



FIRST COMMITTEE  
7th meeting  
held on  
Thursday, 21 October 1982  
at 10.30 a.m.  
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 7TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. CARASALES (Argentina)  
(Vice-Chairman)

later: Mr. GBEHO (Ghana)

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Distr. GENERAL  
A/C.1/37/PV.7  
22 October 1982  
ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 to 57, 133, 136, 138 and 139 (continued)

#### GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. CANALES (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): The Chilean delegation would like to congratulate the Chairman most cordially on his election to the chairmanship of this Committee. His professional qualities constitute a guarantee of balance and impartiality in the conduct of our proceedings.

My delegation wishes to associate itself with the tribute paid by this Assembly to Ambassador Garcia Robles, whose constant dedication to the cause of disarmament, above and beyond political considerations, constitutes a recognition of his own personal efforts and his interest in having the United Nations achieve the substantial results indispensable for a more just and lasting world order. The same applies to Mrs. Myrdal.

The First Committee is beginning its work this year in an atmosphere of frustration, which is natural. The meagre results achieved at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament have again brought to the fore our common task, which still remains only an ideal, namely, the achievement of general and complete disarmament as a means of improving the climate of international confidence, a basic objective for the well-being of man and the progress of mankind.

At the 1978 session, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament adopted by consensus the Final Document, which includes a Programme of Action, paragraph 109 of which provides that general and complete disarmament under effective international control remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament. That Programme of Action, if it had been carried out gradually, would have sufficed to obtain specific progress in disarmament. Unfortunately, in the past four years not only has the 1978 Document been inoperative but the increase in tensions and conflicts in different parts of the world has hampered its implementation. One is justified

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

in saying that the multilateral treatment of disarmament problems, for which this Committee is one of the central forums, will have to be regarded once again as a failure if the rhetorics of speech-making are not replaced by specific negotiations making disarmament commitments binding - in other words, negotiations reflecting the political will of those who have the historic responsibility for the staggering volume manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear and conventional weapons.

This is not the time to determine the nature of that international responsibility for peace, for while all countries, developed and developing alike, are committed to disarmament, the greatest effort must be made by the military Powers. If we want disarmament, we must not arm; and, as eminent men of peace have maintained, it is not wars that require weapons but rather weapons that require wars.

The serious deterioration in the international situation in the past year places before us two alternatives: either to yield to pressures and interests seeking results through confrontation, the use of force or the threat of the use of force, using conventional or nuclear weapons, with the possibility of world annihilation, or else, in order to eliminate the irreversible trend to the destruction of mankind, to comply with the norms and procedures enshrined in the most important international legal instruments in order to find just and lasting solutions through procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

In that regard, we share the concerns expressed by the Secretary-General in his report for this year, which coincide with the comments made by my delegation in the Security Council and at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

We fully support his efforts to restore to the United Nations its effectiveness as a body for preventing threats to international peace and security and as a forum for dialogue and for the finding of solutions through peaceful channels. We firmly believe in the need to progress in both those ways at the same time. Together with the strengthening of legal norms for the



(Mr. Canales, Chile)

peaceful settlement of disputes, we must reduce and, if possible, eliminate the means that could lead to war and destruction. In this connexion, the Foreign Minister of Chile, in his statement during the general debate stated:

"The need to submit conflicts to peaceful settlement must be mandatory. It is essential that conflicts be detected early enough to be avoided, so that they may not be brought as faits accomplis before the Security Council or the General Assembly."

My delegation considers that, in addition to what we have already stated, there are constant factors that make it impossible to create the legal and political framework conducive to the achievement of international control of armaments and the achievement of the reduction and elimination of conventional weapons and, especially, nuclear weapons. Among those factors we wish to single out the following: the lack of a consensus for adopting the comprehensive programme of disarmament; the lack of acceptance of methods of verification and control that are effective and reliable, including on-site inspections; the lack of observance of existing international instruments related to disarmament and the slow pace of the negotiations that should lead to the adoption of international conventions in this field; the constant increase in military expenditures, amounting to approximately \$600 billion a year; the constant militarization of outer space where more than 75 per cent of the satellites sent into orbit are there for military purposes, which makes it urgent to establish a working group within the Committee on Disarmament to study the question of preventing an arms race in outer space; the indiscriminate transferring of weapons, constituting one of the most lucrative fields of trade, which particularly affects the countries of the third world, without it having been possible to establish norms for its control; and, lastly, at the procedural level, the inclusion of new items on nuclear matters in the agenda of this Committee, items which are absolutely unnecessary and often repetitive - for the many resolutions that accumulate year after year often lose sight of their fundamental objective.



(Mr. Canales, Chile)

For Chile, the Final Document adopted by consensus in 1978, moulding as it does the philosophy and provisions of all international instruments on the issue, continues to be a legal and political unity in the field of disarmament, one which was substantially supported in the course of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In its chapters - the Introduction, Declaration, Programme of Action and Machinery - we find a thorough consideration of the key elements needed to structure a comprehensive programme of disarmament which will lead to general nuclear and conventional disarmament.

The provisions of its Chapter III, Programme of Action, contain a set of tasks that should lead to the establishment of international instruments. One of them is the signing of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it was unfortunately not possible to adopt the comprehensive plan submitted by the Committee on Disarmament, which adoption was undoubtedly its fundamental task, one which would have given legal form to a set of political obligations.

My delegation continues to consider as a basis for negotiation the document prepared by the Committee on Disarmament, which contains realistic and flexible short, medium and long-term objectives. We believe that it is a priority matter for the Committee to focus on the search for a generally acceptable instrument including the above-mentioned elements so that the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly can at last adopt them.

The chapter on disarmament measures, particularly issues related to nuclear weapons constitutes the greatest obstacle to final agreement. It would be pointless for me to refer on this occasion to the causes of this situation, which are widely known. We should merely like to say that we do not find ourselves facing an irremediable failure. Quite the contrary: these difficulties should generate new efforts of political will on the part of the parties which, with or without legitimate reason, place obstacles in the way of general agreement.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

We should like to make a few comments on items 41 to 53, as well as the recently inscribed items related to nuclear disarmament.

Article 45 of the Final Document gives priority to nuclear disarmament. This is fully supported by my delegation, as it is the only guarantee for a world that does not want nuclear conflagration and which is, on the contrary, seeking peace.

The accumulation of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the super-Powers is enough to produce a world holocaust, as our populations have become more aware every day. This is demonstrated by the frequent public demonstrations in support of that view and by the General Assembly session devoted to disarmament itself when it launched the World Disarmament Campaign. The mobilization of world public opinion is also an important task.

We must also consider that if we do not control, reduce and eliminate this type of weaponry in the short term, before the end of this century, there will be horizontal proliferation in more than some 30 countries, which will make it extremely difficult to stem the nuclear arms race, thus making nuclear war a constant threat.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty has not been enough to prevent vertical proliferation by the nuclear Powers. Continued research in this field makes it possible to transform the race from a quantitative to a qualitative one with a natural increase in destructive power.

