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Chairman: Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

DISARMAMENT ITEMS

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

Mr. de la FUENTE (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Peru would like to make a brief statement to explain its staunch support of the draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.4 submitted by the delegation of Egypt on the report of the Disarmament Commission.

The Commission did not complete its work at the May and June sessions this year. The reason for that incomplete effort lies in explanations which seriously involve the political positions of certain Member States as well as the legitimacy of certain practices. These, as other delegations have pointed out, are incompatible with the holding of proper negotiations, the purpose of which, one would assume, would be to harmonize interests and approaches, bearing in mind important common goals.

Work on the most sensitive issues was subjected both to unexpected delays and to undue haste. The result is that we cannot impose agreements on ourselves which were not actually reached. We should also bear in mind that we still have to compare and examine a large number of views the consideration of which was cut short at the time.

My delegation agrees with all the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement that the mandate of the Disarmament Commission deriving from the Final Document of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament must be unequivocally consolidated in all its terms.

In the opinion of my delegation, draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.3 does not serve that purpose. It erodes the competence of the Disarmament Commission and, at the same time, violates or circumvents a position of principle of the non-nuclear weapon countries, which is of obvious value, that is, that there is a relationship in concept and in reality between nuclear and conventional disarmament. We feel that the Disarmament Commission is a body quite capable of guiding action on world disarmament, especially in the present circumstances, immediately before the international community is given another opportunity by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. de la Fuente, Peru)

Peru is convinced that a consensus on the issues I have mentioned will in the end prevail.

Finally, I should like very briefly to refer to another topic which my delegation considers important. Peru completely agrees with the contents of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.23, which endorses the work of the governmental group of experts on confidence-building measures among States. We believe that the present deterioration in international relations makes it indespensable and urgent to provide machinery for strengthening international confidence on the basis of mutual respect, mutual benefit and co-operation for development. Peru has taken initiatives along those lines in Latin America. Those initiatives cover not only the military aspects of confidence-building measures, such as tripartite meetings between military commands of the countries of the Andean region and the process of conventional disarmament and armed contigents within the framework of the Ayacucho and Washington declarations, but also our initiatives include proposals to achieve the integrated social and economic development of Latin America. That means that confidence-building measures must be viewed from a global standpoint and encompass all the rules of behaviour which must govern relations among States.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): The purpose of my statement today is to introduce a draft resolution submitted by my delegation in document A/C.1/36/L.18 on the "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon free zone in South Asia".

Pakistan, along with the other States of the South Asian region, shares a deep commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and the objective of keeping our area free of nuclear weapons. That common concern has been reflected in the unilateral declarations made from time to time by individual States in the region regarding the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. The latest manifestation of that concern can be found in the joint communiqué issued on 10 June at the conclusion of Indian Foreign Minister's visit to Pakistan, which stated:

Both sides reiterated their policy of using nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. They called upon all nuclear weapon States to engage in serious discussions on nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The intiative of Pakistan for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia is rooted in its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, in the objective of general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, and in the concern which it shares with other South Asian States for keeping the region free of nuclear weapons. In our efforts towards this objective, which we have been pursuing consistently in the United Nations for several years, we have been encouraged by the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly's first special session on disarmament, which recommended the creation of nuclearweapon-free zones in appropriate regions of the world as an effective measure to contain nuclear proliferation and to reduce the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It will be recalled that in this regard the special session made specific reference to three regions of the world, namely, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. A successful initiative has already been undertaken by the States of Latin America by concluding the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We are convinced that similar regional initiatives, including that for South Asia, will likewise contribute towards the goal of nuclear disarmament.

