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Chairman: Mr. GBEHO (Ghana)

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Statements were made by:

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Mr. Natorf (Poland)
Mr. Rose (German Democratic Republic)
Mr. Rossides (Cyprus)

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ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 57, 133, 136, 138 AND 139 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. OSMAN (Sudan): It gives me great pleasure to offer you, Sir, the sincere congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee at this session. I am confident that under your able and wise guidance the deliberations of this important Committee will be effectively and appropriately conducted. My congratulations go also to the other officers of the Committee. My delegation pledges its full support and co-operation to you and the other officers in the discharge of your responsibilities.

Further, we wish to express our grief at the loss of the outstanding British personality, Lord Noel-Baker. His dedication to the cause of international peace and justice is well known. His untimely passing is indeed a great loss to the cause of disarmament.

I should also like to join previous speakers in expressing my delegation's profound satisfaction at the Nobel Committee's selection for the Nobel Peace Prize for 1982. The recognition given to two of the most devoted supporters of disarmament - Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico and Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden - is recognition of the dedication to the cause of comprehensive disarmament and an encouragement to all of us to work harder to make disarmament a reality.

Only three months have elapsed since the conclusion of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and once again we gather here to consider ways and means to achieve the objectives of peace and security which have always been among the most profound aspirations of humanity. No one can doubt the fact that the second special session devoted to disarmament failed to achieve any sound progress towards the attainment of that noble objective. No one can doubt the equally

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regrettable fact that mankind is today confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. The arms race continues unabated and military budgets are constantly growing. Mankind is confronted with vast stockpiles and a tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces, and the competition for the qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds to which scientific resources and technical advances are diverted. This situation aggravates international tension, sharpens conflicts in all regions of the world, hinders the process of détente, perpetuates differences between opposing military alliances, increases the threat of nuclear war and heightens feelings of insecurity among all States, including those like mine which are non-nuclear-weapon States.

As a believer in the Charter of the United Nations, which states that the purposes of the United Nations are, inter alia, to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, and to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, we view with the utmost concern the vast gap between the purposes of the Charter and the practices of Member States which are supposed to be bound by that Charter. We are equally alarmed at the increasing reliance by Member States on the use of force rather than negotiations and dialogue offered by the United Nations for the peaceful settlement of disputes. We are appalled at the consistently escalating arms race and the huge material and human resources being wasted on armaments, especially at a time when two thirds of the inhabitants of the planet live in conditions of poverty and want.

The second special session devoted to disarmament was convened in the wake of the historic consensus embodied in the Final Document of the tenth special session and the common awareness that the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, constitutes a threat to the survival of mankind. Mindful of the efforts that have been made by the international community to

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implement the Programme of Action of the Final Document, my delegation finds it indeed regrettable that the second special session on disarmament did not live up to the hopes engendered by the tenth special session. More regrettable is that the session was not able to adopt a document on the comprehensive programme of disarmament which would state the specific measures of disarmament to be implemented over the next few years, as well as other measures and studies to prepare the way for future negotiations and progress towards general and complete disarmament.

My delegation is fully aware of the causes and the political ramifications that made it difficult to reach consensus on that crucial matter. However, we believe that the survival of mankind - from East to West and from North to South - is a goal that surpasses narrow national interests and transcends power rivalries and ideological disputes. The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing; the termination of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons within a framework of an effective disarmament process are indeed of interest to all countries. To achieve such a goal we urge the two super-Powers and other nuclear-weapon States to begin immediately a nuclear arms freeze that would be a first step towards the comprehensive programme of disarmament. While we are aware that a nuclear arms freeze is not an end in itself, we believe that it would constitute a most effective step in creating a favourable environment for the start of meaningful disarmament negotiations.

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The Sudan is a strong believer in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace on the basis of arrangements and conditions determined freely by the States of concerned regions. We believe that such measures contribute effectively to the strengthening of regional and international peace and security and constitute important disarmament measures. Hence the Sudan has consistently supported all efforts to transform the Indian Ocean area, including the Red Sea and the Gulf, into a zone of peace, free of foreign bases, military installations, disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, foreign military presence and great-Power rivalry.

With regard to the African continent, the Sudan is bound by its commitments under resolutions of the Organization of African Unity and those of the General Assembly that have declared the African continent as a nuclear-weapon-free zone free from any remnants of foreign influence or intervention. We also fully support the General Assembly's resolutions calling for the transformation of the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

While reiterating our steadfast position on these fundamental issues, my delegation cannot fail to express regret at the fact that the two racist régimes in Pretoria and Tel Aviv have found the means to acquire and manufacture nuclear weapons. With an unholy alliance and a wide range of nuclear co-operation, the two racist régimes are now posing a direct threat to peace and security in Africa and the Middle East and, consequently, to international peace and security. In the strongest terms the Sudan condemns such military and nuclear co-operation and calls upon all States to abide by the disarmament measures that have already been taken and by the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions in order to contain and eradicate the threats posed by those racial régimes.

The Sudan is committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We believe that this session should adopt strict measures in accordance with the spirit of the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. On the other hand, we support the initiatives of the group of non-aligned and neutral countries members of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc working group in the Committee to undertake negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in

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all its aspects. We also hope that this approach will be able to obtain desirable consensus at the current session and pave the way to effective negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament during its next annual session.

We believe that disarmament and international security are both directly interlinked. Together they constitute the fundamental elements of the system for the maintenance of international peace and security contained in the Charter of the United Nations. In view of this interrelationship, disarmament measures should be taken to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States obtain advantages over another. Such measures should also ensure that States refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Moreover, they should ensure that disputes among States be settled through strict implementation of the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law.

As a developing country, the Sudan conceives that there is an organic relationship between expenditures on armaments and economic and social development. The vastly increasing military budgets and the development, production and deployment of weapons, especially by the States possessing the largest military arsenals, represent a huge and growing diversion of human and material resources. Such expenditures on armaments and waste of precious resources could have been used otherwise to elevate the living standards of all peoples and to assist developing countries in achieving economic and social development. In this regard I should like to commend the invaluable study on the relationship between disarmament and development that has been prepared under the auspices of Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden. We wish further that the recommendations made in that study be taken seriously by the international community.

To conclude, we believe that, in conformity with its central role and primary responsibilities in the sphere of disarmament, the United Nations should play a more effective role in this field and make every effort to facilitate the implementation of all disarmament measures agreed upon in this Committee. We concur with those who have spoken before us and referred to the need to review the purposes or role of the Committee on Disarmament, the

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Disarmament Commission and the Centre for Disarmament. The United Nations disarmament machinery should be appropriately strengthened in order to enable the United Nations to carry out its responsibility in enforcing the agreements reached within its own framework. Disarmament has become the overriding requirement for the survival of mankind. Let us all work for that. My delegation is ready to work firmly and wholeheartedly to that end.

Mr. Eugene ROSTOW (United States of America): The United States delegation is gratified to welcome you, Ambassador Gbeho, as Chairman of this important Committee and we congratulate you warmly on your election. I wish as well to congratulate the Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur. It is a pleasure also to congratulate Ambassadors Alva Myrdal and Alfonso Garcia-Robles, the recipients of this year's Nobel Peace Prize. I know that we and the two laureates share a common fundamental objective - the attainment of a peaceful world. We have not always agreed as to the best means of reaching that objective, but we have always respected the views of the Nobel Prize laureates.