The selective implementation of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963, which does not cover underground tests, makes it essential that there be an international instrument providing for the total prohibition of nuclear tests. We are confident that negotiations now under way in the Committee on Disarmament will be given the necessary political dynamism so that paragraph 51 of the Final Document may be fully implemented.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

My delegation deems it essential that some specific actions and measures be taken in this field in order to contribute to the strengthening of a climate conducive to disarmament. Among those steps, we should like to underscore the following:

Continued efforts to establish denuclearized zones, following the example of Latin America, in different regions of the world; reiteration by the nuclear Powers of their commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons or to use them against States that do not possess such weapons; implementation of an effective system of verification which could use the United Nations infrastructure, for instance the World Meteorological Organization; recognition that the peaceful use of nuclear energy constitutes an inalienable right of all States, which should undertake to accept the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency; worldwide dissemination of information on the atomic tests that are conducted in various parts of the world; adoption of special control and security measures for fissionable materials in order to prevent their removal, since it has been proved that such materials can be used by international terrorism; adoption of effective security measures to prevent the escape of radiation emitted by the use of nuclear reactors, which endangers the life of the civilian population.

It has been affirmed that the use of nuclear weapons will necessarily lead to overall nuclear war. We believe that this is not altogether the case, since it is technically feasible to conceive of a localized war using atomic weapons, without neutral States being compelled to participate in the hostilities.

Nuclear proliferation is the responsibility of the nuclear Powers alone and therefore our delegation renews its appeal to the super-Powers to overcome the political obstacles to agreements that can minimize and eliminate the horrible spectre of nuclear war.



(Mr. Canales, Chile)

In all conflicts since the Second World War, only conventional weapons have been used. That is why we attach great importance to general and complete disarmament, starting with weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with the guidelines in the Final Document and in resolution 35/149.

The conventional stage of a process of disarmament is very directly related to the developing countries, which must protect their national security and are compelled to divert a large portion of their budgets to the acquisition of weapons, in order to safeguard their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

My delegation cannot fail to express its satisfaction at the provisions contained in the international Convention on environmental warfare, although we would have preferred that it regulate all types of environmental modification for military purposes.

In connection with radiological weapons, we must strengthen the work of the Committee on Disarmament in preparing the international convention on this topic.

The adoption of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, together with three annexed Protocols, constitutes a decisive step in the disarmament process, thus preventing war from being even more cruel and inhuman and from reaching the civilian population.

Chile, as a developing country, is aware that the problems of disarmament and development are closely related; in other words, there can be no international peace and security if we do not promote development through greater co-operation between nations. We therefore support the suggestion contained in document A/37/195.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

We do not wish on this occasion to repeat the wealth of statistics provided by various international agencies since they are already known to this Assembly; a reading of those statistics demonstrates once of the reasons why it has not been possible fully to carry out the aims of the Plan of Action for a new international economic order.

In the course of this decade, peoples will be confronted with new technological, economic and social challenges which will become increasingly complex if the arms race continues uncontrolled. If we wish to reverse this situation, we must find solutions for the problems that place obstacles in the way of the technological, economic and social development of the developing countries.

Formulas must be sought to balance human, material and financial resources in order to resolve problems that exist in the field of raw materials, energy, food production and protection of the environment. These are the challenges of the Second Disarmament Decade; let us contribute to tackling their causes and effects.

My delegation has carefully studied the frame of reference, conclusions and opinions reached by the group of governmental experts on this issue. We wish on this occasion to reiterate our support for this initiative. The debate at the second special session of the General Assembly reflected a clear trend in favour of that document, in which there is a serious and profound consideration of how human and material resources now used to conduct the arms race could be diverted to peaceful purposes and thus contribute to the economic and social development of peoples, particularly of the developing countries.

To the extent that the reallocation of military resources strengthens the establishment of a New International Economic Order, our country will unreservedly support studies and actions aimed at achieving that objective.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

Chile has on many occasions demonstrated the fact that it is a peace-loving country which strictly adheres to the provisions of the Charter in their letter and spirit and to the norms of international law, and a country which firmly demands compliance with the principles of the legal equality of States and non-intervention.

On the basis of those principles, we should like to reiterate our desire to participate in collective efforts aimed at strengthening international peace and security through the elimination of the threat of nuclear and conventional war; we wish to support the application of practical measures aimed at halting and reversing the arms race, to strengthen procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and to reduce military expenditures, earmarking those resources for the promotion of better living conditions for the developing countries.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Even the first days of the work of our Committee, as well as the preceding general political discussion in the General Assembly, indicate that with all the differences in political trends, positions and approaches to the very specific questions before the General Assembly, the statements of practically all States which recognize their responsibilities towards the peoples have sounded the same common theme: concern in the face of the growth of the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet Union believes that it is necessary to ensure that this understanding of the threat of nuclear war be translated during this session of the General Assembly into the language of specific recommendations, the implementation of which would make it possible to erect solid political, international, legal and material barriers to the growth of that threat. Guided by that purpose, we believe it is necessary that the discussion in the First Committee be conducted in a constructive spirit and be free from sterile rhetoric.



(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

We note with satisfaction that this approach is congruent with the views of practically all delegations here assembled, although there are apparently some who do not welcome it. Even yesterday delegates had the opportunity to hear for themselves that the United States delegation is using actions and methods which are unworthy of our Organization, with the aim of preventing a businesslike discussion of the questions before us and diverting the discussion on to the path of confrontation.

The Soviet delegation does not intend to follow that path, and we categorically reject the hysterical attacks against sovereign States on the part of the United States representative, who has obviously forgotten that he is now within the precincts of an international organization. In an earlier statement the Soviet delegation pointed to the promising prospects which would be opened up by the adoption by all the nuclear powers, following the example of the Soviet Union, of a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The nuclear threat could also be reduced by a strong statement, by the General Assembly in favour of a general and complete prohibition of all nuclear tests, as proposed by the Soviet Union at this session.

Today we would like to draw the attention of the Assembly to the problem of the prevention of nuclear war from yet another angle, from the standpoint of ensuring the safe development of nuclear power. The practical need to raise this question is related to the irreversible process of the rapid development in that field. At this time, in various countries, there are more and more non-military nuclear plants, mainly power plants. Thus, by the end of 1981, in 23 countries of the world, 272 nuclear reactors were already in operation with a capacity of more than 152,000 megawatts, and were producing 9 per cent of all the electric power generated in the world. Moreover, another 239 nuclear power plants were under construction, and when they come into operation the total power of all these nuclear plants will rise to 376,000 megawatts.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

According to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) information, by 1985 nuclear reactors will produce 17 per cent of the total electric power produced in the world, and by the end of the century, almost 25 per cent.

The further development of nuclear energy is consistent with the interests of human civilization. All the data of contemporary science indicate that this is an inevitable process, and will be even more far-reaching in future, particularly in view of the depletion of the non-renewable reserves of organic fuel in the world; thus the peaceful use of atomic energy will make it possible to satisfy the ever-increasing needs of mankind in the fields of energy, industry, agriculture, scientific research, and so forth.

We can be sure that nuclear energy will be developed in more and more countries, practically on all continents of the earth, and accordingly there will also be an increase in the number of such nuclear installations, atomic power plants, research reactors, plants for the production and reprocessing of nuclear fuel, stores of radioactive materials, and so forth.