My delegation believes that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia is a realistic objective which calls for honest efforts on the part of all countries of the region. In the first instance, from the geographical, historical and cultural point of view and other relevant considerations, South Asia is a distinct region and fully qualifies for the pursuit of the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Further, the countries of the region have more than once unilaterally declared their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and their determination not to acquire nuclear weapons. We believe that it should be possible for the States of the region to make an endeavour to translate those unilateral commitments into a joint declaration. That joint declaration, we feel, must also contain a demand for appropriate assurances and obligations on the part of all the nuclear-weapon States. Such a joint declaration would, in our view, constitute an important step towards keeping our region free of nuclear weapons. Pakistan is willing to undertake any discussions or consultations necessary for the achievement of this objective.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The draft resolution submitted by my delegation and contained in document A/C.1/36/L.18 is almost identical to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the subject. By keeping to the same text, we wish to avoid a premature pursuit of any individual aspect of this proposal. Our emphasis is on maintaining the concept, the essence of which carries univeral approval as embodied in the relevant decisions taken by the first special session on disarmament.

In its operative paragraphs, draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.18 reaffirms once again its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon; free zone in South Asia and urges the States of the region, and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested, to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. It also calls upon those nuclear-weapon States which have not done so to respond to the proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts for the realization of this goal.

Lastly, my delegation expresses the hope that this draft resolution will receive the full support of this Committee, reflecting the endorsement of the international community of the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, which is in conformity with the goal of nuclear disarmament and of the reduction of the menace of nuclear weapons in every possible manner.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): On behalf of the delegations of Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam and Hungary, I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.20 concerning the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The sponsors of the draft resolution attach great importance to strengthening the system of political and international legal guarantees for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The idea of concluding an international agreement on this issue is, in the opinion of the sponsors, one of the possible actions to serve this goal. Such an action would be in full accordance with the interests of a large group of non-nuclear weapon States which in recent years have advocated that nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from foreign territories and that the stationing of such weapons on territories where they are not found at present should be prevented.

The conclusion of an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would considerably strengthen the non-proliferation régime, could contribute to reducing the danger of nuclear war and the nuclear arms race and could enhance the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Such an undertaking would make an important contribution to increasing confidence and to strengthening international peace and security. Recent decisions to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present and to deploy more nuclear weapons on the territories where there are already such weapons have, in the opinion of the spensors, increased the importance and timeliness of this question.

It was against this background that in 1978 the General Assembly adopted resolution 33/91 F, which calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present and calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have such weapons on their territory to refrain from any steps which would result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories. In 1979 the General Assembly adopted resolution 34/87 C, which calls upon all States to examine the possibility of concluding an international agreement on this question. The opinions on that subject of a significant number of States contained in the relevant report of the Secretary General in document A/35/145, clearly demonstrated the necessity and possibility of such an agreement and the wish to take practical steps to

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

prevent the further stationing of nuclear weapons. Last year, the General Assembly adopted resolution 35/156 C, which requested the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons.

As the report of the Committee on Disarmament shows, the Committee was unable to deal with this question in an appropriate manner, not to mention the elaboration of such an international agreement. In the light of this situation and taking into account the increased danger of deploying nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present and of deploying more and more sophisticated nuclear weapons on territories where there are already such weapons, the sponsors consider it necessary to continue the efforts aimed at the elaboration and conclusion of an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons.

The draft resolution which I have the honour to introduce is a short and clear one. In its preambular part, it expresses the awareness that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind. It recalls General Assembly resolutions 33/91 F and 35/156 C, in which the Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons. It notes with regret that this appeal of the General Assembly remains unheeded. It also considers that the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would constitute a step towards the larger objective of the subsequent complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other States, thus contributing to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and leading eventually to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Lastly, it bears in mind the expressed intention of many States to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories and expresses alarm concerning the plans and practical steps leading to a build-up of nuclear-weapon arsenals on the territories of other States.

(Ir. Komives, Hungary)

Operative paragraph 1 requests once again the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks aimed at elaborating an international agreement on non-stationing of nuclear weapons. Operative paragraph 2 calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further action involving the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of other States. This paragraph contains a two-fold appeal to nuclear-weapon States: first, not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present and, secondly, not to deploymore nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are already such weapons. Operative paragraphs 3 and 4 are self-explanatory.