It is an honour for me to present again the views of my Government on the issues before the First Committee.

I start with the proposition that some may find paradoxical - the thesis that the last year has been one of singular achievement in the quest for peace. Members may well ask how we can claim progress towards peace for a year during which there were so many acts of aggression and so many stormy exercises of the inherent right of self-defence protected by Article 51 of our Charter, a year that witnessed so many episodes of frustration and failure in the functioning of the Security Council and other systems of collective security.

We make this paradoxical assertion because the climate of world opinion on the vital questions of war and peace has changed profoundly during this year, in response to the impact of events and the leadership of many who have spoken before the Security Council, the General Assembly and this Committee. In this connection, I refer in particular to a number of important statements made at the United Nations General Assembly's second special session on disarmament and to the Secretary-General's significant and forward-looking report to the General Assembly (A/37/1) of 7 September 1982 and his fine statement before this Committee yesterday.

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During the last year there has been a mutation in the way the people of the world perceive what is happening. They have come to realize that the Secretary-General is right in pointing out that:

"... we are ... embarked on an exceedingly dangerous course" (A/37/1, p.3) which he characterizes as being

"... perilously near to a new international anarchy". (ibid.) He reminds us that the failure of the League of Nations to develop an effective system of collective security was a major cause of the Second World War and that we are moving along the same path again. He writes:

"Governments that believe they can win an international objective by force are often quite ready to do so, and domestic opinion not infrequently applauds such a course. The Security Council, the primary organ of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, all too often finds itself unable to take decisive action to resolve international conflicts and its resolutions are increasingly defied or ignored by those that feel themselves strong enough to do so." (ibid.)

The Secretary-General reminds us that:

"Our Charter was born of six years of global agony and destruction. I sometimes feel that we now take the Charter far less seriously than did its authors, living as they did in the wake of a world tragedy. I believe therefore that an important first step would be a conscious recommitment by Governments to the Charter." (ibid.)

The Government of the United States supports the thrust of the Secretary-General's analysis and of his prescriptions for improving the effectiveness of the peace-keeping institutions of the United Nations. As President Reagan said to the General Assembly on 17 June of this year:

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"I have come to this hall to call for international recommitment to the basic tenet of the United Nations Charter - that all Members practise tolerance and live together in peace as good neighbours under the rule of law, forsaking armed force as a means of settling disputes between nations. ... We ask you to reinforce the bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact and to rededicate yourselves to maintaining international peace and security and removing threats to peace.

"We who have signed the United Nations Charter have pledged to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory or independence of any State. In these times when more and more lawless acts are going unpunished - as some Members of this very body show a growing disregard for the United Nations Charter - the peace-loving nations of the world must condemn aggression and pledge again to act in a way that is worthy of the ideals that we have endorsed. Let us finally make the Charter live."
(A/S-12/PV.16, p.12)

A "conscious recommitment" to the principles of the Charter, as recommended by the Secretary-General, cannot, in our view, be achieved merely by adopting resolutions, however worthy. Simple resolutions endorsing the Secretary-General's recommendations could be of utility. But what is needed now, far more than resolutions, is the will to enforce the Charter as it is. The Charter is a document of constitutional character. Its commandments do not need clarification; they need to be obeyed. Resolutions attempting to restate or amplify the key provisions of the Charter might well dilute their authority. As I was privileged to point out in this Committee on 21 October 1981,

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"Unless we ... restore general and reciprocal respect for the principles of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter the slide towards anarchy will engulf us all." (A/C.1/36/PV.6, p.8)

To make the Charter effective, I said then, will not be a simple matter to be settled on the cheap and without tears. It will require effective steps to see to it that the Charter, the arms-control Treaties and the legally-binding decisions of the Security Council are carried out and that we can verify compliance with their terms.

The first step back from the edge of the abyss is to achieve a change in the minds of men. That change - the change that must precede effective action - has begun to happen. Necessarily, the focus of that process must be a crusade to mobilize support for the Secretary-General's thesis that we must do more than condemn aggression: we must actually - and actively - enforce the rules of the Charter against it. As the Secretary-General points out, we must undertake to deter aggression, to seek peaceful solutions to crises in their incipency and to defeat aggression if, despite all precautions, it should occur. Conventional war has gravely wounded civilization many times during this turbulent century. In a nuclear environment the impact of conventional-force aggression could well become unthinkable.

The Secretary-General's report and the statements of many leaders which preceded it dispel a series of illusions which have done a great deal of harm in recent years. Those fallacies and illusions are all associated with the view, frequently put forward by the Soviet Union, that peace is threatened primarily by an "arms race" and that peace can be attained by arms-control agreements, even though Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter is allowed to wither away. This familiar error puts the cart before the horse. As Prime Minister Thatcher said last summer during the second special session on disarmament:

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"It is not merely a mistaken analysis but an evasion of responsibility to suppose that we can prevent the horrors of war by focusing on its i i instruments. Those are more often symptoms than causes." (A/S-12/PV.24, p.6)

For too many people, the complex rituals of arms-control diplomacy have become a convenient escape from the central problem - a decline in the influence of the Charter on the behaviour of States, and the fear to which this trend has given rise throughout the world. Arms-control agreements can be useful in reinforcing a régime of peace; they can never be a substitute for the harsh and unremitting effort to sustain peace directly. This is the sobering and important lesson of the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly on disarmament - that arms-control agreements can be of value only if they are conceived, planned and carried out as part of an overall strategy for establishing and maintaining peace.

The United States has set into motion during the last year a dynamic programme of initiatives in the field of arms control and disarmament. In each case these new initiatives are based on a thorough review and evaluation of the past history of the subject, and dominated by the proposition that arms control and disarmament efforts are an integral part of foreign and security policy.

In his speech of 18 November 1981 President Reagan outlined our approach to four important items on the arms-control agenda: the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear weapons known as INF, and those on strategic nuclear arms reductions, known as START; the negotiations on mutual and balanced reductions of conventional forces in Europe, generally called the MBFR talks; and the continuing process of discussion and negotiation stemming from the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. In addition, the United States has revised and revitalized its unilateral and multilateral programmes for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, eliminating the race of chemical weapons, studying the feasibility of imposing further limits on the military use of outer space and developing new and more effective measures to assure confidence and minimize the risks of war by miscalculation.

I shall now comment briefly on each of these aspects of the arms-control programme of the United States.

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The place to begin, manifestly, is with the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the reduction of nuclear arms through verifiable agreements which strengthen security and help to make stability possible. The outcome of these negotiations will affect the prospects for many other arms control efforts and, indeed, the prospects for peace itself. Success in the effort to curb and confine the nuclear weapon is indispensable to the possibility of peace. Under present circumstances, nuclear arms agreements must be shaped by the principle that nuclear arsenals can be justified only if they are confined to the function of deterring aggression. To put the proposition another way, useful and constructive nuclear arms agreements presuppose that the Soviet Union commit itself to obey the rules of world public order embodied in the Charter.