At the same time, a deliberate destruction of nuclear power plants, of test reactors and other installations of that kind, may very well produce an enormous quantity of emissions and dispersions of radioactive materials, with lethal consequences for the population. In other words, it can produce the same effect as a nuclear explosion. According to the computations of the experts, the destruction of a single nuclear power plant with a capacity of 1 million kilowatts could be compared to the radioactive contamination attendant upon the explosion of a 1-megaton nuclear bomb in the short term, and the effect would be 10 times as great for a period of one year or more.

Research conducted at Princeton University in the United States, and also the calculations of Swedish experts, have indicated that after a major incident at a power plant of such capacity, there would be a zone of radioactive contamination extending 16 kilometres, in which an estimated 58 per cent of the population would buffer lethal effects, and the total surface contaminated could well extend to 10,000 square kilometres.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The long-term effects of radiation would produce cancer in the zone and also various harmful genetic effects among the population. To this it may be added that as a result of a different combination of radioactive isotopes than those which occur during the explosion of a nuclear bomb, the radioactive contamination resulting from the destruction of such plants would be of longer duration than the case of the effects of the explosion of a nuclear weapon, and would last for a period of 50 or 100 years, or longer.

Moreover, it is important to note that an attack on a nuclear plant can have very serious consequences not only for the State which is the victim of such an aggression but also for neighbouring States, since the radioactive particles liberated as a result of this action can very well be scattered far beyond the boundaries of that State. All this indicates that the results of the destruction of nuclear plants designed for peaceful purposes, even by conventional weapons, would be in fact tantamount to an attack with nuclear weapons. In other words, it can be compared to actions which our Organization has already qualified as the worst crime against mankind, but the destruction of nuclear plants designed for peaceful purposes by nuclear weapons would generally have absolutely catastrophic consequences of a global character.



(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Accordingly, the need to ensure a safe development of nuclear energy is organically linked to the problem of how to prevent a nuclear war. But it is not only the disastrous consequences of the destruction of a peaceful nuclear plant which so closely link this problem with the problem of preventing a nuclear war; ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy and the prevention of nuclear war are but two components of the over-all task of eliminating the nuclear threat. The development of international co-operation in the nuclear field and therefore also the more effective development of nuclear energy throughout the world for constructive purposes require the limitation and, in the final analysis, the elimination of the use of nuclear energy for the purpose of producing weapons which, as often pointed out by the General Assembly, are fraught with the greatest dangers for mankind and for the very existence of civilization. Thus, the broader use of nuclear energy pre-supposes the need to increase efforts to eliminate the very possibility of a nuclear war, in other words, to reduce and finally to eliminate nuclear armaments. Such are the dialectics of our nuclear age.

As a first step, which is the easiest to take on the path towards nuclear disarmament, it will be necessary in our view to implement a simultaneous freeze by all States of the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and also of the production of fissionable materials for the manufacture of the various types of nuclear weaponry. Such a freeze would eliminate the possibility of a further growth of nuclear armaments and, in combination with the proposal of the Soviet Union to institute a ban on nuclear weapon tests, it would become a serious obstacle to the qualitative improvement of such weapons. To use a metaphor, such a freeze would be an emergency brake applied to the express rushing towards nuclear destruction, which is how we can describe the nuclear arms race. The freeze would also lead to the strengthening of military and strategic stability and to mutual trust among States.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

It is not coincidental, therefore, that the idea of a nuclear freeze has recently received more and more active support, both on the part of numerous States and on the part of broad sections of the international community. This was demonstrated at the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament during which many delegations put forward specific ideas on that point. We view with understanding, in particular, the proposals on freezing nuclear weapons which were put forward at the special session by India, Mexico, Sweden and Ireland. Of course, we fully agree with those supporters of the freeze who feel that this specific, realistic and tangible action should not be regarded as designed to perpetuate the situation which has now arisen, when the arsenals of States are replete with nuclear weapons, or as a means to legalize nuclear weapons. On the contrary, this freeze must become the first and easiest step towards a radical agreement on nuclear disarmament. It is important also to note that an end to the nuclear arms race, combined with the ensuring of a safe development of nuclear energy, would be an additional stimulus to further development of international co-operation for the peaceful use of atomic energy.

These considerations are basic to the proposal of the Soviet Union to increase efforts to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and ensure the safe development of nuclear energy, in document A/C.1/37/L.7. The new Soviet proposal is prompted by the desire to give a response worthy of mankind, a response to the central question which the nuclear era has put before us: whether atomic energy, which mankind has developed as a result of scientific and technological progress, will help to improve the welfare of peoples and satisfy the increasing needs in the various areas of social and economic development, or whether it will turn the earth into a lifeless, empty planet. There can be only one reply: nuclear energy must be used only for peaceful purposes, only for the good of mankind. This is in fact the appeal contained in the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, which was adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 36/100. This is also the aim of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in whose charter it is particularly emphasized that the Agency will make every effort to develop the use of nuclear energy to preserve peace, health and welfare throughout the world.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

This was pointed out by the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev:

"It is the duty of all who cherish the future of life on our planet to make their contribution to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war and in the search for ways to strengthen peace".

This is the basic thrust of the draft resolution on increasing efforts to do away with the threat of nuclear war and to ensure a safe development of nuclear energy, which the Soviet delegation has submitted to the First Committee. We are firmly convinced that its adoption by the General Assembly would open new important prospects for joint action by States to perform the noble task of eliminating the threat of nuclear destruction.



Mr. KEAT CHHON (Democratic Kampuchea) (interpretation from French):

Sir, I would ask you please to convey my delegation's sincere congratulations to Ambassador Gbeho on his well-deserved election to the chairmanship of this Committee and thus to guide its delicate and important work. Our congratulations also go to the other officers of the Committee, to Mr. Rathore, Secretary of the Committee, and to his staff.

My delegation wishes to express warm thanks to Ambassador Golob of Yugoslavia, the outgoing Chairman of the Committee, and his associates for the excellent work they did.

We wish also to join preceding speakers in addressing sincere congratulations to Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico and Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden, who have just been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

My delegation will in due course speak on the various items on the agenda of the Committee. Today we shall speak specifically to agenda item 54, "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons". In this respect my delegation has already brought to the attention of the Committee at previous sessions facts concerning the use by the authorities of Viet Nam of chemical weapons in their war of aggression against Democratic Kampuchea.

The people and the Government of Democratic Kampuchea would like once again to express their profound gratitude to the Committee for having recommended the adoption of General Assembly resolutions 35/144 C and 36/96 C. We wish also to express sincere thanks to the Group of Experts to investigate the use of chemical weapons for the work it accomplished despite the systematic and virulent obstruction it encountered. We are sure that its next report will again make an important contribution to the work of the Committee.

In spite of the growing opposition of an indignant international community, during the past year the Vietnamese aggressors, pursuing their war of genocide, have persisted in intensifying the use of chemical weapons in Kampuchea. Until about the middle of 1981, these aggressors had recourse to the following methods to disperse the population: bombing with toxic gas shells; spraying toxic chemical products from aeroplanes and helicopters; and poisoning water sources, such as ponds and wells, from which the population draws its water supplies.