Lastly, operative paragraph 5 decides to include this item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope of the sponsors that this draft resolution will receive favourable consideration in our Committee and will command the widest possible support.

Mr. SUJA (Czechoslovakia): On behalf of a group of 25 sponsors, namely the delegations of Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Micaragua, Poland, Syrian Arab Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Viet Nam, Yemen and my own country, I have today the honour of introducing a draft resolution devoted to the question of international co-operation for disarmament. The draft resolution is contained in document A/C.1/36/L.12, submitted under agenda item 51.

The title of this draft resolution is self-explanatory. Its principal purpose is to encourage the development of constructive co-operation among States aimed at the implementation of the objectives of disarmament, especially those that were set forth by the United Nations at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, but also those on which the international community may agree in the future. The draft resolution

proceeds from the conviction that mutual co-operation among States based on firm and clear principles is one of the indispensable prerequisites for progress in the field of disarmament in general, as well as in each individual case of disarmament negotiations. We believe that such co-operation must reflect the political will of all the participants in the talks to find a generally acceptable, constructive and practical solution of the problem under discussion. In the view of the sponsors, the timeliness of this question increases in proportion to the obstacles arising in the course of disarmament talks and to the need at such a time for more concerted efforts to overcome such obstacles.

As for the content, the draft resolution is based entirely on the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the basis of a proposal by Czechoslovakia and other countries in 1979. In drafting the text, the sponsors showed maximum flexibility and took full account of the opinions and comments advanced by a number of delegations.

The draft contains a total of seven preambular and five operative paragraphs. The preambular part of the draft resolution emphasizes, in the first place, in its first and second paragraphs, the close interrelation between efforts aimed at the implementation of the tasks set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the necessity of strengthening effective, constructive and continuing co-operation among all States in the pursuit of that objective. In further preambular provisions, the draft resolution expresses concern over the growing danger of a nuclear var catastrophe, stresses the importance of progress in disarmament for the solution of questions of economic and social development, especially of the developing countries, and underscores the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in supporting and developing international co-operation aimed at the solution of disarmament problems, which follows from its over-all responsibility in the field of disarmament.

The final preambular paragraphs recall the importance of the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament and its positive role in concerting efforts for the solution of the goals set forth in the Final Document of the first special session. We hold the view that international co-operation in the implementation of the Final Document calls for a comprehensive approach to the agreed priorities. It is in this light that we judge also the particular significance of the strengthening of the system of international security in keeping with the United Nations Charter as an indispensable prerequisite for progress in the field of disarmament.

Operative paragraph 1 contains an appeal to all States to observe principles and make active use of ideas embodied in the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament, with special emphasis on the need for nuclear disarmament.

Paragraph 2 calls for all disarmament negotiations to be conducted on the basis of generally recognized principles of international law and, at the same time, appeals to States actively to submit their own disarmament proposals and initiatives and constructively consider those submitted. It is understandable that observance of these principles would in many respects facilitate disarmament negotiations and contribute to the achievement of tangible results in this field.

Paragraph 3 stresses another, today particularly timely, desideratum: that States should refrain from actions jeopardizing or rendering impossible disarmament negotiations and should not bind those negotiations to the solution of unrelated issues.

Paragraph 4 contains the recommendation to make active use of the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament in the preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. The inclusion of this paragraph is, in our view, well founded by virtue of the fact that the need for, and the significance of, the observance of the principles of co-operation at the second special session on disarmament and in the subsequent implementation of its decisions will be as great as they were at the first session.

The last paragraph, 5, expresses the recommendation that States should disseminate the ideas of international co-operation in the field of disarmament also within the framework of actions in connexion with Disarmament Week.

The text of the draft resolution is, in our view, fully in keeping with current needs and possibilities and reflects realistic prerequisites for an improvement of the situation in disarmament negotiations and with the desire that these negotiations be speeded up.