It is the view of the United States Government that achieving true nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States on the foundation of the principle I have just stated is the most important challenge before us in the field of arms control. We must reduce our dependence on these dangerous weapons. We must seek a more stable balance at lower levels of armament. The present situation is unacceptable to us.

How did the present situation arise? The answer is as regrettable as it is simple. It arose as a result of the expansionist foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the arms build-up on which it is based - an unprecedented increase of both conventional and nuclear military forces sustained over a period of more than 25 years. During that period, the Soviet Union claimed immunity from the Charter rules against aggression, and the rest of the world tacitly accepted its claim. That course is no longer tolerable. The process of Soviet expansion and the menace of the Soviet Union's growing military power have come to threaten the foundation of the State system. That system cannot continue to accept the Soviet practice of aggression through the use of its own forces and those of its proxies and satellites, whether organized as armies, guerrillas, armed bands or terrorists, backed by the implicit threat of its growing nuclear forces. During the 1970s, a period when the United States nuclear arsenal was held relatively stable, the Soviet Union expanded both its intermediate-range and intercontinental nuclear forces far beyond any conceivable requirements of deterrence and defence.

The size, scale and structure of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, its steady growth, and, above all, its emphasis on intermediate-range and intercontinental ground-based ballistic missiles are the source of the nuclear anxiety which haunts the world.

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Ground-based ballistic missiles are swifter, more accurate and more destructive than other nuclear weapons, and far less vulnerable to defences. The Soviet advantage in this category of nuclear weapons creates the potentiality for a disarming first strike. And the consciousness of that possibility is generating currents of fear which have great political importance throughout the world.

The purpose of the American nuclear arsenal is to deter aggression against the supreme interests of the United States. The implacable growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal suggests that the Soviet Union looks upon nuclear weapons as instruments of intimidation and coercion, precisely because such weapons, if they are sufficiently numerous, create the capacity to execute a pre-emptive first strike. This is why the Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles is politically destabilizing, and this is why the first objective of the United States in the field of nuclear arms policy is to eliminate this factor of instability in world politics, preferably by reasonable INF and START agreements, but by force-modernization if necessary.

The START and INF negotiations must be viewed together, because the weapons with which they deal are closely related. Intercontinental weapons can, after all, be fired from the Soviet Union not only against New York or Washington, but against targets in Europe, Japan or other places vital to the security of the United States and its allies as well.

The INF talks have now been going on for 11 months. They have been conducted in a businesslike and professional atmosphere. Much progress has been achieved by the two delegations in sorting out what is important to each side, and illuminating the way to possible solutions. It is clear that a potentiality exists for accommodating the analytic concepts used by both sides. What is not yet clear is whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept an agreement based exclusively on the principle of deterrence.

In the INF talks, the United States has proposed the complete elimination of an important class of nuclear weapons on both sides; the Soviet Union, in response, urges the elimination only of the United States weapons of comparable military significance. Under the Soviet proposal, the Soviet Union would be permitted to have up to 300 launchers for its mobile SS-20 systems in the European part of the Soviet Union and an unlimited number in the Far Eastern

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portion of that country, while the United States would be forbidden to deploy any equivalent systems in the European area. The Soviet Union also proposes a moratorium for the duration of the negotiations - a feature of its plan designed to preserve the Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles and to remove any Soviet incentive for agreeing to serious reductions in the most destabilizing class of weapons.

The Soviet Union defends its proposal by contending that there is in fact a balance at the moment in intermediate-range nuclear weapons, in and near Europe at least, and that the deployments planned by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would disturb that balance. The Soviet negotiators achieve this remarkable feat of arithmetic by counting all British and French nuclear weapons with the American forces, treating American bombers, submarine-launched missiles and cruise missiles as equivalent to the SS-20, counting all American weapons as relevant, including American dual-purpose aircraft located in the United States, and excluding many categories in the Soviet arsenal.

The Soviet Union has so far refused to negotiate about its mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the Far East; the United States insists that the negotiations must deal with all such Soviet and American weapons, wherever they are located. After all, the world is round, and nothing can be gained by exporting a security problem from Europe to Asia.

On 21 October 1982, President Brezhnev commented, according to TASS, that the INF talks were making "difficult progress", and that

"these difficulties are rooted in the unwillingness of the United States to reach agreement ... on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security".

The United States notes with interest President Brezhnev's statement that the INF talks are making progress. As I remarked a few moments ago, the United States agrees with President Brezhnev's assessment, in the sense that the negotiating process is clarifying the concepts used by both sides, and revealing patterns of possible congruence in their positions. Furthermore, we welcome the fact that both sides accept the principle of equality as the basis for a fair agreement.

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But we cannot agree with President Brezhnev that the present position of the Soviet Union in the INF talks is one based on the principle of equality.

The American concept of equality is defined with precision: zero on both sides for the most destabilizing intermediate-range ground-based ballistic missiles.

The Soviet Union, however, uses at least four quite different definitions of equality simultaneously: equal reductions on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States; an equal level of force, measured in packages of weapons of different destructive capacities, sometimes between the Soviet Union and the United States, sometimes between the Soviet Union and NATO as a whole. Most often, the Soviet Union uses the term "equal security" to mean that the world must acknowledge its claim of a right to possess a nuclear arsenal equal to the sum of all the other nuclear arsenals in the world. This is a claim for hegemony, not equality.

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United States)

The nuclear arsenals of Great Britain, France and China exist to protect the ultimate sovereignty of those nations. Those weapons are not under American control. These arsenals are entirely defensive in character; given their size, they could not be used for any conceivable act of aggression against the Soviet Union. There is no basis therefore for the claim that such arsenals have any role in bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Sometimes representatives of the Soviet Union say that the mutual security of the Soviet Union and the United States is indivisible. This is a suggestive formulation of the problem defining equality. Thus far, at any rate, it turns out to be as elusive as the others.

The United States believes that achieving equality between the Soviet Union and the United States on the basis of the principle of deterrence, with primary but not exclusive emphasis on equality in the most destabilizing categories of weapons, would in itself be a major political event and a step of genuine importance in the quest for peace.

The Soviet-United States talks on intercontinental nuclear weapons are of course at an earlier stage than the INF talks. Their atmosphere is also serious and businesslike. The United States position was outlined in President Reagan's speech at Eureka College on 9 May 1982. Its essential idea is that of equal ceilings at much lower levels of force - ceilings that would strengthen deterrence and promote stability by significantly reducing the Soviet lead in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Coupled with the elimination of the existing intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as proposed in the INF talks, such a result would enable the United States to maintain an overall level of strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, safeguard our national security and meet our commitments to allies and friends.

To achieve this goal, the President announced a practical, phased approach to the negotiations, like the procedure being used in the INF talks. It is based on the principle that the two arsenals should be equal both in the number of weapons and in their destructive capacity.

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President Reagan said:

"The focus of our efforts will be to reduce significantly the most destabilizing systems - ballistic missiles, the number of warheads they carry and their overall destructive potential."