(Mr. Keat Chhon, Democratic Kampuchea)

However, from the beginning of the dry season of 1981-1982 - that is, starting from October 1981 - they have in addition been using the following new methods: poisoning foodstuffs in populated centres, including the main provincial towns, by Vietnamese agents specially trained in the use of toxic chemical products who spray them over foodstuffs; and giving poisoned medicine to the sick in hospitals.

At the beginning, the Vietnamese aggressors were active in the areas under the control of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea or in those under their own control but which were located mainly in remote regions of the country far from sites accessible to international observers. Last year they extended their field of operations to populated centres - to the civilian population under their temporary control - and even to the areas accessible to international observers.

The list of victims is growing. During the last dry season - October 1981 to April 1982 - the known number of victims exceeded 1,200 killed, including 42 entire families, and 400 gravely affected by poisoning. Even during the current rainy season, the chemical warfare continues to claim victims. The latest were in the Chhouk District, Province of Kampot, in the South-West of Kampuchea: 10 were killed after the spraying of toxic chemical products which occurred on 23 and 24 September 1982.

The use of chemical weapons is also continuing in the occupation of Laos and the invasion of Afghanistan. Statements by victims and witnesses, as well as by those directly involved in the chemical warfare, indicate that during the past year the Vietnamese occupying army in Laos and the Soviet invading army in Afghanistan have been waging chemical warfare against the populations of these two countries. Depositions by Soviet soldiers are quite revealing in this regard. Anatoly Sakharov, a Soviet soldier who surrendered to the Afghan freedom fighters, last September said that he had seen three kinds of chemical weapons in Afghanistan: picric acid affecting the eyes and the respiratory system and causing skin burns; various asphyxiating gases; and a chemical agent called "smirch", which has not yet been identified but whose effects as described by Anatoly Sakharov correspond closely to accounts given by refugees.



(Mr. Keat Chhon, Democratic Kampuchea)

The first two products are sprayed from aeroplanes, while the third is disseminated by rockets launched from helicopters and sometimes from aeroplanes.

There is further evidence. On 13 October 1982 Mr. Sur Gul Speen, special correspondent of the Afghan Press Agency, interviewed a Soviet soldier, Nikolai Moshikov, who had been captured by the Afghan freedom fighters and who belonged to Battalion VDV-345, stationed in the province of Bamiyan. That soldier revealed that the Soviet troops used nine types of lethal chemical weapons, which have various effects on human beings, animals and plants. Some cause immediate death.

With regard to the nature of the substances used, if the products in the "CS" category or the paralysing agents are easy to identify, the experts took a long time to solve the puzzle of the "yellow rain", whose horrifying effects spread terror. It was only in 1981 that the analysis of samples collected from the sites of chemical weapons attacks in North-West Kampuchea enabled the experts to identify the nature of the substances used. They are not the classical chemical weapons but are new products with terrifying effects - mycotoxins of the trichothecene group.

The symptoms of poisoning due to the attacks by chemical weapons were compiled by the Ministry of Health of Democratic Kampuchea and submitted to our Organization in the annex to document A/36/254. They are similar to those resulting from poisoning by trichothecenes, as described in the annex to document A/36/613, produced by the Group of Experts to investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons. Those symptoms are: acute dyspnoea, dizziness, nausea, coughing of blood-tinged material, vomiting of massive amounts of blood through the mouth and the nose, bloody diarrhoea, formation of small hard blisters and coma. Death is immediate for victims in the centre of the area attacked.

Later analyses of the blood of the victims of attacks by chemical weapons in Kampuchea have confirmed that the substances used belong to the trichothecene group. The experts were disturbed to find in blood taken from victims several days after the attack a high level of the toxin T2, and not only its metabolite HT2, which reveals not only the victims' high degree of exposure to the toxins but also the storage of the toxins within the body, with the result that their effects are prolonged.



(Mr. Keat Chhon, Democratic Kampuchea)

Viet Nam does not at present possess the factories or the know-how to produce such microtoxins, even in small quantities. These substances do not exist in a natural state. These chemical weapons have been supplied by the Soviet Union to the Vietnamese authorities. There is evidence that Soviet technicians have trained Vietnamese soldiers in the use of chemical weapons and have supervised their use in both Kampuchea and Laos.

What made the Vietnamese and Soviet aggressors persist in intensifying their chemical warfare against the peoples of Kampuchea, Laos and Afghanistan, despite the condemnation that they incurred? We believe that there are two reasons: first, to break those peoples' will to resist; secondly, to carry out in those countries systematic experiments to prepare for chemical warfare on a large scale.

With regard to the first point, in Kampuchea the Vietnamese aggressors are more bogged down than ever. As they can no longer hope to end the resistance of a whole people, either by the weapon of starvation or by conventional weapons, in the thick jungle and the muddy plains, among a completely hostile population, they are seeking to end resistance by using the trichothecenes, whose effects are horrifying. Those effects, which I have already described, as well as the contamination of the environment, will, the aggressors hope, discourage the inhabitants from continuing their resistance.

The same reasons have prompted the Vietnamese and Soviet occupation forces to continue their chemical warfare in both Afghanistan and Laos.

The Soviet soldier Nikolai Moshikov, whom I have already mentioned, revealed that when the Soviet infantry cannot advance it uses toxic gases against the hideouts of the Afghan freedom fighters and against centres of population. It has also disseminated toxic chemical substances in water, on food and in the gardens and fields.

As regards the second reason of which I spoke - the use of Kampuchea, Laos and Afghanistan as vast laboratories for their chemical warfare experiments - the Soviets and their Vietnamese proxies cynically believe that, because of the difficulties of access to those countries, and especially their target areas,

(Mr. Keat Chhon, Democratic Kampuchea)

foreign observers would take a long time to collect and identify the substances used. Indeed, it was only in 1981 that the mycotoxins used in Laos and Kampuchea were identified, although they were first used in 1976 and 1979 respectively. Meanwhile, through the Vietnamese authorities, the Soviets have already collected considerable data for the evaluation of chemical weapons in various tactical conditions - different places, different seasons and different methods of dissemination, such as artillery or aerial dissemination, etc.

Kampuchea, Laos and Afghanistan will not be the only victims of chemical warfare. Two facts support that statement. The first is the Soviet Union's capacity to produce and stockpile chemical weapons. Research on and development and testing of such weapons goes on ceaselessly in the Soviet Union, and their annual production has risen to tens of thousands of tons.

(Mr. Keat Chhon, Democratic Kampuchea)

The systems for their deployment are continually being improved, and as I mentioned earlier with regard to Kampuchea and Laos, the Soviet Union has not hesitated to furnish chemical weapons to its Vietnamese proxies and to train them in their use.

The second fact is the existence of units specialized in chemical warfare within the Soviet army. Such units, the size of which has astonished even strategic analysts, are well trained and well equipped. For their part, the Vietnamese authorities are also in the process of strengthening their units specialized in chemical warfare, both in manpower and in combat technique.

With the continuation of chemical warfare in Kampuchea, Laos and Afghanistan, we who are the real victims believe that in future chemical warfare will be one of the major options of Soviet strategy in its large-scale offensives.