In conclusion, I should like to express the conviction that this draft will meet with the approval both of this Committee and of the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia): On behalf of a group of sponsors consisting of Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba Fgypt, Fthiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Zairo and Yugoslavia, I have the honour to introdute draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.19, concerning the report of the Committee on Disarmament.

In the present system of international negotiations on disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament has a particularly important place. As the single multilateral negotiating body, it was charged with the duty to negotiate the most important issues of disarmament, and therefore it is expected directly to contribute, in the form of concrete results, to the implementation of recommendations and decisions unanimously adopted at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. For that reason, the work of the Committee on Disarmament commands the particular attention of all members of the international community, and its report to the General Assembly of the United Nations is of the greatest interest to all.

This year's report of the Committee, the third in succession, reconfirms some tendencies and characteristics already noticed in the work of this exceptionally significant negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

On the one hand, the report testifies to the fact that the Committee worked intensively and that ad hoc working groups strove to achieve progress in the consideration of the issues they were charged with. On the other hand, however, the report offers evidence that again this year the Committee was not able to achieve concrete results in negotiations on disarmament issues on its agenda. The fact that the Committee was again prevented from beginning substantive negotiations on those disarmament problems which were

(Hr. Djohic, Yugoslavia)

given the highest priority by the international community gives cause for the greatest concern.

At the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we agreed that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war, and that the ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We agreed further that while disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, and that those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals bear a special responsibility. Proceeding from those positions, we agreed to place nuclear disarmament at the top of the list of priorities and that the achievement of nuclear disarmament would require urgent negotiations.

Today, three and a half years after the first special session, it is evident that the Committee on Disarmament has not yet begun negotiations on the questions concerning the halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the reason being the resistance of some of its members, among them some nuclear-weapon States, to negotiate on these issues in the Committee, contrary to the desire of the overwhelming majority. They are against the establishment of an ad hoc working group for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, thus preventing the Committee from fulfilling one of its most important negotiating tasks.

The report, recrettably, shows that a similar situation exists in regard to negotiations on the comprehensive test ban treaty, which constitutes a very significant aspect of endeavours to halt the nuclear arms race. As in the former case, the same nuclear-weapon States, members of the Committee, have refused all concrete proposals to set up an <u>ad hoc</u> working group for negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty and thus practically blocked all substantive work of the Committee in the consideration and elaboration of that treaty.

The sponsors of this draft resolution attach great significance to the Committee on Disarmament and, for that very reason, in elaborating their draft they were guided by the desire to support its work and to enable it to become an effective body of international negotiations on disarmament issues.

In the preambulatory part of the draft, it is affirmed, inter alia, that:

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

... the establishment of <u>ad hoc</u> working groups offers the best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and contributes to the strengthening of the negotiating role of the Committee on Disarmament."

At the same time, regret is expressed that:

"despite the expressed wish of the great majority of members of the Committee on Disarmament the establishment of <u>ad hoc</u> working groups to undertake multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests was prevented during the 1981 session of the Committee."

Furthermore, deep concern is expressed that:

"the Committee on Disarmament has not thus far been able to achieve concrete results on disarmament issues which have been under consideration for a number of years."

Moreover, the conviction is expressed:

"that the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament and on the implementation of the Programme of Action" adopted at "the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament."

In the final paragraph of the introductory part, it is stressed:

"that negotiations on specific disarmament issues conducted outside the Committee on Disarmament should in no way serve as a pretext for preventing the conduct of multilateral negotiations on such questions in the Committee." In the operative part of the draft, the Committee on Disarmament is urged: "to continue or undertake, during its 1982 session, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the other relevant resolutions of the Assembly."

In order to reach that goal, the draft stresses that the Committee should:

"provide the existing <u>ad hoc</u> working groups with appropriate negotiating mandates and establish, as a matter of urgency, <u>ad hoc</u> working groups on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests."