While no aspect of the problem is excluded from consideration, and the United States will negotiate in good faith on any topic the Soviet Union wishes to raise, the United States proposes that the first topic to be considered in the negotiations should be the reduction of ballistic missile warheads to equal levels at least one third below current numbers. Both ground-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles are included in this proposal. No more than half these warheads would be deployed on land-based missiles. This provision alone should achieve substantial reductions in missile throw weight, a reliable measure of the destructive power of nuclear weapons.

In a second phase closely linked to the first we shall seek equal ceilings on other elements of the United States and Soviet strategic forces, including equal limits on ballistic missile throw weight at less than current United States levels.

In both START and INF the United States has made it clear that verification measures capable of assuring compliance are indispensable. For those provisions that cannot be monitored effectively by national technical means of verification we shall be proposing co-operative measures, data exchanges, and collateral constraints that should provide the necessary confidence in compliance. The Soviet Union has indicated that it will be prepared where necessary to consider co-operative measures going beyond national technical means. That is an encouraging sign. Without satisfactory verification provisions, it would be impossible to achieve meaningful agreements.

The Soviet Union has attacked our START proposals as unfair on the grounds that they call for unequal reduction - indeed, that they call for

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unilateral Soviet disarmament. That is not the case. Each side now has approximately 7,500 ballistic missile warheads. Under the United States proposal, each side would have to reduce the number to no more than 5,000, of which no more than 2,500 could be on ICBMs. It is true that the Soviet Union would have to dismantle more ICBMs to comply with the sub-limit, while we might have to dismantle more submarine-based missiles. But that is the point. There is nothing inequitable about an equal ceiling which strengthens deterrence and stability.

The Soviet position in START, as Soviet spokesmen have made clear in public statements, consists of two parts: a proposal for a moratorium and a series of reductions and restrictions on modernization which would result in preserving the present Soviet advantage in heavy, accurate, swift and extremely destructive ground-based missiles. The Soviet Union seems to treat stability as a quantitative, not a qualitative, problem and its proposal offers no incentive to move away from destabilizing systems, nor would it lead to substantial reductions in the key indicators of destructive potential. If the INF and START talks are successful, the huge Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles will be eliminated. In addition, the achievement of success in these two negotiations would eliminate the menacing Soviet lead in throw weight, which is equally important. If the Soviet Union accepts nuclear-arms-control agreements based on the principle of deterrence only, which is at the heart of our negotiating position, a Soviet first strike would be impossible. Then - but only then - nuclear tension would be diminished.

In President Reagan's statement on arms control on 18 November 1981 he spoke of the importance which we attach to progress in the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced forced reductions in Europe - the so-called MBFR negotiations. As all of the Committee members are aware, these negotiations that have been under way for almost a decade, have been bogged down primarily as a result of Soviet intransigence over acknowledging exactly how many Warsaw Pact forces there are in the area of reductions to be covered by the treaty. The Soviet view applies the principle of caveat emptor with a vengeance. Meaningful progress towards the established goal of reductions to equal levels is hardly possible if we cannot agree on

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the number of forces now deployed on each side - the basis needed to negotiate the reductions. Unless both sides are satisfied about the adequacy of the data used in the negotiations, it is hard to imagine how an atmosphere of trust can be expected to develop.

The West has taken a new initiative in moving the MBFR negotiations forward. In July the West formally submitted a draft MBFR treaty embodying a new, comprehensive proposal designed to give renewed momentum to the negotiations. The new proposal highlights the primary Western objective in these negotiations, which is the lowering of tensions of central Europe through a reduction in conventional forces and the establishment of parity at lower force levels in the form of common collective ceilings on the military manpower of each side. This proposal, submitted as a draft treaty, goes far to meet Eastern concerns and underscores Western seriousness and willingness to bring about militarily significant reductions in central Europe. We can only hope that the Soviet Union and its allies will understand the significance of the Western draft treaty and respond in a positive way.

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At this point let me add a brief note about the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Madrid meetings, since the CSCE process is decidedly relevant to the over-all climate for arms control efforts. Like the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act recognizes that basic human rights and fundamental freedoms are an essential element in the over-all equation that defines security and co-operation between States. The United States is committed to the Helsinki Final Act and to the CSCE process in its entirety. As part of this commitment, we seek balanced and substantive improvements both in the implementation of previously-made agreements and in strengthening the provisions of those agreements. That was our intent when the Madrid meeting first convened two years ago and that will be our intent when it resumes on 9 November. Unfortunately, however, events in Poland and the brutal intensification of repression in the Soviet Union clearly indicate that other States do not share our commitment to the integrity of the process begun at Helsinki. This will make progress at Madrid extremely difficult.

Another important arms control challenge facing the international community is the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union have assumed special responsibilities to work together in order to limit and reduce nuclear arms. The United States has been trying to carry out that responsibility through a long series of nuclear-arms-control proposals, starting in 1946. It will continue to do so. But the problem of non-proliferation is not merely one of negotiating nuclear-arms-control agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States. The issue runs deeper. Every State, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, has the same interest in preventing nuclear proliferation. A world of numerous and dispersed nuclear-weapons States would be unstable and unpredictable. As Secretary Shultz said to the General Assembly a month ago:

"The threat of nuclear proliferation extends to every region in the world and demands the attention and energy of every government." (A/37/PV.11, p. 97)

International co-operation in non-proliferation is essential if we are to confront this major threat to international peace.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty are the most universally accepted instruments of non-proliferation policy and deserve continued broad support. They alone cannot guarantee the world against nuclear proliferation; but they are indispensable weapons in the effort.

(Mr. Eugene Rostow, United States)

Like a number of other international institutions, the IAEA has recently been made the victim of a damaging attack. Some member States have attempted to use the Agency as a forum for political warfare. The procedures used in these deplorable episodes are contrary to the Charter and the statutes of each of the agencies involved. The United States and a number of other nations are resolved to resist this trend as a major threat to the efficacy of our international institutions. All that has been achieved in nearly 40 years of devoted effort is imperilled by such shortsighted and illegal behaviour. The United States calls on all Members of the United Nations to join in protecting -- and strengthening -- these invaluable international resources, which are and must remain universal in their reach.

The United States continues its efforts to seek wider acceptance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and earlier this month, in Washington, we were pleased to welcome Uganda into the ranks of parties to the Treaty, the 119th country to recognize it as an important element of international security.

The United States continues to believe that nuclear-weapon-free zones can, under appropriate conditions, enhance regional security. The Treaty of Tlatelolco has contributed significantly to the prospects for long-term security in Latin America and we remain hopeful that progress can be made towards its full entry into force throughout the region. We believe that nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements could contribute to the security and peace of other regions as well. We commend efforts towards this end and would urge the relevant countries to explore more actively the possibilities for progress in this area.

I should like to turn now to a subject to which my Government attaches major importance: the matter of chemical weapons, their use, and efforts to ban them. When I spoke to this Committee last year I underlined the deep and continuing concern of my Government over the use of chemical warfare in South-East Asia and Afghanistan. Since that time, even more compelling evidence of this activity has come to light. The United States brought this new evidence to the attention of the United Nations in March of this year, in the form of a report which compiled all of the evidence we had before us into a single document. The conclusions contained in that report are unassailable: that selected Lao and Vietnamese forces, under the direct supervision of Soviet personnel, have used lethal chemical weapons, including prohibited toxins, since 1976 at least, and that Soviet forces in Afghanistan have used a variety of lethal and non-lethal chemical agents since the December 1979 invasion.