The stubborn opposition of the Soviet and Vietnamese delegations to the inclusion of items dealing with the study on the use of chemical weapons in the agenda of our Assembly eloquently reveals the present culpability of the authorities of those countries, as well as their long-range intentions.

The tragedy that the peoples of Kampuchea, Laos and Afghanistan are now experiencing will therefore, unfortunately, not be limited to those three peoples.

The experience of previous years has taught us that with the coming of the dry season, which is favourable to the use of chemical weapons and which is now beginning in Kampuchea, the Vietnamese authorities are going to step up their chemical war against the population of Kampuchea. Those authorities are even more determined upon this course because they are being totally bogged down on the Kampuchean battlefields.

The delegation of Democratic Kampuchea therefore appeals to the Assembly to take prompt action to put an end to the criminal actions of those authorities. We demand the continuation of efforts within the framework of General Assembly resolutions 35/144 C and 36/96 C, notwithstanding the results of



(Mr. Keat Chhon, Democratic Kampuchea)

the report submitted by the Group of Experts. We believe that ongoing study constitutes an impediment to the trend towards the use of chemical weapons. We support any initiative aimed at the strict enforcement of respect for the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Convention on chemical warfare, and we call for the adoption of a draft treaty on the complete and effective prohibition of the development and manufacture of all chemical weapons and their destruction.

Pending conclusion of such a treaty effective steps must be taken to put an immediate end to the chemical war being waged by the Vietnamese and Soviet aggressors against the people of Kampuchea, as well as against the peoples of Laos and Afghanistan. An international conference on this subject would be one of the most appropriate means to that end.

In order to put an end to the untold suffering of the Kampuchean people, we appeal to countries that cherish peace and justice to increase their political, economic and financial pressure on the authorities in Hanoi in order to force them to respect General Assembly resolutions 34/22, 35/6 and 36/5 by withdrawing their troops immediately and totally from Kampuchea.

Mr. MICHAELSEN (Denmark): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, of which Denmark is the current president.

It gives me great pleasure to extend to you, Mr. Chairman, our warm congratulations on your assumption of your high office. We are all aware of your qualifications and experience, and we are content that the deliberations of this Committee are in good hands.

At the same time, it gives me great pleasure to take this opportunity to extend warm congratulations to the Mexican representative in this Committee, His Excellency Ambassador Garcia Robles, and to the former Swedish Minister for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, on the great honour the Nobel Committee has bestowed on them by awarding them the Nobel Peace Prize for 1982.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

A few months ago, the second special session devoted to disarmament provided an opportunity to review what has been achieved since 1978 in the field of arms control and disarmament and to consider why progress has been so slow. Strong public interest and involvement echoed the call of high-level representatives of States for concerted efforts to halt and reverse the arms race. On that occasion the Ten expressed regret that little had been achieved in the field of arms control and disarmament. The reasons are many and varied, but the deterioration of the international situation has had a major hampering effect.

The present international situation provides us with a clear illustration of the intimate relationship between disarmament and international security. The growing number of violations of the United Nations Charter, invasions, military occupations, acts of interference in the internal affairs of States and violations of human rights have profoundly impaired the international climate. Confidence has thereby been seriously affected. In these circumstances the disarmament process is slow and difficult. The importance and urgency of our task here in the United Nations underline the legitimate demands of the international community that international law be complied with and that an end be put to situations which violate it. In addition, in the opinion of the Ten, serious efforts must be continued to reach agreement on arms control and disarmament measures which contribute to the preservation and, if possible, the enhancement of international peace and security.

In the view of the Ten, there is a strong need to achieve concrete results in the form of balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements. In the same vein it is necessary to strengthen the mutual confidence between States through a variety of confidence-building measures. Taken together, such efforts would have a mutually reinforcing effect on lowering the levels of armaments while ensuring undiminished security for all States. In this connection

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

Member States should examine possible regional initiatives. In the view of the Ten, the important United Nations studies on confidence-building measures and regional disarmament should stimulate and guide our efforts. All such measures could contribute to the over-all objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

It is a cause of great concern to the member States of the European Community that the United Nations has not been allowed to play its proper role with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes and to prevent the series of grave international conflicts we have experienced during recent years. In this context the Ten have noted with interest the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization and the proposals it contains, and we likewise call upon all Member States to rally once again to the standards of the Charter and to commit themselves to the obligations which they have undertaken in that document. The issue of disarmament and international security is a subject of constant attention by the Ten, as was indicated by their reply to the Secretary-General with regard to the United Nations study submitted to last year's General Assembly.



(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

For the Ten, nuclear disarmament is one of the highest priorities. We must look into means to reach this goal with the participation of the nuclear-weapon States and in particular of those which have the largest arsenals. While all States should make efforts to create progress in this field, the nuclear-weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals must bear the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should take the first step. An important contribution by those States would be agreement upon substantial balanced and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons.

We note with satisfaction that the two main nuclear-weapon Powers have initiated interrelated negotiations with regard to intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons and intermediate nuclear forces.

As for strategic weapons, the Ten welcome the fact that, in the view of both parties, the negotiations cover not only limitations but also significant reductions. We are also pleased that the two Powers have declared their common intention of continuing to respect the limitations envisaged in the SALT II agreement.

We also welcome the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces which are taking place within the framework of the strategic arms reduction talks. It is well known that these weapons are of special concern to us. We hope that the negotiations will lead to concrete results in the near future.

The Ten of course attach importance to other questions related to nuclear disarmament. I shall deal with two of these, the question of a comprehensive test ban and the question of negative security assurances, later. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in certain regions of the world could be a major contribution in the field of disarmament, in so far as all the States concerned are prepared to participate on the basis of freely concluded arrangements. Accordingly, in conformity with the provisions of the Final Document on the principles and appropriate conditions for the establishment of such zones, this question and the prospects it offers should be borne in mind, as well as that of the establishment of zones of peace.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

The objective of maintaining a non-discriminatory and credible international non-proliferation régime, which also has a bearing on the issue of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, is of the utmost importance.

Similarly, we attach priority importance to the question of conventional weapons. The Ten have repeatedly stressed the need for concrete progress in the field of conventional disarmament, which should form an essential part of the overall disarmament process.

The heavy accumulation of conventional forces in Europe adversely affects the stability of that continent. The aim of the countries participating in the negotiations in Vienna on mutually balanced force reductions is to bring about mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces for the purpose of establishing a more stable situation in Europe with the aim of parity at a lower level. Those members of the Ten participating in those negotiations hope that the recent submission of new proposals will enable the process of mutually balanced force reduction to enter a new and revitalized phase.

The process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should, in the view of the Ten, be regarded as an important component of a comprehensive East-West dialogue. It is our hope that the forthcoming sixth session of the follow-up meeting in Madrid will lead to agreement on a balanced and substantive concluding document. The Ten will contribute to the attainment of this objective. Within this framework we will work for tangible progress in the human dimension of the Helsinki Final Act, as well as for the adoption of the French proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe on the basis of a precise mandate to negotiate, as a first stage, militarily significant, binding and verifiable confidence and security building measures which would cover the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Earlier this year many Heads of State or Government, Foreign Ministers and other prominent representatives attended the second special session devoted to disarmament. At the end of the session, the outcome of five weeks of intensive and important work left a feeling of unfulfilment. Neither the anticipated review of the implementation of the Final Document of the first special session nor the expected adoption of the comprehensive programme on disarmament materialized.