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

Bearing in mind the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the assignments of the Committee in that regard, it is further requested from the Committee, in the operative part of the draft:

"to complete, during the first part of its session in 1982, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament."

In addition, the Committee is also requested to:

"intensify its negotiations on priority questions of disarmament, so that it may be in a position to contribute, through concrete accomplishments, to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament."

At the same time it:

"invites the members of the Committee on Disarmament involved in separate negotiations in specific priority questions of disarmament to intensify their efforts to achieve a positive conclusion of those negotiations without further delay for submission to the Committee and, at the same time, to submit to the Committee a full report on their separate negotiations and the results achieved in order to contribute most directly to the negotiations in the Committee ..."

In the last two operative paragraphs, it is requested that the Committee on Disarmament should:

"submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament a special report on the state of negotiations on various questions under consideration ... as well as a report on its work to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session"

and

"to include in the provisional agenda of the thirty-seventh session the item entitled: "Report of the Committee on Disarmament".

Finally, I should like to express the conviction of the sponsors that the proposed resolution will receive the broad support of the members of the First Committee and of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): It is a privilege for me, on behalf of the delegations of Angola, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Hongolia, Nicaragua, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and my own country, to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.10 under agenda item 53, entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

The problem of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States has for the last three years been one of the most important disarmament issues. The present tense and complicated international situation has given new meaning to this problem and has made it even more urgent to find political and legal arrangements designed to strengthen in the most effective way the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Our interest in the solution of this problem is based, first of all, on its considerable potential as a factor for strengthening the political and legal foundations for the observance of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations. The importance of this issue derives also from its being a substantial aspect of the more general problem of averting nuclear proliferation and reducing the danger of nuclear war the consequences of which could not be predictably confined to the immediate parties to the conflict. It is our firm conviction that non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced the nuclear option and have no nuclear weapons on their territories have the moral right to seek and to obtain effective guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The possibilities for making headway in that direction are many, as is evident from the report of the Committee on Disarmament on its 1981 session. The continuation of deliberations on this issue for the third consecutive year in the Committee has reinforced our conviction that nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of all types of nuclear weapons would be the most effective and credible security guarantees to assure non-nuclear-weapon and all other States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

In order to set in motion the process which should bring that about, the socialist States, together with the non-aligned countries, have called for the immediate initiation of negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the whole complex and of questions related to curbing the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Pending the attainment of that objective, banning the use of nuclear weapons concurrently with the renunciation of the use of force in international relations would no doubt be a radical solution to the problem of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. A major step in that direction would be also the acceptance at the present session of the Soviet Union proposal that the General Assembly adopt a declaration solemnly proclaiming that the States and statesmen first to use nuclear weapons would commit the gravest crime against humanity.

Last year's deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament, and its

Ad Hoc Vorking Group on Security Guarantees have reaffirmed the idea of
establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as an effective means of assuring
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The primary importance of the efforts aimed at strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States and reaching an agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present has been emphasized also during the deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament. There is hardly anyone who is unaware that the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present would considerably impede the definitive settlement of the over-all problems of security guarantees. Moreover, such a step would obviously pose an additional threat to the security not only of nuclear-weapon States but of many non-nuclear-weapon States as well. The implementation of the well-known plans for the further deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are already such weapons would without a doubt have the same effect.

The report of the Committee on Disarmament proves that the search for a common approach to the problem of security guarantees has been an important part of this year's session. We note with satisfaction that in the Committee

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

on Disarmament there was once again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention on this subject - a fact which is duly reflected in operative paragraph 2 of our draft resolution which is before the Committee. In this respect, we believe that existing difficulties can be overcome in the process of negotiations in the Committee; that is why in operative paragraph 3 the draft resolution requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations.

The sponsors of the draft resolution, while resolutely calling in operative paragraph 4 for the elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on this matter, are at the same time ready to give consideration to other parallel or interim arrangements designed to bring about the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and to contribute to the efforts for the conclusion of a convention.