(Mr. Eugene Rostow, United States)

Since the release of that report, others have conducted their own investigations and have come independently to similar conclusions. The Canadian Government, for example, recently submitted a report to the United Nations which cited further evidence of the use of such lethal chemical substances in South-East Asia. I regret to say that such use continues. My own Government has obtained further significant evidence of such use, which we shall shortly submit to the United Nations. Finally, there is the United Nations' own group of experts, whose report on this subject we expect before the end of this Assembly session. Their task is not an easy one. Therefore, as President Reagan stressed this summer in his address to the second special session on disarmament, we urge the Governments of the Soviet Union, Laos and Viet Nam to grant full and free access to the areas in which chemical attacks have been reported. Ending the use of these horrible weapons should be given the highest priority by the international community. Violations of existing legal constraints have a negative impact on the entire arms control atmosphere.

It is against this backdrop that efforts have continued in the Committee on Disarmament to develop a draft convention which would ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Is it any wonder that the United States, along with many other delegations, insists that such a convention should contain effective verification provisions? Is it any wonder that the Committee is devoting so much careful consideration to this critical aspect of a convention? We only wish that it had been possible to make more progress on the matter this year.

Many members of this Committee will no doubt recall that in June, when Foreign Minister Gromyko appeared before the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament, he unveiled a new Soviet proposal on chemical weapons, in the form of "basic provisions" for a draft convention. Part of that draft convention addressed the issue of verification in terms which suggested that the Soviet Union might now be prepared to accept systematic international on-site inspection in certain circumstances. This appeared to be an interesting and constructive step. Most of us believe that systematic international on-site inspection, which cannot be vetoed, is essential to the verification of a ban on chemical weapons; but when our delegation to the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament, together with many others, sought to obtain elaboration

(Mr. Eugene Rostow, United States)

from the Soviet delegation about its own proposal we were met with equivocation and evasion. We hope and expect that a more constructive attitude will prevail at the next session of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mention of the Committee on Disarmament leads me to discuss another issue, important to all of us, which has preoccupied the Committee for many years: the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The United States does not believe that in the present circumstances a comprehensive nuclear-test ban would reduce the threat of nuclear war, because such a ban could not reduce the threat implicit in the existing stockpiles. Furthermore, the verification of a comprehensive test ban would remain a serious problem. As yet we see no definitive solution. However, I repeat here what I said earlier in the year to the Committee on Disarmament, that a comprehensive test ban remains a long-term United States arms-control objective. With that objective in mind we proposed that the verification aspects of the nuclear-test ban problem be discussed in a working group of the Committee on Disarmament, a proposal which ultimately won the approval of the Committee.

What happened next is instructive. The Soviet Union and its allies, having agreed to the mandate for the Working Group, sought to obstruct effective work in the Group. Then it put forward the proposition that the Working Group had fulfilled its mandate.

In his speech before the General Assembly, Foreign Minister Gromyko called for the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and in the meantime proposed a moratorium on all nuclear explosions. The Foreign Minister has also submitted a draft treaty for our consideration, as well as draft resolutions on the subject. The United States will, of course, study these proposals with care. Much of the material in these proposals is already familiar.

The Soviet proposal makes no reference to verification. By its very nature it lacks any means to ensure compliance. I should note that the last time we had a moratorium on nuclear testing, some 20 years ago, it was abruptly followed by a large series of Soviet nuclear tests, tests the clandestine preparation of which had clearly been under way during the moratorium. They included the two largest nuclear tests ever carried out, one of which had a yield of about 60 megatons.

The Soviet Union has placed great emphasis in its public statements on its pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The Soviet position is a cynical exploitation of one of the most troublesome moral issues of our age. The controversy about no-first-use pledges underscores the wisdom of the Secretary-General's advice that all nations recommit themselves to the principles of the Charter. NATO has long followed a policy - one it has recently reiterated - that none of its weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. We see no value in a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons if a right, or at least the power, to use conventional weapons in contravention of the Charter is claimed and reserved. The main effect of nuclear-arms-control agreements should not be to make the world safe for conventional aggressive war. In any event, the Soviet no-first-use pledge is unverifiable and unenforceable. Its credibility is belied by the nature of Soviet military doctrine and by the ominous Soviet buildup of massive land-based ballistic missiles, which present an obvious threat of first use.

(Mr. Eugene Rostow, United States)

I have often spoken of the problems which an excessive devotion to secrecy can pose to arms-control efforts. Many in this chamber have long argued that greater openness in military matters could help reduce tensions and lessen the danger of war. Some measures along these lines have already been instituted in Europe as an outgrowth of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and indeed they have made a modest contribution to the reduction of tensions in that most heavily armed area of the world.

My Government is among those which would like to see a wider application of the principle of openness. In particular, we should like to see greater participation of States in the reporting of their military budgets to the United Nations, as repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly, and in the work of United Nations experts to improve the comparability of statistics. President Reagan emphasized this policy in his speech to the General Assembly at its second special session in June. It is our hope that this session of the General Assembly will encourage a broadening of the effort to promote full disclosure and we shall be suggesting ways in which this might be done.

Similarly, I think that the World Disarmament Campaign, which was debated at the special session on disarmament, holds some promise for promoting more widespread, open and thoughtful debate on the subject. This is to be welcomed, provided agreed principles for the Campaign are universally observed. As the Committee knows, the United States worked hard at the special session to ensure that those principles are included in the Campaign. We think that this point is worth emphasizing again in any draft resolution which the Assembly may consider this fall on the Campaign.

The Secretary-General's call to nations to recommit themselves to the Charter should be the dominant theme of this meeting. One place to begin the effort he recommends is in the nuclear-arms negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States now going on in Geneva. We urge the Soviet Union to abandon the claim of a right to retain a nuclear arsenal which goes beyond any conceivable limits of defence and deterrence. To accept the principle of deterrence as the foundation of the INF and START talks would be a giant step towards the goal of peace.

(Mr. Eugene Rostow, United States)

In conclusion, I return to the theme with which I started, that arms-control and disarmament efforts can be useful instruments of a strategy for obtaining and preserving peace, but in no sense can they be a substitute for such a strategy. In the absence of general respect for the rules of the Charter, arms-control negotiations can be futile at best and damaging to the cause of peace at worst. As the Secretary-General has reminded us, peace can be ensured only by enforcing the prescriptions of the Charter against aggression. Since no one can be certain that the escalation from conventional to nuclear war will not occur, the only way to free mankind from the threat of nuclear war is to stop conventional war as well. The draft pastoral letter of the Committee on War and Peace of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops of the United States, released on 25 October 1982, puts the issue with austere eloquence:

"We must reemphasize with all our being ... that it is not only nuclear war that must be prevented, but war itself, the scourge of humanity."

Mr. NATORF (Poland): Mr. Chairman, although my delegation has already done so, I should like, since this is my first statement in the Committee, to congratulate you on your election to the chairmanship and to wish you success in discharging your important duties. My congratulations are also addressed to the Vice-Chairmen of the Committee and to the Rapporteur.