(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

Although -- as the Ten have already had occasion to say -- the results of the session were disappointing, a number of positive aspects deserve to be underlined. Of prime importance was the solemn reaffirmation of the Final Document of the first special session. To this should be added that the consensus principle was upheld as a basis for the work of the session. Finally, it should be recalled that common ground was found with regard to the launching of the World Disarmament Campaign and the expansion of the fellowship programme.

Another contribution to our future work in the United Nations and elsewhere is the series of proposals which were submitted during the second special session devoted to disarmament. These proposals, some of them put forward by members of the Ten, are now before us at this regular session and will be the subject of appropriate examination and discussion.

Although the difficult international situation did not create favourable conditions, the Committee on Disarmament was able to continue its work during 1982 as the sole multilateral negotiating forum.

After several years of inconclusive discussions on the question of a comprehensive test ban, the Committee on Disarmament decided at this year's sessions to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group.

In the past two years progress has been made in the discussions on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. For the Ten this issue is of primary importance, and we welcome the fact that the Ad Hoc Working Group seems well under way to a phase of full negotiations, in which we are ready to pursue an active part. We hope that all States, in particular the major possessors of chemical weapons, will feel the same obligation to contribute to an early agreement on a draft convention which includes provisions for effective and binding international verification.

The establishment of confidence that both present and future conventions in these areas are being complied with is also an urgent problem, which should be addressed at an early stage. I shall elaborate on that later.



(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

The Ten have noted with considerable satisfaction that the Committee on Disarmament decided to include in its agenda for 1982 the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We are convinced that weapons that could be used in outer space, among them anti-satellite weapons, should be subject to effective and verifiable agreements. The Ten entertain the hope that the Committee will consider initiating negotiations on effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

As in previous years, the Committee on Disarmament has dealt with the questions of negative security assurances and radiological weapons. Member States of the European Community have contributed constructively to those discussions, neither of which have, however, reached conclusive stages. The new position recently taken by one of its member States with regard to negative security assurances offers a strong stimulus for further deliberations.

I should now like to turn to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which during 1982 pursued its work as a deliberative body in the field of disarmament. This year the Commission made a particularly important contribution with the successful completion of its work on the preparation of guidelines for a United Nations study on conventional disarmament. The member countries of the Ten attach great importance to this study, and several of them are actively participating in the Group of Experts which the Secretary-General has established to carry it out. Among the important aspects of conventional disarmament which deserve attention is the question of international arms transfers.

(Mr. Micaelsen Denmark)

The Commission also, as in previous years, discussed the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The Commission also continued its work on the question of the reduction of military budgets. The Ten continue to support the proposals for more transparency and comparability as a contribution to the work on the question of the reduction of military budgets and as a valuable confidence-building measure. They welcome initiatives in this field and attach great importance to the widest possible participation in the completion of the standardized reporting system.

Having discussed the work of these two multilateral disarmament bodies and important problems on their agenda, to the solution of which our discussions in the Committee will, we hope, be beneficial, I should like now to touch upon other pertinent issues before us at this thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

The vast and increasing resources spent on armaments, seen together with the serious social and economic problems facing most countries, and in particular the poorest ones, underline the need for consideration of that issue. The comprehensive Study on Disarmament and Development submitted at last year's General Assembly represents a major contribution in this respect. As was reflected in the Ten's reply to the Secretary-General prior to the second special session on disarmament, we find that this study contains a number of important recommendations which merit appropriate attention and follow-up.

I have already referred to the agreement reached at the second special session devoted to disarmament to launch the World Disarmament Campaign. Besides the launching of the campaign itself, the session adopted a set of recommendations defining the overall purpose of the campaign. The Ten are of the view that these recommendations form a good basis for a more detailed elaboration of a programme, and welcome in particular the emphasis they put on the universality of the campaign and the stress they lay on unimpeded access for all sections of the public in all countries to a broad range of information and opinions on disarmament issues.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace continued its work during 1982. The Committee did not complete its work on the harmonization of views on the issues involved. Furthermore, the political and security climate in the region unfortunately did not undergo the changes one would have hoped for. Those member countries of the Ten participating in the discussions still hope that the changes which would make it possible to convene a conference on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace will take place in time. They stand ready to continue their contribution to the work of the Committee with a view to an early agreement on the outstanding issues.

Let me now turn to the question of the alleged use of chemical weapons.

The reports which began to emerge a few years ago on the alleged use of chemical weapons in certain areas of the world are looked upon by the Ten with great concern.

The Ten, who are all parties to the Protocol of 1925, supported the creation and the work of the Secretary-General's Expert Group which was established to carry out an impartial investigation into the alleged use of chemical weapons. We are looking forward to receiving the final report of the Expert Group and hope that in spite of the difficulties which the experts have encountered in conducting their investigation, they will be in a position to reach firm conclusions this year.

In this respect and as a separate exercise, the Ten find that the question of allegations of use of chemical and biological weapons merits particular attention. We therefore attach importance to the pursuit of appropriate arrangements which would ensure that, in the event of allegations of the use of chemical or biological weapons, the facts can be rapidly established.

The second special session on disarmament left over a series of institutional issues for further consideration by the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly. The Ten take a great interest in those questions and will provide their opinion thereon later during our deliberations. We should like to refer at this stage, however, to our common statement at the second special session on disarmament, in which the Ten declared that they were, in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document, prepared to review the membership of the Committee on Disarmament, taking into account its function



(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

as the main negotiating body at the multilateral level. Further, we should like to address ourselves to an aspect of the disarmament process to which the Ten attach great importance and which also has clear institutional implications, namely, verification and compliance. The emphasis should be on efforts to find practical solutions to specific problems within this field, taking into consideration the institutional issues.

Since the first special session on disarmament, considerable changes and improvements have been effected in the structure of the disarmament machinery of the United Nations. However, with the exception of the important study on the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency, which is before the General Assembly for further consideration, the Assembly has so far taken little specific action on the question of the implementation and verification of disarmament agreements. Nevertheless, the need has been felt in recent years for improved procedures for verifying the observance of existing agreements. Proposals with that aim, as well as on several other issues, have been made by member countries of the Ten. The Ten consider that the institutional arrangements for the implementation and verification of multilateral disarmament agreements merit further examination.

I have presented the views of the Ten member States of the European Community on a series of major disarmament issues. Concluding this statement on behalf of the Ten, I should like to express our sincere hope that the work ahead of us in this Committee will be constructive and guided by a serious willingness on the part of all of us to pave the way for real progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. Proposals and new initiatives aiming at this will get our full support. The problems ahead of us are of an extremely complex nature and lend themselves all too easily to lofty declarations and fruitless polemics. But that would not be a proper attitude with which to approach the vital problems on disarmament. On the contrary, as the Secretary-General said in his opening statement at the second special session on disarmament:

" ... with patience and the necessary political will, many elements of this complex set of problems could be singled out and resolved."