In operative paragraph 5 the draft resolution calls once again upon all nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories. It also contains a recommendation that the Security Council examine those declarations with a view to adopting an appropriate resolution approving them.

The speedy implementation of those recommendations by the nuclear-weapon States, as called for by the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, would undoubtedly contribute to the positive development of the issue of the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States as a first step towards the conclusion of an international convention on this matter. We believe that the Committee on Disarmament should take due account of those recommendations with a view to achieving the long-awaited progress which is so urgently needed on the eve of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be convened next spring.

In conclusion, I should like to voice the confidence of the sponsors of the draft resolution that its adoption will undoubtedly contribute to the further intensification of efforts aimed at providing effective means for strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States in the interest of international peace and security.

Mr. VO ANH TUAN (Viet Nam) (interpretation from French): My delegation will have occasion to express its views on the draft resolutions to be presented to this Committee on the question of chemical and biological weapons. For the present, recent statements made by the representative of the United States in this connexion prompt me to make the following comments.

On Thursday last, he stated that the Soviet Union and its allies had used chemical weapons in recent years in Kampuchea, Laos and Afghanistan. That statement, which can only be described as a tissue of lies, follows on a number of other slanderous allegations made by senior officials in the United States Department of State, from the Secretary of State himself down to the Director of Political and Military Affairs. In the meantime, the Permanent Representative of the United States and representative of the criminal genocidal clique have rained down upon the General Assembly a plethora of notes about what they call "new important information", "irrefutable evidence" and so on concerning systematic use of chemical weapons in Kampuchea. The United States press has gone on to speak of imaginary "orange-coloured" rain, the "rain of terror" and so on.

This is essentially an hysterical campaign that has been carefully orchestrated by the new United States administration in order to slander the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, including Viet Nam, and to mask the new and extremely dangerous stage that has been reached in its arms race, in particular in the field of chemical and biological weapons.

In this connexion, in its edition of 12 October 1981, <u>Intercontinental</u> Press wrote as follows:

"The public accusations of Mr. Haig against the Soviet Union do not square with a serious consideration of the facts. However, Mr. Haig is not really looking for scientific truth. He is trying to win support for the immense arms programmes of Washington, including the considerable increases in the chemical and biological warfare programmes ... Mr. Haig's attack is also part and parcel of a double-edged strategy: to isolate Viet Nam in South East Asia and to distract the attention of public opinion in Western Europe from Washington's decision to manufacture the neutron bomb."*

^{*} English text as interpreted from French.

If, from hindsight, we take a look at the history of the last four decades, it will be seen quite clearly that, while seeking nuclear superiority in order to guarantee its world hegemony, the United States developed an extremely varied and highly sophisticated panoply of biological and chemical weapons and has carried out a number of tests with a view to their potential use. So that it could act freely, the United States refused to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 until it was defeated in Viet Nam.

In its 31 October edition, the Washinton Post wrote:

During World Mar II, the Japanese experimentally killed about 3,000 humans, including American prisoners of war, with biological weapons and the U.S. military establishment made a secret arrangement with the Japanese to hide the experiments, according to an article in the current issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

"The Americans entered into the agreement, which included arguments in favour of immunity from war crimes prosecution to the responsible officers, so that America could make use of the results from the gruesome tests, the article's author says." (The Vashington Post, October 31, 1981, p. A3)

Since the Second World War, in the development of its military arsenal the United States has been attaching growing importance to the production of biological and chemical weapons, to which it has devoted human, material and financial resources on an enormous scale. It has carried out barbaric experiments on the peoples of a number of countries of the world in order further to perfect these weapons of mass destruction.

A report on biological warfare that was presented in 1969 to the Committee on Labour and Welfare of the United States Senate emphasized that the effectiveness of biological attacks on a broad scale against unprotected populations would be comparable to that of nuclear weapons. That is why the United States launched a biological war against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1952 and planned to use the Aedes Aegypti mosquito to spread yellow fever in the Soviet Union, in 1956, and quite recently resorted to the use of biological weapons against the people of Cuba, causing five serious epidemics, including haemorrhagic dengue, which resulted in the death of 156 persons, most of them children.