I should also like to congratulate wholeheartedly Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles, who has always spared no effort to promote the cause of disarmament and who has fought for the cessation of the arms race, on the award to him of the Nobel Peace Prize.

We also express through the Swedish delegation our congratulations to Mrs. Myrdal, a tireless spokeswoman for the strengthening of international peace and for disarmament.

The recently-held general debate as well as the present discussion in this Committee have emphasized very forcefully the feeling of deep, yet still growing concern over the tense international situation. One need not recall that the same grave feeling was clearly manifested during the debate at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which failed to reach agreement on concrete steps in this field. The lack of political will on the part of those very States which are responsible for the heightened arms race made the taking of such steps impossible, regardless of the willingness, determination and ardent appeals of the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations.

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

We all know the realities of the present international situation which is characterized by the accumulation of dangerous, negative phenomena in the political, military and economic spheres. One can hardly fail to notice such developments, trends and tendencies as the constant quantitative and qualitative growth of armaments, the continued discussions held in some Western quarters of the possibility of waging and winning a limited nuclear war, the feasibility of a pre-emptive first nuclear strike and the chances of surviving and winning a total, full-scale nuclear conflict. It is now more obvious than ever before that these new phenomena and trends do not flow merely from the inherent dynamics of the arms race but that they also reflect specific conceptions backed by certain political decisions. They are, as a matter of fact, a manifestation of a dangerous evolution in the policy of the United States and some other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is an evolution developed as a result of obsession with gaining nuclear superiority and the pursuit of illusory security through the remorseless expansion of military arsenals. This is a policy of striving to impose their own line in international relations formed from a position of strength and diktat, openly to interfere in the internal affairs of other States, and to destabilize the existing balance of forces.

One can hardly fail to notice that today's world finds itself on the most dangerous path that may lead to a nuclear catastrophe if the nuclear arms race remains unchecked, if the already wide range of nuclear weapons and delivery systems featuring a great diversity of methods, purposes and yields continue to grow, and if an end is not put to the continued development of nuclear stockpiles.

Speaking in the general debate at this session of the General Assembly on 27 September, my Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stefan Olszowski, emphasized that the danger of nuclear war is more evident today than ever before, as it is openly spoken of and is being prepared for in the open. He said, inter alia:

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

"The genuine aspirations of the peoples lie on the side of peace. The first and supreme duty of politicians and Governments in the sphere of international relations is to keep awakening and perpetuating these aspirations and to do all they can to banish for ever an apocalyptic vision of the world. Whoever is unfaithful to this duty, whoever ignores his own and his country's responsibility for international peace and security and embarks on generating tensions, escalating armaments and preaching intolerance, is betraying the trust of his own people, is striking at its peaceful aspirations and is no longer fit to voice them." (A/37/PV.5, p. 64)

The policy of the USSR on the issue that constitutes one of the most urgent problems of our time, the one that has been the focus of international politics and commands the anxious attention of world public opinion for years, finds its clear-cut, positive and constructive expression in the two new proposals submitted to this session of the General Assembly by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Andrei Gromyko, in his statement of 1 October 1982.

Those important proposals - "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" and "Intensification of efforts to remove the threat of nuclear war and ensure the safe development of nuclear energy" - are new major milestones in the long record of efforts for nuclear disarmament undertaken by the Soviet Union. Deriving from previous proposals, they are closely linked with them and together constitute the integral components of the peaceful policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the States of the socialist community. They are logically related to such outstanding initiatives and decisions as the proposal to conclude an agreement on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all States, the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, last year's Declaration on averting a nuclear catastrophe and the USSR decision not to be the first to use nuclear weapons - to name just a few.

There is no need to argue about the timeliness of the new Soviet initiatives. The first one means in practice a major step to be taken

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

without any further delay on how to stop the qualitative development of deadly weapons designed for the first-strike potential. A cessation of tests will build a strong barrier to technological advancement of nuclear weapons, limit considerably their development and thus create the possibility that the nuclear arms race will be brought to a complete halt. Those proposals fully coincide with the long-time efforts and expectations of the non-aligned countries, especially those which participate in the work of the United Nations Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

The proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics contained in the appendix to document A/37/243, entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", reflects a realistic approach that takes account of all the requirements of the present situation. The scope of the prohibition is of a total character, since it is the only effective way of impeding the development of ever new types and systems of nuclear weapons.

The ensuring of compliance with the treaty constitutes one of the most vital and important parts of the draft which has been submitted, because its provisions on verification are what will determine the effectiveness of a treaty of this type. In the past they very often proved to be the most difficult to reach agreement on as well as served as a pretext to justify the unwillingness of some States to work out an agreement. The draft proposes that the activities of the States Parties to the treaty in verifying compliance with its provisions be based on a combination of national and international measures. The proposed verification system provides that:

"For the purpose of verifying compliance with the provisions of the Treaty by other States Parties, any State Party shall have the right to use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law." (A/37/243, annex, p. 3)

By taking account also of the elaborate international procedures of consultation and co-operation, including the exchange of information relevant to compliance with the obligations assumed under the treaty, the said system places emphasis on the matter of its compatibility with the demands of time and the capability of enhancing the effectiveness of the treaty and the strict observance of its provisions.

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

The right to participate in an international exchange of seismic data, the establishment of international seismic centres and the establishment of an international committee of experts of States parties to the treaty will all contribute to its successful implementation and to co-operation between the States parties in the international exchanges related to the effectiveness of the treaty.

The provisions of the draft on the fact-finding procedure regarding compliance with the treaty and on the possibility of requests for an on-site inspection, as well as on the procedure for lodging complaints with the United Nations Security Council whenever there are reasons to believe that there has been a violation of the provisions of the treaty, forcefully confirm the intention of ensuring its effectiveness.

The Soviet representative, Ambassador Troyanovsky, emphasized in his statement that in approaching the task of achieving a cessation of nuclear-weapon tests a joint search could be undertaken in all possible areas, either in a radical way or through a series of consecutive steps. Of course, should it be possible to proceed promptly to the conclusion of such a treaty, it would be in the interest of us all, because of the special urgency stemming from the present international situation. To be realistic, however, one must consider the various factors, circumstances and complexities of the issues involved. There is a growing awareness among States that a complete nuclear-test ban is urgently needed. We hope this is taken under consideration by all those countries which would be instrumental in concluding the proposed treaty as promptly as possible. Also, the fact that the cornerstone already exists for this very important structure should encourage us to redouble our efforts in this direction.

In our opinion, the General Assembly should entrust the Committee on Disarmament with a mandate to proceed promptly with practical negotiations with a view to preparing a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The basic provisions of such a treaty, submitted by the USSR, should be referred to the Committee on Disarmament for its consideration. In due time the Polish delegation will firmly support the Soviet draft resolution, contained in document A/C.1/37/L.6, which also calls on all the nuclear-weapon States, as a gesture of good will and with a view to creating more favourable conditions for the formulation of the aforesaid treaty, not to conduct any nuclear explosions as from the date agreed among them.

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

To start working in that direction, and to intensify efforts to remove the threat of nuclear war and ensure the safe development of nuclear energy would be a step of major importance to the entire world.