(A/S-12/PV.1 p. 27)

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): Since I am speaking for the first time in the general debate, please allow me to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your election to the chairmanship of this Committee and to reiterate what I said a few days ago - that I pledge to you my full co-operation in the discharge of your duties.

I should also like to extend my congratulations to the other officers of the Committee, with whom I will be working to ensure the success of the work of this Committee. I should also like to express my gratitude to Ambassador Golob of Yugoslavia for his very efficient work at the head of this Committee during the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

At last Monday's meeting, I extended the congratulations of my delegation as well as congratulations on my own behalf to Ambassador Garcia Robles and to Mrs. Alva Myrdal for the honour they received in being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. This is a deserving tribute to an indefatigable struggle in favour of disarmament. I have known Ambassador Garcia Robles for many years now, and I have on many occasions been able to admire his dedication, his personal qualities and his profound knowledge of disarmament issues. The award conferred upon him is also an honour to his country, Mexico, and to all Latin America.

The general debate in this First Committee on disarmament items is taking place this year in circumstances that are hardly encouraging. It is normal that in so difficult and complex a field reality always falls short of wishes and aspirations and that the over-all tenor of statements on this problem, regardless of the forum in which they are made, is usually critical and negative.

But rarely in the past - and in any event, never in the last five years - have pessimistic assessments been more justified. There is a process of constant deterioration which has reached a crisis point this year. The clearest symptom of this was the failure of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. But apart from assigning blame

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

for those results - which I will not venture to do, as that is a matter of common knowledge - it is undeniable that there could not have been a sharper or more eloquent contrast between the concerns of international public opinion; expressed through mass demonstrations and the action of thousands of non-governmental organizations, and the attitude of Governments - or rather, of certain Governments - in the General Assembly. Great expectations yielded to still greater disappointments and even alarm.

In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva the picture is no different. There again, there is a clear contrast. A majority of countries - the great majority - is making every effort to achieve concrete results for progress in the task of disarmament. Although occasionally divided by differences of view, these countries are inspired by a common goal: the serious and sincere negotiation of instruments and agreements that respond to the justified fears of the international community for its future and its very survival.

On the other hand, a minority of States, invoking reasons of security, adopts a different attitude - which, taken to the extreme, leads to virtual deadlock in the work of the Committee on Disarmament and to the frustration of those who see in the Committee, as the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, the best way to achieve practical and positive results in an area of such importance.

Of course, one cannot challenge the right of each State to decide what constitutes an adequate level of security and therefore to decide when and in what conditions it should enter into disarmament agreements. However, it is equally impossible to challenge the fact that absolute security can never be achieved and that in an interdependent and increasingly small world, one's own destiny and that of all mankind are inseparable.



(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

If the approach is that any disarmament measure violates national security and the security of the leader of one military alliance, if the goal is to test, perfect and build up arsenals - above all, nuclear arsenals - in a quest for military superiority which, although it may be achieved, is necessarily temporary since it is immediately offset by the other party, then we must wonder at the sense of distracting the efforts of Governments that have other concerns and the attention of an international community which has more human perceptions in rhetorical and pointless exercises, such as those that have recently characterized multilateral activities in the field of disarmament.

The lack of progress in disarmament negotiations does not merely mean stagnation or delay while awaiting more propitious times. It is really a permanent retrogression. Inactivity contrasts with a constant arms race, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, which on the contrary speeds up and becomes worse. New measures are taken every minute. In recent days, we received news that clearly confirmed this in respect of neutron weapons and the military uses of outer space.

When such steps are taken, can it come as a surprise that the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, which was a priority issue by consensus just a few years ago, is now questioned, even as a desirable short-term objective? Can it come as any surprise that nuclear disarmament cannot be discussed in Geneva in a working group because of the opposition of a small number of countries? Can it come as a surprise that it has not been possible to establish a working group on the prevention of the arms race in outer space, because of the negative attitude of one super-Power and its unconditional ally?

Are we doomed to having outer space - that area whose peaceful use has been so much proclaimed - as a theatre for military rivalry? Are we doomed to having satellites make attacks more accurate and weapons more deadly, as was demonstrated by the experience undergone by the Argentine Republic itself?

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

Must all States inevitably fall prey to nuclear blackmail? Can the nuclear Powers enjoy complete impunity in relation to the remainder of the international community? Can they impose their will without obstruction, without resistance? Can they intervene openly in the internal affairs of other countries? Can they preserve colonial situations in the twentieth century?

Even commitments undertaken lose value when a nuclear arsenal is brandished. During the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the head of State of the United Kingdom affirmed, in referring to "promises against use of this or that kind of military weapon", that

"... promises can never be dependable amid the stresses of war."

(A/S-12/PV.24, p. 4)

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

I repeat, they "can never be dependable amid the stresses of war". Does this mean that for the United Kingdom war is a supreme law and that commitments that may interfere in the course of war cannot be trusted? She was certainly speaking with full knowledge of the facts.

This was exactly what happened in the most recent colonial aggression in Latin America. On that occasion the British fleet set its complete arsenal into operation, including its nuclear weapons. It seems that the United Kingdom felt released from its commitment with respect to the only inhabited nuclear-free zone in the free world, no doubt because of the stresses caused by its greed for colonial domination. With the aid of that nuclear protection it managed to re-establish colonialism in Latin America by force and is maintaining it by force. The presence of the nuclear weapon in the British fleet was denounced by Argentina and other Latin American countries before different bodies of the United Nations and no denial was ever made. Regardless of the stated intent not to use that weapon, can such a promise be believed in the midst of the stresses of war when the very author of the promise is the first to doubt its value? Was this not a clear nuclear threat?

The view that declarations on the non-use of the nuclear weapon are invalid compels us to wonder why the Committee on Disarmament is then wasting its time in the search for so-called negative security guarantees, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 59 of the Final Document.

It is logical that there should be reluctance to renounce the possible use of a nuclear weapon. Its possession confers privileged status which is obviously hard to give up.

It should therefore be no surprise that preservation of that virtual monopoly of power is an objective of those who possess nuclear weapons at least of some of them. Toward that end it does not suffice to place every imaginable obstacle in the way of international efforts to stem the arms race. An attempt is even made to justify the continuation of the arms race on the basis of two arguments: on the one hand, that nuclear weapons are good in themselves and on the other that the real danger does not reside in atomic arsenals but rather in conventional weaponry.



(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

The best example of this unheard-of reasoning is provided in the statement made at the last special session of the Assembly, to which I have already referred, some of the paragraphs of which should be recalled:

"Nuclear weapons must be seen as deterrents ..." (Ibid., p. 3)

"... For 37 years nuclear weapons have kept peace between East and West. That is a priceless achievement." (Ibid.) - I repeat, "That is a priceless achievement."