In speaking of chemical and biological weapons, the human conscience continues to be revolted and alarmed by the systematic, prolonged, large-scale utilization of these types of weapons against the peoples of Viet Nam and of other countries of Indo-China by the United States. The world's scientists have unanimously stated that this involves a kind of chemical and biological warfare hitherto unknown in the history of mankind. The International Conference of Scientists held in Orsay, France, in December 1970 condemned this war of aggression in the following terms:

There can be no doubt that the American armed forces are using Viet Mam as a laboratory for chemical warfare so that they can carry out experiments that are most effective because they are directed against a mainly agricultural population. The extent of the loss of human life and natural devastation is such that it can be concluded that this is a genocidal war accompanied by biocide" - *

that is, the mass annihilation of human beings and of all forms of life.

The American botanist Professor, Arthur Westing, having in 1969 visited the rubber plantations of Kampuchea, which had been affected by so-called American 'defoliants', stated that the herbicides had been used as chemical and biological weapons. He said:

These weapons have fantastic destructive power, certainly superior to nuclear weapons. Their long-term effects on the ecological balance are completely unknown and therefore all the more disturbing."*

As to the spraying of toxic chemical products by the United States in Viet Nam, the scientists of the world have considered it an ecocidal war. An American expert has estimated that the quantity of dioxin contained in the 100,000 tons of toxic chemical weapons spread in Viet Nam between 1960 and 1971 amounted to 145 kilogrammes. Dioxin is a highly toxic substance, and it lingers in the natural environment for a very long time, causes defoliation of trees, renders agricultural land barren for decades and modifies a country's environment, producing floods and droughts. According to Professor Westing,

^{*} English text as interpreted from French.

if only 90 grammes of dioxin were to be dissolved in the drinking-water of the city of New York the lives of 9 million inhabitants would be endangered. It is quite obvious that it was, in fact, the intention of the Washington leaders to exterminate Viet Nam and its entire people, together with its environment, through mass utilization of such chemical weapons.

Those are specific facts, monstrous crimes that have been committed by successive Governments of the United States against the peoples of Viet Nam, Kampuchea and Laos. It is ironic and disgusting to see the Washington leaders, who waged the most atrocious war of aggression in modern history against those three peoples, violating all the laws and customs of war, now shedding crocodile tears and trying to pose as incidental defenders of the people of Indo-China. Does the United States believe that that will cause their crimes to be forgotten and that it will be able to evade its responsibility before history?

The few rare pieces of fabricated proof, hastily assembled, are completely devoid of any scientific honesty and can convince no thinking person. Indeed, the scientific circles of a number of countries, including the United States, have been sceptical about the alleged "important information" provided by the Department of State.

Professor Mathew Meselson, biologist and expert in chemical warfare at Harvard University, considered it "outrageous" to ask people to believe a report based on a single sample. Professor Meselson went on to state that the three toxic substances - nivalenol, dioxynivalenol and T2 - which were referred to by Mr. Alexander Haig, could be generated from the most commonly found mushrooms in the world, whether in the temperate or the tropical zone. That is stated in The Oregonian of 23 September 1981. The British professor, John Smith, of Strathclyde University, shares Professor Meselson's view. He states that the Fusarium fungi mushroom, from which these three toxins may derive grows all over the world. That is stated in the New Scientist of 17 September 1981. According to NBC's science correspondent, Mr. Robert Bazel, scientists have stated that this mushroom can be found growing even in the garden of the Department of State - television broadcast of 25 September 1981.