The Soviet proposal in this respect derives directly from the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, adopted by the General Assembly during its thirty-sixth session, on the initiative of the Soviet Union. The new proposal constitutes an enrichment of the declaration, and the translation of its provisions into the practical language of specific measures aimed at removing the existing threat of a nuclear holocaust.

The Soviet draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.7 emphasizes not only that the deliberate destruction of peaceful nuclear installations even by means of conventional weapons is essentially equivalent to an attack using nuclear weapons, but also that the limitation and reduction of the nuclear arms race will produce more favourable conditions for the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Of particular importance is the call, as a first step towards the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear arsenals, for agreement among all nuclear-weapon States on a simultaneous suspension of the production and development of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and also of the production of fissionable materials for the purposes of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would contribute significantly towards curbing the nuclear arms race and, in particular, halting the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, and the creation of new types and systems of such weapons, as well as towards strengthening the non-proliferation régime. It would become a serious obstacle in the way of the upward spiral of development of the technology of death.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that the intensification of efforts to remove the threat of nuclear war would ensure the safe development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and promote international co-operation in this field.

Poland welcomes the Soviet initiatives, which bring all of us hope that the existing deadlock on the subject of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests may finally be broken. The urgency of such a breakthrough is stressed in the

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

joint communiqué of the Meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, issued in Moscow on 23 October 1982. It said, inter alia, that the Committee resolutely favoured an immediate resumption of the talks that were broken off by the United States Administration and strongly calls upon all parties concerned to act in a spirit of good will and political responsibility and renew their efforts directed to the conclusion of an appropriate treaty as soon as possible.

In our view, the preparation and signing of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests is an attainable and realistic goal. The present alarming situation demands such a measure. It demands also intensified efforts to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. The time is already more than ripe for such actions. Moving forward in this way will bring us closer to the ultimate goal - the total ban of nuclear weapons, which is in the highest interest of all mankind.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): My delegation would like to state its position today with regard to several specific questions under consideration in this Committee.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic subscribes to the view that it is imperative to make further resolute and really constructive efforts to deal with the problems that could not be resolved at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. There are a number of positive results of that session which can serve as the basis for such further efforts. All the participating States have reaffirmed the immutability of the Final Document adopted at the first special session on disarmament and expressed their determination to implement it. Strenuous attempts to call into question the principles developed by the General Assembly at the first special session and the Programme of Action adopted by it have proved unsuccessful.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic notes with satisfaction that the second special session contributed to a world-wide upsurge of the mass movement for peace and disarmament. That movement will continue to have a significant say in progress in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

At the second special session on disarmament, absolute priority was accorded to the prevention of a nuclear war. Therefore the unilateral commitment of the USSR not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is rightly considered as the high point of that session. This fact cannot be changed by the kind of allegations we heard today. If the United States and other nuclear-weapon States would declare their commitment not to use nuclear weapons first, it would amount to a general non-use of such weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic
Republic)

Important proposals for the prevention of nuclear war and the cessation of the nuclear arms race, which were put forward by India, Mexico and other States, are now before the First Committee for consideration and action. The second special session strengthened the basic United Nations policy guideline according to which stable world peace, international security, and prosperity for the people can be achieved only by ending the arms race and bringing about disarmament. Clear-cut criteria have thus been set for judging doctrines, concepts and strategies which are commonly referred to as nuclear doctrines. Catch-words employed in this connection are "nuclear deterrence", "counter-force and countervailing strategies" and "limited" and "protracted" nuclear wars. One thing is common to all these concepts: they are aimed at preparing the ground for nuclear war and at making such a war feasible and winnable. Regrettably, such are not only the dreams of the proponents of imperialist world domination, but priorities in their practical conduct of policy.

This morning we were given a lecture on this. Whereas no clear proposals on the questions before us were outlined, and allegations were made, we were told that disarmament negotiations should be based exclusively on the principle of deterrence. That is in clear contradiction to the consensus of the first special session on disarmament.

In the military field, this means, among other things, their striving to upset the existing equilibrium to their own advantage, the creation of a so-called nuclear first-strike capability, a drive for military bases, and the total integration in the arms race of the world's oceans and outer space.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

At the same time, these nuclear doctrines are instruments in the political and ideological preparation of nuclear war and sources of war propaganda. They are directly opposed to efforts for disarmament. As can be witnessed every day, specific proposals aimed at the prevention of nuclear war and the attainment of nuclear disarmament are turned down on the basis of the aforementioned doctrines. It is being contended that nuclear deterrence presupposes the conduct of nuclear-weapon tests, the maintenance and further development of nuclear weapons, and even a nuclear first-strike option. It is this barrier which blocks the most sensible arguments and proposals for nuclear disarmament.

The German Democratic Republic delegation therefore regards it as necessary - and indeed logical - for the United Nations, which pursues the prevention of nuclear war and the attainment of nuclear disarmament as its foremost priorities, to speak out against all such nuclear doctrines. Immediate action to prevent a nuclear catastrophe is the most important need today. Such action must go hand in hand with measures designed to end the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament.

The German Democratic Republic advocates elaboration of a nuclear disarmament programme containing the following main elements: cessation of the development of new systems of nuclear weapons; cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes; cessation of the production of all types of nuclear munitions and of their delivery vehicles; gradual reduction of the accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including their delivery vehicles; and total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The USSR has put forward a proposal to that effect. The initiatives of India, Mexico and other countries, which are directed towards the same goal, likewise merit our attention. Hence there are enough suggestions and ideas to deserve being taken up in a nuclear disarmament working group of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

It was with that in mind that the German Democratic Republic proposed in Geneva, back in March of this year, that such a working group be set up. It should define the various stages of nuclear disarmament and then inaugurate multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. It is our hope that the United Nations General Assembly will expressly come out in support of such a step during its current session.

The German Democratic Republic takes the view that to ban the neutron weapon by a corresponding convention is an anti-nuclear-arms-race measure which should be given priority. The production of that weapon, which is sometimes referred to as the first of the third nuclear-weapon generation, amounts to a direct violation of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament. It means a further escalation of the nuclear arms race.

In its resolution 36/92, adopted at its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly recognized the need to keep the neutron weapon out of the military arsenals of States. Since then it has become even more urgent to get negotiations on this question finally under way.

For one thing, the United States, according to press reports which have not been formally denied, is currently engaged in preparations for the production of a third type of neutron warhead. Neutron warheads are to make up a large part of the 23,000 nuclear warheads which the United States plans to produce over the next 10 years. Secondly, there are increasing signs which confirm our worry that the introduction of the neutron nuclear weapon into military arsenals results in a lowering of the nuclear threshold. This is evidenced by reflections on "some form of delegated clearance" to use tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe.

In the opinion of Western military planners, the neutron weapon is the ideal nuclear weapon for the so-called integrated battlefield - that is, for combined conventional-nuclear-chemical-biological-electronic warfare.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic
Republic)

Thirdly, plans already exist today which call for the spread of the neutron weapons in other regions, and not only in Europe. Israeli experts are openly speaking of the "nuclear weapon for small countries", which, they argue, has special significance for Israel. The South African racist régime is producing delivery vehicles suitable for neutron weapons. No time should be lost in striving to put a stop to this development.

