being of "perceived equality". Militarily seen, this is certainly an irrational goal, but highly relevant for the decision-making process in the two countries, and perhaps even the motor of the nuclear arms race.

I have the impression, however, that the conclusion of a CTB, together with other measures in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament, is not enough appreciated by the two Powers as being highly important for the rest of the world, influencing decisions by other countries. In this connexion I may mention the adherence to the non-proliferation treaty. Of course, I do not say that a CTB will save for always the NPT. It can only be one of the many steps necessary to make this treaty viable in the long run. But a CTB is in any case necessary in the process of diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in the world. Notwithstanding the improvement in international relations between the two main Powers, they seem to be so obsessed by each other, trying to match each other in all kinds of ways, starting new strategic nuclear weapon systems which cost billions of dollars or roubles, that they do not realize sufficiently what influence their attitude could have on the rest of the world. The NPT-Review Conference gave already a clear indication of this state of affairs, which may have grave consequences. I do not underestimate the problems involved in arms control and disarmament: we all know that these are complicated and difficult. But if the arms race continues, disaster can be the only end-product to be expected.

Mr. CLARK (Nigeria): I want to thank most sincerely all the delegations for their active interest and participation in the Mid-Term Review of the Disarmament Decade which we have been undertaking in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3470 (XXX). My delegation is deeply impressed by the number of delegates who spoke, and particularly by the outstanding quality of what they said. In particular, I should like to thank most sincerely Mrs. Inga Thorsson, the Minister of State of Sweden, for her most moving and eloquent contribution to the exercise. I also want to express my warm appreciation and gratitude for the kind words that all the delegates who spoke have so graciously addressed to my delegation.

The review of the type we have been undertaking is liable to take many forms. But its outcome can only be one of two things. Those who are familiar with classical Greek mythology will recall the fate of Narcissus. We may so love in self-reflection what we think is our record of achievement that we may blind ourselves to the needs of humanity and to the reason for the continuing existence of the CCD as a negotiating forum for disarmament. Alternatively, we may see the review exercise in a dynamic, progressive sense. Starting with an examination of the twin targets of the Disarmament Decade, which are disarmament and development, that is, on the one hand to arrest the arms race and to work for general and complete disarmament in the interest of international peace and security, and on the other hand to secure the transfer of additional resources from the more advanced countries through disarmament to the developing countries for economic and social development, we may then proceed to assess in realistic terms our successes and failures with a view to reaching the goals and targets of the Disarmament Decade to the satisfaction of all mankind.

As the Alva Myrdal Group of Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament pointed out in its report pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2685 (XXV):

"The problems of achieving disarmament and of making rapid progress with economic and social development, as well as the problem of generating more aid for developing countries are essentially political. Disarmament will come only if people -- political leaders, citizens and activists in political and social organizations -- change the direction of the policies which have led to arms races; if they reject external policies of intervention; if they reject international competition for power and prestige expressed through military might.

(Mr. Clark, Nigeria)

More aid, and other measures aimed at helping developing countries, will come only if people to a greater degree adopt and act upon internationalist values -- the equality of man; the need to eliminate poverty, mass unemployment, disease, hunger and illiteracy; the desirability of bringing the benefits of science and technology to everyone;" (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1, p. 2).

I believe that the Mid-Term Review Exercise has served some useful purpose. The large number of delegations who spoke indicates the fundamental interest we all have in the subject. No one can seriously say that we are performing our functions and duties efficiently if we overlook some of the stark facts which have been revealed by the various statements made in the course of the exercise. It was important, therefore, that we paused to take stock of our role and achievements during the Disarmament Decade. Secondly, it has set a useful precedent. Henceforth we can deliberately plan our schedule of work. Citing the special plenary sessions we have devoted to the review exercise as an example, we can decide to allocate our time to the consideration of specific subjects at specific times. I do not see why this cannot be the case with, say CTB and CWB, next spring. Thirdly, it has served to clear our minds about several crucial issues on our agenda of disarmament. For instance, we now know better the relative priorities we accord to the various tasks of the CCD. The high priority which the General Assembly of the United Nations and the majority of us attach to the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to general and complete disarmament has been re-emphasized. No attempt to shift emphasis to the so-called threat posed by the increasing international traffic in conventional armament can be taken seriously.