Professor Ton That Tung, a Vietnamese scientist well-known in Western scientific circles, including the United States, for his research into the consequences of United States chemical warfare in Viet Nam and other Indo-Chinese countries, wondered about the ill-considered manner in which the Department of State concluded that there had been chemical warfare solely on the basis of a few hastily assembled samples of myco-toxins, while failing to answer a number of fundamental scientific questions. No precise information was given on where these products were found or proof that these toxins did not exist in nature, on the way in which they were dispersed, the influence observed on the environment or the way in which the samples were collected. Professor Tom That Tung concluded:

"The United States is not morally qualified to raise the question of chemical warfare at the United Nations." (A/C.1/36/5, p. 2)
He added:

"It is easy to slander but difficult to prove." (Ibid.)

In view of the unanimous negative reaction of international public opinion with regard to the tendentious statements made by the head of United States diplomacy and the imaginary evidence adduced regarding the utilization of chemical weapons by Viet Nam in Kampuchea, Washington is now gambling on the results of the investigation of the United Nations Group of Experts. Without wishing to make any value judgement regarding the objectivity and impartiality of the experts from various countries, who engaged in investigation on the territory of Thailand, my delegation opposed the establishment of that group, because we felt it was part of the United States manoeuvres designed to involve the United Nations in its hysterical anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese campaign, thus impairing the very prestige of this world-wide Organization. Whatever ploys and pressure are used by the United States, it will never be able to pull the wool over the eyes of men of conscience and make them believe something that does not in fact exist.

Nor can its campaigns to denigrate its enemies discredit the reputation of our people's armed forces, which, because of their revolutionary nature, scrupulously respect the laws and customs of war, and observe an extremely humanitarian policy towards the enemy. The people of Viet Nam, which has suffered from sophisticated United States chemical weapons, is resolved to work with other peace-loving forces throughout the world to ensure that these arms are prohibited once and for all, and as soon as possible.

If the United States were really aware of the terrible suffering caused to human beings by chemical weapons, as the United States representative stated on 13 November, it should put an end to its propaganda campaign, stop the manufacture of chemical weapons including binary weapons, agree to the resumption of bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on chemical weapons and

put an end to its obstructionist attitude in the negotiations for the drafting of a convention on the prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Mr. KOR (Democratic Kampuchea) (interpretation from French):
Mr. Chairman, in exercise of the right of reply, my delegation would like
to inform you and the rembers of the Committee that at the very moment when
their representative is uttering calumnies and lies here, the Vietnamese
expansionists are expanding their chemical warfare in Kampuchea on an
increasing scale. My delegation will be making a statement tomorrow
morning to report to the members of the Committee the details of the unbridled
intensification of the use of Soviet chemical weapons in Kampuchea by the
Vietnamese invaders.

Permit me to say only that the lies and slanders of the representatives of Viet Nam cannot cover up its dirty crimes in Kampuchea. These three years of war of aggression, devastation and genocide waged by the Hanoi authorities against the people of Kampuchea amply show what the words of the representatives of those authorities are truly worth.

The CHAIRMAN: We set the deadline of 1 p.m. today for the submission of draft resolutions, but we exempted from this provision the submission of draft resolutions on items for which reports are outstanding, that is, have not yet been distributed. As members of the Committee may wish to have information on the status of those outstanding reports, I shall ask the Secretary of the Committee to inform the Committee about it.

Mr. RATHORE (Secretary of the Committee): With regard to item 42, the Group of Experts is making a maximum effort to complete the report, after returning from its field trip, for consideration by the First Committee. As of now it is expected that the report may be completed by 20 November and then sent for processing to Documents Control.

(Mr. Rathore, Secretary of the Committee)

With regard to item 55 (f), concerning the report on the relationship between disarmament and international security, the report was completed and it is hoped it will be issued before the end of this week.

With regard to item 49, concerning the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, that Committee is expected to meet today and may come to an agreement on the final version of the report, and it is hoped that it will be issued before the end of this week.

With regard to item 51 (c), concerning the report of the Secretary-General on the programme of research and studies on disarmament, the report is now available as document A/36/654.

That is the status of the outstanding reports of the First Committee.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.