The world is alarmed at plans for the production of new, sophisticated types of chemical weapons. The present situation calls imperatively for an international agreement on the prohibition of these weapons of mass destruction. The basic provisions of a corresponding convention, proposed by the USSR, have had a stimulating effect on the activities of the relevant Working Group of the Geneva Committee. In this connection, the work of the Chairman of that Group, Ambassador Sujka, representative of the Polish People's Republic, deserves a special tribute.

The German Democratic Republic delegation deems it necessary for the United Nations General Assembly to urge a speedy preparation of that convention; for while the majority of delegations are seeking to reach practical solutions, there are also attempts constantly to raise new technical questions to delay the conclusion of the convention and thus to keep open the possibility of building up a new generation of chemical weapons - the binary weapons. Therefore, the General Assembly should come out against the production of such weapons and their deployment in foreign countries.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

What is common to all aspects of arms limitation and disarmament is the fact that the decisive means for achieving agreements is negotiation. But it cannot be a question of conducting negotiations as an end in itself, and still less admissible is the intention to use them as camouflage for an intensified build-up of military strength. Rather, it is the duty of States to conduct such negotiations in good faith. At last week's session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which was held in Moscow, it was stressed that:

"the interests of peace and security urgently require that all States show great responsibility and political will for attaining constructive agreements on topical international issues, renounce any attempts to gain unilateral advantages, and strictly observe the generally-accepted principles and norms of international law and the treaties and agreements which have been concluded."

One thing is clear: those who pursue a policy of strength do not want to negotiate - they want to dictate.

Ongoing negotiations are deadlocked due to unrealistic demands, underlying which is a bid for military superiority. While, for instance, the Moscow Treaty of 1963 provides for the holding of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban, one of the depositaries of that Treaty feels that this point in time is not "propitious" for such a comprehensive ban. Obstruction continues against the start of negotiations on top-priority issues like the prevention of nuclear war, nuclear disarmament, and the prohibition of the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space. On this and other matters, the Committee on Disarmament finds itself hindered in the exercise of its mandate for negotiations.

In the face of this situation the General Assembly should call for negotiations in progress to be intensified, for dormant ones to be resumed, and for new ones to be started.

We are aware that agreements on arms limitation and disarmament will not come about easily. What it takes to achieve them is the necessary political will. The strict minimum that is required is to refrain from using "cold war" methods

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

such as the one we were exposed to some days ago - and again today - in this Committee. We hope that the further work of the Committee will be marked by a willingness to engage in dialogue in a businesslike atmosphere.

Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I should like merely to make a few remarks concerning the statement made by His Excellency Mr. Eugene Rostow. I congratulate him on the lucid way in which he made the cardinal distinction between a strategy for peace based on the effective implementation of the decisions of the Security Council - the basic implementation of the Charter of the United Nations really - and the procedures that should follow from that: those of productive negotiating agreements on disarmament and on collateral measures for disarmament so urgently needed for peace and security.

He also expressed the realization that there is a new climate of public opinion in the world, which has become aware of the vital questions of war and peace, and that there has been a change in the approach of world opinion towards problems of disarmament and peace. Mr. Rostow observes that that change is reflected in the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, from which he quotes extensively, and which he supports fully on behalf of the United States.

This is a very important fact at the present juncture: that we have the United States supporting the report of the Secretary-General. We thus have a greater hope for moving towards peace and security in the world than we have ever had before.

I should like to explain what I mean. Mr. Rostow made specific reference to parts of the Secretary-General's report. I shall quote some of them: We are embarked on an exceedingly dangerous course, which the Secretary-General characterizes as "perilously near to a new international anarchy" (A/37/1, p. 3)

It is this anarchy that we have to fight against as a first step. We must stop the anarchy that exists in the world as a result of violations of the basic provisions of the Charter prohibiting the threat or use of force, as manifested in continuous acts of aggression and contemptuous disregard of the decisions of the Security Council.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

Mr. Rostow further cites pertinently the Secretary-General as saying that the failure of the League of Nations to develop an effective system of collective security was a major cause of the Second World War and that we appear now to be moving along the same path again. On behalf of the United States, Mr. Rostow supports the Secretary-General and warns that we must stop moving along this path to anarchy.

How can we stop this course? I should like to say a few words about that. The way to stop it is to remedy the original error of the United Nations whereby - and here I quote the same passage from the Secretary-General's report as did Mr. Rostow -

"The Security Council ... finds itself unable to take decisive action to resolve international conflicts" (Ibid.) through a lack of the means provided for in the Charter - for the effective implementation of its decisions. That is the original error in the functioning of the United Nations, and we have to remedy it as a first step. It can be remedied through compliance with Article 43 of the Charter, by which Members of the Organization undertake to make available to the Security Council the means for giving effect to its decisions. In this regard, I refer specifically too to General Assembly resolution 35/156 J, adopted in 1980, which requests the permanent members of the Security Council to facilitate the work of the Council towards carrying out its essential responsibility under the Charter. That resolution was adopted by consensus, with the express consent of the two major Powers.

I would wish to remind the members of this Committee that during this Disarmament Week we should focus our efforts on the effective implementation of the Charter's provisions for making available to the United Nations the means it needs for peace operations. When that is attained a climate of confidence in the United Nations as an effective instrument for peace will be created. Flowing from that confidence in the United Nations would be greater trust among the Members themselves, particularly between the major Powers, which would lead to productive negotiations on disarmament agreements and on collateral measures.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

We have heard Mr. Rostow say that it is not sufficient to prevent the first use of nuclear weapons if the right to use conventional weapons is reserved. The first use or any use of armed force must be ruled out, as provided for in the Charter. That is the essence of Mr. Rostow's statement, and I wish to emphasize that aspect because it is so vital towards effectively prohibiting all use of force, considering that a war with conventional weapons might easily escalate into a nuclear war.

Mr. Rostow concludes his statement after referring to the particulars of the various negotiations in which the lack of trust and confidence is evident. There is suspicion that one side wants to dominate the world; presumably the other side also has the same suspicion, that the United States wants to dominate the world. How is that atmosphere of suspicion to be allayed? By complying with the Charter, as Mr. Rostow says, giving to the United Nations the effective primary responsibility and central role on disarmament. That is an important aspect so lucidly expressed by Mr. Rostow for the first time. At the end of his statement he returns to the theme with which he started,

"... that arms control and disarmament efforts can be useful instruments of a strategy for maintaining and preserving peace, but in no sense can they be a substitute for such a strategy"ⁱⁱ
(supra, p. 33)

based on compliance with the basic provision and rules of order under its Charter.

Therefore, in my submission we should proceed in this Committee diligently and expeditiously to conform to the Charter, by encouraging the Secretary-General to take the appropriate steps under the authority vested in him by Article 99 to bring to the notice of the Security Council the need for carrying out the measures giving effect to its decisions for the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus we may obtain a degree of order and security in the world and make it possible to proceed productively to measures of disarmament.

Before I conclude, I should like to express my deep appreciation - and, I am sure I am not alone in the expression of these feelings - of the way in which you are conducting these proceedings, Mr. Chairman, in these critical times, and your deep understanding of the essence of the whole problem with which we are dealing.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.