I regret that today I cannot go into any detailed reply to the recent call by Mr. Ikle of the United States delegation for a debate on the conventional arms trade. I can only say now that the government promotion of arms exports has not come from the developing countries. Arms exporters know the purposes and benefits of the trade more than the importers. Needless to say that the political, military and economic implications of the traffic are better calculated by countries that claim to have world-wide responsibilities and spheres of influence which are supported by military might. The insecurity and restlessness of the newly independent countries are known to have been stirred up by external Powers in order to stimulate armament expenditures.

(Mr. Clark, Nigeria)

To this end, one newly-independent country has been played off against another, and internal discussions and disaffections fuelled and fanned, not to mention armament manufacturers bribing government officials so as to increase the sales of arms. After all, who authorize and licence the export of arms from one country to another but Governments? Who gain from the balance-of-payment earnings from arms sales and therefore nurture economic and industrial environment necessary for the research, development and production of advanced-technology weapons but Governments? Who peddle the sales of weapons with an eye to serving their foreign-policy and global-security objectives but Governments? And which Governments are these? Are they the governments of the rich, industrial countries or those of the poor developing countries which only seek arms to defend their national independence and sovereignty and to safeguard their internal public order and security. The "merchants of death" today are not the Sir Basil Zaharoffs but Governments and government-sponsored multinational corporations after power and profits.

Furthermore, it will be a sorry day if the doctrine is allowed to gain ground that the CCD should no longer concern itself with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and that because of the increase, albeit lamentable, in the international trade in conventional weapons it should concern itself with negotiation of agreements on conventional weapons only. Nor will another version of that doctrine be tolerated, which says that only nuclear-weapon States count. For this will be an open and reckless invitation to the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world. It does not make sense to equate the dangers of nuclear weapons and those of conventional weapons. I had better stop here. Perhaps it would be better to give some time to the consideration of the United States proposal. Meanwhile, I revert to the Mid-Term Review exercise.

We have come to a crucial stage of our consideration of that item. We should now begin to direct our attention to the possibility of reaching some agreed conclusions. As I indicated in my statement of 20 July, perhaps a working paper presented at some stage might facilitate our conclusions and subsequent report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

(Mr. Clark, Nigeria)

My friends and I in the informal group of 15 have been consulting about this matter in the last couple of days. We all agree that a joint paper on a common position by all of us was desirable and to be preferred. We have been working towards that end. But I must leave today for Colombo to attend the Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries. I am therefore taking the liberty of tabling a working paper in the name of my delegation on the matter in the hope that those who feel able to join us later may feel free to do so.

The philosophy of the working paper is simple. We want a set of conclusions that can be adopted by consensus. The conclusions should be forward-looking. And they should enable us to proceed with our work next Session with a purpose and a plan.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

1. Introduction

The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the company. It is a large and well-established firm with a long history of success. The company's main products are of high quality and are sold in many different countries. The company's financial position is strong and it has a good reputation among its customers. The company's management is experienced and has a clear vision of the future. The company's success is due to its high quality products, its excellent customer service, and its strong financial position. The company's management is committed to the company's success and to the well-being of its employees. The company's future is bright and it is expected to continue to grow and prosper for many years to come.

2. Description of the company

The company is a large and well-established firm with a long history of success. It is a public company and its shares are listed on the stock exchange. The company's main products are of high quality and are sold in many different countries. The company's financial position is strong and it has a good reputation among its customers. The company's management is experienced and has a clear vision of the future. The company's success is due to its high quality products, its excellent customer service, and its strong financial position. The company's management is committed to the company's success and to the well-being of its employees. The company's future is bright and it is expected to continue to grow and prosper for many years to come.

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