"For us the task is to harness the existence of nuclear weapons to the service of peace...". I repeat - "to harness the existence of nuclear weapons to the service of peace." (Ibid., p. 4)

If we follow this surprising reasoning it should be concluded that the Final Document is completely mistaken and that the different affirmations it contains in regard to nuclear weapons are completely absurd. For example, paragraph 47:

"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons." (Resolution S-10/2, para. 47)

The above-mentioned statement also addresses the second argument. It says:

"... Our criticism and our action should turn above all to conventional forces, which absorb up to 90 per cent of military spending world-wide." (A/S-12/PV.24, p.4)

It is clear that conventional weapons have destructive capacity and that they should be limited and controlled, but to say that primary efforts in the field of disarmament should be directed toward that field is an unconcealed attempt to divert international attention. It also reveals profound ignorance of the very essence of the problem. Nuclear weapons are not condemned because they cost a great deal but rather because their destructive power is so vastly superior to that of conventional weapons that their use would not only cause enormous and deplorable material and human losses, but also affect those who do not participate in the conflict and even lead to the obliteration of all life on earth.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

The prevention of a nuclear war remains the supreme objective, regardless of attempts to divert our attention. The way to achieve that goal is complicated and obstacles abound. We cannot ignore that reality, nor can we stand by passively, overwhelmed by the difficulties or try only one all-encompassing approach which would probably lead to delays and failures.

There are several paths that can lead to this objective. The most feasible one, the one that has aroused the support of growing sectors of international thought, is a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons and fissionable material for military purposes. This is a possible course of action which can be adopted without sacrificing anyone's security. Several drafts towards this end were submitted to the second special session of the General Assembly. They have been repeatedly mentioned in this Committee.

Commitments not to be the first to use the nuclear weapon also have value in this field. We would add to the statement made almost 20 years ago by the People's Republic of China the one made last June by the Government of the Soviet Union in one of the few positive acts that the second special session of the General Assembly witnessed. It is undeniable that statements of this type do not bring about a final solution to the problem but they do represent an important contribution which cannot be disregarded.

In spite of isolated events, a climate of frustration and pessimism prevails in the area of disarmament today. I might cite examples of the obstructionism which all negotiations encounter, but I believe everyone is aware of the reality. In this Assembly we shall be hearing many statements which will express the universal concern at the existing situation. We shall be voting on many resolutions which we hope will contribute to our common endeavour, but in the last analysis, to repeat a commonplace, what is important is the political will of States, and only by deeds will they demonstrate whether or not that will exists. Thus far the balance sheet could not be more negative.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

The Argentine delegation reserves its right to speak on specific agenda items. At this time we wished to express a few general opinions, in particular on nuclear disarmament, as a result of our own experience and on the basis of our constant readiness to co-operate honestly and sincerely in the search for formulas which may make possible specific and constructive steps towards the objectives reflected in the Final Document, whose validity, without any amendment or deviation, we strongly reaffirm:

The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on those representatives who have asked to speak in exercise of their right of reply, I should like to draw the Committee's attention to the decision of the General Assembly taken at its thirty-fourth session, which reads as follows:

"Delegations should exercise the right of reply at the end of the day whenever two meetings have been scheduled for that day and whenever such meetings are devoted to the consideration of the same item.

"The number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation at a given meeting should be limited to two per item.

"The first intervention in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation on any item at a given meeting should be limited to 10 minutes and the second intervention should be limited to five minutes." (General Assembly resolution 34/401, paras 8-10)

I now call on those representatives wishing to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I should like to exercise my right of reply to some of the remarks made in his speech by the representative of Argentina about my country.

It seems strange that these observations should come from a country which used force in contravention of the United Nations Charter and in defiance of decisions of the Security Council. Some of the points that he made are not



(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

a matter for this Committee, and there will be an ample opportunity under another agenda item of the General Assembly for delegations to make their views known on the subject of the recent conflict of the Falkland Islands. I should, however, like to reply briefly to a number of points which do fall within the purview of this Committee.

First of all, the representative of Argentina asserted that the United Kingdom used or threatened to use nuclear weapons in the course of the conflict in the Falkland Islands. This is entirely untrue. The Ministers of the United Kingdom Government made clear at an early stage in the conflict that the use of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom in this connection was out of the question. This was in fact also part of a general policy adopted by my Government. I do not think that this thesis of the Argentine representative can be sustained, that we threatened to use nuclear weapons when we had specifically denied an intention of doing so.

It is also not true that the British forces used nuclear weapons or contravened in any way the Treaty of Tlatelolco on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. My country has long been a supporter of this Treaty. We expressed strong support for it when it was first signed and although we are not of course eligible to become a party to the Treaty, we have become a party to the two Additional Protocols. This is in contrast to Argentina which, although it signed the Treaty in 1967, has never ratified it, and it has not come into force for them. It seems strange, therefore, that they should pray in aid a Treaty to which they are not a party.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to make a few very brief comments in response to the words just spoken by the representative of the United Kingdom.

First of all, he referred to the use of force. I would just like to recall, without going into historical considerations which would lead to an exchange of views that I believe would be very interesting, the question that the Malvinas Islands were occupied by force by the United Kingdom, retained by force and at the present time still maintained by force, the preservation

(Mr. Caraseles, Argentina)

of that colonial situation which has so many times been described as incomprehensible at this stage of the twentieth century.

The representative of the United Kingdom made mention of my words, saying that I said that the United Kingdom had threatened the use of nuclear weapons in relation to the conflict in the south Atlantic; but a careful reading of my words will reveal that that quotation is not correct. The point that my delegation wanted to emphasize was the presence of nuclear weapons in the British fleet, in contravention of the commitments undertaken. That presence of nuclear weapons in the colonialist fleet was never denied by the United Kingdom. I repeat, it was never denied, nor was it denied this morning. The representative of the United Kingdom pointed out that spokesmen of his Government had announced on repeated occasions that they had no intention of using that type of weapon in any way in the conflict in the south Atlantic. The point that I also wanted to stress in my statement was that the delegation of the United Kingdom itself had, in the course of the second special session devoted to disarmament, denied the value of that type of statement, of that type of promise, pointing out that such statements could not be considered dependable amid the stresses of war.

## ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: Before I adjourn the meeting, I should like to remind members of one outstanding piece of business before the Committee.

It will be recalled that, in my preliminary remarks at the third meeting of the Committee, I drew attention to the fact that this Committee, like all of the other Main Committees, was expected to give its views or opinion on the proposed Medium-Term Plan. At that meeting, I said that I would consult with the other officers of the Committee and then address members on the matter.

I have had a series of consultations with the officers of the Committee and it is my opinion that the Committee should consider as soon as possible the relevant chapters of the proposed Medium-Term Plan, which is contained in document A/37/6, namely, the Introduction and chapter I. I believe that we should consider this matter some time at the end of next week.

Therefore, early next week, I shall inform the Committee as to whether our already tight programme of work will allow us to hear the views of members, if any, on the issues raised in that plan. The document in question is available from the documents booth for the use of delegations.

Secondly, I should like to inform the Committee that my attention has been drawn to the fact that this Committee has already lost a number of hours because of lateness in opening meetings. I know that there is much consultation before and after our meetings; but I appeal to all delegations to co-operate with the Committee's officers with a view to eliminating this waste of hours that has been brought to my attention. Therefore, in future I intend to start meetings a little earlier than we have been able to do so far